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HUBERT HOWE BANCROFT.

VOLUME XIII.

HISTORY OF MEXICO.

VOL. V. 1824-1861.

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LIBERTY, equality, fraternity: these words fall pleasantly on ears accustomed for three centuries only to the grinding of the chains of tyranny. But even now all is not sunshine; and what light there is dazzles rather than cheers. Many years must yet elapse before the full benefits of the long and bloody struggle for independence will be fully felt. But the more immediate infelicities, whence do they arise?

After this manner. There is set in motion among men caring more for themselves than for their country the wheel of retribution, which scarcely stops turning for half a century. Somewhat as Iturbide had dethroned the viceroy Apodaca, Santa Anna and others had dethroned Iturbide. Made governor in Vera Cruz, Santa Anna revolted, and detached that

place from the emperor's control. Echávarri, the trusted friend, proclaimed the plan of Casa Mata at the head of the troops given him to put down Santa Anna. Other military officers enjoying Iturbide's confidence were equally perfidious. But the chief trouble was the faithlessness of his army. Iturbide had himself set a bad example to his troops. It was a pernicious lesson to teach soldiers; and unfortunately for Mexico's future, it was too well learned. Thenceforth all pretensions, whether personal or otherwise, found a ready support in that large and demoralized element of the army which had no respect for public opinion, personal rights, or any interest in the national welfare, and was always willing to fight for those who paid best, either in money or some species of personal advancement.

The national congress, as heretofore narrated, having been reinstalled on the 29th of March, 1823,¹ decreed on the 31st the cessation of the powers conferred on the executive created on the 19th of May, 1822, appointing in its place a triumvirate, consisting of generals Nicolás Bravo, Guadalupe Victoria, and Pedro Celestino Negrete. This selection of military men exclusively established a bad precedent. The next day Mariano Michelena and Miguel Domínguez were chosen substitutes to discharge the duties of the regular triumviri in the event of absence, or inability to act from death or any other cause.²

The executive authority, now held by Bravo, Negrete, and Michelena in Victoria's absence, at once entered upon its duties. One of its first acts was the construction of a cabinet: Lucas Alaman, minister of foreign and interior relations; Pablo de la Llave, of

¹ *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 135-51; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 744-6, 759-60, 766-7; *Gaz. de Mex.*, i., 1823, 171-4; *Dispos. Var.*, iii. 122; *Mex. Col. Dec. Sob. Cong. Mex.*, 92-3.

² *Mex. Col. Leyes, Órd. y Dec.*, ii. 89-91, 118; *Mex. Col. Dec. Sob. Cong. Mex.*, 93-4; *Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide*, 149-50, 158; *Id.*, *Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 163-4; *Ward's Mex.*, i. 281.

justice and ecclesiastical affairs; Francisco de Arrillaga, of the treasury; and José Ignacio García Illueca, of war and the navy; but this last department, on the death of the incumbent, July 12, 1823, was given to Brigadier José Joaquín de Herrera.³

The whole system of administration was soon changed: the capitanías generales instituted by Iturbide were reduced to mere comandancias in each province.⁴ The congress and government devoted their energies to repair the evils inflicted on the country during the last days of the empire. Political prisoners were liberated; the appointments for members of a supreme court were made null;⁵ the council of state was suppressed. Every mark or badge of the late empire was done away with, it being taken for granted that the future form of government would be republican. The issue of paper money was discontinued,⁶ and other important commercial and financial measures were enacted. To provide resources for the current expenses and for other urgent obligations was a matter of paramount necessity.⁷ Orders were accordingly issued for the immediate sale at lower than regular rates of all tobacco and cigars in the govern-

³The four portfolios had been for a time in charge of Illueca; that of relations to the 15th of April; that of the treasury till the 30th of April; and that of justice till the 6th of June. *Mex. Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1027; *Alaman, Apuntes Biog.*, 19, 21-2; *Ramírez y Sesma, Col. Dec.*, 307; *Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide*, 150.

⁴That of Mexico was left in charge of the Marqués de Vivanco, detached from the civil government; Echávarri went back to that of Puebla; Victoria retained that of Vera Cruz, but having gone to Jalapa together with the Spanish commissioners, left the command with Colonel Eulogio de Villa Urrutia; Anastasio Bustamante resigned his position in the provincias internas, the eastern portion of which was again detached from the western, and its command given to Brigadier Felipe de la Garza. Bustamante became comandante general of Guadalajara, his native place. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 700.

⁵*Mex. Col. Leyes, Órd. y Dec.*, ii. 115; *Mex. Col. Dec. Sob. Cong. Mex.*, 95, 134, 147-8.

⁶This measure was decreed by the junta instituyente at the latter part of 1822. It was ordered that notes to the amount of \$4,000,000 should be manufactured. From Jan. 1, 1823, one third of all public salaries was to be paid in this money, which was also made a legal tender, in the same proportion, in all commercial and retail transactions for amounts over three dollars. This currency was, however, received with disfavor. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 632-3.

⁷On the day the provisional government was installed there were only \$42 in the treasury. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 811.

ment warehouses, and for the disposal of the temporalities of the Jesuits, and of the property of the hospitallers and inquisition. Money was borrowed from an English house, which was repaid later out of the proceeds of a loan of \$16,000,000 negotiated in London. The government likewise, as a matter of policy, effected a second loan of an equal amount from the house of Barclay and Company in England, believing that the British government, for the protection of these interests, would have to recognize and uphold Mexican independence. The terms of the loans were indeed burdensome, a large part of the second being received in military supplies, such as armament, ships, and clothing, at exorbitant prices. However, the ships proved useful, for with them two years afterward was captured San Juan de Ulúa from the Spaniards. With the specie received the government met its most pressing obligations, such as paying for the Manila conducta, and for the one which had been seized at Perote, and cancelling a number of forced loans.

Another measure of the congress, enacted on the 14th of April, 1823, was the establishment of the national coat of arms and flag. The former represented an eagle perched on a nopal growing on a rock rising from the waters of the lake; in his right claw he holds a snake, and is in the attitude of tearing it to pieces with his beak. The flag consists of three vertical bars, respectively green, white, and red, the first color being next to the flag-staff. These colors are symbolical of the three guaranties of the plan of Iguala. White denotes the purity of the Roman catholic religion; the green, independence; and red, the union of the Spanish element with the Mexican nation. The bars were originally horizontal, but were changed to vertical by the first congress.⁸

I will now review the political condition of the country. The victorious republicans soon divided

⁸ *Ricera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii, 145; *Mex. Col. Leyes, Ord. y Dec.*, ii, 94.

themselves into two distinct parties, namely, federalists and centralists. The former, as their name denotes, preferred a federal system of government, and to them the partisans of Iturbide attached themselves in order to be revenged on the men that overthrew him. This party had an organ in the press called at first the *Archivista*, but which later assumed the name of *El Aguila Mexicana*, and being edited under the influence of Juan Gomez Navarrete, Iturbide's attorney, and printed on his premises, added strength to the Iturbidists. The centralist party was formed of the masons of the Scottish rite, and the old monarchists, from whom it unjustly obtained the nickname of Bourbonists. To this party belonged the existing government and congress. Its press organ, *El Sol*, was ably supported by Santa María, the Colombian minister, who was honorably reinstated in his official position from which he had been dismissed by Iturbide's government. His writings were widely read, and appeared under the pseudonyme of Capitan Chinchilla. In some issues, with no small wit, he would criticise the occurrences of the day; in others he would censure with great bitterness the errors of the opposing party, or ridicule them as mercilessly as he had the ceremonials of the imperial court.

The government had, however, most to fear from the exaggerated pretensions of the provincial juntas. These from the first kept the country in agitation; but timely rebuke put them down.

Commissioners from Oajaca, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí, Valladolid, and Guanajuato demanded a new congress.⁹ The minister of relations laid before the chamber the information that in Monterey a junta of delegates had been organized, representing Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, Coahuila, and Texas, which desired

⁹ This was on April 4th. *Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide*, 159-60. Bustamante, a member of the congress, and a centralist, calls those men demagogues wanting a legislature subservient to their will, as their schemes could find no favor with the one then sitting.

a federal union with the province of Mexico.¹⁰ A few days later news reached the capital that the governor of Texas had proclaimed the empire, and had been joined by several savage tribes. The bishop of Sonora refused his support to the plan of Casa Mata. This was of little consequence; but affairs in Guadalajara were assuming a serious aspect. The clergy was ridiculed in *El Pensador Mexicano*, a popular journal, and manifestations of disloyalty and disobedience to the government were daily occurring.

The diputacion and people of that city, seconded later by other provincial capitals, demanded the convocation of a congress to establish the federal system with a suitable constitution. On the 12th of May resolutions were passed in that city to suspend the enforcement of decrees and orders issued by the executive or congress until the popular demand was complied with. The chief authority within the province was then vested in the diputacion provincial, strengthened with the members of the ayuntamiento of Guadalajara.¹¹

The congress, in its anxiety to allay the agitation, increased the powers of the provincial deputations in the nomination of public officers within the respective provinces, giving them also supervision over the administration of their revenue, and at the same time declared its willingness to accept the desired federal system. But these concessions did not satisfy the demands, and it finally became necessary to convoke a constituent congress to assemble in Mexico on the 31st of October. The decree was issued on the 21st of May,¹² and the rules for the elections appeared on the 17th of June.

¹⁰ The matter was submitted April 21st. *Id.*, *Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 177.

¹¹ Other provinces were urged to pursue the same course. *Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide*, 162-3, 172-4; *Id.*, *Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 175-7, 180-9; *Mez. Dictamen de la Com.*, 1-22; *Yuc. Represent.*, 3-5; *Baqueiro, Ens. Yuc.*, iii. ap. 4-8; *Suarez, Informe*, 5-6; *La Minerva*, 1845, May 15, 1.

¹² The ratio for the election was one deputy for every 50,000 inhabitants, every freeman of eighteen years and upwards being a voter without other restriction. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, 760-3, 771-2; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*,

In several provinces revolutionary movements against the government had been promoted, not only by those who in good faith desired the establishment of the federal régime, but in some of them by Iturbidists who hoped to secure, in the midst of the turmoil, the restoration of the empire. Guadalajara and San Luis Potosí presented the most formidable opposition. In the latter province Santa Anna with his troops¹³ had established a protectorate to be maintained until the federation of states should be constituted; but the energetic resistance of the authorities, supported by General Armijo with the force placed under his command, soon compelled Santa Anna to abandon his plan, and report himself in Mexico to answer for his conduct.¹⁴ In Guadalajara the case was quite different; the cry for a federation was a mere pretext, the agitators' real aim being Iturbide's recall. The deputies from there had been instructed to demand that one person only should hold the executive authority, and that a strictly federal constitution should be framed. The authorities and people pretended a willingness to obey the government, but continued the opposition.¹⁵

The executive, therefore, resolved to check by force the insubordination of the Iturbidists, whose chiefs were generals Quintanar and Bustamante. Two thousand men under Bravo and Negrete marched to Guadalajara, and on approaching Nueva Galicia, Negrete in-

MS., viii. 193-7, 201-3; *Id.*, *Hist. Iturbide*, 174-80; *Ward's Mex.*, i. 231; *Mex. Col. Leyes, Órd. y Dec.*, ii. 121-35, 142-3, 148, 172-3, 180-1; *Disposic. Var.* iii. 118-23; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 50; *Lizardi, Advert.*, 1-8; *Yuc. Manifiesto del Cong. del Est.* 1-23.

¹³ After the declaration of the plan of Casa Mata, Santa Anna played no prominent part in subsequent events connected with the downfall of Iturbide. He remained in Vera Cruz when the army marched toward the capital, and soon afterward went to Tampico to promote the revolution in that region. He was later made comandante general of Yucatan.

¹⁴ His troops were transferred to Querétaro. *Santa Anna, Manif.*, 41-4; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 717, 728, 765-6, 781-2; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 34-5.

¹⁵ The province, being called on for a quota of troops to serve in Vera Cruz against the Spaniards on San Juan de Ulúa, refused to furnish it unless Bravo and Negrete were removed from office. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 208.

duced Colima with all its district to refuse further recognition of the authorities at Guadalajara, and the troops stationed there under Colonel Correa joined Bravo's force. This action led to the erection of Colima as a federal territory,¹⁶ and brought about temporarily the settlement of affairs in that quarter, an arrangement being made at Lagos between Bravo and Quintanar. The former then retired with his army to Guanajuato and established his headquarters at Celaya, his troops acting as a corps of observation to be ready for possible disturbances in the future.

The absence of Victoria in Vera Cruz, and of Bravo and Negrete in Nueva Galicia, had left the executive in charge of the substitutes Michelena and Dominguez, and necessitated the appointment of a third substitute, the choice by the congress falling on General Vicente Guerrero. The government was then practically in charge of Michelena.¹⁷

The congress in its deliberations enacted measures for the improvement of the country's industries, and for the reorganization of the army. The frequency of conspiracies in favor of the ex-emperor, as well as of robberies on the public highways, prompted the adoption of a law giving the cognizance of such cases to the military courts, and fixing a very short and peremptory term for the termination of each cause. This law was used afterward as a weapon in the warfare of parties. The government was also authorized, October 2d, to confine at convenient places persons of whose guilt there was a moral certainty, even though it had not been actually proved by process of law. This last measure was adopted in consequence of the alleged discovery of a plot that was to be carried into

¹⁶ The authorities of Guadalajara in the latter part of 1823 made an unsuccessful attempt to bring Colima again under their control. *Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide*, 189, 217, 237-43; *Id., Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., ii. 13; *Id., Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 179, 192-3, 215, 229-30; *Dispos. Var.*, iii. 55, 110; *Colima, Represent.*, 7; *Mex. Col. Leyes, Órd. y Dec.*, ii. 147-8, 159.

¹⁷ Dominguez was very aged. Guerrero, though possessed of much penetration and sound sense, was uneducated, and inexperienced in state affairs. The latter's appointment appears in *Mex. Col. Leyes, Órd. y Dec.*, ii. 141-2.

execution on the fourth of that month, and in which were implicated several officers and bodies of troops, whose chief, General Andrade, though a deputy, was arrested, and finally exiled to Guayaquil, where he died.¹⁸

Congress did not neglect to pay due honor to the original heroes of national independence. On the 19th of July a law was enacted recognizing the services rendered in the first eleven years of the war as good and meritorious. Its promoters and leaders¹⁹ were declared "beneméritos de la patria en grado heroico," and their names were ordered to be inscribed in letters of gold in the hall of sessions of the national congress. Monuments to the memory of those who had suffered for the cause were ordered to be raised on the sites where they were executed, and their remains, such as could be found, were exhumed and brought to Mexico, where funeral honors on a magnificent scale were paid them at the cathedral, several of the very men who had caused them to be shot being present at the ceremonies. Their bones were placed in an urn and deposited in the vault of the Altar de los Reyes, and the two silver keys of the urn delivered, one to the congress, and the other to the executive. The latter was placed in charge of the department of relations.²⁰ In the midst of these sol-

¹⁸ About 50 persons were arrested; among them, besides Andrade, generals José Velazquez and the conde de San Pedro del Alamo, 5 colonels, 7 captains, and about 11 subalterns; schoolmasters, and even barbers, were imprisoned for complicity. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 50; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, 772-4; *Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide*, 183-5.

¹⁹ Hidalgo, Allende, Juan Aldama, Abasolo, Morelos, Matamoros, Leonardo and Miguel Bravo, Hermenegildo Galeana, Jimenez, Mina, Moreno, and Rosales. A little later were added to the list Nicolás Bravo, Victoria, Guerrero, Joaquín Leño, and others. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 768, 771; *Mex. Col. Dec. Sob. Cong. Mex.*, 143, 175, 189.

²⁰ On one occasion when the national palace was captured by revolutionists, this key was stolen, together with the silver seals of treaties with foreign powers. The monuments ordered were not all erected; one was raised in Puebla where Miguel Bravo was shot, and one in Morelia on the site of Matamoros' death. Abasolo having died in Cádiz, his bones were not obtained; and those of Galeana and Leonardo Bravo were not found. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 769; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 202-3. A description of the funeral ceremonies may be found in the *Gaceta Extraordinaria* of September 20, 1823.

emn obsequies, the rabid haters of Spain and everything Spanish urged the Indians to fall upon Hernan Cortés' sepulchre, burn his bones, and throw the ashes to the winds. The disgraceful plan would have been accomplished had not the government averted it by causing the sepulchre to be opened in the night, and the remains to be deposited in a place of safety.

In the mean time the elections for the constituent congress were proceeding, and as was to be expected, the majority of the members chosen were federalists; there were also some centralists elected, equally hostile to Iturbide. The freemasons lost the preponderance they had in the preceding body, and the monarchists were wholly excluded, Fagoaga, Tagle, and others of their party not being reelected. Had it not been for subsequent mistakes on the part of the republicans, the royalist party would have been forever dead in Mexico.

The old congress, after adopting measures for paying the deputies, and appointing a permanent deputacion from its body, closed its sessions on the 30th of October, just one year from the date of its dissolution by Iturbide, thus ceasing to exist at the urgent demand of the very diputaciones provinciales that had revolted against Iturbide in order to force its reinstatement.

In the midst of so much agitation, the constituent congress was installed with great solemnity, and on the 7th of November, 1823, began its labors²¹ to place the country under the most liberal institutions, according to the express national will. The most influential man among the federalists was Miguel Ramos Arizpe, deputy from Coahuila; he was aided by Rejon, Velez, Gordoa, Gomez Farías, García, Godoy, and others. Among the centralists figured prominently

²¹ The proceedings of installation, list of members, etc., appear in *Mex. Col. Ley. Fund.*, 116; *Id.*, *Col. Leyes, Ord y Dec.*, iii. 1-2, 84-7; *Id.*, *Actas Cong. Constituc.*, 1-2; *Prov. Mex. Lista Ciudad elej.*, 1.

José L. Becerra and Servando T. de Mier, Cárlos M. Bustamante, Jimenez Mangino, Cabrera, Espinosa, Ibarra, and Paz.

The secretary of justice and ecclesiastical affairs, Pablo de la Llave, by order of the executive, moved on the 14th that the house should proceed at once to carry out the wishes of the people; and Ramos Arizpe, as president of the committee on constitution, promised to present within three days the draught of an organic law fulfilling that object, and which was to remain in force until a constitution could be framed and promulgated. Such is the history of the *acta constitutiva*,²² the draught of which was circulated to the authorities on the 22d of November, the discussion of it being formally begun on the 3d of December.

The main point to be determined was the system of government embodied in the fifth article,²³ yet in the face of the provincial demands, it was made the subject of a warm discussion. Several deputies spoke against the plan of federation, and Doctor Mier, deputy from Nuevo Leon, on the 13th of December, expatiated on the evils that a separation of the till then united provinces would bring upon the country. The proposed *acta constitutiva*, he said, was but a translated copy of the constitution of the United States of America, which he contended was entirely unsuited to Mexico. The federating of her provinces would be equivalent to separating them—a policy that must necessarily entail upon them the very evils that the Anglo-Americans of the north endeavored to avert with their federation.²⁴ It must be confessed

²² *Mex. Acta Constit.* (Mex. 1824), 1-12; *Mex. Col. Dec. Sob. Cong. Mex.*, 145-6.

²³ Though not lengthy, the future institutions of the country depended upon it. It was as follows: 'The nation adopts the republican, federal, popular, representative form of government.' *Mex. Col. Constituc.*, i. 2.

²⁴ He said that the United States had been separate provinces which federated to resist England's oppression. They suppressed the king's name from their constitution, and the instrument answered very well for their republic; whereas Mexico had as a whole suffered the yoke of an absolute monarch during 300 years. He therefore thought the difference between the two cases to be immense. *Mier, Profezia Polit.*, 3-28; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, Ms., viii. 200.

that Doctor Mier's prophecy became nearly realized, the threatened evils actually covering a long period of years. However, article five was adopted and solemnly proclaimed; and when the discussion was ended, and the acta adopted on the 31st of January, 1824,²⁵ both the executive and congress made known to the people the patriotic spirit that had presided at its formation, expressing hopes for the best results.

The adoption of the fifth article, so boisterously demanded, should have acted like oil upon troubled waters; but it did not. Revolutions followed one another with various intents, and arising from different causes. In the tierra caliente, and in Puebla, San Luis Potosí, Guadalajara, and Querétaro the government had to quell disturbances. The infamous mutilator of Spaniards, Vicente Gomez, el capador, was forced to sue for pardon, which was granted him on condition of his living in California.²⁶ General Echávarri, who had given signs of hostility to the government in Puebla, was removed by force, and Gomez Pedraza sent there to hold the civil and military authority.²⁷ Disorders in Cuernavaca and Cuautla obliged Guerrero to hasten thither in person. His presence sufficed to restore quiet in the south. The most serious trouble occurred in Mexico in the night of January 23, 1824. It was headed by General Lobato, and had for its pretext the same one advanced in Cuernavaca by Colonel Hernandez, namely, hostility to the Spaniards. The executive authority, now held by Michelena and Dominguez, found itself without other support than a small body of troops. The two triumviri repaired to the hall of congress and reported the alarming state of affairs. Santa Anna, who was then subject to prosecution for his acts at

²⁵ *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 776-7; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 227-31; *Id.*, *Hist. Iturbide*, 185-9, 199-230, 243, 270-7; *Mex. Col. Leyes, Órd. y Dec.*, iii. 18-24; *Actas del Cong. Constituy.* iv.; *Cong. Constituyente, Manifi.*, 1-16; *Mex. Col. Constituc.*, i. 1-15; *Mex. Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 76-7.

²⁶ More of him in *Hist. Cal.*, iii.; *Mex. Col. de Leyes, Órd. y Dec.*, iii. 53.

²⁷ General Guerrero's report to the secretary of war, from Puebla, Jan. 6, 1824, at 11 P. M., in *Gaceta Extraord. Gob. Sup. Mex.*, iii. Jan. 8th, 15-16.

San Luis Potosí, tendered his good offices as a mediator; but the congress energetically refused, at two o'clock in the morning of the 24th, to consider any representation of the rebels until they laid down their arms; and on the 26th stringently ordered all army officers that were not with the mutineers to hasten to the defence of the country and its constituted authorities. All officers failing to obey that order were declared traitors, and outlawed. The rebels, finding themselves unsupported and awed by the prestige of the authority vested in the executive and congress, and more so by their fear of Bravo, Guerrero, and Gomez Pedraza, who with their forces would soon be upon them, submitted to the government, with the exception only of the mounted grenadiers under Lieutenant-colonel Stáboli; but these were soon forced to surrender. Stáboli was tried and sentenced to suffer death; but the penalty was finally commuted to exile.²³ The revolution was thus repressed; Lobato accusing Michelena and Santa Anna²⁴ of being the chief promoters.

The acta constitutiva having been published on the 31st of January, 1824, congress summoned the regular members of the executive to the discharge of their functions, and Michelena was given leave to retire. General Bravo obeyed the summons in March, and the executive was then represented by him with Dominguez and Guerrero, as Negrete, who had also returned, resigned his position under the pretext of ill health.

Disturbances soon broke out afresh in Guadalajara. The authorities had not only refused to recognize General José Joaquin de Herrera as comandante general, but also exhibited a marked partiality for

²³ One of the reasons assigned was that his wife was a daughter of the sculptor Tolsa. Bustamante, *Hist. Iturbide*, 188-9; *Id.*, Cuad. Hist., MS., viii. 218-26; *Mex. Col. Leyes, Ord. y Dec.*, iii. 15-17; *Ataman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 778; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 51-72; *Zavala, Revol. Méx.*, i. 267-72; *Tornel, Breve Reseña Hist.*, 163-4; *Liceaga, Adic. y Rect.*, 617-18.

²⁴ Santa Anna was acquitted. His course in Vera Cruz was declared meritorious, the nation having adopted the federal régime.

the enemies of the government, and began to exercise powers not vested in them under the *acta constitutiva*. Indeed, they manifested generally a spirit of insubordination to the national authority, and gave encouragement to the Iturbidist party. The government, therefore, again sent Bravo and Negrete to that part of the republic, which now bore the name of Jalisco, with a strong division. Victoria having by this time returned to the capital, took the place of Bravo in the triumvirate. Bravo and Negrete entered Guadalajara June 11th, without meeting with resistance, having made a convention with Quintanar and Bustamante. Herrera was installed as *comandante general*. A relative of Iturbide, named Eduardo García, and Baron de Rossemberg, a German whom Iturbide had made a lieutenant-colonel, attempted resistance in Tepic, but Colonel Luis Correa defeated them, and García, Rossemberg, and some others were executed. Quintanar and Bustamante were sent to Acapulco for the purpose of being shipped to South America, but the order of banishment was not carried out,³⁰ and both were allowed to go unpunished.

These revolutionary movements placed the government and congress in so difficult a position that the extreme measure was contemplated of vesting the executive authority in a single member of the triumvirate, under the title of Supremo Director, with large though well defined powers. The executive, however, opposed the creation of this supreme magistrate, and circumstances being now changed, it became unnecessary. The termination of the attempted effort on behalf of Iturbide, followed shortly after by his death, gave the *coup de grace* to his party.³¹

After the Jalisco campaign General Bravo returned

³⁰ Bravo was falsely accused by Zavala, *Revol. Mex.*, i. 286-7, of bad faith; it is on record that every act of his was pursuant to orders from Mexico. All the occurrences in Guadalajara and Tepic appeared in the government *gaceta* for June and July. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 240-7, 262; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 787.

³¹ *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 235-8; *Id.*, *Hist. Iturbide*, 230, 235-6; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 787.

to Mexico, and congress decreed that the executive should consist of Victoria, as president, Bravo, and Guerrero; the last named being authorized to retire if his health demanded it, in which event Dominguez was to replace him. From this time to the end of the provisional rule Victoria, Bravo, and Dominguez constituted the executive. Till then the minister of relations, Lucas Alaman, and the minister of war, Manuel Mier y Teran, who were intimate friends and entertained the same views on public policy, had the chief influence in the administration of the government.³² Victoria's presence in the government caused a material change, which greatly influenced subsequent events. He caused Arrillaga to be dismissed, notwithstanding the opposition of Bravo and Dominguez, and of ministers Alaman and Mier y Teran; but Dominguez finally assenting, José Ignacio Esteva was placed in charge of the treasury.³³ The new minister was an able, energetic, industrious man. He laid himself open to obloquy, however, by unduly interfering in the affairs of other departments; hence his differences with the minister of war.

Meanwhile the discussion of the federal constitution had been going on in congress since the first of April. The work progressed slowly, owing to the necessity of attending to much executive business, and it was only on the 1st of August that the first article was adopted. After that date, Iturbide hav-

³² Arrillaga attended exclusively to his department, the treasury; and Llave spent much of his time in scientific studies. *Alaman, Hist. Mj.*, v. 807-8.

³³ The following statesmen had the several portfolios between April 1, 1823, and October 10, 1824: Relations: José Ignacio García Illueca, April 2 to 15, 1823; Lucas Alaman, April 16, 1823, to April 23, 1824; Pablo de la Llave (ad. int.), April 24 to May 14, 1824; Lucas Alaman, May 15 to Sept. 21, 1824; Juan Guzman, chief clerk, Sept. 22d to Oct. 10, 1824. Justice: Illueca, April 2 to June 6, 1823; Llave, June 6, 1823, to Jan. 25, 1824; Gerónimo Torrescano, chief clerk, Jan. 26 to April 20, 1824; Llave, April 21 to October 10, 1824. Treasury: Illueca, April 1 to 30, 1823; Francisco de Arrillaga, May 2, 1823, to Aug. 8, 1824; José Ignacio Esteva, Aug. 9 to Oct. 10, 1824. War: Illueca, April 2 to July 11, 1823; José Joaquín de Herrera, July 12, 1823, to March 11, 1824; Manuel Mier y Teran, March 12 to Oct. 10, 1824. *Mex. Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1027.

ing been put out of the way, and with him all dynastic pretensions, the progress attained was satisfactory. There was not much warmth in the debates till the point was reached whether the executive authority should be vested in one person or in three.³⁴ It was finally decided in favor of one, with the expectation that in the course of time, and checked by laws enacted by congress, the president would not have it in his power to do much harm. In the matter of territorial division, grave difficulties were encountered from the absence of reliable statistical data respecting population, revenue, and resources; for it was noticed that some of the states were more powerful than others, and it was necessary to establish a sort of equilibrium. The last territorial division of intendencias under the Spanish rule was recommended by some members, but objected to by others, because Querétaro and Tlascala, which at that time were mere *corregimientos de letras*, wanted to be separate states. Some trouble was experienced with respect to the territories, namely, Colima, the Californias, and Tehuantepec. But the greatest difficulty was to fix upon the quota of revenue that each state was to contribute for the support of the general government, inasmuch as the revenue of each being unknown, the distribution as fixed upon was mere guess-work,³⁵ and the result was, that afterward very few of the states punctually paid their quotas.

Each part of the constitution, when passed, was published and given the force of law. This was done respecting the election of president and vice-president

³⁴ The point was in doubt, because, according to Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 262, it was presumed that if the power was vested in one only, Victoria would be the chosen one. Bustamante and his fellow-centralists did not like Victoria.

³⁵ The sum of \$3,136,875 was to be yearly paid into the national treasury by the states as follows: Mexico, \$975,000; Jalisco, \$365,625; Puebla, \$328,125; Oajaca, \$262,500; Guanajuato, \$218,750; Michoacan, \$175,000; Yucatan, \$136,250; Zacatecas, \$140,625; San Luis Potosi, \$101,250. The rest ranged from \$97,875 (Vera Cruz) down to \$15,625 (Coahuila). The payments were to be made in instalments every month or fifteen days from the time the states collected their revenue. *Mex. Col. de Leyes, Órd. y Dec.*, iii. 60-2.

and their salaries, and the manner of electing deputies and senators, and justices of the supreme court.³⁶

At the presidential election the centralists made Nicolás Bravo their candidate, Guadalupe Victoria being the favorite of the federalists. The latter obtained a majority of the seventeen votes that were cast, and congress declared him constitutionally elected. The votes for vice-president being divided between Nicolás Bravo and Vicente Guerrero, neither of them having the requisite majority, congress chose the first-named.³⁷

The constitution required that the president and vice-president elect should assume their offices on the first of April, and hold for four years; nevertheless the congress decreed that they should enter at once upon the discharge of their duties, inaugurating without loss of time the new system of government.

The constitution of Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, the name given the republic,³⁸ having been solemnly published on the 4th of October, 1824,³⁹ this day and the 16th of September were declared the only national anniversaries.

The constitution thus adopted confirmed the federal system already established by the acta constitutiva. After declaring the absolute independence of the country, and the Roman catholic religion as the only one permitted therein, and recognizing the states that were to be the component parts of the federation,

³⁶ The president's salary was fixed at \$36,000, and the vice-president's at \$10,000. The other laws were passed Aug. 4th and 27th. *Mex., Col. de Ord. y Dec.*, iii. 62-3, 67-9, 72.

³⁷ The congressional acts appear in *Gaz. Gob. Sup.*, 1824, Oct. 5th, 209; *Mex. Col. Ord. y Dec.*, iii. 78; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 808-11; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 266; *Id.*, *Hist. Iturbide*, 273-4.

³⁸ With the change of system was introduced a new practice in some particulars, namely: to the date of a decree or official letter were added, *4º de la independencia*, *5º de la libertad*, and *8º de la federacion*; the word *Ciudadano* superseded *Don* before a person's given name; and in lieu of *Dios guarde á V'd muchos años*, with which official letters were formerly ended, were put *Dios y Libertad*.

³⁹ Appropriate addresses were made on this day to the Mexican nation by the congress and the executive. *Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide*, 278-91; *Mex. Col. Leyes Fund.*, 125-31; *Gac. Gob. Sup. Mex.*, 1824, 221-4; *Dispos. Var.*, iii. 125-8; *Tornel, Nac. Méj.*, 24-5.

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the instrument divides the powers of the supreme government into three branches, to wit, the legislative, executive, and judicial. The instrument is epitomized in a note.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ The legislative power is vested in a congress consisting of a house of deputies and a senate; the members of the former to be chosen every two years, one for every 80,000 inhabitants, as well as for every fraction exceeding 40,000. A deputy must not be under 25 years of age; must have resided two consecutive years in the state electing him. Adopted citizens with eight years' residence and property to the value of \$8,000, or an occupation yielding \$1,000 yearly, could be chosen. Natives of other Spanish colonies needed only three years' residence. The president and vice-president, members of the supreme court, secretaries of state, and employes of their departments could not be elected deputies; neither could governors of states or territories, military commandants, archbishops, bishops, vicars-general, judges of districts, and commissaries general of finance and war, for the states or territories in which they exercised their functions. To become deputies, such officials had to resign their offices at least six months before the election. The senate is composed of two senators from each state, chosen by a plurality of votes in the state legislature or congress. The junior or last chosen senator is replaced by a new appointment at the end of two years; the first chosen holds his place for four years. Both must be 30 years of age or upwards, and possess all the qualifications requisite for a deputy. Deputies and senators are made inviolable. The congress is required to meet every year on the 1st of January, closing its session on the 15th of April, unless it or the executive deem it necessary to prolong the session for 30 days more. It may also hold an extra session between the dates of the ordinary sessions. Either chamber may impeach the president, supreme judges, secretaries of state, and the governors of states for infractions of the constitution; if two thirds of the votes sustain the impeachment, the accused is suspended from office and surrendered to a competent court to try him for the offence.

The executive power is placed in the hands of a president; in the event of his becoming morally or physically disqualified, the vice-president assumes his functions, temporarily or for the rest of the term, as the case may be. None but a Mexican-born, at least 35 years old, and a resident of the country is eligible for president or vice-president. The president cannot be re-elected till four years have elapsed after his term. The election of president and vice-president is made by the congresses of the states, each of which, on the 1st of September of the year immediately preceding the installation of a new president, names two individuals as candidates, one of whom at least must not be a native of the state. A committee of the lower house of the national congress, composed of one deputy from each state, passes upon the validity of the certificates received from each state, and the chamber then declares who are the elect. Should two candidates have an equal number of votes, or no one have an absolute majority, then the house of deputies chooses the president or vice-president from among the candidates having the greatest number of votes from the state congresses. Many precautions are enjoined against possible encroachments on the part of the president.

The judicial power is vested in a supreme court of justice, and in superior courts of departments and districts. The supreme court is composed of eleven judges and the attorney-general. The members must be natives of Mexico, and 35 years of age or upwards. They are elected by the legislatures of the states in the same manner and with the same formalities as the president of the republic.

The state governments are also divided into three branches, the same as the federal government. The states have the management of their local

Several of its articles are transcripts of corresponding clauses in the constitution of the northern United States. Here and there appears the old Spanish leaven, particularly in the fourth article, which declares that the Roman catholic religion "is and shall perpetually be the religion of the Mexican nation," and forbids the enjoyment of any other. It must be said, however, to the honor of the framers of the instrument, that they manifested a praiseworthy interest in the improvement of the country and in the advancement of education, science, and trade; for the establishment of copyrights and patents, freedom of the press, and abolishment of barbarous practices in the administration of justice, such as torture, arbitrary imprisonment, confiscation of property, retroactive laws, and other procedures by which life, limb, personal liberty and property were at the mercy of unscrupulous tribunals or officials. We note the absence of clauses to establish trial by jury and publicity in administering justice. It cannot be denied that many of the provisions of this constitution produced good results and roused the country into useful activity, even in the midst of the turmoil and confusion Mexico was afterward subjected to during the succeeding half-century or more. Comments, almost without number, were made even in those early days, by both Mexicans and foreigners, endeavoring to show that the troubles Mexico soon found herself involved in were the result of the liberal institutions she had adopted by servilely copying, as the commentators said, her more fortunate neighbor of the north. The opponents of republican government have argued from their standpoint the manifest incompatibility, as they allege, of such political institutions with the habits and education of a people who had been for three centuries in leading-strings, ruled by a system of royal command

affairs with entire independence of the general government. Their constitutions must conform with the requirements of the national organic law.

The full text may be found in *Méx. Col. Constituc.*, i. 16-101; *Méx. Col. Órd. y Dec.*, iii. 78-100; *Gaz. de Méx.*, 1824, iv. 173; *Ward's Méx.*, i. 285-302.

emanating from a court several thousand miles away, and enforced by officials who had nothing in common with the country. No good could, in the estimation of these men, be expected from the sudden change, the fact that the change was absolutely needed being ignored. The subsequent troubles that constantly succeeded one another confirmed them in their preconceived ideas, affording them the opportunity to ascribe to the federal institutions faults that were really faults of the enemies of such institutions—of those who caused the disturbances for their own selfish purposes, and often forced well intentioned men in power, in order to save the government and themselves, to go beyond the orbit of their constitutional authority. It will be seen in the course of this history that such was the beginning of the revolutionary movements that disturbed Mexico almost from the promulgation of the first constitution.⁴¹

The functions of the provisional government ceased when the constitutional executive went into office. During the interregnum of eighteen months the country was often imperilled, and the provisional authorities experienced much difficulty in securing the free institutions that the people demanded. Among the obstacles they had to contend against was the scarcity of property. Amidst constant political disturbance, and notwithstanding the frequent changes in the personnel of the executive, and the unanimous disapproval by it and the cabinet of the system of government demanded, all rose superior to their preferences, laboring zealously to satisfy the popular aspiration. By blending moderation with rigor, they restored public peace, left abundant resources, though unfortunately the proceeds of loans, and removed all hinderances to

⁴¹ The following authorities are referred to: *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 883-6; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 74-76; *Gawlal. Exposicion del Cabildo*, 1-16; *V. Cruz, El Plan Repub.*, 1-27; *Martinez, Sinóp. Hist. Revol. Méx.*, i. 135-9; *Gutierrez, Carta y Opin. Aut.*, 6-18; *Becerra, Voto Particular*, 1-16; *North Am. Rev.*, xxxi. 112-14. Carlos M. Bustamante solemnly protested on the 4th of October, 1824, against the adoption of the constitution. The text is given in his *Gabinete Méx.*, ii. 248-9.

administrative action. The provisional government was accused of excessive severity, but the facts prove that no more was used than the preservation of the public peace called for, and that the government and congress made themselves respected without resorting to arbitrary penalties. Punishments inflicted were in almost every instance pronounced under process of law by the regularly established courts.

Having arrived at the end of the provisional administration, I will now consider the organization of the country into states and territories.

The constituent congress on the 8th of January, 1824, passed a law establishing constituent legislatures in the "provinces that had been declared states of the Mexican federation," and in which such legislatures did not yet exist. The states thus summoned to choose their own legislative bodies were Guanajuato, Mexico, Michoacan, Puebla de los Angeles, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, and Vera Cruz. The same law prescribed the mode of choosing the deputies, whose number was to be for each legislature no less than eleven, nor more than twenty-one, aside from the suplentes, who were to be respectively no less than four, nor more than seven.

Meanwhile the authorities then existing in each of the states were recognized, and were to continue in power till the legislatures should be installed, by which time the nation's *acta constitutiva* would be already promulgated. Under that *acta* the states of the federation were: Guanajuato; Interno de Occidente, composed of Sonora and Sinaloa; Interno de Oriente, formed of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Texas; Interno del Norte, which comprised Chihuahua, Durango, and New Mexico; Jalisco; Michoacan; Oajaca; Puebla de los Angeles; Querétaro; San Luis Potosí; Tabasco; Tamaulipas, formerly Nuevo Santander; Vera Cruz; Yucatan; and Zacatecas. The two Californias and the partido de Colima were temporarily

made territories of the federation, to be under the direct control of the general government.⁴²

A law of May 7th made Nuevo Leon a state, and Coahuila and Texas another. Decrees of May 22d and July 6th raised Durango and Chihuahua respectively to the same rank, New Mexico being made a territory.⁴³

Under the *acta constitutiva* the congress of the state of Mexico was installed on the 2d of March, 1824, and the next day the election of governor took place, General Manuel Gomez Pedraza being chosen for the position.⁴⁴ On the 9th of August the state congress adopted a provisional organic law, which bears the signatures of José Figueroa, president, and Manuel de Cortazar and Joaquin Villa, deputies, acting as secretaries.⁴⁵ The other states pursued the same course, organizing their respective congresses, and choosing their governors. All in due time were acting in their capacity as sovereign states of the federation.⁴⁶

Chiapas, during the confusion prevailing after Iturbide's fall, kept aloof from all participation in Mexican events. The partisans of Mexico and Guatemala in that province endeavored to arrive at a conclusion that would favor their respective wishes. The governments of Mexico and Guatemala invited the province to

⁴² *Mex. Col., Ord. y Dec.*, iii. 12-14. A law of Feb. 4th provided that for the legislature of the *estado interno de Occidente*, Sinaloa should choose six *diputados propietarios* and two *suplentes*, and Sonora five *diputados* and two *suplentes*; for that of the *interno del Norte*, Chihuahua five *diputados* and one *suplente*; Durango, five *diputados* and two *suplentes*; New Mexico, one *diputado* and one *suplente*; for that of the *interno de Oriente*, Coahuila was to choose five *diputados*, Nuevo Leon five, and Texas one; of *sapientes*, Nuevo Leon was to elect two, and the others one each. The following places were provisionally made capitals for the purposes of the decree: Villa del Fuerte for the *estado interno de Occidente*; ciudad de Chihuahua for the *interno del Norte*; and ciudad de Monterey for the *interno de Oriente*. The legislatures were to designate their future capitals.

⁴³ On July 19th each territory was given the privilege of choosing one proprietary deputy and one substitute to represent it in the national congress. *Id.*, 18, 19, 25, 26, 46, 47, 57, 58; *Austin, Expos. al Pùb., Asuntos de Tejas*, 14-15.

⁴⁴ *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 231; *Id.*, *Hist. Iturbide*, 230.

⁴⁵ *Mex. Ley Orgánica*, 1-24.

⁴⁶ *Gaz. Gob. Sup. Mex.*, 1824, nos 40, 45, 47; *Mex. Col. Constituc.*, ii. 294-368; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xi. 575.

unite her fate with the nation they respectively represented. The former was for a time indisposed to allow her the discretion conceded to the other provinces of Central America,⁴⁷ and she was in hourly danger of becoming a bone of contention between these two nations, or a prey to internal strife, each power having numerous partisans in Chiapas.⁴⁸ Fortunately a more generous policy was adopted by the Mexican congress, on the 26th of May, 1824, the executive being instructed to place Chiapas in absolute liberty to make her choice.⁴⁹ The decree was hailed by the junta suprema gubernativa of the province with demonstrations of delight. Compliance therewith was decreed June 24th, and the departments were required to clearly manifest their opinions and disband the troops. The ayuntamientos of the capital and of almost all the other towns, holding the junta in high respect, left to it the decision of the question. The partisans of Guatemala did not fail to make efforts to win the province for Central America. Opposition was also encountered on the part of the asamblea of Guatemala, and much trouble was caused by the contending elements. The junta in all its proceedings exhibited prudence, and thereby averted a revolution with its concomitant evils. On the 12th of September the junta proceeded in the presence of a Mexican commissioner⁵⁰ to the examination and qualification of the reports of the committees named at the session of August 28th. It appeared therefrom that there were 12 departments, one of which was Soconusco, with 104 pueblos, the population being

⁴⁷ Mexico recognized the independence of the united provinces of Central America, by decree of congress, on the 20th of August, 1824. *Mex. Col. Leyes, Ord. y Dec.*, iii. 66.

⁴⁸ *Mex. Decreto del Sob. Cong. Mex.*, in *Dispos. Var.*, iii. no. 8, 2; *Larrainzar, Notic. Hist. Soconusco*, 31-52; *Pineda, Descrip. Chiapas*, in *Soc. Mex. Geog. Boletín*, iii. 350; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 759.

⁴⁹ The existing government of the province, namely, the junta suprema gubernativa, which had been reinstated by the action of the Mexican military authorities, was called upon to convoke, within three months from the date of the decree, a congress to declare its will on the subject of annexation to Mexico. *Mex. Col. Leyes, Ord. y Dec.*, iii. 50.

⁵⁰ Guatemala had failed to send such an officer, though invited so to do.

172,953 inhabitants, 96,829 of whom favored aggregation to Mexico, and 60,400 annexation to Guatemala. In this last number were included the voters of Soconusco; 15,724 cast no votes. The junta therefore declared that Chiapas had legitimately pronounced in favor of union with Mexico. This declaration was solemnly made on the 14th,⁵¹ and celebrated with a *te deum*. Thus were the destinies of Chiapas fixed. With the aggregation to Mexico the office of the junta properly ceased; but as there was no political organization of the province, that body undertook to effect one. Its two principal duties were to bring together a convention to form the constitution of the state, and to see that the oath to support the federal constitution was duly taken. As to the first duty, it issued the necessary convocation, and fixed upon November 12th for the publication of the federal constitution, and the 13th and 14th for administering the oath. Notwithstanding some opposition on the part of the partisans of Guatemala, its decrees were carried out. On the 27th of September the junta addressed an energetic note to Guatemala containing a formal reclamation of Soconusco, which had been occupied by that government, but no effect was produced. However, the constitution of the state of Chiapas, framed November 19, 1825, in designating her territory, included Soconusco, one of the signers of the document being Pedro Corona, as representative of that department. The Mexican government confirmed Manuel Zebadúa as *gefe político*. State congress was installed on the fifth of January, 1825.⁵²

Under the constitution of 1824 the following political divisions were declared to be states of the union, namely: Chiapas, Chihuahua, Coahuila and Texas,

⁵¹ The acts were forwarded to Mexico at once. *Gaz. Extra. Gob. Sup.*, 1824, 201.

⁵² The junta's functions finally ceased the same day. *Larrainzar, Notic. Hist. Soconusco*, 52-77; *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, 193; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 206-7; *Id.*, *Diario Mex.*, MS., xlv. 203; *Id.*, *Hist. Iturbide*, 273-4.

Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco—then spelled Xalisco—Mexico, Michoacan, Nuevo Leon, Oajaca, Puebla de los Angeles, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, Sonora and Sinaloa under the title of Estado de Occidente, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, Vera Cruz, Yucatan, and Zacatecas. The two Californias, Colima, and New Mexico were admitted as territories. Tlascala's position was left open for future decision, and finally, on the 24th of November, the congress decreed that it should also be a territory.⁵³

The states proceeded to frame their constitutions, making them conform with the general one. In a note I give the dates on which each adopted its organic law.⁵⁴

Among the last acts of the constituent congress was the creation of a federal district. During the work of framing the constitution no thought had been given to the establishment of a capital or place of residence for the supreme powers of the republic, it being taken for granted that the city of Mexico was the natural capital of the nation. But no sooner had the state authorities become established than differences arose with the governor, Melchor Muzquiz, and it was decreed by the national congress, on the 18th of November, that the city, including a radius of two leagues from the centre of the main plaza, should be under the exclusive control of the general government, which was to appoint a governor to exercise

⁵³ The territory of each state is clearly defined in her organic law. *Mex. Col. Leyes, Ord. y Dec.*, iii. 79, 125; *Soc. Mex. Geog. Boletín*, i. 96; *Romero, Mich.*, 150-1; *Col. Constituc.*, vols. i., ii., and iii., *passim*.

⁵⁴ Chiapas, Nov. 19, 1825; Chihuahua, Dec. 7, 1825; Coahuila and Texas, March 11, 1827; Durango, Sept. 1, 1826; Guanajuato, April 14, 1826; Jalisco, Nov. 18, 1824; Mexico, at Tezcuco, Feb. 14, 1827; Michoacan, July 19, 1825; Nuevo Leon, March 5, 1825; Oajaca, Jan. 10, 1825; Puebla de los Angeles, Dec. 7, 1825; San Luis Potosí, Oct. 16, 1826; Estado de Occidente (Sonora and Sinaloa), Oct. 31, 1825; Tabasco, at Villa Hermosa, Feb. 5, 1825; Tamaulipas, at Ciudad Victoria, May 7, 1825; Vera Cruz, June 3, 1825; Yucatan, April 6, 1825; Zacatecas, Jan. 17, 1825. *Guan., Const. Polít.*, 1-78; *Mich. Constituc.*, 1-78; *Id.*, *Dec. del Cong. Constituyente*, 1-83; *Puebla, Const. Polít.*, 1-54; *Pineda, Descrip. Chiapas*, in *Soc. Mex. Geog. Boletín*, iii. 370; *Méx., Col. Constituc.*, i. 102-473, ii. 3-469, iii. 3-484; *Méx., Mem. Rel.*, 29-30; *Pinar, Doc. Hist. Son.*, MS., 38-53; *Cor. Fed. Méx.*, Nov. 2, 1826.

civil jurisdiction over the district. José María Mendivil became the first appointee. The state of Mexico strongly remonstrated against the spoliation, declaring it a manifest violation of her rights so solemnly guaranteed by the constitution lately adopted. But it availed naught; the congressional decree was carried out, and the city of Mexico, under the law making it the federal district, was deprived of all participation in framing the laws of the country, and in the choice of the president, and became subject to such taxation and authorities as the general government chose to impose upon it, as well as to other inconveniences.⁵⁵ The altercation, however, was continued, the state's claims being supported by several congresses and ayuntamientos, as well as by prominent statesmen and writers; nor was it till the end of January 1827 that the state congress and authorities moved to Tezcuco. During that interval the congress held its sessions in the old building of the inquisition; and when the transfer was made the authorities took with them about \$500,000 that Governor Muzquiz had saved.⁵⁶ Even as late as 1829 the state congress renewed the claim for the restoration of the city of Mexico,⁵⁷ but all such efforts have been unavailing, and the city has ever since remained as the national capital.

⁵⁵ The state congress and governor were, however, permitted to reside in Mexico till such time as they could prepare a capital to remove to with their records, etc. *Mex. Col. Leyes, Órd. y Dec.*, iii. 122; *Dispos. Var.*, iii. 128-9; *S. Miguel, Seg. Guía*, 189-91; *Mex. Represent. Ayunt.*, 1-12; *Mex. Mem. Rei.*, 30-1.

⁵⁶ They were soon consumed for necessary expenses. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, ii. no. 5, 5-6.

⁵⁷ *Mex., Iniciativa que la Leg. del Est. eleva al Cong. de la Union.* 1-16.

CHAPTER II.

CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.

1824-1829.

AUTHORITIES INAUGURATED—PRESIDENT VICTORIA—INJUSTICE TO HIS CHARACTER—POLITICAL SITUATION—AMNESTY FOR POLITICAL OFFENDERS—FIRST ORDINARY CONGRESS—ARIZPE'S CHARACTER AND PUBLIC CAREER—GERMS OF FUTURE CALAMITY—MASONIC LODGES AND POLITICAL PARTIES—POINSETT—THE PRESS—FINANCIAL TROUBLES—DISTURBANCES IN VERA CRUZ—NOVENARIOS—PLAN OF MONTAÑO—BRAVO'S REBELLION AND ITS SUPPRESSION—EXPATRIATION OF BRAVO AND OTHERS—THE YORKINOS TRIUMPHANT—PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION—IMPARCIALES VERSUS GUERRERISTS—SANTA ANNA'S REBELLION—REVOLT OF LA ACORDADA—THE PARIAN SACKED—CONGRESSIONAL ACTION—GUERRERO MADE PRESIDENT—END OF VICTORIA'S RULE—HIS LAST DAYS AND DEATH.

THE constitutional era was now fairly begun. On the 10th of October, 1824, President Guadalupe Victoria and Vice-president Nicolás Bravo assumed their respective offices, after having sworn to support the constitution, and to discharge their duties faithfully. The president's inaugural address shows that he was conscious of his responsibilities. He bespoke the aid of providence and the coöperation of the people, assuring them that the prosperity of the nation was near to his heart. Religion should be allowed neither to wear the garb of superstition nor sink into licentiousness, while for independence he would die.¹

¹ "La independencia se afianzará con mi sangre, y la libertad se perderá con mi vida," *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1824, iv. 225-7; *Mex. Col. Leyes, Ord. y Dec.*, iii. 107-9; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 270; *Id.*, *Voz de la Patria*, ii. no. 5, 4-5. A portrait of Victoria in oil hangs in the Colegio de San Ildefonso of Mexico, of which he had been an alumnus. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 811, 958.

Victoria belonged to a respectable family of Durango. His real name was Juan Felix Fernandez; but during the war of independence he changed it, taking as his first that of Guadalupe, in honor of the virgin patroness of Mexico, and as his surname that of Victoria, to commemorate a victory over the Spaniards. He was tall, and though lame, capable of great endurance.² For many years he made only one meal in twenty-four or even thirty-six hours. Later he conformed with the usual hours of his countrymen in regard to meals, but ever continued to be most abstemious. He was an honest, unassuming citizen, amiable and kind-hearted, of undoubted courage, and a true lover of freedom. He has been treated fairly but by few. His virtues have been set down as faults, and his talents ignored.³ But for his prudence and purity of character, his country's troubles during his administration would probably have been greater; and yet they were attributed to his supposed indolence and apathy. Because he would not uphold the schemes of those who wanted him to be their tool, they said that he lacked decision; those who could not induce him to take part in their resentments called him apathetic. His errors were ascribed to a refined malice. The truth is that base ambition never

² In campaigning he fared as his men did. It is related that once he was extremely ill with fever, and was conveyed on a bed into the battle-field. As soon as he descried the enemy, he had himself mounted on a horse and rushed into the skirmish. In the heat of it the crisis of the fever took place, and he returned well to his division. *Abispa de Chilpancingo*, 234-5.

³ He has been credited with only mediocre talents, and accused of indolence, and of relying too much on his own judgment. *Bustamante, Vox de la Patria*, ii. no. 23, 1. Alaman makes a statement, as received from Iturbide's secretary, Manso, that when Victoria visited that chief at San Juan del Rio he proposed in writing that the plan should be changed, and an unpardoned insurgent—as if suggesting himself—should be called to the throne and married to an Indian female of Guatemala, to make of the two countries a single nation. He claims that the paper in question, as he and Bustamante were told by Manso, was filed in the department of relations. *Hist. Méj.*, v. 220. How is it, I would ask, that Alaman and Bustamante, who had access to that department, and were no friends of Victoria, at least as a ruler, did not produce a copy of the document? The story looks like one of Alaman's exhibitions of spite against his former chief. Of Bustamante I must say, however, that though not friendly to Victoria's administration, he gives him the highest commendation for military services, purity of character, modesty, and generally for civic virtues. *Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 175-6.

entered his heart. He was ever ready to lay aside his private opinion when duty demanded it. His abnegation and utter neglect of his own interests were notorious; his country was his idol.⁴ He died so poor that he had to be buried at public expense.⁵

Victoria's administration began under the happiest auspices.⁶ The republic was at peace; party violence had been kept under, and every one hoped for the best. The president's authority was disputed by none; and as for money, all the minister had to do was to draw bills on London. And yet there was a dread of impending trouble. Eighty days after the sanction of the constitution, congress authorized the executive to expel all foreigners deemed dangerous; to remove from one place to another, when necessary, any servant of the federation, or inhabitants of the territories and federal district, as also those of the states through the medium of their respective governors. Should the supreme authorities of the states conspire against the national independence, or the adopted federal system, the executive was to bring them under subjection by military force agreeably to article 110 of the constitution.⁷ Following this example, the state legislatures voted ample powers to their governors.⁸ However, on the 24th of December congress voted an amnesty for political offences, excepting from its benefits only persons convicted of treacherous designs against the

⁴ 'A type of Plutarch's republicans,' says Gen. J. M. Tornel, himself an able man and an honorable citizen, who served under Victoria, near to his person. *Breve Reseña Hist.*, 24-5.

⁵ After he had filled the highest offices, and had every possible facility for peculation. *Payno, Cuentas, Gastos*, 599-600; *Thompson's Recoll. Mex.*, 60.

⁶ Warmly congratulated from all quarters, and by none more than Vicente Guerrero, whose ill health prevented his attending the inauguration. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1824, no. 53 et seq.; no. 66, 322-4.

⁷ Act of Dec. 23, 1824. *Mex. Col. Leyes, Órd. y Dec.*, iii. 162-3. These powers were in force till repealed in May 1826. *Rivera, Gob. de Mex.*, ii. 125; for all that, after the latter date, the government, on a false accusation, had the liberal writer Marchese de Santangelo taken by force to Vera Cruz, and sent out of the country. In Vera Cruz his son, 18 years of age, died of yellow fever before his eyes. *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, i. 358-9; *El Amigo del Pueblo*, ii. 139; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, ii. no. 14, 5-6.

⁸ 'Para guardar la tranquilidad y hacer respetar las leyes en sus respectivos territorios.' *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Mex.*, 75.

national independence. By this act Bustamante, Quintanar, and others who had caused disturbances in Jalisco and elsewhere were relieved of all responsibility for their past proceedings.⁹ Whatever fears might be entertained of the minister's abusing such powers under other circumstances were quieted by the general recognition of Victoria's circumspection and benevolence.¹⁰

Among the acts of the constituent congress was that of declaring the constitutionally chosen justices of the national supreme court. They were all prominent citizens of the capital and states. The first president of the court was the licentiate Miguel Domínguez, till lately a member of the executive.¹¹ The constituent assembly closed its sessions on the 24th of December to make way for the first constitutional congress, which began its labors on the 1st of January, 1825.¹² It must be stated to the credit of the former that it not only accomplished much in a short time, but also showed much judgment and tact.¹³ The senators and deputies chosen for the constitutional congress, during the interval of peace, were men of sound judgment and moderate views; among them were several of the members of the constituent chamber.

⁹ Bustamante, who must have his shot at Victoria, says that the president blundered in granting those pardons: 'empezó á hacer sus alcaldadas, como la de dejar impunes á Bustamante y Quintanar por las fechorías qé hicieron en Guadalupe.' *Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 262; *Id.*, *Hist. Iturbide*, 242, 270.

¹⁰ The first cabinet was constituted as follows, and held office during the terms appended to the respective names: Minister of relations, interior and foreign: Juan Guzman, chief clerk, Oct. 10, 1824, to Jan. 11, 1825; Lucas Alaman, Jan. 12, 1825, to Sept. 26, 1825; justice, Pablo de la Llave, Oct. 10, 1824, to Nov. 29, 1825; treasury, José Ignacio Esteva, Oct. 10, 1824, to Sept. 26, 1825; war, Manuel de Mier y Teran, Oct. 10, 1824, to Dec. 18, 1825.

¹¹ Domínguez was a native of Guanajuato, and had been 'corregidor de letras' of Querétaro, an office that brought on him much trouble, as has been recorded in the early history of the Mexican revolution. He was a learned and upright man, and a good statesman. His death occurred April 22, 1830. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, ii. no. 25, 6-7.

¹² The president of the republic and his ministers were present at the opening, and mutual congratulations passed between the executive and the congress. *Id.*, ii. no. 6, 1-2; *Mex. Col. Leyes, Órd. y Dec.*, iii. 138, 163; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 369.

¹³ Alaman, *Hist. Mej.*, v. 815, though disapproving the federal system which that congress established, speaks of it in eulogistic terms.

President Victoria retained, as we have seen, the former cabinet; but early in 1825, being displeased with Mier y Teran, he sent him to Vera Cruz with a military commission, and appointed as his successor Manuel Gomez Pedraza.¹⁴ Miguel Ramos Arizpe, who had not been re-elected to congress, became temporarily official mayor in Llave's department, and when that minister resigned in November, the place was given to Arizpe.

There was great antipathy between Arizpe and Alaman. The former was impulsive, frank, generous, bold, and imaginative, generally acting without method or order; a man withal who made many friends. Alaman was in every respect different. Arizpe, on his return to the Spanish *córtes* in 1820, after his long imprisonment, wielded great influence, which he used to benefit Spanish America, never neglecting the private interests of his countrymen. He returned to Mexico when she was already a nation, to fill the office of precentor in the diocesan chapter of Puebla. He at once placed himself on the side of the party opposed to Iturbide's empire, advocating republican principles. In the constituent congress he was chairman of the committee on constitution, and labored at the task of framing that instrument with all the perseverance and assiduity characteristic of the man. He was a decided federalist. I give in a note further details of his career.¹⁵

¹⁴ Pedraza was in bad odor with the centralists, because of his friendship for Iturbide. Victoria adopted the policy of having in his cabinet men of both parties. *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, i. 341.

¹⁵ In 1830 he acted as plenipotentiary to conclude treaties with Chile. In 1831 he was made dean of Puebla. The following year he labored for the peace of the republic, and was again minister of state till Nov. 1833. In 1841 he was elected from Saltillo to the constituent congress. Failing to bring public affairs to a satisfactory condition, he became despondent, and in March 1842, had an apoplectic fit, which paralyzed an arm and a leg. He became affected with gangrene in April of the following year, and died on the 28th of that month at the age of 68 years. Arizpe was a great man, an excellent clergyman and pastor, wise, just, charitable, humble. In his last years, says Tornel, he was a liberal without exaggeration, and very pious; but hypocrisy was no part of his nature. *Breve Reseña Hist.*, 36-7; *Bustamante, Hist. Santa Anna*, 142-3; *Dicc. Univ. Hist. Geog.*, vi. 548-53; *Arroniz, Biog. Mex.*, 272.

Toward the end of September Alaman resigned, his influence being nullified by that of Arizpe, Esteva, Pedraza, and others.¹⁶ His successor in the department of relations was Gomez Pedraza, who was soon after replaced by Sebastian Camacho, and on the latter being sent to London as plenipotentiary, Juan José Espinosa de los Monteros was placed in charge.¹⁷

Seeds of wild calamities are now sown broadcast. Different writers explain their origin according to their several political tenets. The error seems to lie in attributing to individuals social troubles resulting from the general condition of things. The progressionists and retrogressionists, or conservatives, as the latter prefer to be called, imagine that the symbol of opposition has no importance other than that given it by the character and influence of its supporters. Hence the conservative proneness for blood-letting, and the practice of the progressionists of exiling every political opponent.

There was not now, or for some time after, any well established social or political system. There was little left of the old one, bequeathed by Spain at an early day, for its principles had become vitiated and its interests destroyed. On the other hand, the new order of things widely disseminated its ideas, but failed either to blend them with what remained of the former system, or to cause its entire disappearance. These opposing elements hindered every effort, and the republic could move neither backward nor forward.

About this time a number of political clubs which wielded great influence began to be organized under the name and forms of masonic lodges of the York rite. Their creation has been ascribed to Poinsett, the

¹⁶ According to his own statement. *Hist. Méj.*, v. 822.

¹⁷ Alaman says that Espinosa was much esteemed by Victoria, notwithstanding his pernicious counsels to Iturbide, adding that those which he gave later to Victoria himself were equally so. *Ib. Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, i. 341-4, confirms this statement.

American minister,¹⁸ but the real founder was the clergyman, José María Alpuche, rector of a parish in Tabasco, and senator from that state.¹⁹ To Poinsett was also attributed the formation of a plan to do away with the somewhat aristocratic character of the government, which was still influenced by the old families, the clergy, and the army, and of replacing it, not with a pure democracy, but by introducing a class of men who were merely ambitious office-hunters less respectably connected. Alaman has fathered on Poinsett this absurd charge. He would also have us believe that the president had been assured by members of the Scottish rite lodges that though they had opposed his candidacy, they cheerfully bowed to his authority, in which assurance he placed no faith.²⁰ In these Scottish lodges were affiliated Barragan, Negrete, Echávarri, Guerrero, Filisola, and other prominent generals and colonels, besides many regular and secular priests, and civilians of social and political standing. Several deputies and the minister Esteva had been officers of such lodges, and seceded to join the new societies. After the overthrow of Iturbide, due in a great measure to the action of the ancient rite lodges, it is true that many of their members forsook them to join the York lodges, but the escoceses still had for a time much influence with the government and congress. Later, however, the desertion became so general and simultaneous that some Scottish lodges held meetings with the object of placing themselves,

¹⁸ Zavala pronounces it a pure invention of the aristocrats, and of some European agents who meddled with Mexican affairs much more than Poinsett ever did. After five lodges had been organized Poinsett was requested to procure a charter. This step, and the installation of the grand lodge, was all the part that Poinsett took in the matter. That author declares, besides, that he, Zavala, was invited to join a lodge, and did so without any political design. *Revol. Mex.*, i. 348.

¹⁹ He is represented as a restless spirit, a sort of Danton, without his brains. In the senate he worried the ministry with questions and bitter reproaches. To his political opponents he gave no rest, and they, in their turn, gave him a bad character. His death was sudden. *Tornel, Breve Reseña Hist.*, 308-9; *Alpuche, Rasgo Hist.*, in *Pap. Suelton*, no. xi.

²⁰ For information on origin, political principles, and action of the escocese party, from 1813 to 1828, see *Mora, Pap. Suellos*, i. pp. xii.-xiv.

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with their archives, under the new order, leaving the Scottish sect or party with the assertion that they could no longer be affiliated in a society that wished to restore the monarchy. Gomez Pedraza retired from the old society without joining the new one, but said that the escoceses desired a foreign dynasty. Victoria, Esteva, and Alpuche at once saw that if a society bearing the name of federal could be formed, it would counteract the plans and labors of the escoceses.²¹ The president wanted the support of such an organization, but did not foresee that the pretensions of a popular society knew no limit.²² It is said that he had never been partial to secret societies, and particularly abhorred the *logias escocesas*, because of the men belonging to them, among whom was his rival Nicolás Bravo; and that he now lamented having patronized the *logias yorkinas*, as the government had been belittled by them. Some attempts were made in the congress, weakly supported by minister Espinosa, to prohibit secret societies; but nothing was then accomplished.²³ The two societies were now like two armies facing one another in battle array. Such was the origin of the yorkino lodges, or rather clubs,²⁴ whose sudden development and increased power soon awed their own authors, and whose subsequent divisions and disagreements gave a bloody victory to their foes the old escoceses. At the elections, toward the end of 1826, the yorkinos were victorious in the federal district—the municipal authorities of which possessed great in-

²¹ The York lodges were given attractive names, such as Independencia, Federalista, India Azteca, etc.

²² Copious information in *Cor. Fed. Mex.*, 1826, Nov. 1st and Dec. 4th; Gomez Pedraza, *Manif.*, 32-3; Monteros, *Esp. de los Inf. Masones*; Bustamante, *Voz de la Patria*, ii. no. 15, 8; *Mex. Informe Prim. Sac.*, 22, 25; Paz, *Doloroso Rec. Azteca*, 4-5; Mora, *Obras Sueltas*, i. xiv. xvi.; Suarez y Navarro, *Hist. Méj.*, 10.

²³ The two parties had become too strong, and later brought on two disastrous revolutions. Tornel, *Breve Reseña Hist.*, 45-8. On the 13th of March, 1825, the pope had issued a bull against freemasonry. It was published in Mexico toward the end of 1828. *Masones*, *Bula de N^{ro} S^{mo} Padre Leon XII.*, 1-34.

²⁴ Minister Esteva was the grand master, and Arizpe master of one of the lodges. General Bravo was grand master of the *logias escocesas*.

fluence—in the state of Mexico, of which Lorenzo de Zavala was elected governor in March 1827, and in most of the states. The important state of Vera Cruz, however, went against them.²⁵ Both these societies were strongly represented in the press. During this period of Mexican history the number of periodicals greatly increased, and the people read them with interest. They were, however, with hardly an exception, devoted to politics.²⁶

The year of 1827 was a painful one for Mexico. Among other troubles, to complicate matters and render the situation of the government still more perplexing, came news of the failure of Barclay and Company of London, in whose hands was a balance amounting to nearly \$2,250,000 of the loan contracted with that house. In November congress authorized the government to borrow four millions, pledging the revenues from customs and tobacco, and an equal sum

²⁵Also a few of the less influential. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, ii. no. 15, 4; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 400-1; *Id.*, *Gob. de Mex.*, ii. 126; *Masones y Elecc.*, 1-8.

²⁶In Yucatan were issued the *Yucateco* and another; in Vera Cruz, the *Mercurio*, whose editor, Ramon Ceruti, a Spanish emigrant, was a stout champion of popular rights, and the *Veracruzano Libre*; in Jalapa, the *Oriente*, established by Sebastian Camacho, and continued under his direction after he became a minister of state; in Mexico, *El Sol*, the organ of the escocés party, supposed to have among its chief contributors Lucas Alaman and other able politicians well versed in national affairs; *El Aguila Mexicana*, the organ of the Iturbidists, more popular than *El Sol*, which gradually lost ground, and it may be said was sustained only by the great ability of its writers. The yorkinos established the *Correo de la Federacion*, whose contributors were Lorenzo de Zavala, and all the men of the party that could and were inclined to write. It was their organ till 1829. Though lacking in plan, this paper struck *El Sol* some severe blows. These papers excited the passions of their respective supporters, but violated the laws of decency and the respect due to society much less than some newspapers of the present day. The escoceses, pretending to respectability, also published *El Observador*, and the yorkinos later brought out in opposition to it *El Amigo del Pueblo*. The former was noted for its incisive logic; the latter for its more popular and independent ideas, and for its marked American principles. These two papers were types of the political exaggerations of that period, which were but the preliminaries of a civil war. And yet there was in the midst of all a generous idea—that of the country's welfare as each party understood it. For all that, the abuse of the liberty allowed the press had a baneful effect.

There were periodicals also in Guadalajara, Puebla, San Luis Potosí, Oajaca, Valladolid, and a little later in Durango, Sonora, and even in the most distant and smallest places. *Tornel, Breve Reseña Hist.*, 80-1; *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, i. 355-6; *Pedraza, Manif.*, 34-5.

guaranteed by recognized assets. In these transactions the treasury suffered heavy losses. The secretary of the department thought to cover with the ordinary revenue the appropriations approved by congress for the following year, amounting to a little over fifteen and a half millions;²⁷ but he found it impossible, and the payments of the dividends on the foreign debt had to be suspended.²⁸

Those who from the beginning of the independence had opposed the third clause of the plan of Iguala kept up the agitation against the Spaniards, all of whom were supposed to be accomplices of the Arenas plot, particulars of which will be narrated in the following chapter. The political parties took advantage of the situation to push their pretensions, one of them demanding the destruction of secret societies and the expulsion of Poinsett. In that party were affiliated Barragan and Santa Anna.

Esteva, after resigning the portfolio of the treasury in March 1827, was despatched as comisario general de hacienda to Vera Cruz, but the legislature of that state, composed chiefly of escoceses, refused to recognize him. Shortly before, on the 25th of June, Colonel Rincon had put the troops under arms, a proceeding which the escoceses severely condemned, and

²⁷ *Alaman, Hist. M^{ex.}*, v. 834-5.

²⁸ The secretary of the treasury, Esteva, had resigned March 4, 1827, and was succeeded by Tomás Salgado, who on the 1st of Nov. surrendered the office to Francisco García, who held it only one month. The department then was placed *ad interim* in charge of the chief clerk José Ignacio Pavón till the 7th of March, 1828, when José Ignacio Esteva resumed control as minister, and held it till Jan. 12, 1829, when he resigned, and was replaced the next day by Bernardo González Angulo, in whose charge the office remained till the end of Victoria's administration. During these years changes occurred also in other departments. In that of relations, Juan José Espinosa de los Monteros was minister to March 1828; Juan de Dios Cañedo, from March 8, 1828, to Jan. 25, 1829; and José María Bocanegra, from Jan. 26 to April 1, 1829. In that of justice, Espinosa de los Monteros succeeded Arizpe, from March 8, 1828, to March 31, 1829. In that of war, with the exception of the period from Feb. 10 to March 3, 1827, when Manuel Rincon held it temporarily, Pedraza retained it till Dec. 3, 1828, when his connection with it ceased. José Castro, chief clerk, held it to Dec. 7th; Vicente Guerrero from Dec. 8 to 25, 1828; Francisco Moctezuma from Dec. 26, 1828, to April 1, 1829. *Mex. Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1027-8; *Cor. Fed. Mex.*, 1827, Feb. 8 and 14; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1827, Feb. 3, 13, and March 8; *La Palanca*, 1827, Aug. 9; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1828, 200.

for which Rincon was arrested.²⁹ He effected his escape, however, took command of his battalion, and issued a proclamation to the effect that he would recognize no authority not emanating directly from the supreme federal powers.

Seconded by the artillery brigade, Rincon maintained himself upon the defensive, till finally the president ordered him to Tlaliscoyam, there to await further orders. The president also compelled several of the chief escoceses to remove to Jalapa; placed San Juan de Ulúa, which had been surrendered in 1825 to the Mexicans, in trusty hands; and in July Barragan, who was in command there, was superseded by Guerrero.³⁰

The failure of their plans in Vera Cruz demoralized the escoceses, to the great joy of their opponents. The escoces party, which about the middle of 1827 had taken the name of *novenarios*, had spread in Vera Cruz, Puebla, and Guanajuato. Its members were not numerous, but among them figured several prominent political men, and not a few wealthy ones. The Spaniards belonged to it, and supported it in its work by contributions of money.³¹ The society made a strenuous effort to recover its influence, proclaiming at Otumba on the 23d of December, 1827, the plan of Montaña, so called after an obscure lieutenant-colonel of the old insurgents, who was its figure-head, Nicolás Bravo, the grand master, being the real leader. The plan embraced four articles, namely:

²⁹ A riot occurred, during which the yorkinos in arms destroyed the press of their rivals, who were supported by the governor and General Barragan.

³⁰ Guerrero remained there a short time, during which Esteva assumed his office. *Cor. Fed. Mex.*, 1827, Ap. 27 to Nov. 24; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, ii. nos 21, 22, 23, and 26; *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, ii. 21-4; *V. Cruz, Contestac. Guerr.* 3-16; *El Atleta*, 1830, Ap. 16, 476; *El Observador Rep. Mex.*, i. 36-8, 314-16, ii. 77-100; *El Amigo del Pueblo*, i. 13-15, ii. 200, iii. 19, 69; *V. Cruz, Manif. Cong.*, 11-23; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 425-39.

³¹ The name *novenarios* was assumed because each member of the grand consistory had to catechise nine men and bring them into the society; each of these nine had to procure nine others, and so on, thus multiplying themselves ad infinitum. The members of the escoces party also bore the names of hombres de bien, chaquetas, borbonistas, aristócratas, defensores de la constitucion. *Atleta*, 1830, Apr. 15, 467.

1. Suppression of secret societies; 2. Dismissal of the cabinet; 3. Dismissal of Poinsett, the American minister; 4. A strict fulfilment of the constitution and laws.³² Under the existing circumstances and the well founded apprehension that the yorkinos would enact proscriptive measures against them, the novenarios were in a great measure justified for their own protection in demanding a change of ministry.³³ The plan was printed and circulated on the 30th of December, in the city of Mexico. The real authors soon became known; for on the next day Bravo and Berdejo and a number of colonels and other officers began to leave the capital. Gabriel Armijo in San Luis Potosí, and Barragan in Vera Cruz, accepted the plan. Teran, Hernandez, Moran, and Santa Anna were also said to have done so, but there is no evidence of the fact, though Moran certainly received the conspirators in his house. Santa Anna suddenly appeared in Huamantla; but it remains unexplained how a military officer came to find himself without leave from the government in a town so close to the centre of a rebellion.³⁴ No other name is more applicable to this movement, which had a general-in-chief, staff, treasury, and all other elements pertaining to an army. Bravo was the commander; and we now behold the strange spectacle of the vice-president of the republic, who was also a general of division, whose bounden duty it was to support the gov-

³² Pedraza, the minister of war, had been in June accused of malefeasance, probably with good reason in some cases, but he had successfully defended himself. *Cor. Fed. Mex.*, 1827, Aug. 6, 7; *La Palanca*, 1827, Aug. 9-30; *Mora, Obras Sueltas*, ii. 244-7, 280-1.

³³ Suarez y Navarro finds the justification in Pedraza's own statements. *Hist. Méx.*, 89-97.

³⁴ Tornel, *Breve Reseña Hist.*, 198; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 836-7. Tornel says that Santa Anna was always hostile to secret societies; but Alaman positively asserts that he saw the diploma of high office in a Scottish rite lodge issued to him in Yucatan. Santa Anna had been removed from his command in that locality for meditating a sudden dash with 500 men upon the Cabaña fortress of Habana. He was vice-governor of Vera Cruz when he went to Huamantla. It was believed by the escoceses, and appearances justified the impression, that he went there to join Bravo, but on seeing the superiority of the government forces he tendered his services to their commander, which were accepted, but not till he had been reproved for his suspicious actions.

ernment, jeopardizing his position as well as his standing as an old patriot by heading an armed faction to demand the dismissal of the president's ministers, and the expulsion of the representative of a friendly and powerful nation. Bravo's popularity had been on the wane because of his intimate connection with a party including so many Spaniards among its members. He was undoubtedly actuated by generous impulses toward those whom his efforts had contributed to bring low. Still, his revolutionary course on this occasion was a serious error, and throws a blot upon his otherwise pure and honorable record. The minister of war displayed much energy. Guerrero started with forces almost as soon as Bravo, so that the latter had barely a fortnight for preparation before Guerrero was upon him. Bravo established his headquarters at Tulancingo, a town of ten or twelve thousand inhabitants, twenty-five leagues from the federal capital, in order to give his partisans in Mexico and elsewhere time to organize forces, distract the government's attention, and divide its resources. The rebel force under him was only 600 men. Tulancingo was assaulted on the 6th of January, 1828, by Guerrero with 1,500 men—not 3,000, as Zavala has it—and after a feeble resistance,³⁵ in which the number of casualties did not exceed twelve, all the chiefs of the rebellion on the spot were captured. Barragan and Armijo were also made prisoners somewhat later. They were all taken to Mexico, to be dealt with according to law.³⁶ The congress of Vera Cruz, which had adopted the plan de Montañón, was forced to make an honorable recantation.

³⁵ Bravo and the escoceses claimed afterward that Guerrero violated an armistice of eight hours for conferences. Guerrero's friends allege the contrary. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 837; *Facio, Mem.*, 203-4. The documents on this point are insufficient to clear it up. *Tornel, Breve Reseña Hist.*, 200-1.

³⁶ Alaman alleges that he saw the communication signed by Guerrero as grand master and Col. Mojia as secretary of the yorkino grand lodge, to the lodges in the United States, wherein he detailed the triumph, not as that of the government against rebels, but as that of one masonic sect against its rival. *Hist. Méj.*, v. 837.

Bravo was impeached by the house of deputies. Pending the trials of himself and his fellow-prisoners, a motion for an amnesty was made in the senate, which produced a violent agitation among the yorkino state legislatures, most of which, as well as the ayuntamiento of Mexico city, demanded the execution of the rebels.⁸⁷ Congress took a middle course, the only possible one under the circumstances. It neither granted the amnesty asked for by the escoceses nor allowed the trials to proceed as the yorkinos required; and remitting the penalty of death which had been pronounced against some officers, decreed the expatriation of all; and to that end the prisoners were taken to Acapulco. Bravo and others in the following June went to Valparaiso and Guayaquil, whence the former transferred himself to Guatemala and the United States, losing by death on the voyage his only son.⁸⁸ The expatriated were later permitted to return to Mexico.

This heavy blow not only left the escoceses powerless, but eventually ruined the yorkino party. This faction, now master of the situation, might have done good service to the republic, correcting abuses, introducing improvements, and securing peace and tranquillity; but, unfortunately, to a great extent it was made up of ignorant, ambitious, and unscrupulous men, to whom the national welfare was of no consequence. Instead of trying to heal the wounds inflicted during the past troubles, they opened new ones. Dissension soon broke out among them, which

⁸⁷ Tornel gives most of the representations and other particulars touching the rebellion, trials, etc., in *Breve Reseña Hist.*, 93-97, 166-265.

⁸⁸ The following authorities have also been examined in connection with the novenarios and their rebellion: *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, ii. nos 17-34, iii. no. 18, iv. supl. no. 4; *Mex. Col. Leyes*, 1829-30, 151; *Mex. Mem.*, 1828, 2-4, 14-16; *Decretos y Órd.*, Puebla, 152-3; *Cor. Fed. Mex.*, 1827, Feb. 6 to Dec. 30; 1828, Jan. 1 to April 9; *Barragan, Prision: Bravo, Exped. Instruct.*, 1-52; *Id.*, *Exposicion*, 1-7; *Oac. de Mex.*, 1827, Jan. 4, May, 26; *El Amigo del Pueblo*, ii. 97-108, 159, 200, iii. 69, 97-104, 149-60, 307-18; *El Observador Rep. Mex.*, i. 343-6, ii. 100-2, 101-252, iii. 145-74; *Corres. Seman.*, i. 217-19, 285-8; *La Palanca*, 1827, Jan. 4; 1828, Jan. 3, 21, 24, 31; *Id.*, iii. 64-70, pt 2, no. 2, 6-8; *Cuevas, Porvenir Mex.*, 419-52; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 175-85; *Martínez, Hist. Revol.*, i. 145; and many others.

paved the way for the overthrow and extinction of the party.

Victoria's term of office was approaching its end.³⁹ The most prominent candidates, now that Bravo and Barragan were in exile, were Gomez Pedraza and Guerrero. The former's popularity had been much enhanced by his energetic action and general efficiency. Both candidates having belonged to the same political party, much dissension arose among their friends. A portion of the escoceses, and the aristocrats who could not brook the idea of the low-born Guerrero aspiring to the highest office in the republic, supported his rival.⁴⁰ So did the Spaniards, which must be set down as a blunder on their part; for it imbittered the popular animosity toward them, and assisted to bring about the order for their expulsion.⁴¹ The agitation was not confined to the contending parties; it also existed in both houses of congress. Intrigue was freely used by politicians, as well as calumny and insult by the press. A peaceable termination of the contest was impossible which ever side won the election. Victoria kept himself aloof from all complications, though his ministers favored Pedraza.⁴² The latter won, eleven states voting for him against seven for his opponent. Only eighteen state legislatures had taken part in the election, being the only ones in session at the time. For vice-president the votes were given to Bustamante, Ignacio Godoy, and Melchor Muzquiz, and the first named eventually won.⁴³

³⁹ The choice of the next president and vice-president by the state legislatures was to take place on the 1st of Sept., 1828.

⁴⁰ His supporters called themselves the '*partido de los imparciales*,' made up of federalists, yorkinos friendly to Pedraza, and escoceses hating Guerrero. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 165.

⁴¹ In the latter part of March 1829, a law was enacted expelling from the country all natives of Spain or of the Spanish dominions save Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, with only few exceptions. The law was enforced in the federal district and elsewhere in the strictest manner. *Zavala, Revol. Méx.*, ii.

⁴² Zavala, governor of Mexico, and Santa Anna, of Vera Cruz, were in favor of Guerrero.

⁴³ Mexico, however, voted for Guerrero and Zavala. *Zavala, Revol. Méx.*,

Guerrero's partisans, anticipating defeat, had begun a revolution in the state of Vera Cruz, headed by Santa Anna, at Perote, on the ground that Pedraza had employed force, and taken advantage of his position to overrule public opinion.⁴⁴ This in the face of an order from the president to remove even the semblance of force, and of an assurance from the ministry that the public troops would not be used except to sustain the free action of the state. Gomez Pedraza had been constitutionally elected president, but the opposing party denied it, Guerrero making no effort to quiet the discord.⁴⁵ The president resolved to uphold the constitution, and was seconded by the congress. Santa Anna and his followers were declared without the pale of the law if they did not lay down their arms.⁴⁶ That leader, having sustained a reverse, fled from Perote to Oajaca, pursued by the government forces, which closely besieged him on the 14th of November. His situation had become desperate, when the revolution of the ex-acordada in the federal capital on the 30th of that month saved him, the government having to recall its troops from Oajaca.

This new pronunciamiento was the work of Anastasio Zerecero, according to his own statement,⁴⁷ and Colonel Santiago García, commander of the Tres

ii. 58-72, 76, 144; *Cor. Fed. Mex.*, 1827, July 17 to Sept. 3; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1830, 102; *Tornel, Breve Reseña Hist.*, 101. Godoy was the superior in intellect. Muzquiz had rendered good service for Mexican freedom while Bustamante was still serving in the royalist ranks; but the latter having joined the yorkinos, the odium of his past record was thus wiped out. Guerrero had, it appears, recommended him.

⁴⁴ In Vera Cruz Governor Santa Anna and the ayuntamiento of Jalapa had been impeached before the legislature and suspended. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 483-92. The privileged and wealthy were frantic in Pedraza's interest. Every bishop, chapter, vicar, etc., addressed pastoral letters to the people to stop the progress of the revolution. Most of the printed documents of that time were pastoral letters. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Mex.*, 134.

⁴⁵ Revolutionary movements also took place in Michoacan, Costa Chica, and elsewhere. Robberies and murders became quite common in town and country. *Cor. Fed. Mex.*, 1828, July 8, 17, 19; *La Palanca*, iii. no. 85.

⁴⁶ Sept. 17th. This outlawry was revoked March 17, 1829. *Dublan and Lozano, Legis. Mex.*, ii. 79-80, 97-8.

⁴⁷ He afterward regretted it. 'Esta revolucion ó pronunciamiento lo combinó, dirigió, y llevó á cabo, el autor de estas memorias. Hizo muy mal, lo confiesa ante Dios y los hombres.' *Zerecero, Revol. Mex.*, 109.

Villas, headed it with his battalion. They were seconded by Governor Zavala and General Lobato;⁴⁸ Guerrero himself demanding a change of the ministry, in order that the congress might freely decide the presidency question. Zavala had been hovering for some days near the capital with an armed force, though without committing hostile acts, and entered it undetected. The rebels occupied the ex-acordada building and the citadel.⁴⁹ The troops sent against them were under Colonel Inclan. On the morning of December 2, 1828, hostilities began, and the fight lasted till mid-day of the 4th, when the revolt triumphed. Then pillage was the order of the day. The léperos, taking advantage of the situation, raising the old cry of "Mueran los Españoles!" rushed to the Parian, where were the stores of the Spanish merchants, broke open the doors, and sacked it. In a short time over \$2,000,000 worth of property was carried off, and upward of 1,000 industrious persons were reduced to want. Many other commercial buildings were pillaged.⁵⁰ Victoria in vain attempted to arrest the outrages by going in person to the ex-acordada building, and pleading with the leaders. Meanwhile Pedraza secretly fled to Guadalajara, where he

⁴⁸ Lobato, after this revolution, was sent by the government to Guadalajara as comandante general, and died there early in 1829. He was of humble origin, and rose under favor of the revolution for independence; served in the first revolution, and was pardoned. He was, however, one of the first to join Iturbide in 1821. An ignorant man of small intellect, but a good soldier under an able chief, and faithful. *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, ii. 142.

⁴⁹ See plan of the city of Mexico, this volume.

⁵⁰ This was not foreseen. General Lobato, who was in command, Colonel García having been mortally wounded on the 3d, went to the Parian to stop the robberies, leaving Zavala in charge of the ex-acordada. At this moment Lieut-col. Vicente Gonzalez, an old soldier of the independence, who had been serving with the government force, was captured and brought to the ex-acordada. The enraged mob demanded his life. Zavala acceded, and Gonzalez was shot. *Zerecero, Revol. Mex.*, 109-10. The episode, a blot on Zavala's fame, is also mentioned by Tornel and Bustamante, who add that Zavala did likewise, out of personal revenge, shoot with a pistol Judge Juan de Raz y Guzman in the arm, and would have done the same with Senator Vargas had he been able to find him on that day. Victoria reproached Zavala for killing Gonzalez. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 245. Zavala himself, in *Revol. Mex.*, ii. 220 et seq., mentions the wounding of Raz in his own house 'á deshoras de la noche, y quizás creído de que Zavala haya tenido parte en su desgracia.' Raz did Zavala a good service in December 1829.

lived for some time in concealment. On the 2d of March, 1829, he embarked at Tampico for London, having previously resigned his right to the presidency.⁵¹ The result of this victory was that the congress, which assembled on the 1st of January, 1829, annulled the election of Gomez Pedraza, and chose Guerrero as the second president, Anastasio Bustamante being appointed vice-president. Thus was the national constitution rent, and the door opened for future excesses.

The retiring president had hoped to weather the storm, and recover his lost authority by the appointment of Guerrero as minister of war.⁵² The latter part of his administration was indeed stormy, and he seems to have become bewildered, an evidence of which is the step he took in going to the *ex-acordada* building to parley with rebels.

The country felt the shock of the lawless acts of the mob at the capital. But the yorkinos looked at the matter in a different light, claiming that a new era of peace, prosperity, and happiness had been secured for Mexico.

Victoria's term ended on the 1st of April, 1829, and he retired from office, never again to appear in public life except in an inferior role.⁵³ It must be said in his favor that though he was often influenced by favorites, he never was false to his principles. During his rule were founded the order of the *Águila Negra*, and the York rite lodges, the former by a Bethlehemite friar named Simon Cruz, whom Victoria banished to Yucatan, where he died. In the organization of the lodges Victoria really took but little

⁵¹ *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 130.

⁵² Guerrero held that office only a few days and resigned it, that he might not be suspected of looking after his personal interests. He was then given the command of the forces in Puebla, Oajaca, and Vera Cruz. *Id.*, 131.

⁵³ He was governor of Puebla, which position he resigned to become a senator for Durango, his native state. In March 1839 he served as one of the two Mexican plenipotentiaries to negotiate a treaty of peace with France. *Blanchard and Dauzat, San Juan de Ulúa*, 493-4.

action, and yet he has been accused of lending them much protection.⁵⁴

Victoria retired to the hacienda El Jobo, which was wrongly supposed to be his own property. In the last four years of his life he repeatedly had epileptic attacks. At Tlapacoyam, in 1842, his sufferings, both on account of his country's troubles and of disease, were so great that for a change of climate he went in the latter part of the year to Teziutlan, and in February 1843 to Perote, where he expired on the 21st of March, his death being caused by enlargement of the heart. The body was embalmed and deposited in a vault in the chapel of the fortress, whence it was taken to Puebla in 1862. Santa Anna, when president, decreed⁵⁵ that Victoria's name should be inscribed in letters of gold in the chamber of deputies, and that a monument should be erected at the national expense for the patriot's remains in Santa Paula; but it seems that it was never done.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ His inveterate contemner, Bustamante, attributes to his errors all the subsequent revolutions and miseries of Mexico.

⁵⁵ *Dublan and Lozano, Legis. Mex.*, iv. 412.

⁵⁶ *Breve Reseña Histórica de los Acontecimientos mas notables de la Nacion Mexicana*. Mex., 1852. 8vo. 424 pp. The author, José María Tornel y Mendivil, was governor of the state of Mexico in 1828, and previously private secretary of President Victoria. He had intended to give a full history of Mexico from the date of the independence down to 1852, but death suddenly overtook him when he had only written the events to 1828 inclusive, thus leaving his work a fragment; in fact, nothing but a rapid improvisation, though as far as it goes very useful. The eventful year 1828 is fully treated, and a review of occurrences in general from the beginning of the war of independence is also given. He mostly narrates his own observations in a clear and elegant style, quoting a little from other authorities. His work was first given to the public in the columns of the *Ilustracion* newspaper. Lucas Alamán took advantage of it to correct or amplify some facts—of which Tornel was better informed than any one else could be—but repeatedly disagrees with him in qualifying them.

CHAPTER III.

DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN RELATIONS.

1823-1829.

RECOGNITION BY FOREIGN POWERS—NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE POPE—TREATIES WITH UNITED STATES—POINSETT'S PUBLIC CAREER—HIS NOTES ON MEXICO—DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE—TREATIES WITH EUROPEAN NATIONS—HOSTILITY TO SPANIARDS—ROYAL PLAN OF RECONQUEST—ARENAS' PLOT—EXECUTIONS AND BANISHMENTS—EXPULSION OF SPANIARDS—SIEGE OF SAN JUAN DE ULÚA—THE SPANISH COMMANDER CAPITULATES—DEPARTURE OF THE SPANISH GARRISON—COMMODORE PORTER AND NAVAL OPERATIONS—THE WAR BRIG GUERRERO—SURRENDER OF SPANISH SHIPS ON THE PACIFIC

BEFORE proceeding further with the internal affairs of the country, I will give an account of her foreign relations during the first few years following the establishment of the independence. The earliest diplomatic act of the new nation was the recognition of the Colombian republic as a free and independent power.¹ Her accredited minister was Miguel Santa María, whose unpleasant relations with Iturbide have been already mentioned, as well as his reinstatement in his position.

Congress having authorized the appointment of envoys to foreign governments, their instructions were given them by the regency, and did not require the sanction of the congress. Those, however, given to the envoy accredited to the holy see were specially framed by and with the advice and consent of the archbishops and bishops, and afterward submitted to

¹ April 29, 1822, *Mex. Col. Leyes, Órd. y Dec.*, ii. 38-9.

the approbation of congress.² The government's choice fell on a most learned and worthy ecclesiastic, Pablo Francisco Vasquez, a canon of Puebla, Luis G. Gordoia being made his secretary. The pope, however, refused to receive him, or even allow him to pass the gates of Rome. The envoy continued his efforts, though without avail. Worldly interests swayed the papal counsels. Leo XII. valued too much the good-will of the sovereign, who after the events of 1814 and 1815 restored the pope to his states in Italy. The death of Leo XII. and accession of Pius VIII. did not improve matters, and Mexican affairs remained stationary for several years.³

Early in January 1823 the separate independence of Central America was recognized, and in July the executive was empowered by the congress to enter into such relations with foreign powers as it might deem expedient and conducive to the recognition by such powers of Mexican independence.⁴ A treaty of amity, league, and confederation was entered into with the republic of Colombia, which with some amendments was approved by the Mexican congress the next year, and a minister appointed to that republic.⁵ The opportunity for opening relations with foreign powers was now favorable. The government of the United States gave a courteous reception to José Manuel Zozaya, the minister accredited thereto by Agustín I., but took no action beyond the general declaration recognizing the independence of all the new American states, two years before England did so.⁶ President John Quincy Adams despatched on a visit to

² May 4, 1822. *Id.*, ii. 40, 95-6, iii. 63-4, 113; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Mex.*, 71.

³ *Tornel, Breve Reseña Hist.*, 59-73; *Santangelo, Cong. Pan.*, 73-5.

⁴ Colonel Anastasio Torrens was then sent on a diplomatic mission to the United States, and Francisco de B. Mignoni commissioned as consul general in London. *Mex. Col. Leyes, Órd. y Dec.*, ii. 152, 163, iii. 2, 63; *Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide*, 247.

⁵ October 3, 1823. *Mex. Col. Leyes, Órd. y Dec.*, iii. 6, 10, 14; *Niles' Register*, xxix. 236-7.

⁶ Particulars may be seen in *Zozaya, Apelacion*, 5; *Am. St. Pap.*, iv. 848-50; *Gaz. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 237-8; *Mora, Rev. Mex.*, i. 347.

Mexico Joel R. Poinsett to study the condition of public affairs. In Poinsett's report, after his return, though with a certain prudent reserve regarding the men in power and the state of the country, he clearly predicted the end of the imperial rule, and the government at Washington acted accordingly.⁷ Mr Poinsett returned as minister to Mexico early in 1825, and became very influential.⁸ The first treaty concluded between the two republics was on the 12th of January, 1828, to fix the boundary line. The matter was negotiated by Sebastian Camacho and José Ignacio Esteva for Mexico, and Poinsett for the United States. Its real aim was to declare and confirm the validity of a treaty made in Washington on the 22d of February, 1819, between Spain and the United States, before Mexico had ceased to be an appendage of the Spanish crown. That treaty established the Sabine River, at the ex-

⁷ Pablo Obregon was accredited later as Mexican minister to Washington, where he won the respect of all.

⁸ Poinsett had travelled in Europe and the holy land. Wherever he went he left pleasant memories. He had been in South America, and proved himself a good soldier in the war of Chilian independence. As a member of the American congress from South Carolina he advocated the recognition as independent nations of the former Hispano-American colonies. Liberty with him was no Utopia. As a diplomate he was an able one, uniting frankness with a moderate circumspection, never resorting to untruth or mental reservation. He was keen-sighted, could see into characters, measure men's abilities, and weigh their value. *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, i. 339-40; *Id.*, *Manif. de los principios polít.*, 1-23. Tornel, *Breve Reseña Hist.*, 39, while acknowledging Poinsett's fine talents and soldierly merits, like many other Mexicans, accuses him of having taken advantage of an inexperienced people to mislead them, so that later in life numbers who had trusted him had reason to regret their infatuation. Poinsett's service in the American congress lasted from 1821 to 1825; he was secretary of war under Van Buren, and died Dec. 14, 1851. *Lanman's Dict. U. S. Cong.*, 384. Poinsett published a work entitled *Notes on Mexico*, an 8vo vol., containing such statistical data as he gathered on his first journey in 1822, with descriptions of the places he hurriedly visited, and also a sketch of the revolution and translations of official reports on the condition of the country at the time of his visit. The book likewise gives the judgment he formed of men and affairs. His sojourn there was a short one, but long enough to enable him with his remarkable keen-sightedness to foresee coming events, and to pave the way for his country to have a greater influence in Mexico than the commercial nations of Europe. He also later on published in Mexico, 1827, a pamphlet of 16 pp., entitled *Exposicion de la conducta política de los Estados Unidos para con las nuevas repúblicas de America*; its object being to defend his government and his own course in Mexico against certain charges preferred against them by the legislature of Vera Cruz, whose suspicions he declared to be entirely unfounded.

treme east of Texas, as the dividing line. The period for the ratification of the new treaty having elapsed, an additional article validated it on the 5th of April, 1831, and the whole was ratified by the two governments in 1832. A treaty also of amity, commerce, and navigation was entered into April 5, 1831, which was ratified by the high contracting parties respectively January 14, and April 5, 1832.⁹ Several questions occurred in the years 1826 and 1827 that were subjects of discussion between the two governments, such as claims of American citizens for robberies, impressment of seamen, and seizure and confiscation of vessels by Mexican authorities, of which it is unnecessary to give details here.¹⁰

Great Britain at the congresses convened in Europe to treat of Spanish American affairs had reserved her right to act as best suited her interests, manifesting a resolve to prevent the intervention of any power save Spain, to which she had left the priority of right to obtain by negotiation what advantages she could.¹¹ Had it not been for the energetic and timely declarations of England and the United States against interference by the European powers, constituting the so-called holy alliance, France, in view of the successes obtained in Naples, Piedmont, and Spain, would

⁹ Both treaties officially published by the Mexican government, March 7, 1833. *Mex. Derecho Intern.*, 1st pt 122-50; *Am. St. Pap.*, *For. Rel.*, iv. 422-626, 650-703, v. 907-10; *Id.* (new set), vi. 366, 578-613, 946-62, 1006-14; *U. S. Govt.*, cong. 19, ses. 1, H. Ex. Doc., 142, vol. viii.; *Id.*, cong. 22, ses. 1, H. Ex. Doc., 225, 22-7, in *Mex. Treaties*, i. no. 1; *U. S. Pap.*, ii. no. 25, cong. 19, ses. 2; *Cong. Debates*, 1825-6, i. ind. p. viii.; *U. S. Acts and Resol.*, 141-2, App. 24-30, 22d cong. 1st sess.; *U. S. Govt.*, cong. 16, ses. 2, H. Jour. (Index Spain and S. Am.); *Niles' Reg.*, xxvii. 270, 334, xxix. 334, xxx. 202, 421, xxxi. 136, 301, xxxiii. 19, xxxiv. 245, xxxv. 20, 41, 71, 213, 242, xl. 228-9; *Am. Ann. Reg.*, 1831-2, Pub. Doc. 76-91; *Mex. Mem. Rel.*, 1827, 10-11; *Id.*, 1828, 6; *Id.*, 1831, 2-5; *Mex. Mem. Hacienda*, 1831, 113-5; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1826, May 16, 2-3, and June 6, 3-4; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1836, Jan. to June, 455-60; *Cor. Fed. Mex.*, 1827, Feb. 19, 3; 1828, Jan. 13, 4; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, ii. 456-69; *Tornet, Breve Reseña Hist.*, 79-80; *Mora, Revol. Mex.*, 358-68; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, ii. no. 33, 3-4, vi. 160-7; *Poussin's The United States*, 358-68; *Id.*, *De la Puissance*, i. 412-3; *Santangelo, Cong. Pan.*, 145-61; *Cuevas, Porvenir Mex.*, 373-82; *Mofra, Explor. Oregon*, ii. 464-6; *Filasola, Mem.*, i. 90-108.

¹⁰ *Niles' Reg.*, xxxi. 23, 178, 310, xxxii. 79.

¹¹ In 1822 the Spanish court addressed itself to foreign powers deprecating precipitancy in their decision on the subject. *Manif. Gob. Esp.*, 1-8.

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have attempted to accomplish in America what she had effected in Spain by restoring Fernando's absolute power. Mexico would of course have been among the first to experience the effects of Spain's vindication of her supposed rights. England, in view of the victories won by the Colombians over the Spanish forces in Peru, and of the prospect of a stable peace, concluded that the time had come to make a formal recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies in America. Accordingly Mr Canning, the principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, instructed the diplomatic agents of his government at foreign courts to make known its resolve to enter into direct relations with the new governments of America, and to negotiate with them treaties of amity, commerce, and navigation,¹² to which effect instructions were issued to commissioners previously appointed. Prior to such action, early in January 1824, Lionel Hervey, H. G. Ward, and Charles O'Gorman¹³ had been sent out as commissioners to study and report upon the political condition of Mexico. The agents were received in Vera Cruz with high honors by Victoria. On their transit to the capital the route through Puebla was avoided, that city being still agitated and manifesting hostility to foreigners. In Mexico they were entertained by the executive. Unfortunately, they were present during Lobato's revolt, and it is understood that they sent the government a note to the effect that they would leave the country if those disorders were not forthwith quelled, and protection afforded to foreigners.¹⁴

The British court soon after frankly entered into

¹² *Alaman, Mem.*, 3-4; *Tornel, Breve Reseña Hist.*, 32; *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, i. 322-8.

¹³ Ward was subsequently accredited as chargé d'affaires to Mexico, and O'Gorman made consul-general.

¹⁴ Judging by results, their reports to the British government must have been encouraging. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 782; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 217, 221; *Id., Hist. Iturbide*, 195; *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, i. 269; *Ward's Mex.*, ii. 171-2, 175-7, 236, 262; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méj.*, 51; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1825, 177; *Gregory's Hist. Mex.*, 46.

relations of friendship and trade, and its diplomatic agent was received in Mexico with every mark of respect, the Mexican minister in London having an equally friendly reception.¹⁵

Mr Canning's treaty instructions were given in a draught which was to serve for all the Spanish American republics. In the negotiations conducted by Alaman and Esteva on the part of Mexico they prevailed on the British commissioners to embody in the treaty certain clauses which were then repugnant to British policy, such as that the flag covered the merchandise. Moreover, the time the treaty was to be in operation was limited, and privileges were stipulated for Mexican and other Hispano-American vessels and merchandise. Mexico also reserved the right of conceding advantages to the Spanish flag whenever Spain should recognize her independence. The clause to allow Great Britain the same benefits as should at any future time be granted to the most favored nation was omitted. Such terms proved inadmissible in London, and the treaty was not approved. The English government next sent Mr Morrier, the historian of Persia, and a distinguished diplomat, to make a treaty according to the original draught. Morrier succeeded in having the negotiations transferred to London, though President Victoria was well satisfied with the course pursued by his negotiators. Sebastian Camacho was now intrusted with the business on the part of Mexico at the British court. A treaty was concluded establishing reciproc-

¹⁵ José Mariano Michelena was appointed minister when he ceased to act for the executive. Vicente Rocafuerte, a native of Ecuador, became the secretary of the legation. Bustamante and several others objected to both appointments for good reasons, the chief against Michelena being that he would prove objectionable to the British government, as turned out to be the case. Rocafuerte cost the nation many thousands of dollars. The legation went to England on the British frigate *Valorous*, April 21, 1824. Michelena had orders to buy ships, arms, and clothing. Though neither he nor Rocafuerte showed the best judgment in their purchases and other money transactions, their integrity was not impeached. They both defended their conduct. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 231-2; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 783; *Tornel, Breve Reseña Hist.*, 78; *Michelena, Explic.*, 8-9, 29, 133-5; *Rocafuerte, Regalo*, 8-13.

ity, and leaving unlimited the time it was to be in force.¹⁶ Thus was Mexico placed at great disadvantage for the future development of a national marine, and maritime trade.

France sent to America in January 1823 two secret agents, Julien Schmaltz and Achille de la Motte, to procure information on the political state of Colombia and Mexico, and to work in favor of erecting therein thrones for members of the French reigning family; or if such a scheme should prove impracticable, to enter into treaties of commerce with the two countries. The agents' plans were not detected in Colombia, it seems, but in Mexico, where they presented themselves as tourists, they were arrested, their papers were seized, and though nothing was actually discovered that could be detrimental to Mexico, the government treated them harshly.¹⁷ The French could not be indifferent to England's superior influence in Mexico; and though closely allied with Spain by the interests of their reigning families, the needs of her commerce demanded some sort of communication with the new republic. In the endeavor to gain this point, the commander of the French naval forces stationed at Martinique was instructed to appoint a provisional commercial agent to reside in Mexico, which was done; but the Mexican government refused to recognize him, and in future paid no heed to credentials of such a nature. In fact, no proposition from any government would be entertained unless based upon an absolute recognition of Mexican independence.¹⁸ Finally the Mexican min-

¹⁶ Ratified by Mexico Oct. 27, 1827. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1826, May 13, Sept. 7, 3; Alaman's Rep. to Cong., in *Niles' Reg.*, xxviii. 169-71, xxix. 7, 39, 139, xxx. 340-1, 368, xxxiii. 18; *Mex. Mem. Rel.*, 1826, 4-10; *Id.*, 1827, 3-11; *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, ii. 13-15; *Tornel, Breve Reseña Hist.*, 55; *Santangelo, Cong. Pan.*, 145-7; *Macgregor's Prog. Am.*, i. 684-7; *Annals Brit. Leg.*, 1866, 333; *Cor. Fed. Mex.*, 1827, Nov. 26, 2-4; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, ii. no. 7, 3, no. 9, 3, no. 20, no. 26, 3-4; *North Am. Rev.*, xxxii. 319-26; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1829, 128-9, 160; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, ii. 19-25; *Mora, Revol. Mex.*, 345-84; *Ocios Españ. Emigrad.*, iv. 242-3, v. 213-14; *Cuevas, Porvenir Mex.*, 287-8; *Ortega, Mem. Rel. Dept.*, 55-6.

¹⁷ *Mora, Revol. Mex.*, i. 347; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 295.

¹⁸ On the 4th of May, 1826, the congress passed an act enjoining that

ister in London, Sebastian Camacho, was invited by the French government to enter into a sort of arrangement, to which it would not give the name of treaty, but merely that of provisional convention. By this means the chief points were arranged for the regulation of trade between the two countries. It was equally important to France, whose commercial interests were daily growing larger in Mexico, and to the republic, as a preliminary step toward the formal recognition by the former, and the conclusion of a treaty embodying the usual words and forms of such instruments. Affairs remained in this state till 1828, when the French government concluded to despatch to Mexico a commissioner of the same character as that first sent out by England, to obtain data that might serve as a basis for future action. A serious political disturbance, however, in Mexico, prevented the agent from going to his destination. Then followed the political changes of 1830 in France. Meantime, Señor Gorostiza, Mexican minister in London, under instructions of his government, went to Paris, and negotiated a treaty which the Mexican government afterward failed to ratify.¹⁹ Treaties of amity, commerce, and navigation were, however, concluded with several European nations during this period.²⁰

policy. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1826, May 18, 2-3; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, ii. no. 12, 6; *Ramírez y Sesma, Col. Dec.*, 299; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, i. 781.

¹⁹ Mexico's equality with other sovereign nations was at stake, the alternate priority in the heading of the two drafts of the treaty having been refused by the French minister of state. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, ii. no. 12, 5; *Mora, Revol. Mex.*, i. 349-52; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 71; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1826, Nov. 25, 3; *Cor. Fed. Mex.*, 1827, Aug. 18, 1-3; *La Palanca*, 1826, Dec. 11, 4; *Niles' Reg.*, xxvii. 218.

²⁰ Prussia in 1826 had attempted the subterfuge of keeping a commercial agent in Mexico without a treaty having been entered into between the two nations, but it was not permitted. In following years treaties of amity, commerce, and navigation were made with that kingdom and others, namely, Hanover, Denmark, and the Netherlands; and later with the Hanseatic cities, Wurtemberg, Bavaria, etc. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1826, May, 13, 4; *Mex. Col. Ley.*, 1829, 30, 35-46, 55-73; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1833, 63-73, 137-56, 226, 273-322, 464; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, ii. 136-9, 143-9, 184-94, 334-5, 491-4; *Mex. Mem. Rel.*, 1833, 1-5, 16-20; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., vi. 102; *Niles' Register*, xxxii. 74-85.

The policy of Mexico toward foreigners showed a marked distrust of them; and indeed, the masses of the population were anything but friendly to aliens in general, and to Americans in particular. Foreigners were subjected to constant annoyance, little protection being afforded to their persons or property.²¹ The position of Spaniards in Mexico became more perilous every day, and the system of despoiling them was constantly gaining supporters. The question was brought to a climax by a motion made in congress by Ramos Arizpe in 1824, to deprive all Spaniards of their public offices. The consideration that they had embraced the American cause, and had been guaranteed the rights and privileges of Mexican citizens, was ignored; their enemies were also unmindful of the evil consequences to the country, both in a moral and material point of view, which would result from such an act of injustice, as well as from the needless loss by persecution of so many citizens, a large number of whom had Mexican wives and children, while the greater portion were engaged in some useful industry productive of wealth to the young nation. Blind hatred caused justice and policy alike to be disregarded.²²

The passions of the rabble were constantly kept at fever heat by a portion of the press, and all efforts of the government to check it were unavailing.²³ The utmost vigilance was practised to prevent disturbances of the peace, notwithstanding which, on the night of the 28th of May, 1824, a revolution was on the point

²¹ June 5, 1826, the government showed its distrust in a most stringent passport law. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1826, June 13, 1-2. Reiterated in March, 1828. *Dispos. Var.*, iii. 141-2.

²² Guadalajara in June 1823, and the congress of Yucatan on the 10th of August, 1824, attempted to defeat these projects. *Dispos. Var.*, iii. 116; *Yuc. Manifiesto del Cong. del Est.*, p. xiii.; *Navarro, Iturbide*, 224-7.

²³ The most virulent was one whose motto was, 'Ó se destierra el coyote, ó mata nuestras gallinas;' hence the Spaniards' nickname of coyotes. The editor was brought to trial; but the jury, intimidated by a mob, acquitted him. Another paper of the same stamp was 'El Borbonismo sin máscara.' However, a Frenchman who edited the *Archivista* was expelled for making remarks against the government, which was an arbitrary measure. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 234-6; *Id.*, *Hist. Iturbide*, 233-4.

of breaking out in Mexico, headed by a lieutenant, Basilio Valdés, to overthrow the government, plunder and slaughter the Spaniards, and set fire to the Parian. The plot was fortunately detected, Valdés being arrested and executed, though much influence was brought to bear on Bravo, then president, to save the prisoner's life.

In the midst of the electoral agitation in 1824, the comandante general of Oajaca, Antonio Leon, a man who had rendered good service in the war of independence, and his brother Manuel, attempted there to carry out Lobato's plan of removing the old Spaniards from office, but in a more alarming way, for the attempt was begun with the murder of Cayetano Machado, collector of taxes at Huajuapán, while journeying with his family toward Oajaca. He was assailed by Sergeant Trinidad Reina, and put to death in the most shocking manner. The executive looked on this movement as a most dangerous one, and Victoria was sent to quell it,²⁴ leaving Mexico on the 8th of August. While on his march he learned that a Spanish fleet with reinforcements for San Juan de Ulúa was off the coast, and immediately despatched a considerable part of his troops to Vera Cruz, proceeding with only 250 infantry and 50 horsemen to Huajuapán, the birthplace of Leon, whose influence there was great. Leon, though at the head of a force three times that number, listened to reason, and the trouble was ended without further bloodshed. This happy result increased the esteem in which Victoria was held by his countrymen.²⁵

²⁴ Tornel, *Breve Reseña Hist.*, 22-3, accuses Alaman and Mier y Terán of having caused this selection with a sinister object. Alaman denies the charge, asserting that Victoria asked for the appointment, and Bravo acceded, feeling it to be out of place to oppose him. *Hist. Méj.*, v. 809.

²⁵ Before returning to Mexico, Victoria, on the 5th of September, at Huajuapán, in a proclamation congratulated the people of Oajaca on peace secured without bloodshed. *Gac. Gob. Sup.*, 1824, Sept. 18, 169-70. Sergeant Reina and Guadalupe La Madrid, who appeared as the instigators of Machado's murder, were executed. They implicated the brothers Leon, who were tried in Mexico. Antonio vindicated himself, and Manuel was pardoned by congress. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 810.

A number of discontented Cubans sojourning in Mexico had urgently appealed to the government in 1823 to despatch 1,500 men to their island, which they declared was ripe for independence; but they gave so much publicity to their plans that even if Mexico had been able to furnish the men, fleet, and a competent leader, a failure might be reasonably expected.²⁶ The project was consequently abandoned as impracticable.

It will be remembered that the Spanish commissioners, Ramon Osés and Santiago Irisarri, had arrived at San Juan de Ulúa shortly before the fall of Iturbide. The circumstances connected with that event prevented the imperial government from coming to any arrangement with them. Afterward Victoria was commissioned to treat with Osés and Irisarri, with whom he held conferences at Jalapa, but the only result obtained was a provisional treaty of commerce, for which Victoria had been duly empowered by the government and congress. The Spaniards returned to San Juan de Ulúa with Mexican passports, and the constitutional régime being shortly after upset in Spain by the king with the aid of a powerful French army under the royal duc d'Angoulême, all efforts toward a peaceful solution of the difficulties between the mother country and Mexico were discontinued. Soon after, rumors came from Habana of an expedition about to sail for the invasion of Yucatan, which the deputies of that state assured the government would be well received by the inhabitants. The people of Yucatan, especially those of Campeche, suffered by the interruption of trade with Cuba, and were for this reason dissatisfied with the political change. Santa Anna, then governor and comandante general, heeding the demands of the merchants and others, permitted trade to be carried on, in Spanish

²⁶ Santa Anna was thought of as the proper leader; and it was said that he contemplated leading an expedition against Cuba from Yucatan. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, ii. no. 6, 7, no. 11, 5; *Id.*, *Hist. Iturbide*, 231; *Zavala, Rev. Mex.*, i. 295-9; *Pedruza, Manif.*, 28-9; *Tornel, Breve Reseña Hist.*, 77.

vessels, between that peninsula and Cuba, though contrary to law; it is even asserted that a number of such vessels arrived, August 18, 1824, at Sisal, escorted by Spanish men-of-war to the entrance of the port.²⁷

Fernando was no doubt planning the reconquest of his former colony, and conferred upon the ex-viceroy Apodaca the appointment of captain-general of Cuba, to carry out the scheme. The count, however, did not come out to Cuba.²⁸

A few days after the constituent congress began its labors, a plot was divulged, at the head of which was a friar named Joaquin Arenas.²⁹ This individual, on the 19th of January, 1827, approached Ignacio Mora, comandante general of the federal district, inviting him to join in a plan for the restoration of the Spanish government, and the protection of the true faith, which he claimed to be imperilled by the freedom of the press and the introduction of heretical books. He threatened Mora with death if he divulged the plot to the government, assuring him that it had ramifications throughout the country, and was on the eve of execution. Mora, of course, at once apprised the president, and it was arranged that he should invite Arenas to a second interview, and that Colonel Tornel, the president's private secretary, and Molinos del Campo, the governor of the federal district, hidden from sight, should be present at the conference. The

²⁷ The same men-of-war that had brought relief to the garrison of San Juan de Ulúa. *Yuc. Manif. Cong. del Est.*, 39-53, 78-85; *Yuc. Comp. Hist.*, 14-25; *Beltrami, Mex.*, ii. 355-8; *Barbachano, Mem. Camp.*, 40-3, ap. 9-14; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 67-70; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 238; *Id.*, *Voz de la Patria*, ii. no. 6, 2-3. Under the pretext that the invasion of Yucatan would imperil Mexico's nationality, a motion was made in congress to empower the governors to remove from their homes all persons suspected of hostility to independence. The motion was rejected. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, ii. nos. 5 and 8.

²⁸ King Fernando, by his ambassador in London, the duque de San Carlos, according to the statement of the latter's agent, José Mariano Torrente, solicited the aid of Iturbide, but without avail. *Torrente, Revol. Hisp. Am.*, iii. 365; *Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide*, 228, 252-3; *Id.*, *Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 255.

²⁹ A barefooted Dieguino from Spain with a bad record; his last offence being that of counterfeiting coin at a place that was disguised as a soap factory in Mexico.

friar was caught in the trap and arrested. He stated in prison that the plot had been formed in Madrid, and that King Fernando VII. had sent out a *comisario regio*, who was already on Mexican territory. The royal commissioner's name was not divulged.³⁰ Another friar, a Dominican named Martinez, and two other men, Segura and David, were also arrested as accomplices,³¹ and soon after, March 22d, orders were issued that generals Echávarri and Negrete should be taken as prisoners, the former to the castle of Perote, and the latter to that of Acapulco. General Gregorio Arana, and many other officers, the priests Torres, Hidalgo, and Friar José Amat, as well as a number of civilians, were implicated. All of them were 'old' Spaniards. Their trial was by court-martial, and Arenas, Martinez, Segura, David, Arana and others were sentenced to death.³² Many officers were degraded or lost their commissions, and a number of the prisoners were sentenced to various penalties.³³ Generals Echávarri and Negrete, deprived of their rank, were sent into exile.³⁴

³⁰ His name was afterward understood to be Eugenio Aviraneta, who entered the country in 1825, and worked in the office of the *Veracruzano Libre*. It was never known where he got his appointment, whether from Madrid or from the captain-general of Cuba, or only assumed it to give himself importance. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 827. Aviraneta escaped. The friendly reception given him in Cuba by the authorities, and his subsequent coming to Mexico with the rank of *intendente de ejército* of Barradas' expedition, tend to confirm the friar's statement.

³¹ The men arrested as chief conspirators were mere agents, not the masters. The plan and other details may be seen in *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 390-5. This authority maintains that the conspiracy existed, and that the trials were perfectly in order.

³² Arana to the end, and with his last breath, declared his innocence. Able and impartial lawyers could find in the evidence nothing to justify the penalty that was inflicted on him. *Zavala, Revol. Méx.*, ii. 35; *Antepara, Defensa legal*, 1-77.

³³ Many cases were still pending August 29, 1829, when President Guerrero, in use of his extraordinary powers, ordered them closed, as they then were commuting the penalty of death, where it had appeared to be merited, for others that the courts should designate. *Dublan and Lozano, Legis. Méx.*, ii. 153.

³⁴ Echávarri found refuge in the United States, where he eked out a support by giving Spanish lessons. He would have died in misery but for the assistance afforded him by Iturbide's widow. It is hard to believe that Echávarri threw away his past services to become a traitor to his adopted country. Spain always paid those who worked for the restoration of her sway in America. How is it, then, that Echávarri was not the recipient of her favors? Ne-

The political party known as the *escoceses*, who were accused of complicity in the plot, made no answer to the charge, but denied *in toto* the existence of the conspiracy; and in their turn asserted that the ministers Gomez Pedraza and Ramos Arizpe, and the *yorkinos*, had made a mountain out of a mole-hill for the purpose of effecting their long-meditated schemes against the Spaniards, and of destroying at the same time their political rivals. The *escoceses* even absurdly accused Poinsett of having suggested the idea to Arenas. Possibly the conspiracy would hardly deserve more than a passing notice in history, but for its results. As a fact, it was the precedent, if not the very origin, of the long series of disturbances and violations of personal rights which distracted the country during so many years.³⁵

At this time the question of expelling the Spaniards was moved in the legislature of Mexico. Old wounds were reopened, and every means resorted to for keeping up the excitement against the Spaniards, who were accused of being incessant conspirators against the national independence, and for that reason ought to be forced to leave the country. Victoria did nothing to allay the excitement, and Guerrero promoted that measure with all his influence; Gomez Pedraza did the same, though less openly. Serious tumults occurred in Ajusco, Apam, Toluca, and Aca-pulco, which served as bad examples for the rest

grete resided for some years in New York, leading a quiet life, without communicating with the Spanish authorities, as Tornel, then Mexican minister in Washington, afterward testified. Later he went to live in Bordeaux, where he indignantly rejected a proposition from his former rival, General Cruz, to reënter the Spanish service. May 23, 1835, the Mexican congress restored them to their rights and rank, and permission was given Negrete to return to Mexico. *Dublan and Lozano, Legis. Mex.*, ii. 52.

³⁵ The following authorities have been consulted on this episode: *Padre Arenas, Causa Contra*, 1-117; *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, ii. 6-11, 17-18, 34-5; *Tornel, Breve Reseña Hist.*, 86-108, 114, 163; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 825-34; *Gac. Gob. Mex.*, 1827, Feb. 8, 1-2; *El Amigo del Pueblo*, vol. i.-iii. *passim*; *El Observador de la Rep. Mex.*, i. 87-108, 151-76, 187-213, 415-49, ii. 37-74; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, ii. nos 18, 20; *Correo Semanario*, i. 136-42, 168-9, 188-91, 236-7; *Cor. Fed. Mex.*, 1827, Jan. to June, 1828, June 28; *La Palanca*, 1827, Jan. to June, ii. nos 14, 36, 42; *Arenas (El Padre), Causas*, 1-128; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 126-7; and a large number of others.

of the country, since no armed force was sent to put them down. Governor Zavala of the state of Mexico was also accused of favoring the hostility toward the Spaniards, but he explicitly denied it in the lodges and in official addresses to the legislature.³⁶ The rioters of Ajusco and Toluca retired to their homes, but those of Apam and Acapulco continued in arms. Even the state of Vera Cruz decreed the dismissal of Spaniards from public office.³⁷ Leaving the subject of Spaniards to the legislative authority was tantamount to a decision against them. The legislature of Jalisco was the first to decree their expulsion; that of Mexico imitated it, and in the course of time the legislatures of all the other states followed the example.³⁸

The final decree of expulsion, dated December 20, 1827, was issued by the national congress in obedience to the demands of the state legislatures, but not without opposition in both houses on the part of some prominent members. But for the pressure of state governors, there would have been no majority in favor of the bill. The law as passed, fortunately for the country's good name, contained no clause confiscating property or prohibiting its exportation by the owner.³⁹

³⁶ He declares that he was the only one of the yorkino party to oppose the general ostracism. *Revol. Mex.*, ii. 30-4. Tornel, while acknowledging that Zavala made such an assertion, says that he acted differently, and when Vice-governor Veramendi and some deputies made use of the poisoned weapon, he regretted that they deprived him of the fatal popularity that arbitrary measures would have secured him. *Breve Reseña Hist.*, 166.

³⁷ It was also provided that all Spaniards should be registered and kept under surveillance. *Cor. Fed. Mex.*, 1827, Dec. 6 and 13; *La Palanca*, 1827. Dec. 5, 3-4; iii. 98-9.

³⁸ The Spaniards found themselves ostracized throughout the country before the federal congress adopted a final action regarding them. *Tornel, Breve Reseña Hist.*, 166; *Mora, Obras Sueltas*, ii. 254-6, 260-2; *Cor. Fed. Mex.*, 1827, June 19 to Dec. 28; *Dispos. Var.*, iii. 137; *Alvarez, Manif.*, 115-16; *Puebla, Dec. y Ord.*, 149-52.

³⁹ The law required the expelled Spaniards to leave the country within six months. The exceptions from the effects of the law were: 1. Spaniards having Mexican wives and living with them; 2. Those having children not natives of Spain; 3. Those over 60 years of age; 4. Those physically and permanently incapacitated. The general government could also, after consulting the governor of the respective state, except such Spaniards as had rendered distinguished services to the national independence, and shown themselves well

President Victoria was not hostile to the Spaniards from the mere fact of their nationality; he had, on the contrary, shown favor to many of them who served under him. He abhorred supporting severe measures against them, and only did so when his ministers represented the necessity of such measures for the safety of the nation, and even of the Spaniards themselves, whose lives were often in great peril from popular violence. It is doubtful if the government could have guided the masses into the path of right and justice. Nevertheless, the president endeavored to allay the convulsion, but his feeble efforts availed nothing—instance the results of his intercession when the Parian was sacked in December 1828. The consequences of that scandalous occurrence were that large amounts of capital were taken out of the country, and the merchants of Europe suspended their operations in Mexico.⁴⁰

disposed to the country's institutions; also their sons, if they followed the example of their fathers, and resided in the republic; likewise those practising some science, art, or useful industry therein, and free from suspicion. A previous law of May 10th had suspended all Spaniards from office. The other allowed pensions to such as did not go to reside in the enemy's country. The government from time to time, notably on the 20th of March, 1829, issued most stringent laws and orders against these subjects of Spain. A few were excepted, however, among whom were those who had served in congress, and had remained loyal to Mexico, and the officers and crews of the line-of-battle ship *Asia*. *Dublan and Lozano, Legis. Mex.*, ii. 12, 47-8, 66, 98-106; *Mex. Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1829-30, 9-10, 15-16; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 151; *Id.*, *Voz de la Patria*, i. nos. 4, 5, 11-19, ii. no. 16, iii. nos. 20-4, iv. nos. 2-9; *Arrillaga, Recop.* 1828, 35-206; 1829, 47-195, 205; *Tornel, Breve Reseña Hist.*, 166-71; *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, ii. 125; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1826, May 13; 1827, May 10; *Mex. Mem. Est. Libre*, 1828, p. 3.

⁴⁰ The constitution was thus shattered, and the germ of illegality became finally rooted. *Tornel, Breve Reseña, Hist.* 310-12, 332-424; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 839-43; *Dublan and Lozano, Legis. Mex.*, ii. 90-1; *Snarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 92-134; *El Espíritu Pú.*, 1828, Nov. 2 to Dec. 28; 1829, Jan. 1 to Feb. 28; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1828, 250, 252, 258, 273; 1829, 4-6, 45-6; 1830, 83-5, 113-14; *Gaz. de Mex.*, Extr., 1828, a, 1-4, b, 1; *Mex.*, *Col. Leyes*, 1829-30, 1-2, 8-14; *Dispos. Var.*, ii. 55-6, iii. 144, 149, 151; *Figueroca, J.*, *Observ. de un Ciud.*, 1-2; *Alvarez, J.*, *Manif.*, 116-18; *Puebla, Mem. al Cong.*, 11-14; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, i. nos. 2-10, 15-19, 25, 27, 29, 30, 35, iii. nos. 1-5, 8-17; *Id.*, *Hist. Iturbide*, 149-50, 241-2; *Id.*, *Hist. Gob. Victoria*, MS., 555-76; *Pedraza Manif.*, 52-92; *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, ii. 76-79, 83-149; *Id.*, *Manif. del Gob.*, 1-39; *Id.*, *Viage á los E. U.*, 6; *Santa Anna, Pronunc.*, 1-124, and 54 pp. of annexes; *Rincon, M.*, *Justificado*, 1-89 and 1-108; *Unda, P. V.*, *Esposic.*, 1-32; *Id.*, *Sorpresa del Campo*, 1-19; *El Parian, Prim. Represent. del Com.*, 1-65; *Molinos, Prision; Méx.*, *Juicio Impar.*, 1-32; *Méx. Manif. Disput.*, 4-7; *Cuevas, Porvenir Méx.*, 472-80; *Martinez, Revol. Méx.*, i.

With the overthrow of the constitution in Spain, a change had also taken place in the conduct of Lemaux, the commandant of San Juan de Ulúa, who had at one time manifested liberal ideas toward Mexico. Under the pretext that the Spanish envoys had been dismissed, he assumed a hostile attitude, opening fire upon the city of Vera Cruz, September 25, 1823. The Mexican government then resolved upon active war.⁴¹

In July 1824 a law was passed to issue letters of marque to national and foreign vessels to prey upon Spanish commerce; and orders were given to reënforce the army besieging San Juan de Ulúa, to prevent the landing and march of Spanish invaders into the interior, and at the same time to compel the speedy surrender of that fortress.

The command of the fort had devolved in 1825 on José Coppinger, and the comandancia general and governorship of Vera Cruz had been placed by the Mexican executive in charge of Miguel Barragan. The fortress since September 1823 had kept up more or less vigorously a bombardment of the city, without other results than the destruction of buildings, and depriving itself of the resources which the merchants of Vera Cruz had been wont to supply for the support of the garrison.

A little before this some of the armed ships arrived, which had been purchased in England with the pro-

146-8; *El Atleta*, 1829, Dec. 30; *Montesdeoca, Procl.*, in *Pap. Sueltos*, no. 13; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 185-91; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, 128-30; *Id.*, *Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 481-506, 509-10, 514-20.

⁴¹ Lemaux's action led to grave consequences, not only for the two nations, but notably for the Spaniards residing in Mexico. *Mex. Col. Leyes, Ord. y Dec.*, ii. 151-2, 205, iii. 3; *Mex. Manif. del Sup. Poder Ejec.*, 1-4; *Guia de Hac.*, iv. 297-300; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 703-775; *Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide*, 182-3; *Id.*, *Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 151-2, 202; *Zavala, Revol. Méx.*, i. 248; *Mora, Revol. Méx.*, i. 348, 370-1; *Mex. Mem. Rel.*, 1823, 6-9, 57; *Mex. Mem. Guerra*, 1823, 9-12, 15; *Am. St. Pap.* (new set), *Naval Aff.*, ii. 290-1; *Cuevas, Porvenir Méx.*, 273; *Pap. Sueltos*, no. 1; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 294-5, 303-4; *Id.*, *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 107; *Niles' Reg.*, xxiv. 217, 282-3, xxv. 155, 213-14, xxvi. 100. Yucatan opposed the prohibition of trade with Cuba, her very existence almost depending on that trade, but at the same time declared her submission to the national decree. *Yuc., Manifiesto del Cong. del Est.*, ix.-xi. 34-39.

ceeds of the second loan. They were commanded by British and American officers; to coöperate with them a squadron of gun-boats was formed, under command of Post-captain Pedro Saenz de Baranda, a native of Yucatan. The siege was now closely pressed;⁴² all communication between the fort and the shore was cut off, and the garrison found itself reduced to great straits. Food became scarce, and disease was decimating the men. Unless relief came immediately, the fort would have to surrender.⁴³ A Spanish fleet arrived from Cuba with troops and supplies to relieve the fort, but its commander, not considering himself sufficiently strong to attack the Mexican blockading squadron, returned to Habana.⁴⁴ Coppinger thus found himself compelled to sign a capitulation on the 18th of November,⁴⁵ 1825, under which the Spanish garrison was allowed to depart with the honors of war, being conveyed to Habana at the expense of the Mexican government. The latter received with the fortress all the artillery and other arms and ammunition existing therein.⁴⁶ Both

⁴² As early as Sept. 1823 a Mexican flotilla had taken the island of Sacrificios, though the possession was disputed by the fort. In Dec. 1824 the Spanish garrison was strictly confined within the walls of the fortress, and suffered for want of many of the necessities of life. *Méx. Mem. Marina*, 1824, 6-7.

⁴³ Alaman, *Hist. Méj.*, v. 820, assures us that at this crisis Victoria despatched his friend and minister of the treasury, José Ignacio Esteva, to Vera Cruz, to push the operations of the blockade, or as it was generally understood, 'para que la gloria de la rendición recayese en él,' thus depriving Barragan of the part that rightfully belonged to him. This must be taken with reserve. Tornel, *Breve Reseña Hist.*, 42, without detracting from Barragan, gives Esteva much credit for the success obtained.


⁴⁴ The delay in sending relief to the fort has been attributed to a Col Montenegro, said to have been a friend to the American cause, who had a position near the captain-general of Cuba. *El Veracruzano Libre*, 1828, June 8, 3, in *Pinart, Coll.*

⁴⁵ Tornel, *Breve Reseña Hist.*, 43, and Zavala, *Revol. Méx.*, i. 252, commit the error of giving the date of surrender on the 15th of September. The preliminaries of the capitulation 'en fuerza de las imperiosas circunstancias' in which the Spaniards were situated was signed in the city of Vera Cruz on the 17th by Miguel Suarez del Valle and Domingo Lagrú, commissioned therefor by Coppinger, and on the 18th ratified by Barragan and the Spanish commander. *Méx. Gaz. Extra.*, 1-3; *Gaz. de Méx.*, *Prim. Ép. Fed.*, i. 1825, no. 184, 1-3.

⁴⁶ Including also several launches, barges, boats, and a small schooner, also medicines, and the silver and other paraments of the church. *Alaman*, *Hist. Méj.*, v. 820-1; *Pedraza, Manif.*, 27-8; *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectif.*, 614-15;

the besiegers and besieged were entitled to much commendation for their bravery and constancy.

The whole nation received with enthusiastic joy the news of the capture of the sole point of Mexican territory which had remained in the possession of Spain. The officers, soldiers, and sailors, to whose good services was justly credited this result, were duly re-



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warded; and the Spanish flag that had waved over San Juan de Ulúa was deposited on the 12th of December in the Santuario de la Virgen de Guadalupe.

Vallejo, Col. Doc., i. no. 14, 1-2; *Ward's Mex.*, ii. 262; *Niles' Reg.*, xxix. 182, 231, 239, 276, 355-6, 390; *S. L. Potosí, Rel. de las Demont.*, 1-10; *Cor. Fed. Mex.*, Dec. 2, 1826, 1-3; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1826, May 2, 2-3; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 73. The sick Spaniards, namely, 148 soldiers and sailors, one treasury officer, and six others, were cared for in the hospitals of Vera Cruz.

But the expulsion of this last force did not end the strife between the mother country and the republic, though henceforth, for a considerable time, it was confined to maritime operations, in which Spanish commerce was the only victim. The Spaniards could not retaliate in this warfare, as there was no Mexican marine to prey upon.

A Mexican squadron, consisting of the frigate *Libertad*, and the brigs *Bravo*, *Victoria*, *Guerrero*, and *Hermon*, under the command of Commodore David Porter, sailed on the 5th of December from Vera Cruz for the coasts of Cuba, where a number of Spanish merchant vessels were captured. In order to play still greater havoc with Spanish commerce, already much harassed by Colombian privateers, Porter issued letters of marque, and even approached the coasts of Spain, causing damage to several of the enemy's ships.⁴⁷ The Spanish government in retaliation despatched some men-of-war to the gulf of Mexico, and on the 11th of February, 1828, an action occurred between the frigate *Lealtad* of 50 guns and 300 men, and the *Guerrero* of 22 guns, the latter being captured after her commander, David H. Porter, a relative of the commodore, had been killed. From an official report of Lieutenant Charles E. Hawkins, commanding the *Hermon*, to the commodore, it appears that on the previous day the *Guerrero* met a number of small craft conveyed by the brig *Marte* and schooner *Amalia*, of fourteen and five guns respectively, and opened fire on them off Mariel on the north coast of Cuba, and a short distance from Habana. The assailed sought the protection of a battery, which the *Guerrero* bombarded. But on the 11th the *Lealtad* came and chased the *Guerrero*, which kept up a running fight till she was overtaken and forced to haul down her colors.⁴⁸ This gallant action produced much

⁴⁷ *Cor. Fed. Mex.*, 1827, Feb. 20, April 14; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1827, Feb. 22; *La Palanca*, ii. no. 21; *Niles' Reg.*, xxxiii. 356.

⁴⁸ *Cor. Fed. Mex.*, 1828, March 24; *Niles' Reg.*, xxxiv. 8-9.
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enthusiasm in Mexico. Money was freely subscribed to build another vessel, to be also called the *Guerrero*.⁴⁹

Notwithstanding this misfortune, the *Bravo* and *Hermon* continued their cruise for some time; and it is asserted that the latter captured an armed schooner.⁵⁴

Privateers were fitted out to prey upon Spanish commerce, and schemes to prosecute this kind of warfare were contemplated as late as 1831.⁵¹ Nothing was effected, however. In 1825 the remnant of the Spanish navy in the Pacific Ocean fell into the possession of Mexico. The ship of the line *Asia* and the brig *Constante* escaped from Callao when that place was surrendered to the patriot forces of Colombia. On their way to Manila the crews mutinied, landed their chief officers in the Marianas Islands, and then brought the vessels to Monterey in California, already under the republican flag, where they were given up to Governor Luis Antonio Argüello.⁵²

⁴⁹ What became of those funds is unknown; 'las desgracias de cuanto tenía el nombre de *Guerrero* comenzaron á ser fatídicas.' *Tornel, Breve Reseña Hist.*, 270-3. The widows and orphans of the slain on the brig were pensioned. *Dublan and Lozano, Legis. Mex.*, ii. 65-6.

⁵⁰ The Mexican navy being disabled in 1829, Commodore Porter retired and went back to his home in Pennsylvania. President Guerrero, on the 14th of August, conveyed to him the warm thanks of the Mexican nation for his valuable services. *Niles' Reg.*, xxxvii. 119. While the commodore and his friend Doctor Boardman were on their way to the city of Mexico in May 1829, they were assailed by three armed bandits. The commodore shot the chief dead, upon which the other two fled. The doctor received a sabre-wound in his left arm. *Id.*, xxxvi. 381.

⁵¹ *Cor. Fed. Mex.*, 1828, Aug. 1. General Basadre took out 25 or 30 letters of marque issued by President Guerrero, and when he had already fitted out five vessels to attack the Spanish convoy taking silver to Spain, the British admiral at Jamaica under the supposition, it is presumed, that the letters were apocryphal, gave orders to arrest and treat as a pirate a 'certain Basadre.' *Alaman, Proceso*, 39; *Id.*, *Defensa*, 81.

⁵² *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, v. 819, says the surrender took place in Acapulco, which is a mistake; they were taken there from Monterey by officers in the Mexican service. Full particulars on this episode are given in *Hist. Cal.*, ii. this series.

The following authorities have been consulted in writing the foregoing chapters: *Mex., Acta Constitut.*, 1-12; *Id.*, *Diario Congr. Constituy.*, ii. 680-98; *Id.*, *Col. Copstituciones*, i. 1-101, 320-473, ii. 66-151, 294-368, iii. 165-235, 323, 403-84; *Id.*, *Col. Leyes, Órd. y Dec.*, ii. 89-207, and iii. 1-163, passim; *Id.*, *Col. Leyes Fund.*, 116-64; *Id.*, *Col. Leyes y Dec.*, 1844-6, 414-20; 1847, 35-8, 76-153; *Id.*, *Col. Leyes*, 1829-30, 35-40, 53-85, 90, 151; *Id.*, *Col.*

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CHAPTER IV.

FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC TROUBLES.

1828-1831.

SPANISH SCHEME OF RECONQUEST—BARRADAS' INVASION—HIS DEFEAT AND SURRENDER—REJOICING IN MEXICO—MONARCHICAL INTRIGUES—VICENTE GUERRERO SECOND PRESIDENT—HIS ADMINISTRATION—ABOLITION OF SLAVERY—EXTRAORDINARY POWERS—PARTY ANIMOSITY—RECALL OF POINSETT—CHARGES AGAINST MINISTERS—HISTORY OF YUCATAN—SECESSION OF YUCATAN—REVOLUTION OF JALAPA—ITS EFFECTS IN MEXICO—PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT—BUSTAMANTE AS THE EXECUTIVE—GUERRERO DEPOSED—WAR IN THE SOUTH—TREACHERY AGAINST GUERRERO—HIS CAPTURE, TRIAL, AND EXECUTION—MINISTERS' IMPEACHMENT—HONORS TO GUERRERO'S MEMORY.

THE Spanish court at last saw fit to carry out the long-delayed scheme of reconquering Mexico. It was supposed to be an easy task, on account of the report sent to Europe about the disturbed state of the country, accompanied with assurances, mostly from resident Spaniards, that there was a large party in Mexico ready to help restore the Spanish rule, or to establish a throne for a prince chosen by Fernando VII.¹ An invasion was expected in 1828, and preparations made to meet it;² but it proved to be a false alarm. The Mexicans, on the other hand, had formed plans to divert Spain's attention and resources by carrying the war into Cuba and other dependencies, to which effect Colonel Basadre was despatched on a secret mission

¹ Ex-vice-roy Calleja's speech in the *córtes*. *Cor. Fed. Mex.*, 1828, Aug. 23.

² A proclamation purporting to come from Fernando, and full of promises, was circulated. It first appeared in *El Imparcial* of Zacatecas, May 23, 1828, and was copied by *El Veracruzano Libre*, 1828, June 8.

to Hayti. This proceeding greatly alarmed the authorities of Cuba.³

An expedition for the reconquest of Mexico sailed from Habana on the 6th of July, 1829, under Brigadier Isidro Barradas. The whole force, at the time of sailing, probably consisted of 3,000 men. The fleet, commanded by Rear-admiral Ángel Laborde, was formed of the line-of-battle ship *Soberano*, the frigates *Restauracion* and *Lealtad*, the schooner *Amalia*, the brig *Cautivo*, and fifteen transports, among which was the American ship *Bingham*. On board this last-named vessel were 300 men with their commander, Santos Guzman. In a heavy storm the ship was thrown on the coast of Louisiana, where the officers and men received hospitable treatment. These troops consequently took no part in the Mexican campaign.⁴

The first tidings of the expedition reached Vera Cruz on the 16th of July, by a French frigate, whose commander would not or could not give any information as to its destination. General Santa Anna, then governor and commander of the forces, borrowed a small sum of money and mustered the militia, with the view of attacking the invaders on their arrival.

The Spaniards on the 24th were off Punta de Jerez, near Tampico, and on the 26th sent proclamations on shore, which showed that their government had been led to believe that the Mexican army, which had served under the royal banner prior to 1821, would lend its aid.⁵ On the 27th they effected a landing un-

³ Full information in *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1828, 184; *Dublan and Lozano, Legis. Mex.*, ii. 73; *Alaman, Proceso*, 28-9, 38-9; *Id.*, *Defensa*, 83-5; *Arrangois, Méj.*, ii. 196, 227-8. The enemies of the government abused it, on the ground that it was intended to land a negro force in Cuba, which was a false charge.

⁴ The figures above given are furnished by *Zamacois, Hist. Méx.*, xi. 720-4, 793. The author obtained his data from the diary kept and given him by sub-lieut Eduardo Agustí, who served in the expedition. He assures us that those data were later corroborated in Mexico by officers who took part in the fighting. Zavala, who at that time was a member of the Mexican cabinet, says that the force actually landed was 3,500. *Revol. Mex.*, ii. 176. Others exaggerate it to 4,000, and even 5,000.

⁵ They must have had that impression, else they would not have sent a mere handful of men to a deadly climate and at the worst season of the year, to capture the country.

resisted on the playa de Jerez, or Cabo Rojo, 36 miles from Pueblo Viejo.⁶

After the disembarkation the fleet went back to Habana, pursuant to the orders of the captain-general of Cuba. Barradas' force marched toward Tampico, and after much suffering from the heat, scarcity of water, and myriads of merciless insects, having captured on the way a well defended redoubt with four guns and fifty prisoners, the advanced column on the 18th of August entered that city, which had been evacuated by the inhabitants.

Had the invasion amounted to anything, the Mexican nation⁷ would indeed have been unprepared to face it. When the news of it was announced at the capital, July 31st, the alarm among all classes was great. The troops were in want of everything; and to add to this perplexity, the ministers encountered opposition on all sides, even to their calling the congress to hold an extra session.⁸ The opposition press circulated false reports, pretending to doubt that any invasion had occurred. The intrigues of the government's enemies so hampered every effort to meet the situation that the Spaniards had been landed ten days before the national congress assembled. Even then it did nothing till the 25th of August, on which date the executive was invested with extraordinary power.

The national and state governments then lost no time in making preparations on an extensive scale, apprehending that Barradas' force might be but the avant-guard of a large army.⁹ The suspicious move-

⁶ The chaplain was Friar Diego Miguel Bringas y Encinas, of whom mention was made in the preceding volume. Being a Sonoran, he issued a proclamation on the 28th to his countrymen—another evidence of the mistaken idea that the Mexicans wanted to return to colonial vassalage.

⁷ 'La primer nacion de America,' as she was once proudly called by *El Bole-tin Oficial*, no. 15.

⁸ The council of state would not sanction it, and this, when the invaders were already on the march to Mexico.

⁹ Pecuniary means to meet the expenses were obtained by levying extra taxes. The whole country was called to arms. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1829, 159, 169-70, 183, 188, 195-6; *Mex. Col. Ley.*, 1829-30, 151-9; *Dipos. Var.*, ii. 68, 71; *Mex. Mem. Hac.*, 1870, 101; *Mex. Mem. Guerra*, 1835, 7.

ments of a vessel off Huatulco also awakened the fear that danger might be expected in that quarter. The president organized an army of reserve to occupy positions in Jalapa, Córdoba, and Orizaba, whence it could operate north and south. This body of troops was placed in charge of Anastasio Bustamante, the vice-president, with José Joaquín de Herrera as his second. Another division was created simultaneously in the south, and its command intrusted to Montesdeoca. Not satisfied with these forces, the executive urged the state governments to raise numerous bodies of militia. In the mean time Garza, who was still comandante general of Tamaulipas, had collected all the force of regulars and militia, and had also sent word to Mier y Terán, who had been inspecting the boundary line between Texas and the United States, and happened to be then in Matamoros. Terán at once hastened to aid in the defence, placing himself, though superior in rank, under Garza's orders. Santa Anna, on learning where the Spaniards were, at once embarked about 1,000 men, who with the cavalry despatched by land formed probably a total of about 2,000¹⁰ directly under his command, the government having, as a reward of his activity, made him commander in chief of the army of operations. It is unnecessary to enter into detail of the operations. After several bloody encounters, Santa Anna and Terán forced Barradas and the remnants of his troops to capitulate, September 11th, on the banks of the Pánuco River, but not without a heavy loss of men and officers on both sides.¹¹ Under the terms

¹⁰ Zavala, *Revol. Mex.*, ii. 177, says 'cerca de dos mil.' Suárez y Navarro, *Hist. Mex.*, 146, relying on an official report, has it, 'mil sesenta y cuatro hombres era el total de la fuerza que llevó Santa Anna.'

¹¹ The Mexican casualties were eight officers and 127 men killed, and 151 wounded. On the part of the Spaniards, from fighting and disease, supposing that only 2,700 landed, the loss was 908; if there were originally 3,500, as the Mexican generals believed, then it amounted to 1,708. The Spanish report gives 17 officers, and 983 rank and file, of whom 7 officers and 78 men were killed in action, and 130 died in hospitals from wounds. The particulars of this campaign, furnished by various authorities, are contradictory. One anonymous writer, quoted in *Villa Amor, Biog. del Gen. Santa Anna*, 9-

of the capitulation, the Spanish troops occupying the bar, fort, and town of Tampico were granted the honors of war, and allowed quarters at Ciudad Victoria till their reëmbarkation.¹² The sick and wounded remained in the hospitals, attended by Spanish surgeons. According to an official report of Teran from Pueblo Viejo, Santa Anna having gone back to Vera Cruz in bad health, 1,792 Spaniards reëmbarked between the 9th of November and the 11th of December. Thus ended this foolish and futile attempt to reconquer Mexico, which cost a heavy loss of life and the expenditure of \$1,500,000. It was quite a different affair from the first attempt; but men like Cortés were not plentiful in Spain at this time.

The news of the Spanish surrender reached Mexico in the evening of the 20th of September, and was hailed with wild delight, displayed by the customary bell-ringing and illuminations. The president, Santa Anna, Teran, and others were objects of general praise. It seemed now as if party strife had come to an end.¹³

The defeat sustained by Barradas did not altogether put an end, at least for some time, to the project of reconquest, the king of Spain having been offered by

10. coolly states that Santa Anna suffered two defeats at Barradas' hands, but the latter, in order to carry off the funds in his charge, concluded to surrender to the remnant of the Mexican troops! Barradas never went back to Cuba or Spain. He died abroad, poor and forsaken. *Zavala, Revol. Mèx.*, ii. 176-90; *Boletín Oficial*, nos 1-33; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Mèx.*, 142-87, 414-27; *Centinela Fed.*, 1829, no. 121; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, i. nos 23, 24, 28, 31-7, iv. nos 12, 33; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 520-50; *Martínez, Hist. Revol. Mèx.*, i. 150-2; *Mèx. Mem. Guerra*, 1830, 2; *Alaman, Hist. Mèj.*, v. 846-7; *Zamacora, Hist. Mèj.*, xi. 716-806.

¹² By a later arrangement, at the request of the Spanish commander, the town of Santa Catalina, Ozuluama, Tantima, Altamira, and Pánuco were substituted.

¹³ The trophies captured were placed by decree of Feb. 19, 1834, in the national hall of representatives. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1834, 60-1; *Vallejo, Col. Doc.*, i. no. 34. On the 23d of May, 1835, the congress declared Santa Anna, for his services at Tampico, 'benemérito de la patria,' and further decreed that his name should be engraved on a pillar to be erected on the spot where the Spaniards surrendered, with this inscription: 'En las riberas del Pánuco afianzó la independencia nacional en 11 de Setiembre de 1829.' On the 24th of May, 1843, a decree was issued to erect a monument at Tampico. *Duñlan and Lozano, Legis. Mèx.*, ii. 511, 676, iii. 52, iv. 421-2, 559; *Boletín, Ofic.*, nos 5, 15, 24.

certain corporations aid in fitting out another expedition. The Mexican government was duly advised by its agents and made preparations accordingly.¹⁴ The alarm throughout the country was great, and even gave rise to the circulation of a false report, in August 1830, that 5,000 Spaniards had landed between capes Rojo and Tamiahua near Tuxpan.¹⁵ This rumor probably originated in the movements of a few men seeking a suitable place for a smuggling operation. The consequence was that more stringent measures against the Spaniards were adopted by the government, not only expelling those still residing in Mexico, but forbidding the landing of others.¹⁶

European intrigues were not wanting at this time, 1830, to erect thrones in Spanish America, one of which was to be raised in Mexico and occupied by a prince of the Orleans family. The best informed statesmen and politicians in Europe seemed to be under the impression that Mexico could be ruled only by a monarchy.¹⁷

President Guerrero was duly installed in office on the 1st of April, 1829, and immediately published a manifesto outlining his future policy.¹⁸ The history of Mexico's long struggle for national life is witness to Guerrero's resolution. He was born in the town of Tixtla, then within the intendencia of Mexico, in 1782,¹⁹ of humble parents, Juan Pedro Guerrero and María

¹⁴ Some Carmelite friars had also said that the Spanish flag in July 1830 would wave over the palace at Mexico. That remark apparently explained the influx of Spaniards to the ports. *Atleta*, 1830, March 24, 381; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, ii. no. 16; *Mex., Proceso Instruc.*, 1833, 39-40.

¹⁵ The name of Prince Paul of Wurtemberg, who made a flying visit to Mexico, had been absurdly mixed up with Spanish plans. *Ataman, Defensa*, 85-6.

¹⁶ Deceets and details are given in *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, v. no. 17, 8, no. 21, 7, suppl., nos 9, 10; *Dispos. Var.*, ii. 80; *Dublan and Lozano, Legis. Mex.*, ii. 230, 237-8, 322-3, 390; *Mex. Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1829-30, 142-3.

¹⁷ Zavala assures us that he was invited, about Feb. 1830, by a foreign agent to coöperate in the accomplishment of such a plan. *Revol. Mex.*, ii. 248.

¹⁸ Full text in *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1829, 55; *Guerrero, Manifi.*, 1-20.

¹⁹ The certificate of his christening at the parish church is dated Aug. 10, 1782, by which it appears that he was named Vicente Ramon.

Guadalupe Saldaña, belonging to the lowly race included in the term *castas*, utterly degraded both civilly and politically; for they were disqualified by law, custom, and prejudice for ever emerging from their low condition. To this fact should be ascribed Guerrero's defects, which have been so pitilessly and unjustly exaggerated by the very men that should have extolled his fortitude, and exalted his services and personal merits. It is needless to speak further of his military career, the pages of this history having already detailed it. Suffice it to say that till about 1814 Guerrero was a subordinate, but had already on several occasions made his mark as a good soldier under the banner of Morelos. We have since seen that when the prominent soldiers in the south successively disappeared, Guerrero took their place, keeping alive during several years, by his patriotic perseverance, the spirit of independence.²⁰ Let us consider the man in the new position to which he has been raised. His elevation to the presidency was the triumph of the popular party; notwithstanding the assertions of his enemies to the contrary, he enjoyed the popular preference, and his inauguration took place amid the plaudits of the masses.²¹ Guerrero believed that by leaving the people to themselves, untrammelled, and strictly maintaining the federal institutions, his would be a paternal government, and the country's institutions would become consolidated. He committed a serious mistake in adopting such a course when social and political ties were loosened, and indeed society was almost in a chaotic state. The result could be none other than a loss of all respect for

²⁰ 'Su última esperanza, la única protesta del país contra la dominación española.' *Tornet, Breve Reseña Hist.*, 313.

²¹ Guerrero loved the race he sprang from, and never was ashamed to own it. *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, ii. 57. Bustamante has it that no enthusiasm was shown by the people, not a viva uttered, which is incredible. *Voz de la Patria*, i. no. 14, iv. no. 1. He hated Guerrero, and in this instance, as in many others, has proved himself to be what he has been called, 'escritor sin conciencia y sin fé.' *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 138.

authority when the chief magistrate thus confidently exposed himself to public contempt.

No man who ever knew Guerrero could deny him the possession of good sense, or even of judgment which is all-sufficient in a constitutionally governed country;²² and yet he never seemed to realize what the requirements and conditions of his high position were—its duties and rights, its resources and perils. His acts in the presidential chair lacked that firmness and constancy which spring from a conviction of the justice, usefulness, or expediency of any given measure. He neither possessed the qualifications to prevent the breaking-out of sedition, nor the vigor to repress it.²³ And yet there was in the man no littleness of soul, no imbecility. In grave questions, whenever he did fix his mind and form a judgment, he was firm, persevering, and even obstinate. His political principles were: national independence, the federal system, hatred of monarchical rule, a profound respect for the representatives of the people, expulsion of Spaniards, and the levelling of classes. All favoring these principles were deemed worthy of his confidence, which explains the origin of the intense antipathy felt toward him by those of a different way of thinking, as well as the bitter hostility rankling in his own bosom toward his opponents, who constituted the party controlled by the upper clergy.²⁴ Guerrero's private life

²² The fact stands to confound those who make him out an ignoramus, that after the overthrow of the Spanish rule he had an influential share in organizing the government, and took part in its councils; political parties wanted him in their ranks. Even his foes' deadly hatred is an evidence of their fear of his intellectual powers. *Tornel, Breve Reseña Hist.*, 317. Alainan, one of Guerrero's bitterest enemies, assures us that he was so illiterate that he could barely write his name; and having associated many years with insurgents, ever distrustful of one another, suspicion and dissembling had become a second nature with him, and often in speaking he would utter the very reverse of his thoughts. *Hist. Méj.*, v. 766.

²³ Zavala denies him the talent for directing great affairs, and the feeling of friendship and confidence in his friends which would permit their leading him. Thus he actually made a nonentity of himself. *Revol. Mex.*, ii. 369-70.

²⁴ This party had sustained the viceroys; had banded with the leaders that dethroned Iturbide; then used Bravo and Barragan in the attempt to overthrow Victoria; failing in this, it clung to Gomez Pedraza; and when victorious at last, paraded the bloody heads of many a good citizen, and after the bloody scene at Cuilapa, inaugurated an era of perfect despotism.

was irreproachable. His attention to public business was such, however, that he allowed himself but few hours with his family.

The general affairs of the country in the second half of 1829 were in a chaotic state. Disorganization fettered every branch of the government. Both its friends and enemies were discontented, and disposed to overthrow it. And yet, amidst its constant struggle, Guerrero's administration decreed several progressive measures, the most important of which was the abolition of slavery.

African slavery had indeed been reduced to narrow limits.²⁵ The Dominican provincial of Chiapas, Father Matías Córdoba, gave freedom to the slaves on the estates of his order. On the 16th of September, 1825, President Victoria had liberated in the country's name the slaves purchased with a certain fund collected for that purpose, as well as those given up by their owners to the patriotic junta.²⁶ The general abolition, however, was not actually carried out for some time, certain difficulties having arisen; and several states, among which was Zacatecas, had decreed the freedom of slaves before the general government arrived at a final conclusion on the subject. As a matter of fact, the few remaining slaves were in domestic service, and treated more like members of families than as actual chattels. At last Deputy Tornel,²⁷ taking advantage of the time when Guerrero was invested with extraordinary powers, drew up and laid before him a decree for total abolition. It was signed September 15, 1829, and proclaimed the next day, the

²⁵ The importation and sale of slaves had been strictly forbidden by royal order in 1818, and later by the law of July 13, 1824. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 88; *Méx. Col. Leyes, Ord. y Dec.*, iii. 56; *Méx., Mem. Guerra*, 1824, annex 10; *Bustamante, Medidas Pacífic.*, MS., i. 114-18.

²⁶ Dr San Martín also liberated his slaves. The same day the state assumed the care of some colored orphans whose fathers, some of whom were slaves, had perished in the war of independence. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 121.

²⁷ Tornel himself relates it. *Breve Reseña Hist.*, 85; *Méx. Col. Ley.*, 1829-30, 149-50; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1829, 213; *Dublan and Lozano, Legis. Méx.*, ii. 163.

national anniversary. The law met with no demur save from Coahuila and Texas, in which state were about 1,000 slaves, whose manumission would cost heavily, as the owners held them at a high valuation.²⁸ It seems that the law was not fully enforced; for on the 5th of April, 1837, another was promulgated, declaring slavery abolished without exception and with compensation to the owners.²⁹

President Guerrero organized his cabinet as follows: Lorenzo de Zavala, minister of the treasury, and president of the cabinet; José M. Herrera, of justice and ecclesiastical affairs; Francisco Moctezuma, of war and the navy; and José M. Bocanegra, of interior and foreign relations.

There was, as might be expected, violent opposition to the administration. Zavala had become a special object of the opposition's animosity, which was partly extended to the other ministers. On the 6th of August, 1829, the day after the assembling of the congress in extra session, Zavala was accused before that body of crimes against the nation. Charges were next preferred against Herrera and Moctezuma.³⁰

At the time of the Spanish invasion in 1829 we have seen that Guerrero was invested with extraordinary powers by special act of the congress on the 25th of August.³¹ These powers, though never abused, brought upon him and his cabinet a still more violent hatred. After the defeat of the Spaniards, and amidst

²⁸ The owners claimed having brought them there under the pledge of protection offered them. *Mex. Dict. Comis. Justicia*, 2 ll.

²⁹ The revolted colonists of Texas were excluded from the benefit of the compensation.

³⁰ The press teemed with invectives against Guerrero, his ministers, and Santa Anna. At this disreputable work the most notorious were the *Voz de la Patria*, iv. nos 1-33, v. nos 1 and 7; *El Torito*, *Eco de Yucatan*, and *El Sol*, the writings of which were in the same spirit as those of the writers in Spanish pay at New Orleans and New York. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 185; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 141.

³¹ The only restriction was that the president should not deprive any Mexican citizen of his life, or expel him from the republic. The powers were to cease in January 1830, on the meeting of the congress in ordinary session, to which he was to account for his acts. *Mex. Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1829-30, 55; *Dispos. Var.*, ii. 69; *Boletín Ofic.*, no. 12; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1829, 365.

the general rejoicing, there was a lull in the attacks on the government, but only of short duration. Several administrative acts, one of which was an attempt to check the abuses of the press, again exasperated its enemies. The president's good intentions being now doubted, a coalition of states was formed to oppose the administration. The enactment of a law of taxation produced even worse results, and it was made a point of honor to interpose every possible obstacle; every state refused to obey it. For from this time the states began to ignore the authority of the federal executive, and virtually exercised a veto power to suspend the execution of measures emanating from it. At this crisis, when an exhibition of energetic will tempered by prudence was absolutely necessary, Guerrero vacillated. His motive was undeniably good, but his action was weak. He sought allies from among his opponents in order to secure peace for his administration, and thereby, as he hoped, for the country. Moreover, he tried to disarm his enemies by clemency. He decreed on the 15th of September a pardon to the generals and other officers exiled for the affair at Tulancingo.³² This act was likewise disapproved, and repaid with black ingratitude.

Another point—upon which there may be some difference of opinion—was the president's course in regard to the dismissal of Poinsett, the American minister, on the ground that his presence in the republic was injurious to its peace and interests.³³ Under the pressure, Bocanegra, the minister of relations, was directed to request the government of the

³² *Atleta*, 1830, Jan. 30, 165. Bravo, Barragan, and others came back from New York before they knew of the amnesty, in their eagerness, they said, to aid in the country's defence against the Spaniards. *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, ii. 195; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 164; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, v. no. 1.

³³ The states of Puebla and Mexico were among those demanding it. The legislature of the latter gave as a reason that Poinsett 'had fine and agreeable manners, and used them to delude the Mexicans.' *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, ii. 197.

United States to recall Poinsett, which request was granted. Zavala and his friends looked on this as a grievous mistake; indeed, it was a glaring sign of weakness. Still greater was the error he committed in consenting to the acceptance of Zavala's resignation at what was nothing less than the dictation of the state legislature of Mexico.²⁴ This gave his enemies a signal victory.

Valentin Gomez Farías was called to replace Zavala, but having refused the office, Bocanegra was transferred to the treasury, and Agustin Viesca took charge of the portfolio of relations. After Zavala's retirement the partisans of Guerrero, much divided among themselves before, now broke out into open discord, and the president weakly sent away from him every man against whom public opinion was pronounced. Many who had hitherto stood firmly by Guerrero now turned away from him, some of them even joining the opposition. The fears of an impending change daily increased, and revolutionary plans were attributed to the generals of the army quartered at Jalapa. Santa Anna having visited that town, both he and Bustamante were accused of plotting to bring about a change in the form of government. They then issued a joint manifesto to disabuse the public mind, assuring the nation that no such project had been entertained by them, or any one, and promising to preserve the peace, the institutions, and national unity. Subsequent events proved that Santa Anna was then sincere. Bustamante's disloyalty, however, does not admit of a doubt; he well knew that Muz-

²⁴ Zavala was governor of the state of Mexico, when by express leave of her legislature he became a minister. At the time in question the legislature revoked that leave, forcing Zavala to resign his position in the cabinet. He told Guerrero, 'Me retiro cansado de sufrir ingratitudes y calumnias. Una tempestad amenaza á Vd dentro de poco tiempo.' Public attention was particularly attracted by the strange course of the legislature of Mexico in this matter, which while calling Zavala away from the cabinet to resume his gubernatorial functions, at the same time instructed the lieut.-gov. not to deliver the office to him till specially directed so to do; this without any charge having been preferred against Zavala. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 165; *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, ii. 198.

quiz and José Antonio Facio were preparing a plot to overthrow Guerrero's government, and all authorities disposed to uphold it.

It will not be out of place to give here a brief sketch of the history of Yucatan, since I have made little mention of that province since 1708.³⁵ From that time till the end of the Spanish domination the country was ruled by thirty governors, holding also the office of captain-general, who were appointed by the crown, besides a few others that held the position *ad interim* to fill vacancies.³⁶

During the rule of Governor Vertiz in 1717, the English occupants of Isla de Tris, later named El Cármen, were driven away. The mariscal de campo, Antonio de Figueroa, who governed from 1725 to 1733, winning golden opinions for his generosity to the poor during a terrible famine and epidemic, exerted himself successfully in driving away the English usurpers of Yucatan territory at Belize. He burned Wallix or Belize, and rebuilt it, leaving it only when he believed it safe from further incursions. After his death, however, during a truce allowed by a treaty of peace between Spain and England the wood-cutters and turtle-catchers reoccupied the place, and wood-cutting and smuggling became the established business. Several attempts to eject these interlopers, made subsequently by governors of Yucatan, had no results.

An event worthy of mention was the revolt in November 1761, of the Indian Jacinto Canek, with a large number of followers, because Bishop Parada's constitutions, which greatly favored the Indians, had been suspended, and their serfdom and condition as tribute-payers had been reimposed. The rebels were, however, defeated in their stronghold of Cisteil, and Jacinto and his chief accomplices punished.³⁷

³⁵ See vol. iii., cap. viii., this work.

³⁶ Their names may be found in *Ancona, Hist. Yuc.*, ii. 336-536, *passim*, iii. 5-194, *passim*.

³⁷ Jacinto 'fue condenado á morir atenaceado, roto, y su cuerpo quemado

A crime that caused much consternation was the murder, in the night of the 25th of June, 1792, of the captain-general, Lúcas de Galvez. The deed was wrongly attributed to an officer named Toribio del Mazo, a nephew of the bishop, who, with others, was conveyed to Mexico, and immured in dungeons of San Juan de Ulúa, where they were confined for eight years, undergoing trial without any convicting evidence being found against them. At last the instigator of the crime made confession, and both he and the actual murderer were captured, and the innocent victims released.³⁸

To Governor Benito Perez Valdelomar, who took charge of the government in 1800, Yucatan owed much improvement, particularly in public instruction and facilities for trade.³⁹ During his government there came to Yucatan, in 1810, an emissary of Joseph Bonaparte, then king of Spain—a young Dane named Gustav Nordingh De Witt, who was made much of by the governor and society; but when his business was discovered, he was arrested, tried, and executed.⁴⁰

Yucatan, like the rest of New Spain, experienced the effects of the new institutions resulting from the short-lived constitution of 1812, and the restored one of 1820. The governor, Miguel de Castro y Araos, was deprived of his office, and Mariano Carrillo was made captain-general by the diputacion provincial; but though highly recommended to the court, Carrillo was not appointed, and Juan María de Echóverri came out as jefe superior político and captain-general.

y echadas al aire sus cenizas.' He suffered his punishment. Others received 200 lashes, and had one ear cut off. Cisteil was razed to the ground. *Peon, Crón.*, 453.

³⁸ 14,000 to 17,000 folios had been written, and \$40,000 expended. *Bustamante, Supl. to Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 107; *Id., Notic. Biog.*, 6; *Aranza, Instruc.*, MS., 78-84.

³⁹ *Echáñove, Cuad. Estadíst.; Regil, Mem. Instruct.; Barbachano, Mem. Camp.*

⁴⁰ The execution took place on the 12th of Nov. 1810; *Ancona, Hist. Yuc.*, ii. 517-25.

During the period thus briefly glanced over, Yucatan was ruled in ecclesiastical affairs by a succession of bishops, some of whom left grateful memories, others the reverse, while of many others but little information is extant. One of the most famous of these prelates was Pedro Reyes, an austere Benedictine, who, in his efforts to check the abuses of the clergy and improve their morals, experienced great difficulties, both with his subordinates and the governor. Juan Gomez Parada, who won the love of the Indians for his great exertions to benefit them, succeeded Reyes. I give below a list of his successors.⁴¹

The events that occurred in New Spain by which the Spanish domination was brought to an end produced the change in Yucatan without political commotion, thanks to the prudence and wisdom of the last Spanish governor, Echéverri, who, refusing to adopt coercive measures, placed the province in charge of its diputacion, and then went away. Emperor Agustín sent out as *gefe político* and captain-general Melchor Álvarez, who took possession of his offices without opposition. He was a strong Iturbidist, and subsequently, when the empire was swept away in Mexico, endeavored for some time to hold power, and counteract the effects of the famous plan de Casa Mata. He was compelled to desist, however, and the province after a while joined the federation of states.⁴²

The declaration of war by Mexico against Spain in

⁴¹ Parada's death was in 1728. Juan Ignacio de Castorena y Urzúa, 1730; Francisco Pablo Matos de Coronado, 1736; Friar Mateo Zamora y Pinagos, 1743; Friar Francisco de San Buenaventura Martínez, 1746, who established the seminary; Doctor and Friar Ignacio de Padilla y Estrada, 1753; Friar Antonio Alcalde, 1763; Doctor Diego de Peredo, Jan. 1773; Antonio Caballero y Góngora, 1776; Friar Luis de Piña y Mazo, 1780, an irate man, constantly meddling in affairs not of his province, and causing much trouble; Doctor Pedro Agustín de Estevez y Ugarte, from 1801 to May 8, 1827, when he died. *Iglesias y Conventos*, 326-7.

⁴² In fact, Mérida and Guadalajara were the two first cities that proclaimed the federal system in 1823, for which Yucatan was rebuked by Lucas Alamán, then minister of relations of the provisional government. He qualified the act as immature, uncircumspect, and anarchical, and as one that might imperil national independence and safety.

1823 caused great displeasure to Campeche, whose trade with Cuba was thereby interfered with. Mérida, though an equal sufferer, did not shrink from fulfilling her share of duty.

The state enjoyed peace during the four years' constitutional period of Governor Lopez, though he had to struggle against the spirit of military favoritism that had been fostered by the comandante general Felipe Codallos. The latter showed him much opposition, but Lopez upheld his prerogatives, and Codallos was recalled.

The revolutionary projects which were contemplated in Mexico to put aside the federal system were warmly taken up in Yucatan, and when the long-expected cry of revolution was at last heard, it was in that distant part of the republic. The garrison of Campeche, on the 16th of November, 1829, by a public acta, demanded the abolition of the federal government, and the adoption in its stead of a central military system, that is to say, a single government for the whole country, recognizing Guerrero's authority as far as it did not conflict with the plan, and demanding of the congress that it should convoke another clothed with powers to constitute the republic under a central form of government; with the express understanding that the civil and military authority be vested in the same person.⁴³ This movement was seconded in Mérida, where José S. Carbajal deposed the governor, J. T. Lopez, assumed all the powers, styling himself 'comandante general, gefe superior político y de hacienda,' and with his accomplices declared, on November 9th, the secession of Yucatan from the union until a national majority should adopt the institutions proclaimed in the plan of Campeche.⁴⁴ The news of this event reached

⁴³ The acts of the pronunciamiento and documents therewith connected may be found in *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 170-1; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 560-1; *Id.*, *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 136; *El Boletín Ofic.*, no. 35; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1834, 36-8, 135-6; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, v. no. 1.

⁴⁴ The revolt caused the dissolution of the state congress and of nearly all

Mexico at a time when the administration was defenceless. As an effort to avert a revolution, however, it despatched Zavala to represent to the rebels the unreasonableness of their proceeding. He landed at Sisal, where the comandante, Sandoval, refused him permission to go into the interior. After some correspondence with the dictator Carbajal, an order came for his immediate departure, coupled with a threat to shoot him if he again stepped upon Yucatan soil without express permission.⁴⁵

Lorenzo de Zavala was born in Mérida, October 3, 1788. During the revolutionary war of Mexico he was closely confined in irons for three years in a dark dungeon of San Juan de Ulúa. On being liberated he visited Paris, London, and the United States, returning to his country early in 1822. He was chosen a member of the first Mexican congress. At the age of 33 he had experienced much suffering; but his reputation for learning and political ability was well established. Afterward a president of the constituent congress, in 1824 he was the first to sign and swear support to the federal constitution. Zavala served his country loyally, and yet for his defence of the Texans he was branded a traitor by those who could not see the justice and wisdom of his purpose. He died on the 15th of November, 1835, and his remains were conveyed by four friends to a plain grave prepared by his son in a small cedar forest on the banks of the river San Jacinto in Texas. There they lie in a foreign country till such time as his countrymen, remembering his services, may do justice to his memory. Zavala was not only a distinguished

the ayuntamientos. *Atleta*, 1829, Dec. 30; 1830, Jan. 30; *Suarez, Informe*, 7; *Yuc. Pacífica*, no. 3, 8. Santa Anna tried to dissuade the leaders of the revolt at Campeche from carrying out their intentions. A letter signed by all the chief officers had asked him to support them. His answer was a long and severe reproof. *Espíritu Pú.*, i. nos 129-33. The state of Yucatan continued detached from the rest of Mexico till the end of 1830. *Mex. Mem. Rel.*, 1831, 13; *Barbachano, Mem. Comp.*, 35-46.

⁴⁵ Sandoval's letter clearly implied it, and the bearer said that he had been ordered to state that if Zavala was found on Yucatan soil again he would be 'pasado por las armas inmediatamente.' *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, ii. 209-14.

statesman and journalist, but also a historian and writer of travels. I give in a note an account of his works.⁴⁶

While the events above recited were occurring in Yucatan, General Bustamante, vice-president of the republic and commander of the largest military division, proclaimed on the 4th of December a plan destructive of his government, under the pretence of restoring constitutional order, and the observance of the laws which he and his accomplices said were infringed by the dictatorial powers vested in the executive—powers which, though, perhaps, not judiciously used in every instance, never became oppressive.⁴⁷ Santa Anna tried to prevent this movement, and not succeeding, surrendered both his civil and military commands, the former to Manuel Argüelles and the latter to Colonel Antonio Juillé.⁴⁸

Bustamante, though a yorkino, was influenced by José Antonio Facio,⁴⁹ a number of discontented yorkinos, and not a few escoceses, or novenarios.

⁴⁶ *Ensayo Histórico de las Revoluciones de México*. This work is in two volumes, 8vo, the first of which appeared in Paris in 1831, and the second in New York somewhat later. It gives us the history of Mexico from the breaking-out of the revolution in 1808 to 1830. The most valuable portion is that in which he speaks of the events that he had a direct participation in, as a member of the constituent congress, governor of Mexico, and minister of state, which he describes in a flowing, elegant style, and with remarkable force, defending the acts of the federal party, of which he was one of the most eminent members. Any impartial and unprejudiced critic will recognize in the author a learned publicist, historian, philosopher, economist, and statesman. Another edition, also in two volumes, appeared in Mexico in 1845.

Zavala's other work was his *Viage á los Estados Unidos*, Mérida, 1846, which is preceded with a sketch of his life and writings, by Justo Sierra. The book, according to Zavala's own statement, has not the merit of originality, and did not entail on him much labor, as the descriptions, documents, and even many of the remarks were either taken from others or from memoranda made on the spot. That is what he said himself, hoping that it might be useful to his countrymen. But the fact stands that it is a philosophic work, showing a deep study of the manners and customs of the American people, and more specially of their political institutions, which were so closely copied by the Mexicans.

⁴⁷ Alaman himself uses these words respecting their use: 'En lo general fué mas bien benéfico que opresivo.' *Hist. Méj.*, v. 846.

⁴⁸ He then withdrew to his hacienda of Manga de Clavo to watch the course of events. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 172.

⁴⁹ Facio, Guerrero's mortal enemy, was a Mexican by birth, but educated

The revolted force assumed the title of 'ejército protector de la constitucion y las leyes.'⁶⁰ Its chief presents to us a second time the spectacle of the vice-president heading a revolution to overthrow the government. In this instance perfidy was added, and ingratitude to the man to whom Bustamante really owed the office of vice-president, as well as his military command. In a circular to the congresses of the several states, Bustamante said that Guerrero's government had ignored their wishes, and deprived them of their sovereignty, substituting for their welfare the will of ambitious ministers.⁶¹ Minister Bocanegra on the 7th of November answered the circular in words which explained the ease with which Guerrero's administration came to be overthrown. "The institutions," he said, "cannot be sustained if the general government is unable to fulfil its duties, as will certainly happen if the lack of coöperation on the part of the states causes the failure alike of the coherence and harmony enjoined by the constitution and laws." But the secret of the revolt was that the rebels could not bear the sight of one of Guerrero's race occupying the presidential chair, and ruthlessly destroyed a government whose only faults were excessive liberalism and clemency.

from childhood in Spain, where he served in the army and reached the rank of col of cavalry. He served long under Gen. Elío, King Fernando's tool, and later a famous Carlist chieftain, notorious for his dislike of reforms and constitutional government. Facio returned to Mexico in 1824, and was employed to restore order in Tabasco. On the failure of Montañó's plan, which he had supported, he went to reside in the U. S., whence he came back to take part in the national defence. He then became Gen. Bustamante's secretary at Jalapa. Later, under that chief, he attained high official rank; and, faithful to the political principles he had imbibed in Spain, never understood or respected public opinion; he became notorious for his schemes to destroy his enemies, and for his course in relying mainly on brutal force to uphold the administration of which he formed a part. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 565-6; *Id., Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 137; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 193.

⁶⁰ *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, v. no. 5; *La Cruz*, v. 633; *Mex. Mem. Guerra*, 1831, doc. 1, 12-13.

⁶¹ In his hypocritical address he adds: 'Weighed down by taxation, the money taken depletes their treasuries; the nation derives no advantage; the army is wasting away, its needs not being looked after. Such a bad administration has induced in many the belief that the evils are inherent in the federal system.'

The tidings of the defection at Jalapa almost overwhelmed Guerrero. He looked around him, but found no one to aid or advise him. For a time the old spirit asserted itself, and he resolved to place himself at the head of the few troops still remaining faithful amidst the general desertion; for the bad example shown at Jalapa had been followed elsewhere. He summoned congress,⁵² and on the 11th of December tendered a resignation of his dictatorial powers, about which so many complaints had been uttered. Such an offer, had it been accepted, which it was not, would have deprived him of the only resource he had to keep his enemies in check.⁵³ He ought rather to have resigned the presidency.

The step of summoning the chambers was a fatal one, for the reason that the senators and a large minority in the lower house worked in accord with the revolutionists. The president signifying his intention to command the army in person, the congress chose José María Bocanegra president ad interim.⁵⁴ Contrary to the advice of his friends—among whom was Santa Anna—who counselled him to make a firm stand in the capital, assuring him that they would begin operations against the rebels, Guerrero left the city at the head of 2,000 or 2,500 men, and marched in the direction of Ayacapiztla. He had been called to Puebla, by a numerous party in that city, where, before the enemy occupied it, he could have reënforced his small army with 4,000 well armed civic troops; he could also have drawn to his aid the national guard of the state of Mexico. Thus with 10,000 men and the popular favor he could easily have defeated the small rebel force of 3,000. But he failed to take his friends' advice; he had evidently lost his old spirit. While he was on the march, avoid-

⁵² *Mex. Col. Ley.*, 1829-30, 190-1; *Dublan and Lozano, Legis. Mex.*, ii. 209.

⁵³ *Atleta*, 1830, Jan. 13.

⁵⁴ Dec. 16th. *Mex. Col. Ley.*, 1829-30, 194-5; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1829, 365, 367; *Dublan and Lozano, Legis. Mex.*, ii. 209.

ing any encounter with the enemy, an uprising to support the movement at Jalapa took place in Mexico under a pronunciamiento entitled Plan de Quintanar,⁵⁵ which was aided by José Ignacio Esteva, governor of the federal district.⁵⁶ No step having been taken either by acting president Bocanegra or by Anaya, the comandante general, to check revolutionary attempts, the plotters, in the night of the 22d of December, assaulted both the palace and citadel, which were surrendered to them without resistance; and that shadow of a government, composed of Bocanegra, Viezca, and Moctezuma, vanished after an existence of five days, during which it could do nothing but helplessly witness the rapid advance of the revolution.⁵⁷

The victorious rebels at once constituted an executive authority ad interim, composed of Quintanar, Lucas Alaman, and Pedro Velez.⁵⁸ Lorenzo de Zavala, Manuel C. Rejon, and Fernando del Valle, who had taken refuge the previous night in the mint, were arrested, but released a few days later on promising to recognize accomplished facts.

⁵⁵ *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 572-4; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 161-9, 177-82, 185; *Atleta*, 1829, Dec. 23. This paper, in its issue of Jan. 7, 1830, assures us that Guerrero, in his anxiety to avert bloodshed, had sent commissioners to treat with Bustamante, but Muzquiz detained them at Puebla. Meantime the revolt broke out in Mexico.

⁵⁶ After Tornel's departure as minister to Washington, Esteva was appointed by Guerrero his successor as governor of the district. He had a very direct part in the revolution at the capital. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. ap. 84-5; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 573.

⁵⁷ The plan involved a recognition of that of Jalapa, and was signed by eleven generals and sixteen colonels; among the former being Quintanar, the two Rayons, Terreros, and Zarzosa. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 572.

⁵⁸ Quintanar was made a general by Iturbide, and since the latter's execution had been wholly out of political life. His physical courage was undoubted, but he lacked the moral qualifications to control and direct masses of men. His domestic qualities were respectable, and his wife's family relations induced him to serve now as the instrument of a rebellion. Velez was a native of Zacatecas, born in 1787; had been Gen. Cruz's legal adviser, and became the chief justice of the supreme court when it was founded in 1825; an honest man, and quite an able jurist. The rebels made use of him, and he, probably from fear, permitted them. He was minister of justice in 1843, always highly esteemed, and died the 5th of August, 1848. *Zavala, Revol. Méx.*, ii. 219; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 144, 147. Of Alaman full information is given elsewhere. The act of congress of Dec. 23, 1829, appointing that executive under article 97 of the constitution, may be seen in *Dublan and Lozano, Legis. Méx.*, ii. 210.

The occupation of Mexico by his enemies completely unmanned Guerrero. On the night of the 25th, without apprising General Ignacio Mora and the troops of his intention, he secretly left his camp at Jona-cate escorted by Colonel Francisco Victoria and fifty horsemen,⁵⁹ and took the road to the south, considering himself safe after he had crossed the Mescala River. The simple-minded patriot had not calculated that perfidy could reach him there. From the south he made a representation to the congress offering to abide by its resolution.⁶⁰ For some time Guerrero remained with his family on his estate of Tierra Colorada near Tixtla, but left it on receiving news from Mexico that six cut-throats had been taken out of the jail of Mexico and employed to murder him.⁶¹

Before the end of 1829 all the states except Vera Cruz had accepted Bustamante's plan.⁶² The legislature of Vera Cruz had hurriedly summoned Santa Anna to assume in person the civil and military commands, the acting commander of the forces, Juillé, and Antonio Heredia, colonel of the 5th battalion stationed there, having already refused to accept the revolutionary plan. Santa Anna took command on the 17th of December, and issued a manifesto in which he declared his intention to defend the established government, Guerrero being 'the lawful chief magistrate of the nation, and recognized as such without objection from any of the representatives in congress after

⁵⁹ Soon after Mora and his troops joined the rebels of Jalapa.

⁶⁰ It begins, 'Situado en una de las poblaciones del sur.' *Atleta*, 1830, Jan. 18; *Suarez y Navarro*, *Hist. Méx.*, 189-93; *Zavala, Revol. Méx.*, ii. 221-2. Alaman has it that Guerrero, distrusting his troops, proposed to submit through the new government to the action of congress, and then withdrew to the south, 'permitiéndole el gobierno llevar para su escolta un escuadron de caballeria.' *Hist. Méj.*, v. 847-9.

⁶¹ His declaration at his trial, 7th March, 1831. *Mex. Proceso Instruct.*, 142.

⁶² Guanajuato, Querétaro, and Jalisco, whose comandante gen. was Joaquín Parres, and San Luis Potosí, commanded by Gen. Luis Cortazar, were among the first to make pronunciamientos in favor of the plan. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 573; *Suarez y Navarro*, *Hist. Méx.*, 182; *Atleta*, 1829, Dec. 20-22, 29-30; 1830, Jan. 2, 13, 22, 27, 30, Feb. 1-10; *Espíritu Púb.*, 1830, Jan. 21; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1829, 345, 359; 1830, 42; *Puebla, Manif.*, 1-14; *Facio, Mem.*, 120-9; *Mex. Mem. Rel.*, 1830, 11.

Pedraza had renounced his claim to the presidency.⁶³ Sending 350 men to Perote, he himself made an excursion to Huatusco. His intention was to march against the capital and overthrow the new government, but he was abandoned by his men, the very troops that had served under him against the Spaniards. Whereupon Bustamante accredited two commissioners near him to confer on public affairs, and the result of the conference was that Santa Anna gave up his plan and proclaimed that inasmuch as Guerrero had abandoned his post, he felt compelled to recognize the lawful authority of Vice-president Bustamante.⁶⁴

Anastasio Bustamante y Oseguera was born in Jiquilpan, in the province of Michoacan, on the 27th of July, 1780,⁶⁵ and passed his first years in Zapotlan el Grande. His parents, though not in favorable pecuniary circumstances, provided for him a good primary education; after which, at the age of fifteen, with the aid of friends, he entered the seminary of Guadalajara. His conduct there was all that could be desired; he showed remarkable talents as well as a disposition for study, which qualities with his modesty soon won for him the regard of his teachers and classmates. He next went to Mexico to study medicine,⁶⁶ and after graduating as a licentiate fixed his residence in San Luis Potosí, where he soon acquired a high professional standing and a competency.⁶⁷

⁶³ Before that date—on the 15th—he had issued from his estate a stirring address expressing his resolve to support, even unto death, Guerrero's legitimate authority. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, 563-9; *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, ii. 262.

⁶⁴ After this summons Santa Anna went back to Manga de Clavo. Soon after, the legislature of Vera Cruz abandoned its hostile attitude. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 574-7; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 183-9; *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, ii. 263; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, v. nos 1, 2, 7; *Mich. Mem.*, 1830, 1; *Atleta*, 1829, Dec. 20, 25, 26, 28, 29; 1830, Jan. 2, 3, 6, 9; *Gac. Mex.*, extra, 1830, no. 18; *Santa Anna, El Gen., á sus compat.*, 1-7.

⁶⁵ Garcia, C., *Noticias*, in *Mex. Soc. Geog., Boletín*, 3d ep., i. 484, has it 1789.

⁶⁶ His teacher was Dr Linger, then professor of chemistry in the colegio de minería.

⁶⁷ He was superintendent of the hospital, and head physician of the household of Brigadier Calleja, then in command of the 10th brigade.

Having from his earliest years manifested a liking for the military profession, and devoted some time to the study of its most useful branches, in 1808 he received his commission as one of the officers of the commercial battalion, composed of young men of the best families in San Luis. His long military career under the royal banner, and subsequently under Iturbide's, is well known to the reader. Iturbide made him a member of the junta provisional gubernativa, and the regency promoted him to mariscal de campo.⁶⁸ Later he was honored with the grand cross of the order of Guadalupe. During Victoria's administration he was made a general of division.⁶⁹

Bustamante was possessed of much presence of mind, courage, and sound judgment. With firmness of character, he would yet subordinate his opinion to that of others when he saw the necessity for so doing. He was a lover of civilization and enlightenment, and apparently a disinterested patriot; he was also liberal and frank. In his private life he was exemplary.⁷⁰

On the 1st of January, 1830, Bustamante, as vice-president, assumed the executive office, and issued a proclamation on the 4th, in which he described, from the standpoint of his party, the political situation of the country, accusing the former government of abuses of power and fraudulent use of the public

⁶⁸ He was a colonel when he joined Iturbide in Guanajuato. *Mex. Doc. Relativos*, 18.

⁶⁹ In 1828 the Estado de Occidente made him one of its citizens by a formal act of the legislature. *Pinart, Col. Doc.*, no. 78. In July 1830 the national congress declared him a 'benemérito de la patria.' *Mex., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1841, 57-9.

⁷⁰ Rivera, after commending Bustamante's private life and public services, attributes to him cruel instincts, and credits him with being faithful to his friends, and grateful for favors. *Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 582. This virtue of gratitude he certainly did not show in his action toward Guerrero. According to Zavala, *Revol. Mex.*, ii. 141, Bustamante was servile, and it was understood that Guerrero's preferences for him were in the expectation of using him as a passive instrument, such as he had been to the Spanish crown, and afterward to Iturbide. Further particulars may be found in *Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide*, 236-43; *Id., Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 243-6, and Arroniz, *Biog. Mex.*, 80-9. Alaman, *Hist. Méj.*, v. 151, 957-60, and Rivera, *Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 579, furnish portraits of Bustamante, representing him as a man of fine appearance.

funds. He concluded by submitting his conduct to the decision of the congress and people.⁷¹ The new cabinet was formed on the 7th with the following ministers, namely: Lucas Alaman, of relations;⁷² José Ignacio Espinosa Vidaurre, of justice and ecclesiastical affairs; Rafael Mangino, of the treasury; and José Antonio Facio, of war and the navy.⁷³

The question now occurred what to do with Guerrero. His election could not be declared illegal, for such a declaration would equally disqualify Bustamante. In the senate it was moved to declare Guerrero morally incapable. After the motion had been warmly discussed in the lower house—for the sake of appearances, it is presumed—it was enacted on the 4th of February, 1830, that the man decorated for his eminent services with the title of 'benemérito de la patria,' whom that same body had only one year ago chosen to fill the chief magistracy, was not able to govern the republic.⁷⁴ His acts were repudiated.⁷⁵ The law was published at once.

The change was not favorably received in the south, where numerous parties took up arms and labored to bring on a general revolution on strictly federal principles. Juan Álvarez raised the standard of revolt, and the government had to meet its enemies

⁷¹ *Bustamante, Manif.*, 1-20. Consequent upon which the legislature of Chihuahua, Jan. 28th, petitioned congress to make a thorough investigation into the conduct of President Guerrero and his ministers, including also that of Vice-president Bustamante from the time he took command of the reserve army. *Atleta*, 1830, Jan. 2, 56, March 6, 376-7.

⁷² Alaman had held no public office since he resigned this portfolio in 1825.

⁷³ This portfolio was offered to Mier y Terán, who declined it. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1830, 4. The four appointees were certainly able men. But they were not federalists, and did not enjoy public confidence for that reason. *Atleta*, 1830, Jan. 9, 83-4.

⁷⁴ 'Tiene imposibilidad para gobernar la república.' *Mex. Col. Ley.*, 1829-30, 89; *Dublan and Lozano, Legis. Mex.*, ii. 223; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1830, 3, 72; *Atleta*, 1830, Jan. 20, 31; *Zavala, Revol. Méx.*, ii. 267.

⁷⁵ Gen. Barragan refused a comandancia general tendered him, as he would have to affix his signature to the act of Dec. 23, 1829. He argued that if Guerrero had been a nonentity, then he had no power to set aside the law under which he and others were exiled; he, Barragan, must therefore go again into exile. *Atleta*, 1829, Dec. 28.

on their own ground. Supported by Colonel Codallos, he captured on the 16th of March, 1830, the town and fort of Acapulco.⁷⁶

Under Álvarez the opponents of the government maintained their ground, and General Armijo, having been appointed to direct the operations against them, perished in a bloody battle fought near Texca on the 30th of August, 1830.⁷⁷ Guerrero raised his standard toward the end of 1830,⁷⁸ and was joined by Álvarez; but their forces were routed on the 1st or 2d of January, 1831, by the better organized army of Bravo near Chilpancingo.⁷⁹ Guerrero, much against the advice of Álvarez, retired to Acapulco, paying no heed to warnings given him that the government was planning his destruction. It was not long before a diabolical plan to that effect was matured. The government no doubt had it in view in making preparations by land and sea for the recovery of Acapulco. It seems that Guerrero's supporters had in their service the Sardinian brig *Colombo*, owned by a Genoese named Picaluga.⁸⁰ Whether of his own volition or at Minister Facio's request—a point which, from the secrecy observed, must be left

⁷⁶ The garrison revolted, and Berdejo, the comandante general, and others escaped by sea. *Atleta*, 1830, April 1, 399-411; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 205, 208, 213-16, 227; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, iii. no. 5, 8, iv. no. 7, 6.

⁷⁷ He was defeated by Álvarez, and took flight; but being much hated in the south, was pursued, overtaken two miles from Texca, and hacked to death on the spot. *Zavala, Revol. Méx.*, ii. 340-1; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, v. no. 26, 2-7.

⁷⁸ On the 13th of Oct. 1830, he issued a proclamation at Acapulco, explaining his course. The document was circulated in Mexico, and occupied Minister Alaman's attention in November. He issued another at Texca on the 12th of Dec. *Méx. Mem. Guerra*, 1831, doc. 1, 13-16; *Pap. Suellos*, no. 21; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, 199, 202; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 607; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, v. no. 29, 1-5; *Méx. Proceso Instruct.*, 132-5.

⁷⁹ *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, iv. no. 20, 6; *Id.*, MS., vi. 9-13, *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 215-16. Owing to a severe wound in the chest, received in an action of war several years previously, Guerrero was unable to undergo the fatigues of the campaign, as he had repeated hemorrhages, throwing out pieces of bone, which condition demanded repose. *Zavala, Revol. Méx.*, ii. 342; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 223-7. For his victory Bravo was rewarded by act of congress of Feb. 15, 1831, with a sword of honor. *Dublan and Lozano, Legis. Méx.*, ii. 314.

⁸⁰ There was at the time a rumor in Mexico that Guerrero had chartered a vessel wherein to leave the republic. *Atleta*, 1830, ap. 5, 429.

to conjecture—Picaluga came to Mexico in December, 1830, and offered to Facio to remove his vessel from the control of the government's opponents, and place her at its disposal at Guatulco for the sum of \$50,000, which would pay all damages he had already sustained, and compensate him for her use in the future. This is the story told by the government and by Picaluga himself. But the general belief is that Facio and Picaluga struck a bargain upon the spot for the latter to betray Guerrero into the government's hands.⁸¹ Soon after Picaluga's departure, orders were issued to Captain Miguel Gonzalez to station himself with a force at Guatulco to receive the *Colombo*, or if enemies landed there to capture them. The enemies of the government have charged that the orders given Gonzalez were to receive Guerrero from on board the vessel as a prisoner. Gonzalez accordingly went to Guatulco, having with him two other officers, one of whom it is believed was expressly appointed to act as prosecutor and the other as his clerk.⁸² The plotter Picaluga soon found an opportunity to earn his blood-money.⁸³ Manuel Primo Tapia and Manuel Zavala, who were in Acapulco, commissioned on the part of the government with General Barragan to make conciliatory proposals to the chiefs of the south,⁸⁴

⁸¹ Facio claimed that Picaluga's offer to surrender his vessel was spontaneous, and was accepted because it hastened the government's plans in a manner that could not have been foreseen. The success of the plan surprised the ministers, who, though ignorant when they first heard of all the circumstances connected therewith, were glad to avail themselves of the opportunity to pacify the country. *Memoria*, 33-5. Carlos Bustamante, who was then a supporter of the government, gives the full account of the bargain made between Facio and Picaluga for the betrayal by the latter of Guerrero for \$50,000, declaring that he knows the particulars as given by him to be true. *Vez de la Patria*, MS., vi. 23-6. The arrest was made the occasion of much rejoicing, with ringing of bells. The cabinet said to the congress that the proper measures demanded by the situation had been adopted.

⁸² It is asserted that the government was so sure of its prey that even the stamped paper required by law for judicial proceedings had been provided, and was found on board the vessel. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 227-30.

⁸³ General Duran paid Picaluga in Oajaca 3,000 gold doubloons. *Gonzalez, Decl.*, in *Mex. Proceso Instruct.*, 31.

⁸⁴ This appears in the declarations of Tapia and Zavala and in other documents. *Mex., Proceso Instruct.*, 107-13, 115-16. Rivera, *Hist. Jalapa*, 612-13, says that Barragan's plan for conciliation had been treated by the government. *HIST. MEX., VOL. V. 7*

having secured passage on the *Colombo*, Guerrero accompanied them to the wharf. There Picaluga invited him to breakfast on board the brig, which invitation he accepted; Miguel de la Cruz, collector of the port, also went on board. When breakfast was over the brig set sail, Guerrero concluding to go as far as the entrance of the harbor, having a boat in tow for his return on shore. But while in the act of bidding his friends good-by, he was seized and bound by the crew, and together with the others taken to Guatulco, where the vessel arrived on the 20th of January, 1831.⁵⁵ On the 26th they were marched to Oajaca,⁵⁶ where they arrived on the 4th of February, and the proceedings which had commenced at Guatulco were continued, Lieutenant-colonel Nicolás Conde then acting as the prosecuting officer.

The charges preferred against Guerrero were as follows: 1. That he had personally directed the revolution of La Acordada, and obtained the presidential chair over hundreds of corpses, the plunder of the Parian and many wealthy houses, by which proceedings he had dishonored the nation, and made her appear despicable in the eyes of the civilized world. 2. That after his overthrow from the presidency he had pretended to abide by the decision of the congress, and on finding that the decision was against him, had joined Álvarez and his soldiers, whom he had secretly incited to rebellion. 3. That after the battle of Texca he ordered the officers of Armijo's division to be shot, though they were marching under the safe conduct

ment as a folly. Bustamante also disapproved it at the time. *Voz de la Patria*, iv. no. 13, 5-8; no. 31, 6-7.

⁵⁵ Gonzalez in his report of the 21st makes it appear that Guerrero and the others had landed early in the morning of the previous day, and had been captured. *Registro Ofic.*, 1831, Feb. 1, supl.; *Mex., Proceso Instrucl.*, 75-8. If the prisoners were taken on shore, they must have been returned to the ship, for it was on board of her that the initiatory judicial proceedings took place. *Id.*, 102-3.

⁵⁶ Facio had beforehand ordered Bravo to send troops in the direction of Tlapa to guard against a rescue, and the comandante at Oajaca had also been instructed to send Guerrero to Perote; but a counter-order retained him in Oajaca. *Id.*, 187.

granted them by Álvarez. 4. That he scandalously violated the capitulation at Acapulco, not only depriving the government's soldiers of their arms, but forcing them to go away almost naked. 5. That knowing, as he did, that he was not a legitimate president, he had raised an army in revolt against the authorities, causing the ruin of families and persons. 6. That he disregarded the generous overtures for peace made him, preferring his personal aggrandizement to every other consideration, and looking with indifference on the destruction of upwards of 3,000 lives, besides large amounts of property, etc.; and lastly, that he was at the head of the rebel forces which fought against the government troops at Chilpancingo.⁸⁷

The first charge was outlawed by an amnesty decree, and should not have been revived. The prosecuting officer applied the most opprobrious epithets to the victim, and even added the slanderous accusations that Guerrero had, through Zavala and Poinsett, attempted to borrow money from the United States, pledging the territory of Texas for its repayment.⁸⁸ He accordingly moved the court to pass sentence of death on the accused, which was done. The sentence was approved on the 11th of February by Colonel Joaquín Ramírez y Sesma, the comandante general of Oajaca. Three days later, on the 14th, Guerrero was taken to Cuilapa and shot, after being compelled to listen on his knees to the sentence of the court.⁸⁹

It is, indeed, a singular coincidence that Iturbide

⁸⁷ These charges were drawn up by Facio himself, and confidentially transmitted to the comandante at Oajaca. *Id.*, 183-5.

⁸⁸ This charge the prisoner declared to be utterly false. *Id.*, 150. The evidence of Francisco Fagoaga and José María Bocanegra sustained his assertion, and stamped Alaman, Facio, and other open enemies of Guerrero as unprincipled slanderers. *Rev. Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 141. *Ward, Mex.*, app., speaks of such a contract for \$12,000,000. Zavala pronounces it a barefaced invention of Guerrero's enemies. *Revol. Méx.*, ii. 205.

⁸⁹ The fact was duly communicated the same day to the government. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, iv. nos 27, 28; *MS.*, vi. 22-53; *MS.*, viii. 46. This author asserts that Vice-president Bustamante was powerless to prevent the execution. *Gabinete, Mex.*, ii. 21, following index.

and Guerrero, two men of diametrically opposite ideas regarding government, united their efforts to accomplish their country's freedom, and that both met with death by public execution at the hands of the same political party.

Guerrero left a wife, María Guadalupe Hernandez, a daughter aged 18, named María Dolores, and a nephew, Prudencio Catalan, for whose education provision was made in his will. The widow was appointed executor of the estate.

The Jalapista party was held by the nation answerable for Guerrero's execution. The treachery by means of which the ministers effected his capture was never forgiven them.⁹⁰ After their downfall the sentence was considered a murder, and Alaman, Facio, and Espinosa were impeached on that and other charges;⁹¹ but the accused were never convicted, for the reason that the proceedings were lengthened out, and eventually the case became a party question.⁹²

⁹⁰ Picaluga, for his share in the vile transaction, was sentenced by the admiralty court in Genoa to death, and to pay damages, but escaped punishment, never having returned to his country. Zamacois, *Hist. Méj.*, xii. 22-3, gives the sentence in Italian. Gonzalez, the officer who captured Guerrero and superintended his execution, died covered with leprous sores. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 141.

⁹¹ The house of representatives constituted as a grand jury indicted the three, exempting Minister Mangino. *Mex., Proceso Instruct.*, 254-5.

⁹² Alaman and Facio had hidden themselves, the latter escaping to Europe. While at that safe distance he published a book entitled *Memoria que sobre los sucesos del tiempo de su ministerio, y sobre la causa intentada contra los cuatro ministros*. Paris, 1835, 8vo, 245 pp., and an app. of 8 pp. In it the author, after denying the legality of the body that impeached him, goes on to state from his own standpoint the political events which took place in Mexico during Vice-president Bustamante's administration, endeavoring to defend its course, particularly in the execution of Guerrero and others of the federal party. He seems to have exhausted the vocabulary of abuse against his enemies, making at the same time revelations that are anything but honorable to the government of which he formed a part. Facio never figured again in Mexican politics, but his rank in the army was restored to him in 1835. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1835, 482. Quite different in manner and style was Alaman in his *Defensa del ex-ministro de relaciones D. Lucas Alaman*. Mexico, 1834, 8vo, xxii. and 126 pp. He was politic and suave, as behooved a man who was not yet out of danger. His arguments, like Facio's, were intended to show that the course of Bustamante's ministers was a wise and necessary one to secure peace and the best interests of the country. It is difficult to believe that the guiding mind of the administration had no knowledge of Facio's bargain with Picaluga. Be it as it may, he was finally acquitted of all culpability by the supreme court. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 145.

The congress of 1831 voted to Guerrero's widow and offspring a yearly pension of \$3,000.⁹³ The legislature of Oajaca in March, 1833, decreed that his remains should be exhumed, and with due solemnity be deposited in the church of Santo Domingo.⁹⁴ The town of Cuilapa was erected into a city under the name of Ciudad Guerrero. That same year the national congress ordered the remains to be transferred to Mexico and placed in a mausoleum in the Santa Paula cemetery.⁹⁵ This was not carried out till 1842, when it was decreed that the highest honors should be paid to the hero's memory. On the 8th of April, 1843, a monument was ordered to be erected in Santa Paula, at the expense of the public treasury, and dedicated to Guerrero.

After the ex-president's death the war in that region of southern Mexico, later organized as the state of Guerrero, ceased, Álvarez submitting to Bustamante's government.

⁹³ At the death of either, the survivor was to have the whole pension. *Dublan and Lozano, Legis. Mex.*, ii. 314; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1831, 216.

⁹⁴ A full description of the exhumation and other ceremonies appears in *Carriedo, Estudios Hist.*, ii. 49-55; *Guerrero, V., Soberano Estado*. Mariano Riva Palacio, who had married Guerrero's daughter, was granted the right of citizenship in the state.

⁹⁵ Decree of Nov. 17, 1833. *Dublan and Lozano, Legis. Mex.*, ii. 601.

CHAPTER V.

CONSERVATIVE RULE.

1830-1832.

DESPOTIC MEASURES—CODALLOS' REVOLUTION—YORKINO OPPOSITION—POLITICAL BLUNDERS—INSTITUTIONS PROSTITUTED—INCLAN'S AFFAIR—IMPENDING CHANGES—SANTA ANNA'S PRONENCIAMIENTO—HIS DEFEAT AT TOLOMÉ—SIEGE OF VERA CRUZ—ITS FAILURE—REVOLUTIONS IN TAMAULIPAS—TERAN'S SUICIDE—SANTA ANNA'S REFORMED PLAN—IT IS SECONDED ELSEWHERE—BATTLE OF LOS CARMELOS—FALL OF SAN LUIS POTOSÍ—ITS EFFECTS IN MEXICO—ACTING PRESIDENT MUZQUIZ—BUSTAMANTE'S VICTORY IN GUANAJUATO—SANTA ANNA'S SUCCESS—BUSTAMANTE'S DEFEATS IN PUEBLA—ARMISTICE—PLANS OF PACIFICATION—THE REVOLUTION TRIUMPHANT.

THE party which had labored so hard for nine years to gain control of the government was at last triumphant. It was believed by many that the change would prove beneficial. Indeed, friends and foes alike trusted that the pledges of the leading men would be faithfully carried out, and a constitutional policy with tolerance adopted. Unfortunately, the new rulers manifested no such intentions. Their first step was to draw from congress a vote to legalize the revolution that had elevated them to power. Relying on the clergy and the army, they initiated a policy of persecution against the authorities, functionaries, and prominent men of the yorkino or popular party.¹

Freedom of the press soon ceased under the re-

¹ Several governors and others were deposed, a number of prominent citizens exiled, and the jails filled with political opponents, or persons denounced by paid spies. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 590-1, 596-7; *Mora, Obras Sueltas*, ii. 426-9; *Posadas, Alegato Def.*, 1-16; *Atleta*, 1830, ap. 20, 485.

pressive system of Minister Alaman. Only journals defending the government were allowed to exist.²

The government was not long permitted to pursue its despotisms in peace. Revolutions broke out in southern Michoacan and other parts of the south, as well as in Mexico, San Luis Potosí, and Puebla, which caused much trouble; though, for want of popular support, they were quelled, and their promoters arbitrarily dealt with.³

The military element, being now well looked after as to pay, emoluments, and honors, was daily gaining a preponderance in public affairs; and the government further increased the number of its supporters by winning over the chiefs who had favored the late revolution by means of an amnesty law, so called, but really a penal one against conspirators,⁴ afterward amended, allowing officers in the rebellion not only to submit, but to tender to the pardoning authority their services against their former comrades. They were received with the rank they held among the revolutionists, and even given promotion. The government was running from one blunder into another in its endeavors to sustain itself. In October it forced Gomez Pedraza, who had come back, to leave the coun-

²The *Atleta* was killed under the burden of fines. The press of the capital was finally reduced to *El Sol* and *Registro Oficial*, and later Bustamante's *Voz de la Patria*, together with a few loose sheets to circulate among the rabble. *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, ii. 312-13; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 592, 596.

³Like that of Codallos, begun in December 1829, and crushed in the same month of 1830, whose chief and a few companions were taken prisoners and shot at Pátzcuaro. *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, ii. 283-6, 329-31; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, iii. no. 23, 8, no. 17, 8; *Id.*, MS., vi. 59-62; *Mex., Proceso Instruct.*, 220-2. The parties concerned in such movements were either put to death, banished, or sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. Juan N. Rosains, of revolutionary fame, Col Francisco Victoria, a brother of the first president, Cristóbal Fernandez, Col José Marquez, his secretary Joaquin Gárate, and others in San Luis, and many in Michoacan, were shot. In some cases, as in Morelia, the claims of humanity were disregarded; in others, not even the form of a trial preceded. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 220; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iv. 237; *Id.*, *Proceso*, 193-219, 223-30; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, iv. no. 16, 5 et seq., v. no. 31, 1-3; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 603-4; *Id.*, *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 153.

⁴March 11, 1831. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1831, 218-21. The end of the government was to get rid of its enemies, under the garb of a pardon, to exile them. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 226.

try.⁵ This unjustifiable proceeding was sustained by the subservient ministerial majority in congress.

The national congress from 1829 to the end of 1830, taken as a whole, was undeserving of popular respect. During the first session both houses were subservient to the demands of all parties. Their bickerings and general discordance brought upon the country all the troubles resulting from the Jalapa plan. In 1830, the legislative body, with a few honorable exceptions among its members,⁶ went over to the support of the men who effected the overthrow of Guerrero's government, which explains the ease with which it was accomplished as well as the facility with which Bustamante's administration obtained a legal status. But the congress of 1831-2 conducted itself with still greater subserviency to the will of the ministers, passing special laws, establishing special courts to terrorize those discontented with the existing order of things, giving the government almost unlimited powers, decreeing proscriptions, and rewarding crime. It permitted the executive, without protest, to modify or construe the laws at will.

The judiciary was not free from the corruption that pervaded congress. The courts, from the lowest to the highest, lent themselves to subterfuge and chicanery to please the government, and became its abject tools, as was made evident in the proceedings against Alpuche, Zerecero, Gondra, and others, and in the admission of the most absurd charges, preferred in most cases by notoriously disreputable men.⁷ The independence of the legislative and judicial powers no longer existed, and the people were actually at the

⁵ The reason alleged was that Pedraza's presence would support the opposition to the government, and involve the country in still greater commotion. *Quintana Roa, Acus.*, in *Zuvala, Revol. Mex.*, ii. 347-56; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 834; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 605-6; *Alvarez, Hist. Gen. Méx.*, v. 192-3.

⁶ Senators Pacheco Leal, Rejon, and Portugal; Deputies Quintana Roa and Cañedo. Rejon was beaten in the streets by instigation of the government. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 3-4.

⁷ The death penalty was inflicted on many not taken with arms in their hands, or in open revolt against the constituted authorities. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 224.

mercy of the government and its myrmidons—a state of things which, it must be confessed, was made available for its purposes with ability and energy, without neglecting to gain the favor of the clergy by concessions that virtually restored their former influence.⁸

The despotism of the military is illustrated by the violence shown in the arrest of a printer at Guadalajara by the comandante general, Inclan, which was of so outrageous a nature that the insulted state authorities and legislature deemed it proper to remove to Lagos.⁹ The government for a time, from motives of policy, took no action in the case.¹⁰ Facio tried to extenuate Inclan's fault without offending that and other legislatures, and did not recall that general till the 28th of December.¹¹

This affair precipitated events when the opposition to the government had not yet matured any plan to bring about a reaction. The moderate element in the several parties limited its efforts to checking the retrogressive policy of the administration, and trusted, for a radical change, to the renewal of the executive and congress at the end of 1832. But the large number who had suffered or were suffering at the hands of despotism would brook no further delay; the policy of the opposition was in their estimation too slow and altogether dependent on electoral eventualities to be waited on a whole year, during which those in power would use their large resources to keep it in their own hands. The probabilities were all in favor of the government, which counted on the coöperation of the

⁸ It is said that Bustamante, to further win their good will, visited the churches and prayed much, whereby indulgences were gained from the pope. This led to disagreements in the cabinet, too much preponderance being given to the clergy. Facio wanted the army to be all-powerful. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 154-5.

⁹ Full particulars of the case in *Alaman, Proceso*, 32-7; *Facio, Expos. a las Cám.*, 1-21; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 20-1; *Mora, Obras Sueltas*, i. pp. xl, lxxv.

¹⁰ *Alaman* gives as the chief reason the probability of a movement at Guadalajara in favor of the central system of government, which would have been supported by the whole army. *Hist. Méx.*, v. 851.

¹¹ On that date he surrendered his command to Col Cirilo Gomez Anaya. *Jal., Expos. al Cong.*, 7, 14, 21.

authorities—its own creatures—in many states, and on the indifference of others.¹² Jalisco and Zacatecas, however, occupied a position between those willing to wait for a legal change of ruler, and those who wanted to effect it by force of arms. Without leaning to either extreme, they organized their militia and kept fanning the flame of discord in the press. Wealthy Guanajuato, under General Luis Cortazar's advice, was also prepared for a turn of events. Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, Tamaulipas, and Tabasco, being at a distance, were to be called into action in the event of a conflict with the central force. Meantime the parties were carrying on intrigues to win the elections. Three parties were playing for the stake, namely, the friends of the existing order of things, the moderates, and the radicals.¹³ Amidst the agitation the administration felt sure of victory, and would probably have gained it but for an unforeseen occurrence that dashed to the ground all its plans, and hurled it from power.

Bustamante on the 1st of January, 1832, congratulated the legislative body on the progress the republic had made under his rule, adding that the fury and animosity of political parties had almost disappeared.¹⁴ Flattering manifestations of confidence greeted him from the ministerial majority and his other supporters, when tidings arrived which contradicted his as-

¹² Mexico, Puebla, Vera Cruz, San Luis Potosí, Durango, Querétaro, Michoacan, and Oajaca were allies. Sonora and Sinaloa had their local bickerings to occupy them, and being far away from the centre, did not much feel the hand of the general government. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 261.

¹³ The administration party wanted a man as president who would secure them what had been gained under Bustamante's rule; the moderates desired a combination of the old ideas with the new; the third party was large and affected exaggerated ideas, favoring radical measures, such as abolition of *fucros*, confiscation of ecclesiastical property, reformation of the religious orders, and disbandment of the army so as to crush out militarism from the country.

¹⁴ The states were all represented as having considerable surplus funds. The minister of the treasury could dispose of large amounts at Vera Cruz and Tampico, and had provided for the payment of six months' interest on the foreign debts. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 1. It must be confessed that the administration had much improved the financial and industrial condition of the country.

severations regarding the popular satisfaction with his policy. The garrison at Vera Cruz had, on the night of the 2d of January, issued a pronunciamiento demanding, among other things, the dismissal of the ministers.

Santa Anna had been living quietly for two years on his estate of Manga de Clavo. The administration had tendered him positions and he had refused them. All persons desiring to put a stop to the arbitrary acts of the government, and prevent the coming elections from being conducted under the influence of Bustamante's ministers, urged Santa Anna to place himself at the head of a movement to effect their removal.¹⁵ Santa Anna was convinced that only a resort to arms could remove the dangers of a wide-spread revolution that would lead to general anarchy. The dismissal of the ministers was thought to be the remedy for the evil, and this was the exclusive object of the pronunciamiento. It subsequently took another direction by the express will of the several states. The ministers and their friends attributed the movement to different motives, accusing Santa Anna of sinister views, and charging Colonel Landero, one of the chief promoters, with acts of a dishonorable character.¹⁶ Whatever the actual promptings may have been, the grievance complained against was the conduct of the ministry, as set forth by the complainants in their act, a synopsis of which I give below.¹⁷ Santa

¹⁵ It was hoped that by his mediation the object could be accomplished. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 263.

¹⁶ Santa Anna wanted to be president. Landero had embezzled \$18,000 of his regiment's funds. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 4-6; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 833.

¹⁷ The field and other officers of the garrisons of the town and fortress, by invitation of Ciriaco Vasquez, comandante general, assembled at the house of Col Pedro Landero, and after considering the situation, arrived at the conclusion that the country was threatened with revolution and probably with anarchy. The cause of this general discontent was attributed to the arbitrary acts of the ministers, which had made them hateful to the people, and had been practised in spite of the vice-president's remonstrances. The latter was represented as a firm supporter of the federal system, but his action was trammelled by the ministry. Accompanying the long preamble, the following resolutions were adopted: 1. The garrison renews the obligations assumed in the plan of Jalapa to faithfully observe the federal constitution and laws;

Anna accepted the position, and on the 4th of the same month addressed himself from Vera Cruz¹⁸ to Bustamante, detailing the occurrences at that city, and modestly tendering his good offices as a mediator to bring about the wished for result without breaking the peace or causing disturbance.

While Santa Anna and his followers awaited at Vera Cruz the government's decision, the ministry made preparation for resistance. The four ministers appeared before the chambers to inform them of these occurrences. After the official despatches had been read, Alaman read private letters from General Iberri, and explained from his standpoint the action of the revolutionists at Vera Cruz.¹⁹ That minister next proceeded to justify his own and his colleagues' conduct, and declared their intention to keep their post so long as the congress did not consider them open to the charges that had been preferred against them.²⁰ However, on the 11th the four ministers laid their resignations, accompanied with an explanation of their motives, before the executive; but they were not accepted. Both houses of congress manifested their wish that the ministers should continue in office. This was tantamount to a resolution that the demand of the revolutionists at Vera Cruz should be disre-

2. Asks the vice-president to dismiss the ministers whom public opinion charges with upholding centralism and tolerating abuses against civil liberty and personal rights; 3. It appoints a committee of two officers to lay these proceedings before Santa Anna, and invite him to repair to Vera Cruz and take command of the forces; 4. The garrison, in the event of Santa Anna's acceptance of the invitation, abstains from addressing the supreme government. The general will send this act and such other remarks as he may deem expedient to the vice-president and the authorities of the federation and states, adopting such measures, besides, as may conduce to the accomplishment of the desired object. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Mèx.*, 263-7; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 9-10; *Id.*, *Hist. Santa Anna*, 275; *Id.*, *Hist. Iturbide*, 211; *Rivera, Hist. Ja'apa*, iii. 46-91; *Becher, Mèx.*, 39-41, 48, 53-4.

¹⁸ He had first got possession of \$279,000 from the federal treasury, against the protest of Treasurer Lebrijar. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 11.

¹⁹ He mentioned as causes of the revolution that the troops had been led to believe that General Gomez Pedraza had been called back to the republic, and that to support his landing, a military camp had been founded under Calderon, and troops would be stationed in Vera Cruz.

²⁰ 'Till the chambers should hold them to accountability,' 'si es que hubieran dado motivo á las inculpaciones que se les hacian.' *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Mèx.*, 266-7.

garded as untenable and unconstitutional. Notwithstanding which the ministers remained in power much against their will,²¹ and after a while insisted that their resignations be accepted.²² Meantime, thousands of expressions favorable to the government came from its friends, which were looked upon as so many evidences that the movement at Vera Cruz was condemned by public opinion. The ministry thereupon resolved to employ all the resources at its disposal to crush the promoters. Minister Facio temporarily left his department on the 11th, and repaired to Jalapa to organize a strong division, which was placed in command of General José María Calderon. Peaceable means were, however, first tried, commissioners being sent to induce Santa Anna to abandon his hostile attitude.²³ But they effected nothing,²⁴ and no recourse was left but to appeal to arms. Facio had completed his preparations by the end of January, and General Calderon was to begin operations the next month. Thinking to obtain the surrender of Vera Cruz on the approach of his troops, Facio tried to bribe José María Flores, the commandant of San Juan de Ulúa,²⁵ who returned dignified answers, rejecting the proposal. Hostilities consequently commenced. Santa Anna at first obtained some partial successes, but at Tolome²⁶ he encountered the minis-

²¹ On the 20th of January the legislature of Zacatecas petitioned the vice-president not to keep these men in power against their will, as there was no law authorizing it

²² The vice-president had been showing them some coldness. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 15.

²³ The commissioners were the vice-governor of Vera Cruz, M. M. Perez, Senator Bernardo Couto, and a treasury official named Vicente Segura. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 269.

²⁴ The report of the commissioners to the governor of Vera Cruz, and Alman's to the chamber of deputies, are given in *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 270-3; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 21-3.

²⁵ Facio offered Flores the rank of full colonel and \$25,000 if he would make a counter-pronunciamiento in the castle. His and Calderon's letters, both dated Jan. 25, 1832, appeared in *El Censor* of Vera Cruz, Jan. 30th, and *El Fénix de la Libertad*, no. 18, and were used at Facio's impeachment in 1833. *Mex. Proceso Instruct.*, 54-5. Facio also tried to win over officers and men with offers of promotion and reward. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 156.

²⁶ A small village of palm huts, having narrow paths leading to a bridge which was the passage-way for the miserable place. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 276-7; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, -iii. 63.

terial troops, 3,700 strong, on the 3d of March, and suffered a disastrous defeat, losing heavily in killed, wounded, and prisoners,²⁷ besides a considerable quantity of ammunition and muskets. The ministerialists' loss was also severe. After this disaster Santa Anna hurriedly returned to Vera Cruz with the remnants of his force. He at once set to work to organize another army, and prepared the town for defence. Calderon by a little activity might now have made short work of the revolution, but by his dilatoriness, expecting that the town would easily fall into his hands, and also from motives of humanity to avert further bloodshed, he gave Santa Anna time to complete his preparations, and on arriving in front of the city found his adversary strongly fortified, with 112 heavy pieces of artillery on the ramparts, and 2,500 men. Calderon completed his preparations for the siege on the 12th of April; but all his efforts failed to reduce the place, while hundreds of his men were falling victims to the deadly climate.²⁸ Finally, in view of occurrences in other states, and after losing upward of 1,000 men, Calderon raised the siege on the 13th of May, and retired to Jalapa, where we must leave him for the present to consider important events in other parts that eventually affected Vera Cruz and neighboring states.

Rumors had been for some time in circulation that several states intended to disregard the authority of the general administration. To ward off such blows, the government used all its means of persuasion, and made the most of Teran's influence in the eastern states, where he had the military command. Peace was preserved in that quarter till March, when the

²⁷ Among the killed were colonels Landero and Andonaegui, both of whom had done good service against the Spanish invaders under Barradas. The prisoners were 32 officers and about 460 rank and file.

²⁸ Congress on the 25th of April passed a law granting Santa Anna and his officers a humiliating pardon, which they indignantly rejected. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. MEX.*, 287.

standard of revolt was raised in Tamaulipas by Francisco Vital Fernandez, who was supported by the comandante at Tampico, General Estévan Moctezuma.²⁹ Teran prevailed on the legislature to set Fernandez aside, and restore the authority of the government, and after some conferences with Moctezuma, finding conciliatory action unavailing, he attacked him at Tampico on the 13th of May, and met with a disastrous repulse, which necessitated his retreat to Villeras, whereupon Moctezuma marched into the interior.

Teran afterward obtained some advantages over his adversaries; but the disaster at Tampico, the misfortunes of his country, and his despair of bringing about peace in the region under his command, together with family troubles, affected his mind, and drove him to commit suicide on the 3d of July, 1832, at Padilla, by thrusting his sword through his body.³⁰

Teran's death at this time was a serious loss to Mexico, as he had become the link between the moderate wings of the yorkino and escocés parties, and was their candidate for president of the republic.

The government's fears as to the effect of the occurrences at Tampico and elsewhere soon became realized. José Antonio Barragan revolted in San Luis Potosí, and soon after Zacatecas and Jalisco adopted a revolutionary plan differing somewhat from that of Santa Anna, in that it involved the removal of Bustamante from the executive, and proclaimed Gomez Pedraza as the legitimate president, regardless

²⁹ Moctezuma was an old royalist soldier during the war of independence, and afterward served under Iturbide. He had been out of service when Pres. Bustamante, at the request of his old friend Col. Martín y Aguirre, brought him again into the army, giving him the brevet of a general of brigade, and appointing him to the command at Tampico. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 66-7.

³⁰ *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 90-1; *Niles' Reg.*, xlii. 455. Teran was one of the few Mexicans of general scientific attainments, a man of high character, and a profound thinker. *Tornel, Breve Reseña Hist.*, 27, 269; *Atleta*, 1859, Jan. 9, 83; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, MS., viii. 235, 233; *Id.*, *Voz de la Patria*, ii. no. 23, 3. Teran was interred in the same tomb with Iturbide. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 856; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 91.

of the fact that he had voluntarily resigned his claim to the position.³¹ By right he could not be regarded as legitimate president without a new election; but the party of progress, formed by two strong sections of the yorkinos and escoceses, had no other man after General Teran's death in whom it could repose confidence, especially on the eve of the presidential election, which under the law could not be postponed.

When the secret of the legitimists, as they were called from the project to bring the general government again to a legitimate status, leaked out, though it had been carefully kept by the authorities of Zacatecas and Jalisco, the administration at Mexico considered itself in imminent peril, inasmuch as the revolution in its new tendencies was assuming a different aspect. This condition of affairs evidently called for peremptory measures and extraordinary sacrifices. Alaman did not allow himself to be intimidated, and believing that with the presence of an able and influential general at the head of the army in the field the impending storm might be weathered, he recommended that the vice-president should assume the command of the government's forces in person, and on the 10th of May asked authorization therefor from the chamber of deputies.³² It was refused, and the enemies of the administration had the opportunity to say that the proceeding had been a farce with the ulterior view of recovering in that puerile manner its lost prestige. This false step was followed by another, which was an attempt to remove the foundations on which the revolutionists based their opposition. They had demanded the dismissal of the ministers, and on the acceptance of their resignation the executive thought that the question would terminate.

³¹ The plan of calling Pedraza to the presidency was the work of Gomez Farias and Gov. García of Zacatecas. *Mora, Obras Sueltas*, i. p. lxxv.

³² Art. 112 of the constitution prescribed it. Alaman's exposé of the situation was a long and able one, maintaining that the executive at the head of the army would be better able to cause the constitution and rights of the nation to be respected. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 230-1.

They were therefore allowed to resign on the 17th of May.³³ But the action, which four months previously might have been beneficial, produced no good effects now. The congress had expected much from the firmness of the cabinet, so often proclaimed as it had been in divers ways. It was thought that the ministers would not leave their posts till they had triumphed, or Santa Anna had been persuaded to tender his submission. Their present action was a disappointment, and the states were disgusted with the undignified course of the chambers.

When General Calderon abandoned the siege of Vera Cruz he left 800 men under Rincon on the puente nacional³⁴ to keep Santa Anna in check; the latter, however, got the better of Rincon, cutting off his communications with the main body of the government army. Rincon having retreated to Los Organos, Santa Anna went to the hacienda El Encero, and an armistice³⁵ was agreed upon and signed at Corral Falso on the 13th of June, with the object of holding conferences on the puente nacional, to treat of peace, on the 6th of July.³⁶ Nothing resulted therefrom, however, except a promise on Santa Anna's part to undertake no operation against the government troops during forty-eight hours reckoned from the morning of the 13th.³⁷

The failure of these negotiations resulted from Santa Anna's refusal to accept any proposition from

³³ The portfolios remained in charge of the chief clerks excepting that of the treasury, of which Mangino continued in charge till the 19th of August, after a new ministry had been organized. *Mex. Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1030-1. Mangino was really no political entity. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 292.

³⁴ The puente del rey was so called after the independence.

³⁵ Santa Anna's commissioners were Col. Arago and José M. Vidal; for Calderon, Col. Félix Merino and Adjutant José García Conde. Terms of the armistice in *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 296-7.

³⁶ The commissioners who acted in the government's name were Ex-pres. Guadalupe Victoria, and Governor Sebastian Camacho of Vera Cruz.

³⁷ Bustamante has it that they revealed 'la iniquidad de Santa Anna, y de las hordes que le seguian,' as also the lack of stability and honor of the government. *Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 127.

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the government, because, whether at his own instigation or not, the garrison at Vera Cruz, urged by the authorities of Jalisco and Zacatecas, had on July 5th made a pronunciamiento in favor of restoring legitimacy to the government, or in other words, ignoring Bustamante and proclaiming Pedraza as the rightful president of the republic.³⁸

The despatches conveying the failure of the negotiations with Santa Anna reached Mexico at the same time with the news that Zacatecas, Jalisco, and Durango had adopted the plan of placing Pedraza in the presidential chair.³⁹ Zacatecas placed 4,000 militiamen under arms ready for active service. In Durango General Urrea replaced Governor Elorriaga, who had been deposed in March 1830 by Bustamante's ministers, and in Jalisco the comandante general Cirilo Gomez Anaya was forced to leave Guadalajara.

On the other hand, San Luis Potosí,⁴⁰ Michoacan, Chihuahua, Mexico, Puebla, and Tabasco favored Bustamante; but in Tamaulipas Colonel Mejía seized the port of Matamoros, where he obtained the necessary resources for his 600 men and a squadron of six vessels. He then proceeded to Tampico to unite his forces with those of Moctezuma, and not finding him there,⁴¹ joined Santa Anna at Vera Cruz.

Moctezuma made a rapid march toward San Luis Potosí, and at Pozo de los Carmelos defeated the government force under Colonel Otero on the 3d of Au-

³⁸ The acta sets forth the grounds of action, and directs Santa Anna to accede at the conferences to nothing incompatible with its two articles. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 309-10; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 124-5; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 97.

³⁹ Zacatecas made the declaration July 10th, Durango soon after, Jalisco on the 15th of July. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 312, 314; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 157-8; *Alvarez, J., Manifi.*, 119; *Pinart, Col. Doc.*, 5, 246-7.

⁴⁰ The legislature empowered Gov. Reyes to raise troops, and to borrow \$100,000 to meet expenses.

⁴¹ Moctezuma, after undoing all that Teran had done at Ciudad Victoria, and replacing Vital Fernaudez in the governor's chair, had marched into the interior.

gust,⁴² which opened to him at once the gates of the state capital. The authorities created by a revolution on the 21st and 22d of July and the comandante general Zenon Fernandez took to flight, leaving as governor Felipe Manjarrez, a member of the city council. On the 5th of August the ayuntamiento accepted the situation, and six days later the legislative diputacion permanente met for the sole purpose of nullifying Bustamante's authority, and declaring Pedraza the rightful executive of the republic.⁴³

The occupation of San Luis by the revolutionists staggered the government. The chamber of deputies at once authorized the vice-president to take command of the army. In his absence the executive was intrusted, by special choice of the deputies voting by states on the 7th of August, to General Melchor Muzquiz,⁴⁴ who on the 14th took possession of the office with the title of president ad interim. Bustamante retained his position as vice-president; but after a victory over his enemies he resigned it on the 19th of September.⁴⁵

His resignation was not accepted by congress, but the course of events made it effective.

General Melchor Muzquiz was born about 1790 in Santa Rosa, in the district of Monclova, Coahuila. In 1810 he left the college of San Ildefonso to join the revolution for independence. When a colonel he was captured by the royalists, and would have been shot at Puebla but for an opportune amnesty decree that included him. He supported the plan of Iguala, and in 1824 was governor of Mexico.⁴⁶ From his ac-

⁴² The battle lasted three hours. Otero was slain, many officers were wounded, and the rest, with a few dispersed soldiers, reached the city three hours later. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 162-6; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. MEX.*, 317-8.

⁴³ This is said to have been a free, spontaneous act, without military coercion. *S. L. Potosí, Diput. Perman.*, 2-5, in *Pinart, Col. Doc.*

⁴⁴ He had 15 votes out of 17. Gen. Bravo received one, and Juan Ignacio Godoy the other. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. MEX.*, ii. 445-6, 451; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1832-3, 140-9.

⁴⁵ He stated that he did so of his free will, as a citizen and as a soldier who had never given way to force. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. MEX.*, 330.

⁴⁶ Pres. Victoria made him a general of brigade. Bustamante among his last

tion in concert with Facio to promote the plan de Jalapa, Muzquiz came to be looked upon as Bustamante's second and possible substitute.

Muzquiz was an honest man and a disinterested patriot, ready to do his duty and undergo any suffering for his country and his principles. At his death his family was left unprovided for, and his widow had to keep a school for support. Some time after Muzquiz's death, his name was given to the place of his birth.⁴⁷

Muzquiz appointed his cabinet on the 19th of August, with the following ministers: Francisco Fagoaga, of relations; Juan Ignacio Godoy, of justice and ecclesiastical affairs; Ignacio Alas, of the treasury; General José Ignacio Iberri, of war and marine.⁴⁸

No one had any doubt of Muzquiz's honesty of purpose, but his identification with the party, now thrown out of power by late events, rendered it impossible for his government to satisfy the leaders of the revolution, who were demanding a legitimate authority.

The first efforts of the new administration were directed to the preparations for Bustamante's campaign. Guanajuato and Michoacan were in peril of meeting with the same fate as San Luis Potosí, the forces of Zacatecas and Jalisco now coöperating with those under General Moctezuma. Bustamante accordingly hurried to Querétaro. With his force of 4,000 men divided into three divisions, commanded respectively by generals Amador, Duran, and Arista, Bustamante marched to San Miguel el Grande, since named Allende, where the enemy occupied several important positions. He attempted no movement

acts placed his nomination for general of division before the senate, but Muzquiz, on assuming the executive office, recalled it.

⁴⁷ July 31, 1845, the congress declared Muzquiz 'benemérito de la patria.' *Amigo del Pueblo*, 12 Agosto, 1845, 86; *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., i. 215-8, ii. 192.

⁴⁸ Fagoaga had been since 1821 in favor of a foreign monarch. Iberri was objectionable to the revolutionists. The other two ministers were measurably respected by their opponents, being advocates of popular representative government.

against the city, and occupied the town of Dolores Hidalgo. Moctezuma with superior numbers advanced, on the 17th of September, to the haciendas of El Rincon, evidently intending to seize the important position called Puerto del Gallinero; but Bustamante, detecting his purpose, occupied it early in the morning of the 18th. Five hours later Moctezuma came up and at once opened fire. In a short time the action became general. Moctezuma having first arranged his columns so as to assail the enemy on both flanks at the same time, the brunt of the attack was finally made on Bustamante's left line, after it was found impracticable to break his centre. By massing his whole force against that line, Moctezuma exposed his columns to the fire of the enemy's batteries as well as of some battalions stationed under cover on the slope of a hill. The result was that his troops were driven back by Bustamante's cavalry to where he had stationed his reserve. He tried to renew the attack, but soon found himself outflanked, and the rout became general and complete. His dispersed men were hotly pursued as far as the hacienda of Las Trancas, and cut down without mercy. The mortality on Bustamante's side was large, but that of Moctezuma's army was enormous.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Suarez y Navarro accuses Bustamante of having led the pursuit in person, mercilessly slaying the fugitives. *Hist. Méx.*, 329. The parish priest of Dolores Hidalgo, Rev. Ignacio Moctezuma, on the 23d of September, reported that he had buried 924 in the battle-field, and 45, who died of their wounds, in the parish cemetery. That total of 969 did by no means include all the victims, as the priest had not, owing to great distances, reached all the slain. According to Bustamante, *Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 169-82, who gives a detailed account of the campaign, the number of killed in the battle was 2,128. The prisoners were 604, including 169 wounded. Zamacois says that he investigated that point, and was assured by truthful persons from San Miguel el Grande that the number of killed exceeded 1,500. *Hist. Méj.*, xi. 908-9.

Suarez y Navarro, Juan, *Historia de México y del General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna*. Mex., 1850. Large 8vo, pp. vi. 457, with Santa Anna's portrait. This work covers the period from 1821 to the beginning of 1833—not to 1848 as indicated on its title-page. Of the events in the years 1821-1827 it gives little more than a résumé; but of those which occurred between 1828 and 1832 a full account is given, particularly of the last year. The author purports to furnish a true and honest detail of those events, refuting at the same time a number of accusations that had been preferred against General Santa Anna. He presents his opinions and proofs with good judgment and

Bustamante now reoccupied San Luis Potosí on the 30th of September, reinstating the deposed authorities.⁵⁰ He might easily have quelled the revolution in the other hostile states, but that news reached him of General Valencia's defection in the state of Mexico, which imperilled the national capital. He had only advanced as far as Peñon Blanco, where he obtained, in the latter part of October, a promise from Governor García of Zacatecas that he would cause the legislature of his state to revoke the act recognizing Pedraza. That promise was not fulfilled, owing, as alleged by Bustamante's partisans, to the influence of Luis de la Rosa and Gomez Farias over García.

Affairs in Vera Cruz were in the mean time assuming a most unfavorable aspect for the government. Facio, who since Calderon's retreat from Vera Cruz and his own resignation as minister of war had been in command of the government troops in that state, could not boast of much progress in his operations against Santa Anna. The latter had been active in recruiting and instructing his army, and on the 29th of September was in a condition to assume the offensive. With the view of raising the spirits of his men, some of whom had become downcast on hearing of Moctezuma's defeat, he resolved to engage with Facio, and if victorious march forthwith on Puebla. The latter, who was then crossing the heights of Maltrata, stationed one half of his troops in the town of San Agustin del Palmar and in the hacienda

moderation, without ever allowing himself to use passionate language when criticising those charges. His narrative and comments are clear, and his arguments often well grounded. They are mostly the result of his own personal observation; but he makes occasional quotations from standard authorities. An appendix is attached to the work containing corrections and additional notes; the latter regarding the ex-emperor Iturbide's return from Europe in 1824, and Mexican relations with Guatemala.

⁵⁰ His portrait placed in the legislative chamber was afterward thrown out by the populace. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 190; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 330-1. The revolutionary authorities and legislature found hospitality in Zacatecas. *S. L. Potost, Diput. Perman.*, 2-6.

of La Traslquila under General Antonio Azcárate, while he with the other half occupied the Chaltepēc hill. Santa Anna, making a feint on Facio with his cavalry, directed his real attack, under colonels Mejía and Jarero, against Azcárate. After a short but well contested action, in which Azcárate lost his life, the government troops were completely routed, with a loss in killed, besides the commander, of 12 officers and 353 rank and file. All the arms, ammunition, and 280 prisoners fell into Santa Anna's hands. Facio precipitately fled to the sierra, and the greater part of his remaining force became dispersed.⁵¹

Santa Anna at once marched on Puebla, which after a short semblance of defence succumbed on the 4th of October, the garrison being allowed the honors of war with permission to go to Mexico.⁵² Santa Anna lost no time in advancing upon the capital, and a portion of his army reached Tacubaya on the 22d of October; the other divisions occupying the surrounding towns, the line of investment was soon established.

Meantime the greatly alarmed government had obtained from the congress a vote conferring on President Muzquiz unlimited power to act as circumstances might demand. An effort was made through commissioners to arrive at an amicable arrangement, but it failed because congress refused to sanction any adjustment⁵³ based on the assumption by Pedraza of the executive authority.

The capital had been declared under martial law,⁵⁴ and the command intrusted to General Quintanar,

⁵¹ Andrade, governor and comandante general of Puebla, shared in Facio's defeat, as he had advanced to Tepeaca, and on the countermarch to Puebla lost two thirds of his men, who joined Santa Anna. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 324.

⁵² Andrade reached the capital on the 25th day of October, with very few men; the rest joined Santa Anna at San Martín Tescmelucan. Bustamante, *Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 219-27, gives a detailed account of the capture, with his lying, malignant addenda.

⁵³ October 16th. *Dispos. Var.*, ii. 80; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 115.

⁵⁴ The president's military orders appear in *Dublin* and *Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, ii. 453; *Dispos. Var.*, ii. 82-5.

who answered Santa Anna's demand on the first of November for a surrender of the city with a dignified refusal. The latter did not see fit to open fire, the danger to which Puebla was exposed by Bustamante's approach⁵⁵ demanding his attention. He accordingly raised the siege on the 6th, marched to meet the enemy, and on the 10th reached Huehuetoca, where he received despatches from Pedraza announcing his arrival at Vera Cruz,⁵⁶ and his intention to proceed at once to Puebla. The states that had seconded the movement in Pedraza's favor immediately passed special laws ordering his decrees and orders as president of the republic to be obeyed.

The two hostile armies encountered each other in the hacienda of Casas Blancas, on or about the 12th of November, without a decisive result, but Bustamante had to retire to Tequisquiac,⁵⁷ where Quintanar joined him with a division on the 16th. They then undertook to carry out a preconcerted plan of capturing Puebla while Santa Anna was at Zumpango de la Laguna, but the latter by his activity frustrated their intention.⁵⁸ Bustamante then resolved to try the issue of a pitched battle, and advanced via San Pedro Apetatitlan to the suburbs of Puebla on the 5th of December. Santa Anna having taken up a position in the Posadas ranchería and town of Mexico, Bustamante at the head of the 6th regiment vigorously assailed him, but was repulsed with a heavy loss in

⁵⁵ Bustamante had reached Querétaro, and marching rapidly by way of San Cristóbal, San Juan Teotihuacan, and Otumba, might capture Puebla before relief could arrive.

⁵⁶ He had declined Santa Anna's first invitation to return. But a second commission, composed of Anastasio Zerecero and Lieut.-col. Soto, which met him at Bedford Springs in Pennsylvania, after explaining what he was actually wanted for, was successful. The correspondence is given in *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 341-3; *Zamacois, Hist. Méx.*, xi. 916-19; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 116; Pedraza arrived at Vera Cruz November 5th. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 258-9.

⁵⁷ Bustamante's letter of Nov. 13th, to Col Condelle at San Luis Potosí, in *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 345. Bustamante describes the action. *Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 261-3.

⁵⁸ He not only succeeded in that, but in saving a valuable convoy, by a rapid march of 63 miles in less than 30 hours.

killed and wounded, among the former being his secretary, Lieutenant-colonel Bonilla, and many of his best officers. The number of casualties in both armies is said to have been no less than at El Gallinero.⁵⁹ Santa Anna remained master of the field; the enemy retreated and took up positions at the San Juan hill, the ex-convent of San Javier, the Hospicio and garita de Tlascala, Quintanar occupying the Santo Domingo



PLAN OF PUEBLA CITY.

- | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Cathedral. | 10, 11. Theatres. |
| 2. Palace. | 12, 13. Bull-ring. |
| 3. Episcopal Palace. | 14. Barrack. |
| 4, 5, 6, 7. Hospitals and Asylums. | 15, 16. Parks. |
| 8. Academy of Fine Arts. | 17. Main Plaza. |
| 9. Presidio. | |

mill. Other partial engagements followed, with disastrous results to the government troops. Meantime Gomez Pedraza, who had defended Puebla against an attack in which the enemy had actually possessed himself of some houses of the suburbs, made preparations for future eventualities.

⁵⁹ Details of the Posadas battle in *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 346.

The government also met with reverses in other parts of the country; and indeed, it may be said that its control of affairs was now at an end. I give briefly in a note the occurrences in the several states.⁶⁰ General Muzquiz' government now was obeyed only by Oajaca and Chihuahua. Under the circumstances, Bustamante saw the uselessness of further attempts to capture Puebla, and opened negotiations with his opponents. General Cortazar accordingly sought an interview with Gomez Pedraza and Santa Anna in the morning of December 8th, at which it was agreed to enter first into an armistice,⁶¹ till both houses of congress should take action on the plan for peace proposed to Bustamante by Gomez Pedraza and Santa Anna. It was also stipulated that in the event of the congress rejecting the plan, Bustamante's army should take it into consideration. Meantime Bustamante's forces were to be quartered in Huejocingo and Santa Anna's in Puebla. I epitomize in a note the said plan of pacification.⁶²

⁶⁰ Ciudad Victoria in Tamaulipas, Colima, Toluca, the whole south, San Luis Potosí, Querétaro, Durango, Sonora and Sinaloa, followed one another in acknowledging willingly or under coercion that Gomez Pedraza was the rightful president. *Suarez, y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 332, 349-54; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xi. 923-5; *Pinart, Col. Doc.*, no. 255. In Campeche, Yucatan, on the 16th of Sept. the people shook off the yoke under which for the last three years they had been held by Carbajal. Tabasco and Chiapas also pronounced against their authorities and concluded to disregard Bustamante's administration. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 191-3, 243-50. In the south generals Bravo and Álvarez had made an arrangement to hold their respective comandancias, discontinuing hostilities and acting in concert for the general welfare. *Id.*, 267-9.

⁶¹ It was signed Dec. 11th, the commissioners being Gen. Gaona and Gen. Arista. for Bustamante, and Gen. Anaya and Col. Jarero for the other parties. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1832-3, 258-61; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 358-9; *Bustamante's, Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 273-8; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xi. 927-8.

⁶² The preamble expressly says the object of the plan is to reestablish a truly national and federal government. 1st. Absolute cessation of hostilities. 2d. All elections of members to general congress, state legislatures, and territorial diputaciones from Sept. 1, 1828, to date, to hold good. No more to be said about legitimacy or the reverse. 3d. New elections to be held at once for members of congress, legislatures, etc., to bring about an entire renovation so that the republic may return to the federal régime. 4th. New legislatures to be installed on or before Feb. 15, 1833; for this time, each shall, on the 1st of March, 1833, choose two senators, and vote for the president and vice-president of the republic. The actas, senators, and deputies of congress must be at the national capital on the 20th of March. 5th. Congress shall be installed March 25th, and the next day declare who have been duly

The armistice and plan being in due time laid before the houses of congress, both refused to sanction them,⁶³ in view of which action Bustamante, pursuant to stipulation, resolved to act independently of the government.⁶⁴ Whereupon he held a conference with Santa Anna, Gomez Pedraza, and other chief officers of both armies, at which it was concluded to appoint commissioners to draw up a treaty establishing peace, and stipulating other points of importance.⁶⁵ The commissioners met accordingly at the hacienda of Zavaleta, and framed a treaty, embodying the terms of the plan de pacificacion and other points, to the satisfaction of the contracting parties, which was signed and ratified on the 23d of December.⁶⁶ The sixth article of the convention recognized Gomez Pedraza as president till April 1, 1833, the date on which his term would expire according to his

elected president and vice-president. 6th. During elections no comandante general shall reside, nor troops in the pay of the national treasury shall be quartered, in any state or territorial capital. 7th. The decree of Oct. 7th on extraordinary powers, and the dire law of Sept. 27, 1823, to be revoked. 8th. Gomez Pedraza shall be recognized and obeyed as the rightful president till the 1st of April, 1833. 9th. A general and full amnesty shall be decreed by the future congress for all political offences from and after Feb. 1, 1823. 10th. Santa Anna, as commander of the forces seceded from the government, and Gomez Pedraza formally propose this plan. Dated on the puente de México, Dec. 9, 1832. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 359-60; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xi. 928-31.

⁶³ On the plea of unconstitutionality, *Mex. Manif. Diput.*, 20-3, the congress declined to reconsider Pedraza's resignation in 1828, alleging that it could not revise the act of the congress of 1829. *Dispos. Var.*, ii. 87; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, ii. 470-4.

⁶⁴ Zamacois blames him for his disobedience to constituted authority; highly commending the action of congress he adds, though attributing to Bustamante the humane purpose of averting further bloodshed, that he hereby stained his brilliant record. *Hist. Méj.*, xi. 933.

⁶⁵ Antonio Gaona, Mariano Arista, and Lino Alcorta represented Bustamante; Juan Pablo Anaya, Gabriel Valencia, and Ignacio Basadre acted for Santa Anna.

⁶⁶ Since then it has been known as the Plan or Convenio de Zavaleta, from the hacienda where it was made, and embraces 13 articles. The whole document may be found in *Registro Oficial*, 1832, Dec. 31, ix. no. 122; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1833, April-May, 214-27; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, ii. 522-6. The validity of that arrangement has been impugned as unconstitutional. It was carried out nevertheless. *Peña y Peña, Voto Fund.*, 6-36; *Santa María, Expos.-Protest.*, in *Pap. Var.*, cxlvi. pt 8; Bustamante, *Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 278-82, ends saying, 'Tal es la carta de esclavitud que firmó D. Anastasio Bustamante de una Nacion que le habia colmado de honores.'

election in 1828. He took the oath of office in Puebla on the 26th of December, 1832.⁶⁷

Meantime in the city of Mexico the garrison, headed by General José Joaquín Herrera, pronounced on the 27th of December, recognizing President Gómez Pedraza. Acting President Múzquiz and his ministers thereupon returned to private life, without being able to observe the formality of resigning, congress having already dissolved itself.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ The bishop received him under the pallium. The government council, presided over by the governor of Puebla, acted in lieu of the national representatives. *La Cruz*, v. 635; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 125-7; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 365.

⁶⁸ Congress decreed its dissolution on the 28th. It had on the 21st issued a manifesto congratulatory of its own course, which it had concluded to carry out to the end. *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 366-7; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 299-302.

CHAPTER VI.

THE FEDERAL SYSTEM AND ITS OVERTHROW.

1832-1836.

ADMINISTRATION OF GOMEZ PEDRAZA—HIS SUBSEQUENT CAREER, CHARACTER, AND DEATH—BIOGRAPHY OF GOMEZ FARIAS—HIS POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND ADMINISTRATION—DISTURBANCES IN MICHOACAN—SANTA ANNA'S PARADOXICAL ACTION—ARISTA'S REVOLT AND ITS SUPPRESSION—FIRST MOVEMENTS IN FAVOR OF CENTRALISM—POLITICAL DEFEAT OF FARIAS—SANTA ANNA'S BIOGRAPHY AND CHARACTER—DOWNFALL OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM—SANTA ANNA DICTATOR—POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONTESTS—THE NEW CONGRESS—CENTRALISM INAUGURATED—THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—DISSATISFACTION—ATTEMPTS TO REESTABLISH FEDERALISM.

PRESIDENT GOMEZ PEDRAZA in his inaugural address at Puebla reviewed the events of the late revolution, expressing his appreciation of the services rendered by Santa Anna, and making a harangue to Bustamante's army, in which he commended their valor and patriotism.¹ The cabinet was appointed on the 24th and 26th of December, 1832: Bernardo Gonzalez Angulo, minister of relations; Joaquin Parrés, and in his absence Cirilo Gomez Anaya, of war; Miguel Ramos Arizpe, of justice and ecclesiastical affairs; Valentin Gomez Farías, of the treasury.

Manuel Gomez Pedraza was born in Querétaro² about 1788. During the war of independence he served in the royal army, and the capture of Morelos is in a great measure attributed to his advice. As a

¹ The speeches appeared in the newspaper *La Aurora*, 1832, Dec. 27, *supl.*

² According to information from his relatives. Others make Soto la Marina his birthplace. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 164.

soldier he was held to be a martinet; later, as a statesman, he was a strict republican. He lent his support to Iturbide, however, while on the throne, and was of much service to him. In 1824³ he was despatched to Puebla as comandante general and governor; and charges of neglect to prosecute malefactors being preferred against him, he was recalled, tried by court-martial, but finally acquitted; after which President Victoria called him to assume the portfolio of war in his cabinet.⁴ Of the particulars of his election to the presidency in 1828, and the events therewith connected, I have spoken in a previous chapter. The new government made its triumphal entry into the capital January 3, 1833, and was received with homage. But a fatality seemed to accompany the republic in every effort to consolidate its peace and political institutions. Envy and discord were ever alive, and now showed their unhappy tendencies in the interior. Zacatecas, Jalisco, and San Luis Potosí made objections to some articles in the plan of Zavaleta, grounded on their alleged inefficacy to save the country from a reaction.

The sincere pledges of the new cabinet and confidence inspired induced the states to abandon the prospect of a convention. But the dangerous question initiated by Zacatecas, Jalisco, and San Luis Potosí demanded a prompt solution.⁵ While the states named two citizens to form a privy council, the executive established a board composed of two natives of each state to aid him in carrying out his plans of reform, and at the same time watch his acts. This would be a further guaranty of his good intentions. A meeting of commissioners from Zacatecas, Jalisco, Durango, Querétaro, and San Luis Potosí, on the

³ On the 2d of March, 1824, he was chosen governor of Mexico. *Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide*, 231.

⁴ March 23, 1828, the legislature of Occidente made him a citizen of that state.

⁵ The ecclesiastical chapter omitted no expense to show its acquiescence in the new order of things. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1832-3, 267; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 131-3; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 368-9.

19th of January, after a long discussion of the third article of the convenio de Zavaleta, respecting new electoral acts, waived their objections and proceeded at once to effect their elections, which were completed by the end of February.⁶

Santa Anna and Gomez Farías obtained the majority of votes for president and vice-president respectively, to which end Gomez Pedraza had directed his influence to reward them for their services in his behalf.⁷

Some of the government's measures were worthy of commendation, such as diminishing the military force,⁸ and clearing the public roads of malefactors; but others showed a spirit of vindictiveness, not only as against the ministers of Bustamante's cabinet, but also toward the Spaniards, many of whom had been latterly allowed to live in peace, and others, who had left the country under the expulsion laws, to return. Fortunately for them the orders were greatly modified when General Parrés assumed his duties in the cabinet.⁹

The clergy and army now became the prominent objects of attack, the destruction of their influence being regarded as a policy that would tend to secure future peace and the permanency of free institutions. The measures proposed to this end, both in and out of congress,¹⁰ created great alarm and turmoil, in the midst of which Pedraza's term of office having expired, he surrendered the executive authority to

⁶ We are assured that the electoral laws were in many instances infringed, and that candidates for members of congress and legislatures were purposely taken from the lower classes; a policy which in the long run would be sure to bring on a reaction. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 169.

⁷ They were declared duly elected by the congress on the 30th of March. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1832-3, 499-500; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, ii. 503.

⁸ An order of the minister of war on the 19th January, 1833, discontinued the titles of *libertador* and *federal* that the armies bore in the last civil war.

⁹ See supplementary act of January 18, 1833, and circulars of Jan. 23d, Feb. 23d, March 4th, May 7th. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1832-3, 276-7, 281-4, 444-5, 454-5; 1833, Ap.-May, 147; June-July, 223-4; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 859-60; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 221-2; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 133-5, 149-50.

¹⁰ The new congress was installed on the 20th of March, 1833. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., viii.

the vice-president elect, Gomez Farías, Santa Anna being absent from the city, intentionally, as believed by many, to permit the initiation by Gomez Farías of the reforms demanded by the radical wing of the progressive party, without incurring himself any responsibility in the event of those innovations not finding general support.

After his presidential term ceased, Pedraza continued to use his influence in national affairs. In 1838 he was again minister of war. Acting in opposition to his principles, he served as minister of relations in 1841, sustaining the most absolute power that ever existed in the country since the rule of the *oficiales reales* shortly after the conquest, because he expected good results from it. Seeing his error, he retraced his steps, returning to the support of federalist policy. In 1842 he was a member of the constituent congress, and by his eloquence wielded great power in the chamber.¹¹ In 1844 he became a senator; in 1845 a presidential candidate, but was not elected.¹² After this he showed none of his characteristic activity till 1846, when he was a member of the council of state. In 1850 he was again defeated for the presidential office. His last official act was in the capacity of plenipotentiary to negotiate a convention with the United States.

Gomez Pedraza possessed high intellectual powers, and was energetic in action. His education, political as well as literary, began late, and though the last twenty years of his life were devoted to study, his ignorance of fundamental facts often showed itself even in his best discourses as minister or senator. In the general intercourse with men he was brusque, economized words, and affected some stoicism;¹³ but

¹¹ During his short service in the Spanish *córtes* he made no display of his oratorical gift.

¹² Whilst in the senate he favored the conclusion of a treaty with Texas.

¹³ The attempt at appearing more enlightened and liberal than others, caused many of his aberrations, which were more deserving of pity than re-

with his intimate personal friends he was open and frank. He has been often accused of vindictiveness, but he could with more reason be charged with momentary exhibitions of passion. In private life he was irreproachable.

Pedraza's death, caused by pulmonary consumption, took place on the 14th of May, 1851. He was then 62 years of age. During his long illness he had priests near his bed, but having failed to confess before expiring, such was the intolerance of the clergy, though he had shown them favors in life, that his last wish to be interred in San Cosme was refused. That was of no consequence, however, as congress decreed that his remains belonged to the nation, and that a special mausoleum should be erected for them.

Vice-President Valentin Gomez Farías took possession of the government on the 1st of April, 1833, and a few days after appointed his cabinet, which was composed as follows: Carlos García, minister of relations; Miguel Ramos Arizpe, of justice and ecclesiastical affairs; José María de Bocanegra, of the treasury; and José Joaquín de Herrera, of war and marine.¹⁴

Gomez Farías, the champion of reform and progress in Mexico, was born in Guadalajara¹⁵ on the 14th of February, 1781. He completed his studies and graduated as a physician in his native city,¹⁶ and in a short

proach. *Tornel, Breve Reseña Hist.*, 36. Zavala says of him that he preferred solitude, and it was incomprehensible how he ever aspired to be president. He was noted for 'la regularidad de sus costumbres, sus modales mecánicos, una fisonomía anómala.' *Revol. Méj.*, ii. 58.

¹⁴ They held office only a few months, all of them being out before the end of the year. *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1032; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., viii. 113, 122-5; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1833, Ap.-May, 95, 201.

¹⁵ His parents were of pure Castilian race; his father was named José Lugardo Gomez de la Vara, and his mother María Josefa Martínez y Farías. The names given the child at the baptismal font were José María Valentin. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 172.

¹⁶ It is recorded that he studied French under the greatest difficulties, and having at his examination expressed ideas which he must have drawn from modern French authors, his name was inscribed in the register of the inquisition. *Ib.*

time acquired a profitable practice, from which he amassed a competency.

Gomez Farias did some service to the cause of independence, and was the signer of a proposition to elect Iturbide emperor, this being apparently the only means at the time to secure peace together with Mexican nationality. But when Iturbide abandoned the constitutional path, Farias became a formidable opponent to him.¹⁷ The elevation of Victoria and Gomez Pedraza to the presidential seat was due in a measure to his influence. The new vice-president was a man of progress, but unfortunately of too impatient a disposition to allow time for progress to become steadily developed. However, with his friends' coöperation, he gave a great impulse to the reforms that were initiated by himself in 1831 and adopted by the government in 1833 and 1834.¹⁸ He liked to undertake difficult feats, possessing as he did a large stock of courage and perseverance. Rigorous measures and bloodshed were not to his liking, nor used by him to effect his purposes. He was a democrat at heart, unambitious of honors or wealth, moderate and unpretentious, ever disposed to serve his country, and only aspiring to merit the good will of his fellow-citizens. His first period at the head of public affairs was of short duration, but pregnant with important events, accompanied by grave perils. Surrounded by men most radical in principles, and being without money and without influence, as his ideas on reform were but little understood, he struggled to save the constitution, which was constantly outraged and repeatedly in danger of stranding on the rocks of partisanship.

The privileged classes received some hard blows at

¹⁷ Bustamante, who hated Gomez Farias, confesses that he was 'hombre constante, sesudo, y abunda en talento.' *Voz de la Patria*, MS., viii. 223.

¹⁸ The principles developed 20 years later by Miguel Lerdo de Tejada were prompted by Doctor José M. Mora, who had been impelled to adopt them by Gomez Farias, as appeared in a letter to the latter from Mora, dated Zacatecas, June 24, 1831.

the hands of Gomez Fariás, who energetically sustained that the civil authority should always be above the military, and endeavored to prevent interference on the part of the clergy in secular affairs.

The new administration likewise promoted public instruction, and labored to have the abolition of the capital penalty for political offences recognized as a principle of public policy.¹⁹ It did not favor proscriptive measures, though the more violent wing of its supporters wanted to apply them to their defeated opponents, whom they nicknamed *picaluganos*—after Picaluga, the wretch who betrayed Guerrero—and looked upon as hateful aristocrats.²⁰

The reform measures proposed to be introduced, so directly affecting the interests of two such powerful elements as the ecclesiastical and military, caused the greatest agitation. Santa Anna thought that his presence at the head of the government might allay it, and accordingly assumed the presidential authority on the 16th of May, 1833.²¹ It was about this time that the centralist party made its first public demonstration in a paper directed against the congress.²² This body closed its session on the 21st of May.²³

The prevailing uncertainty and alarm among the better elements of society gave encouragement to the enemies of the progressionists. At last armed parties began to present themselves in southern Mexico expecting support from Santa Anna, who had been

¹⁹ Gomez Fariás never violated it; though he had to deal with the men of the bloody administration of 1830-1832, and with those who in sustaining the *fueros* placed the party in power—his own—in great jeopardy. *Mora, Obras Sueltas*, i. p. ccxxvii.

²⁰ Santa Anna tried to induce first Gomez Pedraza and next Gomez Fariás to banish his personal enemies, but failed. Later, when he held the power to do it himself, he had changed his mind after resolving to champion the cause of the privileged classes.

²¹ On that date he took the oath of office before congress, expressing his satisfaction at his rule beginning under the auspices of peace, '*reynando la concordia entre una mayoria inmensa de ciudadanos*,' expressions that Bustamante ridiculed. *Voz de la Patria*, MS., viii. 134-5.

²² Its title was '*Ó se disuelven las cámaras, ó nuestra ruina es segura*.'

²³ Bustamante, a bitter opponent, says that those chambers did much harm: '*llenaron de lágrimas la Nacion*.' *Id.*, 143.

endeavoring to gain the good will of the bishops and religious orders, while these, on their part, laid much stress at their conferences with him on the good that must result from church and state sustaining one another and acting harmoniously.

Gomez Farías and the moderate wing of the progressionists, dissatisfied with the aspect of affairs, endeavored to check the extremists of their own party, the radicals, but were unsuccessful. While Santa Anna occupied the presidential chair, the party upholding the *fueros* felt itself much stronger. A pronunciamiento was made by Colonel Ignacio Escalada, at Morelia, Michoacan, on the 26th of May, professing to defend at all hazards the religion of Christ, and the rights and privileges of the church and army,²⁴ calling upon Santa Anna to be their protector, and declaring null and void the acts of Governor Salgado.²⁵ Santa Anna, however, disapproved the plan, and in order to go against the revolutionists, who had also appeared at Tlalpam and Chalco,²⁶ Lagos, Leon, and other places, he surrendered the executive on the 3d of June to Gomez Farías—who made active preparations for the campaign—and started²⁷ with the cavalry for Tlalpam to join 1,000 men concentrated there from various points. And now occurred a curious piece of by-play. Santa Anna was apparently made captive by his own revolted troops on the 6th of June at Xuchí, and conveyed to Yautepec.²⁸ His

²⁴ He was later defeated at Las Cruces by Gen. Valencia. In 1834 he was tried and sentenced to death; but the sentence was commuted to life banishment from the republic. *Dispos. Var.*, v. 21.

²⁵ According to Bustamante, Escalada's movement was the result of the writings appearing in the *Antorcha*, *Mono*, *Verdad Desnuda*, and other reactionary journals. He looked upon it as an imprudent step. *Voz de la Patria*, MS., vii. 138-41; *Filisola*, *Mem.*, 382-3; *Arista*, *Reseña Revol.*, 8, 80; *Arriola*, *Recop.*, 1833, Ap.-May, 215-6; June-July, 115; *Rivera*, *Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 155-65. The acts of Gov. Salgado objected to were his banishing 12 military officers.

²⁶ Under colonels Unda and Duran respectively. *Bustamante*, *Voz de la Patria*, MS., viii. 149.

²⁷ Bustamante has it that he left Mexico on Sunday the 2d, which must be an error. *Voz de la Patria*, MS., viii. 153.

²⁸ Vice-President Gomez Farías announced it to the public on the 7th of June. *Arista*, *Reseña Revol.*, 90.

captors, to win the favor of the army, proclaimed him dictator, the very title he wished for though without openly working to obtain it. This is to all appearances the fact; for as soon as Gomez Farías was thought to be powerless, generals, deputies, senators, and even some of his ministers forsook him. The few soldiers and the portion of the police that had remained in the capital made a pronunciamiento²⁹ on the 7th, and attacked the palace. The vice-president's only support at that moment was General Juan Pablo Anaya with about sixty *cívicos*. He did not lose courage, however. The assailants were defeated, many of them lost their lives, and the rest were eventually captured. Energetic efforts were made to restore constitutional order. In a few days a force of 6,000 *cívicos* was organized to defend the capital, which was declared to be under martial law.³⁰ Steps were likewise taken to rescue the captured president.³¹ The latter, on seeing the ill success of the revolutionary movement in Mexico, pretended to escape from his place of detention near Cuautla de Amilpas, and afterward lent his support to carry out the wishes of the most radical wing of the liberal party. It was then that the famous 'ley del caso'³² was enacted in spite of Gomez

²⁹ They had been bribed to do it by Gen. Arista's agents. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 177.

³⁰ The government was on the same day invested by congress, then again sitting, with extraordinary powers, and used them by causing the arrest of several army officers, and adopting other measures. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, ii. 532; *Zimacois, Hist. Méj.*, xii. 32-3.

³¹ It was declared a patriotic act to secure his liberation; honors and high pecuniary rewards were offered to persons successfully accomplishing it, allowing to each \$10,000. Any person making an attempt against the president's life was outlawed. *Dispos. Var.*, v. 2; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1833, June-July, 115, 121, 136.

³² This law was passed by the congress on the 23d of June, 1833. It originated in the senate, and was confirmed by the lower house under the influence, it was asserted by the centralists, of an apprehension that the members of congress as well as of the government were in danger of assassination. It authorized the executive to order the arrest and exile from the republic for the term of six years certain prominent citizens belonging to the party of *religion y fueros*, among whom were Anastasio Bustamante, Mariano Michelena, Zenon Fernandez, Francisco Molinos del Campo, José Maria Gutierrez de Estrada, Miguel Santa María, Francisco Fagoaga, Mangino, and the Spanish religious. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1833, Ap.-July, 130-2; *Santa María, Expos.*, 1-48; *Bustamante, Hist. Santa Anna*, MS., ii. 44; *Id., Voz de la Patria*, MS.,

Farías' opposition. The vice-president had surrendered the executive authority to Santa Anna on the 18th, but Puebla being threatened by Arista and Duran, he resumed it again on the 5th of July, to enable the president to march at the head of the troops against the enemy.³³

The agitation continued throughout the country.³⁴ The effort to weaken the power of the clergy and army was not abandoned; but owing to the absence of a combined plan, vacillation marked the counsels of the administration, which conduced to the ruin of the yorkino party, whose enemies had now at command large resources, besides the good will of Santa Anna. In his policy toward the clergy, the vice-president endeavored to detach the interests of religion from those of the state.³⁵

On the 10th of July Santa Anna marched out of the capital with about 2,400 men³⁶ and six pieces of artillery. On the same day was published a letter dated July 6th, from Arista and Duran³⁷ to Santa

viii. 182-201; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 216-20. On the 21st of June, 1834, President Santa Anna, then coquetting with all parties, allowed persons affected by that law who had not yet left the republic to remain in it provisionally, and gave them safe-conducts, till the future congress should reconsider the matter. His decree did not include the military, who by force of arms endeavored to destroy the federal system, and yet he promised to intercede with congress for their pardon. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1834, 241-2, 326-7.

³³ By special permission of congress decreed on the same date. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, ii. 536.

³⁴ In the south Gen. Bravo was talked of for president; armed parties showed themselves in all directions. Rumors of secret plans were in circulation, the impression prevailing that the revolutionists, for mutual recognition, used an oval-shaped ring on which was engraved the image of Christ.

³⁵ The reform measures, as they related to the church, are detailed in a chapter specially devoted to ecclesiastical affairs in vol. vi. *Hist. Mex.*, this series.

³⁶ According to Bustamante the press-gang was employed, and the rights of citizens were trampled upon. *Voz de la Patria*, MS., viii. 227.

³⁷ These officers, after marching and countermarching in the vicinity of Tezenco, Mexico, and Puebla, proceeded to Tehuacan de las Granadas, where Lamus, commandant at Puebla, attacked them and was defeated, and taken prisoner with his staff, most of his men having in the action gone over to the enemy. Arista and Duran might then have taken Puebla by a forced march the same night, the distance being only 21 miles; but they only showed themselves the next day in front of the city, which they laid siege to. The place was then defended by ex-President Victoria, and the besiegers, after ten days of useless assaults, gave up their purpose, and went away, in fear that Santa Anna was coming against them. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., viii. 209

Anna, in which by the latter's invitation, as they stated, they set forth their views, which were to the effect that the federal system was unsuited for Mexico. They recommended that a national convention should be called to give the nation any form of government other than the federal.³⁹

Several partial encounters took place between Santa Anna and the insurgents,⁴⁰ Arista and his army being finally driven into the city of Guanajuato, where on the 8th of October they surrendered at discretion to Santa Anna, supported by allies of a coalition which had been formed of the western states.⁴¹ Arista and 48 other officers were sent to Mexico as prisoners, subject to the disposal of the supreme government.⁴² The revolution was then considered at an end,⁴³ and the federal institutions were held to be safe. At the conclusion of his campaign Santa Anna returned

-11. It was reported in Mexico that most of the rebel force had been annihilated. *Dispos. Var.*, v. 70-2, *Méx.*, *Mem. Guerra*, 1834, 17.

³⁹ Meantime Santa Anna was to be dictator. The rights of the clergy and army were to be protected. The full text of the letter is in *Arista, Reseña Revol.*, 96-103; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., viii. 219-21.

³⁹ In the midst of the political agitation and civil war the country was invaded by Asiatic cholera, which raged from June to September, destroying thousands of lives. The armies in the field suffered severely. In the city of Mexico alone the burials on the 17th of August exceeded 1,220. Bustamante gives an interesting account of the visitation and its havoc. *Id.*, 235-61.

⁴⁰ A league of the states of Jalisco, Querétaro, Guanajuato, Michoacan, San Luis Potosí, Zacatecas, and Durango was formed in July-August, and later joined by Nuevo Leon, to support the federal government and institutions. It met with the approval of the general government, and indeed, it is said to have been suggested by Gomez Farías with the view of securing the services of 10,000 men. *Durango, Gac. Sup. Gob.*, 1833, 423; *Coalicion Est. Occid.*, in *Pinart, Coll.*, nos 258-9, 266; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1833, 39-51, 312-13; *V. Cruz, Sesión Hon. Cong.*, 1; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., viii. 228, 441-7. After the defeat of the revolutionists the coalition came to an end in November, being no longer encouraged by the national government. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, ii. 641.

⁴¹ The prisoners had all been guaranteed their lives; later they were sent out of the country, with orders not to return till permitted by the government. *Arista, Reseña Revol.*, 62-7, 132-4; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, ii. 580, 599-601; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., viii. 270-83, 339-59. The government's triumph was celebrated with civic and religious ceremonies. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1833, 147-8.

⁴² There had been also troubles in Oajaca and Guerrero, which terminated early in November. An attempt in Chiapas against the federal system, in November, also failed. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 176-7; *Arista, Reseña Revol.*, 22-6; *Carriedo, Est. Hist.*, ii. 40-1; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., viii. 414-28, 491-631; *El Iris de Chiapas*, 1833, Dec. 9; *Chiapas, Dict.*, 1-18; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1835, 405.

to Mexico and resumed the presidency, Gomez Farías' plans being thus interrupted for the time.

Santa Anna had now changed his political opinions, showing a marked disposition to favor a reaction, and being looked upon as its future leader. However, on the 16th of December, on the pretext of ill health, he again turned over the executive authority⁴³ to the vice-president, who, finding the prospect of affairs gloomy, submitted early in 1834 to the force of circumstances, and called Francisco M. Lombardo to take charge of the portfolio of relations, which appointment in itself implied a great modification in the general policy.

A division of the progressionists on points relating to the public instruction and to the management of Indian funds⁴⁴ drew a number of them unwittingly into the ranks of the supporters of 'religion y fueros.' The animosity of parties was becoming more virulent, and discussion was turned into personal abuse. No party seemed to have in mind the welfare of the people.

Amid the confusion a hare-brained plan was proclaimed at Ecatzingo,⁴⁵ proposing to crown a descendant of Montezuma under the old colonial laws; to expel foreigners; and to promote a war of races, inviting the Indians to take up arms and demand equality of rights. The plan, dated Chicontla, February 2, 1834, caused considerable alarm to the government, who suspected it to be the work of the clergy. It failed, but left evil consequences.⁴⁶

⁴³ *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii, 179.

⁴⁴ The government did away with the old separation of schools for Indians and gente de razon. The schools were to serve for all classes together, and to be supported from a common fund. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii, 187.

⁴⁵ Its authors were the curate Epigmenio de las Piedras and a certain Father Carlos Tepixtoc. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., viii. 633-6; *Sombra de Moctezuma*, 1834, no. 1; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii, 194-6.

⁴⁶ Congress on the 19th of Feb. 1834, decreed that all generals and other officers embraced in art. 11 of the convenio de Zavaleta should be mustered out of the service. Again, on the 10th of April, a decree was passed depriving of their military rank Anastasio Bustamante and Felipe Codallos, at the same time declaring that no person who had a direct participation in 'la aprehension y los asesinatos' of Guerrero and others should be permitted

Santa Anna, who had retired to Manga de Clavo, daily received invitations to become the leader of the reactionary movement, with unrestricted powers. After completing his arrangements he went back to Mexico, removed Gomez Farías from power, and assumed it himself on the 24th of April, 1834, at a time when in many places acts had been passed against the reform measures.

Gomez Farías has been blamed by the liberal party for not having acted with energy on this occasion; for failing, in fact, to place Santa Anna in confinement. He had been intrusted with the mission of doing away with the old practices and traditional institutions, and should have energetically destroyed all opposition. The militia and both houses of congress would have supported his action, as he had in his possession the evidence that Santa Anna was conspiring against the country's institutions. And yet he hesitated, solely because he disliked being suspected of personal ambition, or accused of unconstitutional acts. His present course—which he repented of and tried to correct in 1840—led to the overthrow of all that had been done, and to the triumph of a violent reaction based on the plans of Orizaba⁴⁷ and Cuernavaca, which restored their power to the clergy and army.

Farías left the executive office, which he had been exercising with dictatorial powers, without a stain upon his character.⁴⁸ His action was so vigorous that, notwithstanding the efforts of powerful hands to erase the marks of it, they remained visible to the latest day. When the reaction had fairly become master

to belong to the Mexican army. This law was annulled by presidential decree of August 14th of the same year. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1834, 108-9, 449-50.

⁴⁷ This was a plan of the reactionists against certain measures of the state legislature on ecclesiastical affairs, which was seconded in Córdoba. *Mez., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 165; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1834, 205; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 203-14; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., ix. 22-7, 74; *La Sombra de Mocheuzoma*, 1834, nos 4-6.

⁴⁸ 'Con las manos limpias de sangre y de dinero.' *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 227; *Payno, Cuentos, Gastos*, 600.

of the situation he was deposed from his office of vice-president by the congress of 1835,⁴⁹ General Barragan being called to succeed him. He left his country as an exile, and only returned in 1838,⁵⁰ when he was received with the highest marks of esteem by his political friends. He then apparently kept himself on good terms with the government.⁵¹ His subsequent efforts in favor of the federal system subjected him again to persecution and imprisonment. The populace took him out of the prison. In 1840, had he been a sanguinary man, he could have put his enemies to death. He was afterward compelled to seek refuge in a foreign legation, and in September was again banished.⁵² In 1845 he was formally invited to return to Mexico. Gomez Farías was a man of strict moral principles, conscientious, and unselfish.

Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna was born in Jalapa on the 21st of February, 1795, his parents being Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, who had been for many years the subdelegado of the province of Antigua Vera Cruz, and Manuela Perez de Lebron.⁵³ His father wished him to become a merchant, and obtained for him a position in a first-class house of Vera Cruz, which he held only for a short time. His inclination to the military profession was so strong that he was entered as a cadet July 10, 1810, in the regiment Fijo de Vera Cruz, at an earlier age than the regulations required. From that time he saw much active service, and obtained promotion grade by grade. Below

⁴⁹ On the 27th of Jan., and the next day he was forbidden the exercise of the functions of that office. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1835, 37; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., x. 14-8; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iii. 15.

⁵⁰ To live in New Orleans he had to sell even the last piece of his service of plate that he had bought when practising medicine.

⁵¹ The strictest surveillance was, however, kept over him.

⁵² He resided a short time in New York, and then lived in Yucatan about two years. He afterward returned to New Orleans.

⁵³ Lebron was a corruption of the French Lebrun. The name Santa Anna had its origin from Limia in the diocese of Orense in Spain, the family being well connected. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 183.

I give a synopsis of his military career to the date when he became president of the republic.⁵⁴

Santa Anna from his earliest days, even in boyhood at school, manifested a quarrelsome disposition. In after life he was passionate. He liked well enough to see his country's prosperity if caused by himself, but he lacked the necessary ability either to accomplish or maintain it. Moreover, he wasted most of his time in pleasures, being addicted to dissipation in almost every form. Despite these proclivities, he loved honors and money. Santa Anna possessed neither prominent civic traits nor deep convictions in political affairs; hence we see him at one time the president of the republic under the federal form of government; at another, under the central system; and lastly, dictator. Nature had implanted in him the germ of action, which he brought into play whenever required to subserve his own purposes. As regarded his conscience, it was both elastic and numb, never being disturbed by actions that would have greatly troubled most men.

Santa Anna manifested at first a disposition to please all parties, each of which looked to his assistance for its triumph. He finally leaned to the side

⁵⁴ Promoted to sub-lieut of fusileers in 1812, and to lieut of grenadiers with a captain's brevet in 1820; to full captain breveted as a lieut-col in 1821 by Viceroy Venadito. Commissioned a lieut-col by Iturbide; col with the brevet of brigadier by the regency, and a full brigadier by Iturbide. For his victory over the Spanish invaders at Tampico in 1829 Guerrero promoted him to general of division. He was deprived of this rank in 1832 by the government of Bustamante, but it was restored to him immediately after the fall of that administration.

Santa Anna's first campaigns as a cadet were in Nuevo Santander and Texas, taking part in several actions of war, and distinguishing himself for gallantry and general efficiency. In 1811 he served in San Luis Potosí, and in 1812 in the Sierra Gorda, receiving an arrow-wound in his left arm at the action of Amoladeras. On the 18th of August, 1813, he was in an action fought against revolutionists and their Anglo-American allies on the Medina River in Texas, for which he was decorated. Two years later he returned to Vera Cruz, and was actively engaged in campaigning against insurgents, for which services he was a second time rewarded with a decoration. In 1817, while commanding outside of the city of Vera Cruz, he contributed to the pacification of the province, and from that time continued serving the colonial government till April 1821, when he accepted the plan of Iguala and joined the ejército trigarante.

of the reactionists, and by a coup d'état dissolved the national congress.⁵⁵ This act was consequent on the adoption of the plan de Cuernavaca,⁵⁶ the object of which was to proclaim religion, fueros, and Santa Anna, denouncing reform as impious, and condemning federation and Vice-President Gomez Farías.⁵⁷ The plan being adopted by a large portion of the republic in spite of the opposition on the part of Puebla, Querétaro, Michoacan, Jalisco, San Luis Potosí, Zacatecas, Oajaca, and Yucatan, the clergy hastened to support the government with pecuniary means. The opposing states had to succumb, Puebla and her governor, Cosme Furlong, being the last to do so after sustaining a siege.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ On the 31st of May. *Méx., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 165.

⁵⁶ On the 23d of May. It contained five articles, pregnant with future troubles for Mexico, which epitomized are as follows: 1. The plan disapproves all proscriptive laws and decrees; all religious reform, including toleration of masonic sects; and all measures contravening the national and state constitutions. 2. All laws and measures passed in contravention of these constitutions are declared null and void. 3. The people respectfully call on President Santa Anna to uphold constitutional safeguards, he being the only existing authority able to do it. 4. The people declare that the deputies who passed those laws and decrees, together with the functionaries that have obstinately attempted to carry them out, no longer meriting public confidence, must leave their positions and remain passive till the nation represented anew shall be reorganized according to the constitution and in a manner conducive to her happiness. 5. President Santa Anna is assured of the aid of the military force stationed at Cuernavaca in carrying out those purposes. The resolutions thus adopted were forwarded to Santa Anna May 25th. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., ix. 54-6; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 198; *Id., Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 192.

⁵⁷ The apparent head man of the plot was General Ángel Perez Palacios; but the real leaders were José María Tornel, constituted as the executive sword, and Licenciado Manuel Díez Bonilla, the directing brain, both representing the reactionary party. Santa Anna was to be the scarecrow to the enemy when the case required it. *Mora, Obras Sueltas*, i. p. cclxvii.

⁵⁸ In San Luis Potosí, Gen. Moctezuma had to submit to the forces of Cortazar and Valencia. Generals Cortazar and Barragan subdued Jalisco and neighboring states. Santa Anna himself defeated the governor of Zacatecas. Carlos García, at Guadalupe, and his soldiers committed the most scandalous robberies. Santa Anna seized the products of the mines of El Fresnillo, as well as the funds of the state. *Mora, Obras Sueltas*, i. p. cclxxviii. Further and full details of these disturbances, which preceded the establishment of centralism, may be found in *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., viii. 283-669, passim, ix. 1-176, x. 32-63, 76-9, 111-25; *Id., Gabinete Méx.*, i. 103; *Id., Hist. Turbide*, 211; *La Sombra de Moctezuma*, nos 1-12; *Jal., Doc. Ofic.*, 1-11; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 202-3, 214-16, 258-61; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 863-5; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 224-6; *Zac., Diario Exacto*, 1-8; *Dur., Gac. Sup. Gob.*, 792, 794; *Tab., Pronunc.*, in *Pinart Coll.*, no. 310; *Amigo del Pueblo*, 1845, 68; *El Tiempo*, 1834, July 5 to Oct. 26, passim; *La Oposi-*

Santa Anna not only disbanded the national congress, but also the state legislatures, and deposed governors and ayuntamientos, replacing them with adherents of the plan de Cuernavaca. And now behold him ruling as a dictator, without congress, council, legislatures, or ministers—for he had dismissed the members of Gomez Farías' cabinet, retaining only Lombardo.⁵⁹ Their portfolios remained for some time in charge of the oficiales mayores of the several departments vacated, till finally they were intrusted to the following ministers, namely: May 5th, of the treasury, Javier Echeverría; May 21st, of war, General José Joaquín Herrera; July 26th, of justice and ecclesiastical affairs, Bishop Juan Cayetano Portugal.⁶⁰

The escoceses, in order to draw Santa Anna to their side, persuaded him that desisting from further innovations he could maintain the ecclesiastical reforms already in operation, and forward the plan of public instruction. That party showed ability in counselling him to sustain what they were bent on destroying.⁶¹

The dictator convoked a congress to meet in the latter part of 1834, and restored the bishops to their dioceses;⁶² but on the other hand, he became so despotic

cion, 1834, Sept. 10 to Dec. 16, *passim*; 1835, Jan. 8, Feb. 10, June 19; *Mora, Obras Sueltas*, i. p. cclxix., cclxxvi-viii; *El Iris de Chiapas*, 1834, Nov. 24; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, ii. 691-4; *Carriedo, Est. Hist.*, ii. 41, 44. Those who took part in those revolts were pardoned. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1835, 196-7, 545.

⁵⁹ This man became a mere tool, countersigning decrees to establish measures diametrically opposed to those he had authorized six months previously. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 192.

⁶⁰ During the rest of Santa Anna's rule, several changes were made in the cabinet, especially in the treasury department. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1834, 536-7, 611, 619; *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1032-3.

⁶¹ They adopted, as a necessity, the preservation of constitutional forms, though reforming the constitution without going through the dilatory processes prescribed by it. Santa Anna took them into his counsel, not because he either believed or loved them, but from vanity and ostentation. Tornel and Bonilla no longer held the same important position as at first. They were now mere 'bullangueros.' *Mora, Obras Sueltas*, i. p. cclxviii.

⁶² The bishop of Puebla had been banished in April; and other prelates were fugitives or concealed in order to escape persecution. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1834, 101, 277-8; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 192; *Id., Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 192; *El Indicador*, iii. 273-81; *El Tiempo*, 1834, July 26.

in most of his measures that the whole country was greatly agitated. And yet he claimed that the constitution of 1824 was still in force, and repressed all attempts against it.

The military and ecclesiastics now unblushingly used the terms 'federation' and 'sovereignty of states' purposely to throw out their chief opponents, the men of moderate views, and by this means carry the elections. In this game of intrigue Santa Anna was caught in his own net. The elections took place, and though the escoceses and Santanistas endeavored to lead the electors,⁶³ the military and clergy obtained an immense majority, Santa Anna having virtually become the destroyer of that which he had so long labored to establish.

A declaration having been made in the south by General Bravo against the existing state of things, Santa Anna went in December 1834 to Cuernavaca to confer with him in the interest of public tranquillity. He still pretended to maintain neutrality in the war of parties, ordering the troops to confine their efforts to the preservation of peace. This hypocritical pretension was made in the face of his despotic acts, at a time when the passions of men were at fever heat, when chaos and anarchy prevailed, and the comandantes generales were clothed with unlimited powers. Surely no good could result from such a crooked policy.⁶⁴

The general congress opened its session⁶⁵ with much solemnity and pomp, but the whole country felt dispirited at the inefficacy of the measures adopted by the government to reconstruct its institutions on a solid basis.⁶⁶

⁶³ *Mex., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 165. The governors were requested to do their best to reunite the legislative authority of the union. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1834, 266-7, 272-4, 512-15, 537-43.

⁶⁴ A party in Chiapas attempted secession from Mexico to unite her fate with Guatemala. Alvarez, proclaiming disobedience to the dictator, helped to support the anarchical factions.

⁶⁵ Jan. 4, 1835. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., x. 3, 4; *Mex., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 166.

⁶⁶ Eight whole months, from May till December, had been employed in re-

Santa Anna asked for an amnesty law and it was decreed.⁶⁷ It would be impossible to estimate the evils that might have befallen the country if the escocés or moderate party, led by José María Gutierrez Estrada, had not seized the situation. Four parties were struggling for the ascendancy, namely, the allied clergy and military, or centralists, the overthrown federalists, the escoceses, and the Santanistas. Though the first had won the elections, the dictator gave the preference to the third named, and then tendered his resignation of the presidency, which the congress declined to accept.⁶⁸ He was, however, granted a leave of absence, and retired as usual to his estate of Manga de Clavo, General Barragan being chosen to hold the executive office ad interim. The government was surrendered to him on the 28th of January, 1835.⁶⁹ His ministers claimed to act with entire independence, but the general belief was that Barragan never took a step as executive without first obtaining Santa Anna's sanction.

Miguel Barragan was a native of Valle del Maiz in San Luis Potosí, and was born in 1789.⁷⁰ Of his career as a military and public man I have had re-

moving, appointing, and promoting officers and officials, and in annulling acts, and wrangling with the military and priestly oligarchy. *Mora, Obras Sueltas*, i. p. cclxxii.

⁶⁷ The 'ley del caso' of June 23, 1833, was annulled. An amnesty was later proclaimed to include all political offenders. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., ix. 104, x. 9-11; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1835, 68-70, 152-3, 156-8, 171-2, 197; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iii. 43-4, 52; *Mex., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1841, 12.

⁶⁸ Jan. 27th. At the same time he was declared a 'benemérito de la patria.' *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1835, 37, 197, 229.

⁶⁹ Barragan received 13 votes out of 15. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iii. 15-16. The ministers in his administration were: of relations, José María Gutierrez Estrada, to June 1st, and Manuel Díez de Bonilla, from July 9 to October 28; of justice, Agustín Torres, to March 31, and José Justo Corro from May 18 to Feb. 27, 1836; of the treasury, José Mariano Blasco, to Aug. 28; in this department several changes were made till it went into Mangino's charge in Feb. 1836; of war, José María Tornel, from Jan. 28, 1835, to Feb. 27, 1836. *Mex., Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1033.

⁷⁰ He was one of the officers that supported Iturbide's defection, and served in the trigarante army till the attempt at erecting a throne for that chief, which he strongly opposed, for which he was arrested and kept in confinement till the republic was proclaimed.

peated occasions to speak in the previous volume. He was often intrusted with civil offices requiring ability and energy, both of which he displayed. Barragan was ever noted for his kindness of heart, probity, and elegance of manners. For the poor and helpless he always manifested in a practical manner his solicitude.

Shortly after Santa Anna's retirement pronunciamientos were made in several places regarding the form of government, and representations were constantly addressed to the administration and congress favoring a central system; in view of which the two houses of congress formed themselves into a general assembly,⁷¹ and on the 3d of October the change was formally established by decree. Under that act the central régime was virtually inaugurated,⁷² and a provisional statute therefor enacted on the 23d of October, the chief clauses of which are given synoptically in a note.⁷³

In order further to carry out the alleged wishes of the nation,⁷⁴ on the 15th of December, congress passed a constitutional law setting forth the rights and obligations of the citizens and denizens of the re-

⁷¹ Congress on the 5th of May had declared itself invested with powers to reform the constitution of 1824.

⁷² State organization was to cease, and departments were to be established with departmental juntas. The governors were to continue in power even after their terms expired, but subject to the national executive; the legislatures were to cease exercising legislative powers, but before dissolving—such as were in recess being ordered to meet—were to choose a 'junta departamental' consisting of five persons selected from their own number to act as a governor's council. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iii. 75-8; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 201-6.

⁷³ The national religion is to be the Roman catholic, and none other tolerated. The government system to be popular, representative, republican. The supreme national authority is to continue divided into three branches, namely, legislative, executive, and judicial; the legislative consisting of two houses, the senate and chamber of deputies; the executive to be held by a president for a term of years and chosen indirectly by the people; the judiciary to be exercised by a supreme court and lower courts. The national territory is to be divided into departments ruled by governors and departmental juntas. *Méx., Bases y Ley. Constituc.*, 3-7.

⁷⁴ Barragan's administration, in order to attach popularity to past acts, promoted, in accord with the clergy, those manifestations of popular preference. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 200.

public, to serve as a basis for the change to be effected in the form of government.⁷⁵ The same congress, acting as a constituent assembly, framed a new constitution, which, being composed of seven laws, became popularly known under the title of the 'Siete Leyes,' and was sanctioned and promulgated on the 30th of December, 1836. I give below the chief features of the instrument.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ This law was published the same day. *Méx., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 166-70; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1835, 640-59.

⁷⁶ Law 1st prescribes the rights and duties of Mexicans and other inhabitants of the republic. Every citizen having \$100 a year income, proceeding from property or industry, and not disqualified by crime or other cause, had the franchise. 2d, Organizes a fourth power entitled 'supremo poder conservador,' composed of five members, each of whom at the time of election must be 40 years old and have \$3,000 a year; they were renewable, one every two years. The object of this fourth power was to maintain the equilibrium between the other powers; to see to the strict observance of the laws, and to make known the national will on extraordinary occasions. 3d, Establishes the legislative branch in two chambers, namely, that of the senate and that of the deputies; the former with 24 members, eight of them renewable every two years. Each senator must have an income of \$2,500 a year at the time of his election. The manner of choosing the senators was as follows: the house of deputies, the government in council of ministers, and the supreme court of justice each selected a number of persons equal to that of the senators to be chosen, from which lists the departmental assemblies made the choice of senators. The lower house, of popular election, consisted of one deputy for every 150,000 inhabitants and every fraction of 80,000. The deputy must have at least \$1,500 a year. No person having jurisdiction, civil, judicial, ecclesiastical, or military, could be a deputy. 4th, Organizes the executive, vesting it in a president to hold his office for eight years, with the privilege of reelection; he was chosen as follows: the president in council of ministers, the senate and supreme court were each to name a 'terna' from which the deputies had to nominate three candidates, one of whom was to be chosen president by the departmental assemblies. With the president was associated a council of 13 members, two of whom must be ecclesiastics and two military. The councillors were selected by the deputies from a list formed by the executive out of another made by the senate. The president was required to have an income of \$4,000 a year, and had the exclusive right of appointing his ministers. 5th, Establishes the judiciary, namely, one supreme court of eleven justices and an attorney general chosen in the same manner as the executive, one of its branches being the supreme court martial; superior courts; auditing tribunals; and courts of the first instance in the departments. 6th, Treats of the division of the territory and interior government. The state organization is done away with, and the country divided into departments, each of them having an asamblea. The appointment of governor was to be made from the 'terna' proposed by each asamblea departamental. At the head town of each district was to reside a prefecto. Ayuntamientos popularly chosen were to exist at the departmental capitals, and such other towns as had a certain population. The rest were to have 'jueces de paz.' 7th, Fixes the mode of repealing or amending constitutional laws.

A separate law of the same date makes of each of the former states a department, with the following changes: The state of Coahuila and Texas was made into two departments. New Mexico was constituted into a department. The two Californias were formed into one. Colima was annexed to Michoa-

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This constitution failed to satisfy any of the parties. The progressionists saw retrogression in it. The clergy were displeased because certain principles had not been expunged, which were at a future day to bear bitter fruit for them, causing the loss of their influence and property. The army could not find in the law any power entirely dependent on bayonets. However, certain clauses in it were evidently intended to serve as checks to the discretionary power of Santa Anna, who, it was expected, would be the first president chosen under the new régime.

President Barragan had to provide resources for the campaign to put down the revolted colonists of Texas, full details of which will appear in the following chapters; and at the same time to face attempts to restore by force of arms the federal form of government. The most prominent of these were made by generals José Antonio Mejía and Juan Álvarez. The first named, after failing in several attempts in Querétaro and Guadalajara, proceeded to New Orleans, and returned in November 1835 with three ships under Mexican colors, and about 200 adventurers, to Tampico, where through the coöperation of the commandant at the bar, he succeeded in capturing the fort on the 16th of that month; but on assailing the town, where the garrison had remained faithful to the authorities against a pronunciamiento in support of federalism, he was disastrously repulsed, leaving behind a number of prisoners, all of whom were dealt with as pirates.⁷⁷ As for Álvarez, who operated in

can, and Tlascala to the department of Mexico, whose capital was to be the city of this name. *Méx., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 171-218; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., xi. 59-63; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1836, July-Dec., 310-78. Aguascalientes, which since 1835 had been detached from Zacatecas and made a national territory, had been on the 29th of Nov. 1836, made a department. *Id.*, 1835, 188, 224-5; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., x. 67-8; *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1837, 6; *Aguascalientes, Acta*, 1-50; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 300-7. Congress on the 20th of March, 1837, passed a law for the government of the departments. *Méx., Decreto*, 1-26; *Dubán and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, iii. 323-38.

⁷⁷ Bustamante gives other versions as to the real object of that expedi-

the south, he was defeated shortly before the congress undertook the work of reconstruction of the country.

tion, namely, to seize a conducta of silver at Tampico, and to kidnap Santa Anna at Manga de Clavo. *Voz de la Patria*, MS., x, 150-60; *Id.*, *Gabinete Mex.*, ii, 32-3; *Tornel, Tejas*, etc., 63-4; *Rangel, Defensa*, 5; *Young's Hist. Mex.*, 252; *Crockett, Life of*, 381-3; *Niles' Reg.*, xlix, 338-9, 364-5.

The authorities mentioned in the following list have been consulted in the preparation of the fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters preceding *Méx.*, *Col. Leyes Fund.*, 164-70; *Id.*, *Col. Leyes*, 1829-30, 1-15, 46-55, 86-95, 139, 151-60, 173-8, 190-200; *Id.*, *Legisl. Méj.*, 376-7; *Id.*, *Col. Leyes y Dec.*, 1841, 12; *Córtes, Diario Sen.*, i, 91, 144; *Id.*, *Diario Ofic.*, iii, 105; *Id.*, *Diario Ses.*, 1835-6, i, 16; *Méx.*, *Expos. Guerra y Mar.*, 1832, 1-21; *Id.*, *Mem. Guerra*, 1830, 2; 1831, Doc. no. 1, 12-16; 1834, 17-18; 1835, 7, 12, annexes 7-8; *Id.*, *Mem. Estado*, 1835, 1-80, annexes 1-12; *Id.*, *Mem. Hac.*, 1831, 113-15, annexes A. to E.; 1833, 2; 1837, 6; 1870, 101, 122, 1028-33; *Id.*, *Mem. Justic.*, 1834, 26-7, 67; *Id.*, *Mem. Relac.*, 1830, 1-46; 1831, 1-53, annexes 1-10; 1832, 2-35, annex 1; 1833, 1-20; 1835, 1-50, annexes, pp. 1-33; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii.-iii., passim; *Id.*, *Gob. de Méx.*, ii, 128, 136, 144-201, 566-82; *Id.*, *Méx. Pint.*, i, 12-14; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, passim; *Id.*, *Informe Camb. Polít.*, 7-8; *Tornel, Tejas y los E. U.*, 57, 63-4; *Id.*, *Carta*, 3; *Id.*, *Nac. Méj.*, 165-9, 295; *Id.*, *Manif.*; *Id.*, *Breve Reseña Hist.*, 43-5; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, ii, 541-9, iv, 237, v, 570-9, 843-69, ap. 84-8; *Id.*, *Defensa*, pp. iii.-xxii., 1-126; *Id.*, *Proceso*, 1-255; *Id.*, *Apuntes Biog.*, 23-38; *Id.*, *Notic. Biog. Necrol.*, 11-18; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xi, passim, xii, 6-101, 258-9, 274-6, 295-6, 312-17, 331-7, 389-400; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, ii, passim, iii, 9-16, 30-1, 41-4, 51-9, 71-8, 91-2, 109-15, 193, 468, 665, iv, 421-2, 559; *Bustamante, Hist. Iuribide*, 211; *Id.*, *Hist. Santa Anna*, 275; *Id.*, MS., ii, 44; *Id.*, *Gab. Méx.*, i, 103, ii, 21, 32-3; *Id.*, *Med. Pacif.*, MS., ii, suppl., 33-7; *Id.*, *Efemer.*, iii, 1-14; *Id.*, *Carta*, 2-6; *Id.*, *Manif. Guadalupe*; *Id.*, *Mem. Hist. Méx.*, MS., ii, 80-1; *Id.*, *Campaña sin Gloria*, 4-6, 21, 38-42; *Id.*, *La Monarqu. en Méx.*, MS., 1-37; *Id.*, *Voz de la Patria*, i.-v, passim; *Id.*, MS., vi.-x, passim, xiii, 4; *La Ilustrac. Méx.*, ii, 375-7, iv, 185-212; *Clar. al Congr.*, 1-8; *Newell's Revol. Texas*, 10-11; *Dominguez, Informe*, 1-12; *San Miguel, Man. Prov.*, 24-31; *El Constit.*, April 5, 23, etc., 1844; *Bonilla, El Ciudad.*, 11; *Zelaeta, Manif.*, 5-10; *Apelac. al Sent. Com.*, 1-12; *Piña, Pascuas*, 1-8; *Buenrostro, Manif.*; *Zerecero, Rev. Méx.*, 74-8, 274-5; *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Aug. 15, 1853, 311-16; *Gilliam's Travels*, 219-20; *Domenech, Hist. Méx.*, ii, 91-134; *Id.*, *Miss. Adv.*, 359-63; *Holley's Texas*, 321-32; *Cambas, Atlas*, 19; *Valencia, Manif.*, 3-8; *Registro Yuc.*, ii, 131-42; *Hoy se echan los Cim.*; *Monit. Constit. Ind.*, May 28, 1845, 3; *Wilson's Mex. and Its Relig.*, 77-8, 274-9; *Id.*, *Méx.*, *Los Peasants*, 115; *Arista, Reseña Revol.*, 9-162, ap. nos 4, 18-19, 21, 31, 35; *Dos Años en Méx.*, 1-172; *La Sombra de Moch.*, nos 4-11; *Payne's Hist. Europ. Colonies*, 309-10; *Patton's Hist. U. S.*, 694; *Facio, Respuesta Cargos*; *Id.*, *Exposit.*, 1-21; *Disc. Univ. Hist. Geog.*, i, 79, 749-51, iii, 749-63, viii, 544-8, x, 318, 1035-76; *Savage, Doc.*, ii, 185-91; *Miscel. ó sea Col.*, no. 2, 5-19; *Viccaino, Doc.*, 4 ll.; *Flint's Geog.*, ii, 131; *Aguascal.*, *Acta*; *Thompson's Recoll. Méx.*, 61-3, 178-9; *Montesdeoca, Discurso*, 1-12; *Democr. Rev.*, ii, 108-12; *Nouv. Ann. Voy.*, xlii, 293-4, lxiv, 44-68, lxxx, 48-50; *Aspiroz, Cód. Extr.*, 133-49; *Crockett, Life of*, 381-3; *Müller, Reisen in Mex.*, iii, 313-19; *Cumplido, Album Mex.*, ii, 94; *El Veracruzano Libre*, June 8, 1828, 3-4; *Bermudez, Verd. Causa*, 19-31; *Egloffstein, Geol. Méx.*, 33; *La Verdad Desnuda*, 1-6; *Thompson's Wars U. S.*, 641-656; *Tudor's Tour*, ii, 251-3, 322; *Roca fuerte, Un Regalo*; *Id.*, *Contest.*, 1-12; *Id.*, *Consid. Gen.*; *La Oposicion*, 1834-5, passim; *Ibarra, Observ. Proy. Reforma*, 1-20; *Baqueiro, Ensayo Yuc.*, i, 14-16; *El Universal*, March 15, 1850, 4; *Mendoza y Sanchez, Cat. Mus. Méx.*, 27; *Ramsay's Other Side*, 14; *Emigrado Observ.*, 1829, 37, 78-9, 159-60; *Barbachano, Mem. Camp.*, 21-59; *Drake's Certif. Sp. Grants*; *Malte-Brun, Précis Géog. Univ.*, vi, 457-60; *Payno, Cuentas, Gastos*, etc., 600; *Suarez, Informe*, 7, 33;

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CHAPTER VII.

TEXAN INDEPENDENCE; MEXICO'S CENTRALIZED GOVERNMENT.

1819-1841.

BOUNDARY LINE—AMERICAN AIMS—LONG'S INVASIONS—COLONIZATION PLANS—COLONIES FORMED BY AUSTIN AND OTHERS—MEXICO'S LIBERAL POLICY—COAHUILA AND TEXAS—STEPHEN F. AUSTIN'S IMPRISONMENT—TEXAS SEPARATES FROM COAHUILA—REVOLUTIONARY ACTS—MEXICAN TROOPS ASSAILED—SAN ANTONIO DE BÉJAR TAKEN—COURSE OF THE UNITED STATES—NEUTRALITY VIOLATED—AMERICAN TROOPS INVADE TEXAS—DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE BY TEXAS—TEXAN GARRISON AT ÁLAMO MASSACRED—BATTLE OF SAN JACINTO, AND ITS RESULTS—PRESIDENT CORRO'S ADMINISTRATION—PRESIDENT BUSTAMANTE—SPAIN RECOGNIZES MEXICAN NATIONALITY—FINANCIAL DISTRESS—POLITICAL TROUBLES.

THE province of Texas, situated on the gulf of Mexico between the United States of North America and the Rio Grande, and between latitudes $26^{\circ} 50'$ and $36^{\circ} 30'$, had been for some time, prior to 1819, a subject of disagreement between the American republic and Spain, the former claiming that Louisiana extended to the Rio Grande. Her great desire, however, was to own Florida in order to possess the whole range of coast from the Sabine River to Nova Scotia. After getting possession of that peninsula the government of the United States voluntarily gave up its alleged right to Texas, by the treaty of February 22, 1819, concluded between the secretary of state, John Quincy Adams, and the Spanish plenipotentiary Luis de Onís.¹ But that treaty caused much dissatisfaction

¹ A copy of the treaty may be found in *Méx., Derecho Intern.*, 1st pt, 138-44.

on the part of the western and south-western states of the American Union, and it was opposed by many of her most prominent statesmen.

In the following year, under the so-called Missouri compromise, entered into by the slave-holders of the southern states, slavery was not to be extended north of $36^{\circ} 30'$. This compromise, together with the southern boundary stipulated in the Adams-Onís treaty, greatly reduced the area in which slave states might be formed.

The state of Louisiana was separated from Texas by the Sabine River, and it became desirable to acquire the latter province for the benefit of the slave-holding interest. Several devices were thought of to accomplish that purpose. The first one attempted was that of forcible seizure shortly after the treaty with Spain was concluded. The leader of that movement was James Long, a Tennessean, who with about 75 men started from Natchez on the 17th of June, 1819, and reached Nacogdoches in Texas. On the 23d of that month he issued a proclamation styling himself president of the supreme council of Texas, and declaring that "the citizens of Texas have long indulged the hope that in the adjustment of the boundaries of the Spanish possessions in America, and of the territories of the United States, they should be included within the limits of the latter." The proclamation of independence of the republic of Texas then followed.² Long established a provisional government at Nacogdoches, and then went to Galveston to secure the aid of the buccaneer Lafitte. In his absence the royalist troops routed his force, of whom a number were killed, the rest being taken prisoners. Long made a second invasion, and without difficulty possessed himself of La Bahía del Espíritu Santo. This was after New Spain had acquired her indepen-

² That document was published in the *Louisiana Herald*, evidently to invite American citizens to join Long's standard. *Jay's Rev. Mex. War*, 11.

dence. Long and his followers were captured and taken as prisoners to Mexico.³

The next device resorted to in the scheme for wresting Texas from New Spain was that of colonization. Under the 5th article of the Spanish treaty, the inhabitants of the territories ceded to the east and north of the line designated in the 3d article could transfer themselves at any time to the Spanish dominions. Under this clause Moses Austin petitioned Brigadier Arredondo, governor of the eastern provincias internas, for leave to settle in Texas 300 families,⁴ which petition was supported by the few ayuntamientos in Texas, and by Brigadier Antonio Martinez, military commandant of the province. On January 17, 1821, the viceroy directed Commandant Martinez to allow Austin to establish his colonies on the right bank of the Rio Brazos at the distance of 90 miles from the coast, but under the condition that the families were to be from Louisiana, of good moral character, and professing the Roman catholic religion. They might bring their slaves with them, and were required to take an oath of allegiance to the Spanish crown, and of obedience to its laws and authorities in Texas. While these arrangements were being completed Moses Austin died in June 1821, and his son Stephen F. Austin inherited the grant, and carried it into effect midst all the difficulties resulting from the disturbed condition of Mexico.⁵

Since the passage by the constituent congress of a

³ After a short imprisonment they were released. Long was murdered shortly after in 1822. *Am. Cyclop.*, xv. 677.

⁴ He alleged that catholics were not countenanced in the United States.

⁵ The concession was ratified by the imperial government of Iturbide. Austin visited Mexico to arrange the matter, as the progress of colonization had been checked, and the council of state approved his plan with a few modifications relating to formalities and requirements to give possession of land grants. After the downfall of the empire the concession was annulled, but the executive issued a decree, April 14, 1823, confirming the grant to Austin with further power to adopt necessary measures to insure order together with security and progress of the new settlements. These were formed with settlers mainly from Tennessec, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Austin was commissioned a lieut-col of the Mexican army.

general colonization law⁶ leaving the state governments free to regulate the establishment of colonies within their respective territories, several legislatures formed rules for promoting the occupation of their wild lands for industrial purposes.⁷

With the adoption of the federal form of government in Mexico, Texas was united to Coahuila, the two former provinces now forming one state, which in its sovereign capacity made to Austin several grants, among them that of settling eight hundred families, for which he was assigned a larger extent of land. Austin was an active, industrious man, and laboring assiduously in carrying out his colonization schemes, succeeded in planting colonies on the Brazos and Colorado rivers near San Antonio de Béjar, which early in the third decade of this century were already in a flourishing condition.

Austin was not the only person to whom such grants were made in Texas; they were made to all foreigners asking for them,⁸ and the country thus became in a short time populated by about eight thousand families of different races, religions, and habits, and by adventurers from all parts of the world, many of whom took possession of such land as suited them, with no better title than that afforded them by their rifles. All settlers were exempt from taxation during seven years under a Mexican law. This state of affairs greatly facilitated smuggling on the frontier states, to the injury of the Mexican revenue.

Such was the condition of Texas when President Victoria's administration appointed a commission in

⁶ August 18, 1824. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, i. 712-13. Bustamante calls that measure 'la horricada mayor que pudo cometer el primer congreso.' *Voz de la Patria*, MS., x. 136.

⁷ Vera Cruz was one of those states, where a French colony settled on the Goazacoalco, but for several reasons the enterprise failed.

⁸ The state of Coahuila and Texas, March 24, 1825, passed a law inviting foreigners to settle on lands of the state, 'eran libres para hacerlo, y se les invitaba por esta ley á verificarlo.' *Zavala, Revol. Méx.*, ii. 308; *Thrall's Hist. Texas*, 155-6.

1827, with General Manuel Mier y Teran as its chief, to ascertain the boundary line between the Mexican and American republics under the treaty of 1819.⁹ Teran then had an opportunity of observing the giant springing up in that portion of his country. He went as far as Laredo and San Antonio de Béjar, and examined nearly the whole of that region. Austin's colonists were almost all Americans, and of the same nationality were those who in 1826 settled the western line of the Colorado and Nueces. For this reason the American government and people became the more anxious for the acquisition of Texas, which was made manifest in various ways; namely, by offers to purchase,¹⁰ by throwing obstacles in the way of the treaty of limits to delay its becoming effective, and by attempting to extend the boundary of Louisiana beyond the Sabine River.¹¹

The impression had meantime been gaining ground in Mexico that there was serious danger of a disruption of Texas from the republic. Indeed, there were divers good reasons for that apprehension, the chief being the class of population, with its manners and customs, language, religious toleration, and love of liberty.¹² The conquests of industry and enlighten-

⁹ The commission performed that duty from early in 1828, and used its best endeavors to save Texas to Mexico. *Tornel, Breve Reseña Hist.*, 171-3.

¹⁰ The offers of money were made at first with the view of securing the Colorado River as the boundary line, but such propositions led only to the acceptance on the 12th of Jan. 1828, of the line designated in the treaty of 1819. However, in 1829, President Jackson caused the negotiations to be resumed, designating four distinct lines as admissible, and naming several sums of money; but they were productive of no result. The details of the negotiations present no matter of special interest. Gen. Nicolás Bravo is supposed to have used his influence against the American wishes. Similar instructions to the American minister in Mexico were repeated in 1833 and 1835. *Niles' Reg.*, liii. 180; *U. S. Govt. cong.* 25, ses. 1, H. Ex. Doc. 42; *Mex. Derecho Intern.*, 1st pt, 114-17; *Mayer's Hist. Mex. War*, i. 52; *Jay's Rev. Mex. War*, 20-1.

¹¹ Both governments at last, on the 3d of April, 1835, made a convention proroguing for another year the time to appoint commissioners for running the boundary line. *Mex. Derecho Intern.*, 1st pt, 177-80. The president of the United States urged congress to make provision at once for carrying out that treaty; but it was never done.

¹² Private transactions, public acts, and newspapers were in English, which was the common language. *Zavala, Revol. Méx.*, ii. 306; *Mayer's Hist. Mex. War*, 46.

ment are above all others solid and irrepressible. Only men inexperienced in the ways of human nature, or blinded by their ignorance and pride, could have entertained the idea that a mere government decree could undo what had been done by an aggressive, resolute people such as now held Texas for themselves and future comers. Had the Mexican government been guided by wise and generous counsels, it might have secured for the whole country benefits from this immigration by giving to its guests good laws and guaranties, thereby winning their good will and confidence; instead of which, the retrogressive administration of Bustamante, whose guiding spirit was Lúcas Alaman, attempted to solve the problem with a few lines involving a hostile declaration against a rich and powerful neighbor, whose policy consists in making practical the principles of the most unrestricted liberty. The law of April 6, 1830, prohibited the colonization by foreigners on lands situate within states or territories of the republic adjoining those of their nationality. It suspended all contracts that had not been carried out, or that were not strictly within the letter of it.¹³ The law proposed to form colonies on such lands with convicts from Vera Cruz and elsewhere; foreigners coming into Mexico through the northern frontier were to have passports from agents of the Mexican government; land contracts were to be revised to ascertain how the contractors had carried them out; military posts and garrisons and custom-houses were to be established at once. The law did not name Texas, but that was the only state which could have been contemplated by those enactments.¹⁴

¹³ Articles 4th to 7th empowered the government to take possession of such lands as might be suitable for military defenses and new colonies, indemnifying the states for them. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, ii. 238-40; *Thrall's Hist. Texas*, 178-9.

¹⁴ Under the law, convicts and army deserters were sent to Texas as colonists. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1831, 430; *Id.*, *Leyes*, ap. 1833, 132-7; 1834, 47-50; *Méx., Mem. Justicia*, 8-9, 50-1; *Vallejo, Col. Doc.*, ii. 151. That law, however, had no effect whatever to check the tide of immigration. The population, which had been rapidly increasing since 1826, was now about 20,000. *Baker's Texas*, 36.

Teran was commissioned to carry out these enactments. It was no easy task; for it will be readily understood how impracticable it must have been for Mexico, where civil war was the normal condition, to make such a policy effective with colonists so advanced and powerful. Teran, however, began his difficult duty, entering Texas with a considerable force of in-



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fantry and cavalry, including presidial companies.¹⁵ He appointed officials, and declared null and void, or at least suspended for reconsideration, a number of land grants made by the government of Coahuila.

¹⁵ The Mexican minister of war, in his report of April 1833 to congress, says that three battalions and a regiment, with artillery, etc., had been sent to the frontier of Texas to check Indian raids, and to bring under subjection the new colonies, which were already showing symptoms of restlessness. He advised the building of forts in Texas. *Mex., Mem. Guerra, 1833, 8.*

But the differences between the Texan settlers and the Mexican authorities had begun even at an earlier date, and doubtless prompted the adoption by Mexico of restrictive measures. One of the colonies was that of Hayden Edwards in eastern Texas—founded about the same time as Austin's—which soon was involved in difficulties with its Mexican neighbors, and through them with the authorities. Governor Blanco having ignored Edwards' claim, about 300 of his men, who were known as Fredonians, attempted January 1827, a revolution with the assistance of the Indians, and intrenched themselves at Nacogdoches; but being abandoned by the red men on the approach of a Mexican force, they retreated across the Sabine. The Mexican congress thereupon empowered the executive to employ military force to quell Texan disturbances.¹⁶

One circumstance confronted the Texas settlers to their displeasure, as well as that of the slave-owners in the American border states; it was the Mexican policy of abolishing slavery. Previously the slaveholders in these states looked upon Mexico with less jealousy. The planters could cross the line with their slaves, and there was no apprehension with regard to the recovery of fugitive slaves. But after the Mexican government, on the 13th of July, 1824, strictly forbade the importation of slaves from foreign countries, border relations became much changed. Subsequent enactments aimed at the total abolition of slavery,¹⁷ whose future area would, therefore, be still further contracted, frustrated the views of the Texan settlers, and discouraged future importations of slaves from the southern states. This condition of things both alarmed and irritated the supporters of

¹⁶ The law of Feb. 23, 1827, placed at his disposal 4,000 men and half a million dollars.

¹⁷ The constitution of Coahuila and Texas in 1827 gave freedom to children born of slave parents after its date, and prohibited the importation of slaves. The work of emancipation was completed by the act of the Mexican congress of Sept. 15, 1829, manumitting every slave in Mexico.

the slave-holding interest.¹⁸ It is needless to say that Mexico's humane and enlightened policy was rendered nugatory by that interest. The southern slave laws became firmly implanted.¹⁹

The execution of the decree of April 6, 1830, with its attendant coercive measures,²⁰ including imprisonment of citizens, superadded to Texan sympathy with the movement in favor of federalism in Mexico, gave rise to an uninterrupted series of partial revolts at different settlements, which daily increased the insubordination of the colonists and their animosity toward the powers placed over them by the Mexican government. Garrisons were assailed and destroyed, or compelled to surrender; and at the end of 1831 a sort of provisional government had been set up.²¹

The liberal party having soon after been restored to power in Mexico, these movements did not for a time lead to serious consequences. There was a lull in the troubles of Texas. But the Texans had not changed their views as to the desirability of having a government separate from that of Coahuila. A council²² was held at San Felipe, the head town of Austin's colony, and a constitution adopted for the state of

¹⁸ Teran had been also directed to liberate every slave found in Texas.

¹⁹ In 1841 the government of Texas expelled from its territory the free colored people. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 516.

²⁰ The 11th article struck a deadly blow at civilization enterprises. In some cases, like that of the 'compañía de tierras de Tejas y Bahía de Galveston,' whose assignees were Americans, heavy pecuniary losses were inflicted, and Mexico was afterward called upon to settle them. *Curtis' Letter to Col Mejía*, in *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méx.*, 315-19; *Kennedy's Texas*, ii. 76.

²¹ An adventurer named John Austin went from town to town inciting the people to proclaim the independence of Texas, and arms were brought from New York and New Orleans. In 1832 the garrisons at Anahuac and Velasco were captured. A few weeks afterward a Texan force, said to be 250 men, after being assured of the neutrality of the Cherokees and Shawnees, marched against the garrison at Nacogdoches, set down at 375 men, and demanded of its commander, Colonel Piedras, either an unconditional surrender or the proclamation of federalism, together with support of the Mexican constitution of 1824; compliance being refused, a fight ensued, ending in Piedra's utter defeat. *Swisher's Am. Sketch Book*, vi. no. 5, 375-83; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 262; *Baker's Texas*, 36-7; *Kennedy's Texas*, ii. 5-7. Moffitt, an agent of the United States in Texas, is said to have placed the action against Piedras in 1827. *Thompson's Recoll. Méx.*, 174.

²² Presided over by William H. Wharton. Among its members were Stephen F. Austin, Samuel Houston, David G. Burnet, J. B. Miller, and Brauch T. Archer.

Texas. A commission, composed of Austin, Wharton, and Miller, was appointed to lay before the congress of Mexico a memorial setting forth the grievances of the people, and a petition for their relief. Austin was the only commissioner that went to Mexico.²³ His arrival was at an inopportune time, the whole country being in a state of revolution. Under the circumstances the congress showed no disposition to listen to Texan complaints. Austin was put off from time to time with unfulfilled promises till he began to lose patience; still, unwilling to go back without trying every expedient, he remained in Mexico, but wrote a letter to the municipalities of Texas urging them to complete their organization of a state government. That letter was intercepted, and Austin was arrested at Saltillo, brought to Mexico and thrown into prison, and kept therein several months.²⁴ During his imprisonment, the Mexican government despatched Colonel J. N. Almonte to visit Texas, and report his observations. In January 1835 he published a portion of his official report, which, though showing indifference and ignorance on the part of Mexico in regard to Texas, was still a link in the chain of historical evidence. He pretended that the political dis-

²³ The chief complaint was against unconstitutional laws passed by the state legislature; the neglect of Texan interests; the wanton grants of lands etc.—all of which rendered it necessary that Texas should have a separate organization. Austin also, under his instructions, demanded an improved mail service between Monclova and Nacogdoches, extending to the United States line, the Sabine River; correction of custom-house abuses; the punctual payment of the presidial companies; and the circulation of the official journal, *El Telégrafo*, to the ayuntamientos of Texas. *Austin, Expos. sobre Tejas*, 9-32.

²⁴ From Feb. 13 to June 12, 1834. During the first three months he was treated with the utmost rigor. After being bandied from court to court without the slightest idea of what his fate would be, he was released on bail, and finally given the benefit of an amnesty. It is said that he owed his pardon to Santa Anna. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 263. His long imprisonment and detention had been grounded on reports from the government of Coahuila and Texas; some of his own countrymen also had been slandering him, though his motto had ever been fidelity to Mexico, and opposition to violent men and measures. He had warned the Texans against meddling with the family feuds of the Mexicans, as they had nothing to gain and much to lose by such interference. *Kennedy's Texas*, ii. 20, 58-60, 63; *Domenech, Mission Adv.*, 20; *Thrall's Hist. Texas*, 49, 60-2. Austin's treatment caused much indignation in Texas. *Lester's Houston, etc.*, 46-51

sensions of Mexico were seldom, if ever, felt in Texas,²⁵ which was far from being true. His aim evidently was to draw Mexicans to settle in Texas.

In 1835 the Texans appointed committees of safety, and resolved upon having a separate government,²⁶ the war-cloud was darkening and foreboding ill.²⁷ Large bodies of Mexican troops were crowding into Texas with the evident purpose of subjugation. The Texans, on their part, were resolute, and soon began to show their spirit in a series of assaults on Mexican garrisons, which met with success. I give in a note the main particulars of these encounters.²⁸

On the 3d of November, 1835, the delegates chosen the preceding month to a general consultation met at

²⁵ 'Con excepcion de algunos revoltosos' the inhabitants were wholly devoted to their industrial pursuits. *Almonte, Not. Estad.*, 5-96; *Kennedy's Texas*, 69-72, 81.

²⁶ Cos, the Mexican comandante general, attributed the agitation and disturbance to acts of aliens and political intriguers. He called on good citizens to lay their complaints before the general government. Other prominent men were also trying to allay the ferment. *Texas, Coll. Doc.*, in *Pinart, Coll.*, MS., nos 31, 32, 35-7, 41.

²⁷ The centralists had possession of the government in Mexico, and were resolved to crush out the rebellious spirit of the Texans.

²⁸ The first one was at Gonzalez on the 2d of October, 1835, when Col Moore defeated a body of Mexicans, and drove them to flight towards San Antonio de Béjar, leaving behind their dead and wounded. Six days later—Oct. 8th—the fort at Goliad was attacked and taken by the Texans. The next encounter was on the 28th of the same month, near the Concepcion mission, when Bowie and Fannin routed a large body of Mexicans, killing about 100 and capturing their field-pieces. *Kennedy's Texas*, ii. 105-9, 117-22; *Crockett, Life of*, 360-70; *Holley's Texas*, 337-56. After the last affair no fighting worth record occurred till December. Gen. Burleson with 800 men of the federalist army, in two divisions, under Col F. W. Johnson and Benjamin R. Milam, between the 5th and 10th of that month, compelled Gen. Cos, who had with him 1,250 men at San Antonio de Béjar, to surrender on the 11th with upward of 1,100 and all his arms, the rest of his men having been killed in the assaults. Milam was killed. Burleson's official report, Dec. 14, 1835, in *Foote's Texas*, ii. 161-75; *Thrall's Hist. Texas*, 222-9. Moffitt's report on this affair seems to be exaggerated. He makes Cos and 1,300 Mexicans surrender to 400 Texans. *Thompson's Recoll. Mex.*, 174-5; *Mayer's Hist. Mex. War*, 47. On the 15th of December, Cos and his followers, under the terms of their capitulation, began their march to the interior, and in a few days there was not a Mexican centralist soldier to be seen between the Sabine and Rio Grande. *Willson's Am. Hist.*, 646-8. Bustamante speaks of a letter published in Mexico from Colonel Ugartechea of October 28th from Alamo recounting the defeat by 300 Mexican cavalry of twice that number of Anglo-Americans, of whom 78 were killed and a large number wounded. He next alludes to Cos' surrender, adding that he behaved honorably; for the cause of the revolt was that he had endeavored to check the governor and deputies who were selling the fine public lands at nominal prices. *Voz de la Patria*, MS., x. 168-9.

San Felipe de Austin, and at once constituted a provisional government, with a governor, lieutenant-governor, and general council to consist of one member from each municipality.²⁹ Samuel Houston was made commander-in-chief of the army, and Stephen F. Austin, Branch T. Archer, and W. H. Wharton were appointed commissioners to represent the wants of Texas in the United States, soliciting aid to prosecute the war. A declaration was likewise issued regarding the causes that prompted their movement. It will be seen that no intention is manifested as yet of severing the connection with Mexico. The authors of that instrument merely assert their claim to sustain by force of arms their rights and liberties, and the federal constitution of Mexico as adopted in 1824.³¹ The die was cast, however, and the consequences to be expected were a bloody war and possibly defeat with the horrors of Mexican vengeance. Urgent appeals for resources had been made beforehand to friends in the south of the American union, who were not urged in vain; and from this time the Texans were in constant receipt of money, provisions, arms, ammunition, and even fighting men openly enlisted in

²⁹ Governor, Henry Smith; lieutenant-governor, James W. Robinson. The latter was to be ex-officio president of the council. This body was clothed with the powers of government, and continued acting till March 1836.

³⁰ 1st. That the object of taking up arms was the defence of their rights and liberties threatened by military despots, as well as of the republican principles of the Mexican federal constitution of 1824. 2d. That Texas was no longer morally or civilly bound by the compact of union; yet, prompted by generosity and sympathy, she offered support and assistance to such members of the Mexican confederacy as would take up arms against military despotism. 3d. Refusal to acknowledge the 'present authorities of the nominal Mexican republic.' 4th. Resolution to continue in arms as long as Mexican troops remained in Texas. 5th. While claiming the right of defence and to establish an independent government, Texas will continue faithful to the Mexican government so long as it is carried out under the constitution of 1824. 6th and 7th refer to expenses of the army, pledging the faith of Texas to the payment of debts contracted. 8th. Offering land grants to such as may come to render military service in the present struggle. 9th. A solemn vow to carry out these declarations. *Baker's Texas*, 43-5; *Filisola, Mem. Hist. Guerra Tejas*, ii. 173-6; *Thrall's Hist. Mex.*, 187-91; *Foot's Texas*, ii. 41-65. The plan to establish a separate state government had been agitated in 1834, but failed. The anti-separation party succeeded in allaying the excitement, and an adjustment of differences was effected under Santa Anna's arbitration. *Kennedy's Texas*, ii. 62-7; *Willson's Am. Hist.*, 639-40.

New Orleans and other parts. The cause of the insurrection was also encouraged and supported by the press and at public meetings.

In this connection with Texan affairs, it will be well to consider what course was pursued by the government of the United States, and what efforts, if any, were made by it to prevent acts which were open violations of the neutrality laws. The attention of the secretary of state having been repeatedly called by the Mexican legation to the fact that war material and armed expeditions were constantly leaving for Texas to wage war against Mexico, with which power the United States were at peace, orders were transmitted to the several districts to prevent such acts. The secretary assured that legation that it was the wish and resolve of the United States to preserve the neutrality; and in January 1836 added that the government would use every endeavor as far as possible to prevent injury to Mexico; but that "for the conduct of individuals which the government of the United States could not control, it was not in any way responsible."³¹ This seems to have been the loop-hole through which the American government sought to escape responsibility; for the fact stands that none of its alleged efforts availed to prevent the departure of men and supplies to aid the Texan belligerents.³² Nor was this all. The United States government shortly after resolved upon the military occupation of Texan territory. The ground for this action was a reported disaffection of a number of tribes or fragments of tribes of Texan Indians, and of some others that had formerly dwelt in United States territory. The people of Texas were glad, for political as well as economical reasons, to have United States troops

³¹ *Niles' Reg.*, 1. 210-13.

³² They had from the United States 'una proteccion encubierta y constante.' *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 283. And if the government thus practically manifested its sympathy for Texas, would the partisans of that country be regardful of the laws of neutrality?

at Fort Gibson, and intentionally spread reports of intended Indian raids, most of which were unfounded. The result was that after peace was established in Texas, and when the people were organizing a civil government, American troops had been stationed upward of a month among them.³³ A long correspondence passed on this and other subjects connected with Texas, between Gorostiza, the Mexican minister at Washington,³⁴ and Forsyth, the secretary of state, from March 9th to October 15th, the former chiefly complaining of the measures then in progress for the violation of Mexican territory under the pretence of punishing Indians; and the latter asserting that the advance of the American forces under General Gaines to Nacogdoches was a measure of necessity; that through Mexico's inability to restrain the Indians, it had become imperative on the United States to protect their citizens, and that such a course was in accordance with treaty stipulations.³⁵ Finally, in consequence of what Gorostiza conceived to be an invasion of Mexican territory by the United States, he on the 15th of October wrote a long letter of remonstrance to the secretary of state, concluding that he considered his mission at an end, and requesting his passports, which were transmitted to him on the 20th.

³³ General Gaines, of the United States army, concentrated large bodies of men on the frontier. See his letter from Camp Sabine, Aug. 28, 1826, to the governor of Tennessee, in *Niles' Reg.*, li. 87-8.

³⁴ He had come in February 1836 as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.

³⁵ Forsyth wrote May 10th that the instructions given to Gaines had not been based on the belief that the United States had claims to the territory beyond Nacogdoches, but simply to prevent consequences that might grow out of the bloody contest begun in Texas. Gaines' instructions were to fulfil its stipulations in reference to the Indians, 'whether belonging to the territory of the United States or Mexico, and especially to maintain a strict neutrality in regard to the contending parties in Texas.' Gaines called on several states for reinforcements to repel Indian attacks. When he found that he had been deceived as to the intentions of the Indians, he recalled his requisitions. Some time after the United States forces abandoned the country. The correspondence on the Texas question may be found in *Gaines, Gen., Correspond.*; *Leg. Extraord.*, 1-122; *Niles' Reg.* l. 207-9, 213-16; li. 113, 129, 409-12; *Mex., Contestac. Leg. Extraord.*, 1-79; *Am. St. Pap.*—new set—*Milit. aff.*, vi. 412, 416-27; *U. S. Govt. Cong.* 24, Ses. 1, H. Ex. Doc. 249, 256, vol. vi.; *Id.*, Cong. 24, Ses. 2, H. Ex. Doc. 2, pp. 25-101; *Id.*, Cong. 25,

The men at the head of the new centralized government of Mexico showed their incompetency to deal with the Texan insurrection. It is true that they made a lame effort to conciliate the rebels with the offer of a further exemption from all taxation during the next ten years, but on the 30th of December, 1835, they passed a law by which they foolishly expected to check the swelling of the Texan ranks from the United States. The offer came too late, and the law produced no other effect than a number of horrible massacres, and the consequent exasperation of the victims' sympathizers, together with a more determined resistance.³⁶

Those in power misunderstood the difficulties they had to contend with, namely, the character of a population which might be exterminated, perhaps, but never subdued, and the natural obstacles offered by the region and climate. They seemed to think that in a contest between Mexican soldiers and colonists, the latter must of course succumb; but they did not consider that those soldiers would be fighting at a distance of about 600 miles from home, while the Texans were fighting for their hearths on their own ground.³⁷

The Texans now concluded, in view of Mexico's hostile attitude toward them, to sever all connection with that country; and on the 2d of March, 1836, in convention assembled at Washington, on the Brazos,

Ses. 2, H. Ex. Doc. 74, pp. 1-24, vol. ii.; 190, pp. 1-120, vol. iv.; *Cong. Debates*, 1837, xiv. 176-96; *Mex. Correspond.*, *Paso del Sabina*, 1-122.

³⁶ The law in question declared that efforts were made in the United States, in violation of the neutrality laws and of the wishes of that government—such had been its assurances—to fit out armed expeditions to help the rebels of Texas. In consequence, the following rules were established: 1st. Foreigners landing at any part of the republic, or entering her territory by land, armed and with hostile intent, were to be dealt with as pirates. 2d. The same treatment was to be awarded to foreigners found landing or introducing arms or other war material at places in a state of insurrection against the Mexican government with the intent of placing them in the rebels' hands.

Under this law almost all Texans taken with arms in their hands might be treated as pirates. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 280-1; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iii. 114-15.

³⁷ The fatuous rulers took no account of obstacles, such as streams, rain, snow, swamps, nor of the necessity of providing supplies for the soldiers. Moreover, the force employed to attempt the subjugation of the Texans was too small for such an undertaking. *Mora, Obras Sueltas*, i. pp. cclxxxviii.-ix.

unanimously adopted a declaration of independence, which in synoptical form I give below.³⁸ The arguments of the declaration are quite assailable. It is not true that the settlers were invited and admitted under the faith of a compact in the form of a republican constitution. Mexico acceded to the petitions of the first colonists when she was still under vice-regal rule, as an appendage of Spain. The changes subsequently experienced in the institutions could not justify their defection. An insignificant minority, as the Texans then were, had no right to arrange the whole country's administration to its own liking. If that minority disliked the changes, it was at liberty to leave the country. In the political vicissitudes of the Mexican republic, Texas, as an integral portion, had to bear her part of neglect, burdens, and general troubles, like the other states and territories, neither more nor less. Military coercive measures, unwise or brutal though they undoubtedly were, resulted from the general political disturbance; and so far

³⁸ The Mexican government had invited them to settle and reclaim the wilderness, under the pledged faith of the written national constitution, which was republican, and similar to the one they had lived under in their native land. Their expectations had been disappointed. Santa Anna had overthrown the constitutional system, offering them the alternative of abandoning the homes they had made after many privations, or of submitting to the combined despotism of the sword and the priesthood. Texas had been sacrificed for the benefit of Coahuila; the petitions of her citizens for a separate state organization had been disregarded. Their fellow-citizen, Austin, had been incarcerated a long time for his zealous endeavors, within legality, on behalf of Texan interests. Trial by jury and a system of public education had never been established. Military commandants had exercised arbitrary tyrannical powers. The state congress of Coahuila and Texas had been dissolved by force of arms, and the representatives compelled to flee for their lives. Good citizens had been unjustly seized by military authority, carried away from their homes, and tried on trumped-up charges. Piratical attacks had been committed on Texas commerce by desperadoes in the service of Mexico. The right of worshipping God according to the dictates of their conscience had been denied them. They had been required to surrender the arms they needed for their defence. Their country had been invaded and laid waste, and their citizens driven away. The Indians had been incited to ravage and massacre. The citizens had been made the contemptible sport and victims of military revolutions. The Mexican government had invariably shown the characteristics of weakness, corruption, and tyranny. This declaration was signed by 57 members, of whom 10 appear to be from northern and European regions, and 3 native Mexicans; the rest were natives of the southern states of the American Union. *Baker's Texas*, 65-71; *Texas, Luws Repub.*, i. 3-7.

as they affected Texas, in the revolt against the legally or illegally constituted authorities, they were no worse than those dealt to citizens of other parts of the country under similar circumstances. The fact is, that the Texan rebellion and secession were the result of a preconceived plan, as alluded to early in this chapter, to establish a market for African slaves³⁹ in contempt of the Mexican laws, and afterward to annex the new country to the United States. It might have been, perhaps, more honorable, for the parties interested, if their project had been openly avowed from the first, instead of trickery and subterfuge being resorted to.

The national convention on the 17th of March, 1836, adopted a constitution.⁴⁰ It also established a provisional government with plenary powers, electing David G. Burnet president, and Lorenzo de Zavala vice-president, with four secretaries of state. Samuel Houston was reappointed commander-in-chief of the forces.

Let us now consider what the Mexican government was doing to bring these rebellious subjects to allegiance. Resources were scarce, but the government made the most of them, and together with voluntary contributions from patriotic citizens, organized an army for the campaign. The chief command of it was intrusted to General Santa Anna, who in November 1835 visited San Luis Potosí to complete preparations and to set the troops in motion. Toward the end of December, the forces, said to be 6,000 strong, started for San Antonio de Béjar, then occupied by the enemy.⁴¹ They invested the Alamo, a

³⁹ This has been denied on the ground that at the commencement of the troubles slavery existed in Texas only to a trifling extent. *Edinburgh Rev.*, cxlvii. 261-2. But the same writer acknowledges that the prohibition to import fresh slaves was looked on with jealousy, as it would prevent the immigration of wealthy planters.

⁴⁰ A copy of it may be found in *Baker's Texas*, 143-79; *Texas, Laws Rep.*, i. 9-25.

⁴¹ According to Bustamante, Santa Anna's army in Texas did not exceed 10,000 men. *Hist. Invasion*, MS., i. 6. Eight thousand of the best troops in Mexico. *Kennedy's Tex.*, ii. 176-7. Another account makes the force 7,500,

strong fortress near San Antonio de Béjar, which had 14 guns in position, and was garrisoned by about 150 men under W. B. Travis. During 11 days' siege and bombardment, 32 more men forced their way into the fortress. Travis would neither surrender nor attempt to retreat. At last Santa Anna, on the 6th of March, ordered the assault; the stronghold was taken, and the whole garrison put to the sword. Among the slain were colonels Travis, Bowie, and David Crockett, and also twenty residents or traders of San Antonio de Béjar. Only a woman and her child and a negro servant were spared.⁴²

The blood, both of Mexicans and Texans, shed at the Alamo was a useless sacrifice. The massacre, even if in accord with the barbarous usages of war, did not serve the cause of Mexico, but, on the contrary, impressed the Texans with the firm conviction that no settlement except by the sword was any longer possible. It was now with them a question of victory or subjugation accompanied with the direst consequences. The fact was that the siege and storming of the Alamo was a childish display of vanity, to

provided with artillery and other supplies. *Am. Cyclop.*, xv. 678. Santa Anna wanted Béjar for his centre of operations, it being the only place in Texas inhabited by Mexicans. This explains why he traversed such an enormous distance of desert country. *Filisola, Mem. Hist. Guer. Tejas*, ii. 228-30.

⁴² The Texan or American accounts of this struggle place the Mexican casualties at 1,600. According to the account formed by the Mexican general Juan de Andrade, from the reports of the several organizations constituting the storming parties, the casualties were: officers, 8 killed and 18 wounded; rank and file, 52 killed, 233 wounded; total, 311. Santa Anna reported 70 killed and 300 wounded, and with his usual unscrupulous disregard of veracity, sets down the Texan loss at over 600, all foreigners, buried in the ditches and trenches, and 'en las inmediaciones un crecido número que no se ha podido examinar.' He claims also that the Texans used 21 pieces of artillery. According to Mexican accounts, the investing force, together with that hovering at short distances, exceeded 5,000 men. Santa Anna detailed four columns, each composed of one battalion and two companies, besides a reserve of one battalion and five columns, for the assault. *Dicc. Univ. Hist. Geog.*, i. ap. 135-8; *Filisola, Mem. Hist. Guer. Tejas*, i. 6-17, ii. 382-90; *Houston, Life of*, 93-4; *Thrall, Hist. Texas*, 238-46, giving a detailed account of the siege and capture of the fort, says that only two women and a negro servant escaped with life. *Maillard, Tex.*, 101-3, says six men and one woman escaped out of a garrison of 450 men. The same authority and the Mexicans assert that Travis had offered to surrender, but the privilege was denied him. *Bustamante, Hist. Invasion, MS.*, i. 6-7, says that Santa Anna at the taking of the Alamo lost 600 men, which may be exaggerated.

make it appear that San Antonio de Béjar had been retaken by force of arms with a heavy loss of life on both sides. Nor did Santa Anna's blood-thirstiness end there.

Colonel J. W. Fannin was stationed at Goliad with about 500 men, when he received orders from General Houston to fall back on Victoria. These orders were not promptly obeyed, and a Mexican force largely superior in number came upon Fannin, who, having heard that General Urrea was marching on Refugio, despatched thither Captain King with 28 men, on the 11th of March, to cover the retreat of the American citizens. This small force had to seek refuge at the old Refugio mission on the 13th. Next day Fannin sent 112 men with Lieutenant-Colonel Ward to rescue King and his party. The latter, however, while reconnoitring were captured and shot to a man, and their bodies left on the field, food for carrion birds and beasts. Ward and his command then attempted to escape toward Victoria, but being intercepted, were captured, and soon after executed at Goliad. On the 17th of March, Fannin hearing nothing from Ward or King, attempted a retreat, but after a series of engagements found himself surrounded by a very superior force, and with scarcely any supplies or ammunition. At La Coleta, however, eight miles from Goliad, he fought a desperate action, March 18th.⁴³ The next day the Mexicans, 1,900 strong, under Urrea, on the Llano Perdido, summoned Fannin to surrender, which he was compelled to do. It has been alleged that the surrender was made under terms of capitulation, by which Fannin, his officers and men, were to be treated as prisoners of war.⁴⁴ The terms of capit-

⁴³ The Mexican loss is set down as between 300 and 500, and that of the Texans at only 7 killed and 60 wounded. *Baker's Texas*, 54; *Thrall's Hist. Tex.*, 249.

⁴⁴ The following are the alleged terms: 1st. The Texans should be treated as prisoners of war according to the usages of civilized nations; 2d. Private property should be respected and restored, but the side-arms of the officers should be given up; 3d. The men should be sent to Copano, and thence in eight days to the United States, or as soon as vessels could be procured to

ulation, if any were actually granted by General Urrea, were ignored by the commander-in-chief, General Santa Anna; and on Sunday, March 27th, the prisoners, who had been sent to Goliad, were marched out of the fort and shot.⁴⁵

Santa Anna in a letter of May 23, 1836, to the executive of Texas denies that the Mexican force hoisted a flag of truce, or that its commander gave any assurance of quarter by accepting a capitulation. Urrea in his report to Santa Anna declared that he had refused to grant terms of capitulation, as indeed he was prevented from doing by the law of December 30, 1835. According to Lieutenant-Colonel Holzinger, who was present at Fannin's surrender, Urrea gave no warrant that the prisoners' lives would be spared; but his commissioners assured Fannin that the Mexican government had in no instance taken the life of a prisoner that appealed to its clemency.⁴⁶ Fannin was not satisfied with the assurance, but concluded to surrender and trust to the generosity of the Mexican government.⁴⁷ Urrea seems to have promised that he would ask mercy for them. Holzinger blames Urrea for want of frankness in his reports to Santa Anna in not informing him that he had promised clemency to the prisoners. On the other side, Ramon Martinez de Caro, Santa Anna's military secretary, says that Urrea strongly recommended merciful deal-

take them. The officers should be paroled and returned to the United States in like manner. *Id.*, 249-50.

⁴⁵ During the execution 27 of the prisoners broke away from their guards and escaped. Reports disagree as to the number executed. Foote makes it 330, and the Texas Almanac for 1860 has 385, giving the names of the victims. Col Alcérreca superintended the execution. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 284.

⁴⁶ Bustamante, *Hist. Invasion*, MS., i. 7-8, claims that Mexico should not be blamed for acts which often occur in war when men lose reason. He pleads that during the 10 years' war many Texans fell prisoners and were kept in forts and not treated as criminals. When Canales, with 300 Texans, invaded Mexico and capitulated, they were amenable to the death penalty and yet were liberated. He gives other instances of mercy to Texan prisoners.

⁴⁷ Fannin's words were: 'Well, I have no water; my wounded need attendance. I particularly recommend these unfortunates to you. I will surrender at the discretion of the Mexican government.' *Urrea, Camp. de Tejas*, 128-33.


ing with the helpless prisoners, more than 200 of whom he was about sending to Bahía del Espíritu Santo or Goliad; and that Santa Anna's answer had been a severe reprimand, telling him not to stain his triumphs with misplaced compassion. The order for the execution was repeated to Urrea and to the commandant at Goliad. Then again, we have the statement that the commandant at Goliad reported to Santa Anna that Fannin, before he started from that place, had burned the town, leaving the people without shelter, for which, as well as for the loss of their cattle, they felt very indignant, and clamored for the death of the prisoners.⁴³

The reverses of Álamo and Goliad only had the effect of crystallizing the spirit of opposition to Mexico. General Houston addressed the remnants of his army, telling them they must retreat till they were better able to meet the enemy in battle. His force was now of 600 to 700 men, with whom he retreated to the Brazos, and a few days after to a point near the San Jacinto River. His plan was to concentrate all his available forces from all quarters, and to draw the enemy away from his base of supplies. The plan met with all the success Houston desired. Santa Anna with a portion of his force, about 1,600 strong, marched to the banks of the San Jacinto, where he was attacked on the 21st of April, and utterly routed and taken prisoner. Houston, according to his own report, had an aggregate force of 783 men. The conflict lasted about twenty minutes from the commencement of close action till the Texans took possession of the enemy's encampment, together with a loaded piece, four stand of colors, all the camp equipage, stores, etc. The rout began about half-past

⁴³ There were 80 or 86 volunteers from New Orleans, taken in Copano, but not having arms in their possession, they were not included in the order of execution. *Thrall's Hist. Tex.*, 250; *Niles' Reg.*, i. 310; *Caro, Verd. Idea*, 13-14; *Urrea, Camp. de Tejas*, 13-19; *Filisola, Mem. Hist. Guer. Tejas*, ii. 417-29.

four in the afternoon, and the pursuit continued until twilight.

General Houston in his official report to President Burnet on the 25th of April states that the Texan loss was two killed and 23 wounded, of whom six died. Houston himself was seriously wounded, and in consequence General T. J. Rusk succeeded him in the command. The enemy's loss he sets down at 630 killed, 208 wounded, and 730 prisoners. Santa Anna,⁴⁹ General Cos, and four colonels, aids to Santa Anna,



BATTLE-GROUND OF SAN JACINTO.

one of whom was Colonel Almonte, were included in the latter number.⁵⁰ Though the numbers that took

⁴⁹ Santa Anna was hidden in the grass when captured; he was disguised in a miserable rustic dress, wearing a skin cap, round jacket, and pantaloons of blue domestic cotton, and a pair of coarse soldier's shoes.

⁵⁰ Santa Anna was taken on the 22d and Cos on the 24th. There were captured also 600 muskets, 300 sabres, and 200 pistols—a large quantity of arms was lost in the morass and bayou—300 valuable mules and 100 fine horses, besides other valuables, including \$12,000 in silver. See Houston's report in *Thrall's Hist. Texas*, 265-8; *Id.*, in *Kennedy's Texas*, ii. 222-7; *Lester's Houston*, 109-39; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., xi. 22-9; *Willson's Amer. Hist.*, 660-1; *Caro, Verd. Idea*, 18-45, gives Santa Anna's version of the affair, with comments showing the absurdity of many of that general's statements. *Filisola, Mem. Hist. Guer. Texas*, ii. 452-70, gives without comments Santa Anna's report of the campaign, from Manga de Clavo, March 11, 1837.

part in the battle of San Jacinto were insignificant as compared with those in other engagements, the result was momentous to the Texan participants, and to the young republic, whose independence it secured.

Santa Anna's life was now in grave peril, owing to the execution of Texans effected under his orders.⁵¹ To save himself and his companions he entered into an armistice with General Houston, preparatory to arrangements looking to the recognition of the independence of Texas. He accordingly sent a written order to his second in command, General Filisola, instructing him to retreat at once, which was done.⁵² On the 14th of the following May he signed a treaty with David G. Burnet, president of Texas, binding himself in its first article neither to take up arms nor to use his influence with Mexico to induce her to do so, during the pending contest for Texan independence. In a note will be found the remaining articles of this convention.⁵³ There was also a secret agree-

⁵¹ The onslaught at San Jacinto had been made to the cry of 'Remember the Alamo!'

⁵² The Mexican army, now about 4,000 strong, looked upon Santa Anna's orders as invalid, consequent upon his agreement having been extorted from him while in duress. Filisola, however, thought otherwise, and carried them out. Anonymous diary, in *Urrea, Diario*, 91. The retreat was effected under great distress. The orders had reached Filisola April 28th at San Bernardo. Heavy rains had made the roads almost impassable, and the artillery became mired, and would have been lost but for Colonel Ampudia's great exertions. The passage of the Colorado was difficult. Filisola established his headquarters at Goliads to obtain supplies by sea and open communications with the interior. Urrea with his division returned to Matamoras. Texan cruisers shut out the hope of maritime succor. Goliads was therefore evacuated in ten days, and the retreat began for the Rio Grande. *Maillard's Tex.*, 117-18; *Kennedy's Tex.*, iii. 231-2; *Filisola, Mem. Hist. Guer. Tejas*, ii. 470-99.

⁵³ Art. 2. Hostilities between Mexican and Texan forces, both on land and water, shall cease immediately; 3. The Mexican troops shall evacuate the Texan territory, passing to the other side of the Rio Grande del Norte; 4. The Mexican army in its retreat shall not take any private property without obtaining the owner's consent, and must pay a just indemnification; 5. Private property taken by any part of the Mexican army since the invasion, including negro slaves or indentured persons that have taken refuge within its lines, must be surrendered; 6. The troops of both armies shall refrain from coming into contact with each other; 7. The Mexican army must not delay on its retreat longer than absolutely necessary; 8. This agreement to be at once notified to generals Filisola and Rusk for its fulfilment; 9. Texan prisoners in the hands of the Mexicans to be released at once, and passports furnished them to return to their homes; Texas to release a corresponding number of Mexican prisoners, and treat the remainder with due humanity;

ment in six articles intended to pave the way for peace and the recognition by Mexico of the independence of Texas. Below will be found the said articles.⁶⁴

The Mexican congress issued a manifesto⁶⁵ repudiating this arrangement and exhorting the people to continue the war. Nor was the other side in any way satisfied with it. The Texan secretary of war, General Lamar, had on the 12th protested against any treaty being made with Santa Anna, insisting that he should be treated as a murderer. However, after the treaties were signed he acquiesced in them, and afterward vindicated his official associates when they were assailed for their action therein. The Texan army was greatly dissatisfied at Santa Anna's liberation, and resolutions were adopted disapproving the course of the government. A few days after, when Santa Anna was already on board the *Invincible*, which was to convey him to Vera Cruz, two vessels arrived at Velasco, with a large number of volunteers under General Thomas Green, who insisted on his

10. 'Gen. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna will be sent to Vera Cruz as soon as it shall be deemed proper.' *Thrall's Hist. Texas*, 276-7; *Filisola, Represent.*, 68-70; *Id.*, *Mem. Guer. Tejas*, i. 298-300; *Kennedy's Tex.*, ii. 233-5.

⁶⁴Santa Anna solemnly pledged himself to fulfil the stipulations: 'Art. 1. He will not take up arms, nor cause them to be taken up, against the people of Texas, during the present war of independence; 2. He will give orders that in the shortest time possible the Mexican troops leave the territory of Texas; 3. He will so prepare matters in the cabinet of Mexico that the mission that may be sent thither by the government of Texas may be well received, and that by means of negotiations all differences may be settled, and the independence that has been declared by the convention may be acknowledged; 4. A treaty of comity, amity, and limits will be established between Mexico and Texas, the territory of the latter not to extend beyond the Rio Bravo del Norte; 5. The present return of General Santa Anna to Vera Cruz being indispensable for the purpose of effecting his solemn engagements, the government of Texas will provide for his immediate embarkation for said port; 6. This instrument, being obligatory on one part as well as on the other, will be signed in duplicate, remaining folded and sealed until the negotiations shall have been concluded, when it shall be restored to his excellency General Santa Anna—no use of it to be made before that time unless there should be an infraction by either of the contracting parties.' The foregoing is given by Thrall, *Hist. Tex.*, 277-8, as taken from Yoakum, ii. app. no. 5, 528; Rivera, *Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 313-14; Zarco, *Hist. Congreso*, i. 107-8; Niles' Reg., lxi. 98; Bustamante, *Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., ii. 86-90, vi. 35-8; Roa Bárcena, *Recuerdos*, 538-41.

⁶⁵On the 29th of July, 1836. *Méx., Manif. Cong. Gen.*, 1-20.

not being allowed to sail. President Burnet, in view of the situation, caused Santa Anna to be brought back on shore, against his strong protest. Some correspondence passed between him and the Texan government, early in June, arising from his protest against violations of the agreement. The latter explained that it had been out of its power to avert the infringements complained of; that it had been at all times disposed to treat the Mexican prisoners kindly, and to show Santa Anna every consideration consistent with his safety and the poor facilities at its disposal.⁵⁶ Santa Anna was now kept in close confinement until after the meeting of the Texan congress. In July he addressed himself to the president of the United States, asking for his mediation to bring about a settlement of the question between Texas and Mexico. President Jackson answered that he could not act in the matter, as the Mexican minister had notified the American cabinet that his government would not recognize in Santa Anna any authority to act in its name while a prisoner. He was finally released⁵⁷ and taken to the United States.

The fate of the "illustrious prisoner of San Jacinto"⁵⁸ was officially heard of in Mexico January 11, 1837, when the government by a letter from the Mexican consul in New Orleans was informed that Santa Anna, according to his despatch to that official, had been generously liberated by the Texans and had proceeded to Washington, whence he had gone to a northern port of the United States to embark for Vera Cruz.⁵⁹

On his arrival there, about the 23d of February, he

⁵⁶ *Niles' Reg.*, li. 191.

⁵⁷ On the application of Andrew Jackson, president of the United States. *Foot's Tex.*, ii. 349.

⁵⁸ His government calls him so in a circular. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 311.

⁵⁹ The announcement was celebrated in Mexico with demonstrations of joy, and the black crape was removed from the national colors. It was thought strange that Santa Anna should speak of Texan generosity after being harshly treated, even a pistol being fired at him while in prison. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., xii. 11-13, 47-84.

was received with presidential honors, after which he retired to his estate of Manga de Clavo. It was supposed that his visit to Washington had been for the purpose of entering into some convention, but this was made to appear unfounded.⁶⁰ Being well aware of his loss of popularity, Santa Anna on the 4th of March signified his resolution to retire to private life.⁶¹ But on the 9th of that month he took the oath as a Mexican general to support the government under the existing régime.

The Mexican government was apparently in earnest about continuing its exertions to bring Texas under subjection. Large bodies of troops were despatched at the end of 1836 to reënforce the expeditionary army. General Filisola was superseded by Urrea, and the latter, shortly after, by Bravo. Efforts were made to awaken the people's patriotism, and some private parties aided with their means; but for all such efforts, the war henceforth was a very passive one. It would have been a wise policy to have recognized Texan independence and made peace, which would have saved Mexico from greater troubles in the near future. But that policy was not adopted, and the Texan war became a farce and a party weapon.

In May 1839 Bernard E. Bee arrived from the United States at Vera Cruz, commissioned by the Texan government to treat with Mexico for the independence of Texas. The government, however, refused to receive Bee, and simply instructed Victoria, then comandante general at Vera Cruz, to hold private conferences with him and ascertain the real object of his visit; if the independence of Texas was asked for, he was to make him reëmbark at once. Bee after exchanging some notes with Victoria returned to the

⁶⁰ A government circular made it known that he had frankly and positively stated in despatches that he had entered into no treaty, capitulation, or engagement whatever which in any manner was binding on Mexico, or injurious to her honor or the national territory. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1837. 124.

⁶¹ This intention he repeated July 7th, in a letter which was published in the 'Correo' and other journals.

United States. During the same year the Texans were endeavoring to form Texas and some of the northern states of Mexico into a North Mexican republic, and there were not wanting men in these states holding similar views.⁶³

In 1840 the Texan government, while discountenancing raids into Mexico, such as that of Colonel Ross, claimed that the territory of the new republic extended beyond the river Nueces to the Rio Grande, as had been fixed by her first congress, and Colonel Cook was ordered there with a force of regulars to protect the boundary.⁶³ In the same year the Texan navy had already begun to assume proportions; its officers had served in the American and other national navies. It began hostilities against Mexican commerce in August, war vessels appearing before Mexican ports. Its men could land wheresoever they pleased, and its cruisers after a while approached Vera Cruz. Finally the Texan government made that of Mexico understand that if the independence of Texas was not recognized within a given period, the ports of Mexico would be blockaded and her territory invaded. The peninsula of Yucatan, having seceded from Mexico, admitted and saluted in its ports Texan war vessels, and looked to them for aid. In 1842 they rendered assistance to Yucatan, which contributed to their support.⁶⁴

Early in 1841 the Mexican forces on the Texas frontier amounted to about 2,200 men, besides the troops at Matamoros and San Luis Potosí.⁶⁵ General Arista was preparing for a campaign in Texas. The Texans, on their side, began to move upon the Mexican fron-

⁶³ The Mexican government becoming aware of it, a law was passed declaring any overt act in that direction to be high treason, punishable as such. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 428.

⁶⁴ Some troops of Arista's having shown themselves on the Nueces, the Texans prepared to fight. New Mexico was placed under martial law by the Mexican authorities, because it had been invaded by Texans. *Id.*, iii. 440.

⁶⁵ In September 1841 Colonel Peraza was sent to Texas as minister of Yucatan to conclude a treaty of friendship and alliance against Mexico.

⁶⁶ They were stationed at different convenient places, and were provided with artillery. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 515-16. 526.

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tier under generals Houston, Green, and Barton. In September large bodies of Texans appeared in New Mexico, the chief ones in the cañada de Trujillo, and on the banks of the Pecos. A few trifling encounters took place with the Mexicans under García Conde.⁶⁶

In the midst of his labors, President Barragan was attacked by a putrid fever, which put an end to his life on the 1st of March, 1836. His death was universally regretted, and his political errors condoned even by the most advanced liberals in consideration of his good personal traits, and patriotic services, especially that of capturing San Juan de Ulúa.⁶⁷

Owing to General Barragan's illness, the chamber of deputies, on the 27th of February, 1836, chose José Justo Corro, of Guadalajara, to fill the position of acting president. Corro was called to govern the nation at a time when it was beset with troubles both internal and external, and showed himself entirely unfit for so responsible a position. He was a man of excessive piety⁶⁸ and timidity, and utterly ignorant of military affairs, when the country might have to bring into use at any moment its resources and energies in a war with the United States on the Texas question.

Amid the confusion in the interior a plan of 'concordia,' as it was called, was brought forward in June,

⁶⁶ In June 1841 an expedition, generally known as the Santa Fé expedition, had started from the neighborhood of Georgetown on Brushy to occupy New Mexico and induce the people there to unite with the Texans. It had a disastrous termination, most of the men being either killed or taken prisoners and carried to Mexico, where they languished some time in prison. They were finally released, which allayed the excitement of the people of Texas who wanted to invade Mexico. *Mex., Derecho Intern.*, 3d pt, 237; *Thrall's Hist. Texas*, 311-15; *Baker's Tex.*, 93-4.

⁶⁷ Barragan before his death made a whimsical disposition of his remains; one portion was to be buried in the cathedral of Mexico; the eyes were bequeathed to the Valle del Maiz, his birthplace; the heart to Guadalajara; the entrails to other places; the tongue to San Juan de Ulúa. It is understood that he died poor. The funeral was on a scale of great magnificence, the clergy manifesting their sorrow at his loss. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1836, Jan. -June, 274-5; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., xi. 9-20.

⁶⁸ One of the most devout lawyers in the republic. His election was a severe blow to the escoceses, and the forerunner of their loss of influence in the government. *Mora, Obras Sueltas*, i. p. cclxxvi.

at Puebla. Corro's government misconstrued the conciliatory purposes of its authors;⁶⁹ though it must be confessed that under the circumstances the plan was an impracticable one. The agitation was somewhat allayed by the return from exile of Anastasio Bustamante, on whom the people began to turn their eyes for their next president.

During Corro's administration in 1837 the pope recognized the independence of Mexico,⁷⁰ on the understanding that anti-ecclesiastical laws had been repealed, the pope promising to accredit an internuncio, as the poverty of the holy see did not permit of his sending an official of higher rank. The internuncio was to be comfortably supported by the Mexican government. Corro is said to have been greatly pleased by so much condescension on the part of the pope. The same year the admiral commanding the French forces in the Antilles visited Mexico to make reclamations, which if not granted might have led to war.⁷¹

The financial affairs, like the political, were in the worst possible state. Money had to be borrowed on the most onerous terms. The army, not being paid with regularity, sought only promotion and honors, caring little for the country's good name or peace. The people, instead of progressing, were sinking deeper into the slough of ignorance and superstition. Such were the circumstances of the Mexican republic when Bustamante was elected president.⁷² Corro

⁶⁹ The chief object was to promote the union of parties. The government said it was intended to form a new party to work against Santa Anna and the administration. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 291-2; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., xi. 29-30.

⁷⁰ Manuel Diez de Bonilla, the Mexican minister of foreign relations, had been accredited as plenipotentiary to the papal court to make an arrangement on spiritual affairs. A copy of his letter from Rome, dated Nov. 30, 1836, to his department, gives details of his receptions by the pope, negotiations, etc. *Mora, Obras Sueltas*, i. p. cclxxxiv.-viii.; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1837, 133-4; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., xiii. 84-96; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 320, and others also furnish information on the subject.

⁷¹ Corro's government published a pompous manifesto, but in their obsequiousness to the admiral showed that they were under the influence of fear. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 204.

⁷² The electoral votes were as follows: for Bustamante, 57; for Gomez Pe-

surrendered the executive authority on the 19th of April, 1837,⁷³ never again to appear in public life. His rule had been one of the most injurious to Mexico in every sense of the word.⁷⁴

President Bustamante encountered from the first a number of obstacles clearly indicating how difficult it would be to sustain himself in power for the term of eight years for which he had been elected. The promises of his inaugural address⁷⁵ were received by the nation at large with indifference. Acts, not theories, were wanted. The liberal masses had been, however, buoyed up with hopes that the new administration would really endeavor to carry out an enlightened course; but they were disappointed from the first, as soon as the names of the ministers called to form the cabinet became known,⁷⁶ for the reason that they belonged to the ranks of the aristocracy and intolerance. Luis Gonzaga Cuevas, the minister of relations, as a creature of Lucas Alaman, was generally looked upon with distrust; Manuel de la Peña y

draza, 6; Bravo, 3; Santa Anna, 2. *Niles' Reg.*, lii. 49; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1837, 300-1; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iii. 363; *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, i. 1-3; *Id.*, *Voz de la Patria*, MS., xii. 117-18.

⁷³ C. M. Bustamante describes the act, adding that among the persons who tendered the new president their congratulations was Admiral La Bretonnière, who did it in the most courtly French, and was answered in the same language, the Mexicans being much delighted at having a president 'que pudiera pedir los garvanzos en francés como fruto de su estada en Paris.' It is well to say here that this author had undergone a change of feeling toward the president at the time of writing. The merits of Bustamante's first administration belonged to the ministers, the blunders of the administration now beginning were the president's own. *Gabinete Mex.*, i. 2; *Id.*, MS., ii. 1-4.

⁷⁴ His ministers were the following: of relations, José M. Ortiz Monasterio, official mayor in charge; of justice, Joaquin de Iturbide, official mayor in charge; of hacienda, Rafael Mangino, Feb. 21 to Sept. 20, 1836, Ignacio Alas, Sept. 21 to Dec. 18, 1836, José M. Cervantes, Dec. 19 to Ap. 19, 1837, ad interim; of war, José M. Tornel, Feb. 27, 1836, to Ap. 18, 1837, Ignacio del Corral, Ap. 18 to April 19, 1837. *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1033-4.

⁷⁵ To pursue an enlightened policy; to promote the well-being of the people as the source of all political power; and to see that justice was inflexibly awarded, without fear or favor. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 207; *Niles' Reg.*, lii. 204. The congress before which the new president was inaugurated closed its session on the 24th of May, and reopened it on the 1st of June. *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, i. 15-17; *Id.*, MS., i. 41-3.

⁷⁶ Bustamante has it that the appointments were well received by the public. *Id.*, 3-4.

Peña, minister of justice and ecclesiastical affairs, was a fanatic in religion belonging to the most moderate wing of the liberal party, and had held important positions under the colonial government; Joaquin Lebrija, minister of the treasury, was considered incompetent for the position; and Mariano Michelena, called to fill the portfolio of war and navy, was almost unknown to the army.⁷⁷

On the 8th of May the list of the members elected to form the 'supremo poder conservador' was published. It was as follows: Justo Corro, Rafael Mangino, José Ignacio Espinosa, Francisco Tagle, and General Melchor Muzquiz. The suplentes were Cirilo Gomez Anaya, José María Bocanegra and Carlos María Bustamante.⁷⁸ The body was organized with General Muzquiz as president and Tagle as secretary.

Shortly after the inauguration of the new government the news came that the Spanish court had formally recognized the independence of Mexico⁷⁹ in a treaty concluded at Madrid between the minister of foreign affairs, Calatrava, and the Mexican plenipotentiary, Miguel Santa María, on the 28th of December, 1836.⁸⁰ With the sanction of the Mexican congress, on May 1, 1837, the executive ratified the treaty on the 3d, together with a secret article binding Mexico not to allow the fitting-out of expeditions, nor the planning of schemes within her territory

⁷⁷ A list of the ministers, and the time each of them held office, may be seen in *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1034-5.

⁷⁸ Owing to Espinosa's death and Corro's absence, C. M. Bustamante early entered the body as an active member. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1837, 441.

⁷⁹ Since August 1836 orders had been issued to discontinue all acts of hostility against Spain and her subjects. *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., xi. 47. A decree of December 15, 1836, permitted Spanish vessels to enter Mexican ports, and to receive all needed assistance, but they were not to fly their colors. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1836, July-Dec., 195-6, 302-4.

⁸⁰ The treaty was one not only of recognition of Mexico as an independent nation with all the territory she then possessed, but also of amity, commerce, and navigation on the basis of the most favored nations. Art. 4th stipulated that at an early date the two powers would negotiate a special treaty of commerce on terms of mutual benefit, which was done. *Bustamante, Gabinete, Méx.*, MS., i. 9-12, 184-7; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 865-6; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1838, 67-73, 368-72; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, iii. 388-91, 462-5, 536-7.

against the Spanish possessions in the New World. The treaty was subsequently ratified by Spain, and became a law in Mexico February 28, 1838.

About two years afterward, on the 19th of December, 1839, the first Spanish minister plenipotentiary accredited to the Mexican government, Ángel Calderon de la Barca,⁸¹ arrived at Vera Cruz on the war brig *Jason*, and his reception was most cordial.

The political parties hitherto existing under the names of yorkinos, escoceses, liberales, progresistas, and retrógrados now organized themselves into two great parties, known respectively as federalists and centralists, the latter being strong in the capitals and other parts where the clergy and army had influence, and the former in places where the fallen system had created many interests and aspirations. This party was much strengthened by the accession of some military officers of good repute for courage and ability.

This second administration of Bustamante compares unfavorably with his first, as regards respectability, foreign credit, and success in promoting public prosperity, but was superior in its manner of using the supreme authority, which was moderate and within legal bounds. Restricted as the president was by constitutional checks, even from proposing measures to congress, or returning for reconsideration such as the chambers had enacted, he seemed to be guided by no well defined policy, which was owing in a great measure to the fact that he had not the uniform co-operation of his party.

Soon after Bustamante assumed power, revolts broke out in several parts of the republic,⁸² which,

⁸¹ A pensioned knight of the order of Carlos III., commander of that of Isabel la Católica, and of the Neapolitan order of Constantino. One of the queen's secretaries, and a member of her council, Calderon had also a name in the world of letters. *Ricera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 421; *Niles' Reg.*, lviii. 50. His arrival in Mexico city was on the 24th of Dec. *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, i. 215.

⁸² Ugarte and Estévan Moctezuma headed insurrections in San Luis Potosí and Rio Verde. The latter was killed, and the former capitulated under

though quelled, kept the public peace constantly disturbed, a condition of things made still worse by the petitions of several military organizations in favor of a change in the system of government. The administration was thus beset by internal troubles when it needed entire freedom to devote its whole attention to the Texan war, and to the relations with France, which were in a very strained condition, the latter power having lately uttered threats against Mexico.⁸³

The alarms from which some portions of the country suffered were not wholly political. Nature also added to the distress with heavy earthquakes and other calamities.⁸⁴

The national treasury was empty, and there was no means of replenishing it, or even of procuring money to meet the most pressing demands. Direct taxation was tried and failed, private property being excessively encumbered already. The only estates exempt from heavy burdens were those of the church, and hence the necessity of mortgaging them began to grow popular. At the time the cabinet was formed, much had been expected from the minister

the most favorable terms. But to attain these ends the government had to call troops from other departments, and even those concentrated at Matamoros for the Texan campaign. There were disturbances also in New Mexico, Sonora, and elsewhere, and attempts to break the peace in Mexico, Puebla, Guannajuato, and other places. *Andrade, Revol.*, 1-76; *Id.*, *Calific. Legal*, 1-24; *Filisola, Mem. Hist. Guer. Tejas*, i. 507, ii. 26-36; *Dur.*, *Represent.*, in *Pinart, Col. Doc.*, 1-10; *Pinart, Col. Doc. Son.*, ii. 279-302, 306-10; *Méx., Supl. Diario Gob.*, 144-57; *Bustamante, Gabinete Méx.*, i. 5-10, 17, 33-56; *Id.*, *MS.*, iii. 3-7, 67-81, 109-10; *Id.*, *Voz de la Patria*, *MS.*, xii. 23, 81-2, 113-17; *Id.*, *Mem. Justas Quejas*, 1-8; *Larrainzar, in Soc. Méx. Geog. Bolet.*, iii. 132.

⁸³ Fears being entertained of foreign aggressions on the coast, foreigners were under the strictest surveillance.

⁸⁴ On the 1st of Aug. 1837, a very heavy shock was felt in Mexico. The night before a shock did some damage in Vera Cruz. Again, Nov. 22d, a shock in Mexico lasted more than five minutes, and did very serious damage to some of the strongest buildings, including the cathedral and several other churches. It was felt throughout the republic. Shortly before about 520 shocks had been experienced in Acapulco, which destroyed a part of the town, and forced the people to abandon it. This was soon followed by an epidemic that killed millions of fish on both seas. The government adopted measures to prevent the sale of affected fish from Tampico. A great flood in the Rio Grande did much damage. *Niles' Reg.*, lii. 402; *Bustamante, Gabinete Méx.*, i. 26-7, 44-5; *Id.*, *MS.*, iii. 114-17; *Jal. Not. Geog.*, in *Soc. Méx. Geog. Bolet.*, vi. 314.

of the treasury, but he accomplished nothing, and meantime the expenditures greatly exceeded the receipts. Rumor succeeded rumor, each as false as the preceding one, but all containing a little grain of truth as to the president's views in favor of a change of system. His vacillation at last displeased the ministers, and they resigned in a body on the 14th of October. It was reported that the president wanted the federation restored, and the agitation was very great. At last, a few days later, he appointed a new cabinet as follows: José Antonio Romero, of relations; José María Bocanegra, of hacienda; Ignacio Mora y Villamil, of war, and ad interim of justice.⁸⁵

⁸⁵ Romero's appointment displeased the opposition. Indeed, though the president tried to please the opposition, it was not satisfied. *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, i. 41.

The following additional authorities have been consulted for the preceding chapter: *Dublin and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iii. 132-5, 215-59, 323-38, 352-63, 389-91, 443-4, 462-5, 528-7, 664-5, 723, v. 17; *Mex., Col. Ley. y Ord.*, Jan.-May 1854, vi. 69; *Mex., Col. Leyes Fund.*, 171-218; *Córtes, Diario Ses.*, 1835-6, ii. 227; 1836, i. 29, 211-13, ii. 111-18, 137-8; *Córtes, Diario Ofc.*, vii. 324, ix. 171, x. 279-83; *Ricero, Mex. en 1842*, 24-5, 119-23; *Bustamante, Mem. Justas Quejias*, 1-8; *Id.*, *Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., ii. 61-76; *Id.*, *Respuesta al Alld Van*, 1-20; *Id.*, *Voz de la Patria*, MS., xi. 1-63, xii. 1-118; *Id.*, *Gabinete Mex.*, MS., i. 1-95, 109-17, ii. 1-46, 158-90, iii. 3-7, 67-81; *Niles' Register*, l. 365, 393, li.-lii. passim, liii. 210, 225, 243, lvi. 323, 338, lvii. 132, lxii. 49-51, 278, lxxviii. 315-16, lxxix. 98, index 'Texas'; *Fúlsola, Mem. Hist. Guer. Tej.*, i. 479-507, ii. 4-6, 26-36, 88-9, 113-20, 135-51, 173-9; *Gonzalez, Hist. Aguascal.*, 117-32; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 169-70, 202-35; *Id.*, *Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 273-336, 427-30, 440-2, 460-3; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1836, Jan.-June 192-4, 234-9, 252-8, 274-6, 289-96, 311-12, 334-65, 427-8, 442-5, 496; 1836, July-Dec., 48, 54, 95-6, 124-46, 271-378; 1837, passim; 1838, 67-73, 88-9, 234-6; *Kennedy's Tex.*, i.-ii. passim; *Santa Anna, Biog. del Genl.*, 29-32; *Revista Esp.*, 20th April, 1836, 782; *Tornel, Nac. Mej.*, 53-5; *Ortega (Núñez), Mem. Relac. Dipl. Mex.*, 83-93; *Rockwell's Span. and Mex. Law*, 489-92; *Mosaico Mex.*, 271, 341, 461; *Suarez, Informe*, 177-89; *Larrainzar, Soconusco*, 102, 168; *Id.*, *Discurso*, 6-10; *Análisis Crít. Constituc.*; *Arroniz, Biog. Mex.*, 68-72; *Mayer's Mex. Azt.*, i. 321-5; *Méx., Reseña Hist. Negoc. Dipl. entre Esp. y Méx.*, 1-140; *Vieyra, El Gob. del Dep^{to} al Públ.*, 1-16; *Méx., Los Males Públ.*; *Represent. Que los Capitulos*, 1-19; *Méx., Manif. Junta Depart. Méx.*, 1-14; *Fonte, Discurso*; *Semblanzas de los Representantes*, 1-46; *Blasco, Discurso Cív.*, 1-8; *Fossey, Méx.*, 358-60, 505-7; *Derecho Intern. Mex.*, 1st pt, 387-414, 658-9, 3d pt, 237; *Gudiño y Gomez, Oracion Patr.*, 13 pp.; *Domenech, Hist. du Mex.*, ii. 156; *Dicc. Univ. Hist. Geog.*, i. 751-2; *Grattan's Civilized America*, ii. 255; *Cutts' Cong. Cal. and N. Mex.*, 9; *Colima, Represent.*, 7; *Caballero, Hist. Alm.*, 13; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 239-40; *Correo Nac.*, Jan. 2-3, 1849; *El Constitucional de Mérida*, Feb. 3, 1838, 1-2; *Constitucional del Istmo*, May 15, 1837; *Pinar Coll., Bolet. del Instit.*, i. 96; *Represent^o que los Vecinos de Ciudad Victoria*, 1-10; *Guerra entre Méx. y los Est. Un.*, 16-17; *Lewenstern, Le Mexique*, 83-91, 423-31; *Memor. Hist.*, Feb. 2, 1848, 3; *Mérida, Exposic. que el Ayunt.*, 1-12; *Méx., Decreto p^a el Arreglo Int^o de los Depart.*, 1-28; *Méx., Mem. Hac.*, 1844, 3-9; 1870, 1033-5; *Id.*, *Mem. Rel. Exter.*, 1838, 1-19; *Id.*,

Supl. Diario Gob. *Ultimatum*, 144-57; *Id.*, *Proyecto Tercera Ley Constit.*, 1-18; *Id.*, *Bas. y Ley. Constit.*, 1837, 1-127; *Miscel. ó Sea Colec.*, no. 2, 20-30; *Nat. Calend.*, 18; *Toluca, La Ciudad y Munic.*; *Andrade, Revol. Comenzada en S. L. Potost.*, 1-76; *Id.*, *Calificacion Legal*, 1-24; *Supl. al Diario Gob. Méx.*, March 31, 1838, 143-57, 220; *Sierra y Rosso, Represent.*; *Vindicacion del Genl. Presidente*, 1-13; *Paymo, Convenc. Méx.*, 6-14; *Id.*, *Cuentas, Gastos, etc.*, 600; *Romero, Mich.*, 151; *Salv.*, *Diario Ofic.*, Jan. 26, 1876, 6; *Zamora, Bibl. de Legisl. Ultramar.*, ii. 277; *Son. Book*, ii. 285-82, 306-10; *Méx.*, *Constitucion*, 1-75; *Enciclop. de los Sans Culottes; Méx.*, *Complemento; Méx.*, *Proyecto Quinta Ley; Méx.*, *Proyecto Séptima Ley; Soc. Méx. Geog. Bol.*, iii. 132, 370-2, vi. 314, vii. 293, viii. 154; *Pinart Coll.*, Doc. no. 503; *Diario Debates 6 Congr.*, iii. 704; *Diario del Imper.*, June 1, 1866, 531; *Disp. Varias*, ii. 81, v. 35; *Álvarez, Manifiesto*, 16-17; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 865-6; *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Méx.*, i. nos 62, 65, 71; *MS.*, i. no. 84; vol. iv. 1-120; *Wappæus, Méx. and Cent. Amer.*, 124; *Young's Hist. Méx.*, 284, 307-10; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xii. 72-182; *Maillard's Hist. Tex.*, passim; *Houston's Letter to Santa Anna; Burke's Texas Almanac*, 1882, passim; *Méx.*, *Mem. Rel. Exter.*, 1840; *Diario Gob. Méx.*, May 20, 1840, 1; *Channing, Carta al Hon. H. Clay*, 1-63; *Kendall's Narr.*, ii. 410-17; *Hunt's Merch. Mag.*, ii. 264-5, iv. 564, xxv. 738-9; *Ward's Méx.*, ii. 588-9; *Jay's Rev. Méx. War*, 11-30, 53-7, 64-5, 87-95; *Mayer's Hist. Méx. War*, i. 43-9; *Houston's Texas*, i. 206-56; *N. Am. Rev.*, xliii. 233-4, 244-57; *Austin, Exposic. sobre Tejas*, 1-32; *Papeles Var.*, cxliiii. pt 19, clxvii. pt 10; *Deveaux' Letters*, passim; *Holley's Texas*, 55-72, 125-362, 393-410; *Jenkins' Méx. War*, 31-43, 52-6; *Edinb. Rev.*, cxlvii. 256-66; *Baker's Hist. Tex.*, 32-71; *Thompson's Recoll. Méx.*, passim; *Newell's Rev. in Tex.*, passim; *Crockett, Life of*, 369-77; *Rev. Amér.*, ii. 583-4; *Willson's Amer. Hist.*, 631-72; *Ramsey's Other Side*, 15-22; *Foote's Texas*, i. 7-26, 41-65, 218-92, ii. passim; *Morphis' Hist. Tex.*, passim; *Reid's Tramp*, 42-52; *Gouge's Fiscal Hist. Tex.*, 1-53; *Thrall's Hist. Tex.*, passim; *Texas Alm.*, 1857-61, 1868-9, 1872, passim; *Swisher's Amer. Sketchbook*, iv. no. 4, 195-227, 237-51, v. no. 5, 259-93, vi. no. 1, 76-81, no. 2, 134-9, no. 3, 214-36, no. 5, 325-45, no. 6, 409-27; *U. S. Com. to Tex. Moffit's Rept*, 1837, in *Thompson's Recoll. Méx.*, 174-5; *Texas, Laws Rep.*, 1838-45, passim; *Jones' Repub. Texas*, 10-94, 129-520; *Edwards' Hist. Tex.*, 14-17, 41-53, 91-110, 177-313; *Br. Quart. Rev.*, lxi. 335-62; *Lester's Houston*, 45-201; *Benton's Thirty Years' View*, ii. 665-76; *Hunt's Address*, passim; *Cong. Debates*, 1835-6, xii. passim; 1836-7, xiii. 360, 524-8, 1010-13, 1137-40, 2010-64; 1837, xiv. 117-52; *Cong. Globe*, 1836-7, 6, 8, app. 225-9; 1837, 5, 9; 1837-8, 12, 25, app. 555; 1838-9, 18, 98-9, 109-10, 219; 1839-40, 274, 281, 541; 1841-2, app. 513; 1842-3, 79, 133, 340; *Texas Col. Doc.*, nos 1-11, 13-15, 17, 29, 33, 46, 48-53, 56-9, 61-2, 64; *Id.*, *MS.*, 10, 18-28, 30-45, 47, 65; *U. S. Govt.*, cong. 22, ses. 1, *Acts and Resol.*, app. 1-24; *Id.*, cong. 23, ses. 1, *Sen. Journ.*, 12-13; *Id.*, cong. 24, ses. 1, *H. Journ.*, 14, 897-8, 1091, 1100-1, 1218-21; *H. Ex. Doc.*, 250, 256, vol. vi.; *Sen. Doc.*, 365, 374, 384, vol. v.; 406, 415-16, 418, vol. vi.; *Id.*, cong. 24, ses. 2, *H. Journ.*, 11-12, 103-6, 290, 457, 492, *H. Ex. Doc.*, 2, 35, 105, 240; *Sen. Doc.* 20, 84, 172; *Id.*, cong. 25, ses. 1, *H. Ex. Doc.*, 40; *Id.*, cong. 25, ses. 2, *H. Ex. Doc.*, 55, 74-5, vol. ii.; 196, 211, vol. iv.; *Sen. Doc.* 50; *Id.*, cong. 27, ses. 2, *H. Ex. Doc.*, 266; *Id.*, cong. 27, ses. 2, *H. Journ.*, index 'Texas'; *Sen. Doc.* 1, vol. i.; *Id.*, cong. 28, ses. 1, *H. Ex. Doc.*, 2, vol. i.; *Sen. Doc.* 351, vol. vi.; *Sen. Journ.* 417, index 'Texas'; *Id.*, cong. 29, ses. 2, *H. Ex. Doc.*, 4.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PASTRY WAR.

1838-1839.

FOREIGN RECLAMATIONS—FRENCH DEMANDS—ULTIMATUM AND BLOCKADE—
FEDERALIST AGITATION—ADMIRAL BAUDIN APPEARS ON THE SCENE—
CONFERENCE AT JALAPA—THE MEXICAN GIBRALTAR—BOMBARDMENT
AND FALL OF SAN JUAN DE ULÚA—MEXICO DECLARES WAR—EXPULSION
OF FRENCHMEN—DESCENT ON VERA CRUZ—SANTA ANNA POSES AS A
HERO AND MARTYR—CRITICAL CONDITION OF THE GOVERNMENT—THE
MINISTRY OF THREE DAYS—SANTA ANNA CALLED TO ASSIST BUSTAMANTE
—ENGLISH MEDIATION—ARRANGEMENT WITH BAUDIN—DISAPPOINTING
RESULT OF THE FRENCH EXPEDITION.

AND now comes the first brush with a foreign power, the penalty of a marked national failing, unfulfilled promises. In course of the ever-increasing number of pronunciamientos, with their attendant wars and outbreaks, foreigners suffered in common with the natives in person and property, with the difference that while the latter cried in vain to a protecting government for relief, the former invoked the aid of ministers and consuls to press for goodly solace. If the diplomatic agent represented a powerful nation, he generally succeeded in obtaining a profusion of—promises; sometimes in the shape of formal assignment of compensation; but the fulfilment was only too frequently thwarted by change of rulers and an empty exchequer.

Prominent among claimants were a number of Frenchmen, with several heavy demands dating from the time the Parian was sacked in 1828, notably one by a baker whose pastry had tempted the mob—a cir-

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cumstance which the bantering Mexicans seized upon to ridicule the whole affair as the pastry claims. In 1827 the French government had formed a provisional agreement with Mexico for a treaty of amity, assuring for its subjects the same guaranties as had been granted to those of favored nations. Steps were taken at different times for the conclusion of the treaty, without effect, mainly because the French objected to submit to forced contributions,¹ and to the option of the Mexican authorities to suspend the privilege of retail trading. Even the provisional convention had not been sanctioned by the congress, and this defect was used by the government as an additional excuse for deferring the subject.

France finally lost patience, and seeing no attempt made even to examine the claims, her representative, Baron Deffaudis, took his departure January 16, 1838, leaving the legation to a chargé d'affaires. At Vera Cruz he received despatches confirming his attitude,² and inducing him to instruct French residents in the country to form an inventory of their effects. The significance of such steps could not be misunderstood, and they were placed beyond all doubt by the arrival of a French squadron under Bazoche, in March, from on board of which Deffaudis dictated an ultimatum,³ demanding the pay-

¹ The leading cases of injury to person and property are given in the ultimatum presented in March 1838. *Blanchard, San Juan de Ulúa*, 229 et seq. Also, with documents and discussion in *Cuevas, Espos. Dif. Francia; Méx., Doc. rel. Ultimat.*, 1-125, etc.; *Pap. Var.*, lxxvii. pt ii. 1-219, cl. pts i-ii.; *Peña y Peña, Práctica Forense*, iv. 1-300.

² He was sailing out of the harbor when the French war vessel entered with the despatches.

³ Dated on board *L'Herminie*, March 21st. It reviews the leading causes for complaint, assassinations, robberies, and other outrages by individuals, mobs, and authorities, and the evasive attitude of the Mexican government, and demands: 1. A payment by May 15th of \$600,000, at Vera Cruz, in settlement of the claims till March 1st. This amount was shown to be merely one half or one third of the sum really due, were accumulated interest added and the host of minor claims of which the minister had not received formal specification. 2. That the government should place no obstacles to the settlement of certain loans, rebate from duty, etc., due to Frenchmen and not included in these claims. 3. That certain Frenchmen unjustly imprisoned should be released, and a number of designated officials concerned in outrages removed. 4. That a perfect reciprocity be observed toward French agents

ment by April 15th of \$600,000 in settlement of the reduced claims without interest, the removal of certain offending officials, and the observance of favorable reciprocity toward French residents, with exemption from forced contributions or any peremptory interference with their retail trading. The government replied on the 25th of March that the national honor could not admit a favorable consideration of the document unless the squadron retired. This dignified though somewhat abrupt answer received the approval of the congress, which that very night met in extraordinary public session to listen with tumultuous disapproval to the ultimatum.⁴ It was not expected that France would be able to carry out her threats in view of the approaching yellow-fever season along the coast and the subsequent northerly winds, which must play havoc with both ships and crews, as indeed they did.⁵

No satisfaction being tendered, Bazoche on April 16th declared diplomatic relations suspended⁶ and the ports under blockade, a measure dictated, he said,

and subjects, on the basis enjoyed by the most favored nation, exacting no forced contributions and excluding no Frenchmen from retail trading without due indemnity. After the frequent remonstrances made, an immediate answer might be demanded, but Deffaudis would wait till April 15th, and if satisfaction was not given he would leave Bazoche commander of the squadron, to carry out the orders he had received, by making reprisal on the maritime sources of revenue. *Blanchard, San Juan de Ulúa*, 229-50. Bustamante ridicules some of the claims made as absurd, laughs at the demand for reciprocity, since the French alone were enjoying the trade and other privileges, and stamps the document as a 'verdadero libelo.' *Gabinete, Mex.*, i. 112. Rivera joins somewhat in this sentiment, but blames the Mexican government for not consenting to a joint commission for arriving at a settlement. *Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 350-1. This view has been accepted by many later Mexican writers, although, like Zamacois, they still object to certain features of the ultimatum.

⁴ After which it was referred to the committee on government. The government had given notice to the chambers already on February 1st of the impending demand. See comments of the press in *Diario Ofc.*, March 27th, etc.

⁵ Also from scurvy. *L'Herminie* alone shows the following progress of the fever. On June 15th, 23 on the sick-list, in July 74, in August 93 to 167, on September 11th, 343, and this out of 500 men! After this came a hurricane which assisted to break the pest, but inflicted damage on the shipping. *Blanchard, San Juan de Ulúa*, 71 et seq.

⁶ Shortly after Señor Garro, the Mexican minister at Paris, received his passports for England, after being refused an audience by the king. *Voto Nac.*, Sept. 25, 1838. Chargé d'affaires De Lisle left Mexico April 23d.

not against the nation, but against the government. This announcement was intended, while soothing the masses, to strengthen the opposition to Bustamante; and not without success, for the federalists grew more confident as they saw the supreme authorities becoming involved. Pronunciamientos increased in every direction, under the wing of Guzman in Michoacan, under Olarte in the mountains of Puebla and adjoining provinces, breaking out with particular force in Tampico, and under Urrea in Sonora and the region southward;⁷ besides which the Texan question came looming up again. Chiapas was threatened with a Guatemalan invasion,⁸ and San Luis Potosí with military mob rule, due partly to an impoverished treasury that could not provide pay for the troops or means to execute the plans of the cabinet. The president had to ask permission to contract fresh loans for meeting the difficulty, and received special powers.⁹ Orders were issued to strengthen the coast defences. Additional troops were levied and several volunteer corps formed,¹⁰ but in so spasmodic and unsatisfactory a manner as to evoke an outcry from several quarters.¹¹ The government aimed rather at securing itself against the federalists and other opponents than at protecting the country. Comandante General Rincon of Vera Cruz, for instance, was directed to strengthen the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa, the so-

⁷ For which see *Hist. North Mex. States*, ii., this series, and *Hist. Cal.*, iii., for the similar movement in California.

⁸ Which went so far at least as to promote a revolution under ex-Governor Gutierrez; but it was defeated. *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, i. 67-8.

⁹ Decrees in *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iii. 512-34. A loan of \$6,000,000 was twice enjoined, and an extra tax of \$4,000,000. Details in *Mex., Mem. Hac.*, 1838, 3 et seq.; *Romero, Mem.*, 181-4, etc.

¹⁰ Some known as *juntas de honor*, others as defenders of the country. Different classes combined into distinct organizations, such as the Commercial Regiment. *Mex., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1839, 36-8, 90-105, 133-4, 161-3; *Arriaga, Recop.*, 1838, 536-9, 551-4. By decree of June 13th, the army was to be raised to 70,000 men. *Id.*, 273-4. See also observations of *Tornel, Carta*, 7-25; *Pap. Var.*, cexix. pt. iv., concerning contract for arms. *Tornel, Manifest.*, 1. A proposal to seize church property was defeated.

¹¹ Carlos Bustamante, member of the *poder conservador*, or supreme council, and professed friend of the president, came out in more than one pamphlet. *Ya es Tiempo*, 1-4; *Males y Males*; also in *Voz de la Patria*, MS., xiv. 203-10.

called Gibraltar of America, defending Vera Cruz harbor, but felt so hampered by the lack of funds that he proposed to resign.¹² Nevertheless he presented a bold front, and Bazoche did not deem it prudent to attack the fortress with his fever-stricken ships.

The blockade, while cutting deep into the custom-house revenue, did not appear to impress the Mexicans, and France felt it necessary to act energetically on the position taken. Deffaudis had gone home to report, and in his place was sent Rear-Admiral Charles Baudin, with several ships to swell the squadron, and with full power to effect a settlement, peaceably or by force. He reached Vera Cruz toward the close of October, and sent at once a commissioner to Mexico requesting an answer to the late ultimatum.¹³ This led to a conference at Jalapa on November 17th between Baudin and Cuevas, minister of foreign affairs. The former insisted on the main points already presented,¹⁴ but while prepared to abate the additional

¹² He had to borrow small sums from the merchants, and supply the lack of troops with local volunteers. See his *Manifesto*, 17, 23, and appendix, supported by Rivera. *Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 356-8, 364, 384.

¹³ The note is dated October 27, 1838, on board the frigate *Néréide*. It protests against the excuse that Mexico is in a state of revolution, and that foreigners choosing to reside there do so at their own risk. Such maxims are at variance with her own desire to be admitted in the sisterhood of civilized nations, and with the provisional agreement of 1827. If a nation cannot maintain order within her territory she must learn to suffer. Foreigners are useful and necessary for Mexico's prosperity and advancement. *Blanchard, San Juan de Ulúa*, 251-9. The note was carried by Captain Leroy.

¹⁴ Baudin's bases were: 3. Confirmation of the convention of 1827 till a regular treaty of amity could be arranged. 4. No reclamations by Mexico for French sequestrations. 5. Payment of \$200,000 to defray the expenses of the expedition. The total \$800,000 had to be paid within 30 days. An additional secret clause demanded that holders of the so-called 17 per cent. loan should be free to present in payment of duty the proportion thereof agreed upon. Articles 1, 2, 4, and part of 3, of former ultimatum, were insisted upon. Cuevas consented to pay, within six months after the date of the convention, \$600,000 in settlement of all pecuniary responsibility prior to March 21, 1833, but required that Mexico should be at liberty to decide upon the punishment of the objectionable officials. The exemption from forced contributions or loans was no longer applicable, for the congress had decided to use no such measures in future. The other points should be submitted to English arbitration. Existing differences being settled by the acceptance of this proposal the French fleet should retire, surrendering the sequestered vessels. Steps would at once be taken to conclude a treaty of amity and commerce, and meanwhile the most favorable reciprocity should prevail. Baudin yielded as

demand for \$200,000 to cover the expenses of his expedition, he could obtain no satisfactory promises regarding the exemption from forced contributions or the enjoyment of retail trade, nor guaranties for the payment of the \$600,000 now conceded, although deferred for six months. He accordingly left Jalapa on the 21st, with the declaration that unless his terms were accepted by noon on the 27th he would then begin hostilities. The congress and people had great confidence in their Gibraltar, which held out so long under Spain, and the hitherto passive operations of the fleet encouraged the general desire for resisting foreign demands which were represented as humiliating. The ignominious failure of the Spanish expedition was still fresh in mind. And so the chambers declared unanimously against yielding.¹⁵ The president issued the usual florid proclamation¹⁶ offering to sacrifice his life in defence of national honor, but failed to exhibit any effective promptness in his measures. General Arista was sent to reënforce Vera Cruz with 1,000 men, who of course arrived on the scene when too late.

regards the punishment of the officials, and even renounced the demand for expenses. Several minor modifications of clauses were admitted on both sides, bearing partly on the convention of 1827. Full text of correspondence and projects may be consulted in *Cuevas, Expos. Dif. Francia*, and in *Pesado, Doc. Conferencias en Jalapa*, Mexico, 1838, 1-56. See also the official French version in *Blanchard, San Juan de Ulúa*, 261-85, 301-5. The fragmentary accounts in *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 377-9, *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, i. 119, etc., followed by Zamacois, either miss or perversely neglect the main points. Additional authorities will be given in a later note. The proposed English arbitration was not entertained, nor had Mexico listened to it when offered shortly before 'porque sabíamos de Londres que nada deberíamos esperar favorable.' *Id.*, 116-18. This writer believes that mediation on the part of Prussia or Russia might have succeeded, for 'it was known' that France would have eagerly accepted a decorous compromise. A strong admission by so rabid a Mexican advocate, in face of the wide charge that Baudin was anxious for naval achievements. *Méx., Mem. Min. Rel.*, 1839, 2 et seq. Interference on the part of the United States was at one time proposed by the Mexican envoy. See also remonstrances by English traders in *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Mex.*, i. pt 129; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 214-15, declares that Cuevas was an obstacle to any arrangement and Bustamante blinded to the state of affairs.

¹⁵ Bustamante asserts that the capital was ripe for revolution against any concession to France. The deputies were threatened with assassination if they yielded. *Ubi sup.*

¹⁶ *Bustamante, A sus Habitantes*, 1-7; *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Mex.*, i. pts 122-3.

Baudin, on the other hand, had not been idle. The anchorage-ground round San Juan de Ulúa had been examined, and observations made for effective cannonading of different points, and under the cover of night boat parties had made soundings beneath the very batteries to perfect the plans for a prospective assault, especially from the reefs of la Gallega, which approach it on the north, hidden by the tide. The fortress covered the whole extent of a small coral islet, the continuation of this reef, and situated half a mile north-east of Vera Cruz, forming the line of shelter for the harbor in this direction. The rather low walls rising from the sea enclosed a slightly irregular parallelogram, with a bastion at each angle, and further relieved at the south-west and south-east points respectively, by a lighthouse of brick and a square tower, Caballero, ninety feet high, of dazzling whiteness, and surmounted by a belvedere whence ships were signalled. The bastions on the north-west were separated by a tide-covered channel with its redoubt from the half-moon line of low batteries infolding that side. The structure looked imposing enough for its name. Unfortunately, it was built of soft madrepore, except the side facing the harbor,¹⁷ and with hardly any casemates to protect the gunners. The artillery was besides of inferior calibre and poorly mounted, and the whole in a state of utter neglect since the Spaniards surrendered the place. The late circumscribed efforts of Rincon to remedy the numerous defects had been superficial, serving mainly to infuse a degree of false confidence. The garrison consisted of about 1,200 men, under General Gaona, the commandant.¹⁸


During the morning of November 27th the anchorage round the fortress presented a most animated ap-

¹⁷ Constructed, it is said, of stones brought from Spain in course of time as ballast. See plan as given in chapter ii.

¹⁸ Rincon placed the condition clearly before the people in his subsequent defence. *Manifesto*, pp. vii.-viii., xxi.-ii., 126, 137, etc.; also *Lanusa, Vindicacion*, 3, etc.; *Pap. Var.*, clxxxix. pt x.; *Blanchard, San Juan de Ulúa*, 294-5; *Farragut, Life*, 134; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 359.

pearance, signals flying, and boats hurrying to and fro with orders among the French squadron, which exhibited a total of 26 vessels, including transports, with about 4,000 men,¹⁹ out of which three frigates, two bomb-ketches, to the north-east and north respectively, and one sloop of war were designated for the first day's fight, employing 104 guns, while several other vessels cruised in different directions, some to observe the effect of the shells and correct the aim by signals.²⁰

The ships were allowed to take up position unmo-



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lested, although a few shots might have disabled the steamers employed for the purpose.²¹ At half-past two

¹⁹ According to the list issued a month later, which does not include the 3 or 4 small vessels seized from the Mexicans prior to November 27th. This list shows 4,318 men.

²⁰ Riucon, *Manifiesto*, p. 1, adds 2 frigates, 2 steamers, and a brig to the active participants, but the official list in *Blanchard* is as above. The celebrated Farragut, who witnessed the operation, praises Baudin for his plan. 'He would be undoubtedly a *rara avis* in any navy. He is about fifty years of age, has lost his right arm, looks like a north Europe man, . . . with the expression of great decision, with firmness and activity to execute his well digested plans.' Letter in *Farragut*, *Life*, 133.

²¹ This was made a charge against Gaona, but he had orders not to begin

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in the afternoon²² they opened fire with a perfect hail of shells and bombs. The former penetrated from twelve to eighteen inches into the soft coral walls, there to explode, "tearing out whole masses of stone, and in some instances rending the wall from base to top."²³ Such results had not even been dreamed of by the astonished garrison; nevertheless they responded with great spirit, and forth over the gleaming water rolled the thunder from a hundred guns, the dense smoke encircling for a while the batteries. It was mainly bluster, however, for neither artillery nor gunners were capable of much precision, while the powder, most miserable stuff, barely brought the heavier balls within reach of the vessels. This lent fresh assurance to the French, who with more and more correct aim added to the execution, silencing one gun after another, and scattering destruction also within the batteries, now among the infantry ranged along the curtains in case of an assault, now among the handful of artillerists. For the first two hours the gaps in the latter ranks were filled, but after this no substitutes could be obtained, and the firing stopped at frequent intervals for lack of men. An hour after the first broadside a bomb struck the magazine of battery San Miguel, which exploded with a terrific detonation, belching forth in a volume of flames, stones, war material, and human remains torn into a thousand fragments. Shortly after the belvedere of the lofty Caballero sprang into the air with its load of soldiers, yet strange to say, the staff which here upheld the flag remained intact, and as the smoke cleared from the mutilated summit, the colors fluttered a defiance to the foe, cheering the brave defenders to fresh efforts. But what availed mere spirit when hands were lacking for the enginery of war which here played

hostilities, and it was expected till the last moment that the government might yield to Baudin. *Rivera, Hist. Sa'apa*, iii. 385. The dispositions of Gaona are given in his report. *Rincon, Manifiesto*, 120-1.

²² A delay beyond the specified noon hour, caused by a letter from Cuevas which contained merely unimportant concessions, such as offering monthly instalments on the \$600,000 payment.

²³ *Farragut*, loc. cit.

the sole role. It was no longer a matter of mere guns; battery after battery grew silent, and before six o'clock almost the whole exterior line had been abandoned, in many cases with the wounded, who could not be carried off under the scathing hail of explosives and debris. Even the interior lines responded feebly, at last with only an occasional sputter, like the gasp of the dying. Most of the ammunition had exploded, and over 200 of the most indispensable men, including four superior officers, had been killed or disabled, leaving the fortress practically defenceless. The sun had set, and soon the gathering gloom interposed between the combatants. The bombardment ceased, and only at intervals for another hour a bomb came crashing in upon the desolation. The French also welcomed the respite, for although not over a dozen of their men had fallen, the vessels had suffered somewhat and needed overhauling. The bustle merely changed in form to active preparations for the morrow, when the battle should begin anew.²⁴

Gaona on his side recognized that he was powerless to continue the struggle. The fortress was no longer tenable; and fearing that the enemy might attempt a descent during the night, he resolved to gain time at least by proposing a suspension of hostilities, under plea of collecting the wounded and burying the dead. At the same time he addressed himself to Rincon for instructions. Fearing the responsibility, this general gave the commission to inspect the fort to Santa Anna, who had hurried from his country seat to offer his services against the invaders. A glance convinced him that to prolong the defence there meant purely a

²⁴ The bulletin at the close of the day admitted only 4 killed and 29 wounded. *Blanchard, San Juan de Ulúa*, 333-7. This speaks of 210 killed among the garrison, and Farragut states that 222 Mexican sailors perished in the outer batteries. *Life*, 130; but Gaona's lists exhibit only 65 slain and 147 wounded. *Rincon, Manifesto*, 124-5; 'Mas de ciento cincuenta heridos y otros tantos muertos,' maintains Bustamante. *Gabinete Mex.*, i. 128. The Mexicans allude vaguely to 40 guns firing against 140 French, while Baudin gives a list of 20 silenced guns, 133 mounted and 54 dismounted, ranging from 8 to 24 in calibre. Of the 104 French guns used, 6 were eighty-pounders and the rest thirty.

sacrifice of life, and the council over which he thereupon presided voted unanimously to capitulate, for Baudin would accord no delay beyond the morning. And so fell the Gibraltar, after a few hours' bombardment. The French took possession at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November 28th, after allowing the garrison to retire with honors of war, and promising to restore the fortress as soon as all differences were adjusted.²⁵ Vera Cruz being now at the mercy of the new holders of Ulúa, Rincon was compelled to enter into a special agreement to reduce the garrison of the port to 1,000 men, and receive back and indemnify expelled Frenchmen, Baudin offering in return to suspend the blockade for eight months.²⁶

At Mexico the news evoked the cry of treason, with a violent denunciation of Bustamante's lack of promptness in consonance with the inspiring sound of war-hymns along the streets. The government found it necessary to follow the current by ignoring the capitulation, and supplementing the act with a declaration of war. An attendant feature was the expulsion of French residents, proposed already in the spring, but now enforced with a certain harshness.²⁷ The president further stilled the outcry

²⁵ The troops agreeing not to serve against France within eight months.

²⁶ The French were allowed to seek fresh provisions. All excess beyond the 1,000 allowed for garrison, had to retire to a distance of ten leagues from the port. Among the reasons for the capitulation were the scanty remnant of ammunition, the lack of artillerists for more than ten guns, the demolition of so many batteries and dismounting of cannon, and the discouragement of the men at the slaughter. Santa Anna had suggested that the fortifications facing Vera Cruz should be blown up, a standing order with the former viceroys, who were also to entrap invaders along the intricate roads to Jalapa or Orizaba. As the French flag rose over Ulúa the English man-of-war joined with the rest in saluting it. Comments, with documents, in *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, i. 125-37; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1839, 3. Both Rincon and Gaona were called to answer for their conduct.

²⁷ They had to leave towns within three days, and the country within fifteen. Those married to Mexicans or disabled, if well behaved, were exempt. Decrees of Dec. 1, 1838. *Id.*, 1838, 539-41. The outcry against so brief a term caused it to be extended to two months, mainly at the intercession of the foreign ministers. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iii. 504-7, 570. Circulars of March 13 had enjoined good treatment of Frenchmen, in view of the popular ferment. *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Mex.*, MS., i. pts 85, 127. Now this feeling had grown so strong that many hastened to leave at once. On Dec. 8th, 223

against himself by appointing the resolute General Paredes minister of war.²⁸ The regular army was ordered to be increased to 33,000 men, with an enrolment of volunteers²⁹ for repelling invasion, and reënforcements were hurried down to the coast, Santa Anna being at the same time charged to replace the disgraced Rincon on the strength of the favorable impression created by his prompt appearance on the scene. This general communicated the declaration of war, and summoning Arista to his aid, they began to prepare for a defence of the plaza of Vera Cruz. Baudin expressed his regrets at the act, and intimated with brusqueness that he could raze the city to the ground in a moment, but he would not retaliate upon an innocent population for the deeds of its government. At the same time he quietly took the resolution to render ineffective the preparations at the port.


Early the following morning, on December 5th, he sent three divisions to the city, with orders for two of them to carry the two forts Santiago and Concepcion, which flanked it on the east and west respectively, spike the guns and otherwise disarm them, while the third division marched to the residence of Santa Anna with the view to capture him. An unusually heavy fog came to assist the movement, and the first divisions were readily enabled to surprise the forts. More difficult was the task of the third, led by Prince de Joinville, a son of the king. He landed on the quay before the central gate and broke it open with a petard, capturing the cannon defending the entrance. The noise warned the sleeping Santa

were leaving the capital, with their wives and nearly 400 attendants, when they were stopped and deprived of their horses. *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, i. 139. See comments on good treatment in *Uuevas, Espos. Dif. Francia*, 15-18; *Pap. Var.*, cl. pt 2; *Méz., Expos. Condic.*, 263-6. Other foreigners suffered somewhat in the excitement, and the Belgian legation was violated. *Diario Gob.*, Dec. 5, 1838.

²⁸ Moran having resigned. A commission came actually to demand that Bustamante should relinquish the presidency.

²⁹ *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1838, 535, 543-4; *Méz., Decreto para Organ.*, 1-7; *Vallejo*, etc.

Anna, who rushed half-clad from his house just in time to escape. Not so the less suspicious Arista, who was caught in his room. The column there-upon turned to disable the defences along the south line, and on arrival of the other parties an attack was made on the barracks of la Merced. Here the scattered Mexicans made a stout resistance and maintained a galling fire on the assailants, who suffered greatly. Baudin coming up declared the movement both costly and needless, and ordered a retreat, for it was not his intention to hold the town.



VERA CRUZ.

Santa Anna, meanwhile, had kept himself at a safe distance, collecting what troops he could and waiting for the summoned force of Arista. Learning of the retrograde march, however, he thought the moment had arrived to share in the credit earned by the defenders of the barracks, by pretending to chase the French. He came up after the greater part had embarked, and made a valiant dash at the few still left. These had taken the precaution to cover the approach with one of the captured cannon, and as he pressed

toward them at the head of his men a charge of grape-shot raked the line, killing two officers and seven soldiers and wounding a large number, among them Santa Anna, who was hit in the left leg and hand, his horse being shot. A few more volleys were exchanged ere the mist hid the departing boats, and shortly after, as it cleared away, Baudin retaliated for his losses by shelling down the troublesome barracks,³⁰ an operation which frightened the inhabitants into abandoning the town. The troops also withdrew from a place now utterly defenceless to the adjoining Pozitos, whither the suffering Santa Anna had been carried.

This general had behaved far worse than the disgraced Rincon, in allowing himself to be so readily surprised by the enemy, keeping carefully in the background during the main fight, and finally evacuating the city; but he possessed one shining quality—a brazen assurance that bordered on genius. He understood the feelings of the masses at this moment; how readily they could with a little bombast be hoodwinked into the belief that he had achieved a gratifying victory—for had not the boats retired! and above all to accept him as a martyred hero bleeding for his country. In order to deepen the impression, he wrote as from his death-bed, relating how he had driven the foe into the sea, with losses reaching far beyond the hundred. "Cast aside discord," he continued, "and unite against the French. As for me, forgive my political errors, and deny me not the only

³⁰ The French exhibit a loss of 8 killed and 60 wounded, which the Mexicans swell into far greater actual loss, while admitting heavy casualties. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 401. It is also stated that Santa Anna was hit by grape-shot from the boats while prancing on the quay. Arista came out with the usual *Manifesto*, 1-10, to explain his capture. He was released on Jan. 27th. Bustamante supports Santa Anna's charge, that the French attacked while negotiations were pending, *Gabinete Mex.*, i. 140; and the latter reply that Santa Anna quietly closed the gates of Vera Cruz on Dec. 4th, ere declaring war, with a view to capture the prince and other officers then on a visit. See also *Fossey, Mex.*, 511; *Bazancourt, Mex.*, 121-2, 131-2. Mexican accounts place the French columns at 1,100-1,500, while Fossey intimates only 550.

title I desire to transmit to my children, that of a true Mexican." The farce succeeded. The one absorbing theme throughout Mexico now became the noble and patriotic Santa Anna. San Jacinto and all the rest were consigned to oblivion beneath the pedestal of the hero. Even more. His leg, amputated at Pozitos, was afterward removed from its resting-place at Manga de Clavo and deposited midst imposing ceremonies at Mexico.³¹

As the abandonment of Vera Cruz became known the discontent burst out anew, directed as before against the government. The cabinet resigned, and Bustamante yielded so far as to offer the interior and foreign portfolios to two well known federalists, Rodriguez Puebla and Gomez Pedraza. They took possession on December 13th, and the very same day, after taking the oath to the existing constitution, they presented a bill to the council for the formation of a consultative body, composed of one deputy from each department, and for the convocation of an assembly to revise the organic law of 1824, the president being meanwhile invested with extraordinary powers. The council rejected the bill; but the ministry had already summoned the chambers for their purpose, and before them they repeated the arguments, encouraged by a large federalist representation in the galleries. The same audience served undoubtedly to impose upon those deputies who would have risen indignantly against the project, and answers were modified to remonstrances against it as ill-timed under the prevailing critical circumstances, with a final determination for

³¹ Under a fine monument. Santa Anna had the weakness to be present on the occasion, in Sept. 1842, to listen to the fulsome eulogy. Specimen in *Sierra y Rosso, Discurso*, 1-8; *Pap. Var.*, xlii. pt iv., xxxviii. pt ix. He also received a cross to commemorate the fight. C. Bustamante, as a good centralist, tells the story with pathetic earnestness. *Gabinete Mex.*, i., 141-5; *Voz de la Patria*, MS., xiv. 210, etc.; but others, at first secretly and later openly, spared not their ridicule, as Villa-Amor, *Biog. Santa Anna*, 17-18, who also declares that the general shrieked greatly, especially during the amputation, which was clumsily performed, for that matter.

the poder conservador to announce the people's will on the subject. The crowd thereupon sallied into the streets, shouting, "Viva la federacion"! Others took up the cry and proceeded to ring the bells, and to release the lately imprisoned federalist conspirators, notably Farías and Father Alpuche, who were conducted in triumph to their residences. Fortunately for peace, the garrison did not join in the outbreak, and the patrols were soon able to restore order, Alpuche returning of his own accord to prison. The movement lacked strength. Bustamante accordingly declined to enter into the views of his cabinet, such as convoking an assembly and taking possession of church property, and accepted the resignation of the members on the 18th. So ended the ministry of three days.³²

It was not easy under the circumstances to prevail upon eligible men to form a new cabinet; finally Gorostiza, famed as dramatic writer, Cortina, Lebrija, and Tornel accepted the portfolios for foreign affairs, finances, interior, and war, respectively.³³ This was on the whole a very desirable combination; but Bustamante personally did not gain by it, for Tornel joined in the pressure to intrust the direction of affairs during the crisis to the firm and popular Santa Anna. Bustamante indeed began to think it well to yield, especially as he would thereby relieve himself of a serious responsibility. He accordingly pretended that the spreading revolt centred at Tampico required his personal attention, and the poder conservador selected

³² An explanation of their motives appeared in *Verdadera Noticia de los Tres Dias de Ministerio Mex.*, 1839, 1-32; and Puebla issued another in *Ministerio de Tres Dias*, admitting that he aimed solely at a change of system. Some little known comments on these are given in *Bustamante, Diario*, MS., xiv. 215-17; *Id.*, *Voz de la Patria*, MS., xiv. 229-40. Satirical observations in *Testamento del Difunto*, 1-12; *Pap. Var.*, lxxvii. pt v.

³³ Gorostiza had been made a member of the government council in February. *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Mex.*, MS., i. pt 81; *Mex., Mem. Min. Int.*, 1833, 2-3. Zamacois, *Hist. Méj.*, xii. 171, names only two ministers, and those wrongly, copying a vague utterance of Bustamante. In March, Pesado replaced Romero in the interior department, but resigned not long after. Tornel was a member of the poder conservador, yet received permission to enter the cabinet.

for provisional president during his absence the maimed hero of Vera Cruz.³⁴

The prospect of again figuring as ruler at the capital, from which he had so long been kept an exile by the fiasco at San Jacinto, did more than all the doctors toward the convalescence of Santa Anna. He transferred the command of the coast to ex-president Victoria and hastened to Mexico, receiving there, on February 17, 1839, an ovation that must have equalled even his egoistic expectations. The most consoling feature was undoubtedly the triumph achieved over the many bitter opponents who had for over two years showered unopposed their abuse and ridicule. The decoration now publicly conferred upon him for driving the French into the sea silenced them for a time at least. Bustamante was wholly eclipsed. He felt not only mortified, but afraid that his ambitious substitute would retain the presidential chair if he once obtained possession; and so he delayed his departure under pretence of perfecting preparations against the French as well as the federalists.³⁵ Santa Anna fully understood feelings so readily suggested by his own scheming nature, and thought it necessary to assure him that he had no designs on the chair. "March at once against the rebels," he added, "or I shall have to go."

The French question had now assumed another phase. The blockade and other disorders attending it were felt especially by the English,³⁶ and Minister

³⁴ By decree of Jan. 33, 1839. *Méz., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1839, 15-16. General Moran, as president of the council, should have taken the place, but he pleaded illness, perhaps advisedly. During the recent crisis Santa Anna was proposed for dictator in case the government should be unable to restore order. *Méz., Dictamen Comis.; Pap. Var.*, xliii. pt iii. 10.

³⁵ Troops and funds were collecting in different quarters, a portion being sent to Vera Cruz under Codallos, who was replaced by Valencia. Santa Anna joined in the contributions offered for defence by conspicuously tendering his estate for mortgage. For donations, see *Méz., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1839, 5-10; *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Méx.*, i. pts 129, 152; *Arriaga, Recop.*, 1839, 204-5, 258. Governor Salonio of Vera Cruz is praised for his energetic aid by Rivera. *Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 364.

³⁶ For extent, stringency, etc., see *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Méx.*, i. pts 126, 129;

Packenham, who arrived about this time, again offered mediation. The first flush of resentment over, the Mexicans began to realize that a continuation of the struggle must prove disadvantageous to themselves, especially with the federalist movement upon them. The French, on their side, were not prepared for deeper entanglement, particularly in face of the concentration of English war vessels, whereof a squadron of thirteen, surpassing their own in strength, had anchored before Vera Cruz.³⁷ Nor did they care to face another summer's ravage of yellow fever on this coast. As victors, in possession of the leading fortress of the republic, and commanding the ports, they could afford to entertain even concessions; and so Baudin admitted the proposal now made, although not till the English had yielded to his scruples by reducing their fleet to an equality with his own.³⁸

After a conference of two days, attended on the part of Mexico by Minister Gorostiza and General Victoria, a treaty and a convention were signed on March 9th, whereby Mexico promised to pay \$600,000 within six months,³⁹ in settlement of French claims prior to November 26, 1838, and accord to French citizens the same privileges as were enjoyed by those of the most favored nation. The restitution of, or indemnity for, captured Mexican vessels and cargoes, and compensation to expelled Frenchmen, were questions referred to a third power.⁴⁰ This being

MS., i. pts 80, 90; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1838, 214, 400, etc.; 1839, 3-11, 34-7; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iii. 482. With observations in *Hansard's Parl. Deb.*, xlv. 722; *Niles' Reg.*, liv. 177, etc.; *Mex., Mem. Guerra*, 1839, 27.

³⁷ At the close of Dec. 1838. It was Admiral Paget's fleet, for the time under Commodore Douglas. List in *Blanchard, San Juan de Ulúa*, 404-5.

³⁸ There was ground for scruples in view of the debates in the parliament at London, hinting at French designs and English honor and interests. See *Hansard's Parl. Deb.*, xlv. 891-910.

³⁹ In three instalments, on Vera Cruz custom-house.

⁴⁰ The treaty, containing 5 articles, establishes perpetual peace; refers to arbitration the indemnity for vessels taken after the fall of Ulúa, and for expelled Frenchmen, as well as for Mexicans injured after Nov. 26, 1838; declares for favorable reciprocity until a treaty of commerce may settle the details, and stipulates that Ulúa shall be restored so soon as the treaty is ratified, which is to be done within 12 days. The convention, in 4 articles, concedes the \$600,000 indemnity; refers to arbitration the question whether

ratified by Santa Anna, San Juan de Ulúa was surrendered on April 7th,⁴¹ and the French fleet retired with a number of old cannon as trophies, leaving the task of conciliation to Baron Alley de Cypres, the new minister, whose tact and discrimination were hardly equal to the occasion. Mexicans sought consolation in abusing a dilatory and inefficient government, and in giving prominence to those who had sustained national honor by a brave though futile resistance. They undoubtedly found a certain relief in considering that France had achieved but a barren triumph; for the loss sustained in trade and influence in Mexico, in outlay for the expedition and injury to her citizens, far outweighed the indemnity obtained.⁴²

Mexican vessels and cargoes taken during the blockade and after shall be regarded as lawful prey or not; promises not to hamper the payment of recognized French claims, not included in the \$600,000 amount. Signed by Gorostiza, Victoria, and Baudin, at Vera Cruz, March 9, 1839. The ratifications are dated at Mexico March 21st, and at Neuilly July 6th. Text in *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iii. 617-19, 692-3; also in *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1839, 95-8; *Méz., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1840, 376-86. Allusions in *Méz., Mem. Rel.*, 1839, 3; *Id.*, 1840; concerning last payment, in *Niles' Reg.*, lvii. 164, 224. Fully 600,000 francs remained unclaimed for years after to prove the excessiveness of the demand, observe the Mexicans. *Cuevas, Espos.*, 48-9; *Payno, Cuentas, Gastos*, 923-4. The most exhaustive work on this episode is *San Juan de Ulúa, ou Relation de l'Expédition Française au Mexique*, by P. Blanchard and A. Dauzats, with notes by Maissin, published by order of the king. Paris, 1839, 4°, 591 pp., with illustrations, mainly by Blanchard, who, assisting also as interpreter, had additional opportunity for gaining information. He accompanied Baudin's representative to Mexico and other places, and used his pen freely in observations on the scenery, the people, and their institutions, all of which serve to add variety and interest to the narrative, the attractive style of which owes much to the revision of Dauzats. The diplomatic features of the case are given special attention in *Méz., Supl. Diario Gob.*, 342 and 95 pp.; *Pap. Var.*, lxxvii. pts 2, 7, clxiv. pt 7; *Méz. Pamphlets*, i. pt 10; with observations in *Maillard's Hist. Tex.*, 132-48; *Arangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 240-3; *Dubois, Méz.*, 115-18; *Domenech, Hist. Méz.*, ii. 159-61; *Girard, Excurs.*, 10-13, etc.; *Larenaudière, Méz. et Guat.*, 241-52; *France and Mexico*, 3-24; *Beaumont, Res. Question Méz.*, 1-41; *Escalera y Llana, Méz. Hist. Descript.*, 55-61.

⁴¹ The chamber of deputies approved the treaty by a vote of 17 against 12, and the senate by 12 against 3. A heavy fire occurred at Vera Cruz shortly before, involving the custom-house.

⁴² A favorable arrangement was effected on behalf of British bondholders. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iii. 624-31; *Niles' Reg.*, lix. 369, lvii. 80. A review of the claims may be consulted in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 37, Ses. 2, H. Ex., 50, pp. 17-26. A steamer line to England was also projected. *Opúsculo de la Verdad*, pp. i.-iv., 1-56; *Pap. Var.*, xix. pt iv. 24, and a colony of negroes and others. *Méz., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1844-46, 532-4, 577-92. Baudin had been induced on Feb. 17th to open to foreign vessels the upper ports on the gulf, then in the hands of federalists. The blockade was

Moreover, she had accepted practically the very terms offered her before the outbreak of hostilities, and now significantly presented under the auspices of a foreign squadron. England availed herself of the opportunity to press her advantages with the republic.

raised on March 9, 1839. For rewards granted to defenders of Vera Cruz and Ulúa, in *Id.*, 1839, 47-9; 1840, 260-1, 769-70. Rincon was acquitted. *Va-Ujo, Col. Doc. Mex.*, MS., ii. pt 287. His defence appears in *Rincon, Manifesto*, pp. i.-lxxviii. 1-141; *Lanuzza, Vindic.*, 1-77. Defence of others in *Orta, Refutacion*, 1-24. A law of 1843 deprived foreigners of the privilege of retail trade. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iv. 571-2. Bustamante began to revive the project for a Spanish-American confederation to resist foreign interference. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 227.

CHAPTER IX.

FEDERALIST AGITATION.

1838-1840.

CHECKED IN THE WEST, THE FEDERALISTS RISE IN THE EAST—TAMPICO TAKES THE LEAD—THE MOVEMENT SPREADS FROM TUXPAN TO THE RIO GRANDE DEL NORTE—DILATORY ACTION OF BUSTAMANTE—SANTA ANNA FIGURES AS REFORMER—HIS ENERGY SAVES THE GOVERNMENT—DEFEAT AND EXECUTION OF MEJÍA—TAMPICO AND TUXPAN CAPITULATE—BUSTAMANTE RESUMES THE PRESIDENCY—YUCATAN SECEDES FROM THE REPUBLIC—REVOLUTION IN TABASCO—ÜRREA'S PRONUNCIAMIENTO AT MEXICO—BOMBARDMENT OF THE PALACE—FAILURE OF THE OUTBREAK—A MONARCHICAL BREEZE.

FREE from foreign complications, the government was permitted to give undivided attention to the federalist uprising, which, under the fostering patronage of the French fleet, had received fresh impulse. Before the autumn of 1838 it was practically confined to Jalisco, and even here the energetic Paredes had followed up his earlier successes against Urrea in Sinaloa, and against Guzman and his allies in the Guadalajara region, by giving the latter a most effective check on February 4, 1839, at the hacienda de Santa Cruz. This not only saved the departmental capital, but reduced the revolution in the west to insignificant proportions.¹ Southward, in Oajaca and Chiapas, slight sympathetic movements had taken place, only to be promptly suppressed. In

¹ Guzman, with his associates Montenegro and Palafox, lost about 100 killed and many prisoners. About the same time Vicente Gonzalcz was defeated with a loss of 90 in an attempt on Toluca. A pronunciamiento at Guadalajara in May was quickly suppressed with aid of Governor Escobedo. *Diario Gob.*, Feb. 12, May 25, 1839, etc.

the latter department the rising was fostered by Guatemala and ex-Governor Gutierrez, who fell in the first and decisive encounter with the government troops.² These successes and the imprisonment at Mexico of Gomez Farías, lately returned from the United States, and his associates Alpuche and others, who were generally looked upon as the heads and secret promoters of the federal agitation, had reassured the government, when in October 1838 a fresh pronunciamento broke out at Tampico,³ whereof the fugitive Urrea from Sonora soon assumed the direction. The commandant Piedras was compelled to leave, and arrangements were made with the French squadron to permit the entrance of vessels.⁴ Owners of cargoes availed themselves of this privilege to introduce goods almost on their own terms, for the leaders were only too eager to procure means for their project, as well as wealth for themselves. Thus fostered and shielded in the rear, the rising speedily extended to below Tuxpan,⁵ and on the other side all over Tamaulipas into San Luis Potosí and Nuevo Leon, whose inhabitants had strong reasons for dissatisfaction with the remote and indifferent central authority. The prolonged stay among them of the unruly army of observation against Texas was especially annoying, the more so since its maintenance devolved chiefly on these provinces.

The government took alarm, and Canalizo was sent in November to reduce Tampico with part of the force raised against the French invaders. On the 30th he


² Under Barberena, in May 1838. The rebels numbered less than 250, and most of the officers fell. *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, i. 67.

³ A captain, Montenegro, taking the lead, in favor of Col. Veramendi's plan. This occurred on October 7th.

⁴ A significant letter from the French admiral to the federalist leader may be consulted in *Niles' Reg.*, lv. 404, and *Vistazo Rápido*, 5-10; *Pap. Var.*, cl. pt. 34. Bustamante comments on the outrageous arrangements made with traders to defraud the national treasury. Of duties estimated at \$400,000 only \$70,000 entered the custom-house coffers. *Gabinete Mex.*, i. 97, 103. The French obtained supplies at least.

⁵ Where the French blockading squadron had had a slight skirmish in July while seizing a vessel.

undertook to carry the place by assault, and managed to gain a strong foothold. Immediately after, however, an explosion occurred, blowing to pieces a number of his men, and a panic ensued, of which the expectant garrison took advantage to regain possession.



TAMPICO CAMPAIGN.

While Canalizo strove to rally his force the federalists sallied in another direction upon his camp, and put to flight the reserve under the inefficient General Cos. The already demoralized main body soon followed the example, and it was only at Altamira, seven leagues

beyond, that Canalizo was able to collect the fugitives, to the number of 700. About 300 had been killed or captured, among the latter Commandant Piedras, who was shot.⁶

The fall of Ulúa and attendant events at Vera Cruz gave fresh impulse to the revolution, partly from the paralyzing effect on the government. The latter prepared, nevertheless, to send a stronger expedition against Tampico under the able Valencia, and ordered reënforcements for Canalizo, so that he might proceed to Matamoros and check the spread of the movement in the north. The reënforcements, under Garay and Lemus, revolted, however, and joining the party recently formed by the Montereian Antonio Canales, they hastened to lay siege to Matamoros, assisted by a corps which had overrun the centre of the department and driven forth Governor Quintero. The garrison at Monclova also rose under Ruiz, on January 15, 1839, but its effort to capture Saltillo and remove the governor, Francisco García Conde, was frustrated by the arrival of aid from Monterey.⁷ Colonel Ampudia had also obtained an advantage which relieved Matamoros, Lemus promising to return to obedience; but no sooner had the colonel turned his back than the latter reconsidered the situation and surprised the poorly defended Monterey, and subsequently, on May 23d, the capital of Coahuila, the governors of both departments having to retire.⁸ By this time attempts had been made to gain for the

⁶ After an outrageous treatment, says Bustamante. *Id.*, *Gabinete Mex.*, i. 101-2. Montenegro who had started the pronunciamiento, was among the fallen. *Diario Gob.*, Dec. 10, 1839, etc. A writer in *Bustamante*, *Diario*, MS., xlv. 35, swells the loss to 500.

⁷ Under Ugartechea, on Jan. 23d. He claimed to have achieved this victory with less than 400 men, capturing 76 and killing 17 out of the attacking force of 600. *Coah.*, *Gaz. Gob.*, Jan. 26, 1839, and other numbers. Tamaulipas had by law to maintain a local force of 1,300 men. *Soc. Mex. Geog. Bolet.*, i. 136-7.

⁸ García was the governor ruling at Monterey; Prieto succeeded him soon after, and the comandancia general formed about this time for Nuevo Leon was soon after filled by J. M. de Ortega. *Ortega*, *Repres.*, 1-2; *Pap. Var.*, exc. pt 6; *Pinart*, *Coll.*, 1839; *Vallejo*, *Col. Doc. Mex.*, i. pt 179; *Méx.*, *Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1839, 129. Ugartechea fell while defending Saltillo.

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movement also the capitals of Durango and San Luis Potosí, but without success.⁹ Farther down on the gulf coast, however, Cos, who had been intrusted with an expedition against Tuxpan, was routed by the federalists under Mejía,¹⁰ who now stood prepared to assume the offensive.

This blow, together with the fear that when the French departed the federalists might descend on Vera Cruz, served to rouse the loitering Bustamante, and he was at last persuaded to start upon his campaign, for which troops were no longer lacking, owing to the enrolment lately made against invasion and the release of the corps of observation against the French. The war feeling being still rife, advantage was taken of it to continue the levy and the formation of volunteer bodies;¹¹ and an effort was made to reorganize the army and to give it a more martial appearance, yet with only partial success, owing to the

⁹ Comandante General Heredia promptly suppressed the outbreak at Durango on May 3d, arresting the leaders, Captain Rosa and others. Ugarte had sought to rise with the garrison of the citadel at San Luis Potosí.

¹⁰ This occurred in March. Santa Anna had proposed Valencia for this expedition, but the president feared to strengthen those whom he regarded as rivals.

¹¹ The departments had also been fired with patriotic zeal, and even the interior Guanajuato and Durango were taking energetic steps to raise men. Instance *Durango, Iniciativa*, 1-10; *Pap. Var.*, clxxx. pt 7. By decree of January 26, 1839, was issued the general annual draft of men for the army. *Méx., Decreto para Reemplazar Ejército*, 1-21; *Méx., Legis.*, 1853, 253-65; and on July 8th one for reorganizing the army, fixed for the time at 12 regiments of permanent infantry, 8 and a fraction of cavalry, both known by numeric order, 3 brigades of artillery, besides 3 companies on foot and 1 on horseback, and a battalion of sappers, the whole to be distributed into 6 divisions. Of active militia there were to be 9 regiments on foot and 6 mounted. The government could appoint the generals of division to control the 7 comandancias generales of the republic. *Méx., Decreto para Organizar Ejército*, 1-7; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1839, 70-7, 162-4. Militia rules in *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1840, 693-9, 619-20. For light cavalry and for the regiment formed by traders, see *Méx., Decreto Regimiento Comercio*, 1-7; *Pap. Var.*, cl. pt 27. Comments on insufficient armament in *Tornel, Carta*, 8-17, 21-5. An order of July 10th regulates the uniforms: the infantry in blue, with collar and facings of different color, according to the regiment; white trousers to take the place of blue with the change of season. The cavalry varied greatly in their uniform. Both were given an enormous shako covered with ornaments. See for decree of May 11, on uniforms, *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Méx.*, MS., ii. pt 191. A military commission was appointed to collect statistics. *Soc. Mex. Geog. Bolet.*, i. 112-13. Undue proportion of officers and regulations for them. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1839, 40-65, 157-8, 225-32, 263-6; *Méx., Estatuto Plana Mayor Ejército*, 1-22; *Pap. Var.*, lxxix. pts 3, 4, cl. pts 30-1, clxxx. pt 8.

chronic lack of funds, which affected armament in quality and sufficiency, and uniforms as to congruity, one common and conspicuous feature of the latter being the national sarape.¹² The reforms effected were mainly due to the energetic Santa Anna, who assumed control as provisional president on March 18, 1839, and manifested his self-will by promptly placing the press under restraint.¹³

Bustamante had marched to San Luis Potosí, and content with the achievement, he remained there revolving what next to do. Encouraged by this inactivity, the enemy emerged from the gulf districts into Puebla under Urrea and Mejía, and proposed to disconcert his plans by threatening the seat of the department and consequently the capital itself, where a large number of adherents stood prepared to rise. Santa Anna saw the danger, and on the strength of a reluctant permission from the council he hastened on April 30th to Puebla, borne in a litter, ordering at the same time the concentration there of available troops. This promptness turned the scale. The city was already in a ferment; within three hours of his arrival a pronunciamiento in favor of federalism would have been made, involving the release of prisoners in the jails and the overthrow of the small garrison. Santa Anna's presence sufficed to awe the factions, and the approach of troops caused them effectually to subside. General Valencia had brought forward the greatest force, and to him were confided 1,600 men and five guns wherewith to face the enemy. They met at Acajete on May 3d, and a fierce battle ensued. The centralists had found time to form in good order, so that when the less strong federalists fell upon them at the break of day they were warmly received.

¹² Löwenstern, *Mex.*, 40-3, 94-101, is severe on the whole system. As for pay, the vouchers were nearly always disposed of at an enormous loss, sometimes as high as 90 per cent, which speculators shared with a corrupt administration.

¹³ Comments hereon in *Diálogo entre Ministro y Consejero*, 1-4. He took the oath by proxy.


Again and again the latter charged with a will that more than once caused their opponents to waver. Valencia proved equal to the emergency, however, and finally, by an unexpected countercharge with his cavalry, he created a disorder which soon developed into flight. A large number of prisoners were taken, and about 600 dead testified to the bitterness of the struggle. Santa Anna came up with reënforcements, too late to be of any service, but the credit of the achievement, which saved the government by effectually crippling the adversary, belongs nevertheless mainly to his prompt and independent action, regardless of a timid council that sought at the last moment to prevent his departure from Mexico.¹⁴ Among the captured was Mejía, whose dash and tactics had maintained the advantage during the earlier part of the battle. "You are to be shot within three hours," said his captor. "Had Santa Anna fallen into my hands, I would have granted him three minutes," replied Mejía with seeming indifference. As he was led forth, he distributed what money he possessed among the men detailed for his execution, and then knelt in pious attitude to receive the volley.¹⁵

Urrea escaped and gained Tampico, which was invested on May 26th by Arista. The place had a garrison of about 800 men, was well fortified and supported by some small gun-boats, so that Urrea, with every confidence in its strength, resolved to intrust the defence to General Escalada, and seek to distract the besiegers by a movement in their rear.

¹⁴ Escalada's roster shows a federal force of 897 men. *Manifiesto*, 45. The total loss on both sides was between 600 and 700. Bustamante intimates that Santa Anna's cavalry came in time to turn the victory. *Gabinete Mex.*, i. 184; *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Mex.*, MS., ii. 183-7.

¹⁵ José Antonio Mejía was a Cuban who came to Mexico in 1823 and proved ever a staunch federalist. His children were educated in the United States, two sons rising to prominent positions under the subsequent federal government. *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Mex.*, MS., ii. pt 437; *Pap. Var.*, cxvii. pt ii. 6, 23. Shot without trial by spiteful Santa Anna, observes Villa Amor, *Biog. Santa Anna*, 19. Rivera states that this general did not come up till after the execution. He praises Mejía's constancy, yet blames him for bringing foreign adventurers into the country. *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 220. Attack of Cortazar for federalist sympathies, in *Mosquito*, May 18, 1839, etc.

No sooner had he departed, however, by slipping through the lines one dark night, than Barbarena, commander of the flotilla, joined Arista.¹⁶ This treachery not only deprived the town of supplies, but exposed it on the most vulnerable side, as was soon made manifest by the fresh impulse given to siege operations. The garrison became disorderly, some proposing to remove the commandant, others beginning to drink and commit outrages. The frightened property holders and merchants now joined in per-



PLAN OF TAMPICO.

suading Escalada to accept a capitulation on June 4th, whereby troops, officials, and citizens were guaranteed the possession of property and position, the military remaining in service of the government.¹⁷

¹⁶ The largest vessel, a goleta, was entrapped by Arista, and the rest had therefore to yield, says Anastasio Bustamante, *Manifiesto*, 20. In *Escalada, Contest.*, 11, only the 'lanchas' are mentioned.

¹⁷ *Escalada, Manifiesto*, 50-1, etc. The English consul arranged the preliminaries. Urrea was included in the capitulation, under certain conditions. The surrendered armament embraced 32 cannon and 640 muskets. The gar-

This ready surrender of the most important harbor on the gulf next to Vera Cruz, with its rich stock of goods, guarded by so large a force, tends to confirm the charge of treason against Escalada. It had the effect of precipitating also the fall of Tuxpan, whither Urrea had betaken himself to weave fresh plans. Foreseeing the inevitable in the concentration of forces against the place, he hastened to enter into an arrangement with Paredes, whereby he was confirmed in his position and honors as general. Santa Anna naturally felt indignant at such terms, and modified them in so far as to order him into exile, under surveillance. While on the way to Vera Cruz, however, he escaped, and disappeared for a time, till the turn of events again brought him to the front.¹⁸

The fall of Tampico was a heavy blow to the federalist cause, now sustained mainly in the north-east. The news arrived there at the same time with the report that García Conde was advancing with a strong force from San Luis Potosí, while Canalizo, reënforced by Quijano, was moving against Monterey. Lemus at once abandoned Saltillo and withdrew toward the Texan border,¹⁹ but was soon after overtaken and captured.²⁰ Canales, who now assumed the undisputed leadership of the party, with the aid of a representative convention, continued the struggle with Indian and

rison is placed by Montoro at 1,000, whereof 300 had been brought by Urrea from Acajete battle-field. This writer declares that Escalada manœuvred the betrayal of the town. 'El tiempo ha descubierto que el fin y objeto de Escalada, fueron traicionar y enriquecerse.' *Contestacion al Itinerario*, 1-24, with documents; *Pap. Var.*, xxxvii. pt 2. Traders had availed themselves of the federalist occupation to introduce a large quantity of goods under very low duties, and the government at first refused to recognize the transactions. *Niles' Reg.*, lvii. 66, 118; *Diario Gob.*, June 20, 1839. An attempted revolt in May 1840 was promptly suppressed. *Id.*, May 21, 1840.

¹⁸ The capitulation took place June 11th. *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Mex.*, MS., i. pt 206. Urrea issued a protest against the infringement of the capitulation. *Protesta*, 1-19; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 243-4.

¹⁹ García Conde entered Saltillo June 21, 1839.

²⁰ Together with his brother, 18 officers, and 2 commissioners who were on the way to ask for Texan aid. This occurred near Rosas at the end of August. Lemus created ill feeling by allowing pillage and levying contributions. *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Mex.*, MS., ii. 203.

Texan aid, and obtained on November 2d so pronounced a triumph over Colonel Pavon²¹ as to alarm the government, the more so as his confederate, Jesus Cárdenas, was laboring in Texas for aid toward the formation of northern Mexican states into a separate republic.²² Arista was sent against him, and before the close of January 1840 he had practically cleared Nuevo Leon of federalists,²³ and two months later he obtained a decisive victory at Morelos,²⁴ obliging Canales to take refuge on the other side of the Rio Grande del Norte. Raids and skirmishes continued, however, till November 1st, when Canales formally submitted to the government.²⁵

This by no means restored tranquillity, for the federalist troubles were followed by raids on the part of the Indians, encouraged lately as allies, and now taking advantage of the growing hostility between Mexico and Texas, and of the comparatively unprotected border and the secure fastnesses beyond. They penetrated even into San Luis Potosí and Zacatecas, and killed during that southerly raid alone about 300 persons, carrying off over 100 women and children.²⁶

²¹ By treachery, says Bustamante, for Pavon had defeated him on the preceding day, and was negotiating for his submission, when Canales fell upon his unguarded men. *Gabinete Mex.*, i. 213.

²² Including the provinces above the south line of Tamaulipas and Sinaloa, except San Luis Potosí. Cárdenas was aiming for the presidency. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 440; *Niles' Reg.*, lviii. 66, 113. Anaya was in the United States agitating for the constitution of 1824.

²³ Canales at first held his ground well, although retreating into Monterey with Arista, but he was out-maneuvred, and suffered also in retiring toward Monclova. Vidaurri was defeated on January 30th, near Pellotes.

²⁴ Canales' second, Zapata, was shot. Fully 200 were killed and 180 captured.

²⁵ Surrendering 700 muskets, 158 barrels of powder, and 4 war vessels. For text of armistice, see *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, ii. 43; *Diario U. S.*, Nov. 18, 1839, etc. Molano had formed a similar agreement on Sept. 24th, near Saltillo. The vessels, with 11 guns, were secured for the Texans. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 465-6; *Pavon, Manif.*, 1-24; *Id., Contest.*, 1-20, relating to his conduct during the campaign. *Nouv. Annales Voy.*, lxxxvii. 137-8.

²⁶ The *Cosmopolita* of Jan. 27, 1841, speaks of a raid to Catorce involving 800 victims. For allusions to the raids, see *Méx., Mem. Guerra*, 1841, 36-9; *Méx., Informe Pesquisidora*, 1874, 63, 82, etc.; *Amada, Garantías*, 3-36; *Arista, Oficio*, 1-46; *Contreras, Garantías*; *Pap. Var.*, xxxviii. pts 1, 6, lxxx. pt 17; *Wilhelm's Eighth U. S. Infantry*, i. 173-4; *Nouv. Annales Voy.*, lxxvii. 119, etc.; *Velasco, Son.*, 263, etc.; *Soc. Mex. Geog. Bolet.*, vii. 293, 321, xi. 98. These raids extended from Tamaulipas to Sonora, and will be

After the victory at Acajete, Santa Anna had made a veritable triumphal entry into Mexico, and each subsequent success added to his laurels. Centralism seemed firmer than ever, and under its wing was drawn from neglect the memory of Iturbide, to be exalted above that of the federalist heroes as the author of independence and as the patron of the ruling party.²⁷ The approaching return of Bustamante and certain aspects of the political horizon induced the wary Santa Anna to retire to his estate on the plea of bad health, leaving the government in charge of Nicolás Bravo, president of the council, who took the oath as substitute president on July 10, 1839. Nine days later the actual president returned to reassume the control. He was received with customary honors, but even among his own party he appeared greatly overshadowed by the clever shams of his predecessor, while opponents proved so merciless in casting ridicule on his dilatory and cautious military march in the north-east departments that he was induced to publish a defence of his conduct, seeking to take as much credit as possible for directing the finally successful movements of Arista and other generals.²⁸ The aging Bustamante was evidently not the dashing cavalry leader of the independence war.

Although hostile demonstrations were rapidly being suppressed in the north and west, the feeling of the people found expression in demands for constitutional

more fully treated in *Hist. North Mex. States*, ii. this series, which covers the history of the frontier provinces. A law to suppress brigandage by direct military interference, issued on March 12, 1840, was aimed also against revolutionists. See comments in *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, ii. 49-54, 105-9.

²⁷ His ashes had been removed from Padilla, in Tamaulipas, and deposited with impressive ceremonies in the cathedral at Mexico on Oct. 27th, the day when the independence was sworn. The ceremony had been proposed for Sept. 27th, the day of Iturbide's entry into Mexico, but the arrangements failed.

²⁸ *Manifiesto*, 1-76, with documents. Even the *Diario Gob.* ventures on June 5th, under Santa Anna's wing, to join in the hooting, although it subsequently modifies the utterance by attributing Bustamante's lack of energy to goodness of heart, which objected to shedding Mexican blood. See also *Testamento del año 1839*, 1-46; *Testamento del Difunt.*, 1-23; *Pap. Var.*, xlii. pts 9°, 9°, cl. pts 23-24.

reform, and the poder conservador declared on November 9th that these could be entertained by the congress even before the time properly designated by the constitution, so long as its cardinal bases were respected. The concession was not deemed sufficient by the federalists, but their opponents prevailed,²⁹ and the government gained renewed confidence, although the frequent ministerial changes continued to stamp its policy as extremely vacillating,³⁰ greatly owing to a jealous fear of Santa Anna.³¹ With the opening of 1840, however, came news of a fresh outbreak,³² this time in Yucatan.

The peninsula had quietly submitted to the overthrow of the federal system in 1834, but when in addition long-conceded privileges were infringed or set aside by the introduction of excise, the increase of custom-house duty, the levy of funds, and the dragging away of local militia to suffer and die in campaigns against friendly Texas,³³ then patience came to

²⁹ See the respective arguments in *Cosmopolita*, Nov. 16, 1839; *Diario Gob.*, Nov. 20, 1839, and other journals; *Méx.*, *Expediente*, 2 et seq.; *Pap. Var.*, xliii. pt v.

³⁰ Between April 1837 and March 1839 there were 12 changes in the ministry of foreign relations alone. Santa Anna made several changes in the interior and finance departments during his short tenure of power, and on July 27th Bustamante renewed the entire cabinet, the later celebrated Almonte assuming the war portfolio on Aug. 9th and retaining it, strangely enough, for two years. *Méx.*, *Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1839, 138, 164-5, 170-1; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1839, 170; *Romero, Mem. Hac.*, 1035-6. An important feature in the treasury department was the organization of a tribunal de cuentas, or auditor's office, in March 1838. *Méx.*, *Col. Leyes*, 1840, 392-424; with comments in *Bustamante, Gabinete Méx.*, MS., iii. 143, 243-8, 253-4, which contains points additional to those in the printed issue. *Id.*, *Voz de la Patria*, MS., xiv. 241-51.

³¹ As instanced in the abrupt dismissal of the war minister Tornel, and his exclusion from the poder conservador. The sarcastic letter of dismissal may be read in English in *Niles' Reg.*, lvii. 19, 150. Consult the protests and reports on the case. *Méx.*, *Dictámen*, 11-19; *Tornel, Expediente*, 3 et seq.; *Id.*, *Carta*, 1-25; *Andrade, Manif.*, pp. i.-xii.; *Pap. Var.*, xliii. pts 3, 9, 10, cxxvi. pts 4-5, clii. pt 18, ccxix. pt 10. The poder conservador consisted at the close of the year of Muzquiz, president, Carlos M. Bustamante, Peña y Peña, Gomez y Anaya, Sanchez de Tagle secretary.

³² Petty ones did also occur, as at Celaya and Tampico, in March and May, but they were promptly suppressed; the former assisting to swell the Michoacan revolutionists with a few men. *Méx.*, *Nem. Guerra*, 1841, 38.

³³ Baquero, *Ensayo*, i. 30, ii. 448 et seq., enters fully into the causes, to which may be added the indifference of Mexico for the peninsula during the French blockade. Rivera attributes too much to the intrigues of office-seekers. *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 244.

an end, and Iman, a militia officer, raised the standard of revolt at Tizimin, in May 1839. After several unsuccessful movements with untrained followers he profited by experience and managed in February of the following year to capture Valladolid. This gave importance to the cause, and Mérida joining, the entire north-eastern part of the peninsula stood for the revolutionists, who now declared the province independent of Mexico until the federal system should be reëstablished. Affairs were restored to the footing of 1834, including the legislature, Governor Cosgaya, and other authorities, and the local constitution of 1825,³⁴ the Indians being besides granted a reduction in ecclesiastic fees as the price of their favor. With increased strength the federalists now drove the government forces into Campeche and laid siege to it, assisted by a flotilla of four vessels, which effectually offset the reënforcements sent from Mexico.³⁵ During a close investment of two months, several commanding points were gained, and the town was reduced to great stress from bombardment and failing supplies and ammunition. The popular feeling growing decidedly hostile, and no prospects appearing of further aid, the commandant, General Rivas Zayas, capitulated on June 6th, and was allowed to depart with his troops for Vera Cruz, leaving the federalists in possession of the whole peninsula, under a newly chosen legislature or congress, which met in August, headed by Santiago Mendez as governor with presidential power.³⁶

³⁴ Iman was proclaimed provisional comandante general, and a governing council assumed charge till Cosgaya entered office. The legislature of 1834 met in the same month of February to give authority to these acts. *Méx., Mem. Guerra*, 1840, 47. During the excitement the American consul at Campeche was killed. *Niles' Register*, lvi. 49, liv. 226, 336.

³⁵ *Barbachano, Mem. Camp.*, 54, etc. They came in an English vessel, to the number of about 600. The federalists had two vessels which captured two others. The direction of the siege had been intrusted to Lt-col Llergo, a recent acquisition but a trained officer, greatly to Iman's discontent.

³⁶ And Miguel Barbachano for vice-governor. Secretaries of war and finance were appointed. The preceding centralist governor was Marcial Guerra. The elections did not pass off without trouble, and partisanship grew loud. *Baqueiro, Ensayo*, i. 33, etc., iii. ap. 19-23; *Los Pueblos*, June 8, 1840 et seq.;

Not content, the victors opened communication with Texas and arranged for aid from its navy,³⁷ with which they thereupon penetrated into Tabasco, where Maldonado and others had for some time sustained the struggle, capturing the capital, San Juan Bautista, on November 19, 1840, and driving out Governor Gutierrez and his forces. Anaya, who had so long labored in the United States for the federal cause, was the leader of the invasion.³⁸ His arrival was not wholly welcome; but a portion of the local revolutionists declared for him, and having with their aid gained the control, he advanced with swelling forces into Chiapas. Here the comandante general Barberena marched against him, however, and inflicted so severe a blow at Comitan, on May 15, 1841, as to utterly disperse his forces with heavy loss.³⁹ Anaya fled to Yucatan, and now a plausible adventurer from Habana, named Sentmanat, whose bravery and magnetism had won the way during the campaign, availed himself of the demoralization to secure the control. Santa Anna entered into negotiations, and in view of the imposing preparations for the Yucatan campaign, the new governor and legislature were prevailed upon to recognize the bases de Tacubaya and its results, in return for several advantageous concessions, with practical autonomy.⁴⁰

Minerva, May 15, 1845. The president of Mexico decreed the closing of the peninsular ports without means to enforce the order. *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1840, 488-9, 619, 770-1; *Pinart, Coll.*, pt 557; *Nouv. Annales Voy.*, lxxxix. 122. The local government issued an explanation of its reasons and aims. *Yuc., Expos. Gob.*, 3-4; *Suarez, Informe*, 8-9; *Ancona, Hist. Yuc.*, iii. 373, etc.

³⁷ This was settled in September by Colonel Peraza, who offered a contribution toward the expenses on the part of Yucatan. *Yoakum's Hist. Texas*, ii. 318-19. The naval expenses were estimated by *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, ii. 63, at \$3,000 a month. *Id.*, MS., ii. 373, etc., with correspondence.

³⁸ He came in three Texan and three Yucatec vessels. *Busto, Estad. Rep.*, iii. pt. i. 215. His ideas had been circulated in a journal started under the title *Progreso*. His appeal to the Tabascans is given in *Anaya, Alorucion*, 1-14. Gutierrez issued a defence of his conduct. *Pap. Var.*, xli. pt 19.

³⁹ Which, according to Barberena, amounted to 205 out of fully 600 men, who with 4 guns held a height near Comitan. He stormed the position, as he reported in *Regenerador de Oax.*, no. 23; *Diario Gob.*, June 3, 1841, etc.; *Méx., Mem. Guerra*, 1841, 40-1. On rewards to Mexicans for service, see *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iii. 731-3.

⁴⁰ This reunion was finally agreed upon April 30, 1842, and the nominal

The success of the Yucatan movement aroused fresh hope among the federalists. General Urrea had been rearrested and placed under restraint at Mexico, yet not in a manner to stop intercourse with his friends. Of this privilege he availed himself to continue his machinations, encouraged greatly by the strain between the executive and the other powers. Several influential people joined in the conspiracy, and two battalions were won, besides a number of officers. Before dawn on the morning of July 15, 1840, some of the latter⁴¹ broke into the old inquisition building and released Urrea, who thereupon placed himself at the head of the movement. With a force of selected men, stripped of their boots, he silently gained the palace and surprised the guard, nearly all asleep. On the upper floor, however, the squad before the president's private apartments, sixteen strong, challenged the intruders. They had come to relieve them, was the answer, and while hesitating they were overpowered, Urrea passing into the inner rooms. The noise had awakened Bustamante, and as the conspirators entered he jumped half-dressed for his sword. "Fear not, general, I am Urrea," said the leader. "Ungrateful rascal," retorted the other, at which the soldiers raised their muskets, but were restrained by the officers.⁴² The president was assured that his person would be respected, but he remained in his rooms a prisoner. General Filisola was also arrested, but Almonte, minister of war, escaped to the citadel, and there made preparations for suppressing the revolt, summoning all the reliable troops in the vicinity of the capital to his aid.

By this time Gomez Farías had been invited to

blockade proclaimed by the republic since Jan. 12, 1841, was raised. *Mex., Mem. Guerra*, 1844, 30-1.

⁴¹ Under leadership of a prominent person who was spending a goodly patrimony in the main effort to gain notoriety. Bustamante proposes to defeat his object by suppressing the name, partly for the sake of his family.

⁴² 'No hagan fuego, que es el segundo del Sr Iturbide,' exclaimed Marron. *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, ii. 63, leaving the impression that those soldiers held that name as a talisman.

accept the leadership and provisional presidency, and with a swelling mob at his heels, filling the air with "viva la federacion!" he proceeded to the palace, as the headquarters of the revolutionists. Messengers were sent in different directions to invite support for the movement, especially to Puebla, where numerous sympathizers existed. The bearer of the despatch to this city was incautious, however, and a suspicious innkeeper of Tescmelucan made him drunk, secured his papers, and hurried to Puebla to warn Governor Codallos, who at once took precautions, and moreover, sent reinforcements to Almonte. Ere these could arrive, a number of adherents had come to increase the government forces under command of Valencia, among them the alumni of the military college, who not without some risk made their way past the federalist files, carbines to the shoulder and dragging their small cannon. The youngest were, much against their demands, assigned to garrison the citadel, while the troops marched forth with four field-pieces to take position⁴³ near the central plaza, where the federalists had occupied not only the palace but all prominent buildings, stationing troops on the roofs and in the spacious towers of the cathedral, and at the approaches. These manœuvres had not been performed without bloodshed. Skirmishing was maintained the whole afternoon, at times with heavy fire, particularly against the palace. As the captive president sat down to dinner, toward six o'clock, a ball crushed through the room, peppering the table with dust and débris. Without betraying the least emotion he continued to serve himself, saying, "I wager our friends do not suppose that we are calmly enjoying our meal." Shortly after another shot struck down by his side the officer charged with his custody.⁴⁴

⁴³ The Augustinian convent was made headquarters.

⁴⁴ Originally a doctor, Bustamante personally attended to him, and afterward he granted him for some time an allowance, for his leg had to be amputated. This officer it was who had prevented the soldiers from shooting him at the time of the arrest.

Early the following morning, July 16th, the contest was resumed. The revolutionists had secured possession of the treasury and made use of it to gain adherents, but the government displayed greater strength and activity than had been expected, and they feared a bitter fight. Intimidation having no effect on the president, who would promise nothing beyond efforts to prevent bloodshed if consistent with honor, it was determined to release him and try negotiations. They demanded a reëstablishment of the constitution of 1824, pending its revision and acceptance by the state legislatures as existing in 1834; the installation of a provisional government, restricted to directing foreign relations, the states being left at liberty to organize their interior administration; and the abolition of excise.⁴⁵ These proposals were not entertained, as may be supposed, and the fight burst forth anew, varied by sallies, pursuits, and siege operations, with great injury to the city, stagnation of trade, and suffering to the inhabitants, of whom a large proportion had to flee from their houses into the suburbs and country. This state of affairs continued for twelve days, at the end of which the plaza especially presented a woe-begone appearance, with business buildings in ruins and the palace disfigured, its rich furniture and even the archives scattered and ruined in barricade service. All this time reinforcements had been received by the government, and larger bodies were on the way under Santa Anna

⁴⁵ Within 8 months, the recent 10 per cent increase on the consumption tax being returned. Four deputies from each state to join in revising the constitution. Among the reforms must be full political liberty of the press. The provisional president to be elected at once by liberal members of congress and military and judicial courts. Military and proprietary civil positions to be respected. Amnesty granted for past political offences. This was signed by Farias as general in chief, Urrea, and a host of followers. The *Monitor* of Vera Cruz, *Cosmopolita*, and *Diario Gob.*, July, 16, 1839, etc., also Aug. 29, contain interesting details on the outbreak. In *Jul.*, *Gaceta*, i. no. 84, is a letter of Bustamante on his conduct as prisoner. Immediately after he issued a proclamation promising to enforce obedience. The other side replied. The text may be consulted in English, in *Caldéron's Life Mex.*, i. 351-4; *Robinson's Mex. and her Mil. Chieftains*, 224 et seq.

and other generals, while the revolutionists began to fail both in number and resources, under the superior advantages of their opponents and the influence of the clergy over the masses.⁴⁶

The struggle was evidently hopeless, and to prolong it might be fatal. Negotiations were accordingly resumed, and on the plea of sparing the capital further injury the government accorded, late on July 26th, a capitulation of the most favorable nature, assuring the revolutionists in the undisturbed enjoyment of their property and positions under the government, with oblivion of past offences.⁴⁷ This leniency was greatly due to Bustamante's jealousy of Santa Anna, lest he should gain not only the credit of restoring order and use it to extend his influence, but improve the occasion to obtain control of affairs. It was even whispered that the arch-schemer had started the movement to this very end. He was promptly ordered to countermarch. The following day the bells rang the signals for peace celebration, and tolled for the death of fallen soldiers and innocent citizens.⁴⁸

The apprehension was not wholly allayed, however,

⁴⁶ The government forces and authorities exerted great influence in the outlying towns, and priests were made to impress the people by making the most of the desecrating occupation of the cathedral, yet the archbishop publicly acknowledged the forbearance of the party.

⁴⁷ Valencia promising to urge the government to promote a reform of the constitution. The capitulating troops had dwindled to 480, their killed numbering about 200, it is said.

⁴⁸ Over 400, if we may believe Bustamante's figures and estimates. *Gabinete Mex.*, ii. 79-80. Others, including Fossey, *Mex.*, 170, an eye-witness, intimates that few soldiers fell, the citizens suffering most, while thieves and murderers availed themselves of the lack of patrol, etc., to perpetrate outrages. He points out that the capitulation did not embrace foreigners, who were thus 'lâchement' abandoned by their comrades to the government's vengeance. Proceedings against them were ordered. See decrees, *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Mex.*, MS., ii. pts 336-7, 362-5, 371. Some troops were also disbanded. *Mex., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1849, 759-61; while honors were showered on Valencia and his men. *Id.*, 762-7. Bustamante being soon after recommended to congress for cross of honor and the title benemérito, which were granted. *Bustamante, Iniciativa*, 1-13; *Mex., Discursos por Presidentes*, 1-12; *Pap. Var.*, clxxi. pt 16, exci. pt 1. Madame Calderon de la Barca, who resided at Mexico during this period, gives some interesting particulars, especially of the suffering inflicted on the people. *Life Mex.*, i. 318-90. Also *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 451-60; *Dispos. Varias*, v. 38-9; *Thompson's Mex.*, 64. In *Rivera, Mex. Pint.*, i. 20-22, etc., are accounts of damage suffered by the palace and other public edifices. *Mex., Mem. Guerra*, 1841, 39-40.

for Farías and Urrea had gone into hiding;⁴⁹ the president revealed his lack of confidence by converting his temporary residence, the Augustinian convent, into a military camp bristling with guns and bayonets; and the ministry threatened to resign. As it was, several changes took place,⁵⁰ partly owing to the failure of the president to obtain extraordinary powers. The need of a firm government became more apparent to suppress lamentable disorders like the one which had just desolated the capital. The federalists would evidently continue to agitate their cause, and even if they triumphed, the centralists promised to strive in the same manner, to the stagnation of trade and industries, the demoralization of society, and general ruin. It occurred therefore to Gutierrez de Estrada, a former minister possessed of great influence, that the evil might be remedied by establishing a monarchy under a foreign prince, and so suppressing the political aspiration and turmoil which appeared to be the root of disorder. There were still adherents enough of the ideas centred in the plan of Iguala and in the Agustín empire to form a respectable party, strengthened by the passive support at least of a large class, especially of property holders and industrial representatives, who naturally longed for any means to secure peace with its attendant blessings. And so Estrada boldly issued in October a pamphlet advocating the scheme, to be referred to a representative convention. But the howl of indignation which it evoked from the two recognized parties, both attacked in their most ardent hopes and principles, silenced the approval that had timidly prepared to manifest itself. The publication was condemned as seditious, and the writer⁵¹ had to hide himself from the fury of the pub-

⁴⁹ The arrest of the latter being ordered. Farías was discovered and exiled to the United States.

⁵⁰ In the interior and foreign department, three men following one another in the former, in course of five months. *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1840, 786, 820, etc.; *Méx., Exped.*, 1-60; *Pap. Var.*, lxxx. pt 5.

⁵¹ Even the printer was arrested. Besides the *Carta* directed to the president, 96 pp., which contains the main scheme, Estrada issued *Algunas Re-*

lic and seize the first opportunity to escape from the country.

Alecciones, 80 pp., to the same end; *Doc. sobre Méx.* Similar advocacy in *Santa Maria, Expos. Protest.*, iv. 1-80. Comments in *Estrada, Lettre*, 1-33. Denunciations appeared in most journals and in *Estrada, Impug.*, 1-37; *Bustamante, El Presidente; Pap. Var.*, xxix. pts 18-19, cvi. pts 2-4, 8; *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Méx.*, ii. 408, etc. Arrangoiz, *Méj.*, ii. 245-6, 254-5; Domenech, *Hist. Méx.*, ii. 167-9; Otero, *Obras*, MS., i. 194, belong to later advocates. Estrada succeeded finally in his plan, as we shall see, and Almonte, now prominent in opposing it, became its firmest supporter.

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CHAPTER X.

BASES OF TACUBAYA.

1841-1842.

MORE TAXES AND LESS REFORM—PAREDES PRONOUNCES AT GUADALAJARA—VALENCIA SECONDS HIM AT THE CAPITAL—SANTA ANNA STEPS FORWARD TO ASSUME THE LEADERSHIP—BASES OF TACUBAYA—FEDERALIST COUNTER-PRONUNCIAMIENTO BY THE PRESIDENT—MEXICO AGAIN BESIEGED—BUSTAMANTE RESIGNS—HIS CHARACTER AND RULE—SANTA ANNA VAULTS INTO THE CHAIR—SMALL CONCESSIONS TO COVER LARGE ENCROACHMENTS AND ABUSES—YUCATAN DEFEATS THE CENTRALIST TROOPS AND OBTAINS PRACTICAL AUTONOMY—SENTMANAT'S INVASION OF TABASCO—MOVEMENTS ALONG THE TEXAN BORDER—CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES AND GROWING BITTERNESS.

THE secession of Yucatan, imitated by Tabasco, the growing hostility of Texas which had actually assumed the offensive against its late mistress, and the dire calamities attending the inroads of Indians in the north, were matters presented in stronger light now that the subsidence of the federalist movement gave the government a respite. Santa Anna had indeed received orders, as guardian of the lower gulf coast, to prepare an expedition against the revolted provinces and fortify Vera Cruz against Texan cruisers; but for this and the other equally pressing needs funds were required. Notwithstanding the cry of stagnation in trade and industries, the revenues had been increasing of late years, but also in greater proportion the expenditures; so that every budget presented a large deficit, calling for extraordinary measures in the shape of loans and fresh taxes. Among the latter figured an increase of fifteen per cent on the

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interior circulation of imports, decreed at the close of 1839. Yet this afforded little relief, for more than half of the custom-house receipts, the main reliance of the central authority, had for years been assigned to repay advances, cover interest on debt, and so forth.¹ The only recourse was therefore to increase the already heavy burden of the people by adding a tax of three per mille on real estate, and a personal monthly contribution of from one rial to two pesos.²

A grumble was to be expected, and it came, but directed mainly against the former increase of fifteen per cent on imports. The representation came from merchants at the capital and from Jalisco, and the government finding it impossible to entertain the request, Comandante General Paredes y Arrillaga of the latter department took the part of the petitioners, and declared to the governor, Escobedo, that troops as well as people manifested an irritation that could be allayed only by reducing taxes. The governor thought it best to yield,³ but congress conceded only an abatement of three per cent on the consumption impost, and so the outcry grew. It found ever fresh ground for complaint, such as the exclusion in 1837 of foreign cotton fabrics, and subsequently a partial exemption in favor of Matamoros, in order to procure money for the northern army, which injured manufacturers while the trade remained unappeased. Further, there were the interminable discussions on the

¹ By arrangement of August 1839 the government could dispose only of 33½ per cent of the Vera Cruz and Tampico receipts, the most important of all, and 50 per cent of the others. The budget of 1841 estimated the revenue at \$12,874,100, less \$4,800,000 of engaged custom-house receipts, and the expenditures at \$21,830,781, whereof \$17,116,878 for military department, leaving a deficit of \$13,762,681. The cost of collection amounted to 18.49 per cent. Echeverría's report, *Méx., Mem. Hac.*, 1841, 3 et seq.; Romero, *Mem.*, 187 et seq.; *Testamento del Difunto 1840*, 1-16; *Pap. Var.*, xlii. pt 9.

² On all able-bodied persons over 18 years of age, and divided in quotas among five classes, according to their means. The respective tax decrees were issued March 11 and April 8, 1841, the latter regulated by ordinance of April 26th, in *Pinar, Coll.*, no. 581.

³ Decreeing that while the congress considered the question, a consumption tax of only seven per cent would be levied in the department, five at Guadalajara and Tepic and two elsewhere; with two per cent on exports. The personal tax was also lowered. Decree of August 4, 1841.

proposed constitutional reforms, without any prospect of speedy result, although congress had been sitting from January till the close of June and met again in July.⁴ The delay being due greatly to the double consideration required by two chambers, some departments began to urge a joint session, while others advocated a special convention for the task; but nothing was done, save to change two of the ministers.⁵

This naturally increased the irritation, and Paredes, who had been merely feeling the public pulse, came out boldly on August 8th with a manifesto, appealing to the nation against an incapable administration which had humiliated Mexico among the nations, imperilled its integrity, allowed it to be ravaged with impunity by Indians, yet burdened it with debts, while the army stood neglected, the people oppressed with taxes, and industries paralyzed. It demanded the convocation of an extraordinary congress to reform the constitution, the executive being meanwhile vested by the poder conservador in a citizen worthy of confidence, with extraordinary power.⁶ The complaint and the demand were just enough, but the latter was but a mask, as usual. It implied a dictatorship in the hands of Santa Anna, for the 'citizen worthy of confidence' could be none other than that arch-intriguer, who had of late been repeatedly lauded by the people.

It must not be supposed, however, that Paredes

⁴ For reforms agitated, consult *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1839, 238-9; 1840, 621-747. Committee reports in *Dictámenes Comis.*, 1-51; *Pap. Var.*, clxxiv. pt 11; *Méx., Proyecto*, 1840, 1-107; *Ramírez, Voto Partic.*, 109-138; *Pap. Var.*, exc. pt 2. Protests and comments in *Tornel, Protest.*; *Méx., Observ.*, 1841, 1-28; *Discurso Sobre*, 1841, 1-60; *Mex. Pamphlets*, i. pt 5; *Pap. Var.*, xliii. pts 1-11, clii. pt xxv. Congress was prorogued on March 30th. *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1841, 23-4, 61. For president's address at its close on June 30th, see *Pap. Var.*, lvi. pt 5. Another trouble was a partial drought in the valley of Mexico.

⁵ For foreign affairs and finances. *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1841, 54; *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, MS., iv. 1-2, 12.

⁶ The actual congress was to meet to aid in this appointment. The new president should summon the constitutional convention, prescribing its election and duration. *Pinart, Coll.*, no. 590. Favorable comments on the plan in *Otero, Ensayo*, 7-19; *Informe Estrad. S. Blas*, 15; *Pap. Var.*, clv. pt 5, clvi. pt 19.


was wholly a tool of the maimed hero, although in secret understanding with him. He stood everywhere esteemed so far as an honorable soldier, energetic, and with scientific tastes, who believed that the country needed a better administration,⁷ and that the energetic Santa Anna could provide it. In order to insure the movement, he installed new ayuntamientos in different towns, left a reliable garrison at Guadalajara, and marched with 700 men by way of Lagos into Guanajuato, where Cortazar, the most influential governor in the republic, stood prepared to coöperate, General Juvera of Querétaro following the example. The government at once sent a body of over 1,000 men against him, but they passed over almost in a body. The far-seeing Santa Anna had ever taken the precaution to treat the soldiers well. Under Bustamante they had suffered comparative neglect, and were therefore readily won by the prospects now held forth. Although loyal assurances reached the government from different quarters, the revolution continued to spread. The citizens and garrison of Vera Cruz and Ulúa pronounced for it on August 25th, declaring for a large reduction in taxes. Other towns followed,⁸ among them Mexico itself, or rather the garrison of the citadel, under Valencia,⁹ who had

⁷Thompson, *Recol. Mex.*, 84-6, and Löwenstern, *Mex.*, 289-90, join in praising him. Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga was born at Mexico in 1797, and figured till 1821 as a royalist officer, rising only to a captaincy. He then joined Iturbide and was rapidly promoted for brave and efficient action. In 1832 he became a general, and in 1841, as a strong centralist, he received command of a division, with the control of Jalisco. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 287; *Robinson's Mex.*, and *her Mil. Chieftains*, 243. In his own declaration to the nation, preceding the plan, with documents, he distinctly points to Santa Anna as the man. *Exposición*, 1-28; *Pap. Var.*, cliv. pt 25. Doc. 5 herein shows that over 2,200 men belonged to Paredes' division, scattered in different places.

⁸Rivera, *Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 495-7, states that Jalapa presented at first a protest and petition rather than a pronunciamiento. Santa Anna was staying here at the time, as comandante general of the province. In June took place a slight outbreak at Orizaba, which Bustamante connects with the present one. The people of San Luis Potosí had attempted to drive out Governor Sepúlveda shortly before. For Guanajuato pronunciamiento, see *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Mex.*, MS., ii. 464.

⁹'De origen muy obscuro,' says Bustamante, *Hist. Sta Anna*, MS., i. 125, adding instances of his low brutality. *Diario*, MS., xlii. 96-7. Charnay, *Cités*, 197-9, speaks of him as a bad debtor.

so ably checked the late outbreak by Urrea and Farías. Assisted by his brother-in-law, Colonel Lombardini, he had no trouble in gaining more than 1,000 men for his plan, who on August 31st declared in favor of Paredes' pronunciamiento, with slight variation,¹⁰ and he began at once to fortify himself at different points in the capital. This success was greatly due



JALISCO.

to the usual lack of energy and foresight on the part of Bustamante, who now too late took precautions for defence, declaring the capital in a state of siege, and conceding a few of the demanded tax reductions. A remonstrance against violence and strife was added by that nonentity, the poder conservador, whose opinions

¹⁰ *Valencia, Manif.*, 1-16, with documents to prove his clear record during the movement.

were generally asked, in accordance with law, but regarded or followed only when convenient.¹¹

Santa Anna had during this occurrence marched to Perote, where in the guise of a mediator he awaited the turn of events, and as such addressed the government. The latter, which had so far affected to regard him as loyal,¹² sent a sharp reprimand for this unauthorized advance, to the neglect of the coast line intrusted to his care. Santa Anna pretended astonishment. He had actually calmed the revolutionary excitement around him, but deemed it his duty to urge a consideration of an evidently wide-spread demand for reform, and would hold the present ministers responsible for any blood spilled in opposing popular rights.¹³ Such dictatorial language from an officer was properly met with dignified severity by Minister Almonte, who nevertheless concluded by accepting the meditation for the sake of the country, in so far as to exhort the risen leaders to submit to the government,¹⁴ promising that all complaints should receive due attention. Santa Anna's reply was to openly adhere, on September 9th, to the plan of Guadajara as modified by Valencia,¹⁵ and then to march to

¹¹ Bustamante indicates two revolutionary manifestations at Mexico in the preceding December and January, *Gabinete Mex.*, ii. 96-7, 100; *Id.*, MS., 1-17, 26-32, 39-41, which should have warned the government. The election of Tornel as mayor had been opposed by the authorities and created discontent. See also *Tornel, Varios Esp.*, 1-22; *Pap. Var.*, xciii. pt 2.

¹² On the ground of certain letters wherein he had lately censured the demand for reduced taxes. The *Diario Gob.*, no. 2276, denies the rumors against his plotting.

¹³ And for any violence against General Paredes 'ú otros gefes beneméritos que se presentan á sostener como aquel, los derechos imprescriptibles de los pueblos.' Letters in *Gabinete Mex.*, ii. 145 et seq.

¹⁴ If the pronounced leaders submitted they would be treated with indulgence, although a military mutiny at a time when the republic stood threatened in the north and south-east merited severe chastisement.

¹⁵ Bustamante must not govern despotically at the head of troops, regardless of law; nor has the poder conservador the right to authorize such attitude. The president, having decided to assume command of the troops in person and decide the question by force, has violated the constitution, and must not resume executive power. No other means of salvation remains for the republic than to sanction the bases proclaimed by Valencia. In transmitting this act to the government, Santa Anna stated that if other chiefs had not already risen in behalf of national rights, the despotic order of the president in declaring Mexico in a state of siege and assuming command of the army would

Puebla, where he entered nine days later, Governor Codallos having withdrawn to assist Bustamante at Mexico. Before the arrival of the reënforcement the increasing desertion and news from the interior had so intimidated the government that it submitted to the poder conservador a plan for peaceable arrangement, in convoking an extraordinary congress of one chamber, specially elected for January 1, 1842, to reform the political organization and choose a ruler; meanwhile the actual congress and all constitutional authorities should subsist, the president accepting as associates Nicolás Bravo and Santa Anna. The poder regarded the project as unconstitutional, but deferred its decision till the aspect of affairs should become more defined.

One reason for the delay was the confidence infused by the arrival of 1,200 loyal troops. Believing that he could now face the enemy, Bustamante, on September 22d, intrusted the presidency to Javier Echeverría, vice-president of the council,¹⁶ left a strong force in the city under Codallos, and moved with the remainder, assisted by General Canalizo, from one point to another in the vicinity, fortifying them, but making no efforts to oppose the hostile forces now marching up from the north and east, although the attempt could well have been made in detail. He probably doubted his soldiers, and the hesitation was not groundless, for the defection continued, Galindo among others passing over to Valencia with

justify any uprising to overthrow an impolitic, arbitrary, and unworthy administration. Comments on Santa Anna's attitude by Álvarez, in *Pap. Var.*, cxvii. pt 2.

¹⁶ During the absence of Bravo, the president. *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1841, 81-2; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, iv. 32. F. J. Echeverría was born at Jalapa in 1797, and followed the vocation of his father as trader. Later he came to Mexico, after serving in the legislature of his state. In 1834, and again in 1838 and 1839, he was called to the ministry of finance. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 238. All this time he retained his interest in the trading firm, and influenced in its favor a number of government contracts. He gained little credit by his public career, but stands prominent as a patron of arts and useful institutions. L. G. Vieyra was governor of Mexico at this time. *Pap. Var.*, xlv. pt 30. The prior claim to the presidency appears to have been held by the absent J. A. Romero.

600 horsemen sent from Morelia to sustain the president. Within the city, however, the fight had begun, and bombs and shells were once more spreading devastation.

Santa Anna occupied Tacubaya on September 25th, and there as general-in-chief reviewed the army, swelled by the forces of Paredes, Cortazar, and others. Three days later was issued the revised political plan known as the Bases of Tacubaya, by which the supreme powers established by the constitution of 1836 were declared removed, except the judiciary. A council composed of two deputies from each department, selected by the general-in-chief from those at Mexico, should choose a provisional president, and summon a congress, to meet within eight months,¹⁷ for the sole purpose of framing a new constitution. The president was to have all the power necessary to reorganize the public administration, assisted by four ministers¹⁸ and a council composed of two persons selected by each department.¹⁹ For this virtual self-election by Santa Anna as dictator he possessed both the influence and power, and under the circumstances a strong rule concentrated in one hand was undoubtedly necessary. The only question was its abuse.

The plan granted the government two days for deciding upon its course,²⁰ during which several schemes were considered, among them the resignation of Bustamante; but this was opposed by the senate.²¹ Al-

¹⁷ The convocation to be issued within two months, and the reunion to follow within the next six months.

¹⁸ For foreign and interior affairs, public instruction and industries, finance, and army and navy.

¹⁹ Till this meets the junta above mentioned should act. The provincial authorities continued in office if in accord with national opinions. This document, in 13 articles or bases, dated September 28, 1841, is signed by a long list of army men, headed by Santa Anna and by Valencia, Paredes, and Gutierrez, generals of the 3d, 1st, and 2d army divisions respectively. *Mex., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 219-26; *Boletín Ofic.*, Sept. 29, Oct. 1, 1841; *Mex., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1841, 82-6, 92-4; *Ramirez, Tehuan. Mem.*, 1-3; English text in *Mex. in 1842*, 25-8; *Robinson's Mex. and her Mil. Chieftains*, 184-7. Otero, *Ensayo*, 22-3, while in favor of Santa Anna shows opposition to the dictatorship.

²⁰ Bustamante and others say three, but not so the documents on the point, in *Santa Anna, Apunt.*, 1842, 1-24.

²¹ The deputies agreeing, however.

monte, the minister of war and virtual ruler, now conceived the idea of declaring in favor of the federal system as a means for preventing the objectionable dictatorship, and above all for circumventing the ambitious Santa Anna. It was believed that the departments would support it with an overwhelming vote, and the capital was known to be strongly in its favor. To this end the minister negotiated for a prolongation of the armistice, and issued commissions to several persons of influence to collect and arm the former militia of the city. Early on the morning of September 30th Bustamante and Canalizo, heading the cavalry and infantry respectively, proclaimed the federation in the great square before a vast crowd, whose jubilant shouts were reëchoed in salvos and pealing of bells;²² but the act, as might have been expected, was not properly sustained by efficient movements; Valencia had besides won over many liberals, and the formidable army at Tacubaya had not been duly taken into account.

Indignant at the counter manœuvre, Santa Anna prepared to renew hostilities, and once again the city was exposed to all the horrors of the Urrea-Farias episode, with destruction of buildings and slaughter of innocent citizens, with robbery and outrages by outlaws, midst the lament of terrified and bereaved families. The fire was sustained not alone by the garrison under Valencia and Bustamante, which occupied different positions within the city, the latter with headquarters at the palace, but by the allied forces now investing the suburbs.²³ Charges, sorties, and skir-

²² Account and text in *Boletín Ofc.*, Oct. 2, 1841. The constitution of 1824 was declared restored, subject to revision, together with the congress, legislatures, and authorities of 1832, including the then provisional president, General Muzquiz. This was signed by the new governor, Ortiz de Zárate, among others. A junta patriótica of the following day added complementary clauses on election and reforms, and Canalizo confirmed them. Santa Anna now sought to win over the poder conservador by pointing out this overthrow of the constitution of 1836, but obtained no reply. *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, MS., iv. 87 et seq.; *Id.*, *Diario*, xliii. 1-147; *Rivero, Méx. en 1842*, 86-94.

²³ And numbering about 8,000. At the opening of the struggle with Valencia, Bustamante had about 2,000 men, with a large proportion of cav-

mishes had been the rule, and on October 3d Bustamante made a formidable though ineffectual attack on a position at Puente de Jamaica, which cost a number of lives. This added to the discouragement imparted by the growing strength of the besiegers, and desertion increased, many believing that any revolution headed by Santa Anna must succeed. Echeverría and two of the ministers had disappeared, leaving Almonte to act for the government, for Bustamante hesitated to resume the control, although widely called upon, and Muzquiz, the summoned federal president, held back. Under such circumstances, Bustamante resolved to spare the city from further useless suffering by evacuating it, which he did on the morning of the 5th, in the direction of Guadalupe. The allies followed, and both sides formed in battle array. Although stronger than his adversary, Santa Anna by no means relished the prospect of a battle. Bustamante on his side doubted the resolution of his men, additionally demoralized by retreat, and so an amicable arrangement was effected, by which the government troops passed over to the allies, all past differences being buried.²⁴

Bustamante departed for Europe, attended by the respect of all parties for his frank and kind-hearted character and his unselfish and honorable record as a public man. He was a brave soldier, however, rather than a statesman, somewhat slow of reflection, vacillating, and devoid of moral energy, and as such unfit above all to assume the administration under the trying circumstances opening before him in 1837, along a new path, under a new constitution forced upon the

alry, while the other had 1,200, and most of the artillery. Madame Calderon de la Barca, *Life in Mex.*, ii. 224 et seq., gives some interesting experience during this period.

²⁴ The proposed constitutional congress should alone pass judgment on the acts of the late and the future administrations. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iv. 32-4; *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Mex.*, MS., ii. pt 464. The act is dated at Estanzuela, Oct. 6th. On the day Santa Anna approached Tacubaya, Bustamante had sought in vain to effect an arrangement with Paredes and Cortazar.

country by a party with which the people at large were not in sympathy. With undefined ideas and scanty means he had started upon the experimental course, trusting to fortune and bad advisers, and neglecting the lessons taught by experience. Active and passive opposition encountered him on every side, based partly on stagnated resources, and breaking out in pronunciamientos, which, added to the French fiasco, the secession of Yucatan, the insolence of Texas, and Indian border raids, left his administration in no enviable plight.²⁵

On October 7th Santa Anna made his triumphal entry into Mexico, and was declared provisional president.²⁶ Two days later he assumed control of affairs, forming a new cabinet, composed of Gomez Pedraza, Crispiniano del Castillo, Ignacio Trigueros, and General Tornel.²⁷ Popular approval naturally followed the winning side, but any change was now welcomed as an improvement, and the hero of Vera Cruz seemed the most promising man for the occasion. A specta-

²⁵ He returned after the fall of Santa Anna in 1844, and we shall again meet him in public life. He had been decorated while president, and received the coveted title *benemérito de la patria*. *A. Bustamante, Decretos*, 1-4; *Id., Iniciativa*, 1-13; *Pap. Var.*, lvi. pt 5, clxxx. pt 14, cxci. pt 1. Madame Calderon comments on his frank, honest, unheroic face, and his qualities as subordinate, rather than leader. *Life in Mex.*, i. 96-7. Löwenstern attributes his errors to frank reliance on friends. *Mex.*, 234-5. Thompson lauds the unselfishness shown in his poverty. *Recoll. Mex.*, 87. 'De manos puras y de corazon inocente,' adds Bustamante. *Apuntes Hist. Santa Anna*, 23.

²⁶ Tornel signs the decree as president of the body. *Mex., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1841, 93-4.

²⁷ For interior and foreign relations, public instruction and industries, finance, and army and navy, respectively. Pedraza had figured in 1838 as minister for foreign affairs, and Tornel, the well known supporter of his chief, had been repeatedly war minister, and also in charge of the finances. Garcia, ex-governor of Zacatecas, had been selected for finances, but declined, and Dufío took charge till Trigueros, a Vera Cruz merchant, entered in November. About the same time the able Bocanegra left the supreme court and took Pedraza's place, Castillo assuming control of the judicial and ecclesiastical branch. The latter was replaced by Pedro Velez in February 1842. Thompson, *Recoll. Mex.*, 82-4, speaks highly of Bocanegra, Trigueros, and Tornel, the latter known as a patron of learning. Pedraza is alluded to as a haughty, disagreeable man, with whom Santa Anna quarrelled on a slight pretext. *Bustamante, Diario*, MS., xliii. 258-9; *Id., Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., ii. 153, concerning Trigueros' career. Almonte was quieted with the mission to the United States.

tor could not fail to be impressed by his tall, graceful figure, with its small oval face stamped by thought and energy, and with the closely set eyes, brilliantly reflecting an impulsive nature and a talented mind. A sprinkling of gray in the black hair added dignity, and the dark, bilious complexion, with its striking expression of anxious melancholy hovering round the mouth when in repose, generally brightened during conversation into sympathizing affability and winning smiles. When giving command the voice assumed a well balanced, dictatorial tone, which was effectively imposing, and when roused his face changed into repelling fierceness. The arbitrary power accorded to him by the bases of Tacubaya in self-election,²⁸ control of convocation for a congress, and subordination of the council of state, opened the eyes of opponents still doubtful as to the drift of the revolution, and protests began to flow in, notably from Jalisco, Aguascalientes, Guanajuato, San Luis Potosí, and from Bravo,²⁹ in the name of the southern provinces, supplemented by a federal pronunciamiento in Guadalajara and Durango, here by Urrea. But Santa Anna was prepared. He had foreseen some such difficulty, and hastened to despatch Paredes against the federalists, with an army greatly swelled by impressment, while sending commissioners to win others by promises and intrigues. The mere news of Bustamante's overthrow, his own successful assumption of power, and the prompt advance of a strong force sufficed to bring about a prudent reaction. Guadalajara announced its submission, the central protesting body at Querétaro dissolved, Álvarez yielded on the condition of being left in charge

²⁸ He was elected by 39 out of 44 votes, the departments being by no means fully or properly represented.

²⁹ His proclamation in *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Mex.*, MS., ii. pt 404, 15-17. Notices were sent to deny it, as in *Voto de Son.*, Dec. 20, 1841. General Álvarez sustained him. *Manif.*, 57, etc.; *Pap. Var.*, clxxxvi. pt 2. Argument against, in *Quejas de los Mex.*, 1-8; *Mex. Pamphlets*, i. pt 9. The protesting provinces demanded that a junta, convoked at Querétaro by Paredes, should choose the provisional president and define his power, and that a congress, to be immediately summoned, should elect a proprietary executive and frame a constitution.

of the southern coast, Bravo had to acquiesce, and Urrea was bribed with the comandancia general of Sonora, whereupon Santa Anna, now firmer than ever in power, generously issued a general amnesty.³⁰

Reforms became now the order of the day, from the nature of the energetic man in control as well as from a politic desire to conciliate parties and remedy glaring defects. The first step was naturally to gratify the army, and so bind closer to the administration its main support, while preparing also a necessary check on the movements of Yucatan and Texas, the latter marked this time by an invasion of New Mexico under McLeod and Cooke, but promptly defeated by General Armijo.³¹ Several new regiments were formed, notably the grenadier guard, under stringent drafting resolutions, and with determined efforts to dress, arm, and maintain them.³² For this and other purposes a depleted treasury had to be filled, and with fresh taxes. But it was not deemed prudent to startle the people by any sudden or heavy contributions from the fondled vision of lighter burdens and rising prosperity. They were still lulled by the removal of the fifteen per cent consumption tax, and a modification of the three per mille impost on estates, while a parade was made of economy by reducing the assignment to home creditors³³ by putting off the

³⁰ *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Mex.*, MS., ii. pt 466. Aguascalientes was made a comandancia general. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, iv. 89. Alvarez was promoted to a division.

³¹ The Texans, including many U. S. men, being sent to languish in captivity at Perote and other places. A full account of this interesting episode is given in *Hist. Arizona and New Mexico*, this series, based on original sources, as well as on works like *Kendall's Narr. Santa Fé Exped.*, i.-ii.

³² *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1841, 159-61, 188-9. The movements of the officers were subjected to closer control. *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Mex.*, MS., ii. pt 463; *Bustamante, Diario*, MS., xlv. 3. Charges arose against Arista and others in connection with army contracts. *La Minerva*, Mar. 25, 1845. During 1840 several decrees appeared for organizing the militia. *Méx., Decreto Milicia*, 1-4; *Pap. Var.*, liv. pt 12, clii. pt 5, 11, clxxx. pt 11; *Méx., Mem. Guerra*, 1841, 1842.

³³ Of the 8, 10, 12, 15, and 17 per cent assigned on custom-house receipts. The holders raised such an outcry against a contemplated total suspension that half the amount was allowed, and subsequently the arrangement of 1836, with different modifications.

English bondholders, who were finally appeased with a small concession,³⁴ by resuming the management of the tobacco department, and by other measures. In April of the following year, however, several direct contributions were imposed on industries, on articles of luxury, and on incomes, together with a capitation tax.³⁵ Meanwhile, to cover immediate and additional needs, the archbishop was obliged to provide \$200,000, surrender the inquisition building, and witness the sale of a fine estate formerly belonging to the Jesuits,³⁶ and subsequently the seizure of the California pious fund.³⁷ And so the clergy had to pay for their share in the revolution.

A part of the sums thus obtained were appropriated for redeeming the copper money, about fourteen millions, mostly false, which circulated at half its face value, to the prejudice especially of the poor. The new coin, worth an eighth of a rial and weighing half an ounce,³⁸ proved a great relief; but the abrupt manner of calling in the old money caused great mischief.³⁹ Santa Anna took special pains to remove

³⁴ Lizardi & Co. arranged at first for allowing them one fifth of the receipts at Vera Cruz and Tampico custom-houses, they surrendering half of the four years' interest due; but this not being allowed by the government, the latter, on October 10, 1842, assigned $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent added to the duties at these ports.

³⁵ The latter one rial per month, the income tax from $\frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. Also 15 per cent on legacies to corporations. *Méx., Mem. Hac.*, 1841, 1842; *Romero, Mem.*, 215 et seq.

³⁶ That known as La Compañía, near Chalco. The \$200,000 were in response to \$300,000 demanded. Bustamante, *Gabinete Méx.*, ii. 122-5; *Apuntes, Santa-Anna*, 15-17, at this time made a vain appeal for restoring the Jesuits. Other petitions in *Mendizábal, Repres.*, 1-26; *Pap. Var.*, clxxi. pt 14; *Méx., Doc. y Obras sobre Jesuitas*, 1-8, on a proposed issue of Jesuit documents.

³⁷ Serving to sustain its missionary and clergy. The government for a while allowed an equivalent. See *Hist. Cal.*, iv., this series. A decree of October 13th forbade the sale of mortmain property without government permission. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, iv. 35-6. The bishops and orders were besides obliged to accept drafts for different amounts. *Bustamante, Apuntes Santa-Anna*, 47-8. Valencia was rewarded by the grant of seized property and the management of the pious fund. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 245.

³⁸ Bearing on the face a figure of liberty and on the reverse a civic crown with the value mark in the centre and round it the words *República Mexicana*.

³⁹ The decree, dated Nov. 4, 1841, forbade the circulation of the old money after 30 days in the department of Mexico, and after 60 days elsewhere, yet offered the new coin only six months after the surrender of the other. *Le-*

vestiges of the late conflicts in the city, rebuilding the plaza Volador, and causing the erection of a new theatre to bear his name. He must also be credited with having fostered education, trade, and industries in several directions, establishing mercantile tribunals and juntas de fomento for general development in departmental capitals and ports,⁴⁰ reinstalling the old mining tribunal and forming a legislative junta to edit the code. A contract was entered into to open the Tehuantepec Isthmus for interoceanic traffic, although nothing came of it;⁴¹ steps were taken to plant European colonies in Tamaulipas, with little success;⁴² and Mexican territory was swelled by the incorporation of Soconusco, a province formerly belonging to Chiapas, but which, refusing to join her when she separated from Guatemala to become part of the newly formed Mexican republic, had maintained independence of both neighbors. Aggressive

brija y Barrera, Cobre Tabac. Prest., several pamphlets. *Pap. Var.*, cliv. pts 1-10.

⁴⁰ Supported by one eighth per cent on consumption duties and other contributions. Regulations of Nov. 15th, in *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1841, 119-25. Otero, *Obras*, MS., ii. 7-12, has some excellent observations on efforts for development in Mexico. A proposed bribe by merchants of \$700,000 for the free introduction of spun thread, though tempting to a poor government, was rejected in the interest of manufactures. Comments in *Verdadera d la Falsa Opinion*, 1-15; *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, MS., iv. 16-17. Information on schools of agriculture, mining, etc., in *Baranda, Dec. Escuelas*, 1-12; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iv. 514-31; *Méx., Junta Minería*, 1-12. On the Volador rebuilding, in *Méx., Ayunt. Expos. Plaza Volador; Pap. Var.*, clv. pt 14. In course of 1843 the famous Parian bazaar, chiefly occupied by mercers, at an annual rental to the municipality of \$30,000, was demolished for the sake of embellishing the plaza. Petition against the decree in *Méx., Expos.*, 1-16; *Pap. Var.*, lxxxiii. pt 11. Losses to merchants specified in *Lista de Daños del Parian, 1845*, MS., 1-7; *Doc. Hist. Mex.*, pt 12.

⁴¹ With Garay, agent for Englishmen, who again transferred the charter to Americans. Contract in *Diario Gob.*, March 4, 1842. Details of plan, survey, etc., in *Garay, Isth. Tehuan.*, 1-188. The later claims of the grantees were ignored. *Tehuan., Dictamen Comis.*, 1851, 1-51; *Tehuan., Mem. Derechos*, 1852, 1-28; *Garay, Privileg.*, 1-23; *Manero, Not. Hist. Com.*, 51-6; *Ramirez, Mem. Diferenc.*, 1-108. The interoceanic question will be treated in another place.

⁴² Which brought about also the permission for foreigners to hold real estate, although not without protests. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iv. 465, 620-1. Outlines of colonization plans in *Willie, Not. Hac.*, 53-7, ap. 14-28. Bustamante objects. *Diario*, MS., xlv. 51. Rivero compares the value of different nationalities for Mexico, and finds all lacking in sympathy. *Méx. en 1842*, 240-1.

acts on the part of Guatemala roused the agitation of a party, which encouraged Mexican troops to enter and take possession in August 1842.⁴³

On the other hand appeared a series of unfortunate events and despotic acts that far outweighed the benefits conferred. Early spring frosts inflicted great injury on the crops round the capital, and the flight of laborers before the severe conscription law added to the scarcity. The usual indulgence in pronunciamientos and outbreaks rippled the political surface and spread their evil in different sections. Sonora was stirred by civil war, waged against Comandante General Urrea by Gándara, a native aspirant for power.⁴⁴ Lower California had a similar lighter experience, and the provinces eastward suffered from the usual bloody raids of wild Indians;⁴⁵ while the mountaineers of the Chilapa region rose against the government, and encouraged by the sheltering ranges and several military successes, they promoted an extensive if not very strong movement all along the Mescal into Puebla and Oajaca, which continued throughout this and the following years.⁴⁶

⁴³ And by decree of Sept. 11th the territory was attached to Chiapas. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iv. 262-3; *Diario Gob.*, Aug. 31, 1842, Feb. 8, 1843. Larrainzar, *Soconusco, Méx.*, 1843, 1-194, reviews the question at length in favor of Mexico; also in *Soc. Mex. Geog., Bol.*, iii. 124-68, 392, etc., while more or less contrary arguments may be found in *Bustamante, Diario*, MS., xlv. 119, 205; *Gac. Oñc.*, Oct. 18, Dec. 24, 1842; *Méx., Mem. Rel.*, 1844, 3.

⁴⁴ As will be related in *Hist. North Mex. States*, ii., this series.

⁴⁵ A treaty was celebrated with the Comanches on January 31, 1843, to be broken by the Indians at the first promising opportunity, as so many previous arrangements had been. *Siglo XIX.*, Mar. 6, 1842, etc.

⁴⁶ The cause lay in certain acts of injustice by proprietors and judges. *Diario Gob.*, ap. 28, 1842, etc. In *Méx., Mem. Guerra*, 1844, 54-9, the government course is naturally upheld and victories spoken of involving as many as 230 Indians killed; yet the war continued. The comandante general Alvarez was known to be hostile to Santa Anna, who dared not do aught than dissimulate; and he was supposed to be secretly in sympathy with the rebels. His elaborate *Manifiesto* of 1845, 1-180, does not wholly clear him. There was an agitation at this time to erect this region, the former Tecpan, into a separate department, *Bravo and Alvarez, Manif.*, 1-35; *Pap. Var.*, lxxxii. pt 7, cxxii. pt 2, and to establish two presidios, at Chilpancingo and Cuernavaca, to protect the route from Acapulco against robbers. *Méx., Col. Lry.*, May 1854, 14-20.

A more serious affair was the now pronounced segregation of Yucatan. She had in March 1841 adopted a new constitution, a revision of the federal law of 1825, a newly elected congress had been installed, and a declaration of independence had actually passed the lower chamber, although the governor induced the senate to table it.⁴⁷ Santa Anna was determined to continue the preparations for reconquest which he had diverted for the overthrow of Bustamante. Meanwhile he commissioned the Yucatec lawyer, Quintana Roo,⁴⁸ to seek a peaceful settlement; but relying on its late successes, the peninsula would yield only in so far as to remain nominally a part of Mexico, with her own present laws and management of finances and custom-houses, subject to her own civil and military rulers, and contributing to the republic only a fair sum based on true resources and requirements. Any disposition encroaching hereupon could be entertained only from a free and popularly elected congress.⁴⁹ These terms roused the indignation of the Mexican government, which declared that the bases of Tacubaya must be admitted as a primary condition, and that all Yucatecs who failed to submit to the laws of the republic would be treated as foes.⁵⁰

The peninsular authorities proving equally obdurate, a part of the projected expedition, 1,500 strong, left Vera Cruz in August under Morales, and after a slight skirmish took possession of the Isla del Cármen presidio and the entire Yucatec navy of three vessels. With the aid of 2,700 additional men, under

⁴⁷ Barbachano and Peraza were the main promoters of independence. A flag was designed with four vertical stripes of green, red, white, and red, the former bearing five stars, representing the departments of the new state; the red stripes were narrower than the others. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 244.

⁴⁸ Famed as a writer, and whose wife achieved celebrity by eloping to share his hardships during the war of independence.

⁴⁹ To which representatives would go from Yucatan. This was signed on Dec. 28, 1841. *Yuc., Manif. Gob.*, 1841, 18 et seq.; *Baqueiro, Ensayo Yuc.*, iii. ap. 33 et seq.; *Yuc., Expos. Gob.*, 1841, 4-5.

⁵⁰ Yet offering to leave undisturbed its officials and troops, and also the tariff till it could be revised for the whole republic. *Méx., Mem. Rel.*, 1844, 47-8; *Buenrostro, Hist. Prim. Cong.*, pts 52-5, 153 et seq. The new commissioner arrived with these proposals in May 1842.

Miñon, Champoton and Lerma were occupied, and siege was laid to Campeche. This proved ineffectual against the able resistance offered, and Santa Anna, in January 1843, intrusted the management of the campaign to Peña y Barragan with forces now amounting to 4,500 men. He sought to divert the attention of Llergo, his chief opponent, by carrying the war into the region of Mérida, but displayed such lack of energy and skill that Ampudia was sent with 800 additional men to assume the control. He arrived off Campeche in April, just in time to hear that Peña



YUCATAN.

had capitulated with the flower of the army, and was about to embark for Vera Cruz and Tampico. The Mexicans had suffered greatly from the climate on this low and heated coast, and Ampudia recognized that he could achieve nothing with the reduced force at his command. Nevertheless he made so efficient a demonstration before the still besieged Campeche, as to impress the Yucatecs with the danger and cost of rejecting peace proposals now again tendered. An armistice was agreed upon, and commissioners pro-

ceeded to Mexico to arrange the terms. After considerable trouble, involving temporary suspension of negotiations, a treaty was framed on December 14, 1843, whereby Yucatan recognized the government and constitution of the republic, with representation in congress, but was allowed to administer its own affairs, retain its officials and actual military force, exempt from furnishing any contingent of men, save for the fleet,⁵¹ manage its finances, and dispose of the revenue, forming its own tariffs.⁵² And so the costly efforts of Mexico were in vain; for Yucatan achieved all she had really aimed at, chiefly with the aid of her climate and Mexican military blunders. Santa Anna sought in the following year to encroach on the tariff clause of the treaty, and remonstrances proving vain, the province again resolved to ignore the supreme government; but the latter becoming involved with the United States, it had to yield and confirm the treaty.⁵³

⁵¹ The Mexicans keeping a force only at the naval arsenal of Cármen and in case of foreign war. The president has the prerogative in episcopal patronage, and in selecting the superior financial officer from the trio nominated by Yucatan.

⁵² So that foreign goods sent from Yucatan to Mexico had to be subjected to the tariffs of the republic. Trade between the two was subject to the respective tariffs. Favors to any department to be shared by Yucatan, unless purely local. This treaty was signed at Mexico by Tornel, minister of war, and commissioners Pinelo, Rejon, and Castillo. Text in *Yuc., Tratado*, 1845, 1-8; *Baqueiro, Ensayo Yuc.*, iii. 64. The latter provides, indeed, the most acceptable account of the campaign, followed in the main by Ancona, *Hist. Yuc.*, iii. 383 et seq., and others. The version in *Barbacheno, Mem. Camp.*, 59-67, touches mainly Campeche. The original decrees, reports, etc., thereon are given in *Yuc., Expos.*, 1, etc.; *Yuc., Manif. Gob. Provin.*, 1-76; *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Mex.*, MS., ii. pt 454; *Buenrostro, Hist. Prim. Cong.*, pts lii.-v. 153-255; *Méx., Mem. Guerra*, 1844, 4, 11-30; *Id., Mem. Rel.*, 40-9; *Diario Gob.*, Mar. 19, Nov. 9, Dec. 21, 1842; Jan. 1, Mar. 16, 31, Apr. 20, 1843, etc.; *Duende*, Apr. 11, 1843, etc.; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iv. 406, 505-7, 675-8. Account of damage caused by the invasion is commented upon in *Yuc., Mem.*, 1846, Apr. 26. Cármen Island presidio is described in *Soc. Mex. Geog., Bolet.*, iii. 455-69. The Mexican version of the war is given in *Bustamante, Diario*, MS., xliii. 291-2; xlv. 109, xlv. 213, 277; xlii. 37, 211-13, 231, 235; *Id., Apuntes, Hist. Santa Anna*, 80, 155-97, 230-5, etc. He rebukes Santa Anna for having sacrificed nearly two million pesos and 4,000 men. The tone is softer in *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 487-600, passim. In *Niles' Reg.*, xlv. passim, and adjoining volumes, the Texan share in the naval combat at Campeche is given prominence. Richthofen, *Rp. Mex.*, 326-33, comments on the complex tariffs which arise. See also *Suarez, Informe*, 8-9, 18, 108-9; *Pap. Var.*, xlix. pt 17, lxxxvi. pt 3, cxciii. pt 8.

⁵³ *Yuc., Expos. Gob.*; *Pap. Var.*, xlix. pt 16; *Yuc., Mem.*, 1845, p. iii.-iv.,

While negotiations were yet going on in 1843 Ampudia had been ordered to retire to Tabasco, on sanitary grounds as well as to prevent revolutionary infection from spreading in this sympathizing department. The measure was prudent, for Sentmanat, the governor, objected to the intrusion, and marched forth to resist it; but in a battle on July 11th, near the capital, he was routed⁵⁴ and fled to the United States, there to form an expedition for recovering his lost ground. Ampudia soon reduced the province, assisted by the fleet, and was rewarded with the command.⁵⁵ In June the following year Sentmanat reappeared with about fifty adventurers whom he had enlisted at New Orleans. The government had received ample warning, and his small vessel was chased aground by cruisers, while Ampudia followed so close upon the heels of the band as to capture it within a few days, ere a junction with native forces could be effected. The prisoners were promptly shot, including Sentmanat, whose head remained impaled in warning to others.⁵⁶

These operations proved a heavy drain on the treasury, and the taxes continued to increase in every direction,⁵⁷ among them those on house drains and coach

1846, p. 4; *Méx., Mem. Guerra*, 1846, 10; *Id., Mem. Rel.*, 48-66; 1847, 45-66. After Santa Anna's fall congress also proposed to repudiate the treaty, but the question with the U. S. prevented a rupture. *Yuc., Mem. Hist.*, Feb. 5, 1846.

⁵⁴ Ampudia claims that Sentmanat held a strong position with 800 men and 11 guns, and that he engaged him with only 900. *Siglo XIX.*, July 24, 1843, etc.

⁵⁵ *Diario Gob.*, Feb. 19, Aug. 4, 1843, etc.; *Méx., Mem. Guerra*, 1844, 31; *Bustamante, Diario*, MS., xlv. 69; *Id., Hist. Santa Anna*, 209-16. The shelling process taught by the French at Ulúa come here into good use.

⁵⁶ After having been boiled in oil, it is said. 'La pusieron en una jaula,' according to Rivera, *Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 623. See *Minerva*, May 13, 1845; *Pabel. Nac.*, Oct. 5, 1844; *Defens. Integ. Nac.*, Aug. 10, 14, 17, 1844; *Abrja*, Oct. 31, 1844; *Movimiento*, Nov. 10, 1844. The vessel which brought them, the *Wm A. Turner*, left New Orleans May 27th. Of the captured 43, 39 were shot. *Méx., Mem. Guerra*, 1845, 5, including several French and Spanish adventurers, regarding whom their ministers raised several protests. See correspondence in *Siglo XIX.*, Mar. 21, 26, etc., 1845; *Courrier*, French journal of Mexico, Mar. 26, Apr. 19, etc., 1845; *Masson, Olla Podrida*, 62-73; *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Méx.*, MS., i. 53-6. Certain persons sought to purge themselves of complicity. *Tabasco, Repres. Guardacostas*, 1-8.

⁵⁷ The list forming a thick book 'que se vendia... por un peso.'

wheels. Several measures were besides taken to obtain immediate large sums, such as encroaching still more on benevolent and trust funds,⁵⁸ leasing the Zacatecas mint to Englishmen,⁵⁹ levying forced loans and selling property to collect them, and finally by permitting a large importation of spun thread, so vigorously assailed on former occasions as ruinous, and by adding twenty per cent to the import duty, thus increasing by far the burdens which had been used as pretext for overthrowing the former administration.⁶⁰

While the means thus collected were chiefly sunk in the fruitless Yucatan campaign, they were ostensibly to be used for defensive and offensive operations against Texas. Over six years had elapsed since the last serious effort to recover the province, a period broken only by petty inroads on either side, occasionally by Mexico to sustain her claims, and oftener by Texas to retaliate and distract her plans. The most notable of these expeditions was the disastrous march against Santa Fé in 1841, the defeat of which the Mexicans followed up by a descent into the state in March the following year.⁶¹ After this the utterance and preparations in the lone-star region grow so ominous as to maintain the Mexicans in constant apprehension of a strong reprisal. A prompt counter-manceuvre was deemed necessary, in a manner to fully impress the hostile districts with the power of the republic, and the danger of being made the battleground. General Woll was intrusted with the task, and proceeded so cautiously that his appearance before Béjar, in the middle of September 1842, proved

⁵⁸ From the sodality del Rosario \$20,000 were taken. In April 1843 the property of the Mercy order, valued at \$30,000, was seized, and the colegio de Santos was closed to the same end. *Rivera, Méx. Pint.* i. 157-61.

⁵⁹ For 14 years, \$100,000 being paid at once. The ayuntamiento of Zacatecas was dissolved for venturing to protest. *Siglo XIX.*, Oct. 15, 1842, etc.

⁶⁰ *Bustamante, Diario*, MS., xlv. no. 230.

⁶¹ Under General Vasquez, who occupied the evacuated San Antonio de Béjar for two days only, behaving with great consideration. Hays had retired with his ranger garrison.

wholly unexpected. After a slight skirmish, therefore, he took possession of the town, and two days later engaged in an undecisive conflict with a relief party, whereupon he retired unmolested beyond the river, his main object having been attained.⁶³ The incursion had led to a large gathering of defenders, for none knew Woll's intentions, and it was decided to make some use of the movement for a reprisal. Several hundred accordingly crossed the Rio Grande in December and occupied Laredo and Guerrero. Discord broke up the party, and most of the men turned back. About one third resolved to continue the campaign and made a descent on Mier; but here the portion of the northern army, under Ampudia and Canales, about 2,000 strong, came up and turned the tables, obliging them to capitulate.⁶⁴

It was evident that Texan expeditions by land were not to be feared, save by exposed settlements, and the little republic was regarded by Mexico rather as the work of the United States and an index to their attitude. Whatever might be undertaken against Texas, this formidable power behind must be studied and humored to a great extent, lest occasion be given for the quarrel which a great party within her borders were endeavoring to precipitate. After long negotiations, commissioners had been appointed, under a convention of April 1839, for examining the gradually accumulated claims of American citizens against the republic, amounting to more than eleven millions of dollars, out of which, two thirds being investigated, two millions were allowed.⁶⁵ By a later arrangement,⁶⁶ the interest so far due on the sum was to be

⁶³ A number of prominent residents were captured. Woll's reports may be consulted in *Tejas, Exped.*, 1-60. Woll was a French officer who had come over with Mina. A mutiny occurring soon after this, Woll resigned the command of the northern army and Ampudia took charge.

⁶⁴ For particulars, including the attempted escape of the prisoners, I refer to my *Hist. North Mex. States*, ii., this series, wherein original and published reports, including *Green's Journal of the Mier Exped.*, receive due attention.

⁶⁵ Or \$2,026,139.68. *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 27, Ses. 2, Sen. 320, Vol. iv. 420, Vol. v.; H. Ex. Doc. 291, Vol. v.; H. Com. Rept., 1,096, Vol. v.

⁶⁶ Of Jan. 30, 1843.

paid in April 1843, and the principal with later interest in the course of five years.⁶⁶ The first payments were made, although forced loans had to be levied for the purpose under the most grievous circumstances.⁶⁷ One reason for this promptness was apprehensions roused by the agitation at different places in the northern republic in favor of Texas, with actual enrolment of men for aiding her. When the Mexican minister remonstrated, the government at Washington professed to be ignorant of any such movement, although belied at the very moment by an aggressive act on the part of its Pacific squadron, which, in October 1842, took possession of Monterey in California. Ample apology was tendered, but the fact remained patent that at Washington affairs had matured to the very point of war, in apparent sympathy with the popular feeling. To this, moreover, was directly due the justifiably strong language from Mexico which was claimed to have roused the United States. Then, in the spring of 1843, came another invasion of New Mexico from Texas, although prepared mainly in the provinces to the north. The States now pleaded inability to restrain such attempts, but it was evident that sufficient efforts had not been exerted to check them. It cannot be denied that the Texan question, a turning-point for strife, was an outgrowth of Mexico's past errors, and that the sympathy of the Anglo-Americans was natural; but this by no means justified its different manifestations, which could not fail to provoke the somewhat over-sensitive national honor of the Mexicans.⁶⁸ Their relations

⁶⁶ This was effected by Minister Thompson, who takes credit for having arranged a settlement on a metallic basis, in view of the depreciated treasury notes, which were worth only 30 per cent. *Recoll. Mex.*, 222-9, 279, etc.; *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 28, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 158; *Mex. Treaties*, ii, pt 6. By convention of Nov. 1843, the claims not yet examined, and Mexican claims against the United States, were to be adjusted by a new commission. Santa Anna deferred ratifying this arrangement in order to gain the much needed time for deferring unpleasant settlements.

⁶⁷ The April payment amounted to \$270,000.

⁶⁸ The development of the question will be comprehensively considered in a later chapter, and the different acts of aggression in the *Hist. North Mex. States*, ii., and *Hist. Arizona and New Mexico*, this series.

with France and England were not on a much better footing; for both had offended them by acknowledging the independence of Texas, and assisting her with means, the latter making herself besides obnoxious by pressing for the fulfilment of pecuniary obligations.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ Fresh claims for injury to English residents were accumulating. At a public ball an English flag, taken from the Texans, had been exhibited as a trophy, notwithstanding the protest of the minister, and the latter had also offended by transmitting a letter from Texas, unwittingly it was claimed, containing an offer of five millions for the recognition of that state, with a bribe for the minister who could manage to pass the project. Santa Anna's virtuous indignation at the proposal was manifested in *Diario Gob.*, xxii. no. 2433; *Bustamante, Hist. Santa Anna*, 41-2, 240. Thompson justly scouts the supposed influence of England in Mexico. *Recoll. Mex.*, 236-8. The Belize boundary was also a cause for trouble. The commission appointed in 1839 for determining the line had been unable to attend to the task, owing to the Yucatan war. *Méx.*, *Mem. Rel.*, 1840, 2; *Soc. Mex. Geog., Bolet.*, iii. 239. The French had been offended by steps taken against their consul at Vera Cruz for corresponding with Yucatec rebels. A treaty of commerce with the Hanseatic towns was effected on June 27, 1842. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, iv. 227.

The following authorities have also been consulted in the preparation of the three preceding chapters: *Méx., Col. Leyes Fund.*, 219-27; *Id., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1839, passim; 1840, 250-61, 376-439, 488-786, 829; 1841, 22-4, 54, 61, 81-96, 119-61, 188-9; 1844-6, 552-4, 577-92; *Id., Mem. Relac.*, MS., 1839, 1-16; *Id., Mem. Minist. Int.*, 1838, 2-6; *Id., Mem. Hacienda*, 1838, 1-2; 1845, 1-77; 1870, 31, 1035-7; *Id., Mem. Guerra*, 1839, 27; 1840, 28, 46-7; 1841, 1-48, annexes nos 1-18; *Estado Mayor Gral. Ejér.*, 2-7, 33-296; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1838, 47, 92, 138, 214-17, 273-92, 400, 533-54; 1839, 3-11, 32-7, 70, 86, 94-105, 156, 170-4, 189, 204-5, 233, 258, 267-9, 307; May 1849-April 1850, 13; *Bustamante, Gabinete Méx.*, i. 54-216, ii. 5-7, 39-248; *Id.*, MS., i. 161, 216, 225, 349-51, 386, 444-9, 494-6, 554, ii. 243, 343-7, 355, 378, iii. 119-21, 143-9, 243-57, iv. 1-86; *Id., Diario Méx.*, MS., xliii. 1-348, xlii. 3, xlv. 215-17, xlv. 35, 96; *Id., Hist. Sta Anna*, 1-34; *Id.*, MS., i. 89-91, 115-25; *Id., Martirol.*, 8; *Id., Cuad. Hist.*, viii. 163-4, 174; *Id., Voz de la Patria*, MS., xiv. 203-51, 296; *Gonzalez, Hist. Aguascal.*, 1-12; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, iii. 482, 512-34, 564-82, 617-31, 675, 692-5, 727-30, iv. 6, 24, 29-36, 66-7, 76, 89, 227-33, 363; *Informe Estrada-Empl. S. Blas*, 15; *Contreras, Garant. Individ.*, 1-36; *El Tiempo*, May 6, 1846, 1; *Martin, Précis*, 97-100; *Bolet. Extraord. Ciudadela; Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 240-55; *Dubois, Le Mexique*, 115-18; *Filiola, Defensa*, 1-28; *Leon, Contest.*, 1-108; *Canseco, Justa Represalia*, 1-32; *Fossey, Méx.*, 166-71, 253, 284-5, 507-20; *Haro, Mem. Justif.*, 3-17; *Caballero, Hist. Alm.*, 14-15; *Quejas de los Méx.*, 1-8; *Müller, Reisen in Méx.*, iii. 319-20; *Micheltorena, Discurso; Lempriere's Notes in Méx.*, 428; *Anal. Minist. Fom.*, ii. 462-70; *Escalera y Llana, Méx. Hist.-descript.*, 55-68; *Kennedy's Tex.*, ii. 307-10, 352; *Nouv. Annales Voy.*, lxxxvi. 119, lxxxvii. 137-8, lxxxix. 122, cv. 198-9; *Mosaico Méx.*, i. 81-5, iii. 113-15; *Barbachano, Mem. Camp.*, 54-67; *Norman's Rambles in Yuc.*, 224-35; *Arista, Oficio*, 1-46; *Id., Manif.*, 1-16; *Hunt's Merchants' Mag.*, xlv. 607; *Nota del Minist. Bonilla sobre Patronato*, MS., 1-20; *Notic. del Editor sobre Establec. Oficio Escribanos*, pp. i.-xxxiv.; *Ober, Mexico*, 427-8; *Mendizabal, Represent. que al Congreso*, 1-26; *Alvarez, Manif.*, 5-23, 57-107, 124-32, 142-59; *Diario Ofic.*, May 14, 15, 16, 22, 1879; *Peña, Revóquese esta Sancion*, 1 l.; *Méx., Proy. de Reforma*, 1840, 1-107; *Ramirez, Voto Particul.*, 109-38; *Estrada, Carta*, 1-96; *Id., Alg. Reflex.*, 1-80; *Id., Impugn.*, 1-37; *Gutierrez Estrada, Lettre de*, 1-33; *Ortega, Represent. que Dirige*, 2 ll.; *Vistazo Rápido*, 5-10; *San Miguel, Pandeclas Hispano-Mej.*; *Amador, Las Garant. Individ.*, 3-36; *Didlogo Ocurrido*,

1-4; *Alatorre, Manif. del Gob. Aguascal.*, 1-16; *Escalada, Manif.*, 3-51; *Montoro, Contest. al Itinerario*, 3-24; *Abuso del Poder Judic.*; *Zavala, Rev. Mex.*, ii. 201; *Ya es Tiempo*, 1-4; *Urrea, Protesta*, 1-19; *Tres Dias de Minist.*, *Verdadera Notic.*, 1-32; *Sierra y Rosso, Discurso*; *Id.*, *Discurso Colocac.*, 1-8; *Salv.*, *Diario Ofic.*, Jan. 26, 1875, Sept. 10, 11, 18, 1879; *Posada y Garduño, Pastoral*, 1-13; *Barrio, Acusacion*; *Pacheco, Oracion Civ.*; *Zozaya, Apelac.*, 23, 46; *Id.*, *Oracion Civ.*; *Paredes y Arrillaga, Esposic.*, 1-28; *McSherry's Essays and Lectures*, 50-63; *Calderon's Life in Mex.*, i. 96-7, 275-81, 336-80, 403, ii. 7, 121-3; *El Constituc.*, Jan. 19, 1844, 2; *Santa Anna, Biog.*, 19-21; *Id.*, *Apuntam.*, 1-24; *Abbot's Mex. and U. S.*, 278; *Charnay, Cités et Ruines*, 197-9; *Frost's Pict. Hist. Mex.*, 170-8; *El Amigo de la Relig.*; *Larenaudière, Mex. et Guat.*, 242-52; *Nuevo Viaj. Univ.*, iii. 518-19; *Wilhelm's Eight U. S. Inf.*, i. 173-4; *Cuevas, Espos. Dif. Francia*, 15-18, 40-9; *Pavon, Satisfac.*, 1-12; *Id.*, *Manif.*, 1-24; *Id.*, *Contest. que dan los Gen.*, 1-20; *Young's Hist. Mex.*, 206-84; *Chevalier, Des Mines; Mex., Escalafon que Comprende*, 42 ll.; *Osborne's Guide to W. Ind.*, 110-12; *Suarez, Informe*, 8-9; *Blanchard, S. Juan de Ulúa*, 1-20, 64-81, 195, 217-407, 447-521; *Parada, Seg. Esposic.*, 1-18; *Apuntador Semanario*, no. 21, 323-4; *Domenech, Hist. du Mex.*, ii. 159-75; *Alm. Calend.*, 1839, 19-24; 1840, iii. 3-23; *Alm. Amer.*, 1840, 280; *Alm. Calend. Lopez*, 1843, 3-23; *Alm. Calend. Galvan*, 57-66; *Disposic. Varias*, v. 36-39, 41; *Monit. Constit. Ind.*, April 9, 1845, 3; *Pesado, Doc. Relat. Conferenc. Jalapa*, 1-56; *Yuc.*, *Exposic. del Gob.*, 3-4; *Ripley's War Mex.*, i. 42; *La Minerva*, March 25, May 15, 1845; *Democratic Rev.*, v. 92-4, vi. 287-307, 413-24; *Santa Marta, Esposic. Protest.*, no. iv. 1-80, no. v. 1-16; *Gomez, Vindic.*, 1-18; *Villa-Amor, Biog. Gen. Sta Anna*, 17-18; *S. L. Potosi, Garant. Individ.*, 1-36; *McGregor's Progress Amer.*, 332-43; *Id.*, *Commerc. Statistics*, iii. 1172; *Ahrens, Mex. and Mex. Zustände*, 70-1; *Wilson's Mex.*, 120; *Gregory's Hist. Mex.*, 47; *Testam. del Año 1839*, 1-46; *Testam. del Difunto*, 1-23; *Testam. del Difunto*, 1840, 1-16; *Discurso sobre el Derecho*, 1-60; *France and Mex.*, 3-24; *Lafond, Voy. autour du Monde*, i. bk i. 351-66; *Orta, Refutac.*, 1-24; *Andrade, Manif.*, pp. i.-xii.; *Id.*, *Revol. S. L. Potosi*, 16; *Hansard's Parl. Deb.*, xlv. 722, xlvii. 891-940; *Bazancourt, Mexique*, 118-38; *Voy. to Mex. and Havana*, 1-139; *Mayer's Mex. Aztl.*, i. 321-5, ii. 165-6; *Id.*, *Mex. as It Was*, 34-6, 73-5, 81-2, 322-5, 340, 346-52; *Robinson's Mex. and Her Mil. Chieftains*, 175-86, 222-50; *Tornel. Exped.*; *Id.*, *Manif.*; *Id.*, *Varios Españoles*, 1-22; *Id.*, *Protesta*; *Id.*, *Carta á sus Amigos*, 1-25; *Maillard's Hist. Tex.*, 132-48; *Gregg's Scenes and Incidents*, ii. 122-5; *Dur.*, *Iniciativa*, 1-10; *Exposic. al Congr. Supr.*, 1-12; *La Verdadera á la Falsa Opin. Públ.*, 1-15; *Méz.*, *Doc. Ofic. que se Publican*, 1840, 1-90; *Id.*, *Informe Comis. Pesquis.*, 1874, 63, 82; *Id.*, *Observ. sobre Reformas*, 1-28; *Id.*, *Doc. y Obras sobre Jesuitas*, 1-8; *Id.*, *Decr. Comandante*; *Id.*, *Decr. Premios*; *Id.*, *Esped.*, 1-60; *Id.*, *Código Reforma.*, 123-6; *Id.*, *Esposic. sobre Condic.*, 263-6; *Id.*, *Plana Mayor Ejér.*, 1838, 1-8; *Id.*, *Cuaderno de Formul.*, 1-81; *Id.*, *Reglam. Ramo Contabil.*, 1-8, 25 ll.; *Id.*, *Decr. Uniform.*; *Id.*, *Apuntam. Hist.*; *Id.*, *Laws and Courts, MS.*, 7; *Id.*, *Decr. Mil. Activ.*; *Payno, Cuentas Gastos*, 923-4; *Hay's Scraps, Cal. Notes*, iii. 194; *Pinart Coll.*, *Doc. nos* 528, 537, 557, 581, 590; *El Voto de Son.*, Dec. 20, 1841, 2; *Ortiz, Esposic.*, 12-13; *Valencia, Manif.*, 9-16; *Lanusa, Vindic. Gen. Rincon*, 1-77; *Rincon, Manif.*, pp. i.-lxxviii. 1-140; *Arroniz, Hist. y Crón.*, 28; *El Constituc.*, March 12, May 10, 1844; *Malte-Brun, Précis Geog. Univ.*, vi. 430-68; *Gagera, Discurso Patriót.*, 1-16; *Thompson's Recoll. Mex.*, 3, 63-4, 82, 84-6; *Gérard, Excursion*, 10-13; *Mata, Discurso Civ.*, 1-8; *Ferrer, Discurso Pronunc. en Méj.*, 1-15; *Coah.*, *Gac. del Gob.*, March 17, 1838, 2-4; *Löwenstern, Le Mexique*, 284-5, 288-90; *Gallaga, Discurso*, 1-10; *Fisher and Colby's Am. States Ann.*, 1854, 438; *Cuevas, Discurso*, 1-7; *Frisch, Staaten von Mex.*, 29-31; *Antuñano, Economía Polit. en Mex.*, 1-10; *Mercado, Discurso*, 1-18; *Opúsculo de la Verdad*, pp. i.-iv. 1-56; *Farragut, Life of*, 128-36; *Ramirez, Tehuan.*, *Memorias*, 1-3; *Payne's Hist. Europ. Colonies*, 311-12; *Beaumont, Résumé*, 1-40; *Perez, Dice. Geogr.*, i. 22; *Col. Ilin. Rep. Mex.*, 3-17; *Jenkins' Mex. War*, 22; *Furnham's Mex.*, 56, 64; *El Voto Nac.*, Sept. 25, 1838; *Méz.*, *Esposic. que la Supr. Corte*, 19-20; *Id.*, *Doc. Impresos por Acu-*

erdo, 6-49; *Id.*, *Dict. Comis. Sup. Poder Conserv.*, 1-51; *Estrada, Méx. y el Archiduque*, 1-20; *Méx.*, *Ordenanzas Municip.*, 1840; *Cuevas, Esposic. del Ex-Ministro*, 5-6; *Méx.*, *Seg. Parte de Vaya Algo*, 12-13; *Id.*, *Discursos Pronunc.*, 1-12; *Id.*, *Esposic. que los Ministros; Alcance al Núm. Temis; Ecsámen de la Esposic. Dirigida por el Gen. Arista*, 24, 34; *Bustamante (A.)*, *Iniciativa*, 3-13; *Id.*, *Decr. Congr. Gen.*, 1-4; *Id.*, *Manif. que el Ciudadano; Papeles Varios*, xvi. pt 12, xix. pt 4, xxvi. pt 4, xxix. pts 1-26, xxxvii. pts 1, 2, 8, 13, 14, 15, xxxviii. 1, 6, 7, 9, xxxix. pt 9, xlii. pts 4, 9, 9½, 9¾, xliii. pts 1-11, xlv. pt 30, liv. pts 6, 8, 12, lvi½. pts 5, 6, 7, 10, 13, lxxvii. pts 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, lxxix. pt 2, lxxx. pts 5, 17 b, 20, evi. pts 2, 3, 4, 8, cxxii. pt 2, cxxvi. pts 3, 4, 5, cl. pts 2, 3, 21, 23, 24, 34, clii. pts 5, 8, 10, 11, 14, 18, 25, cliv. pts 18, 24, 25, 26, clvi. pt 19, clxv. pt 14, clxxi. pts 14, 16, clxxiv. pts 7, 11, clxxx. pts 7, 11, 14, clxxxv. pt 1, clxxxvi. pt 2, clxxxix. pts 1, 10, exc. pts 1, 2, 6, exci. pts 1, 3, 13, exciii. pts 1, 2, excvi. pt 2, ccxii. pt 5, ccxix. pts 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, ccxxv. pt 1; *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Méx.*, i. nos 121-3, 126, 129, 133-4, 151, 154, 157, 164, 169-70, 179, ii. nos 200, 330, 382, 384, 408; *Id.*, MS., i. nos 81, 85, 89, 90, 92, 166, 168, 173, 176, 182, 206, 209, 220, 255, 237, 265, ii. 183-7, 203, 287, 293, 356-9, 360-5, 368, 389, 422, 435, 437, 464, 466, 468; *Alaman, Apuntes Biog.*, 36; *Baqueiro, Ensayo Yuc.*, i. 16-53, iii. ap. 12-19; *Soc. Méx. Geog. Bol.*, i. 136-7, iii. 332, vii. 293, 321; *Otero, Ensayo*, 3-30; *Id.*, *Obras*, MS., i. 194, 312-17, ii. 1-4, 7-12; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. *passim*, iv. 171; *Id.*, *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 238-40; *Id.*, *Méx. Pint.*, i. 20-22; *Rivero, México en 1842*, 25-8, 86-94, 251-3; *Niles' Register*, liii. 386-7, liv. 48, 128-9, 147, 161-4, 177, 194, 226, 239, 336, 355, 385-7, 407-8, lv.-lix. *passim*, lx. 65-6, 83, lxviii. 146.

CHAPTER XI.

INTRIGUES, MISRULE, AND OVERTHROW OF SANTA ANNA.

1842-1845.

A PROSPECTIVE LIBERAL CONSTITUTION—SANTA ANNA WITHDRAWS BEHIND THE ARRAS—INTRIGUES AGAINST CONGRESS—THE CHAMBERS FORCIBLY DISSOLVED—INSTALLATION OF THE JUNTA DE NOTABLES—NEW ORGANIC BASES—FURTHER POLITICAL JUGGLING—A DUMMY PRESIDENT—RE-ELECTION OF SANTA ANNA—HIS RIDICULOUS VANITY AND PECULIAR MODE OF LIFE—ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION AND ABUSE—PAREDES AGAIN PRONOUNCES AT GUADALAJARA—SANTA ANNA PROMPTLY TAKES THE FIELD—THE HALL OF CONGRESS CLOSED—THE CAPITAL JOINS THE SPREADING MOVEMENT—HERRERA PROCLAIMED PRESIDENT—BLUSTER AND VACILLATION OF SANTA ANNA—HIS FLIGHT, CAPTURE, IMPEACHMENT, AND EXILE—EFFORTS AT REFORM HAMPERED BY FACTIONS.

Mexico's internal afflictions kept pace with those arising from foreign and border relations. In accordance with the bases of Tacubaya, the convocation for a congress to frame a constitution had been issued on December 10, 1841, to meet at Mexico. The election of deputies, by indirect vote, through electoral colleges, was calculated for the 24 departments at one member for every 70,000 inhabitants, the population being estimated at 7,044,140.¹ The result was a pronounced

¹ The exclusion of Texas reduced the departments to 23. The federalists sought to exclude the clergy from being representatives, and to assign Celaya or Querétaro as meeting-place; but Santa Anna prevailed. The congress had to open on June 10, 1842, and sit not over one year. The departments had to pay \$250 per month to their deputies, with \$4 per league for travelling expenses. For convocation and rules, see *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1841, 161-85; *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, i. 147-63; *Méx., Manif. y Convoc.*, 1-22. Discussion on rules in *Méx., Dictámen sobre Convoc.*, 1-20; *Pap. Var.*, lxxxii. pts 8-9. By decree of 1838 the country was divided into two sections, by a line drawn from north of Querétaro to south of Michoacan, the northern departments renewing their deputies for the first biennial term, the southern for the next. *Pinart, Coll.*, no. 525.

federalist victory, greatly to the disappointment of Santa Anna, who had striven hard by intimidation and other unfair practices to modify the issue,² and who from the very day the congress was installed, on June 10, 1842, sought to influence the discussions, although with little success.³ The deputies exerted themselves only the more to produce a constitution that should meet the evidently liberal feelings of the country and cut short a despotism that threatened even the nation's representatives. Several projects had been presented and rejected, including an elaborate plan partaking of both central and federal systems.⁴ This was referred back to the committee, which, in November presented a revised outline that received greater favor and promised to pass, for the departments were left to administer their affairs with almost the same freedom as under the federal system, electing their own legislatures and governors.⁵

Foreseeing what was coming, Santa Anna had recourse to his now well understood manœuvre of retiring to his estate in Vera Cruz, and thence watching and directing operations, leaving the brunt of the contest to be borne by a proxy, with perhaps the humiliation of defeat, while in case of success he could step forward to reap the fruit. He withdrew

² As even Bustamante admits. *Hist. Santa Anna*, 49. See later influence exerted in *Diario Gob.*, *Siglo XIX.*, etc., April 5, 1842, et seq.

³ Thompson, *Recoll. Mex.*, 167-8, pays a tribute to the independent attitude of Mexican deputies toward despots like Santa Anna.

⁴ This was rejected by a vote of 41 against 36. The minority of the committee urged a revised issue of the constitution of 1824, which Minister Tornel attacked with great heat. Text in *Bustamante, Diario*, MS., xlv. 165-6, 207, 211. For text and comments on projects, see *Méz.*, *Proyecto Constitut. Mayor.*, 1842, 1-119; *Id.*, *Minor.*, 1-42; *Méz.*, *Constituciones*, i. pts 1-2; *Pap. Var.*, clv. pt 12; *Zarco, Hist. Cong.*, i. 50-5, 62. Also *Plan Project. sobre Dictadura*, 1842. The northern army had been conspicuous in demanding a plan partaking of those issued in 1824 and 1836.

⁵ They still remained 24 in number, including Texas, but Aguascalientes was merged into Zacatecas, and the department of Acapulco took its place. Election was indirect, with franchise based on property. Two senators were allowed for every department. The president held office for five years, assisted by five ministers. Text in *Constituciones*, i. pt iii. 1-44. Tornel characterized the project as anarchical, and the clergy took alarm at the prospect of tolerance being carried. *Cabilde de Guadalupe*, *Observ.*, 1-19; *Diario Gob.*, Nov. 9, 1842, etc.; *Siglo XIX.*, Jan. 14, 1843, etc.

amidst the somewhat doubtful éclat attending the reburial, with imposing public ceremonies, of the leg he had lost four years before.⁶ Bravo, as president of the council, once more assumed nominal charge of the administration on October 26, 1842, with some repugnance, however, for while a strong centralist, he was not in accord with the personal ambition here seeking to thwart the national will. Tornel, the minister of war,⁷ was the real executive for the ruler at Manga de Clavo, who, with a view to strengthen his control, had already taken steps to disband the auxiliary and rural forces of the towns and haciendas, which naturally belonged to and sympathized with the people, to strengthen the garrison at the capital, and to ordain that army officers must be educated at the military college, under government control.⁸ He had the control and intended to keep it; for there were soldiers and centralists enough at his command. The proposed constitution, aimed against him and his party, could not therefore be allowed to pass into law. Pains had been taken to circulate several of its least favorable clauses, together with the startling discussion on the religious feature, which could not fail to prejudice a large class. Tolerance, indeed, was admitted; the army was to be placed under greater restraint, and during the heat of argument ultra-democratic sentiments had found free expression.⁹

⁶ He had the weakness to attend the ceremony and inspect the magnificent tomb, and was covered with no little ridicule by certain journals. Another monument was founded in the same month of September in commemoration of the defeat of the Spaniards under Barradas. Santa Anna having shared in this also, a medal was struck with a laudatory inscription of the dictator. *Bustamante, Hist. Santa Anna*, 84, 240. A pretence for his retirement was found in the illness of his wife.

⁷ *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iv. 223, 284. The presidio of Tlatelulco was reestablished in July.

⁸ General José María Tornel was the son of a Frenchman by the name of Tournelle, a form changed by the son to obliterate the connection with foreigners, whom he had learned to detest. He belonged to the independent bands and joined Santa Anna in 1820, remaining ever his firm supporter, rising from a position in the war ministry to private secretary of Victoria, governor of Mexico district, deputy, minister to Washington, and cabinet minister. *Fossey, Mex.*, 535-6; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 602-3.

⁹ Tornel issued a special circular, wherein he condemned the constitution as anarchical, aiming at the destruction of sacred institutions.

On December 11th a pronunciamiento was started at the obscure town of Huejotzingo against the congress, as unworthy of confidence, and demanding the installation of a council of notables to revise the constitution.¹⁰ This movement was duly seconded throughout the central provinces by the manipulations of the cabinet and the clergy, and on the 18th, at Mexico, by the garrison. The deputies, who had nearly concluded the discussion on the constitution, could obtain no assurances of protection from the government.¹¹ Finding the hall of congress closed against them, they recognized the futility of resistance, and dissolved of their own accord on the 19th, announcing the act in a manifest wherein they avowed their loyalty to the people whom they represented and the purity of their motives in framing the proposed organic law.¹² It was not long ere protests appeared against the arbitrary procedures of a faction that prevented the people from deciding in a matter belonging to them and of such vital interest. Of this no notice was taken, however, and as the semi-voluntary dissolution left Bravo at greater liberty, he joined the cabinet¹³ in proclaiming that as the public interest demanded the formation of the organic law, the government would appoint a council of patriotic and intelligent men to frame it, assisted by the ministry.¹⁴

¹⁰ Meanwhile the bases of Tacubaya should remain in force. The congress should be dissolved, and the deputies for Puebla, to which Huejotzingo belonged, recalled. *Siglo XIX.*, Dec. 13, 1842; *Diario Gob.*, Dec. 13, 19, 1842. Many attributed the movement chiefly to clerical influence. For sympathetic pronunciamientos elsewhere, see *Id.*, Dec. 20th; *Siglo XIX.*, Jan. 1, 8, 10-11, 14, 1843, etc.; *S. L. Potosí, Plan*, 1842, 3-10; *Pinart, Coll.*; *La Cruz*, v. 633. Rincon of Ulúa fame succeeded Gutierrez as governor of S. Luis Potosí.

¹¹ Bravo and Comandante General Andrade alone assuring them that they had not joined in the pronunciamiento, and would issue no order to dissolve the congress.

¹² It was essentially a protest and a defence against the abusive comments on some of the articles passed by them. Text in *Bustamante, Diario*, MS., xlv. no. 261. Comments in *Méx. Cong.*, 1842, 1-6; *Pap. Var.*, clxv. pt 16.

¹³ Bocanegra, Velez, and Tornel, Trigueros of the finance department having resigned on Dec. 12th.

¹⁴ The council to complete the task within six months. Political attitude during this crisis was to be overlooked. All officials and authorities were obliged to adopt the resolution.

The result was the installation on January 6, 1843, of a body of eighty prominent centralists,¹⁵ who proceeded energetically to work and produced bases for the political organization of the republic, which was formally sanctioned by the government on June 12th, and adopted with imposing ceremonies—the sugar coating of the pill. It declared for a popular representative system, yet the franchise, limited to an income of not less than \$200, excluded a great part of the population;¹⁶ the election was subjected to a triple filtering process, during which the government could find ample opportunity to influence it, and the departments continued to be left almost wholly at the mercy of a central government, which appointed the governors and indirectly the subordinate officials, the departmental assemblies being merely councils with the power of a municipal police.¹⁷ Deputies for congress were required to possess an income of \$1,200 and senators \$2,000. Of the senate, one third was chosen by the three supreme powers and the rest by the departmental assemblies, which also elected the

¹⁵ Termed the *junta nacional legislativo*, with Valencia for president and Quintana Roo for vice-president. Decree with list of names in *Dublan* and *Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iv. 352-6. Rules for internal government in *Méx., Reglam.*, 1843, 1-20; *Pap. Var.*, lxxxiii. pt 4. The proceedings of the body are reported in *Siglo XIX.*, *Diario Gob.*, and other journals. The preliminary meetings began on Jan. 2d.

¹⁶ Together with domestic servants, and, after 1850, those unable to read and write.

¹⁷ Deputies to the lower house were elected for 4 years at the rate of one for 70,000 inhabitants; the senate was composed of 63 members, one third from the industrial classes, including merchants, the rest from distinguished men. The congress sessions began on Jan. 1st and July 1st; during the recess sat a deputation of 4 senators and 5 deputies. Four ministers and a perpetual council of 17, appointed by the president, assisted the government. Laws required the sanction of two thirds of the congressional members. The departmental assemblies consisted of from 7 to 11 members, also limited by the clauses affecting deputies. Governors were appointed by the president from at least 5 nominees presented by the assemblies. The supreme judges were, like the president, elected by the assemblies. For full text, see *Méx., Bases Orgán.*, 1843, 1-45. Signed by over 60 members, headed by Baranda as president, and sanctioned by Santa Anna and the four ministers. Also in *Méx., Col. Leyes Fund.*, 228-63; *Constituciones*, i. pt 4; *Vallrjo, Col. Doc. Méx.*, ii. no. 472. Preliminary projects in *Méx., Proyecto Bases*, 1-51; *Pap. Var.*, clvi. pts 1, 3. Reports and comments in *Id.*, lxxxiv. pts 1-3; *Méx., Observ. sobre Proyecto*, 1-16; *Ramirez, Mem. Hist. Tehuan.*, 13-15; *Guadal., Observ. Bases*. Liberty of the press was declared, but subject to enough restrictions to prevent despotic interference.

supreme judges and the president, the latter for five years. The Roman catholic religion was exclusively sustained; the special privileges, *fueros*, of clergy, army, and other bodies were confirmed, and the government obtained release from the annoying interference of a *poder conservador*, with sufficient loop-holes in the complex text of the bases to intrude its power and influence in numerous directions. The new constitution was, therefore, in several respects more obnoxious and anti-liberal than that of 1836.¹⁹

The inauguration of the system received the personal supervision of Santa Anna, who in March already had emerged from his retreat to secure the acquired victory. He procured for himself a fine reception at the capital by reinstating the *ayuntamiento* and removing Governor Vieyra for having dissolved it on rather trivial grounds,¹⁹ and gained credit with a large class by subsequently forbidding retail trade to foreigners, and authorizing the restoration of the Jesuits in the northern departments to assist in controlling the wild Indians with whom the troops were unable to cope.²⁰ The momentary impression was soon effaced, however, by a fresh dose of taxes and forced loans,²¹ and by the arrest of Gomez Pedraza and other liberal men, whose firm attitude and utterances through the press proved distasteful.²² The political aspect assumed a less encouraging tone, and the dictator soon again thought it prudent to seek the retirement of his

¹⁹ March 5th. *Coronel, Doc.*, 80.

¹⁹ *Ayuntam. Méx. Doc.*, 1843, 1-20, 5-16; *Pap. Var.*, clvi. pts 21-2. Vieyra was succeeded by General Paredes. *Dispos. Varias*, v. 42.

²⁰ This was mainly due to the efforts of Carlos M. Bustamante, the historian and zealous churchman. *Diario Exact. Méx.*, MS., 3. The decree is dated June 21, 1843. The sisters of charity were established later in the year.

²¹ This was especially to meet the payment to the United States, already spoken of, and the continued preparations against Texas and Yucatan.

²² On the proclamation of the new organic law they were included in the amnesty then issued. Their protests appear in *Conejo, Acusacion*, 1-24, with defence also in *Otero, Obras*, MS., iv. 129-96; *Pap. Var.*, clxv. pt 9. In *Vila-Amor, Biog. Santa Anna*, 19 et seq., the vanity, immorality, and other bad traits of the dictator are freely exposed. There had even been signs of defection on the part of Valencia, and, in the north, of discontent, involving a change of army commanders. *Domenech, Hist. Méx.*, ii. 173-5.

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estate. The strongest reason for the withdrawal was undoubtedly the approaching reunion of the new congress,²³ with which was connected the election of a proprietary president. He preferred to play his game for that tempting prize in the background, where also a defeat would be less felt, under cover of an apparently voluntary surrender of power. For a first move he issued a plausible manifesto, explaining the manner in which he had used the extraordinary power conferred upon him in 1841, taking pains to place in the most favorable and absorbing light the several progressive measures of his rule and covering the rest with pleas for public necessity, national honor, the safety of religion, and so forth.²⁴ A second move was to include among the stanch members selected for the government council a proportion of men whose appointment would please the people and conciliate cliques. A third was to appoint, not a lukewarm adherent like Bravo, nor a strong man whose ambition might prove dangerous, but one who could be relied upon to act wholly and faithfully as a machine of the hidden ruler. The choice fell on Canalizo, comandante general of Mexico, formerly the loyal supporter of Bustamante, and therefore a less apparent partisan of Santa Anna, although now wholly devoted to him.²⁵ In addition all the vast political machinery

²³ Rules for election issued on June 19th, in *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iv. 461-4, 486.

²⁴ When the council of notables dissolved at the close of the year, its president replied sincerely to the thanks of the government for its aid by saying, 'Aquella corporacion no habia sido la luz que guiara el gobierno, pues éste habia hecho cuanto le habia venido en gana.' *Bustamante, Hist. Santa Anna*, 247.

²⁵ 'Un maniquí ó titere,' puppet, etc., is the term applied to him. *Id.*, 245. 'Tonto é ignorante,' adds Arrangoiz, *Méj.*, ii. 257. The decree of Oct. 2d appointing him cautiously divided the power between him and the four ministers, the latter removable by Santa Anna. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iv. 600-10. A ridiculous position for a president, observes Rivera, *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 259. Valentin Canalizo, born at Monterey about 1797, became a cadet in the Celaya regiment in 1811, joined the independents under Iturbide in 1820, and after this served with credit in different engagements on the conservative or centralist side. For his share in the death of Guerrero he received the rank of general and the command of Oajaca. In 1841 he was promoted to a division, and subsequently he played a conspicuous part in the pronunciamiento against congress. *Ib.*; *Perez, Dic. Geog. Estad.*, iii. 173-80.

controlled by the dictator was put in motion to support him with intrigue and pressure.

The people, on the other hand, had had enough of such autocracy as Santa Anna's, and looked with expectant hope to the now uniting congress for its termination. So well was this feeling understood that a wide-spread surprise arose when, on January 2, 1844, the national representatives in their opening session²⁶ announced the presidential vote of the departmental assemblies to be nineteen for Santa Anna, and one each for Francisco Elorriaga and General Muzquiz.²⁷ Congress shared in the disappointment, and sought to make the situation as bearable as possible by restricting the presidential power, and forbidding the further exercise of the legislative faculty. Minister Tornel stood up in warm defence of his assailed patron, and the latter paid little heed to the injunction, confident in the subservient adhesion of the majority among the senators, creatures of his, partly by election, partly by influence. A test of this control was furnished by the failure of a motion to remove the acting president, Canalizo, who had become extremely unpopular as the blind tool of the dictator, and his reelection to the position by a large majority.²⁸ Santa Anna naturally objected to a substitute who might prove less tractable, and this requisite he also bore in mind when selecting governors for the departments.

For six months longer Santa Anna chose to remain in the seclusion of his country estate, under the plea that the winter air of the capital did not agree with his broken health. Finally the warm weather pro-

²⁶ The junta de notables closed theirs on Dec. 31st, issuing a farewell address to the public to explain their attitude and work.

²⁷ The former a prominent legislator from Durango, the latter well known as acting president in 1832. Muzquiz died in Dec. 1844, and was in 1845 accorded the title *benemérito*.

²⁸ By 24 votes against 13 for Muzquiz, and 2 for Tornel and Rincon respectively. *Constitucional*, Jan. 30, 1844; *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1844-46, 6-8. The election took place in the senate on Jan. 27th.

duced a change, and on June 3d he made his formal entry with the pomp suggested by fawning adherents and subordinates, who had gone so far as to erect a gilt bronze statue to him in the Plaza del Volador.²⁹ The fears roused by his arrival among the oppressed tax-payers were only too speedily to be realized, and this time he came with cogent reasons. The United States were freely entertaining the proposal to annex Texas, their troops were gathering along its border, and a squadron of their fleet had just appeared off Vera Cruz. While the foreign office demanded an explanation of these threatening movements, Santa Anna seized the opportunity to obtain an extraordinary forced contribution of four million pesos for war preparations.³⁰ His efforts to have the amount increased, and obtain special power to raise it, were thwarted in a manner that provoked his deep indignation. He had become so used to carry his points, or at least to a deferential attitude, that snappish resistance proved most irritating. As a relief to his feelings, he directed a bitter attack on the deputies through the government organs, including the official *Diario*, with a suggestion from one side of a dictatorship. The chambers demanded an explanation in order to make the ministry responsible, but could obtain no satisfaction. One result, however, was that the foreign portfolio changed from the hands of Bocanegra to Rejon, a talented but young and impulsive

²⁹ It rose on a high column and presented him in a general's uniform, standing with the right hand extended northward to indicate his resolution to recover Texas. The unveiling was performed on June 13th by Canalizo and Oropeza, the latter having paid for the erection \$3,000. *Bustamante, Hist. Santa Anna*, 265-6. Among eulogies is one by the governor of Puebla. *Discurso, Pap. Var.*, xxxix. pt 11. In unveiling, the cord became entangled round the neck, and not long after a cord round its neck brought it low, as we shall see. The administration took care to order the different corporations into procession to give éclat to the reception, which otherwise might have proved chilling. Fire-works and feasting followed.

³⁰ After long discussion, the decree was passed by 37 votes against 35, and issued on August 21st, levying two per mille on country estates, city property eight per cent of rents, and so on for industries, rents, etc. *Méx., Col. Lry. y Dec.*, 1844-46, 50-60. See comments in *Defensa Integ. Nac.*, Aug. 7, 24, 1844, devoted above all to uphold the integrity of the national territory.

man, while the war department had, fortunately for the impulsive Tornel, passed shortly before to General Reyes.⁸¹

Santa Anna began to find the situation somewhat uncomfortable, and to long again for the freer atmosphere of his estates. The death of his wife⁸² gave him the necessary excuse. Such it evidently appeared to him, for five weeks later he outraged public sentiment by the ceremonious espousal of a young lady.⁸³ Not that the people were surprised. His character was too well known, with his undignified indulgence in dissipations of all kinds, from Lotharian intrigues and free association with low and doubtful persons in the common cock-pit, to the most imposing and extravagant entertainments, with glittering guards of honor sustained by means drawn from sources not only suspected but known to be dishonest, from the funds extorted by forced contributions and loans, from infringement of industrial protection, from gifts of favor-seekers, from bribes and fraudulent contracts. It may readily be supposed that the subordinate officials did not fail to profit by the example, and the result was the most wide-spread corruption in all

⁸¹ Lately commanding in the north-east. He was appointed on June 10th. Tornel's separation was forced upon him by Santa Anna, who had become jealous of his assumption, it is said. *Constitucional*, Feb. 2, 9, 1844. Bocanegra had held office since Nov. 1841, with a brief interval, during which Monasterio figured. Rejon was an able and energetic Yucatec, with strong Indian traits. The interior department was managed by Baranda, who succeeded Velez in July 1843, and had a warm defender in *Defensa Integ. Nac.*, Sept. 14, 1844. Trigueros continued, since Nov. 1841, as finance minister, save during the beginning of 1843, when Gorostiza relieved him.

⁸² Inés García de Santa Anna, on Aug. 23d, at Puebla, after a marriage of 19 years. She was buried on the 26th with the pomp of a sovereign, the archbishop officiating at Mexico, and in other cities and towns officials and citizens joined in demonstrating their respect. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 630-1. Among the stinging insinuations concerning the real motives for Santa Anna's retirement was one in pamphlet form, *Ya el Presidente se Va para Volter Coronado*, a title which indicates its purport.

⁸³ María Dolores Tosta, a girl of 15 years, married in the palace at Mexico on Oct. 3d, by proxy, in the person of Licenciado Cañedo, who is said also to have acted as godfather at her baptism. Canalizo figured as one of the padrinos at the marriage. An illumination of the public edifices and other demonstrations followed, during which the bride appeared to receive an ovation. Cañedo thereupon conducted her to Jalapa, to Santa Anna. Account of ceremonies in *Diario Gob., Pabel. Nac.*, etc., Oct. 5, 1844, and following dates.

branches. Commanders of forces and districts committed the most outrageous abuse of trust and power with a view to enrichment, either dividing the gains with those above them or relying on their knowledge of defects elsewhere to escape accusation.³⁴ Incited by the spoil, those in authority, from the president down, sought to increase their share by appointing creatures of their own to positions of responsibility, irrespective of merit, and frequently under the most unjust circumstances, dismissing or retiring before the proper time able and experienced administrators, swelling the already disproportionate ranks of officers with improvised captains and colonels, and granting sinecures and allowances, while worthy servants and deserving widows cried aloud for the reduced or withheld pay and pensions due them. Under such mismanagement the country could not possibly advance, weighed as it already was with taxes in every conceivable form, and menaced at every moment with fresh forced loans. Capital sought to hide itself; trade languished; industries broke down under the additional infringement of protection by special decrees or patronized smuggling; agriculture suffered from the flight of laborers before the harsh enlistment and impressing regulations; and while in the north wild Indians spread desolation unhindered, the depressed state of affairs in the central and southern provinces added to the hordes of bandits infesting the roads.³⁵

Canalizo was again forced upon the senate for re-election as acting president,³⁶ and relieved himself

³⁴ The commanders in the north-east, Arista, Canales, and others, openly dealt in contraband, or favored others for a consideration, as revealed also in the documents published in journals like *Amigo del Pueblo*, Nov. 25, 1845, by Domenech, *Hist. Mex.*, ii. 177 et seq., and others. Instance cases as recorded in *Salinas del Peñon Blanco*; *Pap. Var.*, xxxix. pt 16. The finance minister opened the treasury to the mercantile firm with which he was connected.

³⁵ It needs but a glance at the journals of the day, *Diario Gob.*, *Constitucional*, *Defens. Integ. Nac.*, *Pabel. Nac.*, *Abeja*, etc., to realize the extent of the corruption and misery.

³⁶ *Méz.*, *Col. Ley.*, 1844-46, 61-2; *Defens. Integ. Nac.*, Sept. 11, 25, Oct.

somewhat by a commendable activity in organizing troops for the impending Texan campaign, for which he had been designated as commander-in-chief. The most striking measures were the organization of the presidial companies and the demand from the departments of 30,000 men in addition to the contingent of 15,000 required at the close of 1843,³⁷ made the more urgent since General Woll had received instructions in June to declare at an end the armistice with Texas,³⁸ agreed upon in the early part of the year with a view to bring about a peaceful settlement. Mexico then offered her practical self-government, if she would recognize the sovereignty of the republic, with representation in congress;³⁹ but this was not entertained. No hostile movement was undertaken by Mexico, however, for want of money, and in the following spring the chambers permitted the government to listen to proposals from the other side, based on the recognition of Texan independence, with the stipulation that the state should not annex herself to any other country.⁴⁰ Negotiations never took place owing to the infringement of the latter bases, leading to results the most memorable in modern Mexican history, as will be seen in due time.

The funds so far collected by acting President Canalizo had melted away as if by magic, during the

16, 1844. Canalizo being absent when Santa Anna departed, Herrera, president of the council, took charge till he arrived, from Sept. 12th till 21st. Allusions to the changes in *Mala y Reyes, Oracion*, 1-8.

³⁷ On Dec. 29th; all to be tendered in successive detachments. Those from Chihuahua and Durango were to be retained there. The assembly had to issue the necessary orders within a fortnight. Decree of July 2, 1844. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iv. 759. The presidio reorganization was, by decree of Mar. 29th, to be given 'toda preferencia.' *Méz., Col. Ley.*, 1844-46, 19. Comments on, in *Constitucional*, Apr. 9, 19, etc., 1844; *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Méz.*, MS., i. 10-43; *Voto de Son.*, Aug. 22, 1844.

³⁸ President Houston remonstrated at receiving such an announcement from a subordinate, but the government at Mexico deemed it undignified to treat with him.

³⁹ One of Woll's prisoners, I. W. Robinson, formerly lieutenant-governor of Texas, was sent with the proposal in 1843, and commissioners met at Salinas. *Thrall's Hist. Texas*, 337-8.

⁴⁰ Boundaries and other questions should if necessary be settled by arbitration. The Mexican government agreed on May 19th to treat on this basis. *Santa Anna, Apel. al buen Criterio*, 15, ap. 2-3.

process of passing through so many hands,⁴¹ and in September the ministry astonished the chambers by pressing anew for more means, this time in the shape of a loan for ten millions, pleading as additional motives the invasion of California by adventurers, and the intimation that England and France would side with the Texans in case of a protracted struggle. The demand was refused, to the general delight of the people, who had been striving to avoid the last contribution. In the districts of the present Guerrero the appearance of the collectors only



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tended to give fresh impulse to the rising started at Chilapa two years before. This town was captured by the Indians and desolated with fire and pillage; and although troops marched against them and obtained several advantages, the struggle continued with its attendant inflictions.⁴² In Michoacan also the feeble

⁴¹ The ministerial statement disposed of \$800,000 under the vague term of secret expenses.

⁴² *Pabel. Nac.*, Oct. 29, 1844; *Defens. Integ. Nac.*, Oct. 30, 1844; *La Minerva*, June 3, 1845. The lack of energetic interference by General Alvarez roused an outcry from the sufferers, who began to petition for his removal, and elicited a warm defence of his conduct. *Chilapa, Repres. Emigrados*, 1-12; *Pap. Var.*, cxvii. pts 1-2; *Méz.*, *Mem. Guer.*, 1845, 6-9.

remnant of federalist bands found encouragement in the spreading discontent, and elsewhere ravages of storms and floods assisted to foster it.⁴³

Several departmental assemblies raised their voice in protest against the contribution, notably those of Jalisco and Querétaro. The former had, moreover, been roused from its passive attitude by a demand on the part of the executive for a loan of \$150,000 toward certain contracts, and on October 26th, it addressed a formal representation to the congress supported by leading citizens, the governor, and the comandante general, wherein the demand was made for the repeal of the obnoxious tax decree, the exacting of an account from the government for its administration and its disposal of funds,⁴⁴ and the reform of the constitution so as to promote the prosperity of the departments.⁴⁵ Aware how little a mere protest would be considered under so independent an executive as Santa Anna, the authorities took advantage of the strongly manifested sympathies of the people to procure an armed indorsement of their course. Galindo, the comandante general, accordingly headed the garrison in support of the resolutions, and then appealed to General Paredes, who had so successfully initiated the former revolution to assume the leadership.⁴⁶

It may be readily understood that Paredes was a leading, if not the chief, promoter of the movement. He had several motives for taking the step. His former uprising, to which he naturally ascribed the restoration of Santa Anna to power, had not in his opinion been recognized as fully as it deserved; hence

⁴³ *Abeja*, Oct. 9-10, 1844. The floods at Durango in the early part of the year were most disastrous, as will be related in *Hist. North Mex. States*, ii., this series.

⁴⁴ As required also under the bases of Tacubaya from the provisional government.

⁴⁵ This was followed on the 30th by an *Exposición* signed by the assembly president Barajas setting forth the grounds for the representations in administrative abuses and sad condition of affairs. *Jal., Iniciativa*, 1-10. Governor Escobedo, successor of Cañedo, issued an address confirming the hopes of the people for relief.

⁴⁶ Brig. Romero joined his to the 37 signatures of officers. *Id.*, 11 et seq.

his manifest discontent. In order to keep him under supervision, as well as to appease and win him back, Santa Anna gave him a seat in the council of notables, made him comandante general of Mexico, and subsequently senator; but Paredes evidently expected at least the position of acting president, for which the other party considered him unfit, as lacking in administrative talent.⁴⁷ Propitiation came too late. He saw in the increasing popular ferment fully as good an opportunity as before for directing it to his own ends, for midst the many claims on its attention, the government had been obliged to neglect several of the more remote army corps, notably that of Jalisco,⁴⁸ and the clergy, already estranged by the many heavy and arbitrary inroads on its property, looked with alarm on the prospective contributions to be levied for the costly war now looming in the north.

It is related that he had for some time been sounding different military leaders for this project. Some of these hastened to curry favor with the dictator by transmitting the correspondence. Santa Anna was hardly surprised at so common a feature of political intrigue, but it served to remind him that an opponent so influential, especially with the army, must not be disregarded. He had studied the life of Napoleon, and recalled among other incidents his magnanimous reply to the woman who pleaded for the life of her conspiring husband. He looked upon himself as the Napoleon of America, and resolved to act in imitation of his great prototype, always, however, with a prudent regard for what seemed most expedient. He called Paredes, recited the French story, and added: "I also have letters, proof of crime on your part, but I shall ignore them. Behold!" saying which he tore the documents into fragments.⁴⁹ Be this as it may,

⁴⁷ This, indeed, is claimed to have been the main reason for consigning him back to the comandancia general of Jalisco. He refused the senatorship, mainly because his plans had already taken shape.

⁴⁸ Which, among its grievances, complained loudly of the discounts cutting into the pay. *Abeja*, Oct. 19, 1844; *Amigo del Pueblo*, Nov. 29, 1845.

⁴⁹ Bustamante, who relates this incident, adds that further proof appeared

Paredes was not to be moved by so flimsy a display of generosity, for his prominence secured his life, at least under actual circumstances. It is certain, however, that he was placed under momentary arrest and exiled to Toluca for refusing to fall in with the views of a government which sought to remove him to a safe distance, by charging him with the expedition to Yucatan.

Paredes wished to be with his friends and near the scene of action; and leave of absence having been granted, he found himself at Guadalajara to manœuvre the pronunciamiento now bursting upon the country. Accepting the proffered leadership, he on November 2d issued a manifesto, charging the government in the most scathing terms with violation of pledges and abuse of trust, especially during the dictatorship, and declaring Santa Anna suspended from office pending an examination of his acts by the congress.⁶⁰ The government, now thoroughly startled, sought to conceal the importance of the movement, and came forward with exaggerated reports of some petty victories over the Indians on the south coast. Finding this useless, it openly hastened to take precautions, including a reënforcement of the garrison at Mexico, which revealed its doubts regarding the capital itself. In a flaming proclamation it thereupon stamped the pronuncios as enemies of the country, and Paredes as

of Paredes' perseverance in his course. 'Santa-Anna obró como un caballero,' but he was treated as he had treated Bustamante. *Hist. Santa Anna*, 306. As additional propitiation, Paredes was offered the well-paid and almost sinecure office of administrator of mails at Mexico.

⁶⁰The power intrusted under the bases of Tacubaya was probably excessive, but only provisional. Santa Anna's protestations had been accepted and proved false. Instead of carrying out the great reforms to which he stood pledged, he had abandoned himself to a course the most mean and selfish. The manifesto enumerates the proposed reforms in army, public offices, etc., and proceeds to paint the work effected in the most abusive terms. The ayuntamiento of the city on the same day signed approval of the act. *Jal., Iniciativa*, 19-34. The abuse herein poured upon his late patron by Paredes was hardly consistent with the language and acts used not long before in his support. Indeed, Santa Anna caused to be inserted in the *Diario Gob.* of Nov. 11, 1844, a number of letters from Paredes, written at the very time the revolution was planning, wherein he addresses him in the most affectionate terms. See also *Pabel. Nac.*, Nov. 12, 1844.

doubly a traitor, who, instead of carrying out his instructions for defending the country against a threatening invasion, had increased the peril by stirring civil war for ambitious aims.⁵¹ Such a charge from an unpopular and intriguing administration obtained no weight. The people remembered Paredes' former able stand in favor of reform, and ascribed its misdirection entirely to the holders of the spoils, against whom his charges appeared only too true. As for defending the country against invasion, the government had shown its incapacity by squandering the vast means destined for the purpose, and could not be trusted even with that task, however imminent.

Energetic as ever, Santa Anna resolved to place himself at the head of the army and crush the revolution in its cradle. He entered Mexico on the 18th, midst the customary artificial pomp and demonstration, and after an unsatisfactory meeting with a body of deputies and senators, he caused the acting president to formally invest him with the command of the army, whereupon he set out for Querétaro to enforce his will with the sword.⁵² His assumption of the military control was at once challenged by the chambers as unauthorized by them and therefore illegal. War minister Reyes explained that Santa Anna had not reassumed the presidential office and could therefore be regarded only as a general.⁵³ His further observations proved so weak and defiant that he was hooted out of the house and formally accused. He himself thought it best to resign, probably to the relief of his colleagues, for no objection was made, and

⁵¹ *Diario Gob.*, Nov. 9, 1844; *Abeja*, id.

⁵² His address and manifesto issued on Nov. 21st and previously may be consulted in *Pabel. Nac.*, Nov. 12, 26, 1844; *Defensa Integ. Nac.*, Nov. 23, 1844; also in separate form. *Manifiesto*, 1-11; *Pap. Var.*, xxxix. pt 13. The strongest point in it is to recommend a peaceful and deliberate reform of the constitution.

⁵³ Further, the clause of the constitution forbade the president from commanding in person the army and navy of the republic, but Santa Anna had headed only a division. This argument was received with jeers both by house and galleries. The question is discussed in *Couto, Defensa; Pap. Var.*, xiv. pt 6.

General Basadre took his place.⁵⁴ The cabinet continued to maintain a firm attitude, relying on Santa Anna's promptness and strength and the expressions of loyalty from different quarters, although influenced by subservient officials and dictated mostly by fear.⁵⁵ Congress received still more assuring notices, thanks to the energy of Paredes. Aware of the necessity for obtaining a wide indorsement of his plan before the imposing appearance of a strong army should spread dismay and silence the outbreak, he had lost no time in sending circulars to the departmental authorities, and scattering inspiring proclamations throughout the country, with effective allusions to the precarious position of the government and the strength of his own just cause. Aguascalientes, Zacatecas, and Querétaro at once signified their adhesion, Tamaulipas followed, Michoacan, San Luis Potosí, and other provinces were preparing to overcome the still hesitating garrisons, and Guanajuato was certainly not friendly to the central authorities.⁵⁶

Santa Anna reached Querétaro on November 25th, without meeting any resistance, for the garrison had stood aloof during the late agitation, but so chilling

⁵⁴ On Nov. 23d. Trigueros, the finance minister, had on Oct. 29th been replaced by Haro y Tamariz, an intimate friend of Santa Anna. Lombardo had been suggested for the post. See *Pap. Var.*, lxxvi. pt iii. 10; *Boletín Notic.*, Nov. 12, 1844, etc. Deputy Llaca of Querétaro and Gomez Pedraza took the leading part against the cabinet.

⁵⁵ Instances in *Defensa Integ. Nac.*, Nov. 23, 1844, etc.; *Pabel. Nac.*, Nov. 12th, 21st, 30th, etc.; even from Jalisco, *Abeja*, Nov. 11th, 15th.

⁵⁶ Prosperous Aguascalientes had long aspired to become the capital of the country, and stood generally ready to conspire against it. Concerning its condition, see *Gonzalez, Hist. Aguascal.*, 132 et seq. Esparza was governor of Zacatecas. The garrison of Santa Anna de Tamaulipas seconded the revolution already on Nov. 15th, the other districts following gradually. *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., i. 220-6, ii. 13. Colima had long been agitating to become a territory, *Colima, Repres.*, 3-18, independent of Michoacan. *Mich.*, *Informes*, 1845, 23. Opposing arguments in *Colima, Reflex. al Informe*, 1-8; *Pap. Var.*, clxxxv. pt 3, cxcliii. pt 7; *Monit. Constit.*, Mar. 20, 1845, etc. For Guanajuato, see *Cos, Silao*, in *Soc. Mex. Geog.*, *Bolet.*, ép. 2a, iv. 740; *Boletín Notic.*, Dec. 24, 1844. In San Luis Potosí, several tumults were required to prevail on the authorities. Tlascala joined on Nov. 24th. Vera Cruz at first sided strongly with its favorite hero and resident, in a petition to the congress against the *Iniciativa* from Jalisco, but causes soon appeared to change its tone. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 643 et seq. Remonstrance of Guadalajara in *Jal., Expos.*, 3-12; *Pinart, Coll.* Among Paredes' precautions had been to secure the revenue of the port of San Blas.

the mails by opening private letters in quest of conspirators. Minister Baranda now hastened to Querétaro to confer with Santa Anna, and there it was decided to repeat the act which had proved so effective at the close of 1842 in sustaining the dictator.

The chambers met as usual on December 1st, but during a brief recess the doors were closed against the returning members by an armed force. They had no alternative but to submit, yet not without uniting to issue a solemn protest against the different arbitrary acts committed against them and the country.⁵³ The ministry sought to counteract it by a proclamation, wherein they cast odium on the representatives for unpatriotic opposition to the measures of the administration. The dissolution was required for the prompt reestablishment of order and the recovery of Texas, and would be maintained till these objects were accomplished. Under the direction of the constitutional president, Santa Anna, and his substitute, the government proposed to exercise all functions to this end, with particular attention to the financial, military, and foreign departments, yet without increasing the contributions, or encroaching upon life and property or upon the proletariat. Specious pretexts like these, from such a source, deceived no one. The hand of the despot was only too plainly seen⁵⁴ in the very resemblance to former acts and arguments. Deputies and senators exposed them in their protests, and the people manifested their indignation in tumultuous gatherings and loud denunciation, wherein the assembly and ayuntamiento of Mexico joined, the former voluntarily suspending its sessions till the constitu-

⁵³ That of the deputies was signed by all but ten members. The prefect sought to dissolve the senatorial meeting at the house of its president, but had to retire. Congress, after sitting during the first three months of the year, relieved the permanent deputation on June 1st in extra session. The usual session beginning July 1st was prorogued on Sept. 23th. References to and reports of proceedings in *Constitucional*, *Pabel. Nac.*; *Diario Gob.*, *Defensa Integ. Nac.*; *Méx., Col. Ley.*, 1844-6, 19-22, 35-65, passim.

⁵⁴ Revealed besides by intercepted letters to Canalizo, his tool, and published in *Santa Anna*, *Causa*, to be referred to later.

tion should again prevail, and the latter disbanding rather than take the oath of obedience now exacted by the government from all officials and authorities.⁶⁰

Every one of these acts added to the ferment at the capital. Pasquinades and threatening notices appeared against the executive, and the statue of Santa Anna was made an object of ridicule by means of a hangman's cap and other devices. Now came news that the garrison at Puebla had pronounced against Santa Anna. The government fully understood the effect this would have at Mexico, and sought to create a diversion by fomenting a pronunciamiento in favor of the federal system, to be subsequently directed to its own advantage, as on more than one previous occasion. The opponents saw the move, and recognizing the danger of a split, hastened to anticipate it.⁶¹ On the 5th of December the battalion of recruits under Céspedes caught the Puebla infection, and in course of the day other sections of troops at the capital also declared for the plan of Paredes, including the Pueblan corps at the palace, and called on General José Joaquín Herrera, president of the council, to assume direction of affairs in accordance with the constitution.⁶² Without hesitation Herrera summoned the deputies to the convent of San Francisco, and thence issued on the 6th an appeal to Canalizo to assist in upholding the constitutional government and prevent bloodshed. Finding by this time that he could not rely even on the few troops still around him, the representative

⁶⁰ By decree of Dec. 3d. *Pinart, Coll.*, no. 731. The proclamation concerning the suspension had been prepared already on Nov. 29th, *Dispos. Varias*, v. 46, signed like other important acts by Canalizo, Rejon, Baranda, Haro, and Basadre. It was evidently submitted to Santa Anna for revision. Alcalde Cañedo, the proxy at Santa Anna's marriage, sought to intimidate the regidores, and when he returned with a posse for the purpose he found the body dissolved. The supreme court also refused to take the oath. Bustamante, *Hist. Santa Anna*, 357-61, etc., considers the exacting of the oath the culminating motive for the revolution at Mexico.

⁶¹ The federalist move was planned for Dec. 4th, but could not be perfected in time and was deferred till the night of the 5th. *Ib.*

⁶² Which declared that the head of the council should fill the vacant presidency.

of Santa Anna yielded a passive acquiescence. A series of salvos and a general ringing of bells announced the triumph, taken up by the vivas of crowds surging toward the convent. The deputies now marched back in procession to their hall at the palace, many of them borne aloft on the shoulders of enthusiastic followers. At the same time a portion of the rabble broke open the tomb containing Santa Anna's leg, and dragged this member with a cord through the streets midst insults. Another entered the theatre recently erected in his honor, and smashed his large gypsum effigy in the vestibule. The bronze statue in the plaza would have fared a similar fate, but for the prompt action of the authorities to forestall the mob and hide it.⁶³

That same evening the chambers reopened formally and joined in perfecting plans for the new government, whereof the senate confirmed Herrera as temporary president.⁶⁴ The ministry now installed was composed of Luis Cuevas, Riva Palacio, Pedro Echeverría, and General Pedro García Conde,⁶⁵ a selection that met with general approval. Before the grand jury formed by the two houses Santa Anna was arraigned in common with his subservient ministers, and orders were issued for the arrest of these as well as Canalizó. Basadre was captured on the way to Querétaro, disguised as a friar,⁶⁶ but Haro succeeded in gaining that place, and his two colleagues remained in hiding.

The revolution at Mexico came most opportunely.

⁶³ The leg was also secured and reburied. On the preceding day Santa Anna had celebrated the sixth anniversary of the action wherein he lost the leg, and acquired the reputation of a hero. Allusions to the statue in the report of the theatre committee. *Teatro Santa Anna, Observ.*, 1844, 1-15.

⁶⁴ By decree issued on Dec. 7th. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iv. 769.

⁶⁵ For relations, justice, finance, and war, respectively.

⁶⁶ 'Ciento que haria un fraile de bella figura,' observes Bustamante ironically. *Hist. Santa Anna*, 356; *Id., Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., i. 203, etc. Deputy Llaca, who had played so prominent a part in these changes with his eloquence and stanch attitude, died on the 16th of liver complaint, in the midst of his triumphs. *Constitucional*, Dec. 17, 1844, etc.; *La Minerva*, Mar. 25, 1845, etc. As governors of Mexico department and capital districts during the year are named Juan Olmos, Juan Casaflores, General Rincon, and finally General Condelle. *Dispos. Varias*, v. 46.

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Santa Anna, with a select army of nearly 14,000 men, was already at Silao, on the way to crush Paredes and reduce to obedience the adjoining provinces. The task seemed easy enough, for their forces were scattered, and the mere appearance of so imposing an opponent might suffice to restore order. Paredes himself felt so little confidence that he prepared to intrench himself in some strong position. The news from Mexico upset the whole plan. In a council of officers it was decided that Santa Anna should reassume the role of president in order to give legality to his acts, and march at once against the capital, as the present centre of the revolt. A preliminary measure was to seize all the funds he could lay hands upon at the mint and public offices of Guanajuato and other towns,⁶⁷ and to impress additional men at the settlements en route, all of which swelled the popular outcry. A force was left at Guanajuato to check the speeding outbreak, and as a further precaution Governor Cortazar was inveigled and made a prisoner, after having rejected the different offers of Santa Anna for obtaining his adhesion,⁶⁸ while a partial concession was made at Querétaro by reinstalling the assembly and governor.⁶⁹

Fully aware that the wrath of the suspended president would turn against them, the new authorities at Mexico took prompt steps for defence, authorizing a loan of half a million and the free introduction of sup-

⁶⁷ From the mint \$135,000 were taken. \$90,000 of which, belonging to the conde de Perez Galvez, were subsequently restored. The duties from the fair at Lagos yielded \$50,000, and so forth, of which Minister Haro took charge.

⁶⁸ Such as the war portfolio and the captaincy general of Guanajuato. Santa Anna wrote that he wished to confer with him about resigning the presidency. Cortazar set out, but was seized at Tula on Dec. 25th. *Boletín Notic.*, Dec. 19, 1844. Correspondence between him and Paredes, in *Pabel. Nac.*, Nov. 26, 28, 1844.

⁶⁹ He had no sooner passed the place, however, than they reasserted their adherence to the revolution. The garrison had thought it best to declare their loyalty to Santa Anna. The latter had turned back from Silao on Dec. 13th, sending on the way a warning to Herrera. This and other documents may be found in the different journals of the day, including such remote issues as *Meteoro de Sin.*, Jan 17, 1845.

plies into the city, enrolling troops from among the eager crowd of volunteers, under the direction of Valencia, as second in command, and issuing a decree for similar enlistments throughout the departments of auxiliary forces to be maintained only during the present crisis.⁷⁰ In this task they were cheered by a continuous influx of recruits from all parts of the country, showing that the successful movement and decisive attitude of the capital had turned many departments. A most important accession was that of Bravo, who added greatly to the enthusiasm and strength by marching into Mexico with a considerable force and announcing that Alvarez was also coming.

When Santa Anna, therefore, presented himself before the city he found it strongly protected, with an enthusiastic garrison of fully 8,000 men, with Paredes approaching at the head of 4,000, and other leaders from different directions, while he himself stood proclaimed by the congress as a rebel, divested of authority, and somewhat under the fear of being deserted by his men, to whom alluring baits were held out.⁷¹ To besiege the place seemed hopeless under the circumstances; and so, after a vain exchange of demands with Herrera, together with a blustering challenge to decide the question in a pitched battle, he moved onward to Puebla, hoping by the capture of this less formidable point to check the spread of the revolution eastward, and probably to turn the current. His overtures being firmly rejected by Commandant Inclan, he opened fire against the city on January 2, 1845, and in course of the following days carried several outlying positions. But Inclan offered a stout

⁷⁰ They were to be known as *Voluntarios Defensores de las Leyes*, and raised by the respective assemblies. *Méx., Col. Ley.*, 1844-46, 71. At Mexico all classes hastened to join. Martial law was soon after proclaimed. *Boletín Notic.*, Dec. 20, 23, 1844.

⁷¹ Decrees concerning deserters and destitution of Santa Anna, dated Dec. 11th and 17th. *Méx., Col. Ley.*, 1844-46, 72-3; *Pinart Coll.*, no. 829. Herrera had offered to resign in favor of a more efficient man, but his tender was not accepted. Salas, later regent, displayed great activity in organizing the garrison.

resistance, yielding only step by step. This tenacity was wholly unexpected, for he had only a few hundred men, of whom less than 200 were regular troops, while the besiegers numbered more than 10,000.⁷² Still the place could not hold out much longer. Now came news, however, that Paredes and Alvarez had reached Mexico and were already on the way with relief, under the direction of Bravo, as commander-in-chief, further, that Arias had pronounced for the revolution with the northern army, arresting General Woll, one of the staunchest supporters of the late government. These blows, together with the demoralizing effect of the retrograde march from Silao and the retreat before Mexico, proved decisive. Santa Anna had more bluster than resolution. Although the allied forces were little or not at all superior to his own in number,⁷³ and inferior in training, he no longer held out the challenge for a battle, but raised the siege, abandoned the several advantageous positions gained, and withdrew to an adjoining village, allowing the allies to enter Puebla on the 12th.⁷⁴ To this step contributed probably a doubt of his soldiers' loyalty. He nevertheless proposed to make use of them, if not to fight, to back by their imposing number the negotiations which he now opened with Herrera for securing all the concessions possible. To this end he sent Minister Haro,⁷⁵ supported by the now liberal Cortazar, to

⁷² A plot was fostered to betray him for 200 ounces of gold, but failed. The flower of his small garrison had gone to Mexico. *Bustamante, Hist. Santa Anna*, 395; *Id., Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., i. 237-63; *Méx., Mem. Guer.*, 1845, 12-14.

⁷³ The details of forces under Paredes and his companions, in *Boletín Notic.*, Jan. 12, 1845, etc., show 11,688, of which 3,336 were cavalry.

⁷⁴ The names of Inclan and Governor Cabofranco were by decree of Sept. 6, 1845, ordered inscribed in the assembly hall in commemoration of their valiant defence, and so at Querétaro that of Governor Domínguez, and at Guadalajara those of Paredes and Governor Escobedo. All who joined in the revolt received certain privileges, such as exemption from militia service, and 'llevará la Puebla el renombre de *Invicta*.' *Méx., Decret. Min.*, 1845, no. 34. The siege was practically over on the 7th.

⁷⁵ Although provided with a free pass by Bravo, he narrowly escaped maltreatment from the people at Mexico. An informant of Bustamante declares that a council of war under Santa Anna had decided against firing on the people at Puebla, and even to submit to the new government. *Hist. Santa Anna*, 406-7. Haro's commission is dated Jan. 9th.

demand the acceptance of his spontaneous resignation of the presidency, permission to retire to a foreign country of his own selection, with full pay and restoration of his statues and portraits, and the retention of his officers in their position.⁷⁶ But under the changed aspect of affairs, with reënforcements increasing, Herrera refused to entertain any other terms than unconditional submission with surrender of the military command to Cortazar, and Santa Anna now directed his attention wholly to escape, even before a definite answer came. A large proportion of his men⁷⁷ urged him to make a bold stand, promising to sustain him to the last; but he had no faith in the prospect. He counselled them to submit, and then departed for the coast with a small force.⁷⁸ On approaching Jalapa, he sent to ask General Rincon for a pass under which to embark at Vera Cruz. Instead of consenting, this officer took steps to secure his person; and bidding farewell to the escort, the alarmed Santa Anna hastened away by paths little known, attended only by two intimates. He was discovered near Jico, however,⁷⁹ and taken to Perote, there to await the sentence of congress. This solution of the trouble was celebrated with great demonstrations at Mexico and elsewhere.⁸⁰

Santa Anna protested loudly against his imprison-

⁷⁶ The documents bearing on the case exist in separate form in *Santa Anna, Corresp. entre el Sup. Gob.*, Mexico, 1845, 1-51; also in *Pinart Coll.*, no. 735; *Boletin Notic.*, Jan. 7, 1845, et seq.


⁷⁷ 'Todos le aconsejaron que siguiese la campaña,' says Zamacois, *Hist. Méj.*, xii. 378; but this is wrong, for the retreat from Puebla had increased the demoralization and desertions.

⁷⁸ Of 400 light cavalry under Ávalos, and 300 dragoons, and some hussars under Torrejon, who left with him on the 11th. The former abandoned him at an early stage. *Inclan*, in *Pinart Coll.*, no. 735. When Morales surrendered the army on the 13th there were little over 5,000 men left in camp. *Méx.*, *Nem. Guer.*, 1845, 14.

⁷⁹ With 4 servants, on the 15th. The two intimates escaped. They are said to have been Torrejon and Badillo, but this is doubtful. No bribes prevailed with the Indian captors. According to Villa-Amor, *Biog. Santa Anna*, 20-1, they would have made a tamale of him and burned him, but for the cura's interposition. Official despatches, in *Boletin Notic.*, Jan. 6, 1845, et seq.

⁸⁰ Already on the 13th, when the public announcement was made of his flight. *Méx.*, *Col. Ley.*, 1844-6, 79-80.

ment, and against the presumption, as he termed it, of bringing to trial the constitutional president of the country, guiltless as he was at least of treason.⁸¹ Nevertheless, he considered it best to present a defence of his late attitude. As virtual president, it was his duty to take steps to suppress the revolution of Jalisco, which threatened the peace of the country and stood arrayed against the constitution itself. If in so doing he had among other acts proceeded arbi-



FORTRESS OF PEROTE.

trarily against the authorities at Querétaro, it was because they stood as the avowed accomplices of rebels.⁸² The grand jury of congress nevertheless

⁸¹ 'Contra la independencia, ni contra la forma de gobierno.' Reply to interrogations, in *Santa-Anna, Causa*, 73, etc.

⁸² He had approved the suspension of congress, but this approval was merely an opinion expressed of an act already accomplished. He called attention to his many efforts for improving different departments of administration and fostering public institutions, and to his services for the republican cause, which he was the first to proclaim by rising against Iturbide. He also seeks to influence his judges by explaining that his wealth is but the natural result of long and prudent management, assisted by the high pay from his offices. The argument is swelled by repetitions and pointless

declared for his impeachment, on the ground that he had attacked the system of government established by the constitution, dissolving the departmental assembly of Querétaro, and so forth; that he had promoted the decree suspending congress, and that he had risen with armed force against the re-established constitutional government.⁸³ Proceedings were also continued against Canalizo and the ministers, and a large number of the leading officers who had upheld them were suspended to answer for their course.⁸⁴ The late party was too influential, however, to be treated with great severity, and by decree of May 24th the past was consigned to oblivion in a general amnesty, yet this did not restore to the pardoned their offices,⁸⁵ and it included Santa Anna, Canalizo, and the four ministers only on condition that they should leave the country, the first-named forever, the others for ten years, giving bonds to answer pecuniary claims against them.⁸⁶

verbiage, which add to its weakness. It exists in separate form under *Santa Anna, Exposicion*, 1845, 1-43, also in *Pap. Var.*, xxvi. pt 6, lxxxv. pt 2.

⁸³ This report was made on Feb. 24, 1845. As regards the first charge, he was declared liable under art. 90 of the organic law. His share in suspending congress was manifested in several official and intercepted private letters, as reproduced in the *Causa*. See *Santa Anna, Dictámen del Gran Jurado*, 1-24; *Pap. Var.*, xxvi. pt 8. The dictámen was approved by a vote of 90 against 7. The case thereupon passed to the supreme court, where it continued till May. The process with documents attached exists in *Santa Anna, Causa Criminal, Acusado del Delito de Traicion*, Mex., 1840, 1-245, ap. 1-180. Portions of this appear in separate form under *Méx., Causa Santa Anna*, 1-180; *Santa Anna, Expediente*, 1-176; *Id.*, *Proceso*, 1-55; *Pap. Var.*, xxvi. pts 7, 10. With additional points and comments in *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Méx.*, MS., i. 202-84, ii. 2-140, passim; *Diario, Exact. Méx.*, MS., 1-68; *Santa Anna, Apel. al Criterio*, 8-14; *Escalera y Llana, Méx. Hist.*, 70, etc.; and in the journals of the day, as *Monit. Constit.*, Mar. 4, 1845, etc., and others already quoted. *Voz del Pueblo* and *Defensor Leyes* defended him warmly.

⁸⁴ Over 60 in number, nearly all from the army abandoned by Santa Anna before Puebla.

⁸⁵ Although even these were conceded to most of them. Distinctions and life positions were recognized. *Méx., Col. Ley.*, 1844-46, 111-12. The amnesty, so common a measure in Mexico, had been mooted since February, *Algunas Observ.*, 1845, 1-20; *Amnistia*, 3, etc.; *Pap. Var.*, lxxxv. pt 1, clxxiii. pt 19, and considered in congress, in *Méx., Dictámen sobre Amnistia*, 1-8; *Id.*, *De la Mayoría*, 1-20, and practically conceded by May 12th, *La Minerva*, May 13, 1845. Ex-president Bustamante took advantage of it to return.

⁸⁶ They were to be allowed half of the pay granted them under the last life position held previous to Nov. 29, 1844, on condition of residing where the government indicates. They had to ask for a stay of proceedings against

This termination was probably the best; for with the growing agitation in their party, the influence and obstacles brought to bear on the process, and the difficulties enveloping the new administration, a fresh revolution might come at any time to release the culprits. Some of them accepted the offer at once, including Santa Anna, who embarked with his young wife and a few adherents on June 3d for Habana.⁸⁷ Before leaving he issued one of those well studied appeals wherewith he had more than once touched the ready sympathies of his countrymen. He begged them to forgive the unintentional errors of a man mutilated in defence of his country, and who now in his old age was seeking a refuge among strangers. He would ever, to his last breath, offer up his humble prayers to the eternal one for their prosperity so that they might rank among the foremost and happiest of nations.⁸⁸ He knew well that a flourish of his severed limb could not fail to impress compassionate hero-worshippers, while an array of his 'innocent children,' with a glimpse of his locks turning gray on a distant shore, must stir the tender heart of a people so filial and patriotic.

At Habana he received a merited rebuke in meeting his illustrious predecessor, Bustamante, exiled by him and now on the way home from Europe. Juicios de Dios!⁸⁹ The new administration sought also to

them, as a preliminary step. Rejon, Baranda, and Haro were in hiding. For the protracted suit against them, see *Variedades Jurisp.*, iii. 112-35, 157-96; *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex.*, i. 202-20, passim, ii. 6-9, 111-15; *Basadre, a sus Compat.*, 1-8, his defence; *Miscel.*, iii. pt 1; also *Monit. Constit.*, Mar. 9, 1845; *Amigo del Pueblo*, July 29, 1845; *Boletin Notic.*, Mar. 8, 1845, and other numbers and journals. With review by ministers, in *Mex., Mem. Rel.*, 1845, 12-120; *Id., Guer.*, 1845, 3, etc. The predecessor of Basadre, Reyes, was actually sentenced, after a brilliant defence, to loss of honors, office, and pay, with ten years' imprisonment, for authorizing Santa Anna to take command of the army; but he was pardoned. Rejon had escaped on board an English packet in April. Canalizó, although unwilling to accept the amnesty, was sent out of the country. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 274.

⁸⁷ Not without a certain pomp, although a strong guard had been thought advisable to save him from popular insult. *Diario Gob.*, June 4, 1845.

⁸⁸ In *Voz del Pueblo*, and other journals of June 6, 1845, beginning: 'Mejicanos! en mi ultima edad y mutilado.'

⁸⁹ Exclaimed the later archbishop of Guatemala, then administering the see at Habana, when he related this meeting. *Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal*

counteract the schemer by displaying in the worst light the evils he had brought upon the country by his despotic, dishonest, and extravagant measures. By seizure and illegal sale of national or corporation property, by outrageous contracts, suspended salaries and payments, by embezzlement of funds and other means, the nation had been defrauded during his last rule of fully thirty millions, and burdened with an enormous taxation that oppressed every industry and checked development. A large part of these extortions was held and displayed by his adherents in the most unblushing manner, partly in estates taken from the nation or from institutes and occupied as grants or under lease or trust, Santa Anna himself having increased his estates in Vera Cruz to princely proportions, and elsewhere by new accessions.⁹⁰

The efforts of the new government were directed for a time wholly to reform, one feature of which consisted in replacing the many inefficient officials introduced in every department either by favor or with a view to serve as tools. Partisanship prevailed even now in many instances over merit, yet the change, involving a reduction of the excessive staffs,⁹¹ proved most acceptable. At the same time the administration sought to secure itself by redistribution of

Diaz, 20. Santa Anna's health had suffered somewhat during the long imprisonment at Perote, and his life had even been conspired against by a party of jarocho, as the coast rancheros of Vera Cruz were called. *Id.*, *Hist. Santa Anna*, 419-20.

⁹⁰ Notably the fine property of Encero, where he lately lived in regal pomp. 'Era sabido por todos que de Vera Cruz hasta cerca de Jalapa todo el territorio habia llegado a ser propiedad suya.' *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 265, etc. From this Vera Cruz estate he derived a large income by using his influence to monopolize, at times exclusively, the market at the port. Nor did he scruple at smuggling and other illegal methods. See also the ministerial reports. *Méx.*, *Mem. Rel.*, 1845, 60-2; *Id.*, *Mem. Hac.*, 5 et seq. Others came forth in a sweeping invective against this 'Hombre funesto! Hombre de maldicion!' who has consumed the wealth of the country, corrupted its institutions, violated all laws, betrayed all parties. 'Fathers will teach their children to curse thee, and defrauded widows and orphans and impressed and betrayed soldiers and peasants will join in the outcry,' and so forth. An apostrophe issued as a letter in *Siglo XIX.*, Dec. 28, 1844.

⁹¹ Santa Anna had issued over 12,000 army commissions between 1841-44. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 282.

certain leading gubernatorial and other positions, although not always with prudence. Paredes, for instance, was disposed of with the comandancia general of Mexico, greatly to the discontent of this now popularized revolutionist.⁹² Finances required special and delicate investigation, with a view to conform to the popular clamor for reduction of taxes and relief of industries, yet without hampering the treasury too much. One step in this direction was to check the enormous leakage in the shape of smuggling and the evasion of just tax payments.⁹³ Economy, however, was a difficult task under the involved state of affairs inherited from the late administration. Echeverría abandoned the portfolio of finance in January, Palacio surrendered it in despair two months later, and Luis de la Rosa held it only till August.⁹⁴ A loan was indispensable for giving a semblance of impulse to national defences, but the chambers dared not yield readily to a demand which had so lately proved a main cause for revolution. Yet the mere prospect of fresh imposts was enough to raise a thoughtless outcry, in which joined lustily the horde of malecontents roused by official pruning operations, and the government was assailed for its very lack of power or means to put an immediate end to afflicting evils, such as the continued raid of Indians into the northern provinces. They even used against it, as an argument with the ignorant, such occurrences as the transit of Mercury, and an earthquake of great severity which, on April 7th, did damage in different parts

⁹² For appointments, see *Boletín Notic.*, Jan. 20, 23, Feb. 17, etc., 1845; *San Miguel, Rep. Mex.*, 71-2; *Dispos. Varias*, v. 47, etc.; *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., ii. 13, iii. 74, 99; *Monit. Constit.*, Ap. 19, 1845. The reorganization of the departments was considered in *Méx., Dictámen Puntos Constit.*, 1845, 1-8; *Dublan and Lozano, Ley. Mex.*, v. 4; *Pap. Var.*, clxxii. pt 7, clxxiii. pt 21, one point being the union of Aguascalientes with Zacatecas.

⁹³ To which end informers were lured by a premium of two per cent on confiscations. *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, April 1853, 331-4. Protest against free importation of cotton. *N. Leon, Dictámen sobre Algodón*, 1-8.

⁹⁴ He was appointed on March 29th. *Méx., Col. Ley.*, 1844-6, 98; *Pap. Var.*, lxxxvi. pt iii. 14, 29-30. Thompson comments on Echeverría's hatred of foreigners. *Recoll. Mex.*, 90; *Payno, Méx. y Cuest. Financ.*, 13.

of the republic, especially in the central part bordering on the southern range of the valley of Mexico. Xochimilco suffered extremely, and in the capital a number of buildings were ruined, involving also several lives.⁹⁵

All these circumstances added fuel to party spirit, now stirred also by approaching elections. Federalists and Santanistas grew vociferous, and even the persecuted monarchists ventured to wag their tongues,⁹⁶ under the protecting folds of clerical gowns, and partly by virtue of the government's invitation to send in suggestions for constitutional reforms, a task which now mainly occupied the attention of the chambers, as required by the late revolution.⁹⁷ The chief projects were those from the assemblies, and as these existed in virtue of the actual centralist constitution, it may be seen that the demand for a federal organic law could not prove overwhelming. The proposal to change the system was therefore rejected, partly also on the ground that a new appeal to the nation might place the issue at the mercy of army and mob leaders, with perhaps another dictator. The Santanistas had been watching the progress of the

⁹⁵ The most severe shock here took place at 52 to 56 minutes past 3 p. m., with a marked recurrence on April 10th. The dome of the magnificent Santa Teresa chapel fell in; the San Lázaro hospital was ruined; the aqueduct was broken in several places, and so forth. 'En Xochimilco no ha quedado una casa.' *Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal Diaz*, 31; *Id., Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., ii. 43-54. The virgin image de los Remedios was carried round to calm the terrified people, and the authorities took several precautions, together with measures for relief. Consult *Monit. Constit.*, April 8 to May 4, 1845; also *La Minerva, Diario Gob.*, and other journals; *Cortina, Carta; Pap. Var.*, xciv. pt 6.

⁹⁶ Comments on growth of this party in *Amigo del Pueblo*, July 5, 1845; *Pap. Var.*, cvi. pt viii. 33-5.

⁹⁷ The invitation was issued on Dec. 10, 1844. As specimen of the conflicting suggestions may be noted: *N. Leon, Dictámen sobre Constit.*, 1-18; *Coah., Iniciativa Reformas*, 1-43; *Dur., Id.*, 1-14; *Oaj., Id.*, 1-38; *Mich., Id.*, 1-14; *Zac., Id.*, 1-34; *Pap. Var.*, lxxxv. pts 4-5. Also in *Monit. Constit.*, April 11, 13, May 13, 1845, *Boletín Notic.*, *Diario Gob.*, *La Minerva, Amigo del Pueblo*, and other journals. Comments in *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., iii. 158-9; *Gutiérrez, Contest.*, 24-32; *Miranda, Espos.*, 18-58. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 687-9, 703, takes a very impartial view, although a federalist. Otero advocates strongly federalism. *Ensayo*, 63-4, 118-36. While Rosa upholds a middle course. *Pap. Var.*, xlii. pt viii. 43-6, clv. pt 5, clxxi. pt 17.

agitation. Their object was return to power at any price. They were too greatly in the minority at the moment to effect anything by themselves, but the federalists were stronger, and so they proposed a fusion, offering to sacrifice principles if their captive champion were adopted as joint leader. This was readily agreed to, as it had been substantially during the Urrea-Farías outbreak under Bustamante.⁹⁸ A positive declaration against the segregation of Texas was added to gain support from the hot-headed portion of the community, and emissaries were despatched in different directions to promote coöperation. In Puebla sympathetic manifestations became apparent; the still subsisting hostilities in the Mizteca region obtained a fresh impulse; the assemblies of Zacatecas and Yucatan spoke firmly for a restoration of the constitution of 1824; the governor of Chihuahua was deposed by a bloodless uprising, and so also in Tabasco, although here the comandante militar Martínez prepared to assert with arms the supremacy of the federalists.⁹⁹

Santa Anna, who had lent the aid of his purse to these manifestations, was daily waiting for an opportunity to obtain his release in order to place himself at the head of forces, but the alarmed authorities hastened to send him out of the country.¹⁰⁰ This served greatly to disconcert the plans laid; nevertheless, the factions at Mexico resolved to strike a blow, availing themselves of the well known federalist sympathy there, and the popularity of their chief among certain sections of the rabble and of the army, which had become discontented under the economic pressure of a distressed government.¹⁰¹ On June 7th, accord-

⁹⁸ This president also enlisting the federalists just before his fall, as Santa Anna likewise attempted to do.

⁹⁹ This the most pronounced of the provincial manifestations took place on June 14th. For details concerning them all, see *Siglo XIX.*, *Monit. Constit.*, and other journals during June and July 1845.

¹⁰⁰ 'Creyó que con quince dias mas de existir en la República recobraría su imperio.' *Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal Diaz*, i. 22.

¹⁰¹ Among the promoters are named the reconciled Tornel, Boreas, deputy for Yucatan, Lafragua, Farías, and Olaguibel, who is said to have written the pronunciamiento.

ingly, General Rangel of the artillery¹⁰² entered the palace with some of the seduced troops, and seized the president and three of his ministers. Fortunately Herrera had, in anticipation of an outbreak, taken precautions; and warned by the war minister who had eluded the rebels, Uruga, the colonel in command at the palace, hastened to the rescue with a strong force. A brief though sharp contest, involving a loss of twenty-three men, sufficed to reduce the intruders; and elsewhere similar prompt measures served to counteract the effort of conspirators, who with bell-ringing and shouts of Federation and Santa Anna! sought to rally the populace.¹⁰³ Rangel was captured in a hiding-place, yet let off by a sympathetic court-martial with ten years' confinement to Acapulco fortress,¹⁰⁴ while the rebellious troops were distributed in different directions to brood and brew fresh trouble. The Tabasco movement was also quelled, with the arrest of the leader.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² Seized in December as a leading Santanist officer. *Boletín Notic.*, Dec. 29, 1844.

¹⁰³ Among the fallen was Captain Othon, the captain of the guard which joined Rangel.

¹⁰⁴ This court, one of Santa Anna's permanent institutions, was now dissolved by the congress. The defence and judgment were based on technicalities, *Requena, Defensa del Gen. Rangel*, 1-16; *Id.*, *Segunda Defensa*, 1-8, of so shallow an order that the court was assailed and obliged to defend itself. *Rangel, Expos. por la Corte*, 1-53. For additional details, see *Pap. Var.*, xiv. pts 4-5, lxxxv. pts 10-12, lxxxvi. pt. 3, cxviii. pts 1-2; *Rivera, Méx. Pint.*, i. 23, with account of the palace movement; also *Monit. Constit.*, June 1, 8 to 26, 1845, passim, and other journals. *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Méx.*, MS., ii. 123-73, 211, iii. 18-20, 66-7. Some of Rangel's fellow-officers were degraded.

¹⁰⁵ *Tah.*, *Manif. que hace el Com.*, 1-19; *Amigo del Pueblo*, July 19, 1845.

The following additional authorities have been consulted for the foregoing chapter: *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, MS., vi. 1; *Id.*, *Gabinete Méx.*, 98-104, 135-7, 205-12, ii. 55-7, 164-206; *Id.*, *Nuevo Bernal Diaz*, i. 18-32, 67-70, 90-2; *Id.*, *Hist. Iturbide*, 214, 291-3; *Id.*, *No hay Peor Cuña*, 1-15; *Id.*, *Santa Anna*, passim, MS., ii. 1-8, 17-26, 40, 46, 54-66, 81, 127-8, MS., iii. 22-61; *Id.*, *Mem. para la Hist. Méx.*, MS., i.-iii. passim; *Id.*, *Diario Méx.*, MS., xliii. 291-2, 336, xlv.-xvi. passim; *Id.*, *Diario Exacto Méx.*, MS., nos 3 and 5; *Dublan and Lozano, Legisl. Méj.*, iii. 535-6, 709-10, 722, 731-3, 753, iv. passim, v. 10-11, 17-18; *Córtes Diar. Congreso*, iv. no. 91, 1751; *Cong. Globe*, 1842-3, 62; *Willie, Noticias Hacda Públ.*, 30, 32, 53-7, 76-7, ap. 14-28; *Arrullaga, Recop.*, 1838, 204-6, May 1849-April 1850, 12-26; *Niles' S. Am. and Méx.*, i. 116-19; *Id.*, *Register*, lii. 97, 113, lviii. 354, lix. 17, lxi. 66, 196, 241, 322, lxii. 51, 64, 96, 145, 163-4, 192, 210-11, 258, 305, lxiii.-lxv. passim, lxvi. 211, 257, 292, 305-6, 321, 326, 337-8, 353, lxvii. 2, 178, 193, 256-7,

273, 304, 321, 343, 368, 383, lxxviii. 129, lxxix. 83, 91, 99, lxxiv. 310-12; Domenech, *Hist. du Mex.*, ii. 158-201; *Derecho Intern. Mex.*, 3d pt, 218-32; *Mex., Col. Ley. y Órd.*, Jan.-May 1854, vi. 14-20; *Méz., Col. Leyes Fund.*, 227-65; *Méz., Legist. Mej.*, 1848, 493-4; 1850, 53-6; 1853, April-July, 381-4, 531-4; *Méz., Col. Leyes y Decr.*, 1840, 436-8, 507, 620-1, 771; 1841, 161-85; 1844-6, passim; 1848, 366-77, 465, 492-3; Cuevas, *Espos. Dif. Francia; Disposic. Varias*, v. fol. 40-47; *Archivo Mex., Col. Leyes*, i. 147-63; Ricera, *Hist. Jalapa*, iii. passim; *Id.*, *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 170, 227-75; *Id.*, *Méz. Pint.*, i. 22-3, 143-5, 157-61; *Estado May. Gral. Ejér.*, 4-8; Navarro, *Informe sobre frec. Revol.*, 108; Zarco, *Hist. Congreso*, i. 50-5, 62; Gonzalez, *Hist. Aguascal.*, 132-65; Sierra y Rosso, *Discurso en Sta Paula*, 1-8; Jenkins' *Hist. Méx.*, 22-3, 43, 125; Cos, *Estadist. Part. Silao*; Payno, *Méz. y Cuest. Financ.*, 13; Navarro & Ibarra, *Discurso*, 1-15; Perez, *Dicc. Geogr.*, etc., i. 335-7, ii. 415-36, iii. 173-80; Suarez, *Informe*, 8-9, 18-19, 108-9; Hunt's *Merchants' Mag.*, ix. 281, xi. 571, xii. 370, xiv. 98-9; *N. Am. Rev.*, xviii. 1-47; *Variedades Jurip.*, iii. 112-35, 157-96; Ezeta, *Man. de Alcaldes*, 1-252; *Abusos de Poder Judic.*; Cobre, *Tabaco y Prést.*; Heller, *Reisen in Mex.*, 53-7, 64-5; Stephens' *Yuc.*, ii. 243-7; *Guerra entre Méx. y Est. Un.*, 22-3; Peña y Peña, *Práctica For.*, iv. 1-390; Almaraz, *Memor. Metall.*, 14; Coronel, *Doc. Hist. Cal.*, no. 80; La Cruz, v. 633, 637; Anaya, *Alocuc. Tabas.*, 1-14; Fossey, *Méz.*, 172-3, 286-7, 533-6; Cortina, *Cartilla Moral Mil.*, 1-59; *Id.*, *Carta á los Edit.*; Young's *Hist. Méx.*, 263-328; Alvarez, *Vindicacion*, 1-24; Benton's *Debates in Congr.*, xiv. 434-5; *Teatro de Sta Anna, Observ. Com.*, 1-15; N. Leon, *Dict. sobre Ref. Constit.*, 1-18; N. Leon, *Dict. sobre Algodon*, 1-8; Alm. *Calend. Man. y Guin.*, 1842, 5-31; *South. Quart. Rev.*, xv. 98-101; Ramirez, *Mem. para Hist. Tehuan.*, 13-15, 18-19; Gilliam's *Travels*, i. 56-78, 160-371; Bravo and Alvarez, *Manif.*, 1-35; *El Voto de Son.*, 1843, 118-19, 179-80, 211, 235, 240; 1844, 251; Conejo, *Acusacion contra el Auditor*, 1-24; Basadre, *El Gral. á sus Compañeritos*, 1-8; Thompson's *Recoll. Méx.*, 3-11, 32-98, 115, 124-31, 150, 167-200, 214-51, 274-7; Caballero, *Hist. Alm.*, 15; *Anales Minist. Fomento*, ii. 771-90; *El-mont. Geog. Civ.*, 17-31; Miranda, *Esposic. Públ.*, 18-58; Couto, *Defensa*; *Monitor Constit. Ind.*, 1845, March-June, passim; *Dict. Corte Supr. Justit. sobre Asistencias*, 1-11; Jay's *Mex. War*, 74-8; *Algunas Observ.*, 1-20; *Méz., Dict. sobre Convoc.*, 1-20; *Méz., Manif. y Convoc.*, Dec. 1841, 1-23; *Méz., Causas Crim. Sta Anna*, 1-180; *Méz., Decreto sobre Alcabalas*, 1-23; *Méz., Junta de Minería*, 1-12; *Méz., Decretos Min.*, 1845, no. 34; *Méz., El Congreso de 1842*, 1-6; *Méz., Plana Mayor*, 1842, ll. 34; *Méz., Reglam. Junta Nac.*; Lacroix, *Ann. des Voy.*, 4^e Année, 183-201; Busto, *Estad. Rep. Méx.*, iii. 1st pt, 215; *El Razonador*, March 1, 1848, 4; *Santa Anna, Manif.*; *Id.*, *Causa Crim.*, 1-245, ap. 133-80; *Id.*, *Espec. á la Cámara*, 1-43; *Id.*, *Correspond. entre el Supr. Gob. y*, 1-51; *Id.*, *Dict. Gran Jurado*, 1-24; *Id.*, *Apel. al Buen Criterio*, 8-14; *Id.*, *Proceso*, 1-55; *Id.*, *Exped. Formulo*, 1-176; Weichardt, *Die Vereinigt. Staaten*, 1-447; Taylor's *Spec. Press*, 202, 612, 612; Robinson's *Mex. and Her Mil. Chieftains*, 195-200, 245-63; *Manifestar. Que hace el Comand. en Jefe*, 1-19; Macgregor's *Proj. Amer.*, i. 634-7; Colima, *Reflex. ó Notas*, 1-8; *El Presidente Provis. á las Tropas*; Mayer's *Hist. Mex. War*, 32-5; *Id.*, *Mex. Az.*, 325-32; *Id.*, *Méz. as It Was*, 157-8, 292-6, 326-34; *Def. Integ. Nac.*, 1844, Aug.-Nov., passim; Zamacois, *Hist. Mój.*, xii. 265-72, 305-33; *Salv. Diavro Ofic.*, Jan. 23, 1875, 6; *Nouv. Annales Voy.*, xcv. 250, ci. 361-2, cix. 241; *El Pajo de N. Méx.*, Aug. 2-9, 1845; Masson, *Olla Podrida*, 61-118; Estera, *Santa Anna Exposic.*, 1-43; Marnier, *Les Nouv. Voy.*, ii. 65-101; Semmes' *Service Afloat*, 23-32; Mata y Reyes, *Oracion Civ.*, 1-8; Robertson's *l'isit to Mex.*, i. 147-8; La Minerva, 1845, March-June, passim; Michoacan, *Informes Dados*, 1-28; *Méz., Doc. Relativ. Ultimatum*, 43-95, 112-25; *Méz., Bases Orj.ánicas*, 1-45; *Lista Daños Demolic. Parian*, MS., 1-7; Gutierrez, *Carta y Opin.*, 1-96; *Id.*, *Contestacion*, 1-17; Tornel, *Nacion Mej.*, 73-7; S. L. Potosi, *Plan que el Gobernador*, 3-10; Mühlenpfordt, *Versuch einer Getreuen*, i. 358-493, ii. 241-95, 503-7; Pinart *Coll.*, *Print.*, nos 525, 729, 730, 731, 735; Long's *Ant. and West Ind.*, 186-7; *Relacion Hist. Asamblea de Quer.*, 1-66; Ponton's *Earthquakes*, 73; Pabel, *Nac.*, 1844, Oct.-Dec., passim; Colima, *Represent.*,

3-18; *Larenaudière, Mex. and Guat.*, 1; *Buenrostro, Hist. Primer y Segund. Cong.*, Docs nos 52-5, 153-235; *Peterson's Mil. Heroes*, ii. 27; *Septien y Villaseñor, Mem. Estad.*, 287-92; *Amigo del Pueb.*, 1845, June-Dec., passim; *Calderon's Life in Mex.*, ii. 128, 255; *Mason's Pict. Life in Mex.*, ii. 171-7; *Baranda, Decr. de Escuelas*, 1-12; *Puebla, Discurso; Requena, Defensa que hizo*, 1-16; *Gregory's Hist. Mex.*, 48-58; *Otero, Obras*, MS., iv. 129-90; *Id.*, *Orac. Cív.*, 1-21; *Id.*, *Ensayo Cuest. Polít.*, 63-4, 100-1, 118-36; *Frost's Pict. Hist. Mex.*, 176; *Rangel, Esposic. hecha*, 1-53; *Id.*, *Segunda Defensa*, 1-8; *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Mex.*, Print. i. no. 96, ii. nos 352, 472, MS., ii. 454, 471; *Méx.*, *Manif. y Convoc.*, 1-22; *Méx.*, *Continuac. Doc. Cesacion Ayunt.*, 1-16; *Méx.*, *Dict. Com. de Puntos Constit. sobre Amnistía*, 1-8; *Méx.*, *Dict. Mayoría Com. sobre Amnistía*, 1-23; *Méx.*, *Proyecto Constit.*; *Méx.*, *Proyecto Constit. Mayoría*, 1-119; *Méx.*, *Proyecto Constit. Minoría*, 1-42; *Méx.*, *Proyecto Constit. Comis. Espec.*, 1-44; *El Movimiento*, Nov. 10, 1844; *La Abeja*, 1844, Oct.-Nov., passim; *Carbajal, Vindicac.*, 1-53; *San Migue', Repúb. Mex. Direct.*, 57-8, 71-176; *Richthofen, Rep. Mex.*, 326-33; *Guadalajara, Observ. Bases Org.*; *Id.*, *Esposic. hecha*, 1-18; *Observ. Judic. Legisl.*, 549-51; *Osborne's Guide W. Ind.*, 118-22; *Castillo, Dice. Hist.*, 136; *Oaj.*, *Init. Feb. 1845 sobre Reformas*, 1-38; *Méx.*, *Piezas Justific.*, 55-6; *Méx.*, *Bol. Ley.*, 1863, 273-80; *Méx.*, *Decreto sobre Arreglo Trib.*, 1-16; *Méx.*, *Dict. Comis. Puntos Constit. Câm. Senad.*, 1-8; *Manif. Gob. Provis. Yuc.*, 1-76; *Green's Journal*, 239, 450-57; *Cutts' Cong. Cal. and N. Mex.*, 12-14; *Jal.*, *Exposic. que Dirige*, 3-12; *Id.*, *Patriót. Iniciat.*, 1-34; *Discurso Pronunc. por el Presid. Provis.*; *Memor. Hist.*, 1846, Jan. 1-2, Feb. 5; *Baqueiro, Ensayo Yuc.*, i. 46-108, ii. 448-54, iii. 455-75, ap. 36-58, 64-70; *El Constit.*, 1844, Jan.-April, passim; *Yuc.*, *Piezas Justific. Conducta Polít.*, 10-36; *Manif. Gral. Alvarz.*, 32-41, 57-68, 136-58; *Yuc.*, *Inf. sobre Causas frec. Cambios Polít.*, 8-11, 56-65; *Supl. Diar. Gob. Méj.*, March 31, 1838, 74-83, 127-43, 197-219; *Rosa, Discurso en la Alameda*, 32-46; *Salinas del Peñon Blanco; Paredes y Arrillaga, Contestac. que á la Circular*, 3-22; *Méx.*, *Ayunt. Expos. Plaza Vol.*; *Estrada, Méj. y el Archiduque*, 33-5; *Tam.*, *Reglam. Gob. Municip.*, 28-9; *Observ. sobre Proyecto Bases Org.*, 1-16; *Méx.*, *Exposic. al Presid. Provis.*, 1-16; *Méx.*, *Reglam. p. Gob. Junta Nac. Legisl.*, 1-20; *Méx.*, *Dict. sobre Convoc.*; *Gutierrez, Contest. al Libelo*, 17-24; *Pap. Var.*, xiv. pts 4, 5, 6, xvi. pt 12, xxvi. pts 6, 7, 8, 10, xxxix. pts 11, 13, 16, 20, xli. pt 19, xlii. pts 5, 8, xlix. pts 10, 17, liii. pt 6, lvii. pt 6, lxxvii. pt 2, lxxxii. pts 7, 8, 9, lxxxiii. pts 4, 11, lxxxiv. pts 1, 2, 3, 6, lxxxv. pts 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, cvi. pt 8, cxvi. pt 1, cxvii. pt 2, cxxx. pt 1, cl. pt 1, 2, cliv. pt 1-10, 13, clv. pts 5, 12, 14, clvi. pts 1, 2, 3, 21, 22, clxv. pt 16, clxxi. pt 17, clxxii. pt 7, clxxiii. pts 19, 21, clxxv. pt 9, clxxv. pt 3, cxci. pts 7, 8, cxci. pt 6; *Escalera y Llana, Méj. Hist. Descript.*, 69-80; *Museo Mex.*, ii. 39-40, iii. 438-40, iv. 400; *Barbachano, Mem. Camp.*, 59-67; *Boletín de Notic.*, Dec. 1844, Jan.-March 1845, passim; *Coah.*, *Inic. Reformas*, 1-43; *Doc. Relat. Junta Artesanos*, MS., 1-17; *Correo Nac.*, Dec. 2, 1847, Jan. 20, 1848; *Villa-Amor, Biog. Gen. Sta Anna*, 17-21; *Dur.*, *Inic. Reformas*, 14; *Rivero, Méj. en 1842*, 74-136, 240-1, 307; *Yuc.*, *Exposic. del Gob.*; *Id.*, *Tratado que Celebró*, 1-18; *Id.*, *Mem.*, 1840, 4, annex no. 26; *Id.*, *Mem. Leida*, 1845, pp. iii.-v.; *Id.*, *Manif. Gob. Provis.*, 1-76; *Soc. Mex. Geog. Bol.*, iii. 455-63, 2^a ép., iv. 743; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 250-69; *Ancona, Hist. Yuc.*, iii. 326-81; *Méx.*, *Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 247, 255-6, 1037-41; *Id.*, *Mem. Guerra*, 1841, 40-1; 1844, 4, 11-30, 54-9, 90; 1845, 1-5, annexes nos 1-14 and B; 1846, 10; *Id.*, *Mem. Justicia*, 1844, 3-20, 61-9, annexes nos 1-7; 1845, 1-33, 63; *Id.*, *Mem. Relac.*, 1844, 1-86, annexes nos 1-cxxviii. 1-20; 1845, 1-128; 1846, annex A, pp. 48-66; 1847, 45-6, annexes, pp. 48-66; 1850, 10-34, annexes nos 1-10; *Id.*, *Minist. Relac. Exter.*, 1 1; *U. S. Govt.*, cong. 27, ses. 2, H. Ex. Doc. 209, vol. v.

CHAPTER XII.

POLITICAL COMMOTIONS.

1845-1847.

JOSÉ JOAQUÍN DE HERRERA AS CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT—OPPOSITION TO HIS POLICY ON THE TEXAN QUESTION—PREPARATIONS FOR WAR—ARCHBISHOP POSADA'S COURSE—PLAN OF SAN LUIS POTOSÍ—HERRERA DEPOSED—PAREDES AS PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT—DISSATISFACTION—REVOLUTION AT GUADALAJARA—PAREDES OVERTHROWN—SANTA ANNA RECALLED—HE IS ELECTED PRESIDENT—GÓMEZ FARIAS AS VICE-PRESIDENT ASSUMES THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE—SANTA ANNA SUPERSEDES HIM.

THE provisional president and his cabinet favored the policy of settling the Texan and American questions by compromise;¹ but they encountered violent opposition from the press, the people, and the army, all of whom clamored for war. Amid the confusion, it had been arranged that the presidential office should be filled by a president constitutionally chosen. Congress, on the 14th of September, 1845, counted the votes cast by the departments, and declared José Joaquín de Herrera elected;² and on the 16th he was formally installed. In his inaugural address President Herrera promised to abstain from partisanship and to look after the army and finances. Of the Texan question he spoke vaguely.³

¹ The relations of the U. S. with Mexico on the Texan and other questions are fully treated elsewhere.

² Vera Cruz, Puebla, Oajaca, Guanajuato, Jalisco, San Luis Potosí, Zacatecas, Aguascalientes, Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, Durango, Chihuahua, Querétaro, and Yucatan voted for him. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, v. 35-6; *Mex., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1844-6, 285; *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., iii. 20-2; *Id.*, N^o Bernal Diaz, 48; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 705. The other candidates had been Manuel Gómez Pedraza and Juan N. Almonte.

³ *Herrera, Discurso ante el Cong.*, 1-24.

José Joaquin de Herrera was born in Jalapa in 1792, and entered the Spanish army as a cadet of the Corona regiment in 1809.⁴ He was among the first to second Iturbide's plan de Iguala, entered Mexico with the trigarante army, and was then commissioned a brigadier. Herrera aided the downfall of the emperor, and in March 1824 became secretary of war under President Victoria, proving himself a good republican, and an honorable man, a character which he sustained to the end of his life. It was his uprightness that gave him a political standing, his talents being only mediocre.

Herrera thought that now was the best time to bring about the settlement of the Texan question, and save his country from a sanguinary, compromising, and ruinous war. But the press kept up its clamor, and the opposition qualified as perfidy and treason all attempts to maintain peace with the American usurpers, war being deemed the only recourse to save the national honor. The administration, under that pressure, had then, though regretfully, to adopt the war policy, which at once unified the opinion that had been formed in July; many who had formerly favored compromise being now for war. Hence the erroneous impression of the friends of the government that the division on the Texan question had ended.

The departmental assemblies tendered all their resources, and private citizens vied with one another in pecuniary contributions and offers of service. Local authorities organized the militia, and prominent officers asked to be employed against the Americans.

Soon after Herrera's election, and before his inauguration, the members of the cabinet, namely, Cuevas,

⁴ He was in the battles of Aculco, Guanajuato, and Puente de Calderon, during the revolutionary war, which won him a medal of honor. After an active service, he was, in Nov. 1814, promoted to captain. In 1816 he signally defeated the insurgents, under Mariscal Ávila at San Pedro, capturing all their artillery and other war material. He continued serving the crown till Oct. 1820, when as a lieutenant-col he applied for and obtained his retirement. He then settled in Perote, and opened an apothecary's shop.

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Riva Palacio, García Conde, and La Rosa, resigned their offices, as if fearful of the situation in which they had placed themselves. The following were then called to succeed them: Manuel de la Peña y Peña, secretary of relations; Bernardo Couto, of justice; Pedro Fernández del Castillo, of the treasury; and Pedro María Anaya, of war.⁵ These ministers had to face the old evils, and also to meet much opposition by reason of supposed lukewarmness on the war question.

Several officers of the first division, stationed in Querétaro and San Luis Potosí, refused to obey the orders sent them to advance upon the frontier, and mutinied.⁶ General Paredes asked leave to visit Mexico, where he could verbally arrange the plan for the campaign in Texas; but it was not granted, as he was suspected of an intent to revolt against the government, as Álvarez had done in Guerrero.⁷

The army was discontented, owing to reforms the executive had desired to introduce, though he had abandoned his project in order to induce it to march with alacrity to the frontier. Paredes was finally summoned to Mexico, and ordered to surrender his command to Filisola, but his officers opposed the change of commanders,⁸ and Paredes then detained the force that under Gaona was on the way to Saltillo.

A plan was now favored by the friends of the government to call on the clergy to contribute to the support of the national honor with a loan of fifteen million dollars. It was seconded by both houses of congress, and it seemed as if the hour of trial for the church had come. It was saved this time, however,

⁵ Couto was succeeded Oct. 20th by Demetrio Montes de Oca. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 720.

⁶ Alleging that they had not received the necessary supplies for a campaign. *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., ii. 216. iii. 8-10.

⁷ He prevented the departure of an expedition for California, and liberated Gen. Rangel, who had been ordered as a prisoner to Acapulco.

⁸ Bustamante has it that it was by Paredes' own suggestion; and even surmises that Texan gold influenced the movement. *Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., ii. 220.

by its friends. The metropolitan of Mexico was now Doctor Manuel Posada y Garduño, the first archbishop appointed after Mexico became a nation.⁹

It was rumored and believed that Paredes intended to set up a convention and a triumvirate; and it was also known that Santa Anna, then in Cuba, contemplated a return to Mexico.¹⁰ Affairs came to a climax when the army of the reserve, numbering about 5,000 men,¹¹ made a pronunciamiento on the 14th of December at San Luis Potosí, instead of marching to Texas as ordered by the government, the object of which movement was to depose the administration and to set up another better suited to their views.¹² The assembly of San Luis Potosí seconded the plan; and

⁹ Dr Posada was born in San Felipe el Grande, or del Obraje, in the province of Mexico, on the 27th of Sept. 1790. He had, previous to his episcopate, held high positions in the church, university, and government, and toward the end of 1824 was a senator in the national congress. In 1833, being the chancellor of Mexico, he was exiled from his country and went to reside in the U. S., returning in 1834. His consecration as archbishop was May 31, 1840. He made himself very useful with his talents and experience, as well as his personal and pecuniary services, several times aiding the national treasury with large sums from both the ecclesiastical revenues and his own private fortune. The archbishop was remarkable for his kindness and affability, as well as for his learning, conversational powers, and fondness for literature and the fine arts. March 31, 1846, he had a severe attack of congestion, from which he rallied; but on the 21st of April it came on again with greater force, and he succumbed on the last day of the month. His funeral was on a magnificent scale. *Arroniz, Biog. Mex.*, 267, 270-1; *Sosa, Episcop. Mex.*, 220-3; *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, i. 199, ii. 58-9, 95; *Thompson's Recoll. Mex.*, 90-1.

¹⁰ It was likewise reported that Yucatan had resolved to organize herself as an independent republic under the constitution of 1824. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 721. Nov. 29th, Paredes wrote the president that he was in daily receipt of revolutionary plans from all quarters. The people, he said, wanted a change of government by any means. As for himself, he saw that 'the government has neither plan nor principles, and is wholly controlled by the whim of factions.' *Méz., Contestac. habidas*, 6, in *Pinart Coll.*

¹¹ Forming the first and second brigades, commanded respectively by Filisola and Gaona. They arrived at San Luis Potosí on the 28th of June. *El Amigo del Pueblo*, 1845, July 8th and Sept. 2d, 27 and 124; *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex.*, iv. 98-105.

¹² Among the charges preferred against the government, was this: it had allowed to land on Mexican territory and to reside at the capital the plenipotentiary of the U. S., 'que, de acuerdo con el actual gabinete viene á comprar nuestra independencia y nuestra nacionalidad.' The resolutions adopted were ten. The main points were to discontinue the authority of the existing administration, and to convoke an extraordinary congress with ample powers to constitute the nation. In the mean time the executive authority to be held by Paredes. *Méz., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 265-70; *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., iii. 192; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 721-8.

on the 15th Paredes proclaimed that he had assumed the task of reorganizing the republic, and of upholding the national rights which had been outraged by the United States. This pronunciamiento, it has been said, was promoted with the view of establishing a monarchical government.¹³ Whether it was so or not, it met with the support or indifference of those who wanted Herrera's administration overthrown, and was soon seconded or tolerated throughout the republic.¹⁴

Amidst the confusion caused by these events, congress sat on the 28th of December, 1845, after a revolutionary movement initiated at the capital by the Celaya regiment had been quelled.¹⁵ The government could no longer offer any resistance to the hostile elements concentrated at the capital. The revolution was proclaimed in the Ciudadela early in the morning of the 30th by General Valencia. President Herrera surrendered the government on the same day, and retired to his house.¹⁶

The revolutionary chief and his army entered the capital on the 2d of January, 1846, and on the same day called a meeting of general officers. In a brief address he made known his resolution to uphold the national liberties and personal rights, and then laid before the meeting a plan that in his opinion would put an end to the evils the nation was undergoing,

¹³ Paredes in his address glowingly depicted the happiness enjoyed by Mexico during the Spanish viceregal sway, comparing that condition with the present misery, which, it must be confessed, he did not exaggerate.

¹⁴ Congress and the executive opposed the projects of the revolutionists in the decrees of Dec. 23d. The powers of the latter were also enlarged for the next six months; but all availed nothing. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, v. 90-103; *Méz.*, *Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1844-6, 309-11, 317, 395; *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., iii. 206-7, 220-1, iv. 1. Several departmental assemblies at first refused to second the revolution, but afterward acquiesced. Others gave it their approval at once. *La Prudencia*, offl journ. of Guan., alcance al no. 68, Dec. 24 and 25, 1845; *Méz.*, *Boletín Ofic.*, no. 3, Dec. 27, 1845; *Mem. Histor.*, Jan. 2-16, 1846, passim; *La Cruz*, v. 637; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 724-9.

¹⁵ Paredes had then his headquarters in Huehuetoca.

¹⁶ Full particulars on events in Mexico from Sept. 16th to Dec. 30th are given in *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., iii. 1-223 passim; *Id.*, *Nuevo Bernal Diaz*, i. 85-125; *Dispos. Var.*, v. 48; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, v. 105-19.

and requested that it should be discussed with freedom. The plan, set forth in ten articles, was approved almost unanimously, the only dissentient votes being those of generals José Alcorta and José María Miñón.¹⁷

The junta of representatives assembled on the 3d, elected Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga president ad interim, and on the next day placed him in office.¹⁸

Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga was born in the city of Mexico on the 6th of January, 1797. He entered the Spanish army as a cadet on the 6th of January, 1812. Though he saw much active service in that eventful period, having taken part in twenty-two actions, he became captain only in March 1821, at which time he joined Iturbide, and entered the capital with the trigarante army. With the marqués de Vivanco he proclaimed liberty at Puebla in February 1823. In 1831 he was promoted to colonel, and the next year to brigadier-general.¹⁹ After a campaign south of Morelia he was made a general of division. He aided Santa Anna to establish the Bases de Tacubaya, destroying the

¹⁷ The ten propositions were as follows: 1. The citizens that were exercising the legislative and executive functions have ceased to act. 2. A junta of representatives of the departments—two for each department—appointed by the general-in-chief of the army, will at once choose the person that is to wield the supreme executive authority, until the extraordinary congress which is to constitute the nation shall assemble, pursuant to art. 3 of the plan adopted at San Luis Potosí, Dec. 14, 1845. 3. The junta aforesaid to dissolve immediately after choosing the acting president. 4. The powers of such president to be those prescribed by law; he will not go beyond them, except to provide for the defence of the national territory; but always respecting the guaranties prescribed by the laws. 5. The acts of the acting president's ministers to be amenable to the first constitutional congress. 6. The president, eight days after assuming his office, shall convoke the extraordinary congress, to meet in four months at the capital. 7, 8, and 9 continue in office the council, officials, and judiciary. 10. The person to be persecuted for political opinions previously expressed. *Méx., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 271-3; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xii. 405-6.

¹⁸ The junta then adjourned sine die. Its president was Archbishop Posada, and the secretaries Juan N. Almonte and Bernardo Guimbarda. Among its other prominent members were Lucas Alaman, Carlos M. Bustamante, generals Nicolás Bravo, José M. Tornel, and Pedro Ampudia, and Bishop Pardo of Yucatan. *Méx., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 271-6, 316, 372-3; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xii. 409; *Memor. Histór.*, Jan. 5, 1846.

¹⁹ His quarrelsome disposition had lost him the favor of the chief of the army, and he was sent to serve in the western states. Paredes began to take part in political affairs in 1835, and from that time was an upholder of centralism. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 192, 286-98.

constitution of the Siete Leyes, and setting up the strongest dictatorship that was ever inflicted on Mexico. The government did not, however, reward him as he had expected, he being merely retained as comandante general of Jalisco, where his despotism made him hateful. Paredes possessed no qualification but that of brute courage. It is said of him, however, that he refused to accept the presidential salary during the time he held the executive office, contenting himself with the pay of a general.

After promising in his inaugural address to devote his whole attention to the consolidation of order in the interior, and to the defence of the country's honor and rights in the impending trouble with the United States, President Paredes formed his cabinet with the following-named ministers: Luis Parres, of the treasury; Joaquin Castillo y Lanzas, of relations; Luciano Becerra, bishop of Chiapas, of justice and ecclesiastical affairs; and Juan N. Almonte, of war.²⁰

The new government endeavored to bring order out of the chaos existing in the treasury, and issued stringent measures to clear the country of highwaymen and gamblers. Other important decrees were also passed with the view of decreasing the number of public offices, and of bringing about an arrangement of business in the several departments. The press was allowed a certain freedom for the discussion of public affairs, with a warning not to abuse it.²¹

In the interval preceding the convocation of a constituent congress, the press and public warmly dis-

²⁰ *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., iv. 1-3, 18-22; *Id.*, *Nuevo Bernal Diaz*, i. 107-10; *El Tiempo*, Jan. 25, 1846; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 270-1, 275-6. Changes soon occurred in the cabinet; Parres being succeeded by Manuel Eduardo Gorostiza, and the latter in May by the banker Francisco Iturbe. The president having lost faith in Almonte superseded him with José María Tornel, which greatly displeased the monarchists; and to get rid of Almonte appointed him minister to France; but he remained in Habana at the side of Santa Anna. Bishop Becerra was replaced by José María Jiménez.

²¹ The *Diario del Gobierno* of Jan. 8, 1846, said that the government was resolved to punish all abuses of the privilege granted citizens to publish their opinions.

cussed the question of form of government. Some were of the opinion that the restoration of the constitution of 1824 was the only possible means of saving the country; others favored the central régime; and there was not wanting a number among the property owners and merchants who advocated the supposed advantages of a constitutional monarchy with a foreign prince.²² At last the expected convocation was decreed on the 26th of January, 1846, its authorship being attributed to Lucas Alaman. This document conveyed the idea that the extraordinary congress would carry out the fifth proposition of the San Luis plan of December 14, 1845, and also take into consideration such measures as the executive should suggest to save the rights and dignity of the nation.²³

The law met with a strong opposition on the part of all republicans, who suspected in the government the project of carrying out Iturbide's plan of Iguala. With powerful arguments they maintained that the idea of a monarchy in Mexico was not only contrary to the wishes of the Mexican people, but also one that was not at all feasible, there being no such thing as a nobility in the country.

Meantime the government was convinced that a war with the United States was inevitable, and made strenuous efforts to create resources wherewith to support an army in the field. The opposition press did

²² The idea of a monarchical government found a freer expression in the fact that many, and perhaps the chief, persons appointed to draw up the convocation were believed to have monarchic proclivities. The newspaper *El Tiempo* now appeared, boldly upholding those preferences, among whose chief contributors were Alaman, Díez de Bonilla, Tagle, Elguero, and other able writers. About this time there were rumors of a Spanish invasion to place a Spanish prince on a Mexican throne. *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 271; *El Tiempo*, Ap. 4 and 17, 1846; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xii. 416-17; *Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal Diaz*, i. 127-62; *Id., Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., iv. 21-8, 47-182, *passim*; *Memor. Histór.*, Feb. 7 and 23, 1846.

²³ Congress was to be composed of 160 deputies, representing the following nine classes, namely: real estate owners and agriculturists 38; merchants 20; miners 14; manufacturers 14; literary professions 14; magistracy 10; public functionaries 10; clergy and army, each 20. The deputies were to be chosen by the respective classes. The qualifications required of them may be seen in the decree. *El Tiempo*, Jan. 28, 1846; *Memor. Hist.*, Jan. 28, 1846; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xii. 421-5; *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1844-6, 316-47.

not fail to remind the rulers that the frontier was in imminent danger of invasion, demanding that the troops Paredes had diverted from its defence, and brought with him from San Luis Potosí, should be sent back at once, and not kept in idleness at the capital. These suggestions were soon carried out, after the government was apprised of the advance movements made by General Taylor. The utmost activity was then exercised to place a respectable army on the frontier.²⁴ Troops, artillery, and money were also sent to Vera Cruz, where it was feared the enemy would land forces. Some provision was likewise made for the defence of the ports on the Pacific.

The position of the government was daily becoming more and more difficult, for it had not only to provide means to meet the invaders wheresoever they might appear, but also to withstand the deadly attacks of the opposition press, which now openly accused it of an intention to set up a monarchy in Mexico. Federalists, centralists, and the personal supporters of Santa Anna were now working in unison and threatening to upset the government. This decided aggression prompted the adoption of restrictive measures against the press,²⁵ which were virtually an attack against the republicans and tended to widen the breach. The president then, with the view of allaying if possible the hostility of parties at a time when he needed general coöperation, issued on the 24th of April a manifesto, promising to sustain the republican form till the nation should resolve upon a change. This did not save him, however, from being set up by the opposition press as an enemy of the institutions of the country. He was also accused of

²⁴ A loan of \$1,800,000 was raised to fit out the troops that were forwarded to Mier.

²⁵ The official journal on the 12th of March said that the freedom to discuss the question of form of government must cease. Even that restriction being a little later deemed insufficient, another circular was issued to hold the authors, publishers, and printers of such articles amenable; and under its provisions several arrests were made in April. *Méz., Col. Lcy. y Dec., 1844-6*, 356-8; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, v. 121-2.

neglecting to provide against Indian raids which had been frequent in Chihuahua, Durango, and Sonora. The situation was indeed critical; but amid so much trouble the government succeeded in placing the departmental revenues in such a good condition that even the opposition press found reason to eulogize the measures by which that improvement had been attained.

The first step taken by Minister Iturbe on his assuming the treasury portfolio, on the 2d of May, was to suspend payments,²⁶ with the view of applying all the receipts to the support of the army. The next step was to notify the metropolitan chapter that the Mexican clergy were required to contribute \$2,400,000 of the forced loan decreed by congress, in monthly instalments of \$200,000, of which this chapter's share was \$98,000. The archbishop finally agreed to contribute a smaller, though still heavy, sum.²⁷

The Santanists had by this time come to an understanding, and resolved to make Guadalajara the centre of a revolutionary movement to set aside the existing government; and regardless of the difficulties the country was under, from the disasters sustained by her arms at the seat of war, which had caused the deepest pain to all patriotic citizens, a pronunciamiento took place in that city on the 20th of May, under the leadership of General José María Yañez and other military officers, protesting against the law of the 26th of January.²⁸ All who opposed the republican system and the principles of the plan were declared to be traitors. By the 6th article Santa Anna was proclaimed the leader of the great enterprise.²⁹ The government, fearing that the movement

²⁶ *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1844-6, 359-64. An exception was made in favor of the hospicio de pobres de Mexico.

²⁷ The vicar had notified the minister that the total revenue of the archdiocese did not come up to \$98,000.

²⁸ It had been preceded by one in Mazatlan under Col Rafael Tellez on the 7th of May.

²⁹ The preamble set forth that none of the constitutions set up, since the suppression of that of 1824, had benefited the country; that some vile Mex-

would be seconded elsewhere, specially in the capital, redoubled its vigilance to avert it. Soon after, on the 6th of June, the extraordinary congress, summoned under the decree of January 26th, assembled, and on the same day began its labors. Paredes appeared before that body and made a solemn declaration in favor of the republican system. On the 12th of the same month congress met and chose Paredes president ad interim, and Nicolás Bravo vice-president.³⁰ On the 20th the former was authorized to assume personal command of the land forces.³¹ The government was also empowered during six months to procure means to carry on the war and for other purposes, though without seizing or hypothecating the property of persons or corporations. Paredes sent large sums,³² and constantly increased the forces in the north. He adopted every possible precaution to prevent the spread of revolution.³³ But his efforts were of little avail, and he then resolved to surrender the executive authority to Vice-president Bravo, who reluctantly, and only as a matter of duty, accepted

icans had attempted the establishment of a throne occupied by a foreign prince; that the law of Jan. 26th to convoke an extraordinary congress was a mass of absurdities; and it was necessary to prevent the assembling of such a congress to avert foreign intervention with the consequent destruction of the Mexican army, and the dismissal of Mex. citizens from public offices; therefore, the national constitution should be founded on the will of the majority of the people. The plan embraced ten articles, seven of which only were of national import, involving the objects mentioned in the text. Of Santa Anna, it is said that he had been the founder of the republic, and, his errors notwithstanding, 'her strongest support, in spite of European policy, and of the instigations of some wicked Mexicans.' It was also stated that Santa Anna had ever opposed usurpations on the part of the northern republic. *Méx., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 276-80; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 759-60; *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Méx.*, MS., iv. 247-8; *El Restaurador*, June 23, 1846; *Young's Hist. Méx.*, 375-6.

³⁰ See decrees of June 10th and 12th. *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1844-6, 370-4; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, v. 132-3. The republican form of government having been adopted, the monarchical organ, *El Tiempo*, retired from the field, after having scattered among a considerable part of the community its pernicious ideas.

³¹ *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1844-6, 375.

³² Having secured the loan of one million dollars from the church. *Méx., Apuntes Hist. Guerra*, 68-9, 76; *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Méx.*, MS., iv. 218, 225.

³³ He quartered troops in the capital, detached suspected officers, and arrested a number.

the difficult position on the 28th of July. The cabinet formed by Bravo consisted of the following ministers, namely: José Joaquín Pesado, of relations; José M. Jiménez, of justice; Antonio Garay, of the treasury; and Ignacio Mora y Villamil, of war. This cabinet thought it was not the proper time now to frame a new constitution, and attempted to induce the congress to declare that the bases orgánicas of 1845 were the political constitution of the republic; with the view that after their acceptance, and the adoption of some regulations, that body should go into recess. But no project could now be developed, the republic having become the plaything of the military element. Anarchy reigned supreme. On the 3d of August the garrisons of Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulúa revolted, proclaiming the plan of Guadalupe; and early in the morning of the 4th General Salas, with upwards of 1,000 men that Paredes had fitted out to go with him to the front, did the same in the citadel of Mexico. Paredes succeeded in escaping that same night, and expected to join a force he had despatched some days before to the field of operations, but was captured with some other officers, by General Ávalos, and brought back as a prisoner to the citadel.³⁴ At a conference, afterward held by the belligerents on the 6th, it was resolved that Bravo's power should cease, and the government troops accept the plan adopted at the citadel,³⁵ pursu-

³⁴ After an imprisonment in a convent, Paredes was exiled from the country on the 2d of Oct. 1846, just 10 months after he became the executive by Herrera's overthrow. In the various acts adopted by the several towns as they accepted the revolution, he was called a traitor. It has been said against him that during his residence in France he intrigued to bring about European intervention in Mexican affairs. When the Americans had occupied Mexico he was residing in Tulancingo, having eluded the American blockade. Thence he was called by the government at Querétaro, but did not go, alleging ill health. He rendered no service during the war. He afterward showed himself again in the revolutionary arena, opposed the treaties of peace with the U. S., but was defeated by Bustamante. He was included in the general amnesty of April 1849. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 236. Paredes died in September of that year, leaving his family in poverty. It is recorded to his credit that he was an honest man in money matters. His management of public funds was without peculation. *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Méx.*, MS., iv. 33; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 295.

³⁵ The plan consisted of a preamble in seven articles, and resolutions in

ant to which Salas, as general-in-chief, in charge of the supreme executive authority by a decree of August 22d, suppressed the council of government and departmental assemblies, and authorized the restoration of the states, reserving to himself the power provisionally of appointing the governors. Another decree of the same date declared that the congress that was to meet pursuant to the convocation of the 4th should come duly empowered to enact laws on all branches of the public administration.³⁶

José Mariano de Salas was at this time a general of brigade. He was born in the city of Mexico in 1797, and entered the royal service as a cadet in 1813; he fought against the insurgents, obtaining his first promotions, till 1821, when he accepted Iturbide's plan, and for services rendered was made a captain. Afterward he coöperated with Santa Anna, in establishing the republic.³⁷ In 1844 he was second chief of staff, and comandante general of Mexico, which offices he lost for his faithfulness to Santa Anna in December 1844. Herrera employed him, however, in the supreme court-martial, and Paredes restored him the comandancia general of Mexico.

The government remained for a time in charge of Salas,³⁸ all the states recognizing his authority.

six more, embracing a project of regeneration under the federal system, to establish which a special congress was to assemble four months after the liberating forces should be in possession of the capital. Exiles for political causes were recalled, and the absent Santa Anna was made the general-in-chief of the forces to combat for the nation's rights and liberties, including the privilege of self-government. *Méx., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 280-5; *Ramirez, Tehuan. Mem. Hist.*, 32-4; *Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal Diaz*, ii. 67-76; *Id., Mem. Hist. Méx.*, MS., v. 66-84, 95.

³⁶ Both decrees in *Méx., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 285-6; *Id., Méx. Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1844-6, 395-408, 413-16; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, ii. 143-56.

³⁷ From that time he was in almost constant service, sometimes sustaining the existing government, and at others helping to upset it. He also campaigned in Texas toward the end of 1836.

³⁸ His cabinet was most of the time composed of the chief clerks of departments. The portfolio of relations was held a while by Manuel C. Rejon, to Oct. 20th, and by José M. Lafragua to Dec. 23d. *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1042-3.

He published many important decrees for establishing economical reforms, and for other purposes, but few of which were carried out.³⁹ It is said that Salas had at his command, from the beginning of his transition rule, large pecuniary resources.⁴⁰

No time had been lost in notifying Santa Anna, who was then in Habana much devoted to his favorite pastime of cock-fighting, of the changes that had occurred in Mexico, and of his presence in the republic being urgently needed. He accordingly sailed for Vera Cruz upon a British steamer, on the 12th of August,⁴¹ accompanied by his friends Almonte and Basadre, together with Rejon, Haro, and Bóves. On approaching the port of destination, the steamer was visited from one of the blockading ships, whose commander allowed her freely to proceed, as Commodore David Conner, commanding the United States home squadron, had orders from his government not to obstruct Santa Anna's landing.⁴² Much has been said about this apparently strange course on the part of the United States authorities in allowing free entry into Mexico, under the present circumstances, to the ablest and most influential political and military chieftain that republic then had; and comments very unfavorable to Santa Anna were accordingly made, the priv-

³⁹ Aug. 25th. Departmental assemblies to act as state legislatures. *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1844-6, 416. Sept. 17th. Law to distribute the revenues between the general government and the states. *Guan., Mem.*, 1852, 9. Sept. 20th. Government council established. Oct. 10th. Suppression of the excise tax; restored, however, in Nov. *Farras, Opúsc.*, 9. Oct. 10th. Contingent of the states abolished, and compensated for. *Disposic. Var.*, v. 50. Nov. 14th. Freedom of the press regulated. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, v. 171-2, 189-93. Nov. 19th. Tax imposed on ecclesiastical property. *Id.*, 211-17, 235-6; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 809-12; *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 272; *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Méx.*, MS., v. 136-7, 149.

⁴⁰ He found in the treasury \$700,000, out of the one million Paredes had got from the clergy for the Texas war. The money disappeared in about 15 days. *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xii. 504, 515.

⁴¹ His departure was in the night, and he expected to run the blockade at Vera Cruz by favor of the night, in which he failed. *Santa Anna, Apel. al buen criterio*, 17.

⁴² 'U. S. Navy Department, May 13, 1846, Commodore: If Santa Anna endeavors to enter the Mexican ports, you will allow him to pass freely. Resp'y yours, George Bancroft.' The commodore, announcing Santa Anna's arrival, added, 'I have allowed him to enter without molestation.'

ilege thus granted him being attributed to a secret stipulation from which he was to derive large pecuniary and other advantages, on condition of his concluding peace with the United States.⁴³ The fact is, there was no such stipulation, and President Polk explicitly stated it in his message to congress of January 12, 1848.⁴⁴ It was issued simultaneously with the order to blockade the Mexican ports, solely upon the views of policy which he communicated to congress in his annual message,⁴⁵ that is to say, that he believed him an element of discord. Santa Anna's recall to Mexico had been looked for long before it took place. The United States consul in Habana, Robert B. Campbell, probably by his government's instructions, called with an interpreter on Santa Anna and tried to obtain from him an explicit declaration that he would, if restored to power in Mexico, favor peace with the United States. Unwilling to return straightforward answers to the questions propounded to him, he asked permission to bring General Almonte into the conference, after which the conversation was mostly carried on through him. Santa Anna repeatedly said, and in this he was not ingenuous, that he personally was in favor of peace, but would act according to the wishes of his countrymen; if they were for war, he would wage it with all the resources at his command.⁴⁶

Santa Anna landed at Vera Cruz on the 16th of August, amidst demonstrations of respect; the chief of the cabinet, Valentin Gomez Farías, started on the 19th for Puebla to receive him. A procla-

⁴³ *Zamacois, Hist. M'j.*, xii. 505-6; *Santa Anna, Apel. al buen criterio*, being his reply to charges by Ramon Gamboa, 14-15. Jay, *Rev. Mex. War*, 196, suggests that President Polk probably expected that Santa Anna, having wrongs to resent, and being indebted to him for an opportunity to wreak vengeance, 'would foment an insurrection, kindle the flames of civil war, recover his former power, and exercise it in concluding a peace with the U. S. by the cession of California.' Polk deceived himself.

⁴⁴ These are his words: 'Without any understanding on the subject, direct or indirect, with Santa Anna or any other person.' *Am. Quart. Reg.*, i. 532-4.

⁴⁵ Of Dec. 8, 1846. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 20.

⁴⁶ His own statement of that interview differs but little from the above. *Santa Anna, Apel. al buen criterio*, 18-19.

mation was published on the 24th that the federation and the most ample liberty were now restored. The celebration of Santa Anna's return and of the restoration of the federal system took place at the capital on the 14th of September with much magnificence. Both authorities and people were full of hope. Santa Anna had come back under favorable auspices; parties, setting aside old bickerings, grouped themselves under the national standard that Santa Anna was to raise and carry in a succession of victories throughout the campaign against the foreign invader. He seemed to understand his position,⁴⁷ and in the retirement of Tacubaya affected unwillingness to meddle with government affairs, and devoted his attention to organizing the expedition he intended to lead to the north. He urged the government to forward troops to the frontier without delay, and a force of 3,000 men was accordingly started from the capital on the 28th of September, with Santa Anna at its head, for San Luis Potosí.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ He thought that the government was in the hands of men he could easily manage, and continued the semblance of disinterestedness and patriotism exhibited by him at Vera Cruz, in order that the people might forget his past errors and evil practices. *Méx., Apuntes Hist. Guerra*, 67.

⁴⁸ The force consisted of the 2d, 4th, and 5th hussars, and the light squadron of Puebla; 1st and 11th light infantry, and the 2d activo de Méjico; besides foot and light artillery. These were the remnants of the troops that had been stationed at the capital. It may be said that the organization of the Mexican army differed but very little from the European, namely, light and heavy infantry, light cavalry and dragoons, engineers, and field and siege artillery, with the corresponding staff, including the medical, pay, commissary, and other necessary departments. Besides the regular army, the republic had active and reserve militia, and a number of companies intended specially for guarding against Indian raids. At the time the differences with the U. S. assumed a warlike aspect, Mexico had in service the forces in the north under Paredes and Arista, and those under Inclan stationed in Jalapa and Vera Cruz. Several bodies were also in Texas. According to an official letter, dated Dec. 2, 1845, from Minister of war Anaya, the existing force consisted of 14,770 foot, 7,050 cavalry, including 35 presidial companies and 12 active companies of militia of the same class, and 1,731 artillerymen. He demanded a large increase to place the army on a war footing, and also called for the organization of the national guard to serve as an auxiliary force for defending coasts and preserving order in the interior. The total force required for active war according to that report would be 65,087 men. The cost was computed at \$1,172,539 monthly, besides pensions, extra allowances, rations, and other unavoidable expenses. *Peña y Peña, Comunicacion*, 36-40. The Mexican officers and men thought themselves invincible; that opinion being not merely the result of national pride, but also of the supposition that they

Salas' enemies tried to overthrow him, and Santa Anna then published a manifesto stating that the relations between him and the government were most cordial. The administration was making the most strenuous efforts to procure resources, and finally issued a decree, affecting the property of the clergy, to raise two million dollars, which created a great commotion, and made still worse the horrible situation of the country.

The installation of congress, which had a majority of more or less radical liberals, took place on the 6th of December; and on the 23d Santa Anna was chosen president ad interim, and Gomez Farias vice-president.⁴⁹ The latter took the oath of office at once, and assumed the executive authority in Santa Anna's absence.⁵⁰ This statesman's accession to power implied

had much military experience and toughness acquired in their many years of revolutionary strife. The cavalry, mostly lancers, had a factitious reputation both at home and abroad. Many bodies were fairly disciplined, and expert in horsemanship and the management of the lance. Their carbines were mostly useless for accurate aim. The artillery had several foreign officers, and most of the juniors had been educated in the military college at Chapultepec. They were quite proficient in the theory of their profession, and had besides some practical experience. The guns were fine, but clumsily mounted. Of light artillery, such as modern troops used, there was but little. The infantry had some tolerably drilled regiments. The muskets were generally inferior, and by no means accurately made. The staff of the army was not what it should have been. In the engineers the country had some talented and skilful officers, who were quite perfect in the branch of field fortification. Of general officers there was a great disproportion. It was often said they had brigades of generals rather than generals of brigades. There were but few of them, if any, possessing the various qualifications of a general. *Ripley's War Mex.*, 87-90. As for a naval force, Mexico had two steamers, one schooner of six guns, seven small vessels mounting one gun each, and two brigs with 10 carronades each. Most of the vessels were unserviceable. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 720, 722, 744-5. The fortifications of Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulúa, though repaired since the French bombardment, were yet weak. Matamoros and Tampico had no defences worth mentioning. The U. S. had on the gulf coasts a squadron with about 300 guns and 2,400 men, and on the Pacific several frigates and corvettes with 250 guns and about 2,250 men. The American army on the Rio Grande was of about 4,000 men, and had reinforcements at easy distance.

⁴⁹ *Mex., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1844-6, 595-7; *Mex., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 286; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, v. 238-9; *Bustamante, Hist. Invasion*, MS., 1-6; *Id.*, *Nuevo Bernal Diaz*, ii. 143-7. Those elections greatly alarmed both the clergy and military. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 816-17.

⁵⁰ At New Orleans Gomez Farias heard of Santa Anna's overthrow in 1844; he immediately returned to Mexico, when Herrera, though of quite opposite opinions, made him a senator. He promoted Santa Anna's recall as a means of restoring the federal system, served for a time in Salas' cabinet, and was uncompromisingly for war against the U. S.

the reëstablishment of the principles he had sustained throughout his life. But he encountered so much difficulty that he never could form a stable cabinet.⁶¹ The new government endeavored to procure means for carrying on the war, and meeting with great obstructions, threatened the wealthy classes with the seizure of their property if they would not voluntarily contribute to relieve the pressing needs of the nation. Congress authorized it to take fifteen million dollars from the clergy,⁶² which, as it may well be conceived, caused the greatest excitement and opposition.⁶³ Several state governments protested against the measure, and ere long revolutionary movements broke out in various places. At the capital on the 15th of January occurred a serious one, proclaiming 'religion y fueros.' In Querétaro the effect of the publication of that law, which had been made the 17th of January, was still more dangerous. The government was kept in constant alarm by the hostile popular demonstrations, but persisted in the purpose of enforcing the law. Affairs continued in an unsettled state till the 26th of February, when demonstrations were made in Mexico to set aside Farías and the congress, and even Santa Anna, leaving the latter only with the command of the northern army. The scandal of a formal pronunciamiento took place in the morning of the 27th. Reënforcements were sent by

⁶¹ During his occupancy of the executive chair the portfolios were generally in charge of the chief clerks of the several departments. *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1043-4. Amid the tribulations of Mexico at this period the state of Yucatan, which had seceded from the rest of the republic, and again united her fate with it in Dec. 1840, separated a second time, and in May 1847 adopted a special flag to be used under the Mexican colors, to distinguish Yucatan vessels, and insure protection from capture by United States cruisers. *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Méx.*, MS., iv. 30-6, 85, v. 153, 252, vi. 27; *Id.*, *Nuevo Bernal Diaz*, i. 125-7; *Suarez, Informe*, 10, 57-9; *El Tiempo*, Feb. 15, and June 3, 1846; *Niles' Reg.*, lxx. 16, 273, 304, lxxi. 196, 307; *Young's Hist. Méx.*, 340-1; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 328, 830, 885; *The Californian*, S. F., Dec. 1, 1847.

⁶² Santa Anna in a letter of Jan. 2, 1847, to Manuel Rejon, favored the levying of a forced loan from the clergy of twenty millions. The letter is given in full in *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xii. 551-2.

⁶³ Those financial decrees may be seen in *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, Jan. 2 to Dec. 23, 1847, 5-24.

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the governors of the states of Mexico and Puebla to sustain the government.⁵⁴

The revolutionists reformed their plan, accepting Santa Anna as president, and saying nothing about the congress. The latter became displeased with Gomez Farías because he had arrested a number of its members, and then adopted the plan of calling Santa Anna to come and occupy the presidency.

Gomez Farías had to experience the pang of the Mexican army's defeat at Angostura or Buenavista, though Santa Anna, on his retreat, tried to make it appear a victory. Santa Anna had heard on the 10th of March, at San Luis Potosí, that the beligerents at Mexico recognized him as the president, and centred their hopes in him.⁵⁵ He then came rapidly toward Mexico, where he arrived on the 21st of March, and the revolution ended. Having assumed the presidential office, Gomez Farías retired.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ On the last day of February efforts were made to bring about an arrangement, but it failed. Peña, the commander of the revolted, said that the trouble resulted from the obstinacy of a man who would retain power against public opinion.

⁵⁵ He then wrote to Farías and to Peña, requesting them to suspend hostilities till his arrival. However, it is said that he was more than disposed to sustain Farías' authority. But a committee composed of Gen. Salas and others met him at Querétaro, and turned his mind in favor of the revolutionists.

⁵⁶ The career of Farías did not end here. He was afterward a member of congress, and as such opposed at Querétaro the concluding of peace with the U. S. In 1850 he was a candidate for president of the republic, though not elected. He lived to frame the liberal constitution of 1857. The subsequent successes of the reactionists embittered the last days of his life, however. His death occurred at Mixcoac, July 5, 1858; and his remains were accompanied to the grave by men of all political opinions, and many foreign residents, who thus paid homage to his honesty of purpose and unswerving support of the principles he had entertained from his youth. *Rivera, Gob de Méx.*, ii. 320; *Tributo á la Verdad*, 23.

CHAPTER XIII.

CAUSES OF WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES.

1836-1846.

COERCIVE DIPLOMACY—CLAIMS AGAINST MEXICO—THEIR REMARKABLE INCREASE—DEMANDS FOR ADJUSTMENT—AMERICAN HOSTILITY AND MEXICAN FORBEARANCE—DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS SUSPENDED AND RENEWED—ARBITRATION AND ITS RESULTS—MORE AMERICAN CLAIMS AND MEXICAN COUNTER-CLAIMS—UNFAIRNESS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT—RECOGNITION OF TEXAN INDEPENDENCE—FOREIGN INTRIGUES—ANNEXATION OF TEXAS—MEANS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT—A CASUS BELLI—RUPTURE OF RELATIONS—PRESSURE ON MEXICO—WARLIKE DEMONSTRATIONS—SLIDELL'S UNSUCCESSFUL MISSION.

It was a premeditated and predetermined affair, the war of the United States on Mexico; it was the result of a deliberately calculated scheme of robbery on the part of the superior power. There were at Washington enough unprincipled men high in office, senators, congressmen, to say nothing about the president and his cabinet, and the vast array of demagogues and politicians, who were only too glad to be able in any way to pander to the tastes of their supporters—there were enough of this class, slaveholders, smugglers, Indian-killers, and foul-mouthed tobacco-spurting swearers upon sacred Fourth-of-July principles to carry spread-eagle supremacy from the Atlantic to the Pacific, who were willing to lay aside all notions of right and wrong in the matter, and unblushingly to take whatever could be secured solely upon the principle of might. Mexico, poor, weak, struggling to secure for herself a place among the nations, is now to be humiliated, kicked, cuffed, and

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beaten by the bully on her northern border, whose greatest pride is christian liberty with puritan antecedents, whose greatest principle at this time finds exercise in hunting about for plausible pretexts to steal from a weaker neighbor a fine slice of lands suitable for slave labor. Let us inquire a little into the quality of these pretexts, and determine what were the real causes of the war.

In a previous chapter, treating of the Texan revolt and secession, I explained the cause, which was the desire of its acquisition on the part of the southern states of the American union, whose government yielded to the pressure of slave-holding interests. After exhausting all legitimate means, it resorted to somewhat sinister devices, clearly indicating, by its policy in 1836 and subsequently, an intent to coerce Mexico into a cession of the coveted territory.¹ It is true that the United States had declined a protectorate over Texas, which measure would have violated a treaty. Mexico must be made to appear as the culpable party and aggressor. So a long list of claims was presented, for which the republic was held responsible, though a number of them hardly affected American interests at all. An unseemly diplomatic pressure was then employed.

The American envoy, Powhatan Ellis, was instructed to demand such reparation "as these accumulated wrongs may be found to require." If no satisfactory answer should be returned in three weeks, he must inform the Mexican government that unless redress was afforded without delay, his further residence in Mexico would terminate. If this threat proved unavailing, he was to notify the Mexican cabinet that unless a satisfactory answer came to him in two weeks, he should ask for his passports and re-

¹ J. Q. Adams said it was not only Texas the U. S. wanted, but the whole course of the Rio del Norte, and five degrees of latitude across the continent to the Pacific.

turn home. Secretary Forsyth was a fit agent and Ellis was a fit instrument for the occasion. The latter was a Mississippian and a slave-holder.² He wanted war and he wanted Texas; and he fulfilled his instructions to the letter.³

Some of the acts complained of had been committed, before Mexico became an independent nation, by the Spanish authorities. Payment was demanded, on the mere assertions of claimants, for supplies said to have been furnished in furtherance of Mexican independence, and for goods confiscated in violation of the Mexican revenue laws. Events that never occurred were asserted to have taken place, for the purpose of trumping up claims. There appeared in the list complaints against acts of the national navy, and even against proceedings of the courts of justice, many of them unaccompanied with evidence to substantiate them.⁴ The number of such claims accompanying the secretary's instructions was fifteen; and as important issues grew out of them, I give the merits of each in a note.⁵

² *Jay's Rev. Mex. War*, 37.

³ A full copy of Secretary Forsyth's despatch, dated July 20, 1836, to Minister Ellis, appears in *Niles' Reg.*, xi. 409-10.

⁴ Forsyth, in the despatch above mentioned, uses these words: 'The department is not in proof of all the circumstances of the wrong done in the above cases, as represented by the aggrieved parties.' The government deemed it expedient to prefer the complaints then, and to seek afterward for proof. The Mexican minister of foreign affairs said that the number, character, and dates of the claims show that the U. S. govt was actuated by hostile sentiments, and assured congress that few of them were just. *Mex., Mem. Min. Relaciones*, 1838, 10, 11, 14.

⁵ 1. Doctor Baldwin, an American, had in 1832 some unjust judgments passed against him in the Mexican courts, and on one occasion, because of an altercation between him and a magistrate of Minatitlan, he was put in the stocks. Baldwin resisted and attempted to escape, fell, and injured his leg. He was seized, returned to the stocks, and afterward imprisoned. *Baldwin's Claim*, in *Mex. Pamph.*, v. It does not appear that Baldwin was ever denied the right, which he probably used, of recourse to a superior court. 2. The American vessel *Topaz* was chartered by the Mexican government in 1832 to convey troops. The master and mate were murdered by the soldiers, the crew imprisoned, and the vessel seized and used in the Mexican service. The Mexican version of this affair was that the crew attempted to steal some money which was on board, to which effect they had planned to kill the Mexican force and then abandon the vessel. After throwing Captain Ryder overboard, and having the soldiers below under the hatches, they tried to murder the two Mexican officers. Their plan failed; their leader, the mate, was wounded, and they themselves were secured. The crew endeavored to palm

No law or act of the supreme government is complained of; not one of the complaints in question afforded a legitimate cause for war. The conclusion to be naturally drawn from the instructions given Ellis is that he was to establish the principle that, under the treaty of amity with Mexico, when the decisions of Mexican courts did not happen to meet the views

off their crimes on the Mexicans. Two American shipmasters who afterward visited that coast, and investigated the case, decided it against the crew. 3. In 1832 the Mexican officers in Tabasco seized the steamboat *Hidalgo* and schooner *Constitution*, both the property of the American Leggett. *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 83. It appears, according to the Mexican account, that Leggett had special privileges from the government of Tabasco, burdened with the condition, willingly assumed by himself, to convey free of charge Mexican troops when such service should be needed. He was, however, paid for one transportation \$1,433. The steamboat afterward foundered when not in the government's service, owing to the bad state of her hull and excessive lading. This was decidedly a case for a court to adjudicate, and not for diplomatic interference. 4. The *Brazoria* was seized by John Austin, military commandant at Brazoria in Texas, and used for an expedition against Anáhuac. She was damaged and her owner received no compensation. The facts of the case were that Austin was a Texan rebel. The owner abandoned his vessel under protest; afterward the judicial authority declared her unseaworthy, and she was sold at auction. The government long before had ordered the proceeds to be paid to the owner, but he never applied for them. 5. Captain MacKeigé was imprisoned and heavily fined in 1834. The government disapproved the proceedings, and ordered the revenue official and judge arrested for trial to compel them to pay MacKeigé the damages he sustained at their hands. 6, 7, 8, and 9 are cases of vessels engaged in carrying contraband of war, or accused of violating the revenue laws. 10. Two Americans were in 1836 temporarily detained in Matamoros, on suspicion that they were on their way to join the Texan rebels; a mare and two mules were taken out of the yard of the house where they were arrested, which happened to be the American consul's. As soon as they produced their passports they were released, and the animals were returned to them. An apology was made to the consul for the ignorance of the soldiers in entering his house to make the arrest. 11, 12, 13, and 14 were complaints for acts of subordinates, unauthorized by the supreme government, and which caused no injury, pecuniary or otherwise, to any one. 15. The American vessel *Northampton* was wrecked in 1836, near Tabasco, and being taken possession of by custom-house officers and soldiers, more than half her cargo was pillaged or lost by them. The attempt by Mexican local authorities to save the vessel and cargo was certainly in order. If the wreckers committed crimes on board, the injured parties had free action to lay their complaints before the courts. *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, ii. 27-31; *Jay's Rev. Mex. War*, 36-9, 43-5.

William Jay. A Review of the Causes and Consequences of the Mexican War. The author aimed—regardless of considerations prompted by so-called patriotism, and national glory and prosperity—to furnish all the facts connected with the acquisition, by the United States, of Texas and other Mexican territory. He also endeavored to show the dishonest devices that were resorted to for the accomplishment of the preconcerted plan; and to excite abhorrence for that kind of statesmanship which, upholding the maxim that 'all is fair in politics,' seeks to aggrandize a country in defiance of the laws of justice and equity. Whatever differences of opinion there may be as to the author's conclusions, his facts are incontrovertible.

of citizens or denizens of the United States, the latter must be privileged to take action in the premises, demanding that those courts be ignored and their decisions set aside, mulcting the Mexican government in sums to satisfy the claimants. It so happened that before Forsyth's despatch reached the legation at Mexico, two of the fifteen claims, namely, the eleventh and fourteenth, had been settled by the Mexican government to the American minister's satisfaction.

On the 26th of September the remaining thirteen grievances were laid in writing by Ellis before the government, together with five others that his zeal had discovered.⁶ He was assured that the general government would have them investigated. But in less than four weeks from the date of his first note Ellis announced to the foreign office that if the wrongs complained of were not redressed without unnecessary delay, "his further residence in Mexico would be useless." To this a reply was returned the next day that delay in answering a note calling for an investigation was not a sufficient cause for breaking off friendly re-

⁶ 1. The American consul at Tampico had been, on the 26th of May, 1836, summoned by the authorities to authenticate certain papers, and on his refusal had been threatened with imprisonment. To which the government had answered it was ignorant of the whole matter and would investigate it. 2. The American vessel *Peter V. Vroom* being wrecked on the coast in June 1836, the American consul had the cargo brought to Vera Cruz, where the consignees abandoned it to the underwriters. There being no agent of the latter in the place, the court appointed one, who sold the cargo, and the demand of the consul to have the proceeds turned over to him was refused. The Mexican government said to this that the court had acted right, and that the American consul had no authority in the premises. 3. Certain judicial proceedings concerning the American brig *Aurora* had been denied the consul. The government answered that the consul could have had an authenticated copy of all the papers, but he had refused to pay the legal fees charged for making it. 4. The American vessel *Bethlehem* was seized by a Mexican armed vessel on the 2d of September, 1836, the crew detained 20 days, and then landed, the vessel being confiscated, and the master refused a copy of the proceedings. The government in Mexico had not heard of the affair, and promised to investigate. 5. The American vessel *Fourth of July* had been taken charge of by Mexican soldiers. The facts of this case, as the Mexicans represented them, were that the vessel was built for the Mexican government. The agent had contracted before a notary public for the sale, but a party of soldiers had been sent on board previous to the delivery of the bill of sale. The owner had been paid for his vessel and made no complaint. Forsyth on hearing of this case directed Ellis, Dec. 9, 1836, not to insist, of course, on the restoration of the vessel, but 'only to demand satisfaction for the insult offered to the American flag.'

lations; that in order to arrive at a decision on the claims preferred, documents had to be gathered from various parts of the country, and that the requisite instructions had been already issued to procure such documents, upon the receipt of which the government's decision on the several points would be made known to the American legation.

This was exactly what neither the minister nor the state department at Washington wanted. Having assumed an arbitrary and insulting attitude in the matter, these officials were determined that the issue should be so forced upon Mexico that there should be no escape. The United States was the stronger power, and there were many among her fire-eaters in those days who delighted in playing the cowardly part of bully. On the 4th of November Ellis gave formal notice that unless his complaints were satisfactorily answered in two weeks he would go. Mexico felt her feebleness and the humiliation. Within the prescribed time her minister of foreign affairs, Monasterio, replied that under the existing treaty the citizens of either country could bring their grievances before the courts of the other, and hence there was no need of government interference to procure that justice which the courts were ready to afford.⁷

"You say that Mexican armed vessels have fired upon and insulted the American flag," continues Monasterio in his note of the 26th of September, "that American consuls have been maltreated, private citizens arrested and scourged like malefactors, some have been assassinated, and their property confiscated. But these charges are general, and the government de-

⁷ Monasterio's words were fully borne out by the 14th article of the treaty. Forsyth himself had made avail of that article, in his reply of Jan. 29, 1836, to a demand of the Mexican govt for the punishment of the com. officer of an American war ship for an outrage committed by him on a Mexican vessel. His words were: 'The courts of the U. S. are freely open to all persons in their jurisdiction, who may consider themselves to have been aggrieved in contravention of our laws and treaties.' *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 24, Secs. 2, H. Ex. 139, vol. iii. But it was quite a different affair, my bull and your ox or your bull and my ox. Ellis on the 15th of Nov. coolly declared Monasterio's opinion 'wholly indefensible.'

sires that they may be specified before taking them into consideration."

It was well understood at Washington that these charges were pure trumpetry, and by none better than those who made them. Said President Jackson—by no means averse to war and an enlargement of the national domain—to Governor Cannon of Tennessee, two weeks after the coercive instructions had been transmitted to Ellis, "Mexico has given the United States no cause for war."⁸

On the 7th of December Ellis demanded his passports.⁹ The government requested the minister to say on what grounds he was taking a step so calculated to affect the relations between the two powers. Ellis deigned no reply.

The diplomatic intercourse between the two governments was now at an end, the Mexican representative, Gorostiza, having left Washington in October. He had, before demanding his passports, published a pamphlet containing portions of his official correspondence with the American government and his own, with an introduction defamatory of the people and government of the United States. This being deemed by the latter a manifest impropriety, a disavowal of it was demanded;¹⁰ but the Mexican foreign office sustained his course. The satisfaction was given, however, at a later day.¹¹

The opportunity so much desired was now at hand, but the American executive hesitated to recommend to congress an open declaration of war. In his mes-

⁸ And again: 'Should Mexico insult our national flag, invade our territory, or interrupt our citizens in the lawful pursuits which are guaranteed to them by treaty, then the government will promptly repel the insult, and take speedy reparation for the injury. But it does not seem that offences of this character have been committed by Mexico.' *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 24, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 2, vol. i.; *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, ii. 27.

⁹ *Mayer's Hist. Mex. War*, i. 29-30; *Niles' Reg.*, li. 225, lii. 4.

¹⁰ The matter was referred by the American president to congress on the 5th of Dec. 1837, together with the list of claims against Mexico. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 25, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 3, pp. 6-8, 31-164, vol. i.; *Niles' Reg.*, li. 410-11.

¹¹ In 1839 by Gorostiza himself, when he was secretary of foreign relations. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 290, 317.

sage¹² he suggested that the sister republic should be allowed "one more opportunity to atone for the past, before we take redress into our hands. But to avoid any misconception on the part of Mexico, as well as to protect the American national character from reproach, this opportunity should be given with the avowed design and full preparation to take immediate satisfaction." The president accordingly asked for the passage of an act authorizing reprisals and the use of the navy against Mexico, to enforce them in the event of that government refusing to come to terms.¹³ Though congress was not ready actually to declare war, the proposal to make another demand on Mexico was accepted, both houses making exaggerated and hostile reports.¹⁴

I have already alluded to the treaty stipulation forbidding acts of reprisal and declarations of war on complaints for grievances or damages, till they should have been presented and verified, a clause wholly ignored by the president of the United States in his message, which was accompanied by forty-six new grievances. Of the original eighteen, only one, dated as far back as 1831, and in the new set no less than thirty-two, were founded on acts said to have been committed prior to 1832, and which, had they ever been valid, were already consigned to the grave by the treaty of April 5, 1831.¹⁵

¹² Of Feb. 6, 1837. *Cong. Debates*, 1836-7, xiii. 723-4; *U. S. Govt*, Cong. 24, Ses. 2, H. Journ., 354-5, Sen. Doc., 160, pp. 1-170.

¹³ 'Upon another demand thereof, made on board one of our vessels of war on the coast of Mexico.' *U. S. Govt*, Cong. 24, Ses. 2, H. Ex. Doc. 105 and 139; *Niles' Reg.*, li. 378.

¹⁴ The committee of foreign affairs in the house declared that the U. S. would be justified in taking redress; that of the senate was equally hostile. *U. S. Govt*, Cong. 24, Ses. 2, H. Ex. Doc. 281, pp. 1-4, H. Comm. Rept., 231, vol. ii., Sen. Doc. 189, vol. ii.; *Cong. Debates*, 1836-7, i. 723-4, 854-7, 932, 986, ii. 1912-18; *Cong. Globe*, 1836-7, 6, 12, 94; 1837, 1-8.

¹⁵ Mexican Company, Baltimore, 1816; amount not given. This association furnished Gen. Mina with means to invade New Spain, which they asserted had never been paid. Mrs Young, 1817; sum not stated. She was the widow of Col Guilford Young, one of Mina's companions killed in action in Mexico that year. The claim was probably for arrears of pay. These two demands were for revolutionary services against Spain, with whom the U. S. and their citizens were at the time at peace, several years before her domination over Mexico had ceased. John B. Marie, 1824; amount not

On the last day of the session congress appropriated money for the salary of a minister to Mexico, to be appointed "whenever, in the opinion of the president, circumstances will permit a renewal of diplomatic intercourse honorably with that power." The president, though nothing had occurred since December to invite a renewal of relations, appointed a minister, Powhatan Ellis, himself, being the individual chosen.¹⁶ It was pretended that they wished to conciliate Mexico, and so they sent thither her most unprincipled enemy. He was not, however, despatched at once to his destination. A messenger or courier of the department of state went in his stead with a budget of grievances, old and new, now swelled to fifty-seven, which he was to place in the hands of the Mexican minister of foreign affairs, allowing him one week¹⁷ in which to study their merits and return an answer.¹⁸

The Mexican congress, however, had anticipated such a step. Knowing only of the eighteen claims presented by Minister Ellis, it had passed an act authorizing the executive to submit those claims to the award of a friendly power. The foreign office, on the 29th of July, 1837, replied, giving assurances of the desire of the Mexican government to settle the claims upon the principles of justice and equity.¹⁹

given; for goods seized on being imported contrary to a Mexican law of which the claimant pretended ignorance. J. E. Dudley and J. C. Wilson, for property robbed from them by Comanches on their return from a trading expedition to Mexico; sum not stated. *U. S. Govt*, Cong. 24, Ses. 2, H. Ex. Doc. 139, in *Mex. Treaties*, ii. no. 1.

¹⁶ J. Q. Adams said: 'And who was this minister of peace to be sent with the last drooping twig of olive to be replanted and revived in the genial soil of Mexico? It was no other than Powhatan Ellis of Mississippi, lamishing for Texas, and just returned in anger and resentment from an abortive and abruptly terminated mission to the same government. His very name must have tasted like wormwood to the Mexican palate.'

¹⁷ The messenger was instructed to remain in Mexico one week. *Rep. of Cong.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 1, iv.

¹⁸ The courier reached Mexico July 20, 1837. As a specimen of the new claims, I give the following: In 1829, as the reader knows, a Spanish army under Brigadier Barradas invaded the republic of Mexico at Tampico. It destroyed a printing-press said to be the property of an American citizen. Eight years after Mexico was for the first time told that she was held responsible for what her enemies had done in time of war.

¹⁹ The anxiety of the Mexican government was 'not to delay the moment of that final and equitable adjustment which is to terminate the existing diffi-

Mexico, anxious to preserve the peace, not only proposed to refer the claims to arbitration, but once more accredited a minister at Washington,²⁰ who arrived there in October 1837, but did not announce the proposal for arbitration till the 22d of December.²¹ This was a sore disappointment to the enemies of Mexico; for it would postpone the object so dear to their hearts, namely, the annexation of Texas and other portions of Mexican territory. Secretary Forsyth dryly acknowledged the receipt of the proposition, and several times afterward pressed upon the Mexican minister, Francisco Pizarro Martinez, new demands without signifying his acceptance of it.²² He did so at last on the 21st of April, 1838, saying that the president was "anxious to avoid proceeding to extremities." The negotiations following resulted in a convention concluded on the 10th of September, 1838, by which it was agreed that all claims against Mexico should be referred to a mixed commission composed of two members appointed by each government, and for cases in which they could not agree the king of Prussia was requested to name an umpire.²³ Owing to delay in obtaining the consent of

culties between the two governments; and that nothing 'should be left undone which may contribute to the speediest and most equitable termination of the subjects which have so seriously engaged the attention of the United States;' that the 'Mexican government would adopt, as the only guides for its conduct, the plainest principles of public right, the sacred obligations imposed by international law, and the religious faith of treaties;' and that 'whatever reason and justice may dictate respecting each case will be done.' The American government was further assured that the decision in each case would be communicated to it by the Mexican legation at Washington. *U. S. Govt. Cong.* 25, Ses. 2, vol. viii. passim; *Mayer's Hist. War Mex.*, i. 29-30. The president in his message of Dec. 8, 1846, referring to the steps taken in July 1837, said that Mexico gave solemn assurances, and yet again delayed, and the moderation of the United States only complicated the difficulties. *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. Doc. 4, pp. 3-8.

²⁰ It was authorized by the act of the Mexican congress of May 20, 1837. The minister was appointed May 23d. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iii. 392; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1837, 399; *Niles' Reg.*, lii. 309, 354.

²¹ Owing, it seems, to a misapprehension on his part that the proposal had been at an earlier date made to the U. S. cabinet.

²² Four months were allowed to elapse. When the public heard of the Mexican offer, petitions came from all quarters to congress to accept.

²³ The board was to meet at Washington three months after the exchange of ratifications, and to sit not over 18 months. It was left to the option of

Frederick William III. to act as umpire, the convention had to be renewed, when it suffered slight modifications, the most important of which was that the awards were to be paid one half in cash, and the other half in treasury notes bearing eight per cent interest per annum, and receivable for customs duties. The date of the signing of the new convention was the 11th of April, 1839.²⁴

It must not be inferred that among the claims there was not a considerable number founded on justice and equity; but not all of these were proper topics for national controversy. Still, some of them came within that category.²⁵ Had the United States government confined itself to these, and preferred its demands in a temperate manner, its course would have been in order, and Mexico could not rightly have refused their proper adjustment.

The mixed commission went into operation at Washington on the 17th of August, 1840,²⁶ and in about nine months, say to the 26th of May, 1841, had passed judgment upon every claim laid before it accompanied by the requisite vouchers. In February 1842 it ceased to act by virtue of the 18 months' limitation clause. The result was, that of the claims presented less than one fifth were allowed; three fourths were thrown out as spurious; others of the same fraudulent and speculative character, amount-

the Mexican government to effect payments in government stock having in London a value equal to the award.

²⁴ Ratified by Mexico, Jan. 11, 1840; by the U. S., April 6th. The exchange of ratifications was published in Mexico, June 2d. The Spanish and English texts may be seen in *Méx., Derecho Intern.*, 1st pt, 180-9; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, iii. 712-16; *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1840, 492-505; *Mayer's Hist. War Mex.*, i. 31-2; *U. S. Govt. Cong.* 26, Ses. 1, Acts and Resol., 111-18, 122-3, H. Ex. Doc., vol. iv. passim.

²⁵ For instance: American vessels taken with contraband of war on board, and condemned by the Mexican admiralty courts. The contraband of war was liable to forfeiture; but the vessels themselves, and such portions of their cargoes as were not of a contraband nature, were by treaty exempt from condemnation. Art. xvi. of treaty of April 5, 1831.

²⁶ The American commissioners were William L. Marcy and John Rowan, with John Demitri as secretary; on the part of Mexico, Pedro Fernandez del Castillo and Joaquin Velazquez de Leon, with Lucas Palacio y Margarola as secretary. The umpire was the baron de Roenne, Prussian minister at Washington. *Méx., Mem. Min. Relaciones*, 1841.

ing to nearly three and a half millions, were not presented in time to be examined, even after the most unwearied efforts of the United States government to swell the demand against Mexico.²⁷ But adding for these one million, the outside estimate that they will bear with any degree of equity, Mexico was indebted to United States citizens about three millions, instead of nearly twelve millions as claimed. I give in a note a few samples of the claims.²⁸

²⁷ Total amount of claims presented.....	\$11,850,578
Amount of claims presented too late for adjudication.....	3,336,837
	<hr/>
	\$8,513,741
Referred to umpire and undecided for want of time.....	918,627
	<hr/>
Amount of claims adjudicated.....	\$7,595,114
Rejected by commissioners and umpire.....	5,568,973
	<hr/>

Allowed by commissioners and umpire..... \$2,026,139

Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iii. 418; *U. S. Govt*, Cong. 27, Ses. 2, Sen. Doc., vol. iv. passim, H. Comm. Rept, 1090, vol. v.; *Id.*, Cong. 27, Ses. 3, H. Journ., 18; *Brook's Hist.*, 13-22; *Mayer's Hist. War Mex.*, i. 31-2. The president on Aug. 9, 1841, said to congress, with reference to certain reflections cast on the Prussian umpire, that the government had no complaint to make against him. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 27, Ses. 2, Sen. Journ., 554.

²⁸ Orazio de Atellis Santangelo, a school-master, writer, and printer, of whose unjustifiable expulsion from Mexico I spoke in an early chapter of this work, after that act settled in New Orleans, and in due time became a naturalized citizen of the U. S. After a while he presented through the U. S. govt a demand against Mexico for \$398,690 for damages. The Mexican commissioners denied that anything was due; the U. S. com. allowed \$33,440; the umpire cut the sum down to \$50,000. On what grounds the United States government demanded an award for a person who was not an American citizen at the time the claim originated was not made to appear. Santangelo afterward published several papers against the U. S. govt, in one of which he employs his terrible satire against President Polk for having 'defrauded the U. S. claimants on Mexico out of their money.' He also preferred before the president of the U. S. accusations against the Mexican members of the commission. There was also a memorial of his to the American congress in 1846. *Mex. Treaties*, ii. no. 12. Rhoda McCrae claimed \$6,694 for a pension for her son killed in the Mexican service. It was allowed by the American commissioners, disallowed by the Mexican, and rejected by the umpire. Sophia M. Robinson claimed for services rendered by her husband in Mexico, when a dependency of Spain in 1817, \$16,000, and as much more for interest. Rejected bodily by the umpire. John Baldwin claimed for a trunk of wearing apparel seized by the Mexican custom-house officials, principal and interest, \$1,481, allowed by the American commissioners; undecided by the umpire. There was one claim for 56 doz. bottles of porter, original cost and six years' interest, \$3,260! Even Mr Pendleton, member of congress from Virginia, called such claims utterly ridiculous. A Texan land company wanted \$2,154,604; a certain man demanded \$690,000 for erroneous decisions against him in Mexican courts, etc. *Jay's Rev. Mex. War*, 72-3; *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 27, Ses. 2, H. Ex. Doc. 21.

The treaty of arbitration was a thorn in the flesh of many who had cast an evil eye on Mexico, as it did away with all pretexts for complaint against the latter republic, and postponed indefinitely the acquisition of Texas. Still they did not despair. Where strength on the one side and weakness on the other were so palpable; where success was certain if the issue could only be brought on; where all that stood in the way of magnificent plunder was some excuse for the deed—surely the Anglo-American mind should be fertile enough to produce such an excuse. The dissolution of the mixed commission by limitation left, as we have seen, a large number of claims undecided. The United States government, therefore, had yet a pretext for continuing the diplomatic pressure upon Mexico. President Tyler, in March 1842, accredited to the latter government as minister Waddy Thompson, a slave-holder from South Carolina, who was anxious to see Texas annexed to his country.²⁹ The new representative found Mexican credit very low, the treasury notes being worth only thirty cents on the dollar. He succeeded by some means in negotiating, on the 30th of January, 1843, a new convention, under which Mexico agreed to pay on the 30th of April of that year all the interest then due, and the award itself in five years in equal quarterly instalments.³⁰ This arrangement has been represented as a boon to Mexico.³¹ The fact is, that even by Thompson's showing the owners of the

²⁹ He had as a member of congress made a motion in favor of annexation as soon as it should be consistent with the treaty stipulations of the government. This naturally rendered him offensive to the Mexicans, and for that reason he was not a fit person for the appointment. Bustamante had no good opinion of his character or course; and with his usual venom accuses him of being a spy rather than a minister, and a flatterer of Santa Anna's. *Hist. Gen. Santa Anna*, MS., ii. 38.

³⁰ *Mex., Derech. Intern.*, 1st pt, 189-93; *Thompson's Recoll. Mex.*, 229, app. 279-304. The interest due was about \$270,000. The quarterly instalments were to begin the same day. To secure the payments the direct taxes were hypothecated. *Mex., Mem. Min. Rel.*, 1844, xcvi.-c. 8; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 567-9; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 257-8; *U. S. Govt. Cong. 23, Ses. 2, H. Ex. Doc. 158, in Mex. Treaties*, ii. no. 6.

³¹ Rept of C. J. Ingersol, chairman of comm. of *Foreign Aff.*, June 24, 1846.

claims were anxious to make some other arrangement that would save them heavy loss in the acceptance of treasury notes, as they were bound to do under the last preceding convention.

The Mexican government paid the interest accrued, and decreed a forced loan collectible at periods corresponding to those stipulated in the agreement with the United States. The instalments for July and October 1843 and January 1844 were also paid; but whether for want of means or because the news came that Texas had been annexed to the United States, those for April and July 1844 were not covered. However, when it became known that the senate of the United States had rejected the annexation treaty, President Santa Anna ordered the payment of the 4th and 5th instalments, in cash, to Voss, the American government's agent, and his principal was duly apprised of it. It has been said, reflecting on Voss' good sense and integrity, that the government never received the cash; for instead of it, he had taken drafts, which were not honored, and he had given receipts for so much money.³² After that, the objectionable arrangement having become an accomplished fact, Mexico paid no more instalments.³³

The last understanding with the American plenipotentiary called for still more; it stipulated the negotiation of another arbitration treaty, one more comprehensive than the last; that is to say, a convention providing for the settlement of claims of the government and citizens of Mexico against the United States, as well as those of the latter government and its citizens against Mexico.

The claims of Mexican citizens do not appear; but

³² This has been denied by Minister Thompson, who speaks in high terms of Voss' business ability and integrity; he says that only a small portion of the two last instalments was not paid until perhaps a month after it was due, and the money was immediately sent to Vera Cruz, and shipped thence as soon as it could be counted. *Recol. Mex.*, 225.

³³ On the 30th of January, 1846, eight instalments and two years' interest were due. *Young's Hist. Mex.*, 323; *Santangelo, Memorial*, in *Mex. Treaties*, no. 12.

their government had several important ones. American vessels, captured by Mexican war ships for being engaged in contraband trade, had been forcibly rescued by United States cruisers; and even a Mexican national vessel, duly commissioned, had been taken and sent into a port of the United States.³⁴

The treaty stipulated for by the convention of January 1843 was concluded in Mexico on the 20th of November; and under it a commission was to sit in Mexico—the Mexican government as a point of

³⁴ On the 1st of Sept. 1835, the *Correo*, a revenue cutter commanded by Lieut Thomas Thompson, was captured by an American armed vessel aided by a Texan steamboat, for interfering with smugglers, and sent for adjudication to New Orleans. The captors were accused of robbing the cutter's papers and her officers' property. The officers and men were kept in jail for some time in New Orleans, and there tried on the charge of piracy preferred by the captors; but the vessel, officers, and crew were released. No satisfaction or indemnity was given them, however, on the ground that the officers had not established their status. This decision was given in the face of their declarations that their papers had been taken from them, and of the Mexican consul's assurance that the *Correo* was a revenue vessel, and her officers and men servants of his government. *Report of Thompson's Trial*, 3-44. In Nov. 1835, an expedition was openly fitted out in New Orleans to commit hostilities against the Mexican government, and landed in the Tampico River. *Niles' Reg.*, xlix. 339-40. Another cause of complaint, and a very serious one, was the invasion of Mexican territory by U. S. forces in 1836. Again, the Mexican squadron captured two American schooners engaged in conveying contraband goods to the Texans, then at war with Mexico, and taken into Matamoros. This act was in perfect accord with articles 18th and 20th of the treaty of 1831. The American corvette *Natchez* then arrived at the bar and demanded, on the 16th of April, 1837, their surrender, which being refused by the commander on the frontier, she retook one of the schooners, and made a prize of the Mexican war brig *General Urrea*. The latter was afterward ordered to be released at Pensacola. *Id.*, lii. 163, 193, 204-5, 209, 249, 289. That act of the corvette was a deliberate infraction of the 3d clause in the 34th article of the treaty of 1831. The Mexican government with good reason was indignant at such proceedings, but exercising a wise moderation in its efforts to avert a conflict, ordered the release of the schooners, and of the bark *Anne Eliza* that had been detained at Vera Cruz. *Id.*, lii. 209, 228, 302. *U. S. Govt. Cong.* 25, Ses. 2, H. Ex. Doc. 75, vol. ii.; *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, i. 10-12; *Méx., Mem. Min. Relaciones*, 1838, 11-14; *Tornel, Texas y Est. Unidos*, 79-80. Later, on the 24th of June, an American squadron of one frigate and four sloops of war, under Commodore Dallas, called at Sacrificios, and the commodore demanded of Castro, the comandante general, an assurance, such as had been given him by Gen. Filisola at Matamoros, that there should be no more attempts against American merchantmen; otherwise he would adopt efficacious measures to deprive the Mexican squadron of the means of annoying American commerce. Gen. Castro, without manifesting a hostile spirit, replied that neither he nor Gen. Filisola could give such assurances, as they were of the exclusive province of the supreme government. *Niles' Reg.*, lii. 362-3. Dallas then wrote back on the 28th, saying that he would leave on the Mexican coast a sufficient naval force to protect American commercial interests from future Mexican aggressions. *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, i. 20-6.

national pride, because the former one had met at Washington, made this a *sine qua non*—and the king of the Belgians, the choice of the United States minister, was to be the umpire. The United States senate, in utter disregard of the convention, only ratified the treaty with amendments, first striking out of it the right of each government to prefer before the commission any claims or complaints against the other—this point being considered ‘strictly diplomatic’—and secondly, changing the place of meeting to Washington, thus ignoring the Mexican stipulation. The mutilated treaty, conditionally ratified, came back to Mexico, the government taking no further notice of it.³⁵ Hence the outcry of the friends of Texas that Mexico would not settle the claims against her, and President Polk’s assertion that Mexico had thus violated a second time the faith of treaties by failing or refusing to carry into effect the sixth article of the convention of January 1843.³⁶ The subject was again before the United States congress in January 1844, when the president laid before the house information on the indemnity to be paid by Mexico.³⁷

Mexico’s efforts to maintain peace with the United States, by acceding to the settlement of claims on a just basis, only postponed the inevitable and pre-determined war. The reader is informed of the unsuccessful attempts of the United States government to acquire by purchase the old province of Texas, which had been surrendered to Spain in 1819. The last expressed wish to this effect, as appears in a despatch to Joel R. Poinsett, its envoy to Mexico, was to obtain the cession of a much larger area, that is to say, the territory extending from the mouth of the Rio Grande along its eastern bank to the 37th parallel of

³⁵ As originally made, it had been ratified by Mexico on the 24th of Nov. 1843. *Méx., Derecho Intern.*, 2d pt, 154–66; *Thompson’s Recol. Méx.*, 225–7.

³⁶ Polk’s message to congress, Dec. 8, 1846, p. 6.

³⁷ *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 28, Ses. 1, H. Journ., 167, 198; *Id.*, Cong. 28, Scs. 2, Sen. Journ., 134, 248.

latitude, and all north of that line to the Pacific Ocean.³⁸ Poinsett, however, aware that a proposition to that effect would be met with scorn, forbore even to make an overture for the purchase of Texas. The opposition of the Mexicans to all arrangements leading to the loss of national territory became more intensified from year to year. There were not wanting, nevertheless, representative men in Mexico willing to accede to the annexation of Texas to the United States rather than to see her an independent country, or under the control of England; for if a nation, other states of Mexico would unite with it willingly or by conquest; and if anywise connected with England, goods from the latter country would be smuggled through Texas into Mexico, to the ruin of Mexican manufactures and revenue. But the feeling finally culminated into a question not only of national pride, but of actual fear of the consequences that the alienation of Texas would entail.³⁹

The Texan colonists had, however, from the earliest times desired to unite with the northern republic, a feeling which became intensified after their declared independence from Mexico. The slave-holders of the American southern states wanted no independent state there forming a barrier to the advance of their favorite institution. The Texans, on their side, in order to stimulate the desire of the slave-holders for annexation, a few days after declaring their independence, inserted in their constitution a clause giving the rights of citizenship to all white emigrants after a residence of only six months, and authorizing them to bring in their slaves, at the same time that the importation of slaves, except from the United States, was strictly forbidden.⁴⁰ Free negroes and mulattoes

³⁸ Including Texas and the largest and best portion of California, together with the port of San Francisco. Official correspond. in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 25, Ses. 1, H. Ex. Doc. 42.

³⁹ President Santa Anna said it would be like signing the death-warrant of Mexico; for the U. S. would gradually take one after another of the Mexican departments till they had them all. *Thompson's Recol. Mex.*, 233-9.

⁴⁰ This offered to the slave-breeders of the U. S. a monopoly which they

were required to leave the country within a short time, under penalty of being reduced to bondage.

The slave-holders, whose representative man at that time was Thomas H. Benton, senator from Missouri, thought of forming nine slave states out of Texas alone. But the Texans wanted to allure them with the prospect of a larger accession; and with that end in view, on the 19th of December, 1836, voted themselves the territory lying between the United States and the Rio Grande, from its source to its mouth.⁴¹ The option of an independent nationality, or the consecration of that large domain to slavery through annexation to the United States, was submitted to the popular vote, and was decided in favor of the latter by 3,279 votes against 91. The slave-holders in the United States kept themselves well informed on these movements, and showed their alacrity to meet such manifestations half-way.

President Jackson despatched an agent to Texas to

failed not to take advantage of. The desire of the slave interest in the U. S. became an anxiety when the young republic entered later into a treaty with England for the suppression of the African slave-trade. The slave-holders were greatly alarmed at the idea that a time might come when Texas, if left to herself, would decree the abolition of slavery. That fear was shared in by some of the Texan leaders; for even at the latest day, preceding the annexation, though the anti-slavery party was in the minority, the fact could not be disregarded that the majority of the people of Texas were not slave-owners, and that ere long the number of opponents to slavery would be increased by immigration from Europe. The idea of emancipation was an alarming one; whereas, on the other side, annexation was deemed of the highest importance to give stability and safety to slavery, and 'thereby save them forever from the unparalleled calamities of abolition.' *Mirabeau Lamar's Letter, in Jay's Rev. Mex. War*, 87-8.

⁴¹ Taking in parts of Coahuila and Tamaulipas and New Mexico. According to the report of Henry M. Morfit, special agent of the U. S., the boundaries claimed by Texas extended from the mouth of the Rio Grande, on the east side, up to its head waters, thence on a line due north until it intersected that of the U. S.; thence to the Sabine, and along that river to its mouth, and from that point westwardly with the gulf of Mexico to the Rio Grande. The political limits of Texas proper, previous to her revolution, were the Nueces on the west, along the Red River on the north, the Sabine on the east, and the gulf of Mexico on the south. It had been the intention of the Texan government, immediately after the victory of San Jacinto, to have claimed from the mouth of the Rio Grande along its course to lat. 30°, and thence west to the Pacific. It was, however, discovered that this would not strike a convenient point on the California coast, that it would be difficult to control a wandering population so distant, and that the territory now determined upon would be sufficient for a young republic. *U. S. Govt. Doc., Cong. 24, Ses. 2, H. Ex. Doc. 35, vol. ii.*

send reports upon the advantages of the country, in order to excite Americans to go there and take possession. His account of its political, military, and civil condition was laid before the American congress on the 22d of December, 1836, and was accompanied with remarks showing the policy pursued from the first by the American government toward Texas. It is said that the title of Texas to the territory she claimed was identified with her independence; that she asked the United States government to acknowledge that title by recognizing her independence, and then Texas, with a part of Coahuila, Tamaulipas, and New Mexico, might soon become integral portions of the United States. As Mexico would neither sell Texas nor allow herself to be provoked into a war, there was no recourse but to recognize the independence of Texas.

But the northern states were opposed to the acquisition of more slave territory, and it was necessary for the southern schemers to allay all suspicion that they were acting from interested motives. The president laid stress on the benefits to accrue from the recognition, but said that it must be postponed indefinitely. Prudence dictated this attitude till Mexico or some other power recognized the independence of the new nation, or at least "till the lapse of time or the course of events shall have proved beyond all cavil or dispute the ability of the people of that country to maintain their separate sovereignty, and to uphold the government established by them." Mark the quoted words. Eight weeks after, namely, on the 1st of March, 1837, a majority in congress being secured, the lapse of time and course of events which the president contemplated in his message had come, the senate acknowledged the independence of Texas, and soon after the house passed a resolution to the same effect. Thus was Texas recognized as an independent republic. To Mexico's just protest, the United States government answered in effect that Texas as a sover-

eign state had the right to make herself independent if it suited her interests.⁴² This was quite a different doctrine from that enforced at the mouth of the cannon by the northern United States against the southern twenty-five years after. Of course it is right for a Mexican state to secede if the United States wants it, but it is very wrong for any of the states of the northern confederation to secede on any pretext whatsoever. It will be well to state here that Forsyth had on the 29th of May, 1836, assured Gorostiza that his government would adopt no resolution or decision on that question which was not founded on the same rules and principles that had guided its action in the dissensions between Spain and her American colonies. The department of state was now reminded of that declaration by Monasterio, the Mexican minister of foreign affairs, and asked if the Texans were in the same position that the Mexicans held toward Spain when the United States acknowledged Mexico's independence. Did the American government see the slightest point of similarity between a nation of upward of six million people, who by their unaided efforts had thrown off the yoke of Spain after a bloody struggle of eleven years, and a revolting "few thousand adventurers without country, without religion, without virtues, and without laws, menaced by a numerous army," etc.? The minister also alluded to Jackson's message of December 22, 1836, and in obedience to the orders of the executive makes known the solemn protest of Mexico before all civilized nations against the recognition of the "pretended republic of Texas," made by the United States.⁴³ General Tornel, minister of war of Mexico, in a speech before the congress of Mexico, accused

⁴² See *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 262.

⁴³ José María Ortiz Monasterio's note bears date of March 21, 1837. His protest involves the following points: that the acknowledgment complained of could in no manner whatever weaken, diminish, or compromise the rights of Mexico to the territory of Texas, nor her right to employ every means in her power to recover that territory. A translation of the note is given in *Niles' Reg.*, iii. 248-9.

the Americans of puny faith, reiterating his government's resolve to uphold its rights at all hazards, and ended with the words, "the Mexicans will conquer or cease to exist."

Soon after the recognition of Texas the United States accredited a diplomatic agent, named Alcée Labranche, to that government, and received an envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary called Hunt, an American citizen until very recently, who in August 1837 proposed the annexation of Texas to the American Union. He found many obstacles in the way, the chief ones being that a treaty for its accomplishment would involve a war with Mexico, and that the requisite two-thirds vote in the senate for its ratification could not then be obtained. President Van Buren⁴⁴ was too shrewd a politician to risk its rejection and to jeopardize the popularity of his administration in the northern states. To decline the proposal for the time being would not affect him in the southern states. He trusted that by a dexterous management of the American claims against Mexico, the main obstacle to the annexation would soon be removed. In this he was disappointed, as we have seen that Mexico's offer to submit the matters in controversy to arbitration postponed for several years the maturity of that plan.

The independence of Texas was recognized by Great Britain and France, which powers immediately afterward sent their diplomatic representatives, the former Captain Elliot of Canton war fame, and the latter the comte Dubois de Saligny, who in after years became so notorious for his diplomatic trickery in Mexico.⁴⁵ These two nations well knew that Texan

⁴⁴Called the 'old fox,' and more specially the 'northern man with southern principles.'

⁴⁵The Mexican minister of foreign affairs refers on the 31st of Jan. 1840, to the provisional declarations of the French government relative to its recognition of Mexico's independence from Spain, adding that no such dilatoriness was observed in acknowledging Texan independence from Mexico. Existing ties of friendship were as naught; and in the same manner was the fact ignored that Texan population and resources as compared with those of Mexico

independence was but a preliminary step toward annexation to the United States. But it seems that certain of their statesmen allowed themselves to be carried away with the idea, partly inspired by the leading men of Texas with General Houston at their head, that the small party existing in the new republic who sincerely wanted a separate nationality, and looked to a not distant day when they could carry her boundaries to the Sierra Madre, would succeed in warding off the annexation. Elliot supported that party, among whose members the annexationists had agents; he even went to Mexico and tried to prevail on the government to grant Texas her independence.

Texas as one of the family of nations now enjoyed facilities for trade of which both her citizens and those of the United States availed themselves to the fullest extent; and it may well be supposed that war material greatly entered into it, to the further displeasure of the Mexican government. Hence its protest on the 12th of May, 1842, wherein the minister Bocanegra accused the American government of flagrant violations of the treaty of friendship between the two nations in allowing its citizens to afford personal and other aid to Texas, and even at public meetings and in other ways, to promote her annexation to the United States.⁴⁶ The Mexican minister asked if the United States could act in a more hostile manner toward his government short of actual war. This protest was reiterated on the 31st of May, Bocanegra expressing "regrets that, to judge from facts patent to all the world, the United States cabinet and authorities observe a conduct openly opposed to the most sacred rights of men and to the solemn pact of friendship existing between two nations." Repeating the charges of his previous note, he adds that the "countenancing of this toleration will be regarded as positively hostile

were insufficient. Without giving Mexico any prior notice, France recognized Texas and made a treaty of amity and commerce with her. *Méx., Mem. Relaciones*, in *Diario del Gob.*, May 20, 1840.

⁴⁶ Corroborative documents accompanied the protest.

to the republic." The matter was also formally brought to the attention of the other members of the diplomatic corps residing in Mexico. I epitomize in a note this circular, and the correspondence with Minister Thompson arising from it.⁴⁷ Bocanegra's first complaint was answered by the American envoy on the 5th of September, under instructions of July 8th and 13th from Secretary Webster. He sustained the right of the United States to promote trade with independent Texas,⁴⁸ though recognizing the right of Mexico, as a belligerent, to intercept all articles embraced within the term 'contraband of war.' He reminded the Mexican government that under the treaty of 1831 obstructions to legitimate trade were guarded against. As to neutrality toward the bellig-

⁴⁷ The note to the legations of Great Britain, France, Spain, and Prussia explained Mexico's good faith toward the U. S., and complained of the aid afforded, against her rights, in men, arms, and money, to the Texan rebels. The American envoy, Waddy Thompson, then, on the 6th of June, also addressed his colleagues a note denying the allegations of the Mexican government. He argued, quoting Vattel and the treaty with Mexico, that American citizens had a right to send war material to either belligerent, though such material was liable to seizure by the other. He concluded saying that though the U. S. looked on war without cause as the greatest of crimes, they would not shrink from it if necessary to uphold their rights and great principles. Bocanegra, on the 6th of July, objected to Thompson's circular, claiming that the American legation should have waited till the answer from the secretary of state had come. Referring to the oft-repeated charges, he said that his government expected that contraband trade would occur, but had a right to object to its being countenanced by the U. S. government, as such a course, on the part of the latter, rendered it as guilty as the offenders themselves. Bocanegra insisted on the fact that the Texan rebels for a long time past had openly kept an agency in New Orleans; that Texan war vessels were built and repaired in the U. S.; that the proclamation of the Texan president calling for the aid of Americans had been published; that a commission had been recruiting men and procuring supplies openly in New Orleans; that the legislatures of Louisiana and Kentucky, and members of the national congress, had urged war against Mexico. The two war vessels claimed to have been allowed to leave the U. S. for Mexico to fight against Texas were despatched as American vessels with regular papers, and after full guaranties had been furnished; and yet they had been detained at the moment of sailing, and only unwillingly permitted to sail. But Texan vessels publicly recruited and refitted at New Orleans to cruise against Mexican trade and to wage war against Mexican ports. *Méx., Mem. Relaciones*, 1844, xli.-lxii.; *Bustamante, Diario Mex.*, MS., xlv. 53; *U. S. Govt., Cong.* 27, Ses. 8, Sen. Doc. 1, pp. 146-57, vol. i., H. Ex. Doc. 1, pp. 144-55, vol. i.; *Thompson's Recoll. Méx.*, 284-303; *Niles' Reg.*, lxii. 305, 318-19, 321, 326-9, 333.

⁴⁸ Secretary Webster received Bocanegra's first note on the 29th of June, and his second on the 9th of July. Thompson's despatches, and a copy of his answer to Bocanegra's circular to the diplomatic corps, reached the state department at Washington about the 3d of July.

erents, the United States government had provided for its strict observance, and had heard of no enrolment of troops or equipment of ships. Giving or lending money by Americans, he contended, was perfectly legal, and as to the expression of opinion at public meetings on Texas affairs, American citizens enjoyed that privilege under the general laws of the United States. The American government also declared that the emigration to Texas consisted of men who in the exercise of their rights and free will changed their domicile and nationality; if such men went back to the United States and claimed American citizenship after serving a foreign country, then the government could take action respecting them, but not before.⁴⁹ The declaration that Mexico would regard aggressions by American citizens as a violation of the treaty of friendship between the two republics, he added, had greatly surprised his government, and its only answer thereto must be that Mexico was demanding what could not be conceded, and if she should break the peace she must abide the consequences. To Bocanegra's second note Thompson replied that the president of the United States considered his language and tone as highly offensive, implying as it did want of faith on the part of the American government. The latter would not, however, alter its course, which was one of impartial neutrality.

Bocanegra was evidently anxious to keep the peace, for on the 10th of September he accepted the declaration of the United States of their intention to observe a strict neutrality.

An incident occurred the same year that tended to widen the breach and increase the alarm of Mexico.

⁴⁹ Mexico was reminded that when she was fighting against Spain she received all who came to her standard from the United States or Europe, and that in her warfare against Texas, before 1836, an American held high command in the Mexican army stationed in that country. The constitution and laws allowed no interdiction of legal trade or emigration to Texas. Should the emigrant, however, enlist there he would be no longer entitled to American protection, as the government of the U. S. must look on Texas as a foreign independent nation.

This was the capture and surrender of Monterey in Upper California, by Commodore Thomas Ap C. Jones.⁵⁰

The Texas question was one pregnant with disagreeable complications for Mexico. Projects being contemplated to introduce French and English colonists into Texas, under concessions of the Texan government, the secretary of foreign relations, on the 19th of April, 1843, notified the diplomatic corps that such immigrants would not be recognized by his government as bona fide settlers. To translate his own words, "They will be treated as real invaders and enemies of Mexico, . . . and will receive condign punishment;" that Mexican troops in Texas would accord to persons calling themselves consuls only the rights of foreign neutrals. The representatives of powers that had recognized Texas as a nation insisted on the right of their governments to accredit consuls in Texas, and of their citizens or subjects to settle in the country, holding Mexico amenable for any disrespect to their agents, or for injuries to the persons or property of their innocent subjects.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Bocanegra's two notes, having been published in a Mexican journal, fell at Callao into the commodore's hands, together with a Boston newspaper, copying from another of New Orleans a false rumor of British interference, to the effect that Mexico had ceded California to Great Britain for seven million dollars. The commodore, from the tenor of those notes, jumped at the conclusion that Mexico had declared war against the United States; and there being at the time in the Pacific three British war-ships, of whose business he had obtained no knowledge, he thought they were going to take possession of the supposed recent purchase. Jones resolved to be before them, and sailed for the coast of Mexico. Reaching Monterey, the capital of California, on the 19th of Oct., and finding the territory still under the Mexican flag, without more ado he took formal possession of the place on the next day, only to discover his error one day later, and to find himself obliged to restore the Mexican flag, with an apology for his proceeding. The American government of course disavowed the commodore's act; but Mexico's demand for his punishment was disregarded. She was told that he had 'intended no indignity.' *Bustamante, Diario Mex.*, MS., xlii. 69. Full details given in *Hist. Cal.*, this series.

⁵¹ Doyle, British chargé, said on the 20th that his government having acknowledged Texan nationality, British consuls and subjects must be respected by Mexico. The French legation took the same view. Spain and Prussia not having recognized Texas, their representatives referred the subject to their respective superiors. The American minister said that the U. S. claimed no rights over those who had joined the Texan army or become citizens of

Apprehensions of a possible collision with Great Britain on the north-eastern boundary question no longer existing, the United States government resolved that the annexation of Texas should not be delayed, notwithstanding the opposition of a large element in the northern states.⁵²

As early as the 23d of August, 1843, the Mexican government, on hearing that a proposition would soon be submitted to the deliberations of the congress of the United States to incorporate Texas with them, notified the American envoy, for the information of his government, that an act of annexation passed by that congress would be looked on by Mexico as a *casus belli*. This brought out an undiplomatic reply the very next day from Minister Thompson, warning the Mexican government against a repetition of such threats, which he considered incompatible with the respect due alike to his government and to that of Mexico. If intended for intimidation, he said, they would have no effect; and if as a warning, they were unnecessary. The American republic had its char-

Texas; but could not accept the declaration as far as it related to American consuls who had to reside in the country to protect American citizens and trade. Bocanegra, on the 27th of May, wrote the British chargé that only persons in arms or plotting against Mexico would be treated as enemies; but Mexico could not hold herself responsible for injury to others that had entered Texas fully aware of the effects of the unavoidable struggle. Consuls, if not found aiding the rebels, would be treated as neutrals; for to recognize them as foreign officials would involve the recognition of Texas. To the French minister he said that land grants by the Texan government would be looked upon as invalid. Doyle replied on the 7th of June, hoping that Mexican troops would respect the property and persons of peaceable residents, or his government would claim indemnity for innocent parties injured. The French minister said the same, with this addition, namely, that he had instructions to represent to Mexico the bad effects of her disregard of popular rights in Texas, and to seek their recognition. Bocanegra then, on the 11th of July, 1843, informed the French envoy that the Mexican troops would respect the property of foreigners, but not any grants obtained from the Texan authorities, inasmuch as they were usurpations from Mexico. He declared that Mexico was forbearing in war, though false reports represented her as cruel. *Méx., Mem. Relaciones, 1844, lxxi.-lxxxvi.*

⁵²The southern slave-holders were now so determined that at the close of the session of congress in March 1843 a number of its members, headed by J. Q. Adams, issued an address of warning to the American people against the plans of annexation for extending the area of slavery, which might even bring on a dissolution of the Union; at the same time pointing out the gross infringement of treaty obligations toward Mexico, involved by those plans. *Jay's Rev. Mex. War, 88.*

acter in its own keeping, and needed no admonition to save it from stain or dishonor. Bocanegra disclaimed any intention to threaten, and still less to provoke and excite; but resolved to use the right that no one could deny his country, that of regarding the annexation of Texas to the United States as a hostile act, involving a violation of international law, and particularly of the treaty of April 5, 1831, between the two governments. In protesting against the violation of her rights she fulfilled an obligation peculiar to her sovereignty and independence.

On the 13th of September, 1843, Mr Upshur, who had become President Tyler's secretary of state, informed the American minister in Mexico of his government's intention to demand from Mexico that she should either make peace with Texas or show her ability with respectable forces to prosecute the war.⁵³

It is not clear why the government of the United States should take umbrage at Mexico's failure to wage an active warfare on its friends in Texas. Its animus in the effort to bully Mexico⁵⁴ into making peace with Texas appears revealed in Secretary Upshur's note of September 8th to Murphy, American diplomatic agent in Texas, wherein he speaks of a rumor about a scheme in England to furnish the Texan government with pecuniary means to abolish slavery, indemnifying the masters, and the lenders to receive for their money large tracts of land in Texas. Such an

⁵³ Upshur's predecessor had endeavored to bring about a settlement of the war. In Jan. 1843 he directed the American envoy to use his good offices with the Mexican secretary to mitigate the animosity of his government. He did not doubt Mexico's right to subjugate Texas if she could do so by the common and lawful means of war; but other states—specially the United States—were interested, 'not only in the restoration of peace between them, but in the manner in which the war shall be conducted, if it shall continue.' The envoy was directed to use these suggestions at the time, and was likewise informed that 'it is in the contemplation of this government to remonstrate in a more formal manner with Mexico, at a period not far distant, unless she shall consent to make peace with Texas, or shall show the disposition and ability to prosecute the war with respectable forces.' *U. S. Gort. Doc.*, Cong. 28, Ses. 1, H. Ex. Doc. 271, p. 69, 2, pp. 23-48; *Mayer's Hist. War Mex.*, i. 55-6.

⁵⁴ 'The purity of the motives of our government became open to suspicion.' *Gallatin's Peace with Mex.*, 9.

attempt, Upshur said, would be viewed with deep concern by the United States, and must be prevented.⁵⁵ Slavery in Texas was made a subject of discussion in the house of lords by Brougham in August 1843, when Aberdeen, secretary of foreign affairs, referring to the armistice then in force between the belligerents, hoped it would lead to the acknowledgment of Texan independence, adding that the British government would use its best endeavors to this end. Brougham made some remarks in answer to that speech, which were considered ominous by the slave interest in the United States.⁵⁶ British policy on the slavery question was well known in the United States. Great Britain was pledged to encourage the abolition of the slave-trade, and of slavery as far as her influence extended, and in every proper way. The American minister in London was assured, however, by Lord Aberdeen, in November 1843, in reference to Texas, that "the suggestion of England having made or intending to make the abolition of slavery the condition of any treaty arrangement with her was wholly without foundation."

On the 17th of October, 1843, Upshur proposed to Texas a treaty of annexation, and General Almonte, the Mexican minister,⁵⁷ on the 3d of November notified the state department that if the United States should commit the 'inaudito atentado' of appropriating to themselves an integrant portion of the

⁵⁵ 'It cannot be permitted to succeed without most strenuous efforts on our part to avert a calamity so serious to every part of our country. Few calamities could befall this country more to be deplored than the establishment of a predominant British influence, and the abolition of domestic slavery in Texas.' Murphy replied, assuming the liberty to give his superior what he considered a little wholesome advice; nothing should be said 'which can offend even our fanatical brethren of the north; let the United States espouse at once the cause of civil, political, and religious liberty in this hemisphere; this will be found to be the safest issue to go before the world with.' *U. S. Gort Doc.*, Cong. 28, Sess. 1, H. Ex. Doc. 271; *Niles' Reg.*, lxvi. 166.

⁵⁶ Nothing could satisfy him more, while the minister's statement 'would be hailed with joy by all who were favorable to the object of anti-slavery societies,' *London Morn. Chronicle*, Aug. 19, 1843.

⁵⁷ Accredited after Waddy Thompson was received in Mexico as American plenipotentiary. *Méx., Mem. Relaciones*, 1844, 6, 7.

Mexican territory he would demand his passports, and his country would declare war. Upshur in his replies deigned no explanation, and treated the Mexican declaration with scorn.⁵³ Things were now working well for the United States war clique.

The Texans at first did not show much eagerness to be annexed, which worried Upshur, who then began to use menacing language.⁵⁴ He endeavors to allay any apprehension the Texan government may have of a possible rejection by the United States senate of the treaty. He assures it that a clear majority of two thirds of that body is in favor of it—a most extraordinary assertion, indeed, which the result failed to sustain. A treaty of annexation was finally concluded,⁵⁵ and laid before the senate of the United States on the 22d of April, 1844, when it was rejected by a vote of thirty-five to sixteen. Steps had been also adopted to induce Mexico to assent to the arrangement.⁵⁶ While the treaty was under consideration in the senate, a force of about 1,150 men under General Zachary Taylor was stationed at Fort Jesup, near Natchitoches, and a strong naval force ordered to the gulf of Mexico, to guard American interests in Texas and to check Mexican attempts at reconquest. Taylor was directed, if any danger threatened Texas, to march with his force to the Sabine, but not to go beyond the frontier with-

⁵³ Two notes passed from each side between Nov. 3d and Dec. 1st, both inclusive. *Niles' Reg.*, lrv. 266-8.

⁵⁴ He wrote Murphy, the American agent, Jan. 14, 1844, if the proposal for annexation should be rejected, 'instead of being, as we ought to be, the closest friends, it is inevitable we shall become the bitterest foes.' Without annexation, 'Texas cannot maintain that institution [slavery] ten years—probably not half that time.'

⁵⁵ April 12, 1844, in nine articles, signed by John C. Calhoun, Upshur's successor, for the United States, Isaac Van Zandt and J. Pinckney Henderson for Texas.

⁵⁶ Gilbert L. Thompson, a special agent of the United States, had a conference with Gen. Santa Anna at Puente Nacional on the 17th of May, to obtain Mexico's acquiescence, offering a sum of money for differences of limits. His proposals were rejected, and Mexico's resolve to reconquer Texas assured him. Santa Anna's report of the same date in *El Siglo*, June 12, 1844, and its translation in *Niles' Reg.*, lxvi. 351.

out further orders. He was to keep everything in readiness, however, for a possible campaign.

The failure to secure the senate's ratification of the treaty opened the eyes of the president and his cabinet to the necessity of removing obstacles. The chief argument relied on was that war had virtually ceased between Mexico and Texas. But the Mexican government was now roused to activity, and issued some threatening proclamations indicative of a purpose to subdue Texas. Though Mexican efforts to that end must prove abortive, yet the existence of active war would be an argument against annexation, and if annexation was carried out, the United States must needs be a party to the war. Hence, the American government resolved at once to remonstrate against a further prosecution of the war and against the sanguinary manner in which it was waged. Shannon, the present envoy, was instructed on the 14th of October to that effect, and lost no time in carrying out his instructions in a manner that left no doubt the United States were determined to utterly disregard Mexican rights to and over Texas. Mexico, in her exhausted condition, could resent the insult with words only, but they were dignified and truthful words, and grounded on honesty and common sense. The particulars of the correspondence between this minister and Manuel C. Rejon, the Mexican secretary, which brought on a suspension of diplomatic intercourse, are given in a note attached.⁶²

⁶² Shannon accused Mexico of barbarous practices in the manner of waging war, confessing that his government for twenty years past had fostered the policy of detaching Texas from Mexico with the ulterior view of her annexation to its territory for the safety and welfare of the latter; and now it would not permit Mexico to renew the war for the purpose of defeating the annexation. He clearly intimated that in view of the importance of Texas to the United States, the American government would espouse her cause. Rejon repelled such pretensions, declaring that the American president was greatly mistaken in supposing that Mexico would yield to the menace which he, 'exceeding the powers given him by the fundamental law of his nation,' had directed against her. His arguments are powerful, but the great length of his note precludes its insertion here. After some comments on the conduct of the U. S., to show that the latter were practising a 'descarada usurpacion,' he scathingly says: 'If one party labors to obtain more ground to blot it with

President Tyler keenly felt the rebuke inflicted on him by the Mexican foreign office, and while yet writhing under it, in his message of December 19th, to congress, confined himself to comments on "the extraordinary and highly offensive language which the Mexican government had thought proper to employ." He believed Mexico's conduct merited punishment; but abstained, as he said, through a sincere desire to preserve peace, from recommending any measures of redress, and simply urged "prompt and immediate action on the subject of annexation."

Tyler's term of office was near its close. His successor, Polk, had been nominated as the candidate of the democratic party, on the pledge to carry out the immediate annexation of Texas. The democrats of the north had been forced at the party's convention to accept his candidacy, and to submit to the demands of the slave-holders of the south. Polk was elected, and stood as the champion of Texas annexation, representing the national will on that point.

The former plan of annexing Texas by treaty, involving its ratification by a two-thirds vote of the senate under constitutional provision, was now abandoned, Tyler having discovered, as he and the supporters of annexation claimed, that the object in view could be accomplished by means of joint resolutions

the enslavement of a hapless branch of the human family, the other is trying to diminish, by preserving its own, the incentive that the former seeks for so detestable a traffic. Let the world now decide which of the two has justice and reason on its part.' *The New Orleans Bee* declared the answer couched in courteous and respectful terms; but it had made Shannon wrathful, and prompted his unheeded demand for an immediate retraction on penalty of discontinuance of all further diplomatic intercourse till he received instructions from his government. Rejon then retorted that the American minister's reluctance to discuss the conduct of his government was not surprising. 'And indeed, to what else can be attributed this exclusive desire to claim for himself, his nation, and his government the respect denied by him to the Mexican republic and its government, to which he has so often applied the term "barbarous" in his note of Oct. 14th? Is the government of the United States superior in dignity? or has its legislature any right to be thus disrespectful to a government to whom it has refused that courtesy which is due even to mere individuals? Instead of withdrawing his letter, he is ordered to reiterate his former statements.' *Méx., Mem. Relaciones, Docs Justif., 1847, 41-60; Niles' Reg., lxvii. 224, 234-5.*

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of the two houses of congress.⁶³ In short, the joint resolutions had been passed on the 1st of March, 1845, the senate leaving, however, to the president the option of effecting the annexation by resolution or by treaty,⁶⁴ which that functionary promptly availed himself of. A messenger was at once despatched with a letter from Secretary Calhoun to the American representative in Texas to propose the resolutions of annexation to the acceptance of the Texan government.⁶⁵ On the 4th of July Texas agreed to be annexed,⁶⁶ and on the 22d of December, 1845, she formally became a member of the American Union. The European governments which had recognized Texas as a nation, albeit they had endeavored to prevail on her to retain her independent status, made no objection to the change effected.⁶⁷

It is almost needless to state that General Almonte, the Mexican minister, upon the official publication of the joint resolutions, on the 7th of March, demanded his passports after addressing a protest to the diplomatic corps at Washington against the spoliation thus decreed of his country's territory.⁶⁸ This was fol-

⁶³ See his message of Dec. 1844. *Id.*, 222.

⁶⁴ In the house it was adopted by a majority of 22 votes; in the senate, finally, by a majority of two. *Id.*, 369, 378-83, 401.

⁶⁵ Some of the most prominent American statesmen and jurists not only pronounced this device unconstitutional, but the whole plan of annexation and the consequent war, violent, unjust, pernicious, and unprincipled. Among these were Chancellor Kent, Judge William Jay, Charles Sumner, Theodore Parker, Giddings, and many others. See Kent's and Jay's letters in *Id.*, lxxviii. 89-90; *Jay's Rev. War Mex.*, 104; *Sumner's Orations*, ii. 131-62, 186-95; *Parker's Sermon on Mex. War*, *Am. Rev.*, ii. 221-9, iii. 565-80, iv. 1-16, v. 217-30, vi. 331; *Giddings' Speeches in Cong.*, 250-63; *Mansfield's Mex. War*, 9-19; *Livermore's War with Mex.*, 5-40. On the other hand, the authors and upholders of the annexation plot were numerous and able, though interested in the scheme of enlarging the area of slave territory, and to a great extent unprincipled. Among the most prominent was Thos H. Benton, a man always too ready to sacrifice right to interest. See *Benton's Debates in Cong.*, xv. 241, 487, 622, 664; *Benton's Thirty Years' View*, ii. 639-49, 679-711.

⁶⁶ The convention held at Austin voted 55 ayes against one nay, Richard Bache's being the only negative vote. That action was almost unanimously ratified by the people Oct. 10th. *Thrall's Hist. Texas*, 348-50.

⁶⁷ Their commercial treaties with Texas accordingly ceased to have any effect.

⁶⁸ The correspondence may be found in *Monitor Constituc. Ind.*, 1845, March 22d, 29th, and May 3d; *Boletín de Notic.*, 1845, March 31st; *U. S. Govt. Cong.* 23. Ses. 2, Sen. Journ., 142; *Niles' Reg.*, lxxviii. 17, 84, 117; *Mayer's Hist. War Mex.*, i. 73.

lowed by a correspondence in Mexico between Secretary Cuevas and the American legation, in which the former signified the resolution of his government to close all relations with the United States, and therewith enclosed him his passports. The fact was also formally made known to the other foreign representatives.⁶⁹ The next step of the Mexican government was to announce the condition of affairs to the nation, summoning the people to take up arms in defence of their country's rights and honor.⁷⁰

Measures were decreed to raise a large loan, in order to meet the expenses of the impending war.⁷¹ Generals Arista, Paredes, and Gaona with their divisions, numbering together about 1,000 men, were ordered to the front. It was still hoped, notwithstanding these preparations, that war might be averted through foreign mediation or otherwise.

On the other hand, the American government thought proper to concentrate on the frontier of Mexico⁷² all the disposable portion of the United States army. Arms, ammunition, and supplies of all kinds in considerable quantities were shipped for the same destination. A strong fleet was also despatched to the coast of Mexico. In one word, the military and naval departments used all necessary means to

⁶⁹ The note passed may be seen in *Niles' Reg.*, lxxviii. 134-5.

⁷⁰ March 29, 1845, the government urged on the departmental authorities the utmost zeal to defend the national honor, and the respect due the supreme powers. From that time a number of war measures were adopted. Among them were the following: on the 13th of May, wheresoever American vessels might make their appearance the consuls should cease exercising official functions, and American citizens should be made to reside in the interior, at least 60 miles from the coast; on the 30th of May, that the American consuls in Mexico, and Mexican consuls in the United States, should cease acting as such. *Méx., Mem. Relaciones*, 1847, 8-10; *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Méx.*, MS., ii. 221-3; *Amigo del Pueblo*, 1845, July 19th, Sept. 4th; *Niles' Reg.*, lxxviii. 305; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, v. 19-22; *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1844-6, 117-20; *Méx., Decretos, Min.*, 1845, no. 19.

⁷¹ *Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal Diaz*, i. 43-53, 71-2; *Id., Mem. Hist. Méx.*, MS., ii. 14-99 passim, 210, 221, iii. 14-15, 77-8, 113-14, 146; *Niles' Reg.*, lxxviii. 388; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, v. 36.

⁷² The United States regarded Texas as extending to the Rio Bravo or Grande on two grounds: 1st, on the declaration of the Texan congress in December, 1836; and 2d, that said river had been the natural limit of Louisiana. Both grounds were untenable.

guard the Texan frontier, and to intimidate Mexico. The troops, however, had orders to stand on the defensive as long as they could fairly and properly do so, and not to commit or provoke any hostilities.⁷³ General Taylor accordingly encamped in June at Corpus Christi, ready to advance on the Rio Bravo.

Texas secured, Mexico exasperated, and diplomatic relations at an end, everything was now favorable to secure the war determined upon, and which would result in the acquisition of more valuable territory, including much-coveted California. But such a war, to be popular or even tolerated in the northern states of the American union, must be made to appear a war by the act of Mexico. It would be a fine stroke to pretend to further negotiation, or even conciliation, howsoever hypocritical they might be, and these failing, as care should be taken that they should fail, then Mexico might easily be provoked to strike the first blow. It would then be, on the part of the United States, a war of defence, not of aggression, and the national conscience would remain satisfied. This was the policy adopted by the administration of President Polk, and it met with the most infamous success.

Now for the first step, namely, renewing the negotiations. On the 13th of October, 1845, John Black, consul of the United States in the city of Mexico, confidentially apprised Secretary Peña y Peña of the desire of the American secretary of state that the Mexican government should receive an envoy clothed with powers to arrange the questions pending between the two republics. Two days afterward Peña delivered Black a written reply of the 14th, saying that though the Mexican nation had been deeply injured by the acts of the United States in the department of Texas, his government was disposed to receive a commissioner

⁷³ The details of those measures accompanied the American president's message of December 8, 1846. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. Doc. 4, pp. 3-20; *Am. Quart. Rev.*, i. 38-84.

clothed with powers to settle the present dispute⁷⁴ in a peaceful, reasonable, and decorous manner; and thus give a new proof that notwithstanding those injuries and its firm decision to exact adequate reparation, it would not repel with contumely peaceful overtures. The secretary did not agree to receive a minister fully empowered to adjust all questions in dispute, but expressly alludes to the dispute about Texas. His language refers to a commissioner, who was to come and offer—not demand—reparation for the alleged injury inflicted in Texas. Such seems to be the inference that should be drawn from his language, and yet the wording may have been intended to leave the Mexican government the option to reject an American minister, or to refuse entering with him into negotiations on other topics than Texas, if circumstances demanded such a course. If Peña's reply was intentionally equivocal, the American government, with equal diplomacy, accepted it as a full and explicit answer to Consul Black's question. Polk's government must have acted not only with its eyes open, but likewise with an ulterior and sinister design. It asked for no explanation, and hurried off John Slidell as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, and gave him full powers to discuss and settle all disputed questions. That was three weeks before the meeting of congress, and before his confirmation by the senate.

There were two other suggestions, at least one of which was intended as a condition *sine qua non*, namely, that the American squadron stationed off Vera Cruz should retire, inasmuch as its presence there would degrade Mexico in receiving the commissioner, and at the same time place the United States in an equivocal position, apparently contradicting the vehement desire for conciliation, peace, and friendship that

⁷⁴ 'Está dispuesto á recibir al comisionado que de los Estados Unidos venga á esta capital con plenos poderes de su gobierno para arreglar de un modo pacífico, razonable y decoroso la contienda presente.' *Méx., Mem. Relaciones*, 1847, 11, and *Doc. Justif.*, 8-10; *Niles' Reg.*, lxx. 205.

was offered and assured with words. Peña's other remark was that he hoped the United States would send a person "whose dignified deportment, prudence, and moderation, and the discreetness and reasonableness of whose proposals will tend to calm, as much as possible, the just irritation of the Mexicans." But care was taken by the Washington officials that the chosen agent should not be one who would in any wise attempt a calming influence.

The envoy arrived inopportunately at Vera Cruz, December 3, 1845, and Consul Black was asked to prevail on him to postpone his visit to Mexico, as he had not been expected before January, by which time the government hoped to receive the assent and approval of the departments, so as to be able "to proceed in the affair with greater safety."

The minister, however, addressed his first note to Secretary Peña on the 8th of December in Mexico, accompanying his credentials, and though the fleet had not wholly retired, the correspondence began. The question of Slidell's reception having been submitted by the executive, for advice, to the council of government, that body decided on the 16th that he was not in duty bound to receive him in that capacity.⁷⁵ This solution of the point was written to Secretary Buchanan on the 20th, and also to Slidell; and to the latter were communicated in detail the grounds for the Mexican government's action. Slidell refused to transmit Peña's note to Buchanan because it was sealed. The American envoy again on the 24th addressed the department of relations, and in a long argument endeavored to charge the Mexican government with equivocation, and laid stress upon other matters that the United States

⁷⁵ 'The obligation assumed by the supreme government of receiving a plenipotentiary of the U. S., with special powers to treat on the affair of Texas, does not bind it to receive an envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary appointed to reside near the government, in which capacity Mr Slidell has come, according to his credentials.' *Méx., Mem. Relaciones, 1847; Doc. Justif., 16.*

required a settlement of, referring specially to pending claims of American citizens.⁷⁶ Prior to this a change of administration through revolution had occurred, and his last note aforesaid not having been answered, Slidell, from Jalapa on the 1st of March, 1846, tried to obtain a recognition from Joaquin Castillo y Lanzas, who was now secretary of relations, and met with the same refusal as before.⁷⁷ After some further correspondence without any change in the government's resolution, Slidell demanded his passport, which was sent him on the 21st of March.⁷⁸

Meantime, in the early part of the foregoing diplomatic imbroglio, Slidell having apprised the state department⁷⁹ that the Mexican government would probably refuse to treat with him except on the Texas question, all hope of acquiring California by peaceable negotiations now vanished, and at once orders were transmitted to General Taylor to march to the Rio Grande. The American government was bent on war, professedly for two causes: first, the injuries said to have been inflicted on American citizens, which were to be atoned for by Mexico with money; and second, the insults involved in the imputations of bad faith

⁷⁶ The amount now claimed was a little over eight million dollars. The commissioners and umpire, under the treaty for settlement of American claims, rejected as spurious and fraudulent over five and a half millions. The unliquidated claims amounted, after deducting the award, to \$6,455,464. Of these, the American government, by the treaty of peace with Mexico, assumed the payment of such as might be found valid, not exceeding, however, \$3,250,000, so that claims amounting to \$3,205,464 at least were abandoned altogether, and Mexico by treaty stipulation was released from all obligation to pay them.

⁷⁷ The government council had reiterated the advice of last December.

⁷⁸ The whole correspondence may be found in *U. S. Govt. Cong.* 29, Ses. 1, H. Ex. Doc. 196; *Méx., Mem. Relaciones*, 1847, 7-12, and *Doc. Justif.*, 11-46; *Niles' Reg.*, lxx. 204-7, lxxi. 20, 270-1, lxxii. 58-9. The same and other interesting details in *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Méx.*, MS., iii. 46-51, 80-210, *passim*, iv. 82-4, 117; *Id.*, *Hist. Santa Anna*, 272-4; *Id.*, *Nuevo Bernal Diaz*, i. 3-18, 43-53, 71-2, 92-4, 105; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 262-73; *Mem. Hist.*, 1846, Jan. 17, 19; *El Tiempo*, 1846, Mar. 9, 22, Ap. 23; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 745-6; *Apuntes Hist. Guerra*, 24-5; *Gallatin's Peace with Méx.*, 9-13; *Mansfield's Méx. War*, 27-30; *Ramsey's Other Side*, 28-9; *Mayer's Méx. Aztec*, i. 331-3; *Id.*, *Hist. War Méx.*, i. 79-81; *Jay's Rev. Méx. War*, 111-16; *Cong. Globe*, 1845, app. 2.

⁷⁹ His first despatch reached Washington January 12, 1846.

cast by the Mexican rulers on the government at Washington for its course in Texas. There were two other causes, which were kept in the background, the acquisition of California, and the desire to extend the area of slavery.

Cong. Globe, 1835-6, 24, index 33-4; 1836-7, 6, 12, 94; 1837, 8; 1837-8, 9, 21, app. 35-6; 1838-9, 15; 1839-40, 304, 368, 428, 431; 1841, pp. v., viii., extra, p. vi.; 1841-2, p. vi. app. 513; 1842-3, 30; 1844-5, 50, 64, 77, 127, 140, 209, 239, app. 1, 27, 101, 128; 1845, app. 2; 1845-6, pp. x.-xi., xxviii. app., passim; 1847-8, 4, 274; 1851-2, 100; *Cong. Debates*, 1834-5, i. 929-30; 1835-6, iii. 3493, 3593; 1836-7, i. 723-4, 854-7, 982, 986, ii. 1912-18, xiii. 723-4, 854-5, 982-6; *Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, i. 10-12, 20-6, ii. 25-39; *Id.*, *Mem. Hist. Mex.*, ii.-iii. passim, iv. 82-4, 117; *Id.*, *Nuevo Bernal Diaz*, i. 43-53, 71-2, 92-4, 105; *Id.*, *Hist. Sta Anna*, 82, 272-4, MS., ii. 38; *Id.*, *Diario Mex.*, MS., xlv. 181, xlv. 69; *Brook's Hist.*, 6-104; *Rejon, Justific.*, 1-35; *Ramsay's Other Side*, 22-3, 28-9; *Atocha's Statement: Jenkins' Mex. War*, 25-6, 43-6, 64-9, 96-8; *Mayer's Mex. Azt.*, i. 331-3; *Id. Mex. as It Was*, 311-12; *Id.*, *Hist. Mex. War*, 26-32, 54-66, 76-84, 113-23; *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos*, 1-31; *Taylor's Broad Pennant*, 201-22; *Payno, Conven. Mex.*, 15; *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Mex.*, ii. no. 333; *Amer. Review*, ii. 221-9, iii. 565-80, iv. 1-16, v. 217-30, 325-38, vi. 331; *Ceballos, Vind. Mex.*, 47-77, 93-7, 129-35; *Bolet. de Not.*, 1845, March 31, 1-2; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 639; *Id.*, *Hist. Jalapa*, iii. passim; *La Abeja*, 1844, Oct.-Nov., 70-1, 119, 181; *Falconer's On Discon. Miss.*, 55-9; *Livermore's War with Mex.*, 5-50, 162-7, 187-200, 239-86; *El Arco-Iris*, Aug. 26, 1847, 1-2; *Def. Integ. Nac.*, Nov. 16, 1844, 4; *Monit. Constit.*, March-May 1845, passim; *Hughes' Doniphan's Ex.*, 21; *Otero, Ensayo Cuest. Polit.*, 94-5; *Young's Am. Statesman*, 835-49; *Id.*, *Hist. Mex.*, 311, 323; *Polk, Mensage*, 1-53; *Derecho Intern. Mex.*, 1st pt 180-93, 2d pt 154-66; *Federacion y Texas*, 13-39; *Ariz.*, *Howell's Code*, 469-72; *Becher, Mex.*, 56-7; *Gwin's Memoirs*, 205-6; *Claimants on Mex.*; *Crane's Past. etc. of Pacific*, 63-4; *Baldwin's Claim; Mex. Pamphlets*, v.; *Domenech, Hist. du Mex.*, ii. 192-8; *Porter's Review Mex. War*, 36-51; *Viglietti, Reseña*, 1-18; *El Pabel. Nac.*, Oct.-Dec. 1844, passim; *Cal. Star*, April 3, 1847; *The Californian*, June 5, 1847; *Amigo del Pueblo*, July-Dec. 1845, passim; *El Constit.*, April 16, 1844; *Benton's Thirty Years View*, ii. 639-49, 679-711; *Id. Deb. in Congr.*, xv. 241, 487, 622, 664; *Morse's Speech*; *Peterson's Mil. Heroes*, ii. 26-9, 137-60; *Hays' Scraps, Cal. Notes*, v. 54; *Holmes' Speech on Mex. War*; *Cartas de D. Valentin Gomez Fartas*; *Doc. Hist. Mex.*, no. 14; *Jay's Mex. War*, 9-271; *Méx., Corresp. sobre Paso del Sabina*, 81-122; *Id.*, *Apuntes Hist. Guerra*, 6-28; *Id.*, *Contest. Legac. Ext.*, 81-120; *Id.*, *Col. Leyes y Dec.*, 1840, 492-505; *Id.*, *Contestar. habilitas*, 3-11; *Id.*, *Dec. Min.*, 1845, no. 20; *Id.*, *Discus. Dict. sobre Trjas*, 1-37; *Id.*, *Dict. Agreg. Trjas*, 1-8; *Am. Quart. Reg.*, i. 8-17, 33-34, 531-41; *Gullatin's Peace with Mex.*, 5-14; *Rivero, Mex. en 1842*, 214-31; *Southern Quart. Rev.*, ii. 107-12, xv. 83-113; *Memor. Hist.*, Jan. 5, 17, 19, etc., 1846; *Parker's Sermon Mex. War*; *Wood's Wand. Sketches*, 302-4; *Capron's Hist. Cal.*, 38; *Mansfield's Mex.*, 27-30; *Hansard's Parl. Rec.*, lxxxviii. 978-95; *Parrott's Memorial*, in *Mex. Pamphl.*, v.; *Thompson's Recoll. Mex.*, 222-9, 238-41, 279-304; *La Minerva*, April-May 1845, passim; *Gutierrez Estrada, Méj. en 1840 y 1847*, 1-55; *Giddings' Speeches in Congr.*, 250-3; *El Razonador*, Jan. 19, 1848; *Frost's Pict. Hist. Mex.*, 178-93; *Payo de N. Méj.*, Aug. 2, 1845, 4; *Furber's Volunteer*, 13-44, 272-4; *Tribune Alm.*, 1847, 7-8, 17; 1848, 4-6; *Webster's Speech*, pp. 23, no. 29, in *Mex. War Pamphl.*; *Corwin's Speech*, no. 1, in *Cong. Speeches*, i.; *Sumner's Orations*, ii. 131-62, 186-95; *Grattan's Civ. America*, ii. 446-50; *Escalera y Llana, Méx. hist.-descript.*, 81, 93; *Mex., Claims on; Mex. War Pamphlets*, nos 2, 3, 6, 8-13, 16-18, 21, 23, 27, 30; *Green's Journal*, 382-405; *Guerra entre Méx. y los*

Est. Un., 1-28; *Santangelo's Memorial*; *Id.*, *Claims on Mex.*; *Id.*, *A Lesson to Mr Harding*; *Id.*, *Address*; *Id.*, *Charges against Velasquez de Leon*; *Mex. Treaties*, ii. nos 10, 12; *Montgomery's Life of Z. Taylor*, 60-373; *Ruxton's Advent.*, 304-6; *Tejas, Dict. Com.*, 1-11; *Id.*, *Ult. Comunic.*, 1-22; *Id.*, *Supl.*, 1-30; *Id.*, *Com. Agreg. Est. Un.*, 3-30; *Niles' Register*, xlix. 334, 339-41, li. 225, 378, 409-13, index 'Mex.', lii. passim, liii. 45-8, 96, 102, 273, 280, 385, liv. 147, 336, 385, 387, 407, 415, index 'Mex.', lvi. 23-6, 213-14, 242, 348, 384, lvii. 132, 180, index 'Texas,' 'Mex.', lviii. 107, 218, 274, 305, 370, 338, index 'Texas,' 'Mex.', lix. 97, lx. 33, 130, 337, index 'Mex.', lxi. 11, 14-15, 37, 53, 395, 412, lxii. passim, lxiii. 3-4, 51, 83, 227, 242, lxiv. 51, lxxv. 264-8, lxvi.-lxxi. passim, lxxii. 58-9; *Tornet, Tejas Est. Un.*, 79-80; *El Tiempo*, Jan. 24-5, March 9, 22, April 23, 1846; *Ripley's War Mex.*, i. 43-84, 496-510; *Semmes' Service Afloat*, 41-67; *Robinson's Mex. and Her Mil.*, 304-12; *Shackford's Citizen's Appeal*, 3-40; *Méx., Mem. Guerra*, 1846, 1-43, annexes 1-17; *Id.*, *Mem. Min. Rel.*, 1833, 10-14; 1839, 6-8; 1841, 11-14; 1844, passim; 1845, 16-22; 1846, passim; 1847, 1-60, doc. 13-26; 1850, 6-10; *Chih., Represent.*, 8, 10; *Paredes y Arrillaga, Manif.*, 1-19; *Repub. of U. S.*, 77-99, 101-12, 212-17, 236-58, 288; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 251-2, 257-8, 262-73; *Peña y Peña, Comunic.*, 1-35; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1837, 391-2, 399; *Dublan and Lozano, Legis. Mex.*, ii. 411, iii. 392, 712-16; *Pap. Varios*, lxxx. pt 8, lxxxv. pt 15, lxxxvi. pts 1, 8, xcix. pts 1, 2, cvii. pt 1, cxviii. pt 4; *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 24, Ses. 2, Sen. 1, vol. i., pp. 4-5, 26-105; 160, vol. ii., pp. 1-170; 189, vol. ii., passim; *H. Jour.*, 354-5; *H. Com. Rept*, 281, vol. ii.; *H. Ex.* 105, 139, 281; *Id.*, Cong. 23, Ses. 2, H. Ex., 3, pp. 6-8, 31-164, vol. i.; 75, vol. ii.; *Id.*, Cong. 26, Ses. 1, Acts and Resol., 22-3, 111-18; *H. Ex.* 2, p. 6, 190, vol. iv.; *Id.*, Cong. 27, Ses. 1, Sen. 61; *Id.*, Cong. 27, Ses. 2, Sen. Jour., 534; *H. Jour.*, 835, 1189; *H. Com. Rept*, 1096, vol. v.; *H. Ex.* 291, vol. v.; Sen. 320, vol. iv., 411-12, vol. v.; *Id.*, Cong. 27, Ses. 3, H. Ex. 2, pp. 5-6, 144-55, vol. i.; Sen. 1, pp. 146-57, vol. i.; *H. Jour.*, 18; *Id.*, Cong. 28, Ses. 1, Sen. Jour., 10-12; *H. Jour.*, 167-8, 196, 402; Sen. Com. Rept, 70; *H. Com. Rept*, 151, vol. i.; Sen. 341, 349, 350, 351; *H. Ex.*, 2, pp. 26-48, vol. i.; *Id.*, Cong. 28, Ses. 2, H. Jour., pp. 154-5, index 'Mex. Claims'; Sen. Jour., 108, 134, 142, 189, 248; *Id.*, Sen. 81, pp. 1-26; *H. Ex.* 2, 19, 158; *Id.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 2, 196; *Id.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4; *Id.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, 83.

CHAPTER XIV.

CAMPAIGN ON THE RIO GRANDE.

MARCH-MAY, 1846.

TAYLOR MOVES TO POINT ISABEL—ADVANCE AGAINST MATAMOROS—ERECTION OF FORT TEXAS—ARISTA APPOINTED GENERAL-IN-CHIEF—THE MEXICANS ASSUME THE OFFENSIVE—CAPTURE OF CAPTAIN THORNTON'S COMMAND—TAYLOR RETIRES TO POINT ISABEL—BOMBARDMENT OF FORT TEXAS—THE BATTLE OF PALO ALTO—ARISTA RETREATS TO RESACA DE LA PALMA—DESCRIPTION OF THE FIELD—THE BATTLE—DEFEAT OF THE MEXICANS—THE GARRISON AT FORT TEXAS—DEATH OF MAJOR BROWN—ARISTA'S RETREAT TO LINARES—TAYLOR OCCUPIES MATAMOROS.

THE instructions to General Taylor, ordering him to advance from Corpus Christi and occupy positions on or near the east bank of the Rio Grande, were given January 13, 1846, and at the same time vessels were sent to reënforce the gulf squadron. Taylor was, however, directed to await further orders relative to the question of common right to navigate the river, but was not to confine himself to the defensive in case any act of open hostility should be committed by Mexico. Later instructions ordered him under all circumstances to protect private property, respect personal rights, and refrain from interference in religious matters.¹

On the 8th of March he broke up his camp at Corpus Christi, and having decided to make Point Isabel² his military depôt, the greater portion of his stores

¹ *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 196, p. 18 et seq., 77 et seq.; 337, pp. 82-4. Mansfield states that Taylor was ordered to advance to the Rio Grande before the government at Washington had received the correspondence of Slidell with Peña y Peña. *Mex. War*, 30-1.

² The Mexican name for this place is Fronton de Santa Isabel. Fronton means a steep rocky eminence on a sea-shore.

was sent thither by sea. His army barely amounted to 3,500 men, but during his encampment at Corpus Christi, General Taylor had pursued a rigid course of discipline and drill, and when he took the field, his force, in organization and efficiency, was for its size probably the best ever seen in the United States. The equipments of the soldiers, too, were superior to



TEXAS.

those of the enemy, and the supplies of all materials for war abundant and good.

The march to Matamoros was uninterrupted except by wordy demonstrations of hostility at the Arroyo Colorado, about thirty miles north of that city. Here Taylor was notified that his passage of the river would be regarded as a declaration of war and would be op-

posed by force; but no active resistance was offered, and on the 20th the army crossed the stream, the enemy retreating to Matamoros. On the 24th the army halted at a point about ten miles from Point Isabel, and leaving General Worth in command of the infantry brigades, Taylor proceeded thither with the cavalry and an empty train, in order to establish his dépôt. On his approach the inhabitants abandoned the village, having previously set fire to their dwellings.³ The transports had just arrived; and having made arrangements for the defence of the dépôt, leaving Major Monroe in command with two companies of artillery, the general returned to the army. Resuming his march, he arrived opposite Matamoros on the 28th, and at once sent Worth across the river with a communication to General Mejía expressing a desire to maintain amicable relations, and his willingness to leave the port of Brazos Santiago open to citizens of Matamoros until the boundary question should be settled. The Mexican commander, however, declined to hold any conference with a subordinate officer, and appointed General Vega to meet Worth. The meeting produced no other result than the intimation on the part of the Mexican general that the movement of the American army was considered as an act of war, and the refusal to allow Worth to have an interview with the United States consul at Matamoros. Taylor, in view of this hostile attitude, at once commenced to throw up fortifications on the left bank of the Rio Grande in front of Matamoros, and in a short time a fort with six bastions was erected, capable of containing 2,000 men, and batteries were mounted with heavy guns bearing upon the city.⁴

³ *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 31. Jenkins states that the fire appeared to have been the work of the port captain. *Hist. War U. S. and Méx.*, 78. Taylor in his despatch states that only three or four houses were consumed, the fire having been arrested by his men. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 337, p. 116.

⁴ *Id.*, 118-22. Worth left the army at this time and returned home with the intention of resigning his commission. He insisted that his brevet generalship entitled him to precedence over Colonel Twiggs, whose commission

As yet no collision had taken place. The Mexicans, however, were making equal preparations for hostilities. The fortifications of the city were strengthened, and an additional redoubt and a breastwork were thrown up on the west side. The strength of the military force at this time was about 3,000 men,⁵ well provided with ammunition. The artillery consisted of twenty field-pieces. Reënforcements, moreover, were on the way from Mexico, but not on a scale corresponding to the danger. Internal dissension and discord in the army had weakened Mexico's power of self-defence, and the very troops which had been provided to repel foreign invasion had been turned against her own people.⁶ President Paredes, however, despatched a force of 2,200 men,⁷ but he gave command to Ampudia, who had supported his revolution at San Luis Potosí, and moreover appointed him general-in-chief of the army of the north. This appointment gave great dissatisfaction at Matamoros, where Ampudia was regarded with distrust; and a representation was forwarded to the president, setting forth the fatal consequences that might result if so difficult an enterprise were intrusted to him, and recommending Arista. The president yielded, but unwisely retained Ampudia second in command, thereby sowing the elements of discord by leaving in the army two rival chiefs. And all through this war jealousy and want of harmony

as colonel was of older date than his own. Taylor, however, in conformity with the rule adopted by the war department, decided that brevet rank gave no command.

⁵ Consisting of the battalion of sappers, the 1st and 10th infantry regiments of the line, the 2d light infantry, and the 7th cavalry, the auxiliaries of the towns of the north, several presidial companies, and a battalion of the national guard of Matamoros. Two or three days after the arrival of the Americans the marines of Tampico, the 6th infantry regiment, and the battalion of the coast guard of that place arrived. *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 32.

⁶ Two strong divisions commanded by Filisola and Paredes had been ordered to the frontier by President Herrera. Paredes having been recalled to the capital and instructed to deliver the command to Filisola, the officers refused to obey the latter. Soon after—Dec. 14, 1845—Paredes rebelled against the government at San Luis Potosí and marched with the army toward the capital. *Id.*, 30; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 284-5.

⁷ Composed of the 4th infantry regiment of the line, the active battalions of Mexico, Puebla, and Morelia, the 8th cavalry, with six field-pieces and 80 artillerymen. *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 34.

crippled Mexico in the fight, rendered her defeat the more easy of accomplishment. In one point of view, this lack of united will and effort was fortunate for both countries. Under any circumstances, the result of the war must inevitably have been the same; but if, instead of anarchy, harmony had prevailed, much longer and more bloody would have been the struggle, and each nation would have suffered and mourned a far greater loss of life.


Ampudia, ignorant of the steps which had been taken to remove him, meantime hastened to Matamoros, where he arrived on the 11th of April. On the following day he addressed a note to Taylor, peremptorily requiring him to break up camp within twenty-four hours, and retire to the left bank of the Nueces River, under the alternative of war. Taylor refusing, Ampudia determined to cross the river and give battle. He had made preparations to carry this design into effect on the 15th. On the night before, however, he received the government despatch announcing the appointment of Arista over him, and also instructions from that general to suspend active operations till his arrival. Ampudia's mortification was great; he even assembled a junta of his leading officers with the object of gaining their assent to his commencing hostilities. They, however, declined to support him in a step which was in direct opposition to the orders of the general-in-chief.⁸

On the 24th of April Arista arrived at Matamoros, having sent General Torrejon with a portion of the army⁹ across the river at a point some miles above the city. The same day he addressed a communica-

⁸ During this period of inactivity frequent desertions occurred in Taylor's camp, fomented by Ampudia and Mejia by means of proclamations secretly introduced into the camp. Taylor's prompt measures speedily put an end to these desertions. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 1, Sen. 337, p. 118; *Id.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, pp. 302-4; *El Tiempo*, 24 Abril, 1846, 1. Mejia's estimate of Taylor is amusing. Indulging in a sorry pun, he says he is 'mas despreciable que el último sastró de México.' *Ib.*

⁹ All the cavalry, the battalion of sappers, and two companies of the 2d light infantry. *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 35.

tion to the American commander, stating that he considered hostilities to have commenced, and that he should prosecute them.¹⁰ His plan was to throw troops across the Rio Grande above and below the position occupied by the Americans, and advancing to Point Isabel cut off Taylor from his base of supplies, and force him to an engagement. He accordingly marched with the remainder of the troops and twelve pieces of artillery to Longoreño, about five leagues down the river, leaving Mejía with only a small gar-



COUNTRY AROUND MATAMOROS.

ison in command at Matamoros. The plan was a good one, but ill carried out. At Longoreño the troops were long delayed in effecting the crossing, owing to the want of a sufficient number of boats, and Arista's hope to conceal his movements and surprise the enemy was frustrated. But Taylor had already penetrated his design. That Torrejon had crossed the river had been made known to him by an untoward circumstance. Captain Thornton, who had been sent up the river with a party of dragoons to

¹⁰ *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 288.

watch the enemy, fell into an ambushade on the 25th, and after some fighting, in which several of his men were killed, was captured with his whole command.¹¹ Later, Taylor received information that the enemy was preparing to cross below his position, and not believing that Arista would make an attempt upon his fortified camp, rightly concluded that Point Isabel was the object of his movement. On the 1st of May, the fort being brought into a good state of defence, he left in the work the 7th infantry under Major Brown, with Captain Lowd's and Lieutenant Bragg's companies of artillery, and marched with the main force to Point Isabel, which he reached the next day. Taylor left his position while Arista was slowly passing his army across the river in two canoes.

When Arista became aware that the enemy had anticipated his movements, he gave orders for the batteries at Matamoros to open fire on the American fort, and also sent Ampudia with a force and four guns to lay siege to it. The cannonade commenced at five o'clock in the morning of May 3d. Meantime the Mexican general, having united his forces with those of Torrejon, took up a position at Palo Alto, cutting off communication between the besieged and Point Isabel. The boom of the guns, however, was heard at the latter place, and Captain Walker was sent with a small cavalry escort to endeavor to communicate with Major Brown. Making a wide circuit, he gained the rear of the enemy; then, concealing his men in the chaparral, he made his way alone by night to the American work, and on the morning of the 5th returned to Point Isabel with Brown's despatch announcing the safety of the garrison and the slight effect of the enemy's cannonade.¹²

Taylor now determined to go to the relief of the fort with supplies of ordnance and provisions, and on

¹¹ Taylor's official reports say that the party was 63 strong. *Ib.* Captain Hardee, one of the captured, states that seven were killed. *Id.*, 232.

¹² Taylor's and Brown's despatches in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Sen. 1, H. Ex. 60, pp. 292-4.

the 7th again marched for Matamoros. His force did not exceed 2,300 all told, for though reinforcements had arrived at Point Isabel, they were composed of raw recruits, fit only for garrison duty, and were consequently left behind.¹³ About noon on the 8th the American army arrived in front of the enemy, and both lines prepared for action. Arista's position was well chosen. In his front extended a level plain, covered with high grass, surrounded by thickets of chaparral and clumps of dwarfish trees,¹⁴ and flanked by small pools or low swampy bottoms. His line, drawn up only two deep and more than a mile in length, extended across the southern portion of the plain. On its right, supported by a slight elevation of ground, was placed a squadron of the light cavalry regiment of Mexico; the left was composed of the 7th and 8th cavalry regiments and the presidial companies, under the command of Torrejon, and rested on a thicket of chaparral. The artillery, amounting to twelve pieces, was posted at intervals along the line. Ampudia had been ordered to move up from his position in front of the American fort, and with the 4th line regiment, a company of sappers, 200 auxiliaries of the northern towns, and two guns, occupied a position on the right of the cavalry regiments.¹⁵

Taylor's right wing, under Colonel Twiggs, consisted of the 5th infantry, Lieutenant-colonel McIntosh, with Ringgold's light battery, the 3d infantry, Captain Morris, with two 18-pounders under Lieutenant Churchill, and the 4th infantry, Major Allen. The left was occupied by the 1st brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Belknap, which was composed of a battalion of artillery serving as infantry, Duncan's light battery, and the 8th infantry. The train was parked in the rear under guard of a squadron of dragoons.


¹³ *Id.*, 294-5.

¹⁴ This species is called palo alto, a name acquired by comparison with low growth which marks the vegetation in this district.

¹⁵ *Campaña contra Amer. del Norte*, 9.

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At half-past two in the afternoon the Mexicans opened fire with their artillery on the American army, which was advancing by heads of columns, whereupon the latter deployed into line, and Ringgold's battery replied with deadly effect on Ampudia's division which was steadily moving forward in close column to form in line. Taylor from the commencement of the engagement maintained himself actively on the defensive and fought the battle mainly with his artillery, his superiority in that arm being immediately



BATTLE-FIELD OF PALO ALTO.¹⁵

apparent. The American infantry, although posted at supporting distance, was kept in the rear almost

¹⁵ Explanation of plan:

- A. First position of Mexican infantry.
- B. First position of Mexican cavalry.
- C. Second position of Mexican infantry.
- D. Second position of Mexican cavalry.
- C'. Charges of Mexican infantry.
- D'. Charges of Mexican cavalry.
- E. Cavalry auxiliaries of the towns.
- a b c. Mexican park, hospital, and baggage.
- F. First position of American infantry.
- F'. Second position of American cavalry.
- G. First position of American cavalry.
- G'. Second position of American cavalry.
- H. American park.
- K. Pools and swamps.
- X Y Line of the conflagration.

out of range. For more than an hour the contest was carried on with the artillery. But in this duel the Mexicans suffered severely, while the Americans sustained trifling casualties. Arista now attempted to turn Taylor's right, and ordered Torrejon to charge with the cavalry. To meet this attack the 5th infantry was ordered up and formed in square. Ringgold's battery meantime played with deadly effect on the charging cavalry until it reached the chaparral; circling round this and a shallow lagoon in front of the 5th American infantry, it reappeared on Taylor's right and rear. When within close musket-range the side of the square opposed to it delivered so destructive a volley that the whole mass gave way and retired from the contest. While this movement was being repulsed the Mexican infantry suffered severely, but stood their ground with great intrepidity. The courage of the soldiers was, indeed, sorely tried. Halted within deadly range of the enemy's guns, openings were made in their ranks over and over again by the fire, and as often filled up without sign of fear or thought of retreat. To add to their troubles, the wadding of Duncan's pieces set fire to the high grass, and the breeze fanned the flames till the conflagration spread along the whole line, the smoke being carried into the faces of the Mexicans.¹⁷

Arista now changed his front to the left, the troops executing the movement with precision, and a corresponding change was effected by Taylor, whose right was advanced nearly to the position occupied at first by Torrejon. During these operations, which lasted about an hour, the firing had been suspended, but it was now resumed with the same result, and again the Mexican ranks were swept down by the cannonade. But stanch as the soldiers had proved themselves, this continued passive endurance of mutilation and

¹⁷ The authors of *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 39, and *Campaña contra Amer. del Norte*, 10, say that the Americans set fire to the grass in order to hide their movements; but this was not the case. *Ramsay's Other Side*, 47-8, note.

death at last gave way to impatience. They became restive, and indignantly demanded to be led against the enemy, or be withdrawn out of range of his fire.

Soon after the engagement began Ampudia had urged Arista to give the order to charge with the bayonet, but his representations were unheeded,¹⁸ and now again he in vain pressed him to do so. Disorder began to show itself among the troops; their patience was exhausted and they began to waver. Then, too late for them to have a fair opportunity of displaying their courage and efficiency, Arista ordered the charge they had wished for so long. But the movement was executed in disorder and without spirit. The men had lost confidence in their general; they were already persuaded that he was a traitor; that he had sold the army, and that they were to be sacrificed.¹⁹ Night, too, was fast approaching, and the glare of the setting sun dazzled the eyes of the advancing Mexicans. As Arista's right, supported by the squadron of light cavalry of Mexico, bore down upon the enemy's left, it was met by the steady fire of Duncan's battery, the guns being disposed to meet the coming attack. The cavalry was thrown into confusion, and wheeling to the left, pressed upon the infantry, which was steadily advancing, and threw it into disorder, while the enemy's grape and canister wrought havoc in its files. Confusion soon extended along the whole front, though the left still maintained its line. The attack of Torrejon's cavalry on Taylor's right had been equally unsuccessful. Darkness had set in, and the dispirited troops were drawn out of action. Both armies encamped for the night near the field of battle.²⁰

¹⁸ *Ampudia, Ante el Tribunal*, 9.

¹⁹ 'No faltaron voces entre nuestros veteranos de que "era otro Guana juato." ' *Id.*, 10. In *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 46, I find this reflection upon the cause of the Mexicans' defeat on this and the following day at Resaca de la Palma: 'Insistiremos en que la causa primordial de su caimiento y desconfianza—that is the army's—en que el motivo mas eficaz de sus faltas fué la voz que la rivalidad y el odio hicieron correr de que el general en jefe era un traidor... de que habia compromiso formal de vender al ejército entregándolo al furor de los enemigos.' The same statement is made in *Campaña contra Amer. del Norte*, 15.

²⁰ Taylor in his report states that he dislodged the Mexican forces from

At daylight on the following morning Arista began to retire toward Matamoros, and during the day took up a position at the Resaca de la Palma,²¹ resolved again to give battle if the enemy continued to advance. The ground selected was different from that of the plain of Palo Alto, and chosen as favorable to defensive warfare. A slight ravine about two hundred feet wide and four deep, of irregular crescent form, with the concavity facing north, intersected the main road to Matamoros, about four miles from the city. The surrounding ground was covered with thick wood and chaparral, preventing the operation of troops in line. On the northern crest of the ravine, to the left of and commanding the road, a battery of three pieces was planted, and two others were placed on the south of the ravine, one on either side of the road, each of two guns, so trained as to support the first and rake the approach with a flank and cross fire. In the rear to the left was a single piece. Arista's first line of infantry was stationed behind, and protected by the front or northern brink of the ravine, while a second line was posted on the southern crest. The cavalry, unable to act from the nature of the ground, was massed on the road in the rear.

Taylor, on the night of the 8th, had held a council of war, at which the general opinion was that it would be imprudent to advance further, and some officers even proposed to fall back to Point Isabel. But the general was of a different mind; and supported by Colonel Belknap and Captain Duncan, he gave orders to con-

their position and encamped upon the field. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 295. Arista states that each army remained in its respective camp in sight of each other. Roa Bárcena explains by calling attention to the fact that Arista's despatch was written on the night of the 8th, while Taylor's was dated the 9th, when the Mexicans had retired to Resaca de la Palma. *Invasion Norte-Am.*, 36.

²¹ Meaning, dry river-bed of the palm. The action which took place here is indifferently called the battle of Resaca de la Palma and Resaca de Guerrero. It is generally believed that these are names of the same position. The first, however, is that of the place where the battle was fought, and the second of the site on which the Americans halted before engaging. *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 42.

tinue the march.²² Parking the train on the field of Palo Alto under guard, and sending the wounded to Point Isabel, at one o'clock next day he broke up camp and followed the route of the Mexican army. As he approached the edge of the forest which bordered the road and the Resaca de la Palma, a body of the 4th light infantry, under command of Captain McCall, was thrown forward and soon discovered the enemy's position. At four o'clock Taylor came up with McCall. A battery of field artillery was at once advanced under command of Lieutenant Ridgely, the successor of Major Ringgold, who had been mortally wounded on the previous day.²³ On either side it was flanked and supported by the 3d, 4th, and 5th infantry, deployed as skirmishers in the chaparral. The action immediately commenced and became general, the Mexican advanced troops gradually giving away before the steady progress of the Americans. It was dare-devil work, enough to try the nerves and courage of the steadiest, this fight in those dense thickets where the fire-flash of the musket became visible in the gloom; where man hunted man as he would fierce wild game, every step embarrassed by tangled briars and matted undergrowth. But there were here no hounds to rouse the game, no pointers to mark the spot where lurked a prey that waited and watched to rend the hunters. Inch by inch the assailants forced their way forward as best they could, fighting in independent groups unseen by each other. Often the men lost sight of their officers, and had none to direct them as they struggled onward in bands of five or six, firing irregularly. Apparently all was confusion; but general confidence produced harmony in the attack; the rattle of musketry along the whole line told each small party that their comrades in arms were not

²² *Id.*, 41-2; *Ripley's War with Mex.*, i. 123-4.

²³ Major Ringgold was struck by a cannon-ball, which passed through both thighs and the withers of his horse. He died on the morning of the 11th. *Taylor's Reports*, May 12 and 16, 1846; *Frost's Hist. Mex. War*, 229-30; *Henry's Campaign Sketches*, i. 93.

lingering behind. The first line of Mexican infantry was at last driven from its position, and the 3d and 4th regiments, which had been deployed on the right of the road, took possession of the ravine. No decisive advantage, however, could be gained until the enemy's artillery, which played incessantly upon the Americans as they advanced, was silenced. Taylor therefore ordered Captain May to charge the batteries with his squadron of dragoons. Pausing when alongside of Ridgely's guns, this officer discharged his pieces and drew the enemy's fire. Then May swept on to the batteries. As the dragoons leaped at the guns a terrible discharge of grape from the batteries on the other side of the ravine was poured into them, striking men and horses to the ground.²⁴ But May was uninjured, and with those who could follow him, rode over the batteries, one after the other, sabring and dispersing the artillerymen. But though the guns were silenced, he could not retain possession of them. The second line of Mexican infantry closed in and drove him back with six men, carrying with him General Vega prisoner. Meantime the 8th infantry had been brought up and was warmly engaged on the right. Taylor immediately ordered this regiment and a part of the fifth to charge the batteries. This was done; the Mexicans were driven from their guns, and finally from their position. The battle was now almost over. A few desultory attempts to make a stand were overcome, and the battalion which had been left to guard the baggage train was ordered to pursue, which was done to the Rio Grande, great numbers of the enemy being drowned in attempting to cross the river.²⁵ All the Mexican artillery, war material, baggage, and even Arista's official correspondence fell into the hands of the victors.

²⁴ Lient Inge, 9 men, and 18 horses were killed; 10 men and as many horses were severely wounded. *Jenkins' War U. S. and Mex.*, 115. Seven men and 18 horses were cut down, several of the former being whirled into the midst of the Mexicans. *Frost's Hist. Mex. War*, 233.

²⁵ 'Pereciendo ahogados multitud de hombres.' *Roa Bárcena, Invasion Norte-Am.*, 39.

With regard to the losses sustained during these engagements, the latter of which was the supplement of the former, according to Taylor's reports, at Palo Alto he had only four men killed, and three officers and thirty-nine men wounded, several mortally. At Resaca de la Palma his loss was 39 killed, three of whom were promising officers, and 83 wounded, including 12 officers; making a total of 43 killed and 125 wounded.²⁶ It is more difficult to arrive at a conclusion as to the loss sustained by the Mexicans.²⁷

As to the number of Mexicans engaged, Taylor says that 6,000 were engaged at Palo Alto, besides an irregular force, the number of which was not known. In his report of the engagement at Resaca de la Palma, he admits that he had no accurate data from which to estimate the enemy's force, but considers it probable, in view of reënforcements which Arista received from Matamoros, that 6,000 men were again opposed to him. On the other hand, according to statements published in Mexico, Arista had at Palo Alto only 3,596 officers and men,²⁸ while the total amount of troops

²⁶ *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 1, Sen. 388. Taylor's marching force on the 9th aggregated 2,222 men. The actual number engaged with the enemy did not exceed 1,700. *Ib.*

²⁷ Taylor said 1,000 in killed, wounded, and missing in the two actions, but this is not to be relied upon. More than 200 of their dead, he says, were buried by him on the two battle-fields. Arista in his official report to the minister of war, dated May 14th, gives the following figures: At Palo Alto, 102 killed, including 4 officers, and 127 wounded, of whom 11 were officers; at Resaca de la Palma, 6 officers and 154 men killed, 23 officers and 205 men wounded. He places his missing at 3 officers and 156 soldiers; giving a total of 262 killed, 355 wounded, and 159 missing. *El Tiempo*, 26 Mayo 1846, 1. In *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, it is stated that the Mexican army was reduced by one fifth, the loss being principally confined to killed, wounded, and prisoners, since nearly all the dispersed were reunited in Matamoros. Arista in his despatch just quoted says that the total force reunited amounted to 4,000. Ampudia, *Ante el Tribunal*, 11, says 3,500.

²⁸ One hundred and ninety having remained before the American fort, and 1,350 in Matamoros, besides the volunteer defenders. *Campaña contra Amer. del Norte*, 6, Estado no. 1. The author of this historical account of Arista's unfortunate campaign was an infantry officer who took part in it from first to last, but conceals his name. He describes fully the actions at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, the evacuation of Matamoros, and the retreat of Arista to Linares, and supplies plans of the battle-fields and five official tables of the force of the army and number of killed and wounded. While giving all credit to Arista's personal courage, the author attributes the defeat of the Mexicans to the want of military skill displayed by their general, and to his inattention to the representations made by officers under him. The *Campaña* consists of

of the line, according to the same authority, appears to have been 5,136 of all classes. There was, moreover, a large body of irregulars besides the volunteers in Matamoras.

In view of Arista's statement that 4,000 men were reunited in Matamoras after the affair of May 9th, I consider it not unreasonable to conclude that in the battle of Resaca de la Palma at any rate the Mexican force was not less than 5,000 men.

The result of the action at Palo Alto was due to the superiority of the American artillery over that of the Mexicans,²⁹ and Arista's obstinacy in contending so long with that arm against the advice of his generals, his troops being exposed in line to a fire which decimated portions of them. It would seem that his jealousy of Ampudia caused him to listen to no suggestion, however sound. Moreover, he directed his guns entirely against the American batteries, while those of the enemy were trained against his men, which explains the great disparity in mortality.³⁰ The

37 pages, and ends at Linares in June 1846. It was published in Mexico the same year. Ampudia expresses the same views in his manifesto already quoted, the title of which is *El Ciudadano General Pedro de Ampudia Ante el Tribunal respetable de la Opinion Pública*, San Luis Potosí, 1846, pp. 27. He supports his statements by copies of 15 documents signed by different military officers; among them are Arista's instructions to Ampudia, dated April 10, 1846, on the occasion of his superseding the latter. Ampudia gives a brief sketch of his own previous military career from 1834. In *Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal Diaz*, ii. 16-37, is found an account more violently expressed. The writer, Miguel María Fernandez, a friend of Bustamante, without mincing matters, on page 19 says of Arista: 'Hasta el último soldado distingue una infame intriga, y una alma negra en este general cobarde y pícaro.' Bustamante loses no opportunity of publishing any statement, however ridiculous, derogatory to Arista. In a *Boletín de Noticias*, which he edited in Mexico at this time, will be found many such absurd reports, as that Arista sold cattle and provisions to the enemy, and that he had cartridges without ball manufactured for his troops. In his *Nuevo Bernal Diaz del Castillo, ó sea Historia de la invasion de los Anglo-Americanos en México*, Mexico, 1847, vol. i., ii., pp. 162 and 235, he supplies—ii. 21-37—a number of documents furnished him by Ampudia, tending to prove that Arista sold cattle to the Americans, held treasonable correspondence with Taylor, and displayed personal cowardice in the battles of May 8th and 9th. With regard to the work itself, it is a disorderly collection of documentary and newspaper scraps, interspersed with squibs and the compiler's own comments.

²⁹ 'Nuestras piezas de mayor calibre se les tenia que dar elevacion para que alcanzaran, y las pequeñas era una ridiculeza el dispararlas.' *Campaña contra Amer. del Norte*, 15. The distance between the two lines was from 600 to 700 yards.

³⁰ 'The great disproportion in the loss of the two armies arose from this

courageous bearing of the soldiers elicited the astonishment and admiration of their foes, and had they been handled by a more able general, the result would have been quite different. At Resaca de la Palma the troops were demoralized by the previous day's disappointment. Arista persistently refused to believe that the enemy would make any attack on the 9th. The ammunition and baggage wagons were unloaded, and the animals unharnessed; no reserve was placed to support the lines, and even when the firing began, the Mexican general remained in his tent in the rear writing despatches, disregarding reports sent in, and maintaining that it was a simple skirmish. The morale and discipline of the men were destroyed. Troops that had fought bravely on twenty battle-fields, and were accustomed to victory, retired without firing a shot; many soldiers broke their arms, in their rage and disgust, previously declaring that they were betrayed.³¹ At last, when all was lost,

fact: we fired at their masses; they at our batteries!' *Henry's Campaign Sketches*, 95.

³¹ Consult *Apuntes para la Historia de la Guerra entre Mexico y los Estados Unidos*. Mexico, 1848. 8vo, pp., v. 402, l. 1. This work is the joint production of 15 Mexican authors, whose names are: Ramon Alcaraz, Alejo Barreiro, José Maria Castillo, Félix Maria Escalante, José Maria Iglesias, Manuel Muñoz, Ramon Ortiz, Manuel Payno, Guillermo Prieto, Ignacio Ramirez, Napoleon Saborio, Francisco Schiafino, Francisco Segura, Pablo Maria Torrecano, and Francisco Urquidi. These writers state in their introduction that they met at Querétaro in 1847, and there formed the plan of writing an account of the war, in the principal events of which many of them had been participators. It was agreed, and always observed, to intrust to one certain person a particular chapter, but all assisted in collecting documents and data. Each article was discussed in general, and criticised paragraph by paragraph; and in the event of a difference of opinion the majority decided. The writers, some of whom are still alive, were men of ability, and the candor and fairness they evince is in the highest degree praiseworthy. Though errors and mistakes are observable, the intention of the authors to write a faithful history of the war is undeniable, and is carried out to the best of their abilities. Speaking of their work, an American reviewer says: 'It will, we think, be read by every American who has any desire to form an impartial judgment on the subject. The statements are not, in our view, as partial or one-sided as many of the accounts of our own countrymen.' *Hunt's Merchants Magazine*, xxii. 364. Albert C. Ramsey, colonel of the 11th U. S. inf. during the war, translated and published this work under the title of *The Other Side: or Notes for the History of the War between Mexico and the United States*. Written in Mexico. New York, 1850, 12mo, pp. 458. In his preface Ramsey does full justice to the merit of the book, meting out to it generous praise. Referring to mistakes which occur when American operations and opinions are spoken of, he says: 'It must be remembered that American reports, notes, letters, and books

Arista roused himself from his apathy, and placing himself at the head of the cavalry, attempted to retrieve the day. With that branch of the service the effort was worse than useless. The woods on both sides of the road were now lined with the enemy, who in safety shot down his men, and he turned and fled.

When the news of these disasters spread through Mexico, the outcry was great. The government, unmindful of its own injudicious dispositions, threw the whole blame on Arista. It deprived him of the command and submitted his conduct to court-martial. His trial was protracted for several years, and it was not until May 1850 that the supreme military tribunal pronounced sentence in his favor.³²

abound with a still greater number of errors and mistakes when touching on the Mexican policy and measures. In fact, the latter are far better informed on subjects pertaining to the United States than are the American people informed on subjects pertaining to Mexico.' Unfortunately, the colonel was not sufficiently master of the Spanish language to undertake with correctness the translation of so important a work. The consequence is that his edition abounds with wrongly translated passages, some of them of grave importance. In illustration, I shall only notice one, which will suffice for the reader to recognize the magnitude of the errors. The original reads thus: 'El día 10 acabó de reunirse el ejército, disminuido en solo una quinta parte, cosa que verdaderamente asombra, y que se debió seguramente á que casi todos los dispersos tenían que presentarse precisamente en Matamoros.' p. 47. Ramsey translates it: 'The day of the 10th was sufficient to unite the army, diminished to only one fifth of its original strength—a lamentable fact, which was certainly thought so, and an opinion which all the fugitives entertained who actually reached Matamoros.' p. 56. The true sense of the passage is: 'On the 10th the army was already reunited, diminished by only one fifth part, a really astonishing thing, and which was undoubtedly owing to the fact that nearly all the fugitives had necessarily to make for Matamoros.' In his edition he supplies notes of his own, 'appended purely for illustration, and without which many passages would be only imperfectly understood.' The Mexican edition is amply illustrated with excellent plans of battle-fields and portraits of generals, all of which are faithfully reproduced in the New York edition.

³² For fuller particulars, consult *Barasorda, Pedimentos presentados*, pp. 35; *Brito, Defensa que el Sic. Juan José Baz hizo*, etc., pp. 12; *Suarez y Navarro, Defensa que... Garay hizo*, etc., p. 61; *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Méx.*, MS., iv. 16, 37; *Id.*, Méx. en 1848, MS., i.-iv.; *Soc. Mex. Geog. Bolet.*, 2^a Ep. i. 927. The principal charges against Arista were: that, on assuming the command, he had suspended the movements and dispositions of Ampudia; that he had withdrawn from Palo Alto the forces under Torrejon and Canales in order to protect the passage of his infantry over the Rio Grande, thereby opening the road for Taylor's retreat; that he had not attacked the rear of Taylor's army on its march to Point Isabel; that he did not charge the enemy at Palo Alto at an opportune time; that at Resaca de la Palma he unloaded his wagons and unharnessed his animals; that he unskillfully placed his men there, and made no effort to prevent the rout; and that he abandoned Mata-

While the Mexican general by unskilfulness threw away all chance of victory, Taylor's action has not escaped unfavorable criticism. It is maintained that if at Palo Alto he had ordered a charge to be made when the enemy's final attack had been repulsed by Duncan's battery on the left, the whole field would have been swept and the Mexican army been dispersed.³³ His hesitation to attack on the following morning when Arista was moving off has also been condemned as enabling the enemy to take up a position which threw out of action one half of the American artillery,³⁴ Taylor's most effective arm. His victory was thus due to the bravery of subordinates and soldiers,³⁵ not to any remarkable generalship.³⁶

Meantime the garrison at Fort Texas, as the American work in front of Matamoros was called, had well sustained itself during a bombardment of 168 hours. Though the casualties were trifling the fatigue was great. Finding that the enemy's cannonade did little harm, and that his own fire on the city produced no great effect, and an attempt to set fire to it with hot shot having failed, Major Brown confined his firing to periodical discharges at regular intervals, mainly as a signal to his general that the fort still held out. On the 6th he was struck on the leg by a fragment of a shell, and the command then devolved on Captain Hawkins of the 7th. The same afternoon Arista summoned the garrison to surrender. Hawkins convened a council of his officers, and the unanimous decision was to defend the fort to the death. When

moros when he had abundant means of defending the place. *Roa Bárcena, Invasion Norte-Amér.*, 50.

³³ *Henry's Campaign Sketches*, 93. The reason assigned was that he did not wish to expose his train to attack.

³⁴ Ridgely's battery was the only artillery that could be brought into play during the action.

³⁵ In his report of May 17th, *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 1, Sen. 338, Taylor writes: 'In so extensive a field as that of the 8th, and in the dense cover where most of the action of the 9th was fought, I could not possibly be witness to more than a small portion of the operations of the various corps.'

³⁶ *Ripley's War with Mex.*, i. 140.

the action of the 8th began, the boom of the distant guns was hailed with joy; but for hours the suspense was painful. At night the general result of the engagement was known from a Mexican fugitive who entered the fort. On the following day the roar of cannon was heard again, but not so distant as before, and the anxiety of the defenders was brief. The battle-din kept sounding nearer and nearer; the irregular volleys of musketry rattled louder and more distinctly as the tide of combat swept toward the river. Presently the Mexicans in tumultuous flight broke into view of the besieged, who witnessed their panic as they rushed to the water's edge. Then the exhausted men raised a shout of exultation. Major Brown had breathed his last a few hours before. In his honor the name of the work was afterward changed to Fort Brown.³⁷

From want of means of transportation Taylor was unable to cross the river immediately and follow up his victory. The next day was employed in burying the dead, and on the 11th an exchange of prisoners was effected, by which Thornton's party was released.³⁸ The wounded prisoners were sent to Matamoros, the officers on parole. General Vega, and lieutenants Prada and Silverio Velez, who declined a parole, with four soldiers, were sent to New Orleans.

By noon on the 17th Taylor was in a position again to assume the offensive. Heavy mortars had been brought up from Point Isabel with which to menace the city, and a large number of small boats collected. The order to commence the crossing had already been given, when General Requena waited upon Taylor, empowered by Arista to treat for an armistice until the governments should finally settle the question.

³⁷ Besides Brown, the garrison had one non-commissioned officer killed and ten men wounded. Taylor's report, in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 296. Captain Henry gives 13 as the number of wounded. *Campaign Sketches*, 103.

³⁸ Consisting of Thornton, Hardee, and 51 dragoons. 'Dieron por ellos, dos capitanes, un subteniente y cincuenta y un soldados.' *El Tiempo*, 26 Mayo, 1846, 1.

But a similar proposal on the part of the American general had been rejected by Ampudia more than a month before, and Taylor, under the changed aspect of affairs, was no longer disposed to suspend operations. He declined to listen to the proposal; the possession of Matamoros he said was now a *sine qua non*; he, however, said that Arista might withdraw his forces, leaving behind the public property of every description.³⁹ Meantime Arista experienced all the bitterness attending defeat. Resentful murmurs against his conduct were no longer confined to the soldiery; the officers openly commented with severity on his line of action, while he, shutting himself up in his house, sought to ease his mortification by calling his soldiers cowards and coarsely insulting them.⁴⁰ Thus all harmony between the general and his division was interrupted by a quagmire of mutual disgust, into which even the most moderate of his subordinates were drawn. On the 10th he had convened a council of his chief officers, but this did not mend matters. With angry threats he denounced the criticisms against him,⁴¹ and then with puerile imprudence fully exposed the demoralized condition of his army, and the impossibility of attempting the defence of Matamoros.⁴² When Requena returned from his unsuccessful mission, Arista's decision was made. Leaving behind his sick and wounded, to the number of 500,⁴³ spiking what artillery he could not take

³⁹ *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 298.

⁴⁰ 'Diciendo que á cada soldado se le podían poner unas enaguas y otros denuestos así.' *Campaña contra los Amer. del Norte*, 22.

⁴¹ 'Manifestó que estaba pronto á batirse con todas las clases de la division, pues dijo era ya necesario andar con el sable en la mano para el oficial y para el soldado.' *Id.*, 22-3.

⁴² This meeting, remarks the author of the *Campaña* just quoted, had a worse result than the disaster of the 9th. The division became thereby informed that it was without support, that there were only provisions enough to last for a few days and ammunition for a few hours; that Matamoros could only be put in a state of defence at the cost of much time and labor; and that no portion of the army could rely upon any other for support, as the whole was demoralized.

⁴³ 'Siendo 321 heridos y los demas de otras enfermedades.' Official report no. 3 in *Id.* Taylor says 'more than 300 of the enemy's wounded have been left in the hospitals.' *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 298.

away, and throwing a large quantity of ammunition into the river, he abandoned Matamoros the same evening, directing his course to Linares. Passing through Venado, Ebanito, Nutria, and Calabozo—a line of country almost destitute of provisions and water—he arrived there on the 29th of May. The sufferings of the soldiers were dreadful; nothing was wanting of hunger, thirst, and toil to make their misery full. When on the fourth day a heavy storm of rain temporarily relieved their thirst, the benefit was counterbalanced by the road being rendered almost impassable, and all along the wayside weak and exhausted men sank despairingly in the mud and perished. Numbers died writhing in convulsions or struck dead by sunstroke, and some in their despair put an end to their own lives. The desertion, too, was great, and when the army reached Linares it numbered less than 3,000 men.⁴⁴ On June 3d Arista received the order of his removal, and resigned the command on the following day to General Mejía.

Meanwhile, General Taylor crossed the river early on the 18th without resistance, and occupied the city. He gave assurances before doing so that the civil rights of the citizens would be respected, and adopted measures by the establishment of a system of police to insure order. On the following morning Lieutenant-colonel Garland was despatched with a body of cavalry in pursuit of the retreating Mexicans, with orders to harass their rear. This officer followed them beyond Ebanito, but was then compelled to return, owing to the scarcity of water and provisions. He captured, however, a party in the rear, and brought with him twenty-two prisoners, arriving at Matamoros on the 22d.

⁴⁴ Namely: 28 general and field officers; 209 company officers; and 2,638 rank and file. Official Doc. no. 5, in *Campaña contra los Amer. del Norte*, in which work a more detailed account of this retreat will be found, as also in *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 48-51. General García died as he was entering Linares.

CHAPTER XV.

CAPTURE OF MONTEREY.

MAY-SEPTEMBER, 1846.

THE UNITED STATES DECLARES WAR—SCOTT AND THE GOVERNMENT AT VARIANCE—CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS—GAINES' UNADVISED ACTION—THE VOLUNTEER QUESTION—WANT OF A WAR PLAN—MARCH TO MONTEREY—PREPARATIONS OF THE MEXICANS—AMPUDIA APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF—DESCRIPTION OF MONTEREY—THE SIEGE—CAPTURE OF FORT TENERÍA—HARD FIGHTING—WORTH'S OPERATIONS—AMPUDIA CAPITULATES—MONTEREY EVACUATED—DISSATISFACTION IN THE UNITED STATES.

WHEN the government of the United States became aware, by news of the capture of Captain Thornton's party, that hostilities had broken out, the president addressed an extraordinary message, May 11th, to congress, then in session, invoking its prompt action to recognize the existence of the war, and to place at the disposition of the executive the means of prosecuting it with vigor, and thus hastening the restoration of peace. It is to be observed that Mr Polk is both inconsistent and unjust, not to say wilfully mendacious, in his endeavor to throw the whole blame of the war upon Mexico. After giving the details of Slidell's failure at negotiations to adjust the questions in dispute, "both the questions of the Texas boundary and the indemnification of our citizens"—an admission that the boundary question was still unsettled—he asserts that "Mexico has passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory, and shed American blood upon American soil."¹

¹ *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 48. Benton, *Thirty Years' View*, ii. 678, in his remarks upon throwing the blame of the war upon
(368)

Nevertheless congress adopted his views without delay, and on the 13th declared that by an act of the republic of Mexico, a state of war existed between the two governments; it authorized the president to call for volunteers to any number, not exceeding 50,000, to serve for twelve months after arrival at the place of rendezvous, and placed at his disposal \$10,000,000.

The president immediately intimated to General Scott, the commander-in-chief of the United States army, his intention to assign to him the command of the forces in Mexico. But a rupture soon occurred, brought on by the strictures of political parties. Scott held a high reputation for military skill, and he had already been spoken of by the whig party as their candidate for the presidency. His action was therefore narrowly watched by both friends and enemies. The plan of the campaign, arranged at private consultations between the president, W. L. Marcy, secretary of war, and General Scott, was to seize the northern territories of Mexico, and, making the Rio Grande the base of future operations, compel Mexico to come to terms, by moving the main army against the capital, the centre of her resources. But serious difficulties presented themselves at the outset. The nearest base of supplies was New Orleans, too distant from the Mexican frontier. It was agreed that an army of 30,000, regulars and volunteers, would be required. But to provide and send in advance to the several places of rendezvous arms, accoutrements, and supplies of all kinds; to procure proper means of transportation by land and water; and at the same time to study the routes of march and all other details

Mexico, and the cool assumption that it had been made by her, says: 'History is bound to pronounce her judgment upon these assumptions, and to say that they are unfounded.... The actual collision of arms was brought on by the further advance of the American troops to the left bank of the lower Rio Grande, then and always in possession of Mexico, and erecting field-works on the bank of the river, and pointing cannon at the town of Matamoras (sic) on the opposite side.... It was under these circumstances that the Mexican troops crossed the river, and commenced the attack. And this is what is called spilling American blood on American soil. The laws of nations and the law of self-defence justify that spilling of blood.'

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connected with the movement into the interior of Mexico, were not the labors of a few days. Scott knew this full well. He suggested the 1st of September as the earliest day for passing in full force beyond the Rio Grande,² and assiduously applied himself to the preliminary work, in which he was engaged fourteen hours daily. But the nation was excited and impatient. His necessary delay at Washington was regarded as inactivity. Why did he not hasten to the seat of war? it was asked; and prominent men made unfavorable comments upon his presence in the capital. It was forgotten that the vast preliminary arrangements could only be made advantageously at that place, through the respective chiefs of the general staff. Within only a week after the declaration of war Marcy informed Scott that much impatience was felt because he had not already put himself en route for the Rio Grande. There was, moreover, a bill before the senate which proposed to authorize the appointment of two additional major-generals, giving the president power also of selecting generals for the command of the 50,000 volunteers.³ This measure, if adopted, would have given the president power to place some new general over the head of Scott. The sensitiveness of the commander-in-chief, who as yet had received only verbal orders assigning him to the command, was irritated, and on the 21st of May he addressed a letter to the secretary of war which contained expressions that were construed into reflections upon the conduct of the president.⁴

After four days' consideration of his note, the president directed Marcy to inform him that he was relieved of the command, but would be continued in his

² He afterward, May 25th, came to the conclusion, according to most reliable information, that such operations could not be assumed with the least possible advantage before the 1st of October. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 1, Sen. 378, p. 11.

³ See Scott's letter to Marcy in *Id.*, p. 16.

⁴ Marcy replied on the 25th, astonished at Scott's language. 'I do not want a fire upon my rear from Washington,' Scott returned, 'and the fire in front from the Mexicans.' *U. S. Govt, Cong. 29, Ses. 1, Sen. Doc. 378, pp. 4-9.*

position at Washington making arrangements and preparations for the campaign. In his reply Scott endeavored to explain that those portions of his communication which had given offence were intended to apply to Marcy and the president's advisers,⁵ and disclaimed all intention of attributing, either to the president or the secretary of war, any unworthy motives.⁶ He concluded by expressing the wish to be retained in command. But the president saw no reason to change his mind, and though Scott, in a further letter on the 27th to the secretary of war, appealed to the justice of the president and the rights of senior rank, Marcy, by letter of the 8th of June, informed Taylor of his assignment to the command, and the president's intention to continue him in it.

Had not congress called for this correspondence and published it, the supersedure of Scott might have been regarded by the nation as an injustice; but when the particulars became known it was indorsed by public opinion, which was biased, however, by the ridicule ungenerously heaped upon him by his enemies, to whom he gave an unfortunate opportunity of displaying their malignity by an unlucky expression in one of his letters.

Taylor's position at Matamoros was not an enviable one. He was embarrassed by the arrival of volunteers in numbers far exceeding his requisitions; he was crippled in his movements by the want of means of transportation; he was perplexed by discrepant instructions from Washington, and by the indecision of the government as to the plan of the campaign; and lastly, he felt his responsibility increased by not being

⁵ 'I beg as an act of justice, no less to myself than the president, to say—I meant "impatience" and even "pre-condemnation" on your part, and the known, open, and violent condemnation of me on the part of several leading friends and supposed confidants of the president, in the two houses of congress.' *Id.*, pp. 12-13.

⁶ 'But I have, for many days, believed that you have allowed yourself to be influenced against me, by the clamor of some of the friends to whom I have alluded.' *Ib.*

in full possession of the views and policy of the government in regard to future operations.

On the 26th of April he had called on the governors of Louisiana and Texas for a force each of four regiments, General Gaines at New Orleans being desired by him to assist in organizing them. The news of Thornton's disaster had been just received, and exaggerated conclusions were drawn. The army was believed to be in extreme peril, and much alarm was felt. Gaines, a veteran of the war of 1812, patriotic and fervent, adopted a course which, apart from the embarrassment in which it involved affairs, is comical. His enthusiasm, thoroughly aroused, ran away with his judgment. The old soldier completely lost his head. Without a shadow of authority he called for six-month volunteers, in numbers greatly in excess of Taylor's requisition. In the existing excitement his calls were quickly responded to, and regiment after regiment, ill conditioned, was hurried off to the seat of war.⁷ He extended his calls for volunteers to other states, proceeded to make appointments of officers, and, in fact, seemed about to raise an army on his own account, without a thought as to what might be the government's intentions. The secretary of war, by despatch of May 28th, sharply directed Gaines to discontinue his independent action, and confine himself to carrying out the orders and views of the president so far as they had been communicated to him. But Gaines could not stop,⁸ and to prevent further mischief, he was relieved of his command and ordered to Washington. Brevet Brigadier-general George M. Brooke was assigned to the command of the western division.

But the mischief was done. The volunteers, all of whom Gaines had mustered into service for six

⁷ See his letter to Marcy of May 11, 1846, in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong 29, Ses. 1, Sen. 378, p. 51.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 60-1. The reader is referred to this document, which contains official correspondence on this matter, and to General Taylor's despatches in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, pp. 299, 305-6.

months, could not according to law be detained for a period exceeding three months, while those who were in excess of Taylor's requisition, and not included in the president's sanction, were not even legally in the public service.⁹ The government could find only one escape from the dilemma, and that was to offer these troops the alternative of becoming twelve-month volunteers under the act of May 13th. Accordingly instructions to that effect were sent to Taylor, who was ordered to cause the volunteers to be returned to their respective homes if they declined, and to muster out at the expiration of three months' service the volunteers legally enrolled by Gaines. Much dissatisfaction was exhibited by the six-month volunteers when the rumor was received from home that they were to be disbanded unless they volunteered for twelve months; but though Taylor requested to be allowed to retain them in service to the end of the term for which they had engaged, the government remained firm. Meantime the different quotas of the twelve-month volunteers commenced to arrive, and those who had responded to Gaines' calls were gradually discharged. Of all the Louisiana volunteers only one company consented to be mustered into the service for twelve months.¹⁰

On the 8th of June Marcy wrote Taylor, informing him of his promotion to the rank of brevet major-general, and of the president's intention to assign to him the command of all the land forces that would operate against Mexico. He also informed him that he might expect soon to have nearly 20,000 twelve-month volunteers besides the regular forces then under his command. He was told that the president was desirous of receiving his views in relation to the plan of the war, and while the hope was expressed

⁹ Consult the correspondence on this matter between the governor of Louisiana and Marcy, dated June 12 and 25, 1846, in *Id.*, pp. 309-15.

¹⁰ For full particulars relative to this volunteer question, consult the official correspondence in *Id.*, p. 307-23.

that he might be able to place a considerable portion of his troops in healthy towns on the Rio Grande and take and hold Monterey, the important question of striking at the city of Mexico was left pending upon Taylor's advice.¹¹ Four days later General Scott wrote him in quite a different strain, setting it down as the wish and expectation of the president that he would press his operations toward the heart of the enemy's country, making the high road to the capital one of the lines of march which he was expected to take up beyond the Rio Grande. Such contradictory orders could only perplex Taylor, and engender indecision.

Taylor replied in a communication to the adjutant-general of the army, dated July 2d. Confining himself almost entirely to the question of subsistence, he expressed the opinion—based upon calculations made on the supposition that the people of the country would at least be passive, and willing to part with their produce—that a force exceeding 6,000 men could not be maintained beyond Saltillo. The distance from Camargo, where he proposed to establish his depôt, to the capital was little less than 1,000 miles; and except in the improbable case of entire acquiescence on the part of the Mexican people, he considered it impracticable to keep open so long a line of communication. It was, therefore, his opinion that operations from the northern frontier should not look to the city of Mexico, but should be confined to cutting off the northern provinces—an undertaking comparatively easy.

Previous to the receipt of this communication at the war-office, the necessity of striking directly at the Mexican capital through Vera Cruz seems to have dawned upon the government. With the facts before its eyes that Mexico was without a commercial ma-

¹¹ 'Shall the campaign,' says Marcy, 'be conducted with the view of striking at the city of Mexico? or confined, so far as regards the forces under your immediate command, to the northern provinces of Mexico?' *Id.*, p. 324.

rine, and that free communication with the interior did not exist, it was evident that she could only be effectively assailed at the centre of her resources. Partial operations in the north, however successful, could not be expected to enforce the submission of Mexico and obtain concessions from her. In a confidential letter of Marcy to Taylor, dated July 9th, the suggestion is made that the main invasion might take place at some point on the coast, as Tampico or in the vicinity of Vera Cruz, and Taylor is asked his views. Although the government cannot as yet be said to have formed any definite plan, it is evident from this communication that it began seriously to consider what might be the best means of promptly bringing the war to an end. Taylor, however, could express no opinion as to the practicability of an expedition against Vera Cruz, or the amount of force that it might require, while he considered an expedition against the capital directed from Tampico to be out of the question, owing to the impracticable character of the routes. Moreover, he was equally indefinite in additional remarks which he made relative to operations from the Rio Grande, and stated that it must be determined by actual experiment whether a large force could be subsisted beyond Monterey.¹²

When it is borne in mind that the war men at Washington had to contend against the captious spirit and interference of the commander-in-chief, against the indiscreet and unwarranted proceedings of the commander at New Orleans, and against the antagonism of the opposition party, while at the same time they obtained no suggestion of any value from the commander in the field, it cannot be denied that their difficulties in the formation of a war plan were considerable. But the cabinet soon realized the fact that Taylor's experimental movements, with no more definite object than to test the capacity of the northern

¹² Consult this correspondence in *Id.*, 333-9.

districts as regarded the subsistence of an army, would not conduce to a speedy termination of the war.

Meantime Taylor's movements were delayed from want of the means of transportation. When the fresh troops began to arrive, he contemplated advancing against Monterey; and to carry on operations in the valley of the San Juan toward that city, the establishment of his depôt at Camargo was necessary. To effect this, the Rio Grande presented the only feasible means of communication, and the shallowness of the water necessitated the use of light-draught steamers, to navigate which across the gulf from New Orleans was a hazardous undertaking. On the 28th of May Captain John Sanders was despatched by him to that city to procure steamboats suitable to the navigation of the river; but though the official correspondence proves that both the general's agents and the officers of the quartermaster's department promptly performed their duties, Taylor complained of the delay.¹³

He nevertheless pushed troops up the river in furtherance of his design against Monterey. Reynosa, Camargo, and Mier were occupied without resistance, and on the 24th of July General Worth¹⁴ arrived with his division at Camargo. As the steamboats kept arriving, the difficulties of water transportation were to a great extent removed, but still innumerable inconveniences had to be overcome,¹⁵ and it was not until the 8th of August that he was able to make that town his headquarters. The different

¹³ On Sept. 1st, just before marching for the interior, he addressed a letter to the adjutant-general, impeaching in unqualified terms the management of the quartermaster's department. The correspondence on this subject will be found in *Id.*, pp. 557-61.

¹⁴ As the reader is aware, Worth had left the army in April and returned home, with the intention of resigning. He had already sent in his resignation, when the news reached Washington that hostilities had commenced. He at once withdrew it and returned to the Rio Grande, where he resumed command of his division on the 28th of May.

¹⁵ Taylor, writing to the adjutant-general July 22d, says: 'I find the difficulties of throwing supplies up the river to be very great, in consequence of the rapidity of the current and the entire absence of dry steamboat fuel.' *Id.*, p. 399.

routes to Monterey, through Cerralvo and China, having been reconnoitred and the former selected as the more advantageous, the first brigade of regular troops, under Worth, was sent forward August 19th, and occupied Cerralvo without opposition. The army concentrated at Camargo for the movement on Monterey numbered a little over 6,600 officers and men. This force was divided into three divisions, under the commands of generals Twiggs and Worth, and Major-general Butler,¹⁶ the third division being composed of volunteers to the number of nearly 3,000.¹⁷ The remainder of the volunteer force, amounting to over 6,000 men, was left in camp and garrison at Camargo and other towns on the Rio Grande.

On September 5th Taylor left Camargo and pro-

¹⁶The different divisions were composed as follows: Regulars: 1st Division, Brig.-gen. Twiggs.

2d Dragoons, Captain May.....	250 men
Ridgely's and Webster's batteries.....	110 "
1st, 3d, and 4th infantry regiments, Captain Shiver's company of Texas volunteers, and Bragg's battery.....	1,320 "
Baltimore battalion.....	400 "

Total.....2,080 "

2d Division, Brig.-gen. Worth.	
Duncan's and Taylor's batteries.....	100 men
Artillery battalion.....	100 "
5th, 7th, and 8th infantry regiments.....	1,500 "
Blanchard's company of Louisiana volunteers.....	80 "

Total.....1,780 "


Volunteers: 3d Division, Maj.-gen. Butler. 1st Brigade, Brig.-gen. Hamer.	
1st Kentucky regiment.....	540 men
1st Ohio regiment.....	540 "
2d Brigade, Brig.-gen. Quitman.	
1st Tennessee regiment.....	540 "
1st Mississippi regiment.....	690 "
Texas Division, Maj.-gen. Henderson, 1st and 2d regiments mounted volunteers.....	500 "

Total.....2,810 "

Id., 417-18; *Mansfield's Mex. War*, 57. Taylor's return of the actual number of his force before Monterey as 425 officers and 6220 men. His artillery consisted of one 10-inch mortar, two 24-pounder howitzers, and four light field-batteries of four guns each. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4, p. 85.

¹⁷In a paragraph of Orders, no. 108, Taylor assigns as his reasons for not taking a larger number of the volunteers into the field, 'limited means of transportation, and the uncertainty in regard to the supplies that may be drawn from the theatre of operations.' *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 500.

ceeded to Cerralvo, where he arrived on the 9th. On the 11th he issued his order of march to Marin, and on the 15th the last division moved forward, Twigg's division having marched in advance on the 13th. The army met with no opposition, though parties of Mex-



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ican cavalry were several times seen. As Twigg marched through Marin on the 15th, a body of Mexican lancers retired before him. During the two following days the army was concentrated on the banks of the Rio San Juan, about three miles beyond Marin

and twenty-four from Monterey, and on the 18th the whole force moved forward.¹⁸

The numerous delays which retarded the prosecution of hostilities on the part of the United States afforded the Mexicans ample opportunity for preparation. But political intrigues and party animosities prevented harmonious action. After the removal of Arista and the provisional appointment of Mejía to the command, the army, reduced to 1,800 men, was transferred from Linares to Monterey, as soon as it became apparent that the latter city would be the point of Taylor's attack. The troops arrived at Monterey during the last week of July, and were soon reënforced from the surrounding districts. Mejía, in pursuance of his plan to carry on a defensive warfare, proceeded to improve the fortifications without making any attempt to arrest the operations of the enemy. While thus occupied, the change in the government occurred, involving the downfall of Paredes and the return of Santa Anna; and Ampudia, who had been summoned to the capital to attend the investigation into the affairs at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, was appointed by the general government to the command of the army in the north. The dilatory proceedings of Paredes had done little toward providing a military force corresponding to the danger which threatened; but the new government began to act with more promptness. Immediately after the arrival of Santa Anna a levy of 30,000 men had been ordered, and the capital, or San Luis Potosí, appointed as the rendezvous.¹⁹ Ampudia, meanwhile, moved from that city with a large reënforcement for Monterey, where he arrived at the end of August.

¹⁸ The advance, consisting of McCulloch's and Gillespie's companies of Texan rangers and a squadron of dragoons, left at half-past five in the morning, the three divisions following at intervals of an hour. The habitual order of battle was: The 1st division on the right, the 2d division on the left, and the volunteer division in the centre. *Id.*, p. 506.


¹⁹ In *El Restaurador*, Sept. 4, 1846, will be found copy of decree.

On the 31st of that month he issued a decree proclaiming the penalty of death against every native or foreigner who, directly or indirectly, should give aid to the enemy, or engage in contraband traffic with him. He moreover caused numbers of circulars to be dropped on the line of march of the American army, inviting the soldiers to desert under promises of kind treatment and protection.²⁰ But vacillation marked Ampudia's action, and the antipathy between him and his generals rendered it impossible to arrive at any settled plan. At first he conceived the idea of opposing the enemy at Marin, and concentrated there a large force of cavalry under Torrejon. The plan was soon abandoned, however, and Torrejon retired on the approach of the Americans. Several councils of war were held, but the opposing opinions expressed caused repeated changes to be made in the defensive preparations. Fortifications were commenced, then destroyed, and again resumed. Such indecision had a most disheartening effect upon the army and seriously injured its morale. The defensive works of Monterey were nevertheless made very formidable.

The city, which is the capital of the state of Nuevo Leon, is situated in a fertile valley surrounded by mountain ridges of the Sierra Madre. It extends about a mile and a-half along the northern bank of the Rio San Juan, which making a north-easterly turn covers that flank of the town. The suburbs on the north and west were laid out in squares containing scattered huts with gardens enclosed by hedges and irrigating ditches. Directly to the north, about 1,000 yards from the town proper, was the citadel, a bastioned work 270 varas square, erected around the unfinished walls of the new cathedral, protected by dry ditches, and pierced by embrasures for thirty-four guns. It only mounted, however, about twelve, of

²⁰ Copies of these documents are supplied in Taylor's and Worth's correspondence. *Id.*, pp. 420-3.

different calibres, from four to eighteen pounders. This fort was situated near the junction of the three roads leading respectively to Pesquería Grande, Monclova, and Marin. Between it and the town an affluent of the Rio San Juan flowed easterly through the suburbs, the banks of which were steep and difficult. Near the middle of its course it was spanned by the bridge of La Purísima. On the east of the town, just above the junction of this rivulet with the main stream, was Fort Tenería, mounting four or five guns which covered the roads from Marin and Cadereita. Farther south was Fort Diablo with three

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guns, and still farther in the same direction Fort La Libertad with four guns. A system of lunettes was commanded by these forts, and along the northern bank of the Rio San Juan a line of barricades extended for some distance, and turning northward

²¹ Explanation of plan:

- | | |
|-------------------------|---|
| A. Principal plaza. | G. Fort of La Federación. |
| B. Other plazas. | H. Intrenchments. |
| C. Citadel. | I. American mortar battery on night of the 23d. |
| D. Fort of Tenería. | J. Cerro del Obispo. |
| E. Fort of El Diablo. | K. Cemetery. |
| F. Fort of La Libertad. | L. Cathedral. |

connected with the bridge of La Purísima, which was defended by a tête de pont. To the west of the town, north of the Saltillo road, was situated the Cerro del Obispado, and on the opposite side of the river, the hill of La Federacion; both these elevations were strongly fortified. The approaches to all the fortifications on the east of the city were masked by dense shrubbery so as to render reconnoissance difficult.

The exact number of Ampudia's forces is difficult to be ascertained, but it probably amounted to 10,000 men, 7,000 of whom were regulars.²² He had, moreover, forty-two guns of various calibres and an abundant supply of ammunition.

On September 19th the American army arrived in front of Monterey and pitched camp near Santo Domingo, at a beautiful spot called by the Americans Walnut Springs, about one league to the north-east. From a despatch addressed to the adjutant-general of the army on the 17th of September, it appears that the commander was doubtful whether any resistance would be offered by Ampudia; and he so greatly underrated the enemy's forces that it is evident that his information, derived from scouts and correspondents, was unreliable.²³ But he soon discovered that the town was occupied in force. By a reconnoissance that was made by the officers of the engineers, Taylor came to the conclusion that the key to the defences was the fortified eminences on the west of the town, and he determined to occupy the Saltillo road, the possession of which would enable him to cut off the enemy's communications. He accordingly detached Worth with his division and a portion of Colonel Hays' Texan rangers, at noon on the 20th, instructing him to carry, if practicable, the batteries in that direction. In order to

²² Taylor states that the town and works were manned with at least 7,000 troops of the line and from 2,000 to 3,000 irregulars. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 20, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4, p. 88.

²³ Taylor says: 'It is even yet doubtful whether Ampudia will attempt to hold Monterey.... His regular force is small—say 3,000; eked out perhaps to 6,000 by volunteers—many of them forced.' *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 422.

create a diversion in favor of Worth's movement, the remainder of the forces was displayed around the centre and lower part of the town. During the night a ten-inch mortar and two 24-pounder howitzers were placed in battery to play upon the citadel and town.

Worth, meanwhile, pursued his march through the cornfields lying to the north of the town, and during the night of the same day sent a despatch to Taylor to the effect that he had occupied a defensive position, and intended to storm the heights of La Federación on the following morning. He suggested that a strong diversion be made against the centre and east of the city to favor his attack.

Accordingly on the morning of the 21st Taylor directed the 1st and 3d regiments of infantry and a battalion of the Baltimore and Washington volunteers, with Captain Bragg's field-battery, the whole under command of Garland,²⁴ to advance against the lower part of the town and capture one of the enemy's works, if practicable. Major Mansfield of the engineers was charged with designating the points of attack.

As the command advanced it was exposed to a severe fire from the citadel on its right and Fort Tenería on the left. Still the assailants pressed forward, and rushed through the suburbs into the streets of the town. The fire now from house-roof and barricade was galling. Major Barbour of the 3d fell, shot through the heart; Colonel Watson of the Baltimore battalion, refusing to retire, though urged by some of his men to do so, was soon struck dead; Captain Williams of the engineers and Major Mansfield were wounded, the former mortally; and many another gave his last gasp in those narrow streets. Bragg advanced his battery, but the fire from his light guns against the embrasures of Fort Tenería was ineffectual. His

²⁴ Twiggs was too ill to command. He repaired to the field, however, in spite of his illness. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4, p. 85; *Henry's Campaign Sketches*, 193.

men and horses dropped fast, and he had to retire. Their lines being now broken, the Americans paused, and in detached parties sought cover against the murderous fire which they could return with no serious effect. All was confusion; the companies became separated in the streets; officers and men were ignorant of their location, and all were perplexed. The struggle in this direction was hopeless, and the order was finally given for them to withdraw.

As soon as Taylor became aware, by the discharges of artillery and rattle of small arms, that Garland's command was hotly engaged about Fort Teneria, he ordered up the 4th infantry and three regiments of Butler's division to support the attack by the left flank. The leading brigade, composed of the Mississippi and Tennessee regiments of volunteers, under Quitman, advanced against the work under a heavy fire from the citadel. Three companies of the 4th infantry²⁵ preceded this column, and pushing rapidly forward to the assault, had advanced in front of the battery within short range, when they were met with so heavy a fire that one third of the officers and men were almost in a moment struck down. Whereupon the rest fell back.

General Butler, after Quitman's brigade was fairly in motion, had turned his attention to his remaining regiment, the Ohio, General Hamer, and had advanced with it under a heavy fire through several squares, when he met Major Mansfield, who informed him of the failure of Garland's attack, and advised him to withdraw his command. Butler immediately communicated in person with Taylor, who gave the order for a retrograde movement.

Thus, so far, the attack was a failure, and Taylor and his generals fully believed that they had lost the day. But a fortunate circumstance, and the decisive

²⁵ By some mistake two companies of the 4th did not receive the order in time to join in the advance. Taylor's report, in *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 29, Sess. 2, H. Ex. 4, p. 84.

action of a single officer, turned the scale. About 130 yards to the rear of the fort was a tanyard,²⁶ within which stood a building with a flat roof, surrounded by a strong wall about two feet high, affording an excellent breastwork for sharp-shooters. In the confusion of Garland's attack, Captain Backus of the 1st infantry, with a portion of his own and other companies, had gained the shelter of this tannery, and had already driven the enemy from their defences on the roof of a neighboring distillery, when he received the order to retire. Backus was actually withdrawing his men, when the firing in front of the fort, caused by the attack of the 4th infantry companies, made him decide to hold his position. The roof of the tannery completely commanded the open gorge of the enemy's battery, and thence he began to pour upon the garrison a murderous fire, which swept down the gunners. Under this hot salute the garrison began to abandon the work.²⁷

During this time Quitman, though his men were falling fast, had kept steadily advancing, and the fire from the battery having slackened, when within one hundred yards of the work the volunteers rushed forward with a loud shout, surmounted the parapet, and gained the lunette. Galled by Backus' fire in the rear, the Mexicans gave way before the assault, and abandoning their guns, fled to Fort Diablo. The distillery in the rear was immediately afterward carried by the Americans, and thirty prisoners were captured.²⁸

²⁶ Hence the name of the fort, *tenería* or tannery.

²⁷ The authors of *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 60, attribute the demoralization of the garrison to the cowardly conduct of the lieutenant-col of the 3d light infantry, which had been sent into the fort as a reinforcement. He had been ordered to make a sally against the Americans advancing in front, but when the word to fix bayonets was given, he rushed through the gorge of the work, and, taking to flight, escaped by plunging into the river. The writer conceals this officer's name, remarking, 'con cuyo nombre no hemos querido manchar estos renglones.'

²⁸ Five pieces of artillery and a considerable supply of ammunition fell into the hands of the Americans. Taylor's report, in *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4, p. 85. In *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 60, it is stated that there were only four pieces, and that not a single cartridge for cannon remained when the Mexicans abandoned the work.

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Taylor heard of this success almost immediately after he had given the order to retire; he at once countermanded it, and Butler was sent with the Ohio regiment against Fort Diablo by a route more to the left. The troops advanced to within one hundred yards of the work, which was one of great strength, and Butler, while examining it with the object of attempting to carry it by storm, was wounded, and soon after compelled to quit the field from loss of blood. He recognized, however, that the place could not be carried without great sacrifice of life, and on surrendering the command to Hamer, advised him to withdraw the troops, who were falling fast, to a less exposed position. The division was, therefore, moved to a position near the captured fort, but not before having lost many men.

While this was occurring on the left, such troops of Garland's division and of the 4th infantry as could be collected were ordered to enter the town on the right and endeavor to carry Fort Diablo by assailing it in the rear. No sooner, however, had the command left the cover of the captured work than it was exposed to a galling fire of small arms and artillery. The Americans nevertheless pressed on and reached the tête de pont of La Purísima, from which a terrible cannonade was opened upon them. A portion of the troops even passed beyond, and gaining some slight shelter still maintained themselves;²⁹ but to proceed was impossible. Around were barricaded streets and fortified houses; the stream was impassable; to attempt to storm the bridge would be hopeless. Lieutenant Ridgely came up with a section of his battery, but his fire was ineffectual, and he was withdrawn. To gain the rear of Fort Diablo from this point was impracticable, and the harassed troops were ordered to retire under cover of Fort Teneria.

²⁹ It was here that the command of the 3d regiment devolved upon Captain Henry, who went into action with five senior officers, all of whom were killed or seriously wounded. *Henry's Campaign Sketches*, 198.

With these unsuccessful attempts the principal operations of the day ended. During the combat several demonstrations of cavalry were made by the Mexicans, but were effectually checked. The guns of the captured work were turned as soon as possible against Fort Diablo, and one of the 24-pound howitzers of the mortar battery—which had been steadily playing upon the citadel and town—was also brought up and trained against it. At the approach of evening, all the troops that had been engaged were ordered back to camp, except the 1st, 3d, and 4th infantry, a battalion of the 1st Kentucky regiment,³⁰ and Ridgely's battery, which were detailed to hold Fort Teneria and the adjacent buildings.

The result of the day was not encouraging. On three several occasions the Americans had been repulsed, and though a point in the enemy's defence had been taken, no important success could be claimed. Fort Teneria was by no means the key to Monterey—as the failure of the two attempts against Fort Diablo proved—and its capture had cost a heavy loss. Three hundred and ninety-four officers and men had fallen in killed and wounded, among the former some of the most gallant and promising in the army.³¹ It is true a strong diversion had been made in favor of Worth's attack, but if he had sustained a corresponding loss with no more decided advantage, it did not seem very probable that Monterey would fall till half the army had been killed. These were gloomy thoughts, and the ardor of the invaders was damped. As night set in, however, Taylor received a despatch from Worth reporting that he had occupied the Saltillo road, thus cutting the enemy's line of communi-

³⁰ This regiment had remained as guard to the mortar battery, and took no part in the day's engagements. Taylor's report, *ut sup.*, p. 84.

³¹ 'Capt. Williams, topographical engineers; lieuts Terrett and Dilworth, 1st inf.; Lieut Woods, 2d inf.; capt. Morris and Field, Brev. Maj. Barbour, lieuts Irwin and Hazlitt, 3d inf.; Lieut Hoskins, 4th inf.; Lieut-col Watson, Baltimore battalion; Capt. Allen and Lieut Putman, Tennessee reg.; Lieut-col Hett, Ohio regiment—were killed, or have since died of wounds received.' *Id.*, 86.

cation, had stormed, with comparatively small loss, the heights of La Federacion, and expected to carry the Cerro del Obispado in the morning.

Worth's progress on the 20th had been slow. Owing to the delay caused by making the route practicable for artillery, it was nearly sunset before he had accomplished six miles. He had then, however, reached a suitable position near the intersection of the Pesquería Grande road, by that leading to Topo, north of the Cerro del Obispado,³² and just out of range of the enemy's batteries. During the same evening he made a reconnoissance in person of the ground. Skirting round the base of the hills on the west of the valley, the Topo road connects with the Saltillo highway just before the latter enters the gorge through the sierra. Worth by following the former for some distance, and then ascending the slope of a spur, obtained a full view of the position, and decided to occupy the junction of the two roads.

At daylight on the following morning the advance commenced, the 1st Texan regiment, Colonel Hays, leading, supported by light companies of the 1st brigade, under Captain C. F. Smith, followed by Duncan's light battery. But Worth's movements on the previous evening had been noticed by the enemy, and his intention divined. A strong force of cavalry with some infantry had been stationed overnight at the junction of the roads,³³ and as the Americans turned an angle of the mountain they came in full view of the Mexicans, about 1,500 strong, drawn up ready to oppose them. The Texans were ordered to dismount in a cornfield, and take up a position behind the fence along the road side. Duncan's battery was

³² Worth in his report of his operations calls this hill the Loma de Independencia, which name and that of Independence Hill are adopted by American writers on these events.

³³ *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 59, where no mention of infantry is made. Worth in his report says: 'A strong force of cavalry and infantry, mostly the former.' *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 20, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4, p. 103.

placed in position on the sloping ground. The conflict ensued immediately, and was short, bloody, and decisive. McCulloch's company of Texans, not having received the order to dismount, still advanced, and as the Mexican lancers came sweeping upon them the rangers emptied their rifles into the compact mass and then fell back. The lancers eagerly pursued, and exposing their flank to the Texans in the cornfield, a deadly fire was poured into them. Smith's light infantry opened upon them in front, while over the heads of the latter Duncan's battery delivered its fire. The squadron was terribly cut up. It halted, broke, and fled. In fifteen minutes the engagement was over, but in that short time over a hundred brave Mexicans had been stretched dead or wounded on the road, among the former their gallant leader, Colonel Juan Nájera. As the fleeing lancers endeavored to escape up the slopes of the mountains many a saddle was emptied by the shots of unerring marksmen.³⁴ The American casualties were insignificant.

Worth now pressed forward to the Saltillo highway—the remainder of the Mexican force retiring before him in disorder—and occupied the mouth of the gorge where the different routes from Monterey unite; but being exposed to the fire from the hill of La Federacion, he presently moved half a mile farther up the road.³⁵

After a careful examination of the two fortified heights, he decided to make his first attempt against that of La Federacion, and by mid-day his dispositions were made. Accordingly a force consisting of four companies of the artillery battalion, and about an equal number of Texans,³⁶ in all 300 effective men, under Captain C. T. Smith, was detached to storm that height.

³⁴ *Ib.*; *Ripley's War with Mex.*, i. 216-18; *Reid's Tex. Rangers*, 156-8.

³⁵ During this movement, Capt. McKavett of the 8th infantry was struck by a round-shot and instantly killed.

³⁶ Namely, Green's, McGowan's, Gillespie's, Chandlis', Ballowes', and McCulloch's companies, under Major Chevalier. Worth's report, in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4, p. 103-4.

The hill, or rather ridge, of La Federacion extends from east to west; on its western crest was a battery of one gun, and its eastern summit, about 600 yards nearer the city, was occupied by the fort known by the name of El Soldado, mounting two guns. Smith was directed first to storm the nearer or western height, and then if successful assault Fort Soldado. As the command approached the river through fields of high cane and maize, it was discovered by the enemy, who opened a plunging fire of grape and canister; but the height of the hill rendered it ineffectual, the shot for the most part passing over the heads of the storming party. Having crossed the river waist-deep in safety, Smith halted his division at the base of the height for his men to gain breath, and a party of skirmishers being observed descending and occupying favorable points on the slope, Worth immediately sent forward the 7th infantry under Captain Miles to support the stormers. Presently the assailants moved forward and the firing became general. As reinforcements on the summit were seen to arrive from Fort Soldado, the 5th regiment and Blanchard's company of volunteers, under Brigadier-general Smith, were also sent to sustain the attack. Meantime Captain Smith's party pressed up the rocky and difficult height, driving the enemy before them, the rifles of the Texans, who were deployed as skirmishers, telling with deadly effect. As the Americans neared the summit they increased their pace, and pouring in volley after volley on the retreating foe, with wild shouts carried the height. The Mexicans fled to Fort Soldado, and their captured gun was turned against them.

While this was occurring General Smith had reached the base of the ridge, and discovering that by directing a portion of the force to the right and moving obliquely up the height he could assault Fort Soldado simultaneously, led the 5th, 7th, and Blanchard's company against it. His movement was entirely success-

ful. The eager Texans were in hot pursuit of the flying Mexicans³⁷ as the command reached the summit, and at a charging pace, the 5th, 7th, and Texans rushed over the low parapet almost simultaneously, carrying the fort before the enemy could recover from his confusion.³⁸ As the Mexicans fled down the hill the excited victors followed in pursuit, but were quickly recalled, and the guns of the two batteries immediately turned upon El Obispado, which now began to open fire. As the day closed active operations ceased. The Texans were ordered to rejoin the main body, while Captain Smith's companies and the 5th and 7th infantry were left to keep possession of the height.

This important success had been attained with trifling loss to the Americans; and though the night set in with a violent storm of rain, and the greater part of the troops bivouacked without shelter, their spirits were high. Nor did Worth delay matters. That same night he arranged his plan of attack on the Cerro del Obispado. At three o'clock in the morning three companies of the artillery battalion, three companies of the 8th infantry, and two hundred Texans under Hays and Walker, were roused from their rest to storm the height. The whole force was placed under the direction of Lieutenant-colonel Childs.

The crest of the cerro, about 800 feet high, was defended by a battery of two guns. It overlooked the fort of El Obispado—which was situated on a lower point of the ridge, nearer the town—and was deemed inaccessible³⁹ on account of the almost perpendicular ascent; but favored by the thick mist which hung

³⁷ Colonel Hays of the Texan rangers had been detached on special service, but returned in time to share with fifty of his men in the first assault, and to take a prominent part in the second. *Id.*, p. 104.

³⁸ According to Reid, *Tex. Rangers*, 164, Captain Gillespie of the rangers was the first to mount the parapet, then followed the 5th, and almost at the same time appeared the colors of the 7th.

³⁹ 'Se apoderó del pico... contra los pronósticos y las seguridades del señor mayor general García Conde, quien había sostenido que era inacceable.' *Mex., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 61.

around, the stormers, who commenced to scale the height in two separate columns at the earliest dawn, nearly reached the summit before being perceived. Then, however, the enemy was aroused and poured in a volley upon them; but the Americans silently pressed on and did not return the fire, which became incessant, until they were within a few yards of the summit. A destructive volley was then delivered; a deafening shout was raised; the regulars rushed on with the bayonet; and in a few minutes the work was cleared of the defenders, who fled to the Obispado. While this was occurring a demonstration was made, according to previous orders, against el Obispado from Fort Soldado. This diversion held the garrison in check and prevented any support being sent to the summit. The 5th infantry and Blanchard's volunteers were immediately ordered to move from the hill of La Federacion and reënforce the position.

To assault Fort Obispado, with its massive walls and outworks, in broad daylight, would have entailed an enormous loss of life; and as the defenders of the captured work had thrown one of their guns down the steep and carried off the other, Worth ordered a 12-pounder howitzer of Duncan's battery to be taken up the height. This undertaking was accomplished in two hours, and fire opened upon the fort. For some hours the cannonade continued with visible effect,⁴⁰ and a desultory fire was kept up by skirmishers partially covered by rocks and bushes. Finally, the Mexicans having been reënforced with infantry and cavalry,⁴¹ a strong sortie was made with the object of

⁴⁰ It appears that the fort could make no reply, as its guns did not bear upon that point: 'las fortificaciones...únicamente tenían fuegos para la ciudad.' *Id.*

⁴¹ The reënforcement does not seem to have been proportionate to the exigency. Accounts vary, however. 'El general Ampudia ordena que cincuenta dragones desmontados auxilien á Berra'—the Mexican commander of the fort—'orden singular, porque la columna de reserva permanecía en inacción dentro de la plaza! nuestras guerrillas rechazan al fin al enemigo auxiliadas por un corto refuerzo de cincuenta hombres de caballería que mandaba el general Torrejon.' The same authority states that the summit of the Obispado first taken was defended by only 60 men, and that Colonel Berra's force in the

recapturing the summit. But the movement had been foreseen, and as the lancers swept up the sloping ridge—the only ground available for cavalry—they were received by a strong, firm line of the infantry which apparently had been retreating on each side of the ridge, but which suddenly closed in on the top, and fronting the enemy, poured in a rattling volley, while the Texans kept up an irregular but destructive fire on either flank. The charge was repulsed; the cavalry recoiled; its supporting infantry wavered and then broke; and the Mexicans in a confused mass of horse and foot rushed down the slope, the Americans hotly pursuing. No time is given for the fugitives to reënter the fort; they hurry past, wildly fleeing to the city; the pursuers leap through the embrasures and openings; the remnant of the garrison offers only a feeble resistance, and in a few minutes the American flag waves over the fort. The captured guns and the batteries of Duncan and Mackall, which were brought up at a gallop, were soon playing upon the retreating Mexicans, inflicting heavy loss as they crowded along the street into the city.⁴²

The investment on the west side was now complete. Not only the Saltillo road but the city itself was commanded by the captured heights, and Worth moved his division to the Cerro del Obispado, leaving on the hill of La Federacion a force sufficient to hold that position and serve the guns. He then made his preparations to assault the town on the following day.

During the 22d, while Worth was carrying the fortifications on the Cerro del Obispado, no active operations occurred on the eastern side of the city. The citadel and Fort Diablo maintained a fire against

fort was 200 men with three pieces of artillery. *Ib.* Reid says: 'Large reënforcements of cavalry and infantry were seen ascending the road from the city.' *Tex. Rangers*, 185.

⁴²The Cerro del Obispado was gained with comparatively small loss to the Americans, while that of the Mexicans was severe. The former, however, had to lament the fall of Capt. Gillespie of the Texan volunteers. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, ut sup., pp. 99, 108.

Fort Tenería, and such parties of Americans as became exposed to range while relieving the guard in the last-named work; but the day passed without any offensive movement on either side. It is surprising that during this inactivity of the enemy, Ampudia, with the forces at his command, did not make more vigorous effort to retain the important heights on the west. But decision and energy were no strong traits of his character. As it was, the success of the Americans raised a panic among his troops; officers and men alike lost heart, and the general himself was infected with the prevailing hopelessness.⁴³ That night he abandoned Fort Diablo and all his exterior lines of defence, except a few works to the south on the river's bank, and concentrated himself within the interior line around the principal plaza.

Early in the morning of the 23d Taylor was apprised that the enemy had evacuated nearly all his defences in the lower part of the town, and immediately gave directions to Quitman to advance his brigade carefully and enter the city. Ordering out the remainder of the troops as a reserve under Twiggs, Taylor then visited the abandoned works. A portion of Quitman's brigade had already entered the town, and was successfully pushing forward toward the principal plaza. The 2d regiment of Texas volunteers was now ordered up, and dismounting, coöperated with Quitman's brigade. Advancing cautiously but vigorously from house to house and street to street, the Americans forced their way with little loss to within one square of the principal plaza, driving the Mexicans before them from the barricades and house-roofs in spite of heavy fires of grape and volleys of musketry. But the defences were now of a more formidable nature, and the Mexicans were concentrated in great force behind them. Taylor, more-

⁴³ 'Este suceso infundió ese pavor silencioso que precede á las derrotas; y con una que otra escepcion, los gefes de los cuerpos lo hacian sensible, contagiando al mismo gefe, del que la espedicion y la energia no fueron dotes favoritas.' *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 62.

over, recognized the necessity of coöperating with Worth for a combined attack, and satisfied that he could successfully operate within the city, withdrew the troops to the evacuated works.⁴⁴ The Mexicans made no attempt to reoccupy the portions of the town thus abandoned.

Meanwhile Worth, who had received no communication from the commander-in-chief, when he heard heavy and continued firing in the lower part of the town during the morning of the 23d, naturally concluded that Taylor's instructions directing him to co-operate had miscarried. Under this conviction he made his dispositions to assault the town on the west.⁴⁵ Two columns of attack were moved forward along the two principal streets leading to the great plaza. Worth's instructions, similar to those of Taylor, were given with a special view to protect the troops as much as possible from exposure. The men were to be masked whenever practicable, during their advance through the suburbs, and when they reached the houses they were to work their way carefully from street to street, by breaking through the sectional walls⁴⁶ and occupying the roofs. Artillery supported by reserve troops followed at suitable intervals.

The undertaking was both difficult and complicated. Across the streets, at well-chosen points, heavy walls of masonry, with embrasures for one or more guns, and supported by cross-batteries, had been erected; many of the houses were crenellated for musketry; while the assault was rendered doubly dangerous, from the fact that it was commenced at the time when Taylor suspended that on the eastern side, thereby enabling the enemy to throw the strength of his men and guns against Worth.⁴⁷ Nevertheless the

⁴⁴ Taylor's report, in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, ut sup., pp. 86-7.

⁴⁵ Worth's report, in *Id.*, p. 105.

⁴⁶ They were well provided with picks and crowbars, which had been found in Fort Soldado. *Ripley's War with Mex.*, i. 234.

⁴⁷ Taylor says: 'On my return to camp I met an officer with the intelli-

storming columns successfully forced their way forward. Building after building and square after square were gained, the Mexican artillery causing little harm to the sheltered men as they worked their way through the inner walls of the houses. But the rifles of the Texans were plied from house-top and window with fatal effect. By night the Mexicans had been gradually driven back to the great plaza, and the assailants, leaving a covered way in their rear, had reached to within a square of it. Meanwhile Major Munroe arrived with the ten-inch mortar, which had been of little service on the eastern side, and it was placed in position in the plaza de San Antonio,⁴⁸ near the cemetery. By sunset it was ready, and the range having been soon obtained, the artillerists dropped the shells with great precision into the principal plaza. When darkness set in the more active operations ceased; but Worth, determined to hold his position, continued during the night his preparations to follow up the assault on the following morning, and the roof of a large building, which towered over the principal defences, was mounted with two howitzers and a six-pounder. But at dawn a flag of truce was sent in, and a suspension of arms asked for. The last shot had been fired; the siege of Monterey was ended.

Early in the morning of the 24th, Colonel Francisco R. Moreno appeared in Taylor's camp, the bearer of a communication from Ampudia offering to evacuate the town, taking with him all the arms and munitions of war, and asking for a suspension of hostilities.⁴⁹ The proposal was rejected. Taylor de-

gence that General Worth, induced by the firing in the lower part of the city, was about making an attack at the upper extremity... I regretted that this information had not reached me before leaving the city, but still deemed it inexpedient to change my orders.' *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, ut sup., p. 87, see also p. 106.

⁴⁸See plan on p. 391.

⁴⁹According to *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 64, Ampudia was pressed by his officers to capitulate. 'Varios de los que no hemos querido mencionar escitan al general en gefe para que solicite una capitulacion.' Ampudia makes the same statement in his report to the minister of war. *Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal Diaz*, ii, 114.

manded a complete surrender of the town and garrison, the latter as prisoners of war, but stated that in consideration of the gallant defence of the place, the garrison would be allowed, after laying down its arms, to retire into the interior on condition of not serving again during the war, or until regularly exchanged. An answer to this communication was required by twelve o'clock, until which time a cessation of fire was agreed upon.⁶⁰ Whatever mistakes Ampudia might have committed during the defence, he now showed great firmness in sustaining the honor of his nation. Exclaiming to those around him that he would perish beneath the ruins of Monterey before he would submit to such terms,⁶¹ he requested a personal interview with the American commander-in-chief. Taylor had in the mean time proceeded to Worth's headquarters, but on his arrival a conference took place after some demur on his part, on the ground that he would open no negotiations except to arrange terms of capitulation. Upon the representations of Ampudia that the recent change in the Mexican government had altered the position of affairs, and that the latter was favorable to the establishment of a peace between the two nations,⁶² Taylor consented to the appointment of a joint commission to consider the terms under which the Americans should occupy the city. Accordingly he named General Worth, General Henderson, governor of Texas, and Colonel Jefferson Davis of the Mississippi volunteers, on his part; Ampudia designating generals Requena, Ortega, and Manuel María del Llano, governor of Nuevo Leon.

So tenaciously did Ampudia adhere to his deter-

⁶⁰ See the correspondence in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, ut sup., pp. 79-80.

⁶¹ 'Indignándose ante las exigencias del enemigo y declarando que antes de acceder á ellas perecería bajo los escombros de la ciudad.' *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos*, 55.

⁶² 'In the conference with Ampudia I was distinctly told by him that he had invited it to spare the further effusion of blood, and because Santa Anna had declared himself favorable to peace.' Taylor's letter to the war-office, Nov. 8, 1846, in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 360.

mination to save the national honor, that the proposal on the part of Taylor's commissioners that the army should be allowed to retire without parole, the officers retaining their side-arms, was refused. The Mexican commissioners insisted on the retention of the arms and artillery, and though Taylor, responding to the wish expressed by Ampudia to avoid further bloodshed, instructed his commissioners to concede the former, the Mexican general, with a persistency that grievously tried the patience of Taylor, still held out for the artillery. Taylor was on the point of closing the negotiations, and announcing the conference closed rose to depart, when one of the Mexican commissioners entered into conversation with him. The result was that an agreement was finally arrived at by which the Mexican army was allowed to retire from Monterey, retaining the small arms, and one field-battery of six pieces with twenty-one rounds of ammunition. An armistice for eight weeks was also arranged, by the terms of which the Mexican troops were to retire within seven days beyond the line formed by the pass of the Rinconada, the city of Linares, and San Fernando de Presas, while Taylor engaged himself not to advance his force beyond that line before the expiration of the specified time.⁶³ When the commis-

⁶³ I give a verbatim copy of the English reading of the agreement. Art. I. As the legitimate result of the operations before this place, and the present position of the contending armies, it is agreed that the city, the fortifications, cannon, the munitions of war, and all other public property, with the under-mentioned exceptions, be surrendered to the commanding general of the U. S. forces now at Monterey. Art. II. That the Mexican forces be allowed to retain the following arms, to wit: the commissioned officers their side-arms, the infantry their arms and accoutrements, the cavalry their arms and accoutrements, the artillery one field-battery not to exceed six pieces, with twenty-one rounds of ammunition. Art. III. That the Mexican armed forces retire within seven days from this date beyond the line formed by the pass of the Rinconada, the city of Linares, and San Fernando de Presas. Art. IV. That the citadel of Monterey be evacuated by the Mexican and occupied by the American forces to-morrow morning at ten o'clock. Art. V. To avoid collisions, and for mutual convenience, that the troops of the U. S. will not occupy the city until the Mexican forces have withdrawn, except for hospital and storage purposes. Art. VI. That the forces of the U. S. will not advance beyond the line specified in the 2d (3d) article before the expiration of eight weeks, or until the orders or instructions of the respective governments can be received. Art. VII. That the public property to be deliv-

sion met on the following morning for the purpose of signing the instrument, Ampudia still attempted to gain further concessions by the substitution of the word 'stipulation' for 'capitulation' in the heading of the document, but failed. The English and Spanish copies of the document were signed and the agreement was complete.

On the morning of the 25th the Mexican garrison evacuated the citadel, and during the following days the army left in successive divisions for Saltillo, the last brigade marching on the 28th. The number of guns which fell into possession of the Americans was thirty-five, the amount of ammunition and other stores being very great.⁵⁴

With the fall of Monterey the campaign on the Rio Grande may be considered as ended. The undertaking from its first conception was hazardous, and in a military point of view ought to have failed. The force with which Taylor advanced against the city, considering the circumstances under which he made that movement, was inadequate. He was unable to take with him artillery of any service in a siege; his supply of ammunition was moderate; he had rations for only fifteen days; and he had to leave behind no little portion of the camp equipage necessary for the comfort of his troops.⁵⁵ He was so little informed of the

ered shall be turned over and received by officers appointed by the commanding generals of the two armies. Art. VIII. That all doubts as to the meaning of any of the preceding articles shall be solved by an equitable construction, and on principles of liberality to the retiring army. Art. IX. That the Mexican flag, when struck at the citadel, may be saluted by its own battery. Done at Monterey, September 24, 1846. *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 29, S. 1, H. Ex. 4, pp. 80-1. This instrument was signed by the respective commanders and Ampudia, and approved by General Taylor. A copy in Spanish is supplied in *Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal Diaz*, ii. 115-16. The particulars of the conferences have been derived from the letter of Colonel Davis, one of the commissioners, published in the *Washington Union*, and reproduced in *Fry's Life of Taylor*, 258-60.

⁵⁴ *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4, p. 82.

⁵⁵ These are Taylor's own statements, made in a confidential letter to General Gaines, who, however, published it in the newspapers for the purpose of vindicating Taylor from accusations made against him in congress and elsewhere. In this letter Taylor says: 'I moved in such a way, and with such limited means, that had I not succeeded I should no doubt have been severely reprimanded, if nothing worse. I did so to sustain the administration.' *Niles' Reg.*, lxxi. 343, 370.

enemy's strength and the defences of the city, that not until he arrived in front of it did he become aware that its possession would be disputed. In his operations against the place, the element of chance contributed greatly to his success. His detachment of Worth to the western side, six miles away, was a rashly dangerous experiment, and contrary to the rules of war. It exposed that general to the risk of being cut off from the main body—a result which would undoubtedly have been effected by the Mexicans under a more efficient commander. The attack on the 21st was designed as a demonstration in favor of Worth; but though it proved, under the bad generalship of the Mexicans,⁵⁶ most advantageous to Taylor's operations, it was a rash experiment. The movement of troops into the town, exposed to a flank fire from the citadel, against a position of the approach to which nothing was known, cannot be regarded as an exhibition of military skill. Daring it certainly was, but it naturally resulted in a repulse; and brilliant as was the later attack of Quitman's volunteers on Fort Teneria, it is more than doubtful whether it would not have failed but for the fortuitous circumstance that Backus' fire from the tannery coincided with it in point of time.⁵⁷ In fact, Taylor, so far from anticipating a successful result, ordered a retrograde movement at the very time when the fort was being carried. The subsequent operations against Fort Diablo were not attended with similar good fortune—and did not succeed.

Worth's operations on the western side were conducted with great prudence and skill. His seizure of a secure position before making any assault, the promptness with which he supported in strong force

⁵⁶ Ampudia had ample means of throwing strong reinforcements on to the western heights. His neglect of these important points is inconceivable.

⁵⁷ Taylor says: 'This fire happily coincided in point of time with the advance of a portion of the volunteer division upon No. 1—that is, Fort Teneria—and contributed largely to the fall of that strong and important work.' *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4, p. 83.

the storming columns, and his dispositions for the capture of the summit of the Cerro del Obispado prove his efficiency in a most difficult position, and Taylor's discernment in selecting him.

The loss sustained by the Americans was severe, being over 500 in killed and wounded;⁵⁸ that of the Mexicans is not known, but it probably far exceeded that of the invaders.⁵⁹ As to the bravery of the Mexicans in their defence of Monterey there is no dispute. Taylor admitted that the gallantry displayed was alike creditable to the troops and the nation, and the officers of his army bore ample testimony to it.⁶⁰

With regard to the terms of the stipulation, it caused no little dissatisfaction, not only to the army, but to the United States at large. That the Mexican forces should have been allowed to retire, when every circumstance seemed to assure the necessity of their unconditional surrender, caused general disappointment; and the suspension of hostilities interfered with the plans of the government for the vigorous prosecution of the war. The public press severely criticised the convention, and on the 13th of October Marcy addressed a letter to Taylor which plainly indicated the dissatisfaction of the government. It disapproved of the armistice, and Taylor was instructed to give the requisite notice that it was to cease at once.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Taylor in his report of October 9, 1846, places it at 488, namely, 12 officers and 108 men killed, and 31 officers and 337 men wounded. *Id.*, p. 88. But from the official statements published later the number is given as 500, namely, 16 officers killed and 24 wounded, and 126 men killed and 340 wounded. Worth's division only lost 55 in killed and wounded, to which number must be added 22 killed and wounded of Texan volunteers attached to it. *Reid's Tex. Rangers*, 239-51; *Niles' Reg.*, lxxi. 183-4; *Fry's Life of Taylor*, 262. Ampudia places the loss of the Americans at 1,500. 'Despues de una defensa brillante en que el enemigo fué rechazado con pérdida de mil quinientos hombres de varios puestos.' *Bustamante, Nu-vo Bernal Diaz*, ii. 111. A translation of this report of Ampudia's to the Mexican minister of war will be found in *Niles' Reg.*, lxxi. 186.

⁵⁹ Worth states that in the several conflicts with his division the enemy's loss was ascertained to exceed 450 men. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4, p. 108.

⁶⁰ Captain Henry writes: 'Thus far they have fought most bravely, and with an endurance and tenacity I did not think they possessed.' *Campaign Sketches*, 209.

⁶¹ *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, pp. 355-6. Taylor, in his *HIST. MEX., VOL. V.* 26

Such was the reception which the news of the capture of Monterey met with in the United States. As a material result bearing upon the ultimate object of the war, the possession of the city at the cost of so much bloodshed was of no advantage. It was an experimental movement, which merely proved the bravery and endurance of American troops, and the impracticability of carrying on the war with any effect, through sterile regions, in the direction of the Mexican capital.⁶² In fact, the campaign on the Rio Grande had proved by no means consequential.

reply, shows that he adopted the convention from cogent reasons, namely: 'that with his force he could not so invest Monterey as to preclude the escape of the Mexican army; that the considerations of humanity outweighed the doubtful advantages to be gained by a resumption of the attack. With regard to the armistice, it paralyzed the enemy during a period when, from the want of necessary means, he could not possibly move. *Id.*, pp 359-60. In his letter to Gaines he writes: 'Besides, they had a very large and strong fortification'—the citadel—'a short distance from the city which, if carried with the bayonet, must have been taken at a great sacrifice of life, and, with our limited train of heavy or battering artillery, it would have required twenty or twenty-five days to take it by regular approaches.' *Niles' Reg.*, lxxi. 342. Jefferson Davis, writing from Victoria, Tamaulipas, Jan. 6, 1847, says: 'I did not then, nor do I now, believe we could have made the enemy surrender at discretion;...we could drive the enemy from the town; but the town was untenable while the main fort (called the new citadel) remained in the hands of the enemy.' *Reid's Tex. Rangers*, 205.

⁶² 'I do not intend,' says Taylor, writing to Gaines from Monterey, Nov. 5th, 'to carry on my operations (as previously stated) beyond Saltillo—deeming it next to impracticable to do so.' *Niles' Reg.*, lxxi. 342.

CHAPTER XVI.

OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH—BUENA VISTA.

JULY 1846—MARCH 1847.

EXPEDITIONS AGAINST NEW MEXICO AND CALIFORNIA—DONIPHAN'S MARCH TO CHIHUAHUA—BATTLE OF SACRAMENTO—OPERATIONS OF THE GULF SQUADRON—TAYLOR'S PLANS—HE ADVANCES TO SALTILLO—TAMPICO EVACUATED BY THE MEXICANS—TAYLOR OCCUPIES VICTORIA AND ABANDONS IT—SCOTT TAKES COMMAND—WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS—MEXICAN PREPARATIONS—SANTA ANNA AT SAN LUIS POTOSÍ—HIS MARCH TO AGUA NUEVA—TAYLOR TAKES UP A POSITION AT LA ANGOSTURA—DESCRIPTION OF THE PASS—DISPOSITIONS OF THE TWO ARMIES—BATTLE OF BUENA VISTA—THE FINAL CHARGE REPULSED—SANTA ANNA RETREATS.

IN anticipation of war with Mexico, the government of the United States had issued orders to the naval commanders in the Pacific to take possession of the California ports immediately upon receiving news of the commencement of hostilities, without waiting for further instructions. The neglect with which Mexico had long treated that province had rendered its inhabitants lukewarm. Not that they were wanting in patriotism; but their frequent appeals to the government never having been answered, there had been engendered a corresponding indifference with regard to their continuing in the Mexican republic. This indifference was, moreover, fostered by the agents of the United States government; and when in July the American admiral, having received information that hostilities had broken out on the Rio Grande, proceeded to carry out his instructions, he met with no active resistance, and the United States flag was

raised in California without the shedding of blood. Unfortunately the arrogant conduct of a certain United States officer had alienated the kindly feelings of the inhabitants. An uncalled-for revolt of the American citizens against the authorities had further aggravated this antipathy, and thereby led to the only bloodshed that occurred in the acquisition of California. It gradually inflamed the spirits of the people, who some months later rose against the newly constituted power, and appealed to arms. Meanwhile the government at Washington had organized a land expedition against New Mexico and California, under General Kearny, who began his operations in August. Taking possession of the former territory, and establishing a provisional government, Kearny pressed forward to California, and arrived there just in time to aid in suppressing the rebellion. His operations, combined with those of the fleet, soon ended matters. Left to their own resources, the Californians offered but a feeble resistance, and their rich territory was lost to Mexico forever. It is unnecessary, however, to enter further into the particulars connected with the conquest of California and New Mexico, as they are fully narrated in other volumes of this history.¹

Besides the expedition against these provinces, another was planned about the same time against Chihuahua, with the object of furthering the scheme of cutting off the northern provinces of Mexico, as advocated by Taylor.² This latter undertaking was, how-

¹ *Hist. Arizona and New Mexico; Hist. California*, this series. For Mexican views on the acquisition of California, the reader can consult *Otero, Negoc. Diplom.*, 1-12.

² Marcy, in his letter to Taylor of June 8, 1846, writes: 'It is proper that I should advise you that a considerable force, which will also be under your command, will soon assemble at San Antonio de Béjar. The ultimate destination of this force is Chihuahua.' Its destination, however, was not as yet definitely determined upon. *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 323-4. Taylor, replying July 2d, expressed the opinion that operations on the frontier 'should be confined to cutting off the northern provinces—an undertaking of comparative facility and assurance of success.' *Id.*, p. 331.

ever, of a more experimental nature than that directed against California. In the first instance, it was presumed that the northern departments, being opposed to the central system of government, would not only observe neutrality, but would avail themselves of the presence of a strong American force as an opportunity to throw off their allegiance to Mexico, as Texas had done. But this hope was frustrated by the change in the government, and the adoption of the federal system; and the cabinet at Washington soon became aware that the inhabitants of these regions were not only hostile, but would actively obstruct a march into the interior.

Meanwhile General Wool had been placed in charge of the troops that were to operate in Chihuahua. He was instructed to concentrate his command at San Antonio de Béjar, in Texas, and direct his march according to instructions from Taylor, under whose orders the expedition was placed. Taylor, however, considering that Wool was charged by the government with a distinct operation, refrained from controlling his movements, and confined himself to directing him to march on the city of Chihuahua with such portion of his force as could be transported and subsisted.³ At the same time it was suggested that he should advance by way of Monclova.

About the end of September Wool began his march from San Antonio de Béjar, his force amounting to nearly 3,000 men.⁴ On the 8th of October he reached the Rio Grande at the presidio of that name, and crossing the river without difficulty on the 11th, arrived at Santa Rosa on the 24th. Finding that the only route from this place to Chihuahua practicable for wagons and artillery lay through Monclova, he

³ Assist Adj.-gen. Bliss to Wool, in *Id.*, p. 410.

⁴ Namely, five companies U. S. dragoons, one of light artillery—6 pieces, Captain Washington—and three of the 6th infantry, making 500 regulars; one regiment of Arkansas cavalry, two of Illinois infantry, and one company of Kentucky infantry; in all 2,440 volunteers, giving a total of 2,940 efficient men. *Ripley's War with Mex.*, i. 301; *Mansfield's Mex. War*, 85. This force was called the army of the centre.

directed his course thither, and reached that city on the 29th. His long march had been arduous, and Wool began to realize that nothing would be gained by proceeding to Chihuahua, which could be occupied at any time if necessary. He wished to be engaged in more significant movements than an isolated incursion into a remote province, where the only difficulties to be encountered would be those of marching through an almost sterile region. He accordingly expressed his views to Taylor, who, being of the same opinion, instructed him to remain at Monclova until he could decide what disposition to make of his command.⁵ Thus the Chihuahua expedition was abandoned. It had already cost heavily in material and money, and was apparently of no benefit to the American cause. Nevertheless, it afforded Wool an opportunity of converting his raw and refractory volunteers into a well-disciplined and efficient force, the value of which result became manifest on the hard-fought field of Buena Vista.⁶ Taylor shortly afterward instructed Wool to locate himself at Parras; the army of the centre accordingly was marched from Monclova November 24th, and reached its designated post on the 5th of December.

In connection with Wool's expedition against Chihuahua mention must be made of Colonel Doniphan's incursion into that state, and his capture of its capi-

⁵ Taylor, writing to the adj.-gen. Nov. 9th, says: 'He [Wool] inquires what is to be gained by going to Chihuahua. And I am free to answer, nothing at all commensurate with the excessive length of his line of operations. Chihuahua, moreover, is virtually conquered.' *U. S. Gort Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 361. The government at Washington had already, Oct. 22d, begun to doubt whether any advantage would be gained by the occupation of Chihuahua, and suggested that Wool's column should be united with Taylor's at Monterey, or on the Rio Grande. *Id.*, p. 364-5. For fuller particulars of Wool's march, consult *Id.*, Cong. 31, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 32, 5-34.

⁶ Wool was a strict disciplinarian, and was regarded as an uncompromising martinet by the volunteers, whose 'complaints were loud and many.' After they had been in action they had reason to change their opinion. See farewell letter of the 1st Ill. volunteers to Gen. Wool on their departure from Mexico for home, dated June 23, 1847, in *Democratic Review*, Nov. 1851, and reproduced in *Wool, Sketch of Life*, 24.

tal; but as more details are given in another portion of this work, an outline will be sufficient here.

Kearny, finding that he had more troops than were necessary for his own enterprise, at the latter end of September despatched Doniphan from Santa Fé with



CHIHUAHUA.

the surplus, consisting of Missouri volunteers, to Chihuahua, of which place he supposed Wool would be in possession. Doniphan, having concluded a treaty with the Navajos according to instructions, arrived at

Valverde December 12th. Thence he proceeded to El Paso del Norte, which place he entered on the 27th, after having repulsed with loss, on the 25th, a strong body of Mexicans which attacked him at a bend of the Rio Grande called el Brazito.⁷ Hearing now for the first time that Wool had not advanced into Chihuahua, he still determined to penetrate to that city, and commenced his march February 8, 1847. His force numbered 924 effective men, with six pieces of artillery.

El Paso is some 225 miles distant from the city of Chihuahua; and as the route lay through sterile deserts destitute of water, much of hardship and suffering was undergone. Doniphan's advance, however, was not interrupted by any effort of the enemy until he arrived at the pass of Sacramento, about twenty miles to the north of the state capital. Here the Chihuahuans were prepared to receive him, having taking up a strong position in superior numbers. They, however, sustained a disastrous defeat, and Doniphan entered Chihuahua without further opposition, taking possession of the city in the name of the United States government.

His situation, however, was embarrassing. He was entirely isolated, at a distance of many hundred miles from the American army, of whose operations only vague rumors had reached him. Understanding that Wool was at Saltillo, he applied to him for orders to move to that town. Having received instructions to that effect he left Chihuahua at the end of April and reached Saltillo on the 22d of May. Thence the command proceeded to the Rio Grande and beyond, arriving about the middle of June at New Orleans, where it was discharged. Thus terminated this celebrated march, which extended over 3,000 miles through an almost unknown country, and was conducted under innumerable difficulties. As a military

⁷This engagement is called the battle of Brazito.

movement, it was a great achievement; but the expedition, as a factor of the war, was barren of effect.

While the American land forces were thus successfully operating on the Rio Grande the Mexican ports on the gulf were blockaded by a naval squadron,⁸ under Commodore Connor. The United States had long contended for a more liberal construction of the law of blockade than that held by European powers, and now proceeded to carry out the principles which had been advocated. Not only was the doctrine of a paper blockade exploded, but a special warning was ordered given to vessels appearing before blockaded ports; without such warning a vessel was not subject to seizure, and if she effected an entrance was free to depart without hinderance. The duties which devolved upon the American navy were extremely irksome, and the enforcement of the blockade difficult, owing to the nature of the Mexican ports, and the prevalence in the gulf of violent north winds, which frequently compelled the blockading ships at Vera Cruz to seek shelter to the leeward of the islands south of that port. Under these circumstances several neutral ships ran the blockade by entering the harbor by the northern channel.⁹ The small maritime commerce of Mexico was, however, destroyed.

The operations of the squadron were not always attended with success. In August and October Connor made two attempts against the port of Alvarado, which were frustrated by bad weather and the state of the river. On the second occasion the steamer *McLane* ran aground on the bar, and the vessels she

⁸ This squadron in July consisted of three 50-gun frigates, three 24-gun sloops of war, four 10-gun brigs, one 10-gun schooner, the steamer *Mississippi* of 8 guns, and the steamer *Princeton* of 10 guns; in all 13 ships with 290 guns. *Semmes' Service Afloat*, 75. At the beginning of the war Mexico had the steamers *Guadalupe* and *Moctezuma*, the goleta *Aguila*, each of 6 guns, seven small vessels of 1 gun each, the *Mexicano* and *Zempoalteca*, of 10 carronades, and a few other vessels in bad condition. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 744.

⁹ The Mexican government, by decree of Sept. 11th, exempted blockade runners from tonnage dues, and one quarter of the importation duties. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, v. 169; *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1844-6, 441-2.

had in tow got foul of each other in great disorder.¹⁰ More successful was an expedition during the latter month up the Tabasco River, under Commodore Perry, which resulted in the capture of the town of Frontera, two Mexican steamers, and five merchant vessels.¹¹ In August the squadron sustained a loss by the wreck of the brig *Truxton*, twelve guns, Commander Carpender, on the reef of Tuxpam;¹² and a still more serious disaster occurred December 8th, by the capsizing of the brig *Somers*, Lieutenant Semmes. The vessel sank in ten minutes, and thirty-nine of her crew were drowned.¹³ The operations of the squadron in the Pacific were principally confined this year to the coast of California.

After the capture of Monterey, Taylor was prepared to speak as to the advisability of his moving upon the capital. He was evidently opposed to it. Recommending the policy of occupying a defensive line along the Sierra Madre, with corps stationed at Saltillo, Monclova, Linares, Victoria, and Tampico, he said that if it was the determination of the government to strike a decisive blow at Mexico a force should be landed at Vera Cruz or Alvarado.¹⁴ In the mean time the United States government had decided to make a descent on the gulf coast, with the intention of capturing Tampico and invading Tamaulipas. Proposals to open negotiations with the ob-

¹⁰ The *McLane* was got off without much injury, but the enterprise was given up. Connor's report, in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4, p. 630-1.

¹¹ *Id.*, p. 632-5. In the engagement which occurred the Americans lost three men killed and several wounded. Among the former was Lieut C. M. Morris, son of the commodore of that name. He was a valuable officer, and his death greatly deplored. *Ib.*; *Semmes' Service Afloat*, 90. Further details in *Bustamante, Invasion*, MS., 10-11; *Id.*, *Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., v. 210-12; *Iris Españ.*, Nov. 11, 1846, 4.

¹² The officers and crews became prisoners to the Mexicans, and were exchanged for Gen. Vega, and the officers who accompanied him to U. S. as prisoners of war. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, ut sup., p. 382.

¹³ More than one half of her crew, which consisted of 76 persons. See Semmes' report, in *Service Afloat*, 93-9.

¹⁴ *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 33, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 351-3. He considered that the amount of troops should not be less than 25,000 men, 10,000 of whom should be regulars.

ject of terminating the war had been rejected by the Mexican government, which deferred the matter till the assembling of a new congress on the 6th of December. The cabinet at Washington determined to prosecute its design without loss of time, and that no delay might occur, issued, September 22d, instructions directly to General Patterson, then at Camargo, to make preparations for the invasion of Tamaulipas with a strong detachment from Taylor's command.¹⁵

When Taylor received the despatch ordering the cessation of the armistice, he began to put in operation his scheme of taking up a defensive line. Deeming the occupation of Saltillo important as a necessary outpost to the main army at Monterey, and as controlling a region from which supplies could be obtained, on November 13th he marched from Monterey with Worth's division and two squadrons of dragoons, and occupied that city on the 16th without opposition, Ampudia having already retired to San Luis Potosí. Almost simultaneously with this movement one of the objects for which it had been undertaken—namely, the occupation of Tampico—had been unexpectedly gained. Santa Anna, having become informed by an intercepted despatch that Tampico was to be attacked, ordered it to be evacuated, which was carried into effect October 27th. To protect his own position from attack in that direction, he stationed a force of cavalry and infantry, 5,000 strong, under generals Urrea and Valencia at the Tula pass. On November 14th Commodore Perry arrived before Tampico and immediately occupied it. General Patterson, on receipt of the news, promptly despatched six companies of artillery, with a sufficient supply of heavy ordinance to garrison the place, followed soon afterward by a regiment of Alabama volunteers.¹⁶

¹⁵ *Id.*, p. 339-40, 343, 358. This action of the government greatly irritated Taylor. In his reply of Oct. 15th he protested against it, claiming the right of organizing all detachments from the troops under him, and declaiming against the war department corresponding directly with his subordinates. *Id.*, p. 353-4.

¹⁶ *Id.*, p. 374-5, 377, 378. Patterson afterward ordered the Illinois regi-

Taylor's defensive line was now nearly complete. Wool was at Parras with his division; Worth held Saltillo; Butler's headquarters were at Monterey, which was garrisoned by a portion of his command, the remainder being employed in holding the route to Camargo and the mouth of the Rio Grande; and Tampico was occupied by a force 1,000 strong. With the possession of Victoria the occupation of Tamaulipas would be accomplished, and Taylor accordingly put in motion the troops, over 5,000 strong, destined to operate against that point.¹⁷ On the 15th of December he left Monterey, and on the 17th, a junction of the troops, except those under Patterson, was effected at Montemorelos. Here, however, Taylor received a despatch from Worth, informing him that Santa Anna, designing to take advantage of the diversion toward Victoria, intended to attack him at Saltillo, and if successful then fall on Wool at Parras. Taylor therefore returned with Twiggs' division to Monterey, but finding that both Butler and Wool had hastened up to Worth's support, retraced his steps, leaving Butler in command, and entered Victoria on the 4th of January, 1847, Quitman's division having already occupied the city on the 29th of the previous month. No resistance was offered; Urrea's cavalry corps, then at Victoria, slowly retired to the pass of Tula, and Valencia made no attempt to oppose the American general. But the movement was barren of result other than the concentration of the troops, and on the 14th, owing to the want of supplies, Taylor began to evacuate the city, ordering the command to march to Tampico. He himself with a small escort returned to

ments of foot at Matamoros. and a regiment of Tennessee horse, also to proceed to Tampico. Taylor disapproved of his action, countermanded the order, and rebuked Patterson. *Id.*, p. 383-5. Respecting the evacuation of Tampico, the reader can consult *Tampico, Mem. sobre Evac.*, 53; *Parrodi, Mem.*, 53; *Id.*, *Vindicacion*, 17.

¹⁷These consisted of the regulars at Monterey under Twiggs; Quitman's brigade of volunteers; the 2d inf. regiment and 2d Tenn. foot at Camargo; and three regiments of volunteers under Patterson, who was instructed to march from Matamoros. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 385.

Monterey, where he arrived on the 24th of the same month.¹⁸

General Taylor had by this time received news of important changes that had been effected at Washington relative to the conduct of the war and the command of the army. Whether it was that the government had lost some portion of its confidence in him owing to the absence of active resources or suggestions, or that ill-feeling had been created by his strong protests against interference with his command on the part of the war department, during the latter part of November, Scott, who had several times repeated his desire to be sent to the field, was ordered to Mexico to take command of the forces there assembled, and organize an expedition to operate against Vera Cruz.¹⁹ Scott immediately made preparations for his departure, and left Washington for New York on the 24th of November. On the following day he wrote a confidential letter to Taylor, apprising him of his approach and the necessity of drawing from his command the greater portion of his best troops.²⁰ It was not until the 30th of December that Scott arrived at Matamoros, and finding that Taylor had proceeded to Victoria, addressed, January 3d, a communication to Butler, instructing him to put in movement, without waiting to hear from Taylor, for the mouth of the Rio Grande, a large portion of the troops for embarkation for Vera Cruz.²¹ Scott also wrote to Taylor, enclosing a copy of this letter, and sent the despatch by way of Monterey, and on the 6th sent other copies of the same direct from Matamoros to Victoria. The first com-

¹⁸ *Id.*, pp. 861-2, 890; *El Sonorense*, Feb. 26, 1847, i. no. 28, pp. 3-4.

¹⁹ *Scott's Memoirs*, ii. 397.

²⁰ *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 373. Taylor received this communication Dec. 24th while on route to Victoria. *Id.*, p. 848.

²¹ Namely, 500 regular cavalry; 500 volunteer cavalry; Duncan's and Taylor's batteries; 4,000 regulars, including artillery, under General Worth; 4,000 volunteer infantry; in all 9,000 men exclusive of the specified batteries. From this number were to be deducted the troops at Victoria and Tampico, less the garrison for the latter, and a volunteer regiment at Matamoros. The whole number of the force under Taylor's command at this time was estimated by Scott at 17,000, seven of regulars and ten of volunteers.

munication was intercepted by the enemy at some distance from Monterey and forwarded to Santa Anna, who thus became aware, not only of the design against Vera Cruz, but also of the great reduction made in Taylor's force. Taylor received the second despatch at Victoria on the 14th of January, and its contents caused him deep mortification. He expressed himself bitterly to Scott on the course that had been pursued and the withdrawal of the best of his troops when an army of 20,000 men was in his front. He felt that he had lost the confidence of the government, and suspected that he was being sacrificed.²²

Meantime Butler used great despatch in carrying out Scott's instructions. On Taylor's arrival at Monterey the withdrawal of most of the troops had been effected, and his force was reduced to about 7,500 men of all arms occupying positions all the way from Saltillo to Matamoros.

In the preparations to carry on the war Mexico was sorely crippled by internal dissensions and the want of money. Scheme after scheme of defence was stifled by the poverty of the government, and it was not until the return of Santa Anna that any vigor was shown in the organization of an army to repel the invaders. Measures certainly had been adopted to make face against the danger, and various decrees were passed for the raising of troops and the acquisition of means;²³ but these were rendered in a great measure abortive by the alarm which prevailed in the capital, and the general feeling that an internal rupture was imminent. When, however, Santa Anna arrived, the patriotism of the public became more animated, and

²² 'But, however much I may feel personally mortified and outraged by the course pursued, unprecedented at least in our history, I will carry out in good faith, while I remain in Mexico, the views of the government, though I may be sacrificed in the effort.' See his correspondence with Scott, in *Id.*, p. 862-4, and with the adjutant-general, p. 1100-2.

²³ The reader is referred to *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, v. 134-6, 143; *Mex., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1844-6, 393-4, 378-9; *El Restaurador*, Aug. 28, 1846; *Derecho Intern. Mex.*, 3^a p^a, 435-8.

activity and enthusiasm were manifested throughout the country. By decree of September 11th, the national guard was called into existence in all states, districts, and territories of the republic. All males from the age of sixteen to fifty were ordered to enlist, under penalty of losing their political rights. Regulations were laid down for the organization, arming, and discipline of the force, and provisions made for the payment of the troops.²⁴ Punishments were, moreover, prescribed for civil and military employes who should refuse their services when required.²⁵

Santa Anna, who had been appointed commander-in-chief of the army, left the capital, September 28th, with 3,000 men for San Luis Potosí,²⁶ where he intended to assemble a powerful army to operate in the north. About the middle of October he was joined by the forces under Ampudia, who had moved from Saltillo, and one of Santa Anna's first acts was to deprive that general of his command for his attempt to hold Monterey contrary to his own suggestion to abandon it.²⁷ The enthusiasm in San Luis Potosí was unbounded; and as it was at first supposed that Taylor would advance against that city Santa Anna began to fortify it and outlying places to the north of it. These defensive measures, however, were soon discontinued and he turned his attention to the discipline and instruction of his troops. Nevertheless, the delay caused by these important preparations was the subject of much animadversion. By the end of the year large contingents from different states had arrived,

²⁴ *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, v. 161-9; *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1844-6, 424-41. The classes which were excepted had to pay a monthly contribution, varying from 2 reales to \$2, according to grade.

²⁵ By decree of Aug. 31st. *Id.*, 417.

²⁶ *Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal Diaz*, ii. 111-13; *El Iris Españ.*, Oct. 7, 1846, 3.

²⁷ Santa Anna had not considered Monterey tenable. 'Santa Anna, á quien... contrariaba en sus planes la resistencia que Ampudia se habia decidido á oponer en una plaza que él no consideraba fuerte ni defensible, se manifestó en extremo irritado.' *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 69. Ampudia, May 14, 1847, published a defence of his conduct. *Ampudia, Manifiesto*, pp. 10. Santa Anna, however, soon reinstated him in his command.

and the army at San Luis numbered over 20,000 well-trained troops, amply provided with munitions of war.²⁸ But Santa Anna took his time in perfecting the organization of his army. Cramped by want of funds, he felt that it would be unwise to hastily move his large force, under circumstances that would tend to damp the ardor of the men. He was ill supplied with provisions and army clothing necessary for a campaign through the sterile regions which separated him from the enemy. But these considerations had no weight with the impatient public. The opposition press gravely censured his inactivity, as his delay at San Luis was called, and attributed it to an unwillingness to enter upon the campaign, proceeding from sinister motives. The effect of all this was exasperating, and finally drove him prematurely to march against Taylor in the most inclement season of the year, ill provided against the natural difficulties with which he would have to contend.²⁹ Apprised, moreover, of the withdrawal of a large portion of Taylor's force, he really hoped by a rapid movement to surprise and crush him.

On the 28th of January he began his march. His army numbered 18,183 men of all arms, and was divided into three divisions under the generals Pacheco, Lombardini, and Ortega. He had, moreover, twenty pieces of artillery of varying calibre,³⁰ and General

²⁸ According to *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 76-7, the number amounted to 19,996. To this number should be added 1,341 chiefs and officers—exclusive of 16 generals—and a brigade 1,000 strong, under Gen. Parrodi, which joined the army later at Matchuala. *Ramsey's Other Side*, 95, 97. From a private letter written from San Luis Potosí Nov. 14, 1846, to a person in Mexico, and published in *El Monitor*, it is stated: 'There are here 25,000 men—rather more than less—52 pieces of artillery, and a good assortment of powder and balls of all sizes.' Reproduced in *El Sonorense*, Jan. 1, 1847, tom. i., no. 21, p. 4. See also *Rápida Ojeada, Campaña Santa Anna*, 4.

²⁹ *Santa Anna, Apelacion*, 23-4. 'Así es que éste [Santa Anna] salió de San Luis para la Angostura, escaso de víveres y armas.' *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 77.

³⁰ Namely, three 24-pounders, three 16, five 12, and eight 8 pounders, and one howitzer, according to Santa Anna's general orders of Jan. 28th, found on the battle-field of Buena Vista, and a translation of which is given in *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 154-6. See also *Santa Anna, Apelacion*, 24-5.

Miñon with a strong detachment of cavalry had been stationed in advance for some time at the hacienda of Potosí, observing the movements of the enemy. Santa Anna's advance was conducted under every hardship that nature could inflict. Pitiless storms of rain, alternating with icy sleet and impeding snow, beat for days upon the ill-clad troops, who at night bivouacked shelterless and half-frozen on the cold ground. When the sky cleared the burning sun, as it poured its rays on the desert, caused no less affliction. Heat and thirst were as insupportable as the cold and wet. Many perished, numbers sank exhausted on the ground, and desertions were numerous. By the time the army reached Encarnacion, it was greatly reduced.³¹

While Taylor was absent on his expedition to Victoria, some partial success had attended the Mexican operations. Wool, who was stationed at Buena Vista, upon rumors arising that the army at San Luis Potosí was advancing, sent forward, January 18th, a reconnoitring party of fifty cavalymen under Major Borland, to Encarnacion. Borland was joined the next day by Major Gaines and Captain Clay with about thirty men, and decided to extend his reconnoissance to Salado. That night, however, the hacienda was surrounded by Miñon's cavalry, which had rapidly moved from Matehuala, and the American officers, deeming resistance useless, surrendered,³² the whole

³¹ Pacheco's division arrived on the 17th, and the last brigades on the 20th and 21st of February. The loss is put down at 4,000 in *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 96-7. Santa Anna reviewed his troops at Encarnacion. They then amounted to 14,048 men, exclusive of Miñon's cavalry division, numbering 1,200, stationed at the hacienda of Potosí, and which was ordered to advance by the pass of Palomas de adentro, and intercept the enemy then at Agua Nueva between that place and Saitillo. *Rápida Ojeada, Campaña Santa Anna*, 8, 11-12. American accounts place Miñon's brigade at 2,000 cavalymen. *Carleton's Battle of Buena Vista*, 11. Taylor estimated it at about 1,500. *U. S. Gort Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 133.

³² Wool's report in *Id.*, 60, p. 1106-7. Miñon reported having captured two field-officers, four other officers, and 76 men. *El Sonorense*, Feb. 18, 1847, tom. i. no. 29, p. 3-4. The total number of captives according to Taylor's official list was 70. *U. S. Gort Doc.*, ut sup., 56, pp. 301-3.

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party being sent as prisoners of war to Mexico. A few days later Captain Heady, Lieutenant Churchill, and seventeen Kentucky volunteers were also captured while reconnoitring.³³ The rumors of the advance of the Mexicans, supported by these untoward circumstances, assumed such a positive shape as to induce Taylor to remove his headquarters from Monterey to Saltillo, where he arrived on the 2d of February. To restore the confidence of the volunteers, which was somewhat shaken by the late occurrences, he decided to establish a camp at Agua Nueva, eighteen miles in advance of Saltillo, and remove the main force thither, leaving at the latter place a suitable garrison. By the 14th the occupation of the new position was completed; a depôt was established; and supplies were brought in as rapidly as possible. As yet nothing certain was known with regard to the movements of the Mexicans, but on the 20th it was ascertained by reconnoissances, skilfully conducted by Major McCulloch and Lieutenant-colonel May in the directions of Encarnacion and Hedionda, that the enemy was in large force at the former place, and Miñon within a short distance of the latter.³⁴ As the camp at Agua Nueva could be turned on its left flank by the road from Hedionda to Encantada in the rear, Taylor decided to fall back to the hacienda of Buena Vista—about twelve miles distant—where, owing to the nature of the ground, he could take up such a formidable position as would greatly neutralize the superiority in numbers of the enemy. He therefore broke up his camp at noon on the 21st, and moved the main body to the new position. During the same day and night the removal of the stores was assiduously carried on, and Colonel Yell with his regiment of Arkansas cavalry remained behind to protect them against attack, with instructions to fire the hacienda and such stores as remained on the approach of the

³³ *I. I.*, p. 299.

³⁴ He was already at Guachuchil. *Carleton's Battle of Buena Vista*, 16.

enemy. Having made his dispositions, Taylor, leaving Wool in command, proceeded the same evening to Saltillo, to make arrangements for the defence of the town.

On his arrival at Encarnacion Santa Anna felt confident of surprising the enemy at Agua Nueva; and unaware that Taylor was evacuating the place, laid his plans accordingly. The hacienda of Encarnacion is distant thirty-six miles from that of Agua Nueva, from which it is separated by a dreary, waterless desert. Santa Anna's scheme was to halt during the early part of the night in the desert, and then silently continuing his march, to fall suddenly on Taylor at early dawn on the 22d. On the 20th he issued his order of march, which was to commence at 11 o'clock on the following morning. Ampudia, who had been restored to his command, was to take the lead with the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th battalions of light infantry; the 1st division under Pacheco was to follow; then the division of the centre under Lombardini, succeeded by the 3d division, commanded by Ortega. Each division was accompanied by its portion of the artillery, and the cavalry was to bring up the rear, escorting the ammunition and baggage trains. At starting the troops were supplied with rations for only two meals,³⁵ one of which was to be eaten at night on the desert; and the chiefs of corps were strictly charged to see that each soldier took with

³⁵ Carleton, *Battle of Buena Vista*, 234, in a note referring to Santa Anna's official report of the battle, leaves it to be inferred that the Mexican general made a misstatement in saying that the troops had only one ration during the 22d and 23d, and points out what seems to him a discrepancy between Santa Anna's order of march and his report. There is, however, no contradiction in the two documents. The order makes it apparent that three rations were issued on the 20th. The first ration was eaten on the 21st before starting; the second at night on the desert; and on the morning of the 22d there was only one ration left, which was all the half-famished troops had during that day and the following. I see no discrepancy, therefore, in Santa Anna's assertion that the army, 'without other food than a single ration, which was dealt out at Encarnacion, endured the fatigue of combat for two days.' *Id.*, 151. A literal translation of Santa Anna's order which was found on the battle-field is supplied in *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 33, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 1, pp. 156-8.


him as much water as he could carry, and used it with economy. During the halt no fire was to be lighted, and on resuming the march no signal by bugle or beat of drum was to be made.

But with all his care Santa Anna's plan to effect a surprise was already frustrated by Taylor's tactics. Some hours before dawn Ampudia approached the pass of Carnero, some miles to the south of Agua Nueva. Colonel Yell's advanced picket was driven in, and hastened with all speed to report the approach of the enemy. Yell at once set fire to the hacienda and the stores he had been unable to remove, and then fell back to Buena Vista, where he arrived at daybreak. When Santa Anna reached Agua Nueva early in the morning of the 22d, the smouldering ruins told him that the Americans had retreated, and he firmly believed that they had fled. So pausing no longer than to give time for his weary troops to replenish their canteens, he pushed forward in pursuit, trusting that Miñon, who had been instructed to gain the rear of the enemy, would so entertain him³⁶ as to enable himself to come up with the retreating columns, and fall upon them in disorder. For twelve more miles he impetuously urged his march, to find the foe drawn up in battle array at the formidable position of Angostura.

The hacienda of Buena Vista is situated in a pass which breaks through a lofty range of mountains extending from east to west, and separating the valley of Saltillo from that of Encantada. This pass varies from a mile and a half to four miles in width. At its southern extremity is situated the hacienda of Encantada and at its northern the town of Saltillo. Through this narrow valley a small stream winds its way to Saltillo, keeping its course much nearer to the western side, the portion of the valley east of the stream being elevated sixty or seventy feet above that

³⁶ *Santa Anna, Apelacion*, 26.

on its other side. The road runs along the eastern bank; and at Angostura,³⁷ one and a half miles to the south of Buena Vista, and nearly seven from Saltillo, a spur projects from the elevated table on the east, and extends to the road, where it terminates abruptly, barely leaving space for the highway between it and the perpendicular bank of the stream. At this point the ground on the west is cut into a network of deep gullies by the stream, extending across the lower level nearly to the base of the moun-



BATTLE-FIELD OF BUENA VISTA.³⁸

tains. The sides of the projecting spur on the east are exceedingly steep, and the ridge connects with a

³⁷ Meaning 'the narrows.' This name was given to the spot later, its proper appellation being El Chupadero, that is, 'the sucker.' *Rápida Ojeada, Campaña Santa Anna*, 13.

³⁸ Explanation of plan:

- A. Ampudia's troops.
- B. Lombardini's division.
- O O'. Mexican cavalry in different positions.
- D. Pacheco's division.
- G M. Mora y Villamil's attack.
- K P P'. Mexican batteries.
- Q. Santa Anna's headquarters.
- N N'. Advance of the Mexicans.
- R. Bragg's battery and the Kentucky volunteers.
- S. American skirmishers.
- T. Taylor's position.

broad plateau extending to the mountains and protected in front and rear by deep ravines impracticable for artillery and presenting formidable obstacles to cavalry. Thence to Encantada a succession of alternate ridges and barrancas made the manœuvring of any class of troops on such ground difficult, but especially of cavalry. Wool had some time before pointed out the advantages offered by this position, and Angostura, the elevated plateau, and the connecting ridge which commands the road in both directions for some distance, were selected by Taylor as his battle-ground.

As soon as Wool was aware that the enemy was approaching he proceeded to take up the selected position. Washington's battery was posted in the road at Angostura, supported on the left by the 1st Illinois volunteers, which was stationed on the tongue of land projecting from the plateau; to the left of this regiment was the 2d Illinois and a company of Texans; while to the extreme left on the plateau, near the base of the mountains, were posted the Arkansas and Kentucky mounted volunteers; in rear of Washington's battery the 2d regiment of Kentucky occupied the crest of a ridge. As a reserve, the Indiana volunteers, the 1st Mississippi riflemen, two squadrons of dragoons, and Sherman's and Bragg's light batteries were stationed upon the ridges immediately in rear of the plateau and Illinois volunteers.

When the advance of the Mexicans came within sight of the enemy, it halted to enable the different divisions of the army to come up and take their several positions. In the mean time Taylor had arrived from Saltillo, and Santa Anna presently sent in a flag of truce, summoning him to surrender at discretion, as he "was surrounded by twenty thousand men, and could not in any human probability avoid suffering a rout and being cut to pieces with his troops."³² One hour

³² *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 1, p. 98. From Santa Anna's expression Taylor drew the deduction that the Mexicans were really

was given the American general to make up his mind. Taylor immediately despatched a brief answer, declining to accede to the request.

Santa Anna now made his dispositions to attack. Recognizing the impracticable nature of the ground on his left, and that Taylor had neglected to occupy the heights on his right, he directed Ampudia to take possession of them with his light division by advancing up the southern ridge. Another ridge more to the north led to the same crest, gradually converging toward the first-named ridge, with which it united at the summit. When Ampudia's movement was observed a portion of the Arkansas and Kentucky cavalry was dismounted, and with a battalion from the Indiana brigade, put in motion under Colonel Marshall on the northern ridge. It was now past two o'clock in the afternoon, and the conflict during the day was mainly confined to these opposing troops. As the foes approached each other on the converging ridges they opened fire, the rifles of the Americans being much more effective than the heavy volleys of the Mexicans, from which the former sheltered themselves behind the rocks and crest of their ridge. While these forces ascended higher and higher toward the angle, in their endeavors to outflank each other, Taylor was induced by an apparent movement on the enemy's left to push to his own right, across the stream somewhat in advance of Washington's battery, Captain Bragg's light battery supported by McKee's Kentucky infantry, while the 3d Indiana volunteers was moved up and posted on the eminence in rear of Washington's position. But no serious operations took place, though an occasional cannonade was directed by the Mexicans against the troops on the plateau. The remainder of the afternoon was employed by the Americans in strengthening their position at Angostura. A ditch and parapet among

20,000 strong, and says that later information confirmed his estimate. *Id.*, 138.

the gulleys on the right were made, and occupied by two companies of the Illinois infantry as the immediate supporting force of the battery. Three guns were also detached from Washington's battery and sent on to the plateau under Lieutenant O'Brien, the 2d Indiana volunteers being ordered up to sustain them.

At night the contest on the mountain ceased, the Mexicans having finally outflanked the Americans, and the two armies bivouacked in their respective positions, waiting for the coming morn to continue the conflict. The night was a bitter one. The wind blew almost a hurricane, and cold rain-squalls beat upon the shivering troops; while to add to the sufferings of the Mexicans, they were weak from want of food. But their enthusiasm was not damped, nor were their hearts faint; and when Santa Anna addressed them that evening, their loud cries of "Liberty or death!" with which they responded to his words, were distinctly heard in the American lines.⁴⁰ Taylor, confident that no attack would be made till the following morning, and still anxious about Saltillo, returned thither during the night with the Mississippi regiment and a squadron of the second dragoons.

At daylight on the 23d Santa Anna recommenced the action. During the early hours of the morning he had reënforced Ampudia's light division with 2,000 men from Lombardini's and Pacheco's commands, and these forces, having gained several elevated positions, to the left and rear of the American skirmishers, began to open fire as soon as it was light. Presently the Mexicans were seen pouring from their ridge in great numbers into the ravine which separated them from the Americans, but this movement was soon checked by O'Brien, who brought up a 12-pounder howitzer and swept the ravine with shrapnel.

Santa Anna had drawn up his army in three columns of attack. The first, under General Mora y Villamil,

⁴⁰ *Carleton's Battle of Buena Vista*, 47.

was designed to move down the road and carry the pass of Angostura. The second, composed of the commands of Lombardini and Pacheco, was to move in two divisions to the right, one across the mountain ridge occupied by Ampudia, and at the upper termination of which a battery of 8-pounders having a plunging fire on the plateau had been planted by General Micheltorena, and the other was to advance up the deep ravine in front of the plateau, and effecting a junction with the first turn the Americans' left. The third column was composed of the troops under Ampudia, destined to sweep the mountains and operate on the extreme left of the enemy. General Ortega's division constituted the reserve. A battery of 12-pounders was placed in position in front of Angostura to assist in the attack of the first column.

Shortly before eight o'clock the columns advanced to the attack. The one directed against Angostura was received, however, with such a destructive cannonade from Washington's battery that Santa Anna soon recalled it and ordered it to take shelter behind a ridge projecting from the plateau toward the road.⁴¹ Meantime Pacheco's division had moved up the ravine, while that of Lombardini was already descending into it from the ridge at a point somewhat higher up. Both these columns were supported by strong bodies of cavalry and lancers. As soon as Pacheco's position was known, General Lane, the senior in command on the plateau, ordered forward O'Brien's three guns to oppose the enemy's advance, leading in person the 2d Indiana volunteers as a support. The guns were thrown into battery at the base of the southern ridge, and the infantry was formed into line on the left, facing toward the road. Pacheco's infantry was already ascending from the ravine and deploying into line on the ridge. Lane had hardly got

⁴¹ Speaking of this attack, Roa Bárcena says: 'Me inclino á creer que el intento de Santa Anna al hacerla, haya sido dividir la atencion del enemigo.' *Recuerdos*, 97.

into position before the Mexicans opened fire; and though the American artillery caused great havoc among their thick ranks, they held their ground with great obstinacy; and continually re-forming, as fresh men crowded up, an unceasing fire was poured upon the Americans. Hitherto the Indiana men had behaved well. But the Mexican battery on their left had begun to enfilade their ranks, and when Lane ordered an advance to a more favorable position, the companies broke one after another; a panic seized the men, and leaving the artillery unsupported, they fled from the field, the greater portion to Buena Vista, and many of them even to Saltillo.⁴²

Thus abandoned, O'Brien could not possibly hold his position; he was compelled to fall back to the line, leaving one of his pieces in the hands of the enemy. Finding that he had not a single man uninjured, he withdrew his remaining two pieces to Washington's battery.⁴³

Pacheco's forces now pressed on to the plateau and effected a junction with Lombardini's division, which soon came up. The American riflemen on the slopes of the mountain, upon the flight of the Indiana regiment, left their position and retreated along the plain to the rear, and four companies of Arkansas cavalry that had been stationed in Lane's rear fled almost at the first fire; while the remaining Arkansas cavalry and the Kentucky cavalry, at the base of the mountain, followed the retrograde movement. Ampudia's light division poured down the slopes in pursuit; the Mexican cavalry advanced from cover, and masses of horse and foot pressed along the base of the mountain on the Americans' left, and were gaining the rear in great force. The American position was completely

⁴² Wool's and Lane's reports, in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 147, 181-2. Carleton states that this flight of the 2d Indiana regiment was caused by Col Bowles, who commanded it, giving without the authority or knowledge of Lane the order: 'Cease firing and retreat!' *Battle of Buena Vista*, 60.

⁴³ *U. S. Govt Doc.*, ut sup., p. 160.

turned. The second Illinois regiment, supported by two pieces of artillery, had manfully stood its ground, but was soon outflanked and compelled to fall back to a point nearer the road. Bragg's battery and the 2d Kentucky regiment were withdrawn from the extreme right, and with two pieces of Sherman's battery, which were stationed in the rear, were hurried up to avoid disaster. At this critical moment Taylor arrived upon the field from Saltillo with two companies of the 2d dragoons and the Mississippi regiment of riflemen. With the dragoons he hastened to the plateau, having directed the Mississippi regiment to oppose the advance of the Mexicans, who were pressing on the fugitives as they flocked into the hacienda of Buena Vista.

To follow all the movements during this eventful day, after the arrival of Taylor, pertains rather to the part of an analyst of military tactics than to that of the historian. The 2d Illinois and 2d Kentucky gallantly repelled every attempt of the Mexicans to drive them from the plateau, while the supporting artillery which formed a line of guns across the lower portion of the table played with terrible effect upon the hostile masses. In this part of the field a portion of the lost ground was recovered. The Mississippi regiment, joined by some few of the 2d Indiana, who were rallied by the great exertions of their officers, by a brilliant charge checked the advance of the victorious Mexicans, who, sorely cut up by the rapid fire, rolled back in confusion upon the supporting columns.

Still the aspect of affairs was gloomy for the Americans. Their position was most critical, and nothing but the bad generalship of the Mexican commander saved them from defeat. Nearly all the artillery was removed from Angostura—the key to Taylor's position—and the supports at that point were reduced to a mere handful. Mora y Villamil's column lay in strong force behind the southern ridge, and Ortega's

powerful reserve was close at hand. Had Santa Anna directed a vigorous assault with these fresh troops against Angostura at this time, it would have required all the infantry and artillery on the plateau to hold the point. The plateau would have been gained; the American troops in the rear unaided by artillery would probably have been overwhelmed by numbers, and Washington overpowered by being attacked in reverse, or Saltillo and all the stores and ammunition lost. But the important movement was neglected, Taylor was allowed to strengthen his left and rear with artillery, and for hours the combat continued over a space of ground upwards of two miles in length.⁴⁴

While the Mexican infantry sustained a check, a body of cavalry about one thousand strong, under General Torrejon, having skirted the base of the mountains, bore down upon Buena Vista, where they were met by the Kansas and Kentucky mounted volunteers, who had retreated thither. In overwhelming numbers the Mexicans bore the Americans before them, and mixed in utter confusion, the whole mass of horsemen poured down upon the hacienda and into the narrow street which separated the buildings. But here the fugitives from the field, collected on the housetops and behind the walls of the yards, opened fire upon the Mexicans. The brigade divided; one-half, wheeling to the right, returned, the other pressed on through the hacienda with the Kentuckians and Arkansas men. These now disentangled themselves, and Colonel May having come up to the support with two companies of regular dragoons and two more of Arkansas volunteers with two pieces of artillery, the Mexicans continued their course to the mountains on the west, and pelted at by the artillery till out of range, escaped through a gorge. In this sharp *melée* Colonel Yell fell on the American side and many of the best and bravest men. The Mexicans left thirty-

⁴⁴ *Carleton's Battle of Buena Vista*, 87-8.

five men dead upon the field, and Torrejon was severely wounded.

Meantime Santa Anna, finding that he could not drive the Americans from the plateau, planted a heavy battery of 24-pounders at its upper end, the fire from which enfiladed its whole extent. When the attack against Buena Vista failed, an attempt was made by a splendid brigade of cavalry to gain the road at a point in rear of the plateau by advancing along the ridge on which was stationed the Mississippi regiment, now strengthened by the 3d Indiana. But the lancers were driven off with heavy loss by the fire of the Americans without even coming to close quarters.

The Americans now began to press upon the Mexican right, which gradually gave way; while the artillery, intercepting the retreat and directed against the masses, did great execution. So terrible and rapid were the discharges that the right wing of the Mexican army seemed hopelessly cut off from its main body. The men crowded in confusion into the ravines and gullies, and as the enemy's guns, continually advancing, poured their shot into them, were gradually being driven up into an angle of the mountains. At this time Taylor, then on the plateau, received a message purporting to come from Santa Anna, and conveying his wish to know his demands. Concluding that the right wing would surrender, Taylor sent Wool to the Mexican commander and gave orders to cease firing. It is by no means certain that this was a scheme designed to effect the escape of the right wing; nevertheless, during the temporary cessation from firing, it gained the upper portion of the plateau, and under cover of the battery there joined the main army.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Wool could not induce the Mexicans to cease their fire, and returned without an interview with Santa Anna. *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, ut sup., p. 136. The explanation given of this occurrence in *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 102-3, is to the effect that a staff officer, named Montoya, finding himself within the American lines, in order to avoid capture had recourse to the stratagem of pretending to be the bearer of a message from Santa Anna, and was conducted to Taylor, who sent him, in company with two officers, to that

Santa Anna now prepared to make a final effort for victory. At this time the Americans had but three guns on the plateau, and three regiments of infantry.⁴⁶ Far to the left were the Mississippi and Indiana regiments, all the cavalry, and six pieces of the artillery. Santa Anna, advancing his battery of 8-pounders, moved his first column of attack, under Mora y Villamil, to his right, and uniting it with his reserves and remnants of his right wing as they came up, formed, under cover of the southern ravine, a single massive column, under the direction of General Perez.⁴⁷ The artillery on the plateau had been advanced to strike the retreating Mexicans, and the infantry was also moving forward. The manoeuvres of the enemy in the ravine below were hidden from sight, and as the Illinois and Kentucky men approached the head of the plateau the dense column poured over the southern crest, delivering a withering fire. Masses of the Mexicans closed in upon the Americans, who were almost instantly swept into the gorge in their rear. The edges on both sides were rapidly occupied by the Mexicans, and a murderous fire poured down upon the fugitives as they rushed down the gulch to the road to seek the protection of Washington's battery. Meantime a strong body of cavalry had swept over the salient spur of the southern ridge and was hastening to occupy the mouth. The destruction of the Illinois and Kentucky regiments seemed certain; but Washington turned his guns upon the cavalry, driving it back from the only gateway of escape, and the shattered remnants gained the shelter of the battery. But the loss had been very heavy. Colonel Hardin, 1st Illinois, and Colonel McKee and Lieutenant-colonel Clay, of the 2d Kentucky, had fallen, and num-

commander. Montoya, when he had entered the Mexican lines, separated from the commissioners, and Santa Anna was surprised at receiving a summons to surrender, which was promptly declined.

⁴⁶ The 1st and 2d Illinois and the 2d Kentucky. Two of the guns were under the command of O'Brien, and the third, a 6-pounder, under Thomas.

⁴⁷ Lombardini had been wounded early in the day, and his command had devolved on Perez. *Id.*, 101.

bers of inferior rank.⁴⁸ While this was occurring, O'Brien and Thomas made a desperate stand with their guns. But though their discharges of grape and canister tore through the opposing ranks, they could not arrest the advance of the Mexicans. There was no faltering on the part of these; the shock on the column at each discharge was terrible, but the gaps were instantly filled up, and the masses surged ever forward. O'Brien, a hundred yards in advance of Thomas, worked his pieces till their flash scorched the nearest files as they were swept down. He and his few remaining men were wounded, and delivering his last fire in the very faces of their foes, they escaped to the rear, leaving the guns in the hands of the Mexicans. Victory seemed certain. But Taylor, after the successes on the left, had at once ordered the Mississippi and Indiana regiments, and Bragg's and Sherman's batteries, up to the plateau, and these forces are now hastening thither at full speed. Bragg first arrives—at the critical moment when O'Brien's guns are taken—and though there is no infantry to support him, opens fire at once. The hostile columns are almost at the muzzles of his pieces, but the first discharge causes them to hesitate; a second and a third quickly follow and throw them into disorder. Sherman arrives, and the havoc spreads. The Mississippi and Indiana regiments, which have hastened across the gullies and ridges, mount the northern edge of the plateau, and pour their fire into the right flank of the Mexicans, who can no longer stand their ground. At all points they are repulsed and retreat into the depths of the ravine.

It was now late in the afternoon. A violent storm fell on the fiercely contending armies, the lightning and thunder quelling the cannon's flash and roar; the operations on both sides nearly ceased. When night fell the

⁴⁸ 'No loss falls more heavily upon the army in the field than that of colonels Hardin and McKee, and Lieut-col Clay.' Taylor's report, in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, ut sup., p. 138.

two armies occupied nearly the same positions which they had held in the morning, the Mexicans having gained possession of a point at the upper part of the plateau where their heavy battery was placed.

During the day Miñon had been hovering near Saltillo, having occupied the road to Buena Vista, and intercepted several fugitives from the battle. Captain Shover, however, in charge of the headquarter camp at Saltillo, moved his piece, supported by a gun from Captain Webster's battery, against him, and after a few effective shots compelled Miñon to abandon the pass and take refuge in the ravines.

Every preparation was made by Taylor during the night for a renewal of the conflict in the morning, but when daylight broke it was discovered that Santa Anna had abandoned the field and retreated to Agua Nueva, leaving great numbers of his wounded. He could no longer continue the contest with his faint and famished troops.⁴⁹ Both sides claimed a victory. As to the engagement itself, it consisted of a succession of alternate successes and repulses, and at the close of the day the attitude of neither army was one of triumph. But the necessity which compelled Santa Anna to withdraw turned the scale of advantage immensely in favor of the Americans, and the horrors attending the retreat crushed the morale of his army.

On both sides the loss was severe. That of the Americans was 267 killed, 456 wounded, and 23 missing, a total of 746 out of 4,769 officers and men engaged in the action.⁵⁰ The Mexican loss was ad-

⁴⁹ In his despatch written that night on the battle-field he says: 'Lo único que afflige en estos momentos mi situacion es no tener ni una galleta ni un poco de arroz siquiera para alimentar á tanto herido.' *El Iris Español*, Mar. 2, 1847.

⁵⁰ *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, ut sup., p. 133. The report of Inspector Churchill, made later, reduces the American loss to a total of 666. This is explained by the fact that in Taylor's list many only slightly wounded were comprised, and some of the missing were present for duty at a subsequent muster. *Carlton's Battle of Buena Vista*, 191-212. I cannot omit to mention the exaggerated reports of the loss sustained by the Americans published on the Mexican

mitted by Santa Anna to have been 1,000 killed and wounded,⁵¹ but it was probably nearer 2,000. On both sides, too, the courage of the combatants was conspicuous; the bravery displayed by the American volunteers,⁵² hitherto untried in battle, and the valor with which the Mexicans pressed up to the cannons' mouths, capturing three pieces and two standards, excite equal admiration.⁵³

On the 25th an exchange of prisoners was effected, by which the release of the Americans taken at Encarnacion was agreed upon; and on the same day Santa Anna called a council of war, at which it was decided, on account of the deplorable condition of the troops, to retreat to San Luis. Of that terrible retreat I shall give no account. Taylor again occupied Agua Nueva on the 27th, and on March 1st sent Colonel Belknap with a detachment in pursuit of the Mexican rear. That officer advanced to Encarnacion and found the road cumbered with the dead and dying victims of wounds, hunger, and exhaustion. When Santa Anna reached San Luis Potosí his army was reduced by more than 10,000 men.⁵⁴

side. Santa Anna, while stating that Taylor's army was from 8,000 to 9,000 strong, with 26 pieces of artillery, adds that more than 2,000 of that number were stretched upon the field—'mas de 2,000 cadáveres.' *El Iris Españ.*, Mar. 2, 1847. Ordoñez, writing in May 1847, boldly asserts that the army lost 1,700 in killed and more than 600 wounded, while the Mexican loss was a little over 800 wounded and about 600 killed. *Refutacion*, 12.

⁵¹ His report in *El Iris Españ.*, Mar. 2, 1847. Taylor estimated the number at 1,500, considering it probable that it would reach 2,000. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, ut sup.

⁵² There were only 453 American regulars engaged in the battle. *Id.*, 137-8.

⁵³ *Carleton's Battle of Buena Vista*, 111.

⁵⁴ Las bajas que sufrió de la Angostura á San Luis, ascendieron á 10,500. *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 115. In this work will be found a full account of Santa Anna's retreat.

Among the authorities that have been consulted for the history of Taylor's campaign and the operations in the north, and of which I append a list, José María Roa Bárcena's work, *Recuerdos de la Invasión Norte-Americana, 1846-1848, por un joven de entonces*, Mexico, 1883, 4^o, pp. 686, deserves especial mention. The author states that several years ago he began to prepare the material for his book with the intent of recording his personal observations and impressions on the events that passed before his eyes. He tells us that after studying the Mexican documents relating to them, he proceeded to do the same with the American records, from which he experienced the surprise and pleasure of discovering that the American commanders had done justice to the heroism of his country's defenders. He had in view to correct his coun-

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trymen's errors, and while placing his country and her defenders in the right position, do some good to the present Mexico, by pointing out in the causes, course, and results of that war, what international policy may have in reserve for Mexico, and what she should do for self-preservation. Roa Bárcena's style is clear and elegant; his conclusions are as impartial as may be expected from one who looks at the whole question from the Mexican standpoint. Nevertheless, his work is more valuable as a compilation than for depth of reflections. He quotes extensively from official documents and authorities, both Mexican and American, and does not generally flinch from giving the different accounts of events. The spirit of his first chapters is superior to that observable in the latter portion of his book, which lacks unity in plan and form.

James Henry Carleton, The Battle of Buena Vista, with the operations of the Army of Occupation for One Month, New York, 1848, pp. 238. This little work is a detailed and excellent account of the battle, from which it derives its title. The author was a captain in the 1st reg. of dragoons, who was present at the engagement, and, as he remarks, had opportunities, during the service he was called on to perform on the battle-field, of deliberate observation on many different parts of the ground. Moreover, he was encamped for eight months afterward on the same spot, and conferred with the different officers engaged. Besides these means of acquiring correct information, he has consulted the official reports of both parties, and combined the substance of them in his narrative. These authorities are generally quoted at the foot of the page, and an appendix of 78 pages is added, containing correspondence with Gen. Wool, and numerous official documents, both Mexican and American.

J. Reese Fry, A Life of Gen. Zachary Taylor, sm. 8°, pp. 332, Philadelphia, 1847. A narrative of the life of Taylor, from his birth down to the quiet occupation by him of the positions secured by the victory of Buena Vista. The author derived his information from public documents and private correspondence, which are liberally quoted. The incidents of Taylor's early years are obtained from materials collected by Robert T. Conrad. The work concludes with a number of anecdotes, illustrative of the general's habits and character.

Memoria sobre la Evacuacion Militar del Puerto de Tampico de Tamaulipas, pp. 53, is an exposition of General Parrodi, relative to the evacuation of Tampico. It was prepared in April 1848, but not published until some time later, since Parrodi waited for the publication of the *Apuntes para la Historia de la Guerra*, in order to refute the inaccuracies which he was aware that work would contain in its account of the abandonment of the port. Parrodi received imperative orders from Santa Anna to evacuate the place, but his prompt obedience caused great discontent; he was arrested on his arrival at San Luis Potosí, and submitted to a court-martial. Appended to the *Memoria* are copies of 32 official documents.

Fuller references on Taylor's campaign are: *Derecho Intern. Mex.*, 3d pt, 435-8; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 922-53; *Conj. Globe*, 1845-6, app. index, p. v.; 1846-7, index, 8, 17, app. index, p. 3; *Bustamante, Méx. en 1848*, MS., pp. i.-iv.; *Id.*, *Nuevo Bernal Diaz*, i. 15, 113, ii. passim; *Id.*, *Invasion*, MS., 6-14, 25-7, 59-67, 84-7; *Id.*, *Mem. Hist. Méx.*, MS., iv.-vi. passim, vii. 69-73, 143; *Dubou and Lozano*, v. 134-6, 143, 153-69, 259, 267; *Rivera, Hist. Jalisco*, iii. passim; *Id.*, *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 252; *Pinar Coll.*, nos 812, 851; *Brito, Defensas*; *N. Am. Rev.*, lxxii. 15-59; *Am. Rev.*, iv. 171-9; *Amer.*, *Pict. Hist. of*, 30-49, 121-2; *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Mex.*, MS., ii. no. 436; *Ramsay's Other Side*, 30-2, 36-9, 43-5, 57-61, 65-6, 69, 78-80, 83-5, 99-140, 259-60, 232; *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos*, 32-151, 662-7; *Hughes' Doniphan's Ex.*, 13; *Guerra entre Méx. y Est. Un.*, 23-151; *Zumacois, Hist. Méj.*, ix. 172, xi. 761; *Young's Hist. Mex.*, passim; *Niles' Reg.*, lxx.-lxxii. passim; *Harrison's Battle-fields*, 347-9, 428, 442; *Livermore's War with Mex.*, 51-82, 115-22, 156-61, 287-310; *Disc. Univ. Hist. Geog.*, ix. 878-86, x. 467-72; *San Francisco (Juan de), Vindica.*, 1-41; *Williard's Last Leaves*, 35-60, 77-89; *Abbot's Mex. and U. S.*, 17-22, 63, 81,

119-20, 271-6; *El Contra-Tiempo*, March-May 1840, *passim*; *Macgregor's Proj. Amer.*, i. 637-43, 656-8; *McCall's Letters from Frontiers*, 456-62; *McCabe's Comp. View*, 156-7; *Kollonitz's Court Mex.*, 260; *Hobbs' Life in Far West*, 139-68; *Sun of Anah.*, July 1, 17, 1847; *Harper's Mag.*, xlix. 333; *Kenly's Mem. Maryland Vol.*, 13-487; *Dunbar's Romance of the Age*, 38-9; *Id.*, *Am. Pioneering*, 15-16; *Tribune Alm.*, 1847, 17-25; 1848, 17-26; 1849, 33; *Ampudia, Ante el Tribunal*, 1-27; *Id.*, *Manif.*, 1-10; *Reid's Scout Exped.*, 119-224; *Carpenter's Travels in Mex.*, 24-7; *Wise's Los Gringos*, 237-73; *Cutts' Cong. Cal. and N. Mex.*, 10, 29-31, 42, 75-100; *Diario Exact. Mex.*, MS., 2-3; *Brackett's U. S. Cavalry*, 53-64, 78-103, 112-24; *Wool, Sketch of Life and Services*, 1-30; *Jal., Préstamos*, in *Imp. Var.*, pt viii., p. 33; *Wilhelm's Eighth U. S. Inf.*, i. 277-430, ii. 356-9; *Lossing's Pict. Hist. U. S.*, 483-5; *Zarembo's Merchant*, 14-15; *El Restaurador*, Aug.-Sept. 1846, *passim*; *Repub. of U. S.*, 101, 136-9, 269-79; *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Com. Rept. 70, pp. 1-4, H. Ex. 4, *passim*, Acts and Resol., pp. 160-1; *Id.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 56, pp. 283-405, Sen. Repts., pp. 30-2, 62-7, 141, app. 2-19; *Id.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 2, pp. 1161-1237; *Id.*, Cong. 31, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 32, pp. 5-34; *Mex. Treaties*, vii. nos 1, 4, 11; *Méx., Manif. Supr. Trib. Guerra y Marina*, 6, 25-7; *Id.*, *Camp. contra Amer. del Norte*, 1-37, with Docs; *Id.*, *Rápida Ojeada sobre Camp. en Coal.*, 1-19; *Id.*, *Doc. rel. Magist. vac.*, 1-20; *Escudero, Memorias*, 46-8; *Ripley's War with Mex.*, i. *passim*; *Lossing's Outline Hist. U. S.*, 298-336; *Scott's Mem.*, ii. 397-414; *San Miguel, Rep. Mex. en 1846*, i. 170-2, ii. 3-13; *Id.*, *Seg. Guía*, 7-9; *Murray's Pict. Hist. U. S.*, 470-6; *Proy. de Monarq.*, 32-44; *Doc. sobre Méx.*, no. iv.; *Chih. Book*, i. 35-6; *Memor. Histor.*, Jan. 1, 3, 6, 9, 22, 29, etc., 1846; *Tumpico de Tam.*, *Mem. sobre Evac.*, 1-53; *Escalera y Ullana, Méx. Hist. Descript.*, 94-111; *Domenech, Hist. Méx.*, ii. 203-17; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 273-9; *Hist. Mag.*, x. 207-13; *Iris Español*, 1846-7, *passim*; *Robertson's Reminiscences*, 1, 76-213; *Lane's Autobiog.*, MS., 8-54; *Henry's Camp. Sketches*, 1-331; *Hardman's Frontier Life*, 338-68; *De Bow's Indust. Resources*, i. 363-73; *Armin, Heut. Mex.*, 145-57; *Bazancourt, Mex.*, 141-215; *Mayer's Mex. Act.*, i. 334-429, ii. 329; *Id.*, *Hist. Mex. War*, 149-88; *Rouhaud, Rég. Nouv.*, 27-8; *Mason's Pict. Life in Mex.*, i. 205-16; *Taylor and his Camp.*, 9-128; *Corbett's Legist. Man.*, 282-4; *Encarnacion Prisoners*, 1-96; *Uruga, Sumaria*, 1-40; *Méx., Reglam.*, 1-23; *Id.*, *Reg. Arch. Gen.*, 1-20; *Id.*, *Doc. Relat.*; *Id.*, *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 29-115, 138-50; *Hunt's Merch. Mag.*, xxii. 364; *Jay's Mex. War*, 158-95, 223-30, 272-333; *Scott, Ill. Life of*, 1-156; *Fry's Life of Taylor*, 12, 163-77, 195-288; *Fate of Republics*, 119-25; *Amer. Quart. Reg.*, 1848, i. 14; *Semmes' Serv. Affont*, 38-40, 62-101, 116-24; *Otero, Negoc. Diplom.*, 1-12; *Id.*, *Comunic. sobre Negoc.*, 11; *Heller, Reisen in Mex.*, 195-7, 270-1, 287-8; *Mansfield's Life of Gen. Scott*, 359-79, 465-74; *Mex. War, Complete Hist. of*, 28-66, 85-6; *Furber's Volunteer*, 12, 44-119, 187-212, 250-89, 342-93, 455-8, 490; *Miscel. ó Sea*, no. 1, 1-64; *Mex. War and its Heroes*, i. 249-50, ii. 219; *Ober, Mexico*, 431-43, 477; *Farnham's Mex.*, 55-6; *Peter-son's Mil. Heroes*, ii. 31-4, 44-54, 61, 71; *Howitt's Hist. U. S.*, ii. 350; *Hays' Life*, MS., 39; *Robinson's Mex. and her Mil. Chieftains*, 256-63, 312-43; *Ortega (Nuñez), Mem. Relac. Dipl. Mex.*, 77-81; *Payne's Hist. Europ. Colonies*, 312-13; *Taylor and his Generals*, 13-215, 231-68; *Mexico, Battles of*, *passim*; *Conkling's Guide*, 243-4; *Taylor's Spec. Press*, 603, 612; *El Tiempo*, Jan.-June 1846, *passim*; *Thorpe's Army Rio Grande*, 30-5, 59-72, 123-43, 189-96; *Patton's Hist. U. S.*, 704-14, 741-3; *Edward's Camp. N. Mex.*, 16-184; *Rodenbough's 2nd Dragoons*, 92-8, 114-30, 518-19; *Parrodi, Mem.*, 1-53; *Id.*, *Vindic.*, 1-17; *Perez, Dicc. Geog.*, i. 467-87, ii. 433-42; *Ordoñez, Refut. Rápida Oj.*; *Alm. Amer.*, 1849, 193-7; *Cuerpo Méd. Mil., Reglam. del*, 1-23; *Cuba, Battles of*, 21-2, 30-49; *Museo Mex.*, ii. 469-70; *Santa Anna, Apel. al buen Criterio*, 24-32, ap. 66-9; *Dix' Speeches*, i. 179-97; *Taylor and his Staff*, 36-80, 146-66; *Cal. Star*, Jan.-Aug. 1847, *passim*; *El Arco Iris*, July 13, 1847; *Capron's Hist. Cal.*, 38-9; *Campaign in Mex.*, 46-8, 74-218, 242-6; *Barasorda, Pedim.*, 1-35; *Disposic. Var.*, v. fol. 49, 53; *Arrouiz, Biog. Mex.*, 142-6; *Son. Book*, iii. 327-32; *El Sonorense*, Oct. 9, 1846, Jan. 1, Feb. 12, 18, 26, March 5, 12, April 2, 9, 23, 30, Sept. 3, 1847, in *Pinar*

Coll.; *Papeles Varios*, xv. pt 9, xxxix. pt 22, xli. pt 10, li. pt 8, lvii. pt 8, lxxxvi. pts 7, 10, 13, lxxxviii. pt 13, lxxxix. pt 3, xcix. pts 4, 5, 6, 10, cvii. pts 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, cxxx. pt 3, clxxxiii. pt 11; *Jenkins' Mex. War*, 58, 73-97, 120-2, 149-215, 241-3, 433-53; *Frost's Mex. War*, 13-16, 57-102, 123-8, 154-9, 182-5, 206-17, 331-2; *Id.*, *Pict. Hist. Mex.*, 196, 207, 246-331; *Méz.*, *Mem. Hac^a*, 1870, 275, 1043-4; *Id.*, *Legisl. Mej.*, 1849, 227-30; Abr.-Jul. 1853, 161-92; Enero-Jun. 1856, 448-51; *Id.*, *Col. Leyes y Dec.*, 1844-6, *passim*; 1847, 24-5; *Mansfield's Mex. War*, 30-4, 44-75, 140-16.

CHAPTER XVII.

SCOTT'S MARCH TO PUEBLA.

FEBRUARY—JULY, 1847.

TAYLOR RETURNS TO MONTEREY—PREPARATIONS AGAINST VERA CRUZ—
LANDING OF UNITED STATES FORCES—APATHY OF THE MEXICAN GOV-
ERNMENT—FORTIFICATIONS OF VERA CRUZ—SIEGE AND CAPITULATION—
RESPECTIVE LOSSES—OPERATIONS OF THE GULF FLEET—SANTA ANNA'S
PREPARATIONS—HE TAKES UP A POSITION AT CERRO GORDO—SCOTT
ADVANCES INTO THE INTERIOR—BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO—THE HEIGHT
CARRIED—SCOTT ENTERS JALAPA—THE CASTLE OF PEROTE EVACUATED—
WORTH PROCEEDS TO PUEBLA—TRIST APPOINTED COMMISSIONER TO
MEXICO—HIS DISAGREEMENT WITH SCOTT—ATTEMPTS AT NEGOTIATION
WITH SANTA ANNA.

WITH the battle of Buena Vista, Taylor's active operations in the north may be regarded as ended. His work in future was confined to holding possession of the country occupied. The withdrawal of his regular troops for Scott's expedition against the capital, and the approaching expiration of his best volunteers' term of service, rendered offensive manœuvres in the direction of San Luis Potosí inadvisable. At the same time Scott's advance against the capital so occupied the Mexicans that the hostile forces in the northern provinces were almost unmolested. For a brief period the communication between Monterey and the Rio Grande was interrupted by the operations of generals Urrea and Romero, who, in concert with Santa Anna's design of cutting off the retreat of the army which he had hoped to defeat, had advanced with a strong cavalry corps from Tula to the neighborhood of Cerralvo and Camargo. On the 24th of Feb-

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ruary Romero attacked a large wagon-train near Marin, escorted by Lieutenant Barbour, 1st Kentucky regiment. The train was destroyed, about 50 wagoners were killed, and the escort captured.¹ Again, early in March, a train of 150 wagons, escorted by Major Giddings, was attacked near Cerralvo, and a sharp action took place. Many of the wagons were destroyed, and a number of lives were lost. The Mexicans, however, were finally repulsed.² Several other affairs of a like nature took place; but Taylor, having returned to Monterey and established his headquarters at Walnut Springs, marched in person with a strong force against Urrea, who thereupon retired by way of Victoria and Tula to the south.

It appears from the official correspondence that Scott first submitted to the government a written exposition of his views relative to a new line of operations on the 27th of October, 1846. In the memorandum which he laid before the secretary of war he expressed the opinion that, in consideration of Mexico's rejection of all overtures of peace, only by the capture of the capital could she be brought to terms, and that the most practicable way of effecting this would be by taking possession of Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulúa. To accomplish the latter he deemed a force of 10,000 men necessary, though 15,000 would be better if they could be on the spot before the yellow-fever came. Nevertheless, he was willing to attempt the capture of Vera Cruz with a smaller force. To reach the capital an army of more than 20,000 men would probably be needed.³ Scott's views were

¹ *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 210-12; *Id.*, H. Ex. 60, p. 1119-20, 1123-4. Urrea reported that 120 wagons and as many pack-mules were captured, and 200 of the enemy killed or taken prisoners. A great number of the wagons were burned for want of animals to take them off. *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos*, 116.

² Urrea states that the train consisted of 300 wagons, 100 of which were burned. *Id.*, 116-17. Giddings' force numbered 260 men. Two of the escort and fifteen teamsters were killed. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 213-15.

³ At this time Scott stated Taylor's army, including Wool's command, to

approved, and, as the reader is aware, he was appointed to the command of the forces in Mexico.

As soon as the United States government had decided to change the base of operation, preparations were carried on with all possible vigor. Transports were procured as quickly as possible, large quantities of munitions of war manufactured, and siege trains of heavy artillery shipped as promptly as circumstances would permit. By February the transports began to arrive at Brazos Santiago, and by the end of the month the embarkation of the troops had been effected at that port, as well as of Patterson's and Twiggs' divisions at Tampico. The island of Lobos, about sixty miles to the south of the latter place, was appointed by Scott as a general rendezvous, and there he organized his army, now numbering over 12,000 men.⁴ On March 7th the fleet of transports numbering about eighty vessels anchored at Point Anton Lizardo, and Scott, having reconnoitred the coast, decided to effect a landing at a point about three miles south of Vera Cruz. Sixty-seven surf-boats, each capable of holding from seventy to eighty men, had been provided, and into these 5,500 men were embarked and put ashore about half-past five in the afternoon of the 9th. During the night the debarkation of the whole force was effected without opposition.⁵

be 20,500, to be shortly increased to 27,250 by nine additional regiments of volunteers. From them he proposed to withdraw 14,000 for the Vera Cruz expedition. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 59, p. 59-60. The correspondence referred to in the text will be found in the same document, pp. 54-63.

⁴ Consisting of the 1st and 2d brigades of regulars respectively under Worth and Twiggs. Worth's command was composed of the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 8th infantry, the 2d and 3d artillery, Duncan's field-battery, and two companies of volunteers. Twiggs' brigade included the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 7th infantry, the 1st and 4th artillery, with Taylor's field-battery, and a regiment of mounted riflemen. The division of volunteers under Patterson was organized into three brigades, commanded by Pillow, Quitman, and Shields respectively. The first consisted of the 1st and 2d Tenn. and 1st and 2d Penn., with Steptoe's battery of 12-pounders; the second of the South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama regiments; and the third brigade of one regiment of New York and two of Illinois men. Besides this force of infantry and field-artillery there were the 1st and 2d regiments of dragoons, and one regiment of Tenn. horse. *Ripley's War with Mex.*, ii. 17-18.

⁵ *Scott's Autobiog.*, 419-21. Scott here states that the whole number was

While Vera Cruz, the gateway to the heart of the nation, was yet threatened with this hostile movement, the inhabitants received the unpleasant tidings that a revolution had broken out in the capital, and that the troops destined to move to their aid were there employed. It was more interesting fighting each other for individual supremacy than banding against the invaders. The fortifications of Vera Cruz were not in a satisfactory condition, many important points being out of repair, and the armament by no means in serviceable order.⁶ Gunpowder also would have been almost entirely wanting but for the opportune arrival of the French bark *Anax*, which succeeded in running the blockade during a norther with a cargo of that article.⁷ Provisions both in the city and in San Juan de Ulúa were scarce at the time of Scott's descent upon the coast, and the government's extraordinary neglect to furnish aid in any form gave rise to bitter reflections and to suspicions of treachery on the part of Santa Anna.⁸

rather less than 12,000 men, but these figures did not include the cavalry which was landed later. *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 223.

⁶ Cannons of 24-pound calibre were mounted on carriages for 18-pounders, and 18-pounders on those for 12-pounders. p. 18, of *Un Tributo á la Verdad*, Vera Cruz, Julio de 1847, 4^o, pp. 72. This short work was written by an anonymous citizen of Vera Cruz, who was evidently present at the siege. The first 20 pages are taken up with political matters, and the writer all through the work makes clear his repugnance to Santa Anna and his party. He then portrays the neglect of the government to take proper precautions for the defence of Vera Cruz, and compares Mexico to a vampire that ever sucks her blood, and abandons her in time of danger to her fate. p. 22. Next follows an account of the patriotic exertions of the garrison and inhabitants to oppose the enemy, of the daily operations during the siege, and of the effect of the bombardment. Santa Anna's proceedings down to the entrance of the Americans into Puebla are then severely criticised, and the conclusion reached that while at Habana he made some compact with the U. S. gov., p. 45-6. The different interests of portions of the Mexican republic are touched upon, and the different effects of the war upon them. In a note the copy of an important document is supplied, namely, Gen. Landero's report of the siege to the minister of war.

⁷ Though she was lost on the following day, more than 1,000 quintales of powder were saved. *Id.*, 23. Captain Desaché, by decree of May 21, 1852, was awarded \$22,000 for running the blockade in January 1847. He was probably master of the *Anax*. *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1852, 122-3.

⁸ 'Suponiendo... que estaba decidido que Vera Cruz corriera la misma suerte que Tampico, y no faltaron extranjeros que decían publicamente, que estos dos puntos y Ulúa estaban ofrecidos en garantía de compromisos hechos en la Habana.' *Tributo á la Verdad*, 23.

The fortifications of Vera Cruz at this time consisted of a system of bastions and redans encircling the town on the land side, commencing at Fort Concepcion, situated on the shore at the most northern point, and terminating with Fort Santiago, at the south-eastern extremity of the town. The forts were both of considerable strength, but the intermediate bastions, seven in number, were small and provided with curtains of thin masonry only proof against musketry. Owing to the shifting nature of the sand which surrounds the town, no protecting ditches are practicable, as they are quickly filled up during the heavy northerly winds that so frequently prevail. At the end of 1846 there were in the city, according to the report of the minister of war, 144 pieces of artillery of different calibres, of which 89 only were mounted, and in San Juan de Ulúa 135 out of 147 were mounted. Many of the former and most of the latter were heavy guns.⁹ The numerical force of the garrisons in the town and castle was 4,390¹⁰ of which 3,360 constituted that of the former, a number insufficient even to man effectively the fortifications. Thus it was that Scott was enabled to land his troops in full force without a shot being fired at him within range. In vain appeals were made to the government as the enemy's intentions became more certain and the danger daily more threatening. During the siege no exterior aid was rendered to the beleaguered city except by trivial diversions made by a few troops of cavalry and irreg-

⁹ On the defences of the city there were eleven 24-pounders and twenty 16-pounders. In San Juan de Ulúa, there were eighty-seven 24-pounder brass and iron cannon, ten 84-pounder mortars, ten 68 pounders, and sixteen 42-pounders. The other pieces varied from 4 to 16 pounders. *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos*, 158.

¹⁰ Including artillerymen and infantry of the line, active battalions of different states, and the national guards of Orizaba, Vera Cruz, Puebla, and other towns. *Id.*, 158-9; *Tributo á la Verdad*, 18. Scott says in his despatch of March 17, 1847: 'The garrison of Vera Cruz, independent of that of the castle, is ascertained to be about 5,000 men.' *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 221. Respecting the condition of the garrison and artillery, consult *Bustamante, Invasion*, MS., 39, 51, 54-5, and *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 849-57. A tabular statement of the different corps and number of men is supplied in *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 154-5.


ular bands of guerrillas. Nevertheless, though thus abandoned, the commandant, Juan Morales, made every possible preparation to resist, in the vague hope that a relieving army might arrive, or that he might be able to hold out till the *vómito* compelled the Americans to raise the siege. The *ayuntamiento* and citizens nobly supported him in his efforts; night and day soldier and civilian worked side by side at the defences; and rich and poor and old and young were alike animated with patriotic ardor.

Scott began to take up the line of investment immediately after having disembarked his troops. He encountered some difficulties in his operations, and it was not until the 12th that his line of investment was completed.¹¹ The ground about Vera Cruz, out of range of fire from the town and castle, is broken by numerous hills of loose sand, with almost impenetrable thickets of chaparral between, and the progress of the troops was slow. Heavy northers, too, set in, stifling the men with drift sand, interrupting the landing of subsistence and baggage, and delaying the arrival of the siege artillery. On the 18th Scott began his approaches to the city. He ran his trenches with considerable skill, being careful to keep the town as a shield between them and the fire from the castle, and on the 22d had sufficient guns in position to authorize his summoning the city to surrender. Hitherto hostilities had been accompanied with few casualties. A vigorous but ineffective fire at long range was kept up from the town and castle on the line of investment, but the nature of the ground protected the besiegers, and the cannonade was received by them in silence. Paltry skirmishes also took place with insignificant loss to either side, and a few Amer-

¹¹ The line of investment extended in the form of an arc about the city for over six miles. Worth's division occupied the south-eastern portion of the segment; on his left was Patterson's command encamped in the centre of the line; and still farther to the left and north was Twiggs' division extending to the beach at Vergara.

ican stragglers, committing depredations on the inhabitants, were killed by the rancheros.

At 2 o'clock in the afternoon Scott sent in a summons to General Morales, who was in command of San Juan de Ulúa as well as Vera Cruz, offering to stipulate that if the city capitulated no fire should be directed against the castle unless the latter fired



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upon the United States troops with which the former would be garrisoned. Morales peremptorily refused to comply,¹² and on return of the flag the bombardment began.

The Americans had at this time seven 10-inch mor-

¹² Copies of both documents will be found in *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, ut sup., p. 226-7. The latter is a translation of the original Spanish.

tars in position, the batteries being planted about 800 yards from the beleaguered city. There were, moreover, six 8-inch mortars¹³ planted at intervals along the parallel. The Mexicans returned the fire of the enemy with great vigor and precision, but the sunken trenches from which the American mortars played rendered their accuracy of little avail, while, after the range was obtained, the bursting shells of the Americans told with visible effect upon the city. Vessels of the blockading fleet, now under Commodore Perry,¹⁴ drew up near Point Hornos and also opened fire with heavy guns. On the 23d three more mortars were placed in position, and on the following day a naval battery, consisting of three 32-pounders and three 68-pounder Paixhan guns, opened fire. The cannonade on both sides was terrific. Heavy shells crushed through the stone roofs and sides of the houses, scattering ruin around; many portions of the city were set on fire; and no building afforded protection against the deadly missiles, as the round shot tore open its way and the bomb burst open a passage. The Santa Bárbara bastion, against which the naval battery had been directed, was almost rent to pieces, but its fire could not be silenced. Once its flag was shot down and fell outside, but to the admiration of the besiegers, it was recovered by the brave defenders amidst a shower of cannon-balls, and lashed to its place.¹⁵ The naval battery also suffered; its heavy embrasures and strong platform were torn and battered down and its guns dismounted. But the damage sustained by the Americans was small in proportion to that inflicted upon the Mexicans. The scene

¹³ Called coehorns, from the name of their inventor, Baron Coehorn. They were mounted on wooden blocks, made of bronze, and portable for short distances by two men.

¹⁴ Perry relieved Connor Mar. 21st. *Id.*, p. 223.

¹⁵ 'This gallant act excited the astonishment of our men.' *Furber's Volunteer*, 527. The name of the courageous young officer who performed this daring feat was Sebastian Holzinger, a lieutenant of the Mexican navy. He was aided by a youth, only 16 years old, of the national guard of Orizaba, now General Francisco A. Velez. *Tributo á la Verdad*, 27; *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 157; *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos*, 174-5.

in the city was one of desolation. Numbers, both of the garrison and non-combatants, had fallen, and provisions, after twelve days' close investment, began to fail.

Late on the night of the 24th the American commander received a communication from the consuls of Great Britain, France, Spain, and Prussia, praying him to suspend hostilities and grant a truce to enable the subjects of their respective nations, as well as the Mexican women and children, to leave the place on account of the frightful results of the bombardment. Scott had already, on the 13th, sent in safeguards to the foreign consuls, covering their respective subjects, and as they had persisted in remaining in the city, with military severity, but with undeniable justice to his position, supported by his previous action, he would not listen to an application made too late, according to the rules of war.¹⁶ He informed the foreign representatives that no truce could be granted, except on application of the commander-in-chief of Vera Cruz.

Each day the cannonade and bombardment had become more destructive, as fresh guns were brought up. On the 25th another battery of four 24-pounders and two 8-inch Paixhan guns was opened, and a terrible fire sustained during the day. The foreign inhabitants were now convinced of the uselessness of further resistance, and their consuls pressed Morales to take measures, for the sake of humanity, to save the non-combatants. This he could only do by capitulation, and on the night of the 25th he called a council of war at which the advisability of surrender was generally expressed. To this he was obstinately opposed,¹⁷ and he resigned the command to General

¹⁶ Communication between neutrals and neutral vessels lying off the island of Sacrificios had been left open till the 23d, to allow neutrals to escape. Consult the correspondence in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 218-20, 228-9, 230-1.

¹⁷ On the 24th he had already expressed his mind to the consuls: 'The place should be ruined, or he would perish before he would make any demonstration, even indirectly, of yielding.' *El Republicano*, in *El Sonorense*, May 7, 1847, p. 2-3.

José Juan Landero. On the morning of the 26th that commander, aware that the ammunition was wellnigh exhausted, and that the poor were already starving, sent in a communication to Scott, inviting him to appoint three commissioners to treat with an equal number on the Mexican side regarding terms of surrender. Whereupon Scott ordered a cessation of the fire, and appointed as his commissioners generals Worth and Pillow and Colonel Totten, who during the afternoon held a meeting with colonels Gutierrez de Villanueva and Miguel Herrera and Lieutenant-colonel Robles, as the representatives of Landero.

Some time was lost by disagreement as to terms and in discussions. The Mexican commissioners demanded that the garrison should be allowed to march out with the honors of war, retaining all the arms and stores belonging to the different corps, and an allowance of artillery corresponding to its force. Scott's commissioners were instructed to demand the absolute surrender of Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulúa, the rank and file of the garrisons of which places it was designed to send as prisoners of war to the United States, while the officers would be allowed to retire to their homes on the usual parole.

Nevertheless, on the following day all difficulties were overcome, and a convention was signed late that night, by which Vera Cruz and the castle of San Juan de Ulúa, with their armaments, munitions of war, garrisons, and arms, were surrendered. The Mexican officers were allowed to retain their arms and effects, and the troops were permitted to retire to their homes, their officers giving parole that they should not serve again until duly exchanged. The garrison was permitted to march out with the honors of war, and the civil and religious rights of the inhabitants of the city were solemnly guaranteed.

The surrender took place at ten o'clock in the morning of the 29th, and the American troops immediately

afterward took possession of the city and castle, which were placed under the command of Worth.¹⁸

In the siege of Vera Cruz the loss on the side of the Americans was insignificant, being only 67 in killed and wounded, eleven of whom were killed.¹⁹ The Mexicans suffered much more severely, and 1,000 is perhaps not too low an estimate of the killed alone.²⁰ The spoils taken, according to the official statements sent to the American government, comprised 5,000 stands of arms, 400 pieces of ordnance, and a large quantity of ordnance stores.²¹

Scott's bombardment of Vera Cruz and his refusal to yield to the appeal of the consuls produced in the country the deepest indignation; and in the Mexican publications of the day no epithet is spared in qualifying his course of action as barbarous and inhuman. Nor were foreign nations—which under similar circumstances would have acted in precisely the same manner—behindhand in condemning him.²² But with the lapse of time the matter has been judged with more calmness and proper justice, and there are not

¹⁸ Scott's despatches, in *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, ut sup., p. 229-38.

¹⁹ Scott's return, in *Id.*, p. 253-5. This number includes the casualties sustained in outside skirmishes. The period extended from the 9th to the 28th of March.

²⁰ Landero states that 350 of the troops and 400 of the inhabitants were killed, but that the numbers in neither case are exact, as many dead—muchos cadáveres—lay buried in the ruins. *Tributo á la Verdad*, 72. Roa Bárcena states that the number of killed and wounded was estimated at 1,000, and that the value of property destroyed was between \$4,000,000 and \$5,000,000. *Recuerdos*, 178. The number of shot and shell thrown into the city was 6,700, weighing 463,600 lbs., while the projectiles fired by the Mexicans amounted to 8,486. *Id.*, 178-9; *El Iris Español*, May 12, 1847, p. 3; *Tributo á la Verdad*, 72; *Furber's Volunteer*, 551. See also the account in *El Iris Español*, Apr. 7, 1847, p. 2-3. Furber states that the Mexicans did not know their own loss, and that their calculations varied from 1,200 to 1,500. *Volunteer*, 554.

²¹ *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, ut sup., p. 239. The number of guns is thus made to exceed by more than 100 the figures supplied by the minister of war at the close of the preceding year. Scott also says 5,000 prisoners were taken. Roa Bárcena considers that the American general raised his figures too high. *Recuerdos*, 188.

²² The *London Times* of May 1, 1847, denounces his action as opposed to the sentiments of humanity and justice. Many of the English and French residents, who had suffered severely during the siege, with glaring inconsistency complained bitterly against Scott.

wanting even Mexican writers who exonerate Scott from the charge of inhumanity.²³

Scott had now obtained the best base for his advance upon the capital that the country afforded, and he made his preparations for that movement with the utmost expedition. A delay of some days, however, occurred from want of transportation means, during which time he gave his attention to restoring order in Vera Cruz. On the 11th of April he published a proclamation,²⁴ in which he informed the public that the Americans were not hostile to the Mexican people, but to their bad rulers; he reiterated his assurance of extending protection to their civil rights and religion; and invited the natives to return to their occupations in which they would be unmolested and meet with just dealing.²⁵ Under his provisions for the maintenance of tranquillity, and by the prompt punishment of American offenders,²⁶ confidence was greatly restored, and the inhabitants who had fled soon returned to the town and pursued their vocations.

At this time the capture of Alvarado was at last achieved. After the surrender of Vera Cruz, Quitman had been sent with a brigade against that port to coöperate with the fleet, but on his arrival found it in possession of Lieutenant Hunter of the *Scourge*, to whom it had been surrendered by the authorities.²⁷

²³ Roa Bárcena writes: 'Sus deberes de humanidad, antes que apiadarse del vecindario de Vera Cruz, le obligaban á economizar la sangre y las fatigas de sus propios soldados.' *Recuerdos*, 178.

²⁴ Copy of which will be found in *El Iris Español*, 21 Abr., 1847, p. 3, and translation in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 937.

²⁵ To prevent exactions, however, a tariff of prices of articles of food was decreed by Worth, April 1st, after consultation with the civil authorities. Among these I may mention beef, venison, and pork, each 12½ cents per lb., mutton, 18½ cents, and a 12-ounce loaf of bread, 12½ cents. *Id.*, p. 934. On the 3d a tariff of duties was decreed, the blockade of the port being raised. *Id.*, 931. Measures for the civil government of the place were also adopted, Worth having been appointed temporary governor by Scott. *Id.*, 930-4.

²⁶ Several culprits were imprisoned or fined for robbery and other delinquencies, and one person was hanged for rape. *Id.*, 935-7; *El Iris Español*, 21 Abr., 1847, p. 3.

²⁷ *Niles' Reg.*, lxxii. 131-2; *El Arco Iris*, 9 Nov., 1847, p. 4. Hunter had been stationed to watch the mouth of the river, and discovering that there were no troops in the town, demanded its surrender. His action was disap-

Quitman returned April 4th to Vera Cruz, and Perry placed a detachment of marines in the place to hold possession.

Shortly afterward, April 18th, Tuxpan was captured by the fleet after a feeble resistance, and the guns which belonged to the stranded *Truxton* were recovered. As the place was of little importance, it was abandoned after the works had been destroyed.

Perry next turned his attention to Tabasco again, and about the middle of June, having proceeded some distance up the river, landed a force of 1,100 men and 10 pieces of artillery, which took the town by assault without difficulty. Destroying the fortifications and transferring the war material to his ships, Perry left the town in possession of 420 men.²³ Tabasco and the ports in the southern portion of the gulf were held for some time by the naval forces, which experienced no other opposition than annoyances. During the remainder of the war the whole of the eastern coast of Mexico was under the power of the gulf squadron.

When Santa Anna arrived at Matehuala he received news of the revolution promoted in the capital by the political party called the *polkos*, and decided to proceed thither in person. At San Luis, therefore, where he arrived March 9th, he placed Mora y Villamil in command of the troops which he left behind, and with a portion of his shattered army hastened to the city of Mexico. His presence tended to restore order. He assumed the presidency without opposition, and made a triumphal entry into the city March 23d. Intelligence of Scott's descent upon Vera Cruz had reached the capital as early as the 11th, but had not caused any great

proved by Perry, who court-martialed him and sent him home. The president did not agree with Perry's proceedings, and complimented Hunter. *Sun of Anahuac*, July 3, 1847, p. 1; *Furber's Volunteer*, 565.

²³ Official reports, in *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 1. Consult also *El Arco Iris*, Aug. 9, 1847, pp. 2-3; *El Razonador*, 18 Junio, 1847, p. 1; *Niles' Reg.*, lxxii. 187-8, 194, 304; *Soc. Mex. Geog. Bolet.*, iv. 244.

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alarm, it being confidently expected that the place would be able to hold out for a considerable time. When, however, the news of its fall arrived on the 30th, this illusion gave place to great sensation. A large body of troops²⁹ had been despatched from the capital the day before to the aid of Vera Cruz, and the troops that had been left at San Luis Potosí³⁰ were also on the march in the same direction. Every exertion was now made by Santa Anna to concentrate forces to oppose the advance of the Americans. A decree was passed April 1st empowering him to take command of the army in person, and providing for the appointment of a substitute as president in his stead.³¹ Having issued one of his usual spirit-stirring proclamations, in which he spoke with confidence of the ultimate triumph of the Mexican arms, and his own determination to die in the cause, he left the capital April 2d, and arrived on the 4th at his hacienda of Encero, about three leagues distant from Jalapa on the road to Vera Cruz. Within a few days the troops from the capital and San Luis Potosí successively arrived, as well as others from different parts. In the movements and concentration of these forces the greatest activity was displayed. The troops stationed at the Puente Nacional having been unwisely withdrawn, and the road to the village of Plan del Rio left open to the enemy, Santa Anna decided to take up a position at the pass of Cerro Gordo.

Santa Anna encountered great difficulties in making

²⁹ Consisting of the grenadiers of the guard, the 6th regiment of infantry, the *Libertad* and *Galeana* battalions, two squadrons of cavalry, and eight pieces of artillery, all under the command of General Rangel. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 877; *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos*, 194.

³⁰ Namely, two brigades of infantry, numbering 4,000 men, respectively under generals Vasquez and Ampudia; one of cavalry, numbering 1,500, under General Julian Juvera; and 150 artillerymen; in all 5,650 men. *Id.*; *Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 121.

³¹ The vice-presidency was suppressed; the congress appointed the substitute, the election falling upon Pedro María Anaya. *Id.*, 878; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, v. 264-5. Congress on March 28th had authorized Santa Anna to raise \$20,000,000 for the prosecution of the war. *Id.*, v. 262-3.

his preparations. The government had neglected to provide for the maintenance and equipment of troops. A great portion of his force was composed of raw recruits, undisciplined and unaccustomed to the use of fire-arms. The position at Cerro Gordo was without water; intrenchments had to be thrown up and the army was without the proper implements; the soldiers were hungry and there was little to eat. Nevertheless, this indefatigable leader, without money and most of the ordinary resources for military preparation, collected an army of 9,000 or 10,000 men,³² with more than forty pieces of artillery. With laborers and implements taken from his hacienda he cut a ditch from it to Cerro Gordo, three leagues in length, supplying abundance of water, and threw up intrenchments and placed batteries on half a dozen important points. And all this was accomplished within twelve days. It is true the works were incomplete and the surrounding ground was not properly cleared, but he maintained that if he had had fifteen days more time, he would have made his position unassailable.³³ He established a depôt, making himself responsible to a merchant of Jalapa for the payment of goods delivered at it. He caused the

³²It is impossible to arrive at the true number. Scott estimated it 'at 12,000 or more.' *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 264. Santa Anna, in his report from Orizaba after the battle of Cerro Gordo, says that he had little over 6,000 men, adding: 'No es pues cierto que se hubiera reunido allí una fuerza de 12 á 14,000 hombres como se ha divulgado con ligereza ó por malicia.' *El Razonador*, 29 Junio, 1847, p. 3. A Mexican officer writing anonymously in the same periodical—15 Junio, 1847, p. 1—makes the same statement. But no mention is here made of the cavalry which Santa Anna in his *Apelacion*, 35, puts down at 1,500. Roa Bárcena has investigated this question—*Recuerdos*, 196—and taking Santa Anna's figures, makes the number 7,000. By assuming 4,000 as representing the number of the infantry which arrived from San Luis Potosí, he increases these figures to 8,000, and lastly by calculations made from *Méx.*, *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 121, 170–83, he swells the number to 9,000. I must add that many of the soldiers who had left Vera Cruz under parole were compelled by Santa Anna to reënter service, and were distributed in the different corps. *Id.*, 169. A writer in *El Monitor*, 28 Abr., 1847, says: 'No hay hoy quien ignore que el general Santa-Anna tenia en su posicion mas de diez mil hombres.' Gamboa, on page 32 of his *Imputacion al Informe del Señor General Santa-Anna*, which was written in refutation of the *Apelacion al Buen Criterio de los Nacionales y Estrangeros*, copies this remark, and referring to Santa Anna's statements, concludes that at the least he had 8,500 men.

³³'Quince dias mas habrian bastado para mi intento.' *Apelacion*, 34.

cattle on his estate to be driven into camp, and fed his hungry troops with meat. He did everything, in fact, that man could do to insure success. Yet Santa Anna has been accused of culpably losing the battle of Cerro Gordo, and I do not say he was wholly without blame.

A limited amount of pack-animals and other means of transportation having been obtained, Twiggs' division of regulars, the 2d, marched from Vera Cruz for Jalapa April 8th, and was followed the next day by two brigades of Patterson's division of volunteers.³⁴ Twiggs arrived at the village of Plan del Rio on the 11th and encamped there. As yet he was entirely ignorant as to the strength of the enemy, and had no more reliable information respecting it than vague reports obtained from Mexicans, who variously estimated it at from 2,000 to 13,000. On the 12th, however, he made a daring reconnoissance, and discovered the general position of the enemy, and the fact that he was in much greater force than had been expected. Nevertheless, he meditated attacking, and on the 13th, having matured his plans, issued his orders to his own division and that of Patterson, which had also arrived in camp, and over which he assumed command. His hasty proceedings were arrested, however, by the receipt of an order from Patterson to suspend all operations until the arrival of the commander-in-chief.

Meantime Scott, who had been somewhat better informed than his generals,³⁵ at the first intimation that a serious conflict might be expected, hastened to

³⁴ Leaving behind Quitman's brigade and Thomas' Tennessee horse. Brigadier-general Pillow temporarily took command of the volunteer division, owing to the illness of Patterson. The regulars had been organized into two divisions, the 1st of which was under the command of Worth. *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 928-9.

³⁵ He heard on the 9th that Santa Anna was at Jalapa with 6,000 men. He still believed that no serious opposition would be met with before reaching Jalapa, and on receipt of the first reports of Twiggs and Pillow thought 4,000 men an exaggerated estimate of the enemy's force in the pass of Cerro Gordo. *Id.*, 928-9, 939-40.

the front, and arrived at Plan del Rio on the 14th. He was followed by Worth with his command, which came up at midnight on the 16th.

The American general employed two days in reconnoitring the formidable position of the enemy. No view of the ground could be obtained from any single point, and the dispositions of Santa Anna were for the most part hidden from sight. The work, too, of reconnoitring was extremely difficult and laborious, owing to the labyrinth of deep ravines and the confusion of massive hills which extended on all sides. Nevertheless, it was successfully accomplished, and on the 17th Scott began his attack.

The highway from Vera Cruz to Jalapa, crossing the Rio del Plan at Plan del Rio, at first winds its way with a north-west trend through a series of eminences, which, like a Titanic staircase, rise in successive altitudes. Then taking a south-westerly direction, it approaches the northern bank of the river at the base of the highest eminence, called Cerro Gordo, or the *Telégrafo*.³⁶ The Rio del Plan flows at the bottom of a ravine between four and five hundred feet in depth. The sides of this ravine are perpendicular, and present an impassable barrier against approach from the south. On the north of the line of eminences an equally impracticable ravine extends, while beyond it the mountains rise tier upon tier. Santa Anna's dispositions were as follows: On the eminences to the south-east of Cerro Gordo, and flanking the road on the south, four batteries were planted, mounting twenty-two guns in all. At the approach of the road to the ravine, down which the Rio del Plan flows, was a battery of seven guns; on the summit of Cerro Gordo a fort had been erected, defended by four light pieces, afterward increased to six; this position dominated all the other batteries, which con-

³⁶ American writers have misapplied the latter name of this hill to a neighboring eminence lying to the east of it, the proper appellation of which is *el Atalaya*.

secutively commanded each other in the order of their nearness to Cerro Gordo. The main camp of the Mexican army was situated on level ground at the western base of the Cerro Gordo, and covered by a strong battery on the commanding slope to the north. Some distance in the rear the cavalry under the command of General Canalizo was stationed at Corral Falso.³⁷ From Plan del Rio an old road led up to the fortifications on the right of the Mexican position. By consulting the accompanying plan the reader will obtain a correct idea of the battle-field.



BATTLE-FIELD OF CERRO GORDO.

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| A. Mexican camp. | E. Twiggs' movement on the 18th. |
| B. Mexican defences and batteries. | F. Pillow's attack. |
| C. Mexican cavalry. | G. Shields' approach on the Mexican camp. |
| D. Twiggs' positions on the 17th and 18th. | |

Strong as was Santa Anna's position, he made a fatal mistake in neglecting to fortify the Atalaya. To the advice of his engineers and the urgent repre-

³⁷ The above description of Santa Anna's positions is derived from his report of May 7th, in *El Razonador*, 20 Junio, 1847. It corresponds in every main particular with Scott's account and his plan of the battle-field as given in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 256-7, 261.

sentations of his generals on this matter he turned a deaf ear, telling the former that not even rabbits could ascend the height, and insulting the latter by remarking that cowards nowhere felt themselves safe.³⁸ A picket of twenty-five men was all the force he chose to post on the important point.

Scott, recognizing the strength of the enemy's front position, resolved to turn his left, and marked the Atalaya as a point on which to plant a heavy battery. Under the direction of the topographical engineers a path was cut with immense labor, out of sight of the enemy, across the chasms and slopes south of the northern ravine, with the object of gaining the Jalapa highway in the rear of Cerro Gordo. This road was pushed forward until, owing to the nature of the ground, it approached within fire of the Mexican lines and was discovered.

On the morning of the 17th Twiggs was ordered to advance along the new line of approach and turn the enemy's left by occupying all the heights in the neighborhood of Cerro Gordo, which might be of advantage in an attack on that fortification. Having taken up a position to the north of the Atalaya, Lieutenant Gardner, of the 7th infantry, was sent with his company to reconnoitre a height immediately below it, and presently became sharply engaged with a strong force hastily pushed forward by Santa Anna. He, however, maintained his ground until relieved by Colonel Harney with the rifle regiment, and Colonel Childs with the 1st artillery, who drove the Mexicans back to the Atalaya. Pursuing their advantage, the Americans pushed forward against the latter height, and after a spirited contest carried it. Santa Anna

³⁸ 'Diciendo, ni los conejos suben por ahí! Algunos generales... repitieron igual súplica á Santa Anna'—that is, that he would fortify el Atalaya—'quien se negó de nuevo enojándose y prefiriendo estas expresiones: los cobardes en ninguna parte se consideran seguros: lo que produjo el disgusto que debia esperarse' *Tributo á la Verdad*, 35. The neglect to fortify this point was the ground of serious charges against Santa Anna.

too late recognized his mistake in not having secured that point, and endeavored to regain it by three times directing a furious assault against it. But the deadly rifle repelled each attack, and the Atalaya summit remained in possession of the enemy. Childs' troops in their impetuosity rushed down the slope and began to ascend the Cerro Gordo, but the recall was sounded and Childs fell back, with a loss of nine killed and twenty-three wounded.³⁹ Then from Cerro Gordo a deluge of grape was poured down upon the Atalaya, but the Americans, sheltering themselves on the shelving sides of the crest, sustained little harm. During the night, with incredible labor, a 24-pounder gun and two 24-pounder howitzers were dragged up by hand and placed in position. A 68-pounder howitzer was also, with equal difficulty, transported from Plan del Rio and planted on the south side of the river, bearing upon the batteries on the Mexican right.

On the evening of the 17th Scott issued his order of battle, which from first to last exhibits his confidence in being able to drive the Mexicans from their positions.⁴⁰ Twiggs was directed to move forward and take up a position on the national road in rear of the enemy's position and cut off the retreat. Two regiments of volunteers, under Brigadier-general Shields, were ordered to be sent up as a reënforcement, and Worth's division of regulars was ordered to follow up the movement against the Mexicans left along the route pursued by Twiggs. Pillow, in command of Patterson's division, was to pierce the line of batteries on the heights resting on the ravine and dominating the approach from Plan del Rio. He was directed to

³⁹ Santa Anna, in his despatches of the same day, reported this part of the engagement as a complete triumph on his side. *Tributo á la Verdad*, 35; *El Razonador*, 29 Junio, 1847, p. 2.

⁴⁰ He gives positive directions regarding the pursuit; states that the army will not return to the encampment at Plan del Rio; and orders the baggage-trains to follow in the afternoon of the 18th or early the next morning. General Orders No. 111, in *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 258-9.

begin the assault as soon as he heard firing on his right. Wall's field-battery and the cavalry were to be held in reserve on the national road, out of view and range of the enemy's guns.

At daybreak on the 18th the guns on the Atalaya opened fire on the higher height of Cerro Gordo. Harney, who occupied the summit with the rifle regiment, the 1st artillery, and 7th infantry, immediately organized an attack. Sending the rifles to the left, down the ravine, he drew up the 3d and 7th regiments for a direct assault in front. This force was supported by the artillery regiment. The fortification on Cerro Gordo was surrounded by an abatis of thorny brushwood, extremely embarrassing to a storming party. Harney, observing that a large force was moving on his left to the support of Cerro Gordo, immediately gave the order for the storming column to advance. The first obstacle encountered was a breastwork of stone, at which the Mexicans made so obstinate a stand that bayonets were crossed. Driven from this position, the defenders again attempted to repel the enemy at a line of defences immediately below the main fortification. But their efforts were vain. The plunging fire of the artillery and the heavy volleys of musketry—delivered by inexperienced hands—passed over the heads of the assailants, who, though breathless, with a wild rush upward, burst through the abatis and forced their way into the fort.

Meanwhile Twiggs had been moving forward the other portion of his division under a heavy fire from Cerro Gordo, till Riley's brigade, which consisted of the 2d and 3d infantry, the 4th artillery, and a portion of the 1st artillery,⁴¹ following the guidance of the engineers, arrived in rear of Cerro Gordo. Orders were now issued to assault that height in reverse, and with similar success the assailants gained the

⁴¹ I notice, in the return of killed and wounded, three of this regiment among the casualties of Riley's brigade. *Id.*, p. 263, 270.

summit simultaneously with Harney's force. The Mexicans in panic fled down to the Jalapa highway, and their guns were immediately turned upon them.

While this was occurring, the Americans, directing an assault against the Mexican left, sustained a serious reverse. Pillow, owing to the difficulties of the ground, though directed to make it as close as possible to the edge of the river, brought his men in front of the 2d battery.⁴² The volunteers pressed forward at first with enthusiasm, but, being enfiladed by the battery resting on the ravine, and being embarrassed by the difficulty of the ground, were soon thrown into confusion, and after sustaining a severe loss, were repulsed, many of the men fleeing to the highway and escaping to camp.

But meanwhile the centre of the enemy had been pierced, and his camp taken. Shields had been sent forward, and with his command approached the camp by the rear through the tangled brushwood. Arriving in front of the battery, his men were severely cut up, and he fell dangerously wounded; but Colonel Baker, who succeeded him, deployed his men in skirmishing order, and the battery was carried.


Santa Anna, seeing that all was lost, had fled; Vasquez had fallen on Cerro Gordo; and Vega, Pinson, and Jarero, in spite of their success, recognized that their position was untenable. The howitzer on the south of the ravine was dropping its shells with deadly accuracy into the batteries, and, cut off from every chance of relief, there was no course left to them but surrender. A white flag was hoisted, and Scott, who was now on the Cerro Gordo, dictated his terms. Vega and his brother generals surrendered themselves as prisoners of war, and 3,000 men laid down their arms. Canalizo with the cavalry, though Santa Anna ordered him to charge the advancing Americans, retired without attempting to cover the retreat.

The victory of the Americans was complete. Santa

⁴²Consult the plan.

Anna fled to Orizaba, where he collected about 3,000 of his scattered troops.⁴³ Scott, without hinderance, marched to Jalapa, and on the 20th entered the town in advance of Worth's division.

The formidable fortification of Perote, second only to San Juan de Ulúa, next occupied the attention of the United States general, and there he expected to meet with serious opposition. The place, however, was in



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no condition to make resistance. Though a large number of guns were in position, there was a want of ammunition and provisions, and Canalizo ordered

⁴³ The loss of the Mexicans has never been ascertained. That sustained by the Americans during the two days amounted to 431 in killed, wounded, and missing, 63 of whom were killed on the field. About 3,000 prisoners were taken, between 4,000 and 5,000 stands of arms, and 43 pieces of artillery. Owing to the impossibility of keeping guard over such a number of captives, they were released on parole, and the small arms were destroyed, being of no value to the army. *U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 257, 264.*

Gaona, the commander, to abandon it and retire with the garrison.⁴⁴ Worth had been ordered forward without loss of time, and took possession of the castle on the 22d.

Scott's further advance was temporarily embarrassed by learning, a few days later, that the greater portion of the expected new levies had been landed at Brazos Santiago with a view to aid Taylor, unfavorable reports of whose situation had been received at Washington. This placed him in a difficult position, as the term of service of the old volunteers was near its expiration, and the discharge of seven regiments,⁴⁵ numbering 3,000 men in an excellent state of efficiency, was a serious consideration. Nevertheless, as their time expired in five or six weeks, and to advance farther from the coast would expose them to the necessity of returning to Vera Cruz at the most fatal season of the year, Scott, on May 4th, from considerations of humanity, issued his order for them to embark at Vera Cruz for New Orleans, where on their arrival they were honorably mustered out of the service. Patterson, whom this discharge left without a command, also returned to the United States.⁴⁶

The American congress had passed laws authorizing the raising of fresh troops, and it was the intention of the government to increase Scott's force to about 20,000. Recruits had been quickly obtained, and several detachments were already in motion for Brazos Santiago. At that place General Cadwalader, with about 1,000 troops, disembarked early in April; but Scott, on the 25th, instructed him to embark for Vera Cruz the new regiments as rapidly as they arrived,

⁴⁴ Santa Anna sent an order to Canalizo instructing him to defend the place until he could arrive with reinforcements, but Canalizo had already moved forward to Puebla. *El Razonador*, 29 Junio, 1847, p. 3.

⁴⁵ They were the Tennessee cavalry, the 3d and 4th Illinois infantry, the 1st and 2d Tennessee infantry, the Georgia infantry, and the Alabama infantry. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 956.

⁴⁶ Few of these troops were willing to reenlist, at which Scott expressed his regret. *Ib.* They were mustered out on the last day of May. *Furber's Volunteer*, 614.

and in case the line of the Rio Grande was secure, to stop the landing of troops at Brazos Santiago, and directed them to proceed without delay to Vera Cruz.

Although Scott recognized the advantage of moving into the interior during the general panic which prevailed after the battle of Cerro Gordo, the discharge of the volunteers made it doubtful whether he could reach the capital. Nevertheless, he determined to proceed as far as Puebla, which town he knew did not hope to resist his progress. Accordingly, on the 6th of May, Quitman was sent from Jalapa at Perote with two of his regiments to join Worth, who was ordered to advance to Puebla. Worth began his movement on the 8th, and arrived without interruption at Amozoc on the 13th. From this place, which was twelve miles distant from Puebla, he sent in a communication to the ayuntamiento, requesting to meet its members to arrange about his occupation of the city. While waiting for the reply a strong force of cavalry was discovered on the 14th, moving through the hills with the evident intention of turning Amozoc; and as Quitman's corps was in the rear, Worth felt some fear for its safety. He at once sent Colonel Garland, with the 2d artillery regiment and two guns of Duncan's battery, supported by the 6th infantry, in that direction. This detachment presently came within range of the Mexicans, and the American artillery, opening fire, quickly dispersed them. This demonstration had been made by Santa Anna. On his arrival at Orizaba he re-formed the troops which he collected, and having organized a system of guerrilla warfare to harass the enemy and interrupt his communications, proceeded to Puebla. There he endeavored to encourage the inhabitants, and excite in them a spirit of resistance, but his effort was vain; the people felt but little confidence in him, and were inclined to submit to the triumphant invaders.⁴⁷ He

⁴⁷ Scott says: 'Puebla...stands ready to receive us amicably, or at least courteously.' *U. S. Govt Doc.*, ut sup., p. 954. Vasquez, the bishop of Puebla,

therefore turned his attention to securing the retreat of his infantry, and to carrying off the artillery in Fort Loreto near the city. Thinking that he would be able to destroy Quitman's command as Worth advanced on Puebla, he led his cavalry in person against it, but when he discovered that Worth was still at Amozoc, retired from a contest which offered no chance of success. During this operation the Mexican infantry retreated with the artillery along the highway to Mexico, and Santa Anna followed with the cavalry before daybreak next morning.⁴⁸

Worth moved on in the morning of the 15th, and was met by the ayuntamiento of Puebla three miles outside the city. In obedience to Scott's desire to conciliate the inhabitants, the terms of capitulation were made as liberal as possible, and the column quietly occupied the place.⁴⁹ Worth's reception by the authorities was coldly courteous.

Meanwhile Scott on the 11th of May issued at Jalapa a proclamation to the Mexican people, which elicited the warm approval of the president of the United States, and was well received in those portions of Mexico occupied by the Americans. The document was written in Spanish, at the instigation of Mexicans of high standing and influence, some of them churchmen, and expressed sentiments likely to meet with a friendly response, and promote the cause of peace. The ability with which it was written and the topics suggested influenced the approaching elections in Mexico in favor of the peace party. In one point only was it somewhat inconsistent with the policy of the United States, and that was

is alleged to have favored the occupation of the city by the Americans. *Bar, Vida de Juarez*, 47. His influence would have great control over the people. Santa Anna says that the populace were enthusiastic in their demonstration in favor of defence, but that the influential men were lukewarm. *El Iris Español*, 19 Mayo, 1847, 4.

⁴⁸ Consult Worth's account in *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, ut sup., p. 994-5, Santa Anna's despatch in *El Iris Español*, 19 Mayo, 1847, 4, and *El Razonador*, 18 Mayo, 1847, 2-3.

⁴⁹ A copy of the terms granted by Worth will be found in *El Iris Español*, 5 Junio, 1847, 3-4.

in Scott's explanation of the cause of the war, which was attributed to a desire to put a stop to monarchical schemes in Mexico.⁶⁰

When the government at Washington received in quick succession news of the victory at Buena Vista and the capture of Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulúa, it hoped that Mexico would be disposed to peace; and the president appointed Nicholas B. Trist, chief clerk of the state department, as confidential agent at the headquarters of the American army. Trist's principal recommendation as the man for such a mission was his devotion to the administration. Scott entertained no friendly feelings toward President Polk, and the attempt to appoint a lieutenant-general, although unsuccessful, had galled him deeply. The government, conscious of Scott's sensitiveness, had taken the precaution to direct Trist to communicate confidentially to him the project of a treaty with which he was provided, and which set forth the demands of the United States. Scott was also to be informed of the instructions which had been given to Trist. The commissioner, however, on his arrival at Vera Cruz in the beginning of May, forwarded to Scott a despatch for the Mexican minister of foreign relations, sealed and not accompanied with any explanation regarding his own mission. Trist at the same time addressed a note to Scott, and forwarded one from Marcy directing the general to suspend hostilities in case Trist should make known to him that such contingencies had occurred as would make the president willing that military operations should cease. This letter mystified Scott, who could only see that the secretary of war intended to degrade him, and on May 7th replied to Trist, stating that he

⁶⁰ On this point Marcy writes: 'As it could not have been your design to enter into a full discussion of the causes which led to the war, it is not to be taken as an authoritative exposition of the views of the executive in this respect.' *U. S. Govt Doc.*, ut sup., p. 975. Copies of the Spanish and English translation of the document, and other particulars, will be found in *Id.*, p. 964-5, 968-74. In the capital the proclamation was denounced as an insult to the nation. *El Razonador*, 18 Junio, 1847, 1-3.

doubted whether he could so far commit the honor of his government as to take any direct agency in forwarding the sealed despatch. The remainder of the letter exhibits an ebullition of characteristic ill temper. This elicited an insolent answer, couched in ironical terms, from Trist, which led to further correspondence that displays the virulent animosity with which these two personages regarded each other. On May 14th Trist arrived at Jalapa, and without deigning to call on Scott, occupied himself with writing his reply. Neither took the least pains to conceal his rancor from the army.⁵¹ This disgraceful quarrel drew upon both individuals rebukes from the government at Washington.

Scott, having made dispositions for the subsistence of his army, left Jalapa May 21st and entered Puebla on the 28th, Twiggs arrived with his division on the following day, and the army was again concentrated. Meantime Cadwalader arrived at Vera Cruz, and a large train, escorted by Brevet Colonel McIntosh, having been assailed by a strong force of guerrillas under Rebolledo and some loss sustained, Cadwalader, on the 8th of June, marched from Vera Cruz with 500 men and two mountain howitzers, to its assistance. At the Puente Nacional a sharp action took place, in which Rebolledo was driven from his position, and the train was brought to Jalapa, though incessantly harassed by the enemy. Cadwalader pursued his march and entered Perote June 21st, where he was joined by Major-general Pillow with 1,500 men, July 1st. The united commands, numbering 3,500 men, then proceeded to Puebla, and Scott's force, thus augmented, now numbered 10,276, of

⁵¹ The correspondence on this matter was published by the government, and will be found in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 813-31, 958-63, 965-6, 975-6. Scott's anger was unbounded, as may be gathered from his note to Trist of May 29th, whose letters he describes as a 'farrago of insolence, conceit, and arrogance,' and adds: If you were but armed with an ambulatory guillotine, you would be the personification of Danton, Marat, and St Just, all in one. *Id.*, p. 996.

whom 8,061 only were effectives, there being no less than 2,215 men on the sick-list.⁶²

Commissioner Trist had followed the headquarters of the army, waiting for an opportunity to enter upon his mission, and finally sent the despatch for the minister of foreign relations through the British legation, the English minister readily acceding to his request in the matter. The conciliatory tone of the despatch met, however, with no better result than previous offers on the part of the United States to negotiate.⁶³ On June 22d, Minister Ibarra again informed the government at Washington that the decision on the affair in question rested with the Mexican congress.

During this time no friendly intercourse had existed between Scott and Trist. To both these officers communications were addressed from Washington, animadverting upon their conduct, representing that the interests of the nation required their coöperation and urging a reconciliation. But before the receipt of these despatches Trist addressed, June 25th, a letter to Scott,⁶⁴ which smoothed the way to more friendly feelings, and henceforth the relations between the two were more cordial.

About the time of this reconciliation, secret agents from Santa Anna arrived at Puebla. This leader, in spite of his disasters, had succeeded in establishing his authority. During the discussions in congress relative to negotiations for peace, that body, to avoid the responsibility, passed a resolution that it was the duty of the

⁶² Scott's letter of July 25th. *Id.*, p. 1013. The arrival of Brigadier-general Pierce from Vera Cruz with about 2,000 more effectives was expected. Scott with this reinforcement hoped to advance with 9,500 men after leaving a competent garrison at Puebla. *Ib.*

⁶³ The despatch was from James Buchanan, the secretary of state, who informed the Mexican minister of Trist having been sent as a commissioner invested with full powers to conclude a treaty of peace. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 38-40.

⁶⁴ The contents are not known, as the despatch conveying the copy was never received at the department of state. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 830-1.

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executive to make treaties, and that its functions were limited to the approval or disapproval of them. Santa Anna's position was embarrassing, and he referred the matter to a council of general officers, who, equally afraid of consequences, avoided more direct advice than by expressing the opinion that another opportunity should be afforded Mexico of gaining a victory before proposals of peace should be entertained. Santa Anna adopted a course which presented to him a twofold result—success in negotiation, or a delay in the advance of the enemy which would be favorable to his own defensive preparations.⁶⁵ He privately intimated to the American headquarters that if \$1,000,000 were placed at his disposal, to be paid at the conclusion of peace, and \$10,000 paid down, he would appoint commissioners. In the conferences which were held at Puebla on this proposition Scott advocated its acceptance. The question, however, whether the United States government would consent to have recourse to the payment of the million as a bribe was a difficult one, and long discussed. Pillow was admitted into council, and raised objections, but finally yielded to Scott's arguments. Santa Anna was accordingly apprised in cipher that his proposition was accepted, and the \$10,000 were disbursed from the secret-service money at Scott's disposal. When matters had gone thus far Santa Anna intimated that to enable him, in view of the existing feelings at the capital, to appoint the commissioners for Mexico, it would be necessary for the American army to advance, and threaten the city by carrying one of the Mexican outworks. Whether Scott had full confidence in Santa Anna's promises or not, he did not for one moment relax his preparations. Pierce had arrived at Vera Cruz, and Scott, according to his previous plans, was waiting for his division to come up, which would enable him to advance with

⁶⁵ Roa Bárcena considers that Santa Anna's only object in the proceedings to be narrated was simply to gain time. *Recuerdos*, 236-7.

his full strength. Pierce left Vera Cruz on the 19th of July, and by the end of the month the American general proceeded to put in operation a new movement.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ These negotiations with Santa Anna appear to have terminated with the advance of the American army. Ripley enters fully into this curious piece of diplomacy, which fully illustrates Santa Anna's cunning. *War with Mex.*, ii. 148-70.

CHAPTER XVIII.

INVASION OF THE VALLEY OF MEXICO.

AUGUST, 1847.

SCOTT ADVANCES—MUSTERING OF THE MEXICANS—DEFENCES OF THE CAPITAL—THE CHALCOO ROUTE—A FLANK MOVEMENT—VALENCIA'S INSUBORDINATION—HIS AMBITIOUS DESIGNS—THE BATTLE OF PADIERNA BEGINS—SANTA ANNA'S INACTION—THE MORNING SURPRISE—EFFECT OF VALENCIA'S DEFEAT—BRAVO OUTFLANKED—FORTIFICATIONS OF CHURUBUSCO—ANTIQUATED TACTICS—CANNONADING THE CONVENT—CRITICAL POSITION OF SHIELDS—THE TÊTE DE PONT—GALLANTRY OF RINCON AND ANAYA—SANTA ANNA RETREATS WITHIN THE GATES—PERIL OF THE CITY.

THE arrival of General Pierce with reënforcements¹ enabled Scott to begin the long-meditated march upon the capital. The rarefied air of the table-land affected the men severely, and combined with climatic fevers, dysentery, and other causes to swell the sick-list at Puebla. The care of these as well as the city itself devolved upon Colonel Childs, with a few hundred men.² This deduction made, left at the disposal of Scott about 11,200 men,³ with which force he set out from Puebla between the 7th and 10th of August, *en echelon*, leaving one short day's march between each of the four divisions, under Worth, Twiggs, Pillow, and Quitman, respectively.⁴

¹ Of 2,429 men, with which he had left Vera Cruz July 19, 1847.

² His report in *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 471. Nearly 700 of the sick died.

³ Not counting train-men and Mexican and army followers, Scott asserts that he left with only 10,738 rank and file. *Id.*, 384. The Mexican version of Roa Bárcena enumerates 40 pieces of artillery, 700 wagons and 500 laden mules. *Recuerdos*, 299. Gamboa, *Impug.*, 49, assumes over 6,000 horses and mules, and 1,100 wagons. Desertion assisted to reduce the force somewhat, as Mansfield, *Mex. War*, 223, points out.

⁴ Twiggs left on the first day, preceded by Harney's cavalry brigade. His

Scott had naturally expected to meet with opposition in crossing the range into the valley of Mexico, for here a very effective resistance could have been made with a small force; and he was not a little elated as he saw further evidence of the enemy's neglect. The route followed was along the less elevated Rio Frio, north of the hoary-headed sentinels, Iztaccihuatl and Popocatepetl, at whose feet was verdure bright with flowers of a never-ending summer. With emotions not unlike to those that stirred the first intruding Spaniards three centuries before, the soldiers yielded themselves to the entrancing view from the summit of the pass. The contrast with the bleak ridges around lent to it the glamour of a terrestrial paradise, and, with senses quickened in the aroma-laden air, their eyes lingered on the winding lakes with azure skies reflected, on undulating fields and meadows bright with blossoms, on villages nestling in gleaming whiteness midst shady groves, and beyond on the checkered domes and fretted turrets of the foremost capital upon the continent.

With far different feelings the Mexicans beheld the advance in its tortuous march along the slopes of volcanoes, extinct or slumbering within, but girdled without by a death-bearing cestus, marked by a broken gleam of bayonets, by the white-covered wagons and fluttering pennons. Many a patriot's heart beat high with indignation at the sight of the invaders, while others felt a creeping fear akin to that of the spectators of yore at the winding march of pagan processions round the temple pyramids, from whose summits were to rise the agony shrieks of human victims and the fumes of blood.

With his usual evanescent energy Santa Anna had bestirred himself to meet the threatening danger, by

two brigades were commanded by Gen. Persifer Smith and Col. Riley; those of Worth by cols Garland and Clarke; Pillow's by gens Cadwalader and Pierce; Quitman's volunteers were mostly under Gen. Shields. *Scott's Repts.*, 31; *Sonorense*, Sept. 17, 1847.



VALLEY OF MEXICO.

placing Mexico in a state of defence as the coming centre of action. He reorganized the shattered forces, drilled recruits, threw up fortifications in every direction, manufactured arms and ammunition, and imparted life to all and everything. Herein he shone indeed as a good genius. And nobly did the people respond to his appeal, with hardly a murmur at his arbitrary levies of men and funds. It was an imposing spectacle, this rally to the defence of home, especially after a long series of disasters to their best armies, with an inefficient government, a faction-torn congress, an empty treasury; with poor and scanty armament, and hardly a single leader in whom they could repose confidence. More volunteers presented themselves than ever before,⁵ mustering within a short time an army of fully 20,000 effective men, and somewhat over 100 pieces of artillery. Several thousand more stood enrolled, and while not equipped as regular soldiers, they served as auxiliaries in different capacities to swell the number.⁶ It was like a gala-day at Mexico as these forces were reviewed and sent forth to their posts. Flowers in festoons covered the muzzles of the frowning guns, and bright cockades the breast heaving in enthusiastic response to the cheers around, and to the blossom showers and fluttering handkerchiefs of señoritas smiling midst their tears.

Profiting by experience, Santa Anna had resolved to await the enemy behind the lines with the main body, while two divisions, under Valencia and Álvarez, the latter consisting of cavalry, and each of about 4,000 men, advanced in the direction of Tezcuco and Chalco respectively, prepared to fall upon

⁵ 'Y los batallones contaron bajo sus banderas mas soldados que en cualquiera otra época.' *Apuntes Hist. Guerra*, 211.

⁶ A ministerial report of Aug. 30th shows a force of 20,210, including 8 generals and 1,729 subordinate officers. Gamboa, *Impug.*, 51-2, gives details swelling the number to 21,500. Santa Anna reduces the artillery to 90 pieces, *Detall*, 94, but there were many additional gun counted as unserviceable. See also Roa Bárcena, *Recuerdos*, 296. Ripley places the total force, 'according to Mexican accounts,' at over 36,000, *War with Mex.*, ii. 161, and so does Scott, *Mem.*, 496, etc.; which *Apuntes Hist. Guerra*, 209, declares indignantly to be 'una impostura,' while acknowledging 104 useful guns.

the flank and rear of the assailants whenever they should attack the intrenchments. Till then no conflict was to be engaged in, save to harass the advance. The city itself possessed many natural advantages, which, with means and prudent generalship, might have rendered her wellnigh impregnable. The prevailing rains had transformed the surrounding lands, formerly covered by the now half-drained lake, into a marsh which presented almost insurmountable obstacles, especially on the east side. Approach was therefore confined to the several raised causeways, notably the south-eastern or Vera Cruz road, the southern to Tlalpam and Acapulco, the western to Chapultepec and Toluca, and the northern to Guadalupe. Between these lay a number of minor or branch roads, especially on the south and west, each protected more or less by barricades, lunettes, trous-de-loup, and wet ditches. Beyond rose a line of formidable outworks, centring on the north side upon the hills near Guadalupe, with a score of guns. The hill fortress of Chapultepec, two miles off, commanded the western roads of San Cosme and Belen, and the square-bastioned citadel of the city adjoined the latter gate. The southern approaches were defended by strong works at Churubusco and Mexicalcingo, nearly five miles from the city, and at San Antonio, still farther south; while the eastern were enfiladed by the impregnable rock known as El Peñon, now surrounded by the overflowing waters. The route between the lakes of Chalco and Tezcuco was regarded as the only one practicable for the enemy, and although nature had assisted in protecting the eastern semicircle, the southern and south-eastern outworks received special attention. Between the southern and western points of the exterior line, however, lay a wide, open stretch, and the corresponding inner works were of no importance; but it was supposed that this weak spot could be readily strengthened in case of need.⁷

⁷ For additional details, with plans of the works, see *Apuntes Hist. Guerra*,

The general plan of Santa Anna had undoubtedly its good features, but he counted too much on the efficiency of his subordinates, and on the readiness of the enemy to fall into his traps. On the other hand, it was a perilous feat for Scott to penetrate into the very heart of a strange country filled with patriotic people, cut off by rocky barriers and vast plains, by deserts and fever-zones; and with the prospect, not of decisive battles, but of costly assaults or prolonged sieges, for which his force seemed wholly insufficient. But retreat appeared out of the question. Furthermore, he was governed somewhat by jealousy of Taylor's successes, and emboldened by the lack of unity in the opposing generals, by his own superior arms, and by the prestige of victory.

Traitors stood ready here as elsewhere to disclose by-paths and gate-ways, and by the time Scott had gained Ayotla, after a march of five days, he possessed sufficient information to decide him to advance against the western side of the city. Reconnoissances toward El Peñon and Mexicalcingo convinced him further that to penetrate this outer line in this direction, along the narrow causeways, would prove both dangerous and costly; but as the route round the southern shore of Chalco was understood to be too difficult, without questioning this supposition, he prepared to break through by attacking Mexicalcingo. At the last moment, however, General Worth, who had more prudently investigated the matter, produced a report which changed the plan in favor of a southern march, which was begun on August 15th.⁸ He took

204-21; *Mansfield's Mex. War*, 236-41; *Ripley's War with Mex.*, ii. 177-84. To Gen. Robles was mainly due the strength of El Peñon. The village of Santa Marta near by had been submissively evacuated and razed. Herrera assisted Santa Anna as second in command. The leading generals besides Valencia and Álvarez were Bravo, holding the southern line from San Antonio, Terrés, Rangel, Perez, Leon, Rincon, Anaya, lately acting president, and ex-President Salas, second to Valencia. Means for the defence were obtained partly by forced contributions, whereof Semmes, *Campaign*, 201-2, has preserved a specimen list of apportionments. Of the million and half lately granted by the clergy, less than one tenth remained. *Santa Anna, Apel.*, 94.

⁸ Scott and Worth had quarrelled, and the former felt therefore less disposed

the lead, and reached Talpam on the second day, after a slight skirmish with Álvarez, who might readily have inflicted trouble and injury by harassing the enemy along the several defiles, encumbered as they were with heavy trains, while he possessed a flying corps of fully 4,000 men.⁹

As soon as Santa Anna found that the Americans had changed their route, he threw his forces to the southern side, and hastened to strengthen its defences. Valencia's northern army, embracing 4,000 of the most experienced soldiers in the country,¹⁰ was ordered from its post of observation at Tezcuco to San Ángel. A preliminary examination caused Valencia to report against the occupation of either San Ángel or Padierna, a point southward, by which the invaders might branch off toward Tacubaya; and as later indications led to the belief that they proposed to march straight along the main road upon San Antonio, he was ordered to fall back to Coyoacan.

By this time Valencia's views had expanded. He had lately made himself conspicuous by objecting to timid defence operations, and boasting that he knew how to crush the enemy. The bombast proved so contagious as to revive a proposal of investing him with the chief command. Santa Anna became alarmed,

to accord credit for a discovery which exposed his own neglect. *Scott's Mem.*, 469. But Worth's friends show that a council of generals held on the 14th decided on the former plan, and declared that the less practicable route south of the lake should be tried merely by Worth's lighter division for a rear movement. *Ripley's War with Mex.*, ii. 190-202. The effort of Scott's friends to explain this plan as a mere feint is further disproved by the testimony of Semmes, *Campaign*, 239-57, who joined Worth's exploring party, and appends letters by Worth, Scott, and others. The change was fortunate for the Americans, for they might have become involved on the narrow and easily obstructed causeways, which afforded no facilities for operations, while forces from El Peñon could have harassed their rear. The reconnoissance round Mexicalcingo was declared to have been the most daring feat of the kind during the war. A partial movement was made in this direction to deceive the Mexicans. *Peterson's Mil. Heroes*, ii. 94; *Arco Iris*, Aug. 25, 1847. The northern route round Tezcuco Lake was declared difficult, with its barren and wet lands and its strong works.

⁹ The Americans say 6,000, while an official report records him only 2,762; but he had many irregular followers. *Santa Anna, Detail*, 93, 106.

¹⁰ 'Cinco mil veteranos,' says Santa Anna. *Id.*, 94. In *Apuntes Hist. Guerra*, 228, this is reduced to 3,700, while Scott raises it as high as 7,000. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 308.

and hastened to send him aside with such force and instructions as should restrain his ambition. Valencia naturally chafed under this restraint. By reconsidering the situation, he was now induced to blunder into the very admirable conclusion that Scott would probably not confine himself to the narrow front presented by San Antonio and Churubusco, but attempt at least a flank movement by way of Padierna. By selecting a good position here he might check this movement, and certainly distract the enemy's operations by threatening his rear. The manœuvre promised in any case to promote the main point, his reputation for zeal, dash, and sagacity, while even a moderate success would so buoy his schemes as to land him perhaps in the presidential seat. He accordingly refused to withdraw to Coyoacan. Santa Anna's fury was mingled with suspicions; but as he had not the means to enforce compliance, and dared not remove him lest he should expose his own jealousy and lack of judgment and provoke a mutiny, he had to yield.¹¹

Meanwhile Valencia had moved his entire force, with 22 guns, to the eastern slope of the hill known as Padierna or Contreras, which commanded the debouché of the only direct route between the roads to San Antonio and San Angel; a route leading over a pedregal, or lava-bed, lashed as it seemed into broken billows of stone, and most difficult to cross. The position, by no means the best, was protected in front by a rugged ravine, and by three low breastworks, with a detached lunette on the right; but it could be enfiladed from any direction, especially the summit of the hill, which remained most unaccountably neglected.

The objections which led Scott to turn from the eastern approach to Mexico applied in a measure to an advance along the Tlalpam road, for a direct assault on San Antonio must involve a heavy sacrifice.

¹¹ 'Bajo su responsabilidad,' as he explains, *Apel.*, 97, although the assent is not so worded. See correspondence between Valencia and Alcorta, the minister of war, in *Rel. Causas*, 20 Ag., 1847, 13-28.

He therefore resolved to turn this position by crossing the pedregal and thus disconcert the garrisons by a rear movement, opening at the same time the way toward the Chapultepec line, as the weakest. The task of making a road was assigned to Pillow's division, guarded by Twiggs, the former being authorized to join forces and drive Valencia from his position if he proved troublesome. The latter, who had already feebly contested the ground with the reconnoitring party,¹² was not slow in opening fire, and Pillow proving equally prompt in accepting the challenge, the conflict began early in the afternoon of August 19th. Valencia's skirmishers were driven from the pedregal and beyond the rancho Padierna into the camp, and two light batteries were planted to cover an assault by Smith's brigade. So murderous, however, was the fire from the heavier metal of the intrenchments that the batteries were practically silenced, and the brigade had to fall back for shelter. Another brigade was sent to its aid; but now occurred a diversion of which the Mexicans took advantage for a spirited sally, during which they recaptured the rancho, although holding it only for a time.

The diversion was caused by the approach of Santa Anna, on the road from San Ángel, at the instance of the insubordinate Valencia, with a force of not less than 6,000.¹³ Anticipating some such movement, Pillow had, at the opening of the conflict, despatched Riley's brigade to occupy San Gerónimo, a village situated midst fields and orchards on a small plateau one mile north-west of the intrenchments. His object was also to operate on the flank and rear of the latter; and this soon occupied his exclusive attention,

¹² Under Capt. Lee, on the 18th. A simultaneous reconnoissance toward San Antonio resulted singularly enough in the death of Capt. Thornton. The officer whose capture on the Rio Grande had been the proximate cause of war was the first to fall on penetrating to the heart of the country. He had been exonerated by the court-martial. *Ripley's War with Mex.*, ii. 210.

¹³ And 5 guns, as admitted in Santa Anna's despatch to Valencia. *Rel. Causas*, 28. Bárcena reduces the figures to 4,000 and Americans swell it to 12,000.

for Valencia's cavalry displayed great activity, especially while led by General Frontera, who fell mortally wounded during one of the charges. It was consequently fortunate for the Americans that the failure of the front assault induced Pillow to send against the rear another brigade under Cadwalader. This arrived at San Gerónimo just in time to check, by a bold demonstration, the advance of Santa Anna, who thereupon contented himself with forming in line upon the rising ground, about half a mile north of Cadwalader's position. His evident course was to promptly attack the far inferior column before him, which for that matter stood between two fires, with Valencia's cavalry and other available support in the rear. Instead of this, he allowed the precious time to pass, fuming and sneering at the advices transmitted by Valencia, which magnified into overwhelming victories the advantages so far gained. Scott, on the other hand, hastened to send additional reinforcements to San Gerónimo, thus averting the danger and snatching the prospects of victory from his opponent. By this time night had set in, and with it the usual showers during this season, which tended to close operations for the day.

A drenching rain caused Santa Anna to return to the quarters at San Ángel.¹⁴ What his next attempt would be, it was difficult to say; for "in view of the impending rout," he observes, "I ordered General Valencia that same night to spike his guns and retreat to San Ángel." This message reached the latter in the midst of a general and noisy celebration of the American defeat, attended by a lavish distribution of preferments among the officers, Valencia having with great foresight reduced to documentary form a glowing account of his triumph, well calculated to

¹⁴ He had labored from 5 P. M., when he claimed to have arrived in front of San Gerónimo—others say an hour or more earlier—in vain search for a route by which to break through to Valencia's camp. He left the cavalry and infantry in the field, exposed to the 'tempestad horrible,' to be rejoined in the morning for action on the morrow. *Detall*, 98-9.

promote his schemes against Santa Anna.¹⁵ That similar designs influenced the latter may readily be supposed. A council of officers supported Valencia in an indignant refusal to obey the order of the general-in-chief, which implied an exchange of victory for demoralizing defeat, that left the way of the enemy open to Mexico. No, they would rather perish with the whole army.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the abandonment of his advantage by Santa Anna cast a gloom over the hitherto festive camp.

Santa Anna's retreat was not observed by the invaders, who passed the night in preparations for the morrow. Persifer Smith had assumed command¹⁷ at San Gerónimo, and had planned a night attack upon the exposed rear of Valencia's camp, with three brigades, leaving a fourth to check the vanished forces of Santa Anna, and a fifth to mask the movement by active demonstrations in front. He set out shortly after midnight, groping his way in the dark through the forest and along the slopes, favored to some extent by the patter of the rain and the whistling wind. The need for caution and silence, and the difficulties of the imperfectly known route, delayed the march; and it was not till dawn that he found himself in position, just behind the brow of the neglected summit. The brigade in front had already engaged the Mexicans, and protected by the din, he could reload the wet arms and arrange for the assault. Meanwhile Valencia discovered the advance, and turned two guns to assist in checking it; but the

¹⁵ 'El enemigo ha sufrido una pérdida espantosa,' he writes. Text in *Rel. Causas*, 27. The final order to spike the guns appears to have come after midnight, a previous despatch, arriving at 9 P. M., having vainly urged him to join Santa Anna's forces in front of San Gerónimo. *Id.*, 28-9. Even Roa Barceña, who generally seeks to shield Santa Anna, cannot refrain from pointing out that it was far easier for him to reach Padierna than for the other to break through. He blames his conduct throughout this transaction, and states that he began the retreat at 7 P. M. *Recuerdos*, 331-6; 'como abandono criminal,' adds *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 240. Americans, *Ripley's War with Mex.*, ii. 240-1, and others, freely stamp the act as savoring of treachery.

¹⁶ *Rel. Causas*, 28.

¹⁷ Conceded by Shields, who ranked higher.

Americans lost no further time. Riley took the lead, followed by Cadwalader from the western rear, while Smith supported them by a northern flank movement. On gaining the summit one blinding volley was delivered, and then, regardless of the sweeping fire in response, they rushed down the hill with deafening shouts. Riley's men entered the camp almost in a body, with bayonets and clubbed muskets driving the cavalry in disorder upon the infantry. The confusion was increased by the stampede of train-mules and the shrieks of terrified women. The soldiers, disheartened by Santa Anna's abandonment, were further demoralized by the sudden disappearance of Valencia. With such acknowledgment of defeat the less responsible subordinates, many of them enrolled by force, could not be blamed for following so contagious an example. The efforts of a few men like Ex-president Salas to rally the fleeing proved of no avail amidst the turmoil. Within a quarter of an hour the camp was taken, and the fight turned into pursuit and slaughter, wherein shared the troops in front as well as those at San Gerónimo, that blocked the main exit from the ravines. The road to Mexico was strewn with dead for over a mile.

Thus ended the battle of Padierna, which involved the destruction of the foremost military division of the army, so far as veterans were concerned; with the loss of nearly 700 in killed, 813 prisoners, including four generals, besides 22 pieces of brass ordnance, 700 pack-mules, and a large quantity of small arms and stores.¹⁸ The Americans suffered comparatively

¹⁸ Scott's despatch of Aug. 28th, in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 308. The Americans claim to have lost comparatively few—not over 60 in killed and wounded 'on the spot,' that is, excluding the casualties of the preceding day. Smith swells the capture to 1,500. *Id.*, p. 329. Roa Bárcena, *Recuerdos*, 339, estimates the American loss at 300. In *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 239-42, are additional details of Mexican efforts, whereof Salas, as next in command to Valencia, claims his share in a report of the 23d. *Rel. Causas*, 29-30. Bustamante alludes to defective ammunition as one cause of defeat. *Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., vii. 190-4, 202-6, viii. 19-20; *Id.*, *Invasion*, 101-2, 108-19; *Diario, Exact.*, *Mex.*, MS., 47 et seq. The captured generals were Salas, Blanco, Mendoza, and García. The leaders of the five American

little, owing to the rapidity of their movements. The disaster, moreover, left the way open to Mexico, toward its weakest point; with the additional advantage to the enemy of turning the dangerous southern outworks, although Scott neglected this opportunity.

And now for a way among the discomfited officers to shift the responsibility each from his own shoulders. As Valencia prudently kept aloof,¹⁹ Santa Anna could direct the torrent of indignation against him for a time. Salas again sought to extol himself at the expense of Torrejon, the cavalry leader.

Santa Anna claims to have been preparing to advance toward Padierna when fugitives brought him news of the disaster. He at once fell back on Churubusco, ordering Bravo, who commanded the line at San Antonio, to retire also toward the capital. These movements were timely, for the Americans were coming up in hot pursuit. Worth's division, which had occupied Coapan a short distance in advance of the

brigades were Smith, Riley, and Cadwalader in the rear, Pierce in front, and Shields at San Gerónimo. Semmes, *Campaign*, 269, 279, condemns the fight on the 19th as a needless waste of blood, and attributes to Smith's plans and execution the victory of the 20th; and Ripley, *War with Mex.*, ii. 296, 305, etc., claims for Pillow the chief credit, while objecting to Scott's orders for road-making in face of the intrenchments. Their quibbles rest on inadequate reasons, however. It appears conceded that the pedregal had to be crossed, and evidently by the path followed, in order to avoid a costly front attack on the southern outworks. This crossing became the more necessary after Santa Anna's advance, so as to prevent a junction of Mexican forces in the rear. The crossing led unavoidably to a conflict with Valencia, which again demanded the movement to his rear conducted by Smith, but for which Riley had paved the way on the preceding afternoon. As for the Mexican plans, Valencia undoubtedly took the right course in seeking to check the flank movement by Padierna; but this does not excuse his disobedience and many blunders, such as neglecting his rear, the summit of the hill, the pedregal with its excellent skirmishing ground, and so forth. Still the cause for defeat lies primarily in Santa Anna's retreat. Mansfield shows that the actual conflict began at 6 A. M. and lasted 17 minutes; by 8 A. M. pursuit was over. *Mex. War*, 255, 260. Scott asserts that 4,500 Americans were engaged. *Mem.*, ii. 481. See also *Gamboa, Impug.*, 41-7, condemning Santa Anna; *Rayon, Asedio*, 39-112; *Dicc. Univ.*, x. 106-13, etc.; *Mex. War, by English Soldier*, 234-50; *Jenkins' Mex. War*, 334-73; *Harrison's Battle-fields*, 374-90; *McSherry, El Puchero*, 71-81.

¹⁹ Santa Anna threatened to shoot him. He collected some fugitives and issued from Toluca a partial defence. *Roa Bárcena*, ubi sup., 341-2.

headquarters and depôt at Tlalpam, and was thence threatening San Antonio, received orders to carry it. As a direct attack would involve a heavy loss of men and time, Worth resolved to turn it by a sweep to the left through the eastern fringe of the pedregal. This was executed by Clarke's brigade, and so rapidly that, although Bravo was already retreating in obedience to orders, the Americans gained upon him and cut his column in two, compelling the rear part to abandon the narrow causeway and seek safety across the meadows, eastward, with the loss of several guns on the way as well as at San Antonio. Beyond, toward Churubusco, all was confusion—cavalry, infantry, artillery, all rushing onward midst the rumble of trains, the mad plunge of spurred horses, the yell of drivers and arrieros, the frantic shouts and gesticulations of officers, and the groans of the wounded; while behind pressed the foe, halting only for a moment to take more deadly aim, and then pressing forward over the dead and dying to swell the horrid heap.

Meanwhile, the other divisions were pursuing the fugitives from Padierna along the road through San Ángel and Coyoacan, driving Santa Anna's columns into the midst of Bravo's retreating men, and so increasing the disorder upon the causeway near Churubusco that a large amount of war-stores had to be abandoned in order to let the troops pass, the abandoned trains serving to some extent for shelter.²⁰ The promptness of the Americans in following up the advantage at Padierna proved of value to them, for they not only made inroads on Mexican artillery and ammunition, and broke one of their columns, but interrupted defence preparations at the next scene of action. Foremost among the pursuers was Clarke's sixth regiment of infantry, which, at 11 A. M. on August 20th, began the battle of Churubusco.

²⁰ 'Santa Anna previno no pasara por el Puente ningun carro, hasta que lo verificase la tropa. . . y esto dió lugar á la pérdida de tantas municiones,' observes the *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 245, as one feature of the bad arrangement. Pillow turned from Coyoacan eastward to assist in cutting off Bravo's retreat.

Hist. Mex., Vol. V. 31

This was the name of a small village on the southern causeway, lying on slightly elevated ground about 1,200 feet south of the streamlet Churubusco, which flows eastward into Xochimilco Lake. Its central feature was the massive stone convent of San Pablo, nearly square, with crenellated walls for musketry and unfinished parapets, surrounded by an outer wall which constituted a regular field-work, with embrasures and platforms for cannon, and especially strong toward the south. It was held by General Rincon with about 1,400 men and seven guns.²¹ Intent mainly on the inner line of the capital, Santa Anna ordered Rincon to maintain himself at this point to the last, keeping back the enemy, while he sought refuge with the main army across the river, deploying a portion to the left, and the rest behind the artificially elevated banks, which, with their rows of maguey, offered an excellent rampart. At the bridge by which the highway crosses the river was a scientifically constructed work, well bastioned and curtained, with wet ditches and platforms for heavy metal;²² but the line in front was obstructed by the stalled trains, which served the enemy for a screen. The total strength of the defenders at and behind Churubusco was estimated at from 9,000 to 27,000.²³

Santa Anna's plan, as we have seen, was to let the

²¹ Twiggs' report claims to have captured with Rincon 104 officers, 1,155 men, and 7 guns, *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 324-5, to which must be added dead and fugitives. In the *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 251-2, this brave force is classed as 650 badly armed peasants, with 6 pieces of metal. Roa Bárcena gives its composition, *Recuerdos*, 363, as chiefly guardia nacional de Independencia and Bravos, with some American deserters, etc. Semmes, *Campaign*, 284, leaves the impression that only 3 guns were planted inside the walls; while in *Ripley's War with Mex.*, 256, the San Antonio road, it is said, could be swept by its 7 pieces.

²² Five, says *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 252.

²³ Americans say that reinforcements came from the city, while Santa Anna and others intimate rather that troops were sent into it. Scott estimates the Mexican forces round Churubusco at 27,000. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, ubi sup., p. 310. Roa Bárcena, holding to his first basis of 20,000, and deducting the losses by Valencia and Bravo, estimates that the force could not have exceeded 9,000. *Recuerdos*, 375-6. But we have seen that a large number of irregular troops at least can be added. The Americans he placed at not less than 8,000, after deducting the men left at Padierna and at the depôt of Tlalpam. See note 5, this chapter.

enemy exhaust themselves by butting against the outworks of the capital. Although the strongest points had been turned, accident assisted him in drawing them toward his best remaining strongholds; and Scott, adhering evidently to the long-exploded tactics of never leaving a fort in the rear, allowed himself to be carried away. He should have called to mind Napoleon's maxim to avoid doing what the enemy desired. The victory of Padierna had opened the way toward Tacubaya and to several intermediate roads, unprotected by outworks, and with weak inner defences. Scott was sufficiently well informed of this to venture in all confidence to avoid the isolated outworks of Churubusco, so far from the capital, especially as he did not need or intend to use the road which it protected. The acquisition of Churubusco was valueless, and the expenditure of time and blood upon it a waste.²⁴ It must be conceded, however, that the details of the attack, left mainly to the judgment of subordinate generals, were well outlined and managed, with slight exceptions.

The task of engaging and carrying the convent was assigned to Twiggs' division. Worth was left to pursue his advance along the southern road, leading to the river line defended by the main army, and portions of Pillow's and Quitman's divisions were sent to coöperate by a movement against Santa Anna's rear. Twiggs directed the brigades of Smith and Riley to occupy the ground in front and to the left of the convent respectively, assisted by a field-battery. The position could have been improved, for it left them exposed to a galling fire that opened wide gaps in the ranks and obliged the battery to retire after a while with heavy loss; yet the infantry maintained its ground well, even within seventy yards of the convent, sheltered to some extent from the incessant fusillade by obstructions which proved of no avail,

²⁴Roa Bircena, *Recuerdos*, 347-8, points out some of these blunders on Scott's part.

however, against the heavier metal. The convent seemed a very volcano, enfolded in a dense cloud, and rumbling with the roar of artillery and rattle of musketry, the warning tones of messengers speeding forth on bloody trails, midst flashes of fire that lighted the scene as lightning-rays the storm. Beyond, along the distant hills rolled the echo of the thunder, reverberating in ever-feeblér accents until it died in whispered moans; fading like the broken canopy of smoke that drifted in lazy indifference toward the icy summits of Iztaccihuatl.

Although the convent figured as centre point, the main effort of Scott was directed against the forces behind Rio Churubusco, in front and rear. The latter important movement was intrusted to the brigades of Shields and Pierce, which passed from Coyoacan north toward Portales, to turn the right flank of the reserve; but it was not undertaken with sufficient force,²⁵ for here stood the flower of the Mexican army, with the advantage of position. Santa Anna responded, moreover, by a prompt counter-advance, directing the cavalry to outflank the Americans, and compelling them to change the manœuvre to a more direct attack. This broke against the firm lines of the Mexicans, who sent the columns back staggering and in disorder. They quickly formed anew, however, to charge again and again. But in vain; their opponents repulsed every effort, and inflicted a terrible havoc with their steady fire, the Palmetto regiment alone leaving half its number on the field. And now the Mexicans, elated with success, pressed closer. The situation was becoming critical, and Shields sent a hurried appeal for aid. Just then a cry of alarm rose to the rear of Santa Anna's position, the prelude to a new phase of battle.

Worth's two brigades under Clarke and Garland, assisted by Pillow's brigade under Cadwalader, had

²⁵ The direct opposing force being 4,000 infantry, supported by 3,000 cavalry. *Mansfield's Mex. War*, 267.

been directing their attention mainly to the river dikes with their tête de pont, soon recognized as the key to the position. The sixth regiment tried at the outset to follow Santa Anna's retreating men into this stronghold; and it might have succeeded but for a well-directed cannonade from the convent side, which made it recoil in confusion. Support was near, however; and now began more cautious operations; for the batteries of the tête de pont stood prepared to hold their own, under the management too of the San Patricios, composed of Irish deserters, who sought in religious sympathy an excuse for turning traitors. The stalled trains afforded a protection against their raking volleys, however, and enabled Cadwalader to penetrate to a point between the bridge and the convent, and cut a valuable connection, while the other brigades deployed to the right and along the dikes. After nearly two hours of ineffectual firing and charging, a part of Clarke's force²⁸ managed to cross the river some distance east of the tête de pont and fall upon its rear. At the same time another section made a dash across the ditch in front, and climbing over the wall pell-mell, without ladders, carried the works at the point of the bayonet. A stream of men now poured over the bridge, driving the foremost lines in disorder upon the main columns of Santa Anna. Without an attempt to press the advantage gained on the right, and without an effort at a rally, the latter abandoned resistance and turned in flight toward the city walls, with the Americans in close pursuit, among them the lately almost overwhelmed brigades of Shields and Pierce.

But there are stancher officers than Santa Anna, who know how to join patriotic soldiers in redeeming the national honor. The convent still holds forth in stern defiance, its stout handful at bay, single-handed against superior numbers, and even venturing on futile sallies. But the flight of the reserve precipitates its

²⁸ Under caps HOFFMAN, WALKER, and BROOKS.

fall. Leaving pursuit to others, some of Worth's men hasten to direct against the convent the heavy guns at the tête de pont from which they had suffered so severely, together with a hitherto silenced battery of their own. This sudden attack from the side least protected has a startling effect on the garrison, already disheartened by their apparent abandonment for sacrifice, and by the failing ammunition, which is causing a sensible abatement in the cannonade.²⁷ Rincon and his second, Anaya, lately acting president, observe the danger, and rushing forward midst the men, they cheer them on to fresh efforts, joining personally in directing the artillery, regardless of the raking cross-fire. But the brigades in front and on the left take advantage of the diversion to renew their exertions, and soon Smith's men follow up with a charge which gains the parapet and holds it. Another bound, and on to slaughter. Just then the white flag is raised; the futility of resistance is admitted. Instantly there is a hush, as the smoke lifts and dissipates in curling wreaths.²⁸

The conflict still rages in the distance. The pursuers have reached La Candelaria beyond, slashing and thrusting at the straggling mass of fugitives. They already approach the battery protecting the gates of San Antonio Abad, so close upon their heels as to be prepared to enter with the Mexicans. Just then is heard the bugle sounding the recall. They

²⁷ The *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 255-6, declares that by the time of surrender the guns could not be supplied at all. The charge is made of treason in connection with the manufacture and supply of ammunition. Semmes attributes the stoppage to the artillerists being driven from their post by the firing in the rear. *Campaign*, 290.

²⁸ The fight here had lasted from 10.45 A. M. till 3.30 P. M. *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos*, 368. Twenty minutes after the tête de pont fell, adds Scott. *Mem.*, 400. Twiggs received the surrender of 3 generals, Rincon, Anaya, and Arellana, 101 other officers, 1,155 men, 7 guns, and other material. *U. S. Genl. Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 324-5. The dead numbered 136 and the wounded 99, including most of the artillerists. *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos*, 365. The San Patricio deserters are said to have 'pulled down the white flag of surrender no less than three times.' Letter in *New York Courier; Mansfield's Mex. War*, 267. Capt. I. M. Smith, who led the assault, according to Scott, himself unfurled the white flag and stayed his men on seeing the condition of affairs. *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 257.

halt and yield the vantage, all save a few blinded by excitement. It is a small band of dragoons, led by Captain Kearny. The battery opens upon them, but they heed it not. They spring from the saddle and across the ditch; the Mexicans turn, and, half cut in pieces, the band falls back. The battle is over.²⁹

Its result was a demoralization among the defenders, with the temporary disorganization of their army, placing the capital for the time at the mercy of the victors. Scott places the Mexican losses at 4,000 killed and wounded and 3,000 captives, including 213 officers, among them eight generals, of whom two were ex-presidents; also 37 pieces of artillery and a large amount of small arms and stores. For his own side he admits 139 dead and 876 wounded, including 76 officers.³⁰ These casualties include the losses at Padierna, Scott embracing the day's operations under five victories, Padierna, San Antonio, Churubusco Convent, the tête de pont, and Shields' charge—a rather fanciful effort with which to draw attention from his several blunders, notably after the actual battle.³¹

It is affirmed by Santa Anna that the victors might have taken the capital by following up their advantage during the pursuit or for some time after,

²⁹ Kearny lost an arm, and Major Mills, a volunteer on this occasion, fell as he reached the gate. *Scott's Mem.*, 496. In *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 247, an officer is allowed to penetrate on horseback through an opening in the wall; and Santa Anna, *Detall*, 101, relates that an officer was captured and treated with great consideration by him because of his valiant resolution to take Santa Anna's life or die. A monument was subsequently erected at Churubusco over the remains of Peñúuri and Martínez de Castro, who had distinguished themselves at the convent, and pensions and honors were bestowed on Rincon's valiant band. See further, *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., vii. 216-17, viii. 35-43; *Id.*, *Invasion*, MS., 143-7; *McSherry, El Puchero*, 81-8; *Mayer's Mex. Aztec.*, i. 390-9; *Perez, Dicc.*, i. 493-7, ii. 459-67; *Rayon, Asedio*, 74-112, 245-64; *Gonzalez, Discurso*, 1-8.

³⁰ Besides some missing. *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, as above, p. 313-14, 384. Ripley, *War with Mex.*, ii. 282, adds a list of leading officers. Worth suffered most, his casualties being 349, although Shields' loss of 240 was relatively highest; Twiggs had about 200 hors de combat and Pillow nearly 200. *Semmes' Campaign*, 293, 296. Roa Bárcena, *Recuerdos*, 371-4, offers no important objections, nor do other Mexican writers. Santa Anna, *Detall*, 101, vaguely alludes to the loss of more than one third of the army and half of the best artillery.

³¹ *Semmes' Campaign*, 293.

for no organized resistance could have been offered; all was disorder among the soldiers as well as citizens.³² The American general returned most unconcernedly to the headquarters at Tlalpam, surrendering his advantages and giving Santa Anna time to recover himself. Scott explains his extraordinary conduct by saying that he, as well as Trist, "had been admonished by the best friends of peace against precipitation: lest by wantonly driving away the government and others, dishonored, he might scatter the elements of peace, excite a spirit of national desperation, and thus indefinitely postpone the hope of accommodation."³³ He also pleads humane considerations, which, if sincere, are creditable enough to the man, but hardly to the general, in his precarious position, to sacrifice one tenth of his small force for an object of questionable value, and then, neglecting to secure the prize, to be compelled to do his work over again.

³² 'Si el enemigo repite su ataque como yo lo esperaba, seguramente ocupa la capital sin mucha resistencia.' And Scott writes that after the Mexican army was beaten at Churubusco, 'the feebleness of the defences at the gates of the city—four miles off—could not, as was well known to both parties, delay the victors an hour.' Report 32, in *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 390.

³³ *Id.*, p. 314. He adds in his *Mem.*, 498, an explanatory note that an assault on the city by day would have involved a loss 'dangerously great'—which is contradictory to his official report—and by night the carnage among the citizens, their women and children, would have been frightful, as well as pillage, for the soldiers could not be controlled, and time could not be lost in making prisoners. Mansfield commends this christian magnanimity. *Life Scott*, 433-4; but Ripley, Semmes, Kendall, *Battles of Mex.*, and others, naturally condemn him from a military standpoint. Semmes claims for his favorite, Worth, the chief glory of the victory, by carrying the tête de pont, which led to the defeat of Santa Anna and the fall of the convent; but he also says that Worth called the halt at La Candelaria, when the city might have been carried by following up the advantage. *Campaign*, 290-1.

CHAPTER XIX.

FALL OF THE CAPITAL.

AUGUST-SEPTEMBER, 1847.

PANIC AT MEXICO—SCOTT IS LURED INTO AN ARMISTICE—DELUSIVE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS—PATRIOTIC SENTIMENTS—SANTA ANNA MANŒUVRING TO GAIN TIME—MUTUAL RECRIMINATIONS—MOLINO DEL REY—CAPTURE AND RECAPTURE OF THE BATTERY—SOME MEXICAN HEROES—A BARREN TRIUMPH—INNER DEFENCES OF THE CAPITAL—THE HILL FORTRESS OF CHAPULTEPEC—BOMBARDMENT AND STORMING OF THE CASTLE—WORTH CARRIES THE GATE OF SAN COSME—QUITMAN'S OPERATIONS AGAINST BELEN—SANTA ANNA EVACUATES THE CITY—ENTRY OF SCOTT—A PATRIOTIC UPRISING.

WITHIN the walls of Mexico all was panic and confusion. The very stillness following the battle had cast an ominous chill upon the people, which spread with the creeping shades of night and the threatening clouds—a fitting pall for the scattered slain. None knew but that the Yankees might be stealing up in the darkness, or lurking beneath the walls; and the bugle-sound of the retreating bands, now growing fainter in the distance, might fall with startling blasts before the coming dawn. There was relief, therefore, in the patter of the rain, in the calls of stalking sentries, and in the excitement of preparations for defence, with the hurrying adjutants bearing orders, the tramp of marching regiments, and the bustling noise of sapper parties. Santa Anna was the guiding spirit. With all his blunders and failures, he was still the only one to whom the people could turn, with his energy and tact, his resolution and ability for providing means and organization.

The following morning saw the enemy moving toward the south-west, Worth's division occupying Tacubaya, Pillow's Mixcoac, and Twiggs' San Ángel, Quitman's still remaining at Tlalpam, where it had obtained a share in the success by checking the cavalry division. The orders to its leader were to cut the American lines, and he hastened to execute them by an imposing demonstration at a sufficient distance to avoid the disorderly effect of bullets; and under cover of this another less valuable officer was sent with a small body to taunt the garrison with a bold though momentary sweep at nearer range, which involved the expenditure of a certain amount of powder. The closer approach of the Americans reminded Santa Anna of the absolute need for a suspension of hostilities in order to recuperate; but after having by his inefficient manœuvres added to the list of disasters, he naturally feared to expose himself still further by appearing as a suppliant. He had already induced among others the British consul-general to sound Scott concerning the proposal made at Puebla; and this official willingly accepted the task, influenced thereto by his jealousy of the Americans. He found it easy to play upon the weaknesses of a stubborn and conceited general, and convince him that by pressing his advantage he might drive away the government, rouse national despair, and dispel the prospects for a near and glorious peace. Already predisposed in favor of some such measure, Scott sent a proposal to open negotiations.¹ This pleased Santa Anna; for it left his opponent in the apparent position of begging for an armistice. His spirit rose accordingly, and Minister Alcorta received instructions to signify in a tone of condescension that the president would listen to the proposal.²

¹ A modification of a harsher note prepared during the preceding evening, demanding the surrender of the capital. Santa Anna, on his side, had allowed his representative to urge an armistice for burying the dead—but only in non-committal verbal form.

² Santa Anna fails not to reproduce this documentary proof of his cleverness, in *Detall*, 102-4.

Santa Anna's hesitation was proof in itself of the popular feeling against peace, in the country if not at the capital. He himself was guided wholly by the political vane, swayed especially now by party agitation; and he stood prepared for anything that could promote his own ambitious schemes, regardless of stipulations and rules, however solemn. He boasted loudly that the suspension of hostilities was accepted by him merely to prepare for fresh combats,³ and that he would willingly serve in a subordinate capacity for the defence of his country. In short, he stood ready as hitherto to sacrifice his life upon its altar.

The conditions for the armistice, arranged on August 22d,⁴ prohibited as usual either army from strengthening its position or force, permitted the Americans freely to obtain supplies, save in arms and ammunition, and provided for an exchange of prisoners on equal terms.⁵ This was ratified on the following two days, greatly to the chagrin of the majority in the American army: some moved by a thirst for spoils, others by a desire for glory, while a more reflecting class regretted the surrender of evident military advantages, without a single guarantee to bind a man so wily and unscrupulous as Santa Anna.⁶ Even Mexican opponents

³ See intercepted correspondence with the ex-minister Rejon, wherein is added that the justice of the Mexican cause demanded that overtures should be listened to. *Semmes' Campaign*, 302-4. Ripley, *War with Mex.*, ii. 332, believes he personally desired peace. See also *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 65, p. 445.

⁴ By generals Mora y Villamil and Quijano for Mexico, and by the American generals Quitman, Smith, and Pierce.

⁵ Art. 5 at first demanded the evacuation of Chapultepec as a guarantee, but Scott was induced to yield the point to Mexican pride. American residents were allowed to return to their business. Intercourse with Vera Cruz had to be protected by Mexico. Arts 11-14 provided for Mexican rights in places occupied by Americans; and 15-16 for the ratification of the armistice. *Id.*, H. Ex. 1, p. 356. An account of foraging is given by Gen. Lane, 'Gallant Joe,' himself, in his *Autobiog.*, 30-5, a valued MS. on my shelf, full of interesting campaign details and anecdotes.

⁶ Pillow among others had at first opposed any armistice; Worth had demanded at least the surrender of Chapultepec; and Quitman and Pierce held out a while. Scott himself had laid down rules for Taylor to grant no armistice without receiving sufficient guarantee of good faith; and in correspondence with the war department, *Id.*, no. 60, p. 960-2, he had alluded to the need for caution, yet a short-sighted infatuation is after all allowed to prevail in a question of such grave importance, involving the safety of the army and the aim of the expedition.

to this chief sought to decry terms which granted respite to a foe small in numbers and in want of supplies;⁷ but it is undeniable that his diplomacy here gained a triumph that saved the capital for a time.

Commissioner Trist now hastened to open negotiations for peace by urging an early meeting with Mexican commissioners. The selection for the latter fell upon generals Herrera and Mora y Villamil, and the able lawyers Couto and Atristain, the first chosen for his prominence as late president and chief of the peace party, one whose influence would sustain Santa Anna's attitude, and divide the brunt of responsibility. Couto, distinguished also as a writer, was conceded to be the diplomatist of the party.⁸ They met first at Atzacapotzalco on August 27th, and subsequently at a less distant place. Trist lost no time in the customary haggling and browbeating, but came at once to the point by presenting the project brought from Washington, which in article four demanded from Mexico the cession of all territory beyond a line following the Rio Grande del Norte along the south border of New Mexico, and up its western boundary to the first branch of the River Gila, thence along this tributary and main stream to the mouth of the Colorado River, and along the centre of the gulf of California into the ocean. It further required free transit across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, and offered in return a sum of money to be agreed upon, besides abandoning all claims for war expenses, and promising to pay all private claims against Mexico on the part of citizens

⁷ See charges in *Santa Anna, Informe sobre Acusaciones Gamboa; Gamboa, Impug.*, 49-51.

⁸ Atristain had financial tact and English sympathies, and Mora, regarded rather as consulting engineer, favored peace 'à toda costa.' *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 269. Herrera had at first declined on the ground that his former peace efforts had caused his removal from the presidency; but while excusing the two associates first proposed, A. F. Monjardin and A. Garay, Santa Anna insisted on retaining him. Correspondence in *Diario Gob.*, Aug. 26, 1847, etc. At first their power was limited to merely receiving and reporting on American proposals, but when they threatened to resign on Aug. 30th, it was amplified.

of the United States, as recognized by conventions of 1839 and 1843 or still pending.⁹

It will be observed that this demand was for half the territory of the republic; and there were many who thought that more should have been claimed at first, if only to hasten Mexico into readier acquiescence.¹⁰ The commissioners undoubtedly recognized the forbearance that left them some soil to call their own, and the generosity that abstained from charging for the trouble and cost of appropriating the remainder. They required three days to deliberate, less perhaps for fully grasping this lesson in modesty and magnanimity than to sound once more the public feeling. And this was not slow in asserting itself.

As for the people, their impulses were lofty, determined. They deemed it disgraceful to yield to a handful of enemies, when all the country stood prepared to rise at the call of a worthy leader, even without a clear prospect of success. But they had been blinded to the true condition of affairs, the superior enginery and manœuvres of the enemy, the desolation of war, the threatening uprisings and dismemberment, the absence of united action on the part of their generals. Those who pondered on these things were sure that past lessons must have taught better tactics, and trained superior officers; for during the war of independence their fathers had triumphed over far greater numbers. It was cowardly even to listen to the insolent demands preferred; it was base treachery to surrender—nay, to sell—their northern countrymen to the foe. Under such taunts and pressure prudence had to give way to a false patriotism, inspired by men guided by base personal motives and aims, and who, caring nothing for the people, misdirected their efforts, and sacrificed them, apparently not realizing what they were doing.¹¹ They belonged, of course, to the party

⁹ *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 52, p. 85, etc.

¹⁰ He 'should have demanded more, and not come at once so near the ultimata,' says Ripley, *War with Mex.*, ii. 349. But Trist wished to lose no time.

¹¹ So intense grew the excitement at Mexico that the lóperos attacked the

out of power, which looked with envy on the one in possession; and there were men who resolved that as they could have no share in the millions so temptingly tendered, the government should not be permitted to obtain such means for fortifying its position. Vattel and Perreau were flourished with reckless learning; pamphlets and proclamations were scattered broadcast; and so effectual was the rodomontade as to intimidate or drown every other outcry. But the governors and local authorities thought it their duty to protest against listening to overtures; and it was easy for remote states, as yet free from the ravages of war, to join in the cry. The state of Mexico even threatened to separate from the union. Congress behaved no better. When called upon to express the national will in the pending issue, which was of such importance, its members evaded the responsibility under various excuses, notably the unsafe condition of the capital. The change of meeting-place to Querétaro served to stimulate them but slightly.¹² Among the army officers the most incapable were loudest in their bluster, as the only means of covering their blunders.

The peace party saw the futility of their efforts, but in order to gain time for Santa Anna the commissioners continued the negotiations, arguing against the cession of territory beyond Texas proper with the Nueces for the boundary. Taking the cue from the party in the United States which denounced the war as unjust, they put certain leading questions concerning the motives for the war, and the demand for territory—questions which Trist prudently evaded, while conceding the peninsula of Lower California. Softened by the bland tone of Couto, he moreover distinguished

American trains as they came in on the 27th to obtain supplies, killing one man and wounding several. Henceforth supplies were transported to the camp during the night. Some believe that Santa Anna instigated the tumult, in order to figure as patriot, and to hide from Americans his defence preparations. Herrera bravely interposed.

¹² Otero and Gamboa clamoring with the rest for war, and the latter spending his main efforts in abuse of Santa Anna. See *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos*, 410-18.

himself by offering to refer his proposals to Washington, to which end the armistice would naturally have to be prolonged for about six weeks. His judgment in making such an offer may be questioned in face of the growing sick-list among the United States troops, scattered in unhealthy villages, remote from reënforcements, while their opponents were daily gaining strength.¹³ To the Mexicans the proposal seemed so extraordinary that they began to suspect a lurking design to gain time for reënforcements; and being now ready to resume the contest, they resolved to break off negotiations by presenting a counter-project, known to be inadmissible, at least by Trist with his limited powers, and even by Mexico, for that matter, under the changed aspect of affairs, for it offered to surrender all territory beyond the Nueces and latitude 37°.¹⁴

Scott had been duly warned that Santa Anna was not only infringing the terms of the armistice by defence operations, but displaying an attitude in common with the leaders of public opinion that could not be misunderstood; he was urged to resume hostilities ere the enemy grew too strong. But his suspicions were lulled by the aforesaid neutrals, duly instructed by the chief at Mexico. Perhaps he was ashamed to acknowledge openly that he had been duped. The final turn of the negotiation, however, woke him from his dream. He now gave vent to his anger in a sharp

¹³ He pleads the wish to commit the Mexican government to yielding a part of the national domain, and the prospect of better weather in October for fighting. *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 52, p. 192. But these were doubtful gains.

¹⁴ The line to follow the eastern border of New Mexico to 37°, and along this parallel to the Pacific, the territory between the Nueces and Rio Grande to remain neutral ground. The money offers of the U. S. were accepted. See *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 40; *Mex. Treaties*, vii. pt 5, as above, and *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 280-6, with a note from the commissioners, condemning the war as unjust, and giving the reasons for not ceding more territory. See also *Herrera, Contest. al Comis.*, 1-36; *Contest. entre Sup. Gob.*, 1-36; *Mex. Pamphlets*, iii. pt 3, iv. 141-384; *Rayon, Asedio*, 112-25, 305-40; *Diario Exact. Mex.*, 1-68; *Arco Iris*, Sept. 1, 26, 1847, etc.; *Sonorense, Diario Gob.*, and other journals, and notably the later chapter on final peace treaty.

note, September 6th, to Santa Anna, accusing him of violating the armistice, and declaring it at an end by noon on the following day, unless a satisfactory answer was given. This came the same evening in an unequivocal denial of the accusation, with counter-charges against Scott, preferred in a tone of well-feigned grief and indignation,¹⁵ and concluding with the bold declaration that he would repel force with force. And now the alarm-calls burst forth within the city, announcing the speedy recommencement of hostilities. Fresh panic and confusion ensue; and from the gates north and west flow streams of refugees, especially women, children, and foreigners, to hide before the impending storm.

There were sufficient grounds for charges on both sides, although Santa Anna had shown less scruple in securing advantages from the cessation of hostilities, by strengthening the fortifications of the city, calling in troops, enrolling and organizing fresh forces.¹⁶ Scott, on his side, had taken care especially to obtain supplies for nearly three weeks in advance, forage alone being scanty. His artillery had received a valuable addition by the capture of heavy metal, hitherto lacking, and so essential to siege operations; but his force had diminished under casualties and sickness to less than 9,000 effective men, and the efficiency of several corps had suffered somewhat from the sudden interruption to active service and the enforced idleness. It was thought necessary, therefore, to improve the morale of the army by dealing severely with the captured San Patricio

¹⁵ Text in *Santa Anna, Apel.*, 104-8.

¹⁶ These and other points are noticed in the *Diario Gob.*, and other periodicals, from Aug. 21st into Sept. Herrera was appointed comandante general at Mexico, and Bravo at Chapultepec, with Leon for second. The different lines of the city were intrusted, the north and north-west to Palomino and M. Martinez; the western and south-western to Lombardini and M. Perez; the southern at first to Leon, subsequently to Juan N. Perez; and the eastern to Carrasco. Anaya and other prominent officers were accorded their liberty by Scott, in return for American prisoners. The Prussian minister offered his sympathy and mediation in behalf of Mexico.

deserters. Fifty were hanged, and the rest lashed, branded, and imprisoned.¹⁷ The military depôt and hospitals were transferred from Tlalpam to Mixcoac, and orders issued approximating the corps in anticipation of a general assault on the capital, Riley's brigade advancing to Nalvarte, and Pillow dividing his forces between San Borja and Tacubaya.

Scott had been informed, perhaps at the instance of the astute Santa Anna, that at Molino del Rey, King's Mill, a mile from Tacubaya and near the western foot of Chapultepec hill, a cannon foundry was in operation. Worth received orders to make a night descent on the place between the 7th and 8th of September, and destroy the machinery, seizing the powder stored near by. A closer examination by this officer revealed, if not the full strength of the position, at least that the task would prove more than he could accomplish in the proposed raid. His force was accordingly increased, and fearing entanglement in the dark among unknown buildings, he was permitted to postpone the attack till dawn, and to have the help of the artillery. He also proposed to draw greater advantage from the fight than the destruction of a probably imaginary foundry, by following it up, if successful, with an assault on Chapultepec; but Scott's views had not yet risen to the great importance of this fortress, intent as he was

¹⁷ The latter being saved by the mitigating circumstances of having deserted before the war began, etc. Hitherto deserters had been driven off in disgrace or lightly punished. *Manfield's Mex. War*, 280-1. In *Mex. War, by English Soldier*, 255, is an allusion to maltreatment by officers as a cause for desertion. Mexican writers naturally condemn the execution as barbarous; yet greater strictness in their own army would undoubtedly have improved its value. To the pleading of the clergy and influential residents in behalf of the deserters, Scott replied that the Mexican government was to blame for tempting them to desert; yet he enrolled guerrillas to raid upon their countrymen. A striking account of the execution is given in the fourth number of the *American Star*, Sept. 28, 1847, a journal brought out at Mexico by the followers of the invading army. See also *Arco Iris*, Sept. 12, Nov. 4, 7, 1847; *Gen. of Lib.*, Oct. 19, 1847. Their form of organization is recorded in *Mex. Col. Ley.*, 1847, 181-2; *Correo Nac.*, Nov. 30, 1847; *Sonorense*, Sept. 10, 1847.

on attacking the southern front of the city; hence he objected.¹⁸


Molino del Rey consisted of a range of massive stone buildings, with crenellated walls and parapeted roofs, commanded by the plunging fire of Chapultepec at a distance of some 3,000 feet. A smaller but equally solid building, the *casa mata*, stood 1,500 feet to the west, surrounded by a quadrangular bastioned field-work.¹⁹ Between these two points rose a battery of three small guns, and in front extended a line of embankment with ditches and patches of maguey, screening the Mexican force, which numbered somewhat over 4,000 effective men²⁰ under Leon, the next highest officer, General F. Perez occupying the *casa mata*. To these must be added the cavalry corps of Alvarez, nearly 4,000 strong, which occupied the hacienda de los Morales, a mile westward, with orders to support Leon by flank operations.²¹ The force at Molino was much larger on the 7th; for Santa Anna believed Chapultepec to be the next objective point, and proposed to personally defend it, but deceived by the well-directed demonstrations of Scott along the southern line of the city, he retired with a large proportion of his forces to strengthen this line, and left the mill without recognized head or distinct plans.

¹⁸ This assertion by Ripley, Semmes, and other less friendly writers is partly confirmed by Scott's own despatch, with his ideas modified by experience, wherein he still thinks that the capture of the hill castle may not be necessary. 'We were not entirely ready' to take it on the 8th, he adds. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 355. Yet his biographer, *Mansfield's Mex. War*, 281, writes that he determined on this occasion to attack 'the defences of Chapultepec.'

¹⁹ The southern part of the molino was a wheat-mill, the northern the foundry, formerly a powder-mill. Their total length was about 1,400 feet. Two main entrances existed on the south and west.

²⁰ Including the garrison of the buildings. Roa Bárcena estimates them at exactly 4,000, including 40 artillerists. *Recuerdos*, 426-8. About the same in *Apuntes Hist. Guerra*, 392. Worth swells the number to 14,000, including the reinforcements that arrived after the battle was practically over. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, as above, p. 365. Mansfield has 'at least ten thousand;' and 4 guns are assigned to the battery.

²¹ Santa Anna, *Detail*, 108-9, places his force at 4,000, other Mexicans incline to 3,000. While luring Scott into a dangerous movement against the mill, Santa Anna was in his turn deceived by the feint against the south line of the city.



Worth made dispositions for a vigorous assault on the Mexican centre, to be followed by attacks on either flank; and to this end assigned the centre, facing the Mexican battery, to a storming party of 500 men under Major Wright, Garland's brigade with two light pieces taking position on the right to threaten the molino and cut off support from Chapultepec, and to sustain two twenty-four pounder battering guns on his left. Clarke's brigade under McIntosh with three light pieces faced the Mexican right, which rested on casa mata, and still farther to the left a troop of cavalry was stationed to observe Álvarez, while Cadwalader's brigade stood in reserve behind the centre. This force, reaching 3,500,²² moved forward during the night and took position along the clear and gently declining ground in front of Molino del Rey, watching for the dawn. With its first faint gleam, the battering guns open fire on the mill, and a whistling of balls and crashing of masonry follow. Yet not a sound rises from the Mexican lines; the place might be deserted. Wright's storming party forms and rushes toward the point marked for the central battery. Its position had been changed, however, and as they advance it bursts upon them at an angle with round shot and grape. They pause, startled; but only for a moment, and then turn upon it with the cry of 'Forward!' Once more a shower of shot that mows its bloody swath, disabling, of officers alone, eleven out of seventeen. There is no further halt, however. The remnant gains the batteries. A brief struggle, hand to hand, and the guns are seized, ready to be turned against their own lines. It is now daylight. Colonel Echeagaray of the 3d light infantry observes the danger; the garrison discharges a withering volley on the storming party, and then with a stentorian

²² Worth's field return, which Roa Bárcena, *Recuerdos*, 429, accepts, yet increasing the guns to 9 or 10. *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 293, about the same. Mansfield reduces the force to 3,154.

‘Á ellos!’ he pounces from out the smoke and hurls them back in disorder, reoccupying the battery.²³

Worth is equally prompt. He orders forward three companies of the light battalion and a part of the reserve to sustain and rally the shattered column. Garland on his side moves from under the plunging fire of Chapultepec upon the Mexican flank, while his battery runs forward to enfilade the recaptured point. Once more the Americans charge simultaneously from centre and right, under a raking volley of balls and bullets, especially from the roofs. Numbers and impetus prevail. Again the disputed battery falls, and now its deadly vomit turns upon the mill. The fight concentrates in the reëntering angle of the Mexican lines, which had been quickly recognized as the weakest. The heavy cross-fire from the azoteas prevents concerted action among the assailants for a while; but soon a company finds shelter under a bank, and begins to pick off one marksman after another, with steady and fearful precision. The men on the roofs quail as they behold the widening gaps. Their fire slackens, and no sooner do the assailants observe it than on they rush toward the mill, driving back the broken remnants of the front lines.²⁴ They reach the very walls; and covered by the well-directed fusillade in their rear and flank, they commence almost unmolested to batter the gates and shoot into apertures, widening at the same time the breaches already made. The southern portal yields, and some spring in,²⁵ while others climb the roof and assist in gaining the north-western entrance. The Mexicans stoutly dispute the passage, under the valiant lead of General Leon; but a bullet stretches him low, and now they waver and fall back. Colonel Balderas steps forward to encourage them.

²³ The Americans charge that here and elsewhere Mexicans bayoneted the wounded.

²⁴ General Ramirez is accused in the *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 295, with neglecting to hold the centre; but the main defect must be sought in Santa Anna's withdrawal of troops on the preceding evening.

²⁵ Led by Major Buchanan and Capt. McKenzie, of the 4th infantry and 2d artillery.

His inspiring cheer is taken up; they rally and rush upon the advancing foe. One more effort and the point is gained; but Balderas also falls;²⁶ and now without another such noble head they retreat, though slowly, step by step, closely pressed by the enemy. Balderas' regiment is conspicuous for its firmness under the onslaught. A rush is made for its banner, but Suazo, one of the officers, tears it down, winds it round his body, and fighting his way through the lines, reaches the cypress grove at the foot of the castle hill, covered with wounds. To this spot the rest of the mill garrison has also retired, save a body of 700 which is cut off, and has at last to hoist the white flag.²⁷

The casa mata had played an equally stirring though less important rôle. After a preparatory cannonade with Duncan's battery, McIntosh rushed to the assault of what he regarded as a common field-work; but was met by a fusillade so withering as to almost level entire platoons, like gusts of fire shrivelling all before them. McIntosh fell, mortally wounded; Scott, the next in command, was struck dead; and so along the line. Still they struggled on, and still the bullets poured down in unabated fury till nearly one third of the force was disabled. It seemed madness thus to enter the jaws of death. They wavered. And now the Mexicans sallied, with shouts of triumph, and turned the check into a hurried retreat; but instead of following up the advantage by pressing the disordered column and perchance utterly routing it, Perez, the commander, hastened to turn the flank of the assailants of the mill, only to be effectually stopped by a battalion of Cadwalader's reserve. Even now the Americans might have been worsted if Álvarez' cavalry had performed its duty. It had advanced from Los Morales, and stood on the level ground

²⁶ Another account removes him before Leon.

²⁷ Santa Anna intimates that the molino was lost through the sally of a part of the defenders, which found it impossible to return. *Detall*, 109; but Roa Bárcena denies it.

about half a mile west of the casa mata, prepared to advance, partly by the main road to the molino, narrowed by a bridge at a small intervening ravine, partly by a clear sweep round it to the left. Álvarez saw his opportunity as McIntosh prepared to assault the casa, and ordered a charge by front and flank. But his seconds bungled and dallied till Duncan, for the time unable to fire on the casa mata, was able to bring up his guns. A few shots sufficed to throw the advancing body into disorder, of which the voltigeur regiment took advantage for a vigorous assault that forced a retreat.²³ Duncan was relieved just in time to renew his cannonade upon the casa, and this time with such effect as to seriously trouble Perez. The fort was a powder-magazine. By this time the mill had fallen, and seeing that soon the brunt would concentrate upon him, he determined to retreat in time. The pursuing Americans captured less than two score of his men.

At this moment, when the battle was practically over, reënforcements appeared along the road skirting the northern side of Chapultepec, under the direction of Santa Anna, as if to retake the mill; but the Americans quickly brought up and unlimbered their guns, assisting the infantry to repulse them, with the loss of a field-piece. Nevertheless the proximity of the commander-in-chief with additional troops restored a certain degree of confidence among those who had retreated into the grove, and assisted indirectly the retreat of Perez. A combined movement might therefore have been undertaken with good prospects, but for the approach of reënforcements

²³ Álvarez accuses Andrade, who should have crossed the bridge, of insubordination as well as cowardice. Letter in *Santa Anna*, *Apel.*, 126-31. Major Sumner crossed the bridge under a scathing fire from the casa, and assisted with his body of dragoons to enforce the retreat, and a twenty-four-pounder was brought up to support him. Roa Bárcena, *Recuerdos*, 445-6, blames Álvarez for not removing Andrade earlier than he did and leading in person. *Correo Nac.*, Nov. 4, 1847, hints at cowardice among officers. The retreat of one division involved the other. Semmes points out that the lack of organization and the lightness of the horses made the cavalry worthless for front operations. *Campaign*, 329.

under Pillow, who on noticing that the battle had become serious hastened to the relief before Scott sent him orders.²⁹ Still intent on his project to follow up the advantage, and flushed with victory, Worth urged Pillow to aid him in carrying the hill fortress; but this officer would not infringe the distinct instructions of his superior. Perhaps he also objected to assist in plucking another laurel for a rival general. Worth had no alternative save to pick up his dead and wounded and fall back on Tacubaya in face of taunting demonstrations from the Mexicans, to whom he thus abandoned the field, and under the boom of the castle artillery which sounded like trumpet-blasts of victory. Indeed, Santa Anna assumed, and not without reason, that the objective point of the enemy was the fortress, and that his opportune arrival frustrated their plans and compelled them to retreat. At all events, he caused to be sounded a peal of triumph from the city bells, and spread throughout the country a glowing account of his achievement.³⁰

So ended a battle which takes rank as perhaps the most strongly contested of any during the war, and, proportionately, the bloodiest; for out of the American force of barely 3,500 men, the casualties numbered 787, among which were 116 killed, the officers suffering exceptionally, to the extent of nearly one third of those engaged. The Mexicans also lost

²⁹ Roa Bárcena blames Scott for this tardiness.

³⁰ As instanced in *Sonorense*, Oct. 1, 1847, and other country journals. In a subsequent defence he modifies the claim somewhat. 'A no presentarme en estos momentos con la columna que conducia desde la Candelaria, se hubiera tal vez perdido ese día á Chapultepec.' Yet he finally succeeded in forcing the enemy to retreat. *Detall*, 109-11. Other Mexican writers recognize the intent of the Americans; and in *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 302, the battle-field is yielded to them, Santa Anna being blamed for his tardy arrival at 9.30 A. M. General Peña led the movements of the reinforcements. Roa Bárcena thinks that the Americans would have gained in honor and advantages by retaining possession of Molino del Rey. Their feint against the south lines of the city saved them by keeping back Santa Anna. *Recuerdos*, 430-3. The retreat left the moral effect of a defeat, and the impression that the castle was stronger than it seemed. Santa Anna did not reoccupy the mill. Mansfield, *Mex. War*, 285, 289, considers that the holding of the mill would have entailed a needless exposure to the Chapultepec fire.

heavily, notwithstanding their intrenched position, and they had to surrender about 690 prisoners, four guns, and much ammunition.³¹ As for the result achieved, this was reduced to the destruction of a few old cannon moulds, and a furnace, the only vestiges of the foundery, and the weakening and demoralization of the Mexican army; but the moral effect was about equalized by the exultation of the people at the apparent repulse of the Americans, and by the dissatisfaction in the invading army at the narrow escape from defeat and the enormous sacrifices for such barren triumphs, when so much direct work still remained to be done. Scott admitted by the subsequent operations his mistake in neglecting to pursue the advantage gained at the mill. The capture of Mexico seemed as remote as ever, and many officers spoke despondently of the necessity to intrench themselves and await reinforcements, believing, in common with many Mexicans, that the cost of further achievements by their reduced number would ruin them.³² Notwithstanding their defeat, the Mexicans can point with pride to the brave resistance of their soldiers at the casa and molino, and to the noble efforts of leaders like Echeagaray, Balderas, Gelaty, and Leon.³³

³¹ Worth places their casualties at the round figure of 3,000, besides 2,000 who deserted after the battle. For a list of his own losses, with names of officers, see his reports in *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 365-73. Over 100 horses were killed and wounded. While admitting the bravery of the Mexicans, Ripley, Semmes, and others exalt the Americans, on the ground that they captured an almost unknown intrenched position with inferior numbers; for to the garrison of over 4,000 is naturally added the 3,000 or 4,000 cavalry, and the heavy reinforcements that came too late for anything but a skirmish. *Semmes' Campaign*, 331. A large stock of powder was carried away by the victors from the casa mata, the remainder being blown up with the building, but so carelessly as to kill a dozen men. Roa Bárcena claims that this was done by shell from the castle.

³² The chief accusers of Scott are, as before, Riley and Semmes. He may be excused somewhat on the ground that the strength of Molino del Rey was unknown; yet Worth warned him that he expected a severe fight. With earlier reinforcements it might have been a comparatively easy task to drive and follow the defeated mill garrison into the castle.

³³ Echeagaray 'aún vive,' says Roa Bárcena, *Recuerdos*, 452. Promotions, medals, and monuments were freely bestowed by a grateful country, as shown by decrees in *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1847, 267-70, 1853, iv. 345-6; *Méx. Legisl. Mej.*, 253, 619-21, 1856, 111-14; *Archivo Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 516. For additional details concerning the battle, I refer to *Diario Gob.*,

One effect of the defeat was a marked increase in desertion, and a declining confidence among the corps, due greatly to the glaring lack of unity and energy among the leaders.³⁴ This in itself compelled Santa Anna to confine himself more than ever to defensive operations along the inner lines of the capital, with their walls, embankments, and ditches, and their eight garitas, or gates, each forming an intrenched fort, which in times of peace served for custom-houses.³⁵ Owing to the marshy nature of the surrounding land, during this the rainy season, the approach was practically restricted to the corresponding roads, five of them main causeways, whereof the two on the west, and the others more or less, were obstructed by cuts and barricades. The western roads were commanded to some extent by Chapultepec, the only outwork now entering into consideration. The increased demonstrations by the enemy along the south front, marked by the location of a battery at La Piedad, only one mile distant, and the advance of several corps toward it, led naturally to the belief that this was their objective line. Aware of its weakness, as formerly explained, Santa Anna at once directed a large force to throw up a line of intrenchments, extending from Niño Perdido diagonally to the exterior barricade of San Antonio Abad, and provided with

Sept. 1847; *Correo Nac.*, Sept., also Nov. 27, 1847, Jan. 3, Aug. 23, Oct. 10-17, 1848; *Razonador*, Nov. 17, 1847; *Arco Iris*, Dec. 3, 1847, etc.; *Rayon*, *Asedio*, 125-57; *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., vii. 221-6; *Diario Ex-act.*, MS., 60 et seq.; *Taylor and his Staff*, 113-20; *Scott's Mem.*, 506-7; *Peterson's Milit. Heroes*, ii. 114-20; *Harrison's Battle-fields*, 391-402; *Frost's Pitt. Hist. Mex.*, 551-75; *Perez, Dicc.*, ii. 467-73; *Jenkins' Mex. War*, 334-97.

³⁴ Bravo declares that he had to watch his men to prevent further loss. *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., viii. 27 et seq. Governor Olaguibel of Mexico brought in a body of several hundred recruits, *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 313, and cannon were sent from Acapulco; but these gains were small. Gamboa still assumes a defence force of 17,000, *Impug.*, 52, from which Roa Bárcena deducts desertion and losses at Molino del Rey.

³⁵ At San Antonio, 10 pieces of artillery; at Niño Perdido, 2 pieces; San Cosme, 2 pieces; Belén, 3 pieces, commanded by General Terrés. The other gates had no artillery, but could obtain men and armament in case of need, if the front should change from the south and west, where intermediate works existed with from 1 to 4 pieces. Details in *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 309; *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdo*, 456.

three batteries, of eleven guns, strong curtains, and wet ditches; in addition to which the main canal was cut, flooding nearly the whole front, the south-east being unapproachable. Scott had been reminded that it was easy to stop this work by cannonade. Instead of doing so, however, he wasted his time with slow disposition of troops and reconnoitring. A strong attack at any time before the 11th of September might have readily gained this front, and with it the city;³⁶ but when Scott awoke to the reality the intrenchments were finished. At the council now held the opinion of most officers appeared still to favor an attack on the south, rather than against the comparatively unknown lines on the west, which demanded a preliminary and probably costly reduction of Chapultepec. The lately completed defences, however, decided Scott for the western approaches, and especially for the hill fortress, to which he assigned an undue importance, believing that its capture would materially hasten that of the capital.³⁷ Twiggs was accordingly ordered to continue the demonstrations from La Piedad, against the south, with two batteries, supported by Riley's brigade, while Pillow and Quitman, supported by a portion of Worth's forces, marched during the night to take up position to the west and south of Chapultepec, and erect four batteries with which to open fire upon the castle at daybreak on the 12th. One was located within the Molino del Rey to cover the west approach to the castle, another immediately south of the mill building; the third midway between Tacubaya and the castle, facing its south-west angle; and the fourth on the

³⁶ The approach was good, as shown by a flying reconnoissance of some cavalry headed by Santa Anna, which narrowly escaped injury from a masked battery. Even if Scott had intended to occupy the south front merely with feints, it was a mistake on his part to let the opponent strengthen it, and so hold it with a smaller force.

³⁷ Mexican officers regarded it of less value, owing to its merely plunging fire, and to the shelter offered by the aqueducts leading to the city. *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 318, etc. Twiggs sided with Scott, and the vacillating officers were overruled.

Tacubaya road, directed against the castle front and the battery at its south-east foot. The latter contained three of the eight pieces of artillery here distributed.³³ A fifth battery was placed to the west, with some dragoons and infantry, to check any movement on the part of Álvarez, who had advanced a few hundred feet from his former position, toward the casa mata.

Chapultepec is a picturesque mound, famed far back in the dim traditions of Aztec migrations, and later consecrated to royalty. Montezuma and his predecessors there sought distraction from administrative cares, and communed with dryad oracles in the hallowed grove, whose majestic ahuehuate cedars, furrowed by the sweep of ages, have since inspired a long line of noble viceroys and democratic presidents, and shaded the play-ground for the rising generations of successive races. The north side is inaccessibly steep, and the east and south-east nearly so, leaving a practicable slope only toward the west, besides a triangular road along the southern acclivity, protected at the knee by a bastion. At a height of 160 feet the summit extends into a terre-plein 600 feet in length, surmounted along the northern edge by a heavy yet not untasteful building, erected in 1785 for a vice-regal palace. Republican rulers converted it into a college and citadel, and matched the dome and colonnade adornments with ungainly flank projections, parapets, and bomb-proofs, with adjoining bastions and out-houses, the whole enclosed by a parapet wall tapering westward in a crémaillère line to a priest-cap, and protected by ten serviceable pieces of artillery, several of heavy calibre. The slopes were, moreover, provided with walls, and on the west with ditches, mines, and a midway redan. Along the south base ran a wall 1,600 feet long, protected on the south-east by a barricade with artillery across the Tacubaya

³³ Including one 24-pounder, three 18-pounders, and four mortars. The first two batteries were not erected during the night.

road, and a similar work swept the road skirting the aqueduct along the north base. The exterior fringe of the grove at the western foot was shielded by an embankment with ditch and redan, facing the Molino del Rey. General Bravo, of independence-war fame, commanded here a garrison reduced by desertion to about 800 regular troops, of which 250 were posted on the summit and the rest in the grove and batteries.³⁹

Pillow takes possession of the unoccupied mill at dawn on the 12th, under an ineffective fusillade from the grove, and at the same time the southern batteries open fire. Blazing fuse and balls whirl fast and furious against the castle, crushing through the walls, and scattering dust and débris upon the defenders. The monumental frame begins to gape in ruins, and even the girdling parapet is torn by noisy shells. But like a lion at bay, it rises in defiance and roars in prompt reply, a counterpart to the song of battle. It is a music of the spheres; but death wields the baton beneath a lurid canopy, wherein Valkyries chant the dread refrain while watching for their prey.

The aim of the assailing batteries is becoming fearfully precise for the garrison pent up above within the narrow space, the artillerists suffering so severely that toward noon several of the cannon are silenced.⁴⁰ But the din and crash do not diminish, for Pillow seizes the opportunity to place the battery just south of the mill, so far held in check by the summit fire; and now the bombardment grows fiercer still, throughout the afternoon, till darkness interferes.

³⁹ His list enumerates 832 men. *Rayon, Asedio*, 265-8; to which must be added cadets and irregulars. Desertion had reduced the Toluca battalion alone from 450 to 27. *Bustamante, Invasion*, MS., 126-35. Santa Anna increases the force to 1,000 above and 500 in the grove. *Detall*, 112-13; *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 307-8. Americans estimate it at from 2,000 to 6,000. For descriptions and views of Chapultepec, consult *Rivera, Mex. Pint.*, i. 298 et seq.; *Soc. Mex. Geog. Bolet.*, viii. 195-9; *Museo Mex.*, iii. 212; *Ward's Mex.*, ii. 230-2; *Mühlenpfordt, Mex.*, ii. 353-4; *Mayer's Mex. as It Was*, 155-7; *Ellon's With French*, 36-42; *Kollontz's Court Mex.*, 186-94; *Hall's Life Mex.*, 145-7.

⁴⁰ Bravo states that he had only three pieces left with which to reply. *Ubi sup.*

Despite the damage inflicted, the enemy had gained little by his day's work, save in keeping the adversary in doubt as to his real intent. Santa Anna therefore remained inactive, unwilling to hazard a field movement with the reserve. Later in the day he visited the castle and made some dispositions, swelling the force in the grove to 500 men.⁴¹ Night brings a cessation of hostilities, but no repose. The noise of preparations for the portentous morrow resounds on both sides, and the soldiers rest on their arms watching for the dawn. Scott has issued orders for an assault both by Pillow and Quitman, led by two picked storming parties of 250 men each,⁴² while Worth advances in closer support, and Twiggs throws out Smith's brigade to his left to check reinforcements from the city. Early on the 13th, the batteries burst forth anew in lively cannonade along the south front of the capital as well as against the castle. Meanwhile the infantry moves into position for the fray. Bravo now becomes convinced of the enemy's object, and sends a warning message to Santa Anna, pointing out the need for supporting the hill fortress; but the latter holds aloof with other views, deceived to some extent by a feint against the south-western city gates.

Suddenly at 8 A. M., the roar of artillery⁴³ ceases, and a significant silence intervenes, the prelude to another struggle. A voltigeur regiment is seen to rush from the crumbling precincts of the mill and flit along the southern wall. Its goal is the redan in a breach of the wall at the southern end of the in-

⁴¹ Leaving all in good condition, as he claims, while boasting of the risk he ran from bombs and shells during the trip. *Detail*, 112. This is sneered at in *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 311, which points out the lack of a head, 'creadora organizadora, directora.' Bravo claims that he was ordered to withdraw men from the grove to the summit, but overruled so bad a disposition. *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., viii. 29 et seq. He further asked for other troops declaring the garrison so demoralized as to be worthless; but Santa Anna refused to cram more men into so small a space.

⁴² Chosen respectively from the veteran divisions of Worth and Twiggs, and headed by McKenzie and Casey. This effort failed to be made on the evening of the 12th, because the preparations were not complete. Scott's report, in *U. S. Gort Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 377-80.

⁴³ *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, loc. cit.

trenchments that fringe the western slope of the grove. So quick is the advance that ere a second volley can be delivered the voltigeurs are springing over ditches and parapets, and falling in the rear of the intrenched line, whose defenders are occupied by a simultaneous front attack by the fellow-regiment. Thus surprised, there is no alternative save to fall back among the sheltering trees, where they hold forth a while against the ever-growing numbers brought up by Pillow. General Perez falls in covering the retreat, but Colonel Xicotencatl, worthy descendant of the famed Tlascaltec chieftain, rallies this overwhelmed band to fresh efforts till he also succumbs; and then they break at the foot of the hill.⁴⁴ Now the hill batteries direct their fire into the very grove, and shot and shell come crashing through the branches, scattering splinters in all directions, and shaking the heavy moss that hangs like stalactites, or even felling some ancient ahuehuete that for centuries had mutely preached the nothingness of man.

The fire from the hill is becoming unendurable, and, as the storming party is still delayed, Pillow orders the front line to take its place. A few rounds of canister and a fusillade to clear the way, and up charge the voltigeurs, seeking what shelter they can from bowlders and projections against the galling rain of bullets. Several officers fall; Pillow himself is wounded; and maddened by the loss, the men rush blindly on, changing the cry of 'Forward' into a wild yell of 'Vengeance!' Ah! the beastliness of war! Good men killing good men; patriots hewing down patriots as if each regarded the other as poisonous reptiles, when indeed there is no personal issue between them. Fools all, they and their masters—blinder than bats, more senseless than donkeys, thus to feel obliged to butcher each other a while, before settling down to an adjust-

⁴⁴ Some leave the impression that he fell on the summit, but he commanded the reinforcement left by Santa Anna in the grove. *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos*, 483.

ment of differences on some plan within the domain of reason! But what have wire-pulling politicians to do with right or reason? What care office-seekers, men who spend their lives in their efforts to supplant others and gain for themselves a better place—what do they care who and how many are killed or mangled and buried in the ditches?

Numbers and impetus prevail; the redan is carried, and so closely are the defenders pursued that the officer charged to fire the saucissons of the mines, just beyond, waits for a moment. That moment saves the pursuers. He is disabled;⁴⁵ the saucissons are destroyed, and the rush continues to the crest of the hill. Here the enemy have to pause, however, at the foot of the parapet, from which grape and bullets now pour upon them, tearing wide gaps in the ranks.

While waiting for ladders, they crouch back behind rocks and into hollows which have been neglected by the engineers, and thence begin to pick off artillerists and sharp-shooters with a precision so terrible as soon to silence the artillery and force the evacuation of the bastion at the knee of the front ascent. By this time Cadwalader, who had replaced the wounded General Pillow, brings up the ladders and fascines; and now there is a rush across the ditch to plant the ladders. The musketry fire redoubles, and down come the first climbers, dead and disabled, and so the next daring stormers; but assailants cluster thick and eager at the foot to take the vacant places, and finally they gain a foothold on the parapet.⁴⁶

A resistless number follows across the vacated priest-cap and into the precincts of the yard, joined by an-

⁴⁵ Bravo, who appears too ready in his report to charge subordinates with cowardice, says the officer, Alaman, could not be found when required; but American accounts state that he or his deputy was disabled.

⁴⁶ Pillow reports that Col Johnstone led the *voltigeurs* foremost up the hill. Lieuts Selden, Rogers, and Smith were among the first to climb and fall. Capt. Barnard was the first to plant his colors in the works, and so on. See *U. S. Govt Doc.*, as above, p. 400 et seq. Fossey, *Mexique*, 133, claims that a French volunteer, Dargonville, planted the first colors.

other party, whose ascent along the south side has been facilitated by a top fire upon its bastion. Light howitzers and captured guns are turned upon the castle and the raised terrace along the eastern verge, mingling their thunder with the sharp ring of rifles, driving the defenders from the windows and roofs and forcing them over the walls, while covering the entrance of the stormers. A chance shot strikes the staff, and the castle flag bends over; but the next moment it is righted again by sturdy hands, and flutters forth defiantly. The assailants press closer, however, and are already in hand-to-hand conflict within the citadel. The excitement of battle and the loss of comrades seem to have frenzied them, for they rage with a ferocity never before displayed during the war,⁴⁷ granting little or no quarter. And few ask it. The very cadets, mere boys of fourteen years and upward, fight with heroic daring, and cheer their elders on as they stand at bay to sell their lives dearly, banishing sombre premonitions and quailing not at death. The blood of stripling and graybeard mingle in their flow, and bear the mournful tidings in the red-tinged waters of the aqueducts. Finally a party gains the roof and strikes the flag; and as the banner of the invaders rises, midst deafening huzzas, a change sets in. The authoritative voice of the officers prevails; the slaughter stops; the vanquished yield. Bravo surrenders, together with four generals and 100 other officers, the total number of prisoners captured on and round the hill being placed at 800.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Ripley attributes it to the killing of wounded Americans at Molino del Rey, after the first repulse by Mexicans. *War with Mex.*, ii. 423-4.

⁴⁸ And the total of killed, wounded, and prisoners at 1,800, out of the estimated 6,000. Pillow's loss for the whole day is given at 143. Report in *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, as above, p. 408. See also list in *Correo Nac.*, Mar. 16, 1848, and later notes. The four generals were Monterde, Noriega, Dosamantes, and Saldaña. Cano, the engineer of the work, fell. For honors accorded to Xicotencatl and his brave San Blas battalion, see *Mex., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1853, v. 217-18; *Roa Bárcena*, ubi sup. Santa Anna charges that Bravo hid before the close of the battle, and was found in a ditch, *Apel.*, 115; but none will believe this of the old hero, famed for his bravery and magnanimity during the war of 1810-21. He was certainly vindicated before the council of war. *Gamboa, Impug.*, 55.

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Quitman's division and storming party had also advanced to the assault, aiming for the south-east angle of the castle enclosure. This was protected by a strong battery under the command of Rangel, who opened so galling a cannonade and fusillade as to break the lines and drive them for shelter under some buildings midway to the goal. These proved of little avail, however, against the heavy metal that came crashing and plunging down upon them, and left them exposed to a flank fire from the reserve on the causeways. The volunteer regiments in support were thereupon directed to cross the meadows to the left and gain the enclosure through the southern wall, while Smith's brigade made a sweep to the right to check the causeway troops and threaten to fall in the rear of Rangel's position, two of the bombarding batteries resuming fire, with a view to silence the opponents in some degree and to prepare the way for a fresh advance. Smith's manœuvre had a good effect, and the volunteers gained the wall, although not without being severely cut up by the cross-fire. Now the storming party made another rush, followed by its support, to be once more checked by scathing volleys; but only for a moment. Pillow's party had already cleared the terre-plein of the hill, and was beginning to fire on the rear of Rangel's lines, creating a diversion which enabled the stormers to enter the battery. The defenders still held forth in gallant fight, at close quarters, with bayonets crossed and rifles clubbed. But the rear fire grew heavier; Bravo's men were springing and sliding down the eastern declivity in disorderly flight, closely pursued, and Peña y Barragan was already in retreat along the northern road, pressed by a considerable force from Pillow's and Worth's divisions, whose progress had been facilitated by the summit fire on the barricade in this direction.⁴⁹ There

⁴⁹ The first advance against this barricade had been checked in nearly as severe a manner as Quitman's. Both these assaults proved a waste of blood; for the capture of the castle by Pillow's division involved the fall of the bar-

was no alternative save to retreat, and this Rangel effected in admirable form along the Verónica avenue, covering at the same time the retrograde movement of Santa Anna, who as usual appeared with reënforcements when too late. The commander-in-chief made up for tardiness of movement, however, by a brisk volley of virtuous indignation against the 'infamous conduct' of those who had permitted the castle to fall. The cavalry leader was too far away to receive his share of compliments in all their freshness. He was besides absorbed just then in an elaborate pirouette on the enemy's left, sufficiently beyond range to combine safety with healthful exercise.

Worth and Quitman halted merely to re-form their columns, and then hastened onward in pursuit, the former along the Verónica causeway, the other on the Belen, supported by Smith and subsequently by Pierce. Both approaches presented a double roadway, divided by an aqueduct of strong masonry, with open arches and massive abutments that afforded shelter against missiles, especially to the pursuers. Scott despatched heavy ordnance to both divisions, partly from Twiggs' line, which gradually ceased its cannonade. The heaviest reënforcements were sent to Worth; for the San Cosme approach, as farther from the scene of battle, was regarded as the least protected. And this was verified already at the works covering the junction of the Verónica and San Cosme roads, which possessed not a single gun.⁶⁰ Beyond, however, rose a barricade from which Worth's advance was driven

ricades and batteries below. Quitman claims to have obtained 7 cannon, 1,000 muskets, and 550 prisoners, including 100 officers, in the works. His report in *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, ubi sup., p. 413. See also Worth's report, *Id.*, p. 391-2. Semmes, *Campaign*, 344, pays a tribute to the bravery of the north side parties. The reports of Rangel and Santa Anna, *Detall*, 114, etc., show that Quitman did not carry the battery till the top fire drove the defenders. Rangel's conduct is praised. *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 316.

⁶⁰ At this point, Santo Tomás, Col Ramiro rallied a force and sought to capture Magruder's battery, which was in advance of its support, but Magruder unlimbered his pieces in time to save them with a decisive volley. *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 320.

back and kept in check till artillery could be brought up. With this and the musketry, so lively a fire was thereupon opened from the barricade and houses as to completely sweep the road, and prevent even the placing of cannon at the abandoned works near the junction. To push onward seemed impossible; but Worth ordered the brigades of Clarke and Garland into the buildings which lined the road on either side, and made them hew their way through the walls with pick and crowbar. When the men were sufficiently advanced for a flank fire, a howitzer was hoisted to a roof and brought to bear upon the barricade, compelling its evacuation.⁵¹ Some of the retreating troops penetrate during the confusion into the city, but Santa Anna appears in time to rally, and returning with them to the gate he atones somewhat for his previous neglect by prompt dispositions and aid. The assailants mine their way with impunity, however, maintaining from windows and azoteas a fusillade of terrible volume and accuracy. By five o'clock they have burrowed their way almost to the gate fortress, unseen yet not noiseless, for midst the din and excitement can be heard the dull thud of battering beams, with the cracking of timber and the crumbling of walls. Now a light gun is advanced to the captured barricade, at a run through the bullet shower, and then pours against the gate the responsive roar of three pieces, one located as if in mockery upon San Cosme church. While attention is thus centred on the front, the roofs of the adjoining buildings suddenly heave with a living mass. The next moment comes a withering discharge from a line of rifles on either flank, under cover of which storming parties rush at a signal from their retreats. So rapid is the movement and such the onslaught from different sides that the works are scaled and lines formed before the defenders recover from the shock. The reserve, however, is still prepared to

⁵¹ Rangel feared a flank movement from cross-roads. *Tercera Brig.*, 4, etc.

dispute further progress, and falls into position to rally the broken ranks. Just then a bugle sound is heard, intended to recall one of the corps from an exposed point. It is misinterpreted, and the whole mass recedes, quickened by raking volleys from the lost guns now turned upon it by the victors. Santa Anna hastens forward with reënforcements; but it is too late, and he can only direct the movement toward the citadel.⁵² The approaching darkness tends to stay the pursuers, and Worth establishes his headquarters just inside the gate.⁵³

Quitman's division had distinguished itself by a more rapid progress, the cost of which, however, far outweighed the result. Although his orders were to advance cautiously with the main object of keeping up a diversion, he allowed himself to be impetuously led onward. He received his first check at Puente de los Insurgentes, a redoubt forming part of the intrenched line toward San Cosme; but an opportune flank fire by Worth's division enabled him to cross it and push onward, his men springing from arch to arch under the aqueduct, and seizing every opportunity to deliver a volley. As they approached the fortified gate of Belen, General Terrés, who commanded here, brought them to a momentary halt with a succession of round shot, grape, and musketry, which cut terribly into all who were not sheltered.⁵⁴ During the intervals, however, they crept nearer, and shortly after one o'clock the gate was carried by a simultaneous and overwhelming rush. Terrés fell back with his small force, raked by one of his own guns now turned upon him, and so closely pressed that it was feared the pursuers would push their way with his own men into

⁵² Rangel is not blamed either in *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 322, in *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos*, 502, or by Santa Anna, *Detall*, 118, who praises him, 'la defensa...sostenia con valor.' Rangel pleads insufficiency of troops. *Terceru Brig.*, 1-9. One gun was taken along.

⁵³ Twiggs' brigade being ordered to join him.

⁵⁴ A corps was also moved out to deliver a flank fire upon them from the south-west, but this received a prompt check from their artillery.

the citadel. Just then Santa Anna appeared on the scene with reënforcements drawn from other points, and rallied them. 'Coward!' he cried to Terrés, and wrought up by excitement he pounced upon him, struck his face, and tore off his insignia.⁵⁵ Guns were quickly planted on the paseo; the citadel was strengthened, and troops took position around, directing so withering a discharge upon the invaders as to compel them to recede, shattering the captured works and silencing its artillery,⁵⁶ yet not attempting to drive Quitman beyond the gate.

The firing continued till nightfall, when, under cover of darkness, the enemy hastened to plant a heavy battery with which to shell the citadel on the morrow. Worth did the same, while preparing to push into the heart of the city with the first gleam of morning. His battery being quickly in line, he resolved to impress the inhabitants with a sense of the impending danger, by sending into their midst an instalment of shot and shell. It was a severe but salutary lesson. A whole city followed with awe-stricken faces the flight of the portentous missiles as they tracked the sky with trails of fire, and sank behind the dented fringe of buildings to scatter desolation and blend their verberating rumble with agonizing shrieks of startled women and bereaved families. The effect proved decisive.

At eight o'clock a council of war was forming at the citadel to discuss the situation. Santa Anna showed that the army was wholly demoralized, partly from lack of ammunition and other means, and because of overdue wages and insufficient rations. The force had greatly

⁵⁵ Terrés explains that Santa Anna had most unaccountably left him a force wholly insufficient for the defence; but in *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 320, he is accused of having abandoned the gate before the enemy entered it, and Santa Anna says that he compelled his subordinate, Argüelles, to abandon it against his will. He also asks how he became a prisoner after the battle. *Apel.*, 117. Gamboa, *Impug.*, 55-6, shows that Terrés was absolved by a later council of war, and Roa Bárcena, *Recuerdos*, 495, adds that Santa Anna repaired his injustice in 1853 with rank and pension.

⁵⁶ Several details of gunners, as well as Drum, their commander, being killed. Quitman's report, in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, loc. cit., p. 415-16.

diminished, without prospects of filling the gaps. The citadel would soon be battered down, and perhaps the entire city, to bury in its ruins thousands of innocent victims.⁵⁷ It was accordingly resolved to evacuate the capital. The cavalry, numbering 4,000, was at once despatched, and 5,000 infantry followed after midnight, the militia and irregulars being dissolved.⁵⁸

About one o'clock in the morning of the 14th a deputation from the city council⁵⁹ presented itself at Worth's headquarters, and being directed to Scott at Tacubaya, demanded of him guarantees for life and property.⁶⁰ Scott refused to bind himself to any terms, except such as were imposed by honor and customary usages,⁶¹ and Worth hastened to affirm possession by advancing at dawn to the alameda, while Quitman, after receiving a white flag from the citadel and occupying it, marched to the central square and hoisted over the palace the stars and stripes, the first foreign colors to flaunt within Aná-

⁵⁷ He as usual charges loudly cowardice and insubordination, and adds that the men had no food. 'En aquel día, que no habían probado alimento; que en cuatro anteriores se les debían los socorros.' *Detall*, 119-20. Gamboa denies the lack of food and ammunition, and shows that Governor Olaguibel suggested that the views of ministers and citizens should be consulted before so grave a step as evacuation should be resolved upon, in face of an enemy inferior in number. *Impug.*, 57-9. Carrera, commanding the artillery, believed a defence to be useless, and so did generals Alcorta, Perez, and Lombardini, although the latter objected at first. Further discussion was stopped by Santa Anna declaring for evacuation. *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 323-4. The scholar Ramirez mentions a curious incident. While making historical extracts a bomb fell upon his house and interrupted him at p. 80 of the MS., bound by me in the collection *Dur.*, *Doc. Hist.*; on pp. 62-79 are marginal notes bearing on these war operations.

⁵⁸ And a portion of the garrison at the remote gates was forgotten. Some of the militia objected to such passive yielding. Gamboa points out that Santa Anna had still 13,000 or 14,000 men at his command, including probably the militia. Roa Bárcena condemns the abandonment before guarantees had been sought for the city. *Recuerdos*, 503-4.

⁵⁹ Names, etc., in *Monitor*, Sept. 28, 1847.

⁶⁰ With the safety of their institutions, and the privilege for the ayuntamiento to control the revenue, maintain armed patrols, and float the national flag.

⁶¹ 'And the spirit of the age,' on the ground 'that the city had been virtually in our possession from the time of the lodgments effected by Worth and Quitman.' *Scott's Report*, 383, loc. cit.

huac's capital since Cortés planted his banner upon the ruins of Tenochtitlan.⁶²

Scott made his entry during the forenoon at the head of a brilliant suite and an imposing force, midst a dense gathering of spectators who lined the streets and azoteas and filled the balconies, in some of which were white flags and foreign colors, in protestation of peace and protection. Yet even along this main line of the march, houses with closed shutters stared the invaders coldly in the face, as did many a quarter of the city with its bleak, deserted aspect. And no welcome glance or cheering sound mingled with the music of the march. All around was chilling silence, emphasized in frigid or frowning looks, and relieved here and there only by glances of curiosity or a passing gleam of admiration at the imposing figure and benevolent mien of the victorious general. In this lay more than mere sullenness, which in itself tended to rouse a counter-irritation among the invaders, with an unpleasant display of arrogance and drunken disorder. The feeling became marked as the soldiers dispersed in search of quarters, and every insolent act or gesture added fuel to the fire, till it burst forth in a determined uprising of the Mexicans, prompted especially by disbanding militiamen. The first shot was aimed at a crowd of officers clustering round General Worth. This was followed by a scattering fusillade in different directions, and by showers of stones from the roofs. The onslaught resulted in several deaths and a large number of wounded for the invaders. Scott recognized the danger of allowing such a movement to gain strength in a large and populous city, where every

⁶² Worth's adherents charge Scott, not alone with misquoting the report of their favorite in order to lessen his achievement, but rail bitterly at the preference given to Quitman on this occasion, when Worth had a prior right, by virtue of his capturing the central gate which left the city at his mercy, while Quitman had been repulsed and kept at bay before the citadel. Semmes, *Campaign*, 349-52, is among Worth's adherents. Quitman could claim a certain right by his early capture of Belen gate. The question reached the congress, and is fully considered in *History of Raising the Flag in Mexico*; *Houston's Report*; *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Repts 31; *Id.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Repts 808-10.

building formed a stronghold, with a redoubtable garrison in every family. The smallness of his force compelled him to take prompt and severe measures. Artillery was at once brought out to sweep the different streets with grape and canister, and to batter down houses from which missiles came, while troops charged the crowds and stormed the dwellings.

The long-feared horrors of a siege had come at last in aggravated form, intensified by outrages on the part of criminals whom Santa Anna had released before his departure, with a view, as many declared, of occupying the enemy and retarding pursuit.⁶³ The confusion was swelled to a panic by alarmed families who hastened to leave the city, or who crowded the churches to implore protection from the virgin. Santa Anna sent some troops to give direction to the outbreak, but they were too few to effect anything. The Mexicans wasted their valor in barren achievements, that stood relieved for a moment by noble gallantry, only to sink the next into oblivion. All day the city trembled before the roar of cannon and the flash of musketry, which changed from one quarter to another. Night brought no respite; for although the battle lessened, darkness magnified the din, now swelled by the tramp of noisy soldiers, while bandits crept within the shadows of the walls upon their kindred errand. Early on the 15th a few enthusiasts began anew the conflict; but the earnest proclamations of the ayuntamiento had their effect, sustained by the imposing demonstrations of Scott to carry out his threat of razing every building that revealed a hostile movement. With the rising of the sun the struggle ceased.⁶⁴

⁶³ But Scott was too weak to risk the dangers of a pursuit. He estimates the released criminals at 2,000, who were intent on plunder during the tumult roused by impelling national hatred. *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, p. 383-4, *ubi sup.* Zamacois denies that Santa Anna released convicts for the purpose indicated. *Hist. Méj.*, xii. 844-5. Roa Bárcena, *Recuerdos*, 507, avows that patriots stirred the tumult; roused by the arrogance of the victors, as explained in *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 326-7, the promoter being Col Carbajal of the guardia nacional. Garland was wounded by the first shot.

⁶⁴ Several writers condemn the pronounced efforts of the wealthy to check

The valley campaign was ended, at a cost to the victors of more than 2,700 killed and wounded, besides the sick. This heavy inroad upon a force of 11,000 speaks well for the resistance of the Mexicans, as do their losses, estimated by Scott at over 7,000.⁶⁵ Their lack of success must be attributed first of all to bad generalship, which permitted the unchallenged advance of Scott across the range and round Chalco Lake; which depended too much on certain positions in

the popular outburst, and their offensive display of flags for protection. Others exaggerate the cruel conduct of the invaders, while admitting that the worst outrages on their side were committed by renegades from Puebla who tore along with red-banded hats. *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 323-42. Roa Bárcena, however, applauds Scott's attitude as really humane under the circumstances, *Recuerdos*, 511, and believes with Zamacois, *Hist. Méj.*, xii. 849, that another army might have behaved worse. Even the permission by Scott to ravage hostile localities was acted upon with great limitation. *Ripley's War with Mex.*, ii. 444. Peterson points to the deeds of the English at Badajoz and San Sebastian as horrible compared with the worst isolated cases here. *Mil. Heroes*, ii. 126. Stragglers continued to be killed by lawless Mexicans. *Semmes' Campaign*, 355; *Mex. War, by English Soldier*, 261-2. Additional details in *Monitor*, Sept. 15, 1847, et seq.; *Arco Iris*, Sept. 26, 1847; *Gen. of Lib.*, Sept. 25, 1847; *Sonorense*, Oct. 1, 1847, etc., which speak of plundering léperos, of girls collecting stones, etc.

⁶⁵ Together with 3,730 prisoners, one seventh being officers, including 13 generals, among them 3 ex-presidents. The capture embraced more than 20 colors and standards, 75 pieces of ordnance, besides 57 wall-pieces, 20,000 small arms, an immense quantity of shot, shells, powder, etc. His report is in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 334-5. Yet the report of the inspector-general adds only 1,330 military prisoners to those taken before Sept. 7th, whereof 823 on the 13th and 14th. *Id.*, p. 430-1. For list of captured officers, see *Archivo Mex.*, *Actas*, ii. 374-89. Some accounts place Scott's loss in the valley at 4,600 rank and file, 90-100 officers, and about 1,000 sick. *Nacional*, *Boletín* and *Sonorense*, the latter of Nov. 12, 1847. Scott gives the casualties among his officers at 383, and the losses on the 13th and 14th at 832. Roa Bárcena assumes that 300 of his men suffered from the tumult alone. See also reports in *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 31, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 11; *Id.*, *Mess. and Doc.*, 1847-48, ii. app. 1-236. Details and comments in *Bustamante, Invasion*, MS., 87-152; *Id.*, *Mem. Hist.*, vii. 1-237; viii. 27-35, the autograph records by this venerable historian, who witnessed many of the scenes. *Diario Exact. Mex.*, MS., 61-5, gives a diary of occurrences in the capital during the siege; and Rayon adds many valuable facts from a military standpoint, in *Asedio y Defensa*, 157-268, with orders and correspondence. Also *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iii. 934-56, iv. 5 et seq. Observations by medical men, in *Vander Linden, Rel.*; *Id.*, *Mem. Salud. Mil.*, pt 3. Official reports of the capture of Mexico, in *Arco Iris*, Sept. 16-19, Oct. 3-4, 10, 15, Nov. 18-22, Dec. 11, 1847, with estimates of losses; *Correo Nac.*, Dec. 10-11, 1847; *Ramador*, Nov. 24, 1847; *Gen. Lib.*, Oct. 16, 1847; also *Monitor*, *Federalista*, *Espir. Pub.* Moreliano, *Sonorense*, and other journals; *Scott's Mem.*, 508-17; *McSherry's Puchero*, 103-26; *Jenkins' Mex. War*, 427-31; *Addey's McClellan*, 31-35, giving the share of this rising officer in the campaign; *Frost's Pict. Hist. Mex.*, 576-90; *Mayer's Mex. Aztec.*, i. 415-16; *Semmes' Service Afloat*, 400-79; *Young's Hist. Mex.*, 534-7; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xii. 808-40; *Rivera, Gob. Méx.*, ii. 332-7; *Perez, Dicc.*, ii. 473-85; *Balbotin, Invasion*, 120.

the blind hope that the enemy would fall into traps; which manifested itself in the insubordination and neglect of Valencia, the inaction of Santa Anna at Padierna and his lack of firmness and provision in subsequent encounters, and in the remissness of Alvarez. Other causes are found in the defective organization and rawness of the troops, mostly composed of inexperienced recruits and militia, and supplied with inferior arms, circumstances that swell the glory of the defence at Churubusco, Molino del Rey, and Chapultepec.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Scott's victories, while brightened by the stanchness and moderation of his army, are somewhat dimmed by costly sacrifices, due to dilatory movements and neglect of opportunities, and by allowing an astute opponent to circumvent him.

CHAPTER XX.

END OF THE UNITED STATES WAR.

1847-1848.

SANTA ANNA'S ADMINISTRATION—ANAYA'S FIRST TERM—FEDERAL CONSTITUTION RESTORED—STATE OF GUERRERO—SANTA ANNA RESIGNS—PRESIDENT PEÑA AND HIS EFFORTS FOR PEACE—INVADER'S RULE AND OPERATIONS—SANTA ANNA DEPRIVED OF COMMAND—ANAYA AGAIN PRESIDENT—PEÑA SUCCEEDS—PEACE POLICY CONTINUED—INTERNAL DISTURBANCES—WAR OF RACES IN YUCATAN—TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES, WHOSE FORCES EVACUATE MEXICO—GAINS AND LOSSES—EVILS OF THE WAR—PAREDES' REVOLUTION—END OF PEÑA'S ADMINISTRATION.

SOON after Santa Anna assumed the executive office, he formed what may properly be called a semi-parliamentary cabinet, the ministers being Manuel Baranda, of relations; José Ignacio Gutierrez, of war; Juan Rondero, of the treasury; and F. Suarez Iriarte, of justice. Congress authorized him, under certain restrictions,¹ to borrow twenty million dollars. The Farías law of January 11th against clerical property was revoked.

Santa Anna's stay at the capital was short; with the authorization of the legislative body he took command of the national arms, General Pedro Maria Anaya being named his substitute,² and taking charge of the presidency on the 2d of April.³

¹ He was not to sell any portion of the national territory, neither was he to levy forced loans, nor seize private property without compensation, nor enter into contracts for foreign colonization. *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1847, 49-51; *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 124-7; *Niles' Reg.*, lxxii. 214-16.

² This was in accordance with the act of April 1st, suppressing the vice-presidency, authorizing the appointment of a substitute for the president when absent or unable to act, and fixing the 15th of May prox. as the date for the states to elect the president of the republic. *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1847, 53-5; *Mayers' Méx. Aztec.*, i. 369; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, v. 264-6; *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Méx.*, MS., vi. 190-1.

³ The ministers tendered their resignations, which were not accepted.

Anaya was born in Huichapan in 1795, and began his military career in June 1811, as a cadet.⁴ In 1821 he joined Iturbide's movement, and marched to Guatemala under General Filisola. In 1823 he was made a major of cavalry; four years later a lieutenant-colonel; and in the short time from April to June 1833 a colonel and brigadier-general, for his faithful support of federal institutions. In later years he held several civil offices.

The whole attention of the government was now engaged in the war.⁵ The capital was placed under martial law, and the executive clothed with extraordinary powers.⁶

On Santa Anna's return, May 20th, Anaya surrendered the government to him, and went to the front.⁷ Santa Anna's measures after this were wholly military,⁸ excepting one on the 21st of May, when he swore to carry out, and did publish, the *Acta Constitutiva y de Reformas*, passed on the 18th by the constituent congress, the third article of which declared that the *acta constitutiva* and federal constitution, sanctioned respectively on the 31st of January, and 24th of October, 1824, formed the only political

Iriarte was, however, succeeded in the department of justice May 15th by Luis de la Rosa; and Gutierrez, in that of war, May 22d, by Lino José Alcorta.

⁴ His promotions were so slow that, having taken part in 20 actions, he only became a captain early in 1819, and still held this rank in 1821.

⁵ Several important measures were adopted, namely: organization of the national guard; a law for the punishment of deserters; and one of general amnesty for all political offences from the time Mexico became a nation. Another to the same effect was issued June 14th. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, v. 268-9, 284-5.

⁶ The act is dated April 20th. He was, however, forbidden to make peace with the U. S., to conclude negotiations with foreign powers, or to sell national territory. Art. 5 declares it high treason for any one to enter into treaties with the U. S. *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., vi. 228-9; *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1847, 60-2; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, v. 267-8.

⁷ In the defence of the capital, Anaya was taken prisoner, but during the armistice, was unconditionally released.

⁸ His ministers at the time were: of relations, M. Baranda to 17th June, D. Ibarra to 6th July, José R. Pacheco to Sept. 16th; of justice, J. M. Duran to June 17th, V. Romero to Sept. 16th; of the treasury, Juan Rondero to Sept. 7th, and F. M. Lombardo to Sept. 16th; of war, I. Gutierrez to May 22d, L. J. Alcorta to Sept. 16th. *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1045.

constitution of the republic with the reforms now adopted in thirty articles. The sixth article declares to be states of the federation those which were named in the federal constitution, and such as were made afterward. A new state was created to bear the name of Guerrero, mainly comprising the old province of Tecpan, and the city of Mexico was given, while it continued to be the federal district, a vote in the election of president, and the privilege of choosing two senators.⁹



GUERRERO.

Under the reformed constitution the state of Guerrero was to be organized from the districts of Acapulco, Chilapa, Tasco, and Tlapa, and the municipality of Coyuca, the three first named being taken from the

⁹ One of the reform articles prescribed that, besides the senators chosen by the states, there should be an equal number to that of the states chosen on the nomination of the senate, of the supreme court of justice, and of the house of deputies, voting by deputations. The persons obtaining these three suffrages to be the elect, and the chamber of deputies, voting by persons, was to name the rest to complete the number. The office of vice-president was suppressed. Art. 30 declared that on the publication of this law, all the public authorities were to conform thereto; the legislative power continuing vested in the present congress till the assembling of the first constitutional chamber. The states were to continue observing their respective constitutions, and in conformity with them renew their authorities. *Méx., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 237-300; *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1847, 76-157; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, v. 375-83.

state of Mexico, the fourth from Puebla, and the fifth from Michoacan, provided these states gave their assent within three months to the detachment of territory proposed.¹⁰ Owing to the obstacles in the way, some delay occurred in carrying out the law, but the state was finally constituted in 1849.

In order to provide against the possibility of his being killed or captured by the enemy, Santa Anna issued a decree September 7, 1847, appointing his substitutes, which he sent to Manuel de la Peña y Peña, president of the supreme court, to be held in reserve;¹¹ and in accordance with a congressional act decreed that the supreme government might reside in any part of the republic, should the requirements of the existing war demand a change of location. On the 16th of September he held a council of war at Guadalupe and resigned the presidency ad interim, and claiming powers under the 97th article of the constitution, declared that thenceforth the supreme executive authority should be vested in the president of the supreme court, with generals Herrera and Alcorta as his associates, the latter taking the place of Bravo, who was now a prisoner in the enemy's hands.¹² But this provision was rejected as unconstitutional by the president of the supreme court, Manuel de la Peña y Peña, who forthwith repaired to Toluca, and next to Querétaro, where he assumed the office of provisional president of the republic on the 26th of September,¹³ with Luis de la Rosa as his sole minister.

¹⁰ Objections having been raised by Puebla and Michoacan, some delay occurred. Congress allowed, in Aug. 1848, further time for the states interested, and they finally consented. *Méx., Col. Ley.*, 1848, i. 282-3; *Id.*, *Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1848, 307; *Id.*, *Legisl. Mej.*, 1848, 305; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, v. 438; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 359, 369.

¹¹ Art. 1 substituted the president of the supreme court, associated with generals J. J. de Herrera and Nicolás Bravo; art. 2 said that this decree should remain in force till congress assembled and provided otherwise.

¹² Art. 2 of that decree provided that the supreme authorities should, for the time, and till otherwise ordered by the national legislature, reside in Querétaro.

¹³ The nation was without a head from the 17th to the 25th of Sept.

From the moment the city of Mexico was evacuated, desertions on a large scale constantly occurred in the Mexican army. At Guadalupe Santa Anna resolved to let go all officers and men that were unwilling to follow him. On the march of a part of the force under Herrera toward Querétaro, the desertion was such that only by great efforts was a complete dispersion prevented.¹⁴ Santa Anna marched with his demoralized force on the 16th of September for Puebla, reaching its suburbs on the 24th. He hoped by the aid of General Rea, who had been besieging the place, to effect its capture, which he considered an easy undertaking, and thus cut off Scott's communications with Vera Cruz. The United States force holding the town under Colonel Childs consisted of 500 effective men, well armed but otherwise unprovided, and 1,800 invalids.¹⁵ According to Mexican accounts, Santa Anna had 2,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and a good supply of siege artillery, but his operations availed nothing. He raised the siege on the 1st of October,¹⁶ and marched to El Pinal, hoping to cut off a valuable convoy escorted by General Lane. He was again unsuccessful, the convoy entering Huamantla on the 9th, a few hours after his departure from the place,¹⁷ and continuing the march to its destination. Some fighting occurred on the 9th, the foreign invaders having serious casualties;¹⁸ but the Mexican army was now reduced to a skeleton, and

¹⁴ Discipline was at an end. The men would lag behind to seize food and other necessities at the haciendas and small towns. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 5, 6.

¹⁵ *Ripley's War with Mex.*, ii. 491.

¹⁶ See *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 344-7.

¹⁷ It is said the invaders plundered the place and committed outrages. *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos*, 519.

¹⁸ Ripley says the Mexicans had 500 lancers and some infantry in Huamantla when Lane entered the place, and that the invaders lost there 13 killed and 11 wounded, Capt. Walker of the riflemen, a distinguished officer, being among the former. *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos*, 519-20, does not agree with him in either particular. The latter adds that Lane's casualties from Santa Anna's attacks on his rear were 100 killed and 24 prisoners. Lane has acknowledged that the fight was a bloody one, 'the Mexicans combated their assailants with the energy and fury of despair.' *Autobiog.*, MS., 76-8.

Lane entered Puebla unmolested. Santa Anna returned to Huamantla on the 10th.

After the fall of the capital, Scott republished on the 17th of September, with important additions, his orders of February 19th, declaring martial law.¹⁹ The next day he prescribed the distribution and quartering of the troops in the city.²⁰ The collection of customs or duties at the gates of the city by the civil authorities was to be continued till modified by the civil and military governor, to which office General John A. Quitman had been appointed.²¹ At first it was hoped that harmony would be maintained between the Mexican civil authorities and the foreign military rulers; but as it turned out, there were almost daily causes of dissatisfaction.²² The most serious difficulty was about providing quarters for the troops. Angry correspondence followed, and the ayuntamiento was deposed. A municipal assembly was then chosen under the auspices of the conqueror, and given powers to effect reforms, provided they met with his sanction.²³ These men, who had thus lent themselves to

¹⁹ By the 15th art. of his regulations the city with its religious buildings, inhabitants, and property were placed under the special guard of the faith and honor of the U. S. army—an injunction that was not fully carried out, at least as respected the treatment of the inhabitants. As a consideration for the protection thus tendered, a tax was levied on the city of \$150,000, payable in weekly instalments of \$37,500 each. The ayuntamiento was charged with its collection and payment, to effect which it raised a loan at 15 per cent. *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 365; *Roa Barcena, Recuerdos*, 511-13.

²⁰ No private property was to be occupied without the owner's consent, or special orders from general headquarters. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Scs. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 389-90.

²¹ The Mexican civil authorities were of course subject to the governor. *Ripley's War with Mex.*, ii. 533-4; *Mayer's Mex. Aztec*, i. 420-1; *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., viii. 1-35.

²² The Mexicans complained that the U. S. military authorities inflicted the penalty of flogging on the lower class of population for slight offences, and were answered that it was in accordance with military law and usage. There was no safety for life or property, the city being at the mercy of robbers, traitorous counter-guerrillas, and drunken volunteers. The ayuntamiento remonstrated without obtaining satisfaction. *Roa Barcena, Recuerdos*, 543; *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 366; *El Razonador*, Nov. 6, 1847. Ripley acknowledges that the discipline among the troops had after a while become much relaxed, and vice was rampant. A fruitful cause of outrages was the vices openly permitted by the governor and general-in-chief. *War with Mex.*, ii. 569.

²³ The members were most of them persons of no standing. The president, Francisco Suarez Iriarte, was, however, a man of ability, had been a minister of state, and was at this time a deputy to the national congress. They carried

act as the conqueror's tools, found themselves in an unenviable position as soon as the negotiations for peace were initiated.

During that period several newspapers were published at the capital, both in English and Spanish, the former of which freely vented their wrath on the Mexicans.²⁴

Soon after the commanding general had completed his study of the revenue system, he prepared an order fixing the amount of the direct taxes, and the duties to be collected on the precious metals. This order was promulgated on the 31st of December, 1847,²⁵ and the first step toward its execution was to despatch Colonel Withers with the 9th infantry to Pachuca; the next was to station Cadwalader's brigade at Toluca; a few weeks later a detachment was sent to Cuernavaca. The number of troops being too great to be conveniently accommodated in the city of Mexico, Riley's brigade was stationed at Tacubaya, Patterson's division at San Ángel, and a portion of Butler's at Molino del Rey.

The annoyances of the Mexican guerrillas caused the sending of a column of newly arrived troops in January to occupy the towns of Córdoba and Orizaba, where the guerrilla chieftains had held their quar-

their obsequiousness to the pitch of giving a banquet to the conqueror, Scott, in the beautiful spot called El Desierto, on the 29th of January. It has been asserted that on that occasion toasts were drunk in honor of the victory of the U. S. arms in the valley of Mexico, and the desire expressed for the annexation of all Mexico to the U. S. Iriarte was, after the Mexican government reoccupied Mexico, brought to trial. He made a very able defence; he was kept in prison several months, and on account of ill health, allowed to go to his estate, where he died soon after. *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos*, 550-4; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xiii. 100-2.

²⁴The *American Star* and the *North American*. The first named had been originally published in Puebla. It was filled with abuse of the Mexicans, particularly of Santa Anna and the Mexican troops, though still leaning in favor of peace. The other, sustained by officers of the invading army, advocated the annexation of Mexico to the U. S. It had some able Spanish articles supposed to have emanated from Mexican pens. The Spanish papers were *El Monitor*, which went as far as it dared in defending Mexico's cause; *El Eco del Comercio* advocated peace and the union of parties; and *El Canchero*, which abused the respectable classes, occasionally giving some evidences of wit.

²⁵ *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 1063.

ters.²⁶ There were guerrilla parties constantly annoying the invaders, and often striking serious blows. Those under Rea in Puebla had kept Childs confined to narrow limits in that city, capturing his mules, and intercepting his supplies. In Vera Cruz the parties were under different chiefs, the most notable being Father Jarauta and J. C. Rebolledo, comprising in all about 400 men, mostly rancheros. The enemy's trains required to be strongly guarded by infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and even then they did not always escape unscathed.²⁷ The guerrillas of Tamaulipas were under Canales, Urrea, and Romero, having some cavalry officers of the regular army under them. The United States military authorities finally adopted stringent measures to check depredations, and even shot a number who had violated their parole.

During the progress of the events already related, various occurrences took place in the Californias, New Mexico, and on the western coast of Mexico, which, though having but little effect on the main question of the war, were still parts of its history, and had a direct bearing on peace negotiations.²⁸

Public attention was soon called to dissensions among the generals of the invading army. An accusation having been made against Scott, a court of inquiry was ordered by his government. He was deprived of his command, Butler succeeding him on the 18th of February, 1848.²⁹ Leaving them to their quarrels, let us continue the thread of Mexican history.

The prominent man now was President Manuel de la Peña y Peña, born at Tacuba on the 10th of March,

²⁶ Particulars on those movements in *Ripley's War with Mex.*, ii. 575-9; *El Arco Iris*, Feb. 2, 1848; *Free Am.*, Feb. 17, 1848; *Jenkins' Mex. War*, 483.

²⁷ Once they attacked a convoy at Tolome, capturing 14 wagons and upwards of 400 loaded mules, and killing 100 men. *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 387.

²⁸ See *Hist. Cal.*, v.; *Hist. North Mex. States*, ii., this series, giving the military and naval operations on the Pacific, and Gen. Price's campaign in Chihuahua.

²⁹ *Scott's Mem.*, 583-95; *Ripley's War with Mex.*, ii. 585; *Niles' Reg.*, lxxiv. 4-5; *El Razonador*, Feb. 26, 1848.

1789, of a good family though in reduced circumstances. He early gave evidence of talents, and was admitted to the bar on the 16th of December, 1811.³⁰ The executive, after Iturbide's fall, made him an oidor of the audiencia, and on the 25th of December, 1824, he was elected by a majority of the states to fill a justiceship in the supreme court of the republic, from which date he was connected with that court nearly all the time till his death.

Peña also held other important offices, namely, minister of the interior in 1837, and member of the poder conservador, in which latter office he achieved prominence. He was professor of law in the university, and toward the end of 1841 participated in framing the bases orgánicas. In 1843 he was made a councillor of state and senator, and to the latter office was reelected in 1845. He had the portfolio of relations under President Herrera, and at the fall of that administration returned to his position in the supreme court.

Peña's course in upholding the constitution doubtless saved Mexico from the evils of anarchy, which would necessarily have followed if any heed had been paid to Santa Anna's pretension to dictate who should be his successor as president. The new government was unhesitatingly recognized and congratulated by several comandantes generales and governors. It insisted on the elections of members to the national congress being effected. President Peña was thoroughly convinced that the war could not, for the want of resources, be prosecuted any longer, but would not at-

³⁰ In 1813 he was síndico of the ayuntamiento of Mexico, an office that he filled so ably that the king appointed him, at the request of many respectable and influential persons, an oidor of the audiencia of Quito in Ecuador, which he did not accept, requesting to be employed in New Spain. By the time this was decided the independence had been consummated, when Peña swore to support it, and was given a high position in the territorial audiencia of Mexico, which he retained till the 21st of October, 1822, when, being already a councillor of state, he was appointed by the emperor minister to Columbia, which appointment had no effect, the empire having ceased soon after. He had also conferred on him the cross of the order of Guadalupe. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 341-2.

tempt to solve such an important question on his unsupported judgment.³¹

Santa Anna was ordered to surrender the command of the army to Manuel Rincon or Juan Alvarez. Some bitter correspondence passed between the ex-president and the present incumbent, through Minister La Rosa, who told the former that orders for his trial had been issued because it was necessary to bring the army under discipline, and to energetically repress insubordination and cowardice. Santa Anna was also severely rebuked for the disrespectful tone of his communications to President Peña. He obeyed the order, delivering the command to his second, General Reyes, who was to hold it till the arrival of the commander designated by the government.³²

Santa Anna's late military efforts had failed, partly through the lack of morale among his troops; it had been beaten out of them by constant revolutions, or if not by these, certainly by their defeats in the northern campaign. But the blame falls also upon his own blunders and shortcomings, his uneven capacity and instability of purpose, manifested especially in the battle-field. He redeems himself, on the other hand, with many a diplomatic triumph, and shines with his energy, in rising indomitably after every disaster, in creating resources, forming armies, directing a number of admirable measures, and inspiring all around with zeal.³³

³¹ The governors were requested to suggest, in the event of their not favoring a continuation of the war, the best mode of conducting it for the national safety and honor.

³² Santa Anna went to reside with his family in Tehuacan, where he narrowly escaped capture by Lane on the 23d of January. Early in 1848 he obtained a passport to go abroad, and with a safe-conduct of the U. S. forces embarked at La Antigua on the Spanish brig *Pepita*. Early in 1850 he went to Cartagena, and fixed his residence in Turbaco. Subsequent political events in Mexico recalled him to his country.

³³ Besides the defence of his conduct issued in *Apelacion*, Mex., 1849, 71 and 184 pp., which covers the entire campaign, and in *Detall de las Oper.*, 1-48, relating to the defence of the capital, Santa Anna appealed also to the public in *Manif. Mex.*, 1848, 1-12, and *Comunic. Ofic.*, Guad., 1848, 1-11; *Pap. Var.*, xcix., pts 17-18; and through journals like *Arco Iris*, *Razonador*, Nov. 3, 6, 1847, Jan. 1, 1848, etc. He was the most prominent fighter of Mexico in the war of 1846-8. *Roa Bárcena*, *Recuerdos*, 533.

Peña took upon his shoulders the responsibility of entering upon preliminary negotiations for peace. He well knew that his resolution would be a destructive weapon in the hands of the moderados, among whom was Paredes, who was summoned to Querétaro, and refused to go.³⁴

Congress, having assembled at Querétaro, decreed that a president ad interim should be chosen on the 9th of November, upon which date Pedro M. Anaya was elected with the express condition that his functions should cease on the 8th of January, 1848,³⁵ and if congress was not then in session, the office should devolve on the person designated by the constitution. A vote of thanks was awarded to Peña. The latter on the 12th of November, at a very critical time, surrendered the executive authority.³⁶ It may be said, however, that the presidential change was merely in name, as Peña at once took charge of the portfolio of relations, and his policy was continued.³⁷

The government's hands were tied by the scarcity of resources. The loss of the capital had evidently disheartened the people. Indeed, it was impossible to rouse the enthusiasm of a people who had neither arms nor ammunition, nor even the means of sustaining life. The states that had not been brought under subjection by the invading enemy spread the false

³⁴ Peña caused to be released on parole all prisoners of the enemy, and adopted several measures directed to the correction of abuses.

³⁵ His election was formally announced on the 11th of Nov. *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1847, 214-16; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, v. 305-6.

³⁶ Several attempts at revolution in Guanajuato had somewhat occupied the government's attention. *El Correo Nacional*, Oct. 29, 1847; *El Arco Iris*, Dec. 6, 1847. A revolt had been successful in Oajaca; large bodies of men had gathered in the sierra of Querétaro, whose aim was to prey upon the country; in Chiapas a faction was working to reannex her to Guatemala, that faction claiming that the people were tired of Mexico's misrule and neglect of their interests. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 23; *Id., Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 344; *Tab., Manif. del Gob.*, 1-20.

³⁷ His colleagues then were, Luis de la Rosa, in treasury and justice; and Ignacio de Mora y Villamil, in war and navy. *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1847, 216; *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1046. The most important measures of the new administration were: granting pardon to deserters reporting themselves with their arms; reorganizing the army; and demanding from the states an extraordinary contingent of 16,000 men. *Méx., Doc. Min. Guerra*, 1-13.

report that the government was negotiating a treaty to sell the Californias, Chihuahua, New Mexico, and a part of Sonora.³⁸ The governors of states nearest to Querétaro who could easily come there had been invited by Peña to hold conferences on the 10th of November. Those of Puebla, Querétaro, Michoacan, Guanajuato, San Luis Potosí, and the vice-governor of Zacatecas came. Jalisco accredited a commissioner. The governor of Mexico failed to appear. Those governors closed their conference in the middle of December, declaring that they would sustain the federal government in the fulfilment of its duties.³⁹

Anaya surrendered the executive office on the 8th of January, 1848, to the person designated by the constitution, namely, the president of the supreme court, Peña y Peña, and took charge of the portfolio of war,⁴⁰ ever acting in accord with his successor, who continued his labors to secure a peace.⁴¹ He earnestly urged the assembling of congress without delay, hoping that the deputies would not forsake their country's interests at this time of tribulation. The governors were asked to coöperate to that end, and were assured that the administration would endeavor to avert the military occupation of the states yet free, by negotiating a treaty of peace which should not tarnish the national honor and dignity. With all these exertions, on the 11th of January only eight senators and 26 deputies had come to Querétaro.

³⁸ What gave rise to such a report was that the government's correspondence with its commissioners in Mexico, Miguel Atristain and Juan Hierro Maldonado, to treat of peace, was intercepted. The governor of San Luis Potosí wanted the war to continue, and protested against any peace. The legislature of Mexico demanded that the question of peace should not be acted upon without first obtaining the sanction of the integral parts of the republic, proposing that each should accredit two deputies fully instructed. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 36-7.

³⁹ 'En la extension y forma prescritas por la constitucion.' *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos*, 567-8.

⁴⁰ His colleagues were Luis de la Rosa, of relations and treasury; J. M. Duran, of justice. *Méx., Leg. Mej.*, 1848, 8.

⁴¹ Anaya was again secretary of war under Arista; serving in Ceballos' administration three days. On Santa Anna's restoration he was made postmaster-general, and held this office at his death on the 21st of March, 1854.

The government not only found the greatest difficulty by reason of scanty resources, but had also to struggle against revolution which now showed its head in San Luis Potosí, and threatened to invade other states. An anarchical plan was proclaimed by the vice-governor on the 12th of January, to the same effect as that which Deputy Zubieta once moved in congress, and was formally rejected. It was the resumption of autonomy, and a revolt against the national sovereignty at the same time that its authors pretended to respect that sovereignty. The government at Querétaro was now in a most difficult position. Fortunately the revolution was strangled at its birth. The vice-governor resigned on being imprisoned, and the legislature sensibly disavowed his seditious plan.⁴² Other seditious attempts were initiated elsewhere, whose object was to upset the government. In the Sierra Gorda revolution had become chronic, and was getting to be more and more bloody every day. It could not be stopped, though a heavy force was sent there to check it. Crimes were of daily occurrence.⁴³

Fears were entertained that disorderly and plundering parties would appear in several places, particularly in the regions thickly populated by Indians.

The condition of Yucatan, suffering from a war of races, caused great alarm, there being good reason to apprehend that the insurgents would be successful in destroying every vestige of European civilization.

The rebellion of 1847 had its origin in the unappeasable hatred of the Mayas toward their rulers from the earliest time of the Spanish conquest. In republican days their chiefs had often been invited to aid one party or another in the civil wars so constantly

⁴² The executive of that state wanted the war to continue at all hazard, and organized troops. It was said that Governor Adame, if that plan had succeeded, would be the president, and even those who would be his ministers were spoken of.

⁴³ The rebels marauding in the sierra de Huejutla asked aid from the U. S. commanders, which was refused them. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 67.

scourging the land. It was thus that the chiefs, or caciques, Manuel Antonio Ay, Cecilio Chí, and Antonio Pat, as well as many others, acquired experience in warfare and the use of fire-arms. They had taken part in an emeute⁴⁴ which the government allowed to go unpunished. It was probably this impunity that stimulated them to plan a conspiracy to deluge the country with blood, and to sow devastation throughout its length and breadth. They found a ready coöperator in the notorious murderer, Bonifacio Novelo of Valladolid. The first meeting to treat of the insurrection on behalf of the independence of their race was in the rancho Xihum, about sixteen leagues from Tihosuco, and as many from Valladolid. Ay and Chí attended it, but there is no certainty that Pat did.⁴⁵ Their plan became known to the government. Ay was arrested and executed at Valladolid on July 26th. Chí and Pat were not captured, but many others fell into the government's hands and were harshly dealt with as conspirators against the white race.

Chí struck the first blow, falling upon the town of Tepich on the 30th of July, when the inhabitants were asleep, and pitilessly murdering all the mestizos and mulattoes. Only a few women were for the time spared, to satisfy their lust. One man escaped, however, who carried the tidings to Tihosuco.

The rebellion soon spread through the south and east. Several bloody encounters took place, in which the white men and their allies were victorious, but no decisive results were gained. The measures of the government against the natives were severe; indeed, they formed an inhuman system of persecution, which only helped to swell the ranks of the insurgents, and to increase their animosity.

I have no space to enter into details. The insurrection became so general that the whites and mixed

⁴⁴ Jan. 15, 1847. *Baqueiro, Ensayo Hist.*, iii. ap. 98-101.

⁴⁵ Chí was the most blood-thirsty. Ay thought their enemies could be subdued without spilling much blood. Pat wanted his race to be above all others, and to rule; but he had no desire to exterminate or expel the whites.

breeds had to abandon their homes, and seek refuge on the coast from their relentless foes, with whom the government could no longer cope.⁴⁶ At last in this time of anguish, help came from an unexpected quarter, in the form of arms and ammunition sent them by the authorities of Cuba. Some Spanish war vessels also rendered assistance in conveying families to places of safety.

In 1848, after peace had been concluded between Mexico and the United States, Commodore Perry was requested by the citizens of Laguna de Términos not to evacuate the island till Mexico could afford them protection, which was acceded to.⁴⁷

Finally, through the good offices of the curate Vela, a treaty was entered into with Jacinto Pat;⁴⁸ but being several times violated, it soon ceased to have any value. The rebels were never short of arms or ammunition.⁴⁹

In 1849 a foreign regiment, with most of the men from the United States, was organized, but was disbanded soon after.⁵⁰ The state government, having to provide resources, gave leave in March of that year to take to Cuba or Vera Cruz, as coolies, such Indian prisoners as were willing to go there.⁵¹ The Mexican government disapproved of the measure, but after a

⁴⁶ *Busto, Estad. Rep. Mex.*, iii. pt 1, 263; *Mayer's Mex. Aztec.*, i. 429; *Niles' Reg.*, lxxiii. 5.

⁴⁷ Three hundred and fifty men were left till relieved by a Mexican force. It is asserted that the governor tendered the sovereignty over Yucatan to any nation that would assume its protection. *Baqueiro, Ensayo Hist.*, ii. 331-3, 374-6, 394-403; *Ancona, Hist. Yuc.*, iv. 106, 109; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xiii. 171-2, 194.

⁴⁸ A most ominous and humiliating one, inasmuch as it stipulated, among other things, that the Indians should retain their arms, and all that had been taken from them should be restored. Miguel Barbachano, for whom Pat had a special predilection, was to be governor of Yucatan for life, and Pat, chief or governor of the Indians, also for life. Personal and distilling taxes were to be abolished, and ecclesiastical fees much reduced. *Baqueiro, Ensayo Hist.*, ii. 403-14.

⁴⁹ There is abundant evidence of their being supplied by the traders of British Honduras. *Belize, Yuc. Espos. Gob. Créditos*, 98-102.

⁵⁰ *Niles' Reg.*, lxxv. 205.

⁵¹ It was said that they went willingly; but this is rather doubtful, as the government received a bonus of \$25 per head. *Barbachano, Discurso*, 20-1.

reconsideration, it was carried out with the consent of the latter.

Affairs in Yucatan began to assume a more promising aspect early in 1850, when, after some important victories by the government forces, the Indians saw the necessity of an arrangement.⁵² The state government then, on the 2d of February, 1850, issued a decree intended to induce the Mayas to accept peace, granting pardon to all who had been concerned in the rebellion. The hopes of a peaceable solution were not realized, however, the war still continuing. In 1851 the rebels established their headquarters and stronghold in Chan Santa Cruz. General Vega made strenuous efforts to bring them under subjection, several expeditions to Santa Cruz meeting with considerable success. A treaty of peace was made, or at least an understanding was arrived at, in 1853, with the chief Tzuc, through the good offices of the superintendent of Belize. The arrangement was drawn up in Spanish, and Maya and several other native leaders accepted it afterward. Under it Chichanjá and other towns of that region laid down their arms, though without submitting to the government of Yucatan, in which anomalous and precarious situation they have remained to the present day.

President Peña never lost sight of the great point of securing peace with the United States. Negotiations having that object in view were reopened by the United States commissioner, Nicholas P. Trist, who, though his powers had been withdrawn by his government, continued exercising them on the supposition that, peace being desired by the United States, any treaty honorable to the latter would be ratified without a too close inquiry as to the authority under which it had been accomplished. After several conferences⁵³ held between him and the Mexican com-

⁵² Their proposals may be seen in *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xiii. 358-64.

⁵³ The proposition was made to Trist by the Mexican commissioners that

missioners, Bernardo Couto, Miguel Atristain, and Luis G. Cuevas, a treaty was finally concluded and signed by them at Guadalupe Hidalgo,⁴ on the 2d of February, 1848, consisting of twenty-three articles, and an additional and secret one extending the term stipulated for the exchange of ratifications. The chief stipulations embraced in the treaty were those contained in articles 5, 6, 12, 13, and 14.

Article 5 fixes the future boundaries between the two republics, and under it Mexico ceded to the United States Texas, New Mexico with all the territory then belonging to it, and Alta California. The limit between the latter and Baja California was made a straight line drawn from the middle of the Rio Gila, where it unites with the Colorado, to a point on the coast of the Pacific Ocean, distant one marine league due south of the southernmost point of the port of San Diego, according to Pantoja's map of 1782. The article also stipulates for the future running of the boundary line between the two nations. Article 6 gives the United States and their citizens a free and uninterrupted passage by the gulf of California and by the river Colorado, below its confluence with the Gila, to and from their possessions north of the boundary line defined in the preceding article. Article 12 stipulates that the United States shall pay Mexico, in consideration of the extension of boundaries acquired by the former, fifteen million dollars, and

an armistice and cessation of arms should be entered into. Trist laid it before Gen. Scott, but the latter for good reasons would not take upon himself the responsibility of granting a second armistice till a treaty had become a fact. This was verbally made known by Trist to the commissioners of Mexico, whose government then, after due consideration, resolved to secure an arrangement of the questions at issue between the two countries, by secret negotiations, and without an armistice, leaving the latter to be entered into when the arrangement should have been completed. Couto, one of the Mexican commissioners, wrote Peña on the 3d of Dec. that Scott, though unwilling to formally agree to a cessation of arms, promised not to prosecute hostilities. He fulfilled his promise, contenting himself with the occupation of two or three new places, when he might, had he chosen, have freely invaded the central states. *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos*, 590-1; *Apunt. Hist. Guerra*, 392.

⁴It has been stated that Trist himself chose the place, because of the veneration felt for it by the Mexicans. *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos*, 607.

specifies two modes of payment, one or the other of which the Mexican government is to designate at the time of ratifying the treaty. Article 13 binds the United States government to assume and pay to its claimants against Mexico all amounts due them, and those to become due them by reason of claims liquidated and decided against Mexico under the conventions of April 11, 1839, and January 30, 1843. Article 14 exempts Mexico from all claims not decided against her which have arisen previous to the signing of the treaty, the United States assuming their payment, the full amount not exceeding three and a quarter million dollars. Article 23 provides that the treaty shall be ratified agreeably to the constitutions of the two countries, and the ratifications exchanged at Washington in four months from the date of signing, or sooner if practicable. The additional secret treaty allows that the time of exchange of ratifications may be extended to eight months, should the political condition of the Mexican republic so demand it.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Arts 1 to 4 relate to a firm peace in the future, and stipulate the suspension of hostilities, cessation of blockades, evacuation of Mexican territory, surrender of castles, plans, and public property by U. S. forces. Art. 7 gives the right of navigating the river Gila, and the part of the Rio Bravo del Norte below the southern boundary of New Mexico, to the vessels and citizens of both countries. Art. 8 gives to Mexicans established in territories formerly belonging to Mexico, and wishing to remain in them in future, the rights of U. S. citizenship, unless they should signify within one year their preference for Mexican citizenship, with which character they might also remain, and hold property, which would be respected. Art. 9 secures ample guarantees to all ecclesiastic and religious corporations or communities in the territories acquired by the U. S. under this treaty. Art. 17. The treaty of Apr. 5, 1831, between the two countries is revived for eight years in every particular not incompatible with the stipulations of this treaty. Arts 21 and 22 prescribe the manner of avoiding hostilities in the future, the privileges of merchants, mode of alleviating the fate of prisoners, etc. Full texts of the treaty may be found in *Méx., Derecho Intern.*, 1st pt, 193-226; *Manfield's Mex. War*, 332-45; *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1848, 30-95; *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1848, 28-93; *Niles' Reg.*, lxxiv. 43-5; *Young's Hist. Mex.*, 559-67; *Dublin and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, v. 367-80; *Ripley's War with Mex.*, ii. 581-5. Pursuant to the terms of the treaty, Mexico and the U. S. appointed commissioners to run the boundaries. The former also made provision to bring into her territory Mexican families residing in the ceded territory and desirous of coming to Mexico. *Dublin and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, v. 438-41, 491; *Méx., Derecho Intern.*, 1st pt, 255-8; *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1848, 307-14; *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1848, 305-12.

On the 6th of February the treaty was officially announced by Minister La Rosa; on the 22d of the same month it was laid by President Polk before the senate of the United States, by which body it was confirmed with some amendments.⁶⁶ The reasons for such amendments were, at subsequent conferences, explained to Minister La Rosa by the United States commissioners Ambrose H. Sevier and Nathan Clifford, and, being deemed sufficient and satisfactory, the Mexican government accepted them, and at once ratified the treaty with such amendments, and it was confirmed by a large majority in the Mexican house of deputies, and by 33 to 5 in the senate.⁶⁷ The United States commissioners, on the 19th of June, officially notified the secretary of state that the treaty was complete, and President Polk, two years and two months from the commencement of the war, issued his proclamation to his people, announcing that peace now reigned between the United States and Mexico. The treaty, indeed, put an end to a war that never should have been undertaken; a war begun by one of the parties to it without any justification, and accepted by the other with a remarkable lack of foresight and indifference to results. Without means, in the midst of political confusion, and after thirty-six years of constant civil disturbance, the Mexican republic undertook to measure its strength with a young nation full of life and vigor, with abundant military and naval elements. And yet, unhappy as the results were for it, one must acknowledge that its honor was maintained. The treaty represents, indeed, its great misfortune, but does not involve perpetually ignominious stipulations, such as many another nation has submitted to at the will of a conqueror. The United

⁶⁶ The modifications were in the 9th, 10th, and 12th articles. The additional and secret article was expunged entirely.

⁶⁷ A question on the constitutionality of the treaty was raised by a number of deputies, but their objections were overruled by the supreme court. *Bravo, Impugn.*, 1-20; *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1848, I. 684-708; *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectif.*, 331-52.

States was in the wrong; all the world knows it, all honest American citizens acknowledge it. The Mexican republic lost a large portion of its territory, and with it many citizens, but retained its nationality and independence, with an immense extent of country, more than enough to render it happy and powerful in the future.

Soon after the signing of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, a convention was concluded on the 29th of February by generals Worth and Smith on the part of the United States army of occupation, and generals Mora and Quijano on the part of Mexico's military authorities, for a provisional suspension of hostilities, which was ratified by General Butler, and by Anaya, the Mexican minister of war, on the 6th and 7th of March. It contained seventeen articles, and the object, as it implied, was a cessation of arms pending the exchange of ratifications of the aforesaid treaty, and further to enable the Mexican authorities to restore constitutional civil government in the places occupied by the United States forces.⁵⁸ By virtue of the armistice, and under the special appointment made by the president on the 6th of March, of Juan M. Flores y Teran as governor of the federal district, the latter restored the ayuntamiento of 1847, regulated the collection of municipal taxes, and called the people to choose deputies and senators to the national congress, as well as to elect a president of the republic.

The preparations for the departure of the United States troops had begun about the middle of May; and on the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace being published by their general-in-chief, the detachments at Toluca, Cuernavaca, and Pachuca were retired. Patterson's division left Mexico for Vera Cruz on the 30th of May; the other divisions departing in the first days of June, and on the 12th of that

⁵⁸ Text of the convention in *Méx., Derecho Intern.*, 1st pt, 250-4; *Méx., Legisl. Méj.*, 1848, 94-101; *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1848, 96-103; *Dublin and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, v. 345-8.

month the United States guards were relieved by Mexican troops, the United States flag was hauled down, and the Mexican hoisted upon the national palace and saluted by the artillery of both armies. Worth's division was the last to abandon the city, and after its departure the president and his ministers entered the capital.⁶⁹ The retiring troops spent a few days in Jalapa waiting for transport ships, and on their arrival repaired to Vera Cruz and embarked. The evacuation of the northern line was also effected rapidly and in good order, excepting a little dilatoriness on the part of Sterling Price at Chihuahua.

In Vera Cruz, where the custom-house had been restored to Mexican officials on the 11th of June, the surrender of the city and the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa took place with the usual formalities and salutes. On the same day, the last remaining force of the invaders reëmbarked, and the Mexican people breathed free again.

And now let us consider the results of the Mexican war for the United States, which may be summed up in three items, namely, loss of life, loss of money, and gain of territory. Of the first item, according to official returns, the actual loss in the field, by battle and sickness, was 15,000 men; in battles alone 5,101. This was not all, however. Many on their way to join their regiments in Mexico fell sick and died, without having appeared on the rolls of the actual force. Many died after being mustered out of service. It may therefore be said with truth that the loss of life was not less than 25,000 men.⁷⁰ What it is for 25,000 men to be killed, God knoweth; it was much to them, howsoever little to the magnates at Washington. According to a Mexican account, the

⁶⁹ A description of the events appears in a contemporaneous narrative, which is copied in *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos*, 628. The official announcement of the reoccupation of the capital by the Mexican government appears in *Méx., Col. Lry. y Dec.*, 1848, i. 70-2. In September next, honors were paid to the Mexican victims of the war.

⁷⁰ *Mansfield's Mex. War*, 347, 356-65; *Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos*, 537-8. Livermore sets 20,000 as a very moderate computation. *War with Mex.*, 110.

number of killed of the Mexicans in the several battles was almost 5,000 men. It is not easy to ascertain what was the actual loss of life sustained by Mexico during the war.⁶¹ The cost in money to the United States has been estimated at \$166,500,000. The loss in money to Mexico will never be ascertained. The gain of territory by the United States was immense, comprising a surface of upwards of 650,000 square miles.

The total strength of the army employed by the United States in Mexico, from April 1846 to April 1848, consisted of 54,243 infantry, 15,781 cavalry, 1,782 artillery, and 25,189 recruits, making a total of 96,995 men. From the foregoing list have been excluded several companies called out in Ohio and Louisiana, but that did not go to Mexico. If included, the total number called out by the government would exceed 100,000 men. The number that actually served in Mexico exceeded 80,000, not all called out at the same time, but in successive periods. At the closing of the war, according to the adjutant-general's reports, there were actually upwards of 40,000 in the field.

The war of the United States against Mexico is fraught with instruction. A hope had been cherished by the friends of peace among some nations, that in a pure republic, where the people rule, a warlike spirit could not be fostered. Here and elsewhere it has proved otherwise. The spirit developed by free institutions makes the republican a most formidable soldier when he is not swayed by moral scruples. In the United States sectional rivalries and interests, and the eagerness to gain distinction, had fanned the flame of passion for war, and the battle-field was looked to as a good arena for deciding the pending issues as well as for competition. Social, political, commercial, or industrial interests are but broken reeds, as man

⁶¹ *Hernandez, Estad. Mej.*, 234; *El Arco Iris*, Feb. 9, 1848.
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will not give up the gratification of his passions, even though by so doing he may make a profit. Civilization has done away with many of the old barbarous practices, but unless supported by a truly christian spirit will not afford the adequate remedy.

The so-called improvements of warfare in the opinion of men justify the continuance of war, on the ground that the destruction of life and the infliction of suffering have been much diminished by the new devices. God save the mark! Killing men is not a trade susceptible of improvement; the experience of the Mexican war shows that neither side dispensed with the horrors of ancient practices.⁶² If the injustice of all war was never before established, it was made clear by this contest between the two republics of North America. The saddest lesson to learn by the citizens of the United States is that the war they waged against their neighbor is a signal example of the employment of might against right, or force to compel the surrender by Mexico of a portion of her territory, and therefore a blot upon their national honor.⁶³ The United States had an opportunity of displaying magnanimity to a weaker neighbor, aiding her in the experiment of developing republican institutions, instead of playing the part of bully.

President Polk recklessly waged a devastating war, and yet pretended to be sighing for peace. His supporters in the press advocated the bombardment of Mexican cities, and an inhuman destruction of Mexican life.⁶⁴ Those barbarous sentiments were

⁶² 'Plundering, massacres, cruelties, the killing of the wounded on the field of battle, and even in some cases burning alive at the stake, have been recorded, on the highest official authority, as a part of the history of the Mexican war.' *Livermore's War with Mex.*, 263.

⁶³ 'A compound of the crime of the highwayman, who puts his pistol at your head, and cries, "Deliver or die!" and the truckling of the pedler who trades in small wares, and chuckles over his hard-driven bargain after it is made.' *Livermore's War with Mex.*, 265.

⁶⁴ 'Destroy the city of Mexico, level it with the earth on which it stands, serve Puebla, Perote, Jalapa, Saitillo, and Monterey in the same way, and then increase our demand,' says one. 'Unless we distress the Mexicans, carry destruction and loss of life to every fireside, and make them feel a rod of iron, they will not respect us,' says another. The *Union*, Polk's organ, in-

aggravated by the false pretext on which they were urged, namely, that Mexico had provoked the war. It was President Polk's action in ordering troops beyond the limits of the United States and into Mexican territory that brought on the war. It was an assumption on his part of powers not vested in him by law. The war, though recognized by congress after hostilities had begun, was in fact the device of Polk and his party. He had no right to involve his country in war, and the house of representatives told him so.⁶⁵ The four days' bombardment of Vera Cruz was no doubt effected according to the laws of war; but this does not tend to increase our respect for war laws, for it was horrible and wholly unnecessary work.⁶⁶ Add the illegitimate barbarities committed—often with impunity—by an undisciplined, lawless rabble, such as a large portion of the United States forces was composed of—unfortunately too well authenticated, and retaliated for as they often were by the Mexicans, especially the guerrilla parties—and we have acts of atrocity, whosoever were their authors, evidencing a depravity of nature as appalling as it was disgraceful.⁶⁷

The United States could have secured peace by ceasing to assail the Mexicans, who were fighting only

dulges in the old Christ-like logic: 'Henceforth we must seek peace, and compel it by inflicting on our enemies all the evils of war.' See *Jay's Rev. Mex. War*, 259.

⁶⁵ Polk well knew that congress would not authorize his invading Mexico to compel the payment of an alleged debt.

⁶⁶ The foreign consuls wrote Gen. Scott, March 24, 1847, of 'the frightful results.' The *New York Herald* said that the bombardment placed the town in ruins, 'under which great numbers of non-combatants, men, women, and children, were buried.' Many heart-rending descriptions might be quoted.

⁶⁷ Such cases, almost without number, might be given here, not only from contemporaneous correspondence of reputable journals such as the *Charleston Mercury*, *Louisville Journal*, *New Orleans Picayune*, *Saint Louis Republican*, *Boston Daily Times*, *El Arco Iris*, a Mexican newspaper, and numerous others; but likewise from official reports to the war department at Washington, including the spirited remonstrance of May 10, 1847, by Gen. Mora y Villamil, at San Luis Potosí, to Gen. Taylor, in which he uses these words: 'The treacherous assassinations of Agua Nueva, Catarina, and Marin have not been the only ones; the ruin, devastation, and conflagration of towns mark everywhere the march of the invading army.' Such outrages also occurred on the line from Vera Cruz to Mexico. *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 910-14, 1139-42, 1178; Sen. 26; Miscel. 73, 78; Sen. 52, 347.

in self-defence. But the so much desired peace they were resolved so to secure by war that a bargain, which was nothing better than barefaced robbery, should be secured. The coveted acquisition was secured, and President Polk boasted in his message to the United States senate of "the magnanimous forbearance exhibited toward Mexico." All this, as every intelligent American knows, was pure humbug. It was not magnanimity but policy which prompted Polk and his fellows to pay Mexico about twenty million dollars when she was at the conqueror's mercy. It gave among the nations, howsoever Almighty God regarded it, some shadow of title to stolen property.⁶⁸


The negotiation of a treaty to bring peace to distracted Mexico was the source of great trouble in the country, caused by those who used it as a pretext to promote their own aims. A revolution broke out at Aguascalientes, whose chiefs were Governor Cosío and the guerrilla leader Padre Cenobio Jarauta. With about 1,000 men they drove out of the city the comandante general, Manuel Arteaga, who had refused to join them.

Jarauta, in accord with the garrison of Lagos, published in June the plan of the discontented in five articles, the chief points of which were to ignore the existing government, and that the states should reassume their sovereignty, and provide means for the constitution of another. Meantime the command of the forces was to be vested in the general officer of the highest rank who had accepted the plan. This arrange-

⁶⁸ *Livermore, Abiel Abbot. The War with Mexico Reviewed.* Boston, 1850. Sm. 8°, 310 pp. This work was intended by the author to be a review of the Mexican war on the principles of christianity, and an enlightened statesmanship. A committee of award, composed of three of the most distinguished divines in the U. S., pronounced it the best as yet written on the subject, allowing him the premium offered by the American peace society. It is full of facts on the events of the war, which is exhaustively treated in a philosophical and christian spirit, deprecating its commencement, and the causes that led to it, the mode of its prosecution, both in its legitimate and illegitimate bearings.

ment, the secret work of Paredes, was signed by seven men.

Paredes left Aguascalientes June 12, 1848, joined Jarauta and his companions, and marched on Guanajuato, which seconded his views on the 15th. The governor was deposed, and Manuel Doblado appointed in his place. Doblado issued a stirring address to other governors, but they paid no further notice than to strongly disapprove it.⁶⁹ Paredes met with a similar



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rebuff from General Anastasio Bustamante, who was despatched with a large force to attack him. Much hard fighting ensued, but the most important action was on the 18th of July, when the town was assaulted and Jarauta taken prisoner, conveyed to Valenciana, and shot.⁷⁰ His death disheartened the rebels. Their

⁶⁹ Rivera, *Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 94-100; *Méx., Col. Ley.*, 1848, i. 104-6. The refusals and condemnation of several governors are seen in *El Correo Nac.*, June 30 to Aug. 3, 1848.

⁷⁰ The execution was pursuant to orders from the government. Arrangoiz,

chiefs pretended much resolution to continue fighting, but it was a mere ruse to gain time. Indeed, in the morning of the 19th, Paredes, Doblado, and the rest escaped. The city then surrendered. The chief leader, Paredes, went to Europe. All the implicated were finally pardoned.⁷¹

In the midst of the confusion, the election for president of the republic took place, and José Joaquín de Herrera was reelected and assumed his duties, and Peña returned to his post of president of the supreme court on the 3d of June, 1848.

Ex-president Peña was the author of several lectures on jurisprudence, which are highly valued by the legal profession of Mexico. He had the reputation of being an excellent husband and father, a loyal friend, and upright judge. He was greatly respected and beloved, though there were not wanting some who called him a traitor for the treaty with the United States that he advocated as chief magistrate of the republic. His death occurred on the 2d of January, 1850; his remains were accompanied to the grave by rich and poor, and all classes.⁷²

Méj., ii. 295, says Jarauta was allowed only half an hour to prepare for death. According to Bustamante's report, he was shot three hours after capture. Jarauta was a friar, and had been a carlist leader in Spain in favor of absolutism. It is claimed that, though not a Mexican, he had done good service to Mexico, and whatever his political faults, he should have been spared. *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xiii. 193-202. The fact is, that in his guerrilla warfare he was hardly better than a highwayman, plundering both friend and foe without much discrimination.

⁷¹ *El Heraldo*, Nov. 20, 1848; *El Repub. Jalisciense*, July 20, 1848; *Méz., Legist. Méj.*, 1851, 116-18; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, vi. 46-7, 82.

⁷² The coffin was carried on the shoulders of the sergeants of the several regiments, and the pall-bearers represented the army, the treasury, and the university. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 334.

American writers on the war with Mexico are numerous; and many of their productions, owing to extravagant exaggeration, or to the fact that they are mere compilations without any originality or reflection, are worthless to the historian. Apart from official documents, the most important of American authorities for a history embracing the whole war is: *R. S. Ripley, The War with Mexico*. 8vo, 2 vol., pp. 524, 650. New York, 1849. The author was a brevet major of the U. S. army, and first lieutenant of the 2d regiment of artillery, and his work possesses merit, not only on account of the ability displayed, but also owing to the advantages possessed by the writer for collecting material. A personal observation of both the principal routes of operation, his intimate acquaintance with many American officers, and his intercourse with Mexican officers, together with his access to the official pub-

lications of the two governments, supplied him with excellent means of producing an impartial history of the war. This, he states in his preface, was his aim; and it must be admitted that he has succeeded as far as all reasonable expectation could desire. The work contains an account of all the operations during the war, down to the time of the evacuation of Mexico, preceded by an introductory chapter on Mexican relations with the U. S. previous to the breaking-out of hostilities. Ripley criticises the military movements of the different generals on either side, his observations being made with reference to the approved maxims of great military men. Both Scott's and Taylor's errors in generalship are exposed, as well as those of their opponents. At times the author is somewhat prolix. He supplies good plans of all the principal battle-fields.

Scott's Memoirs. 8vo, 2 vol., pp. xxii. 653. New York, 1864. The first volume is devoted to the early life of the autobiographer, and to his career while serving in the U. S. army in Canada, and during the Chippewa and Black Hawk wars. About 250 pages of the second volume are occupied with the Mexican war and matters connected with it. But little information is obtained from the general's narrative additional to that furnished in his own despatches, which he frequently reproduces in the Memoirs. He gives some account of his differences with the U. S. government and Taylor, which could be of vital importance to no one but himself. He enters, moreover, into an explanation of his quarrel with Trist—pp. 570–80—attributing its initiation to feelings of mutual dislike that accidentally arose between them at Washington, and to his own belief that the commissioner's known prejudice against him had much weight in his appointment. The offensive tone of Trist's letters is attributed to ill health; Scott speaks of him as a most amiable companion, and regrets that he was afterward neglected by the U. S. government.

Raphael Semmes, Service Afloat and Ashore during the Mexican War. 8vo., pp. 479. Cincinnati, 1851. The author was flag-lieut. of the U. S. home-squadron operating in the gulf of Mexico. After the capture of Vera Cruz, he was despatched to the seat of the Mexican government to treat about the exchange of prisoners. In the prosecution of this mission he joined the American army at Jalapa, and was attached to Scott's staff as a volunteer aide-de-camp. From this time he followed that general till his entry into the Mexican capital, and had ample opportunities not only of obtaining material for a history of that campaign, but also of making himself familiar with the habits and customs of the Mexican people. His work, which from its title would lead the reader to suppose it confined to naval and military operations, is largely taken up with descriptions of the people and country and Mexican history, the portions of it devoted to the war being comparatively small. The work met with so favorable a reception by the public that within a year a second edition was issued. This induced the publishers, in the absence of the author, to issue an abridged form, omitting those portions not directly connected with the campaign under Scott, who was then a candidate for the presidency. The title assumed for this smaller 8vo of 367 pages is: *The Campaign of General Scott in the Valley of Mexico*; by Lieut Raphael Semmes, U. S. N. Cincinnati, 1852.

Edward D. Mansfield, The Mexican War: A History of its Origin, and a Detailed Account of the Victories, etc. 8vo, pp. 365. New York, 1849. This work is valuable as being based chiefly upon public documents, copies of which occupy a large portion of it. Its principal characteristic is an absence of prejudice, and an evident desire for impartiality. On pages 143–62 will be found a translation of Santa Anna's account of the battle of Buena Vista. The author remarks in his preface that he has 'felt no pleasure in tracing the causes which led to this war.' Only a rapid sketch is given of the events connected with New Mexico and California. Mansfield was a graduate of the U. S. military academy. During the time of Scott's candidature Mansfield published *Life and Services of General Winfield Scott.* 8vo,

pp. 536. Auburn, 1852. This work naturally includes Scott's campaign in Mexico, but this part is only an abbreviation of the previous production.

George C. Furber, *The Twelve Months' Volunteer; or Journal of a Private in the Tennessee Regiment of Cavalry*, etc. Large 8vo, pp. 640. Cincinnati, 1850. Though 'a complete history of the war with Mexico' is included in this production, it adds little regarding main events. Nevertheless, it has the merit of being original in the greater part, and is interesting to the general reader as containing accounts of the amusements, duties, and hardships of a soldier's life in camp. The author has not confined himself to incidents of the war, a large portion of the volume being descriptive of the Mexican manners, customs, and religious ceremonies. Furber continued Philip Young's *History of Mexico, her Civil Wars and Colonial and Revolutionary Annals*, large 8vo, pp. 636, Cincinnati, 1850—which terminates with the capture of Vera Cruz—and carried it down to the treaty of peace. In this production he has confined himself strictly to historical events, and has produced a large amount of documentary evidence.

Brantz Mayer, *Mexico as It Was and as It Is*. 8vo, pp. 390. New York, 1844. The author of this interesting book on Mexico was secretary to the U. S. legation to that country in 1841-2, and possessed all the qualities necessary for the production of good work. To a power of close observation he united a fine imagination, and with his mind alive to all interesting matters, he was indefatigable in his researches and examination of the peculiarities of the country. So versatile were his talents that he was at home on any subject, and in the volume under discussion he occupies himself with equal zeal and ability on affairs of the church and political matters; on the antiquities of the country and the general government; on commerce, agriculture, and manufactures; on coinage and mines; and on the habits, customs, and social condition of the natives. Moreover, having travelled extensively in Mexico, he gives pleasing descriptions of the physical features of the country. Nevertheless, owing to Brantz Mayer's views regarding the working of the Roman catholic religion in Mexico, he has not escaped severe criticism. In March 1844, shortly after the publication of his work, a long article devoted to its dissection appeared in *The United States Catholic Magazine and Monthly Review*. In this review it is declared that the production can confer no real benefit on society; Mayer is charged with prejudice, and with having distorted facts both past and present; and with injustice to the Mexicans. The reviewer considered it his duty to vindicate the people of Mexico from the unfounded imputations of a writer whose pen got the better of his judgment. Mayer may have been too unsparing in his descriptions of the more disagreeable aspects and propensities of the Mexicans, and in his condemnation of useless institutions, to suit their pride, or the taste of such advocates of conservatism as the reviewer; but his production doubtless represents a truthful picture of Mexico at the time. His work is profusely illustrated. A third edition was published in Philadelphia in 1847. In 1848 Brantz Mayer published simultaneously in New York and London his *History of the War between Mexico and the United States*. This smaller production properly commences with a preliminary view of the origin of the war, in which the author devotes some pages to a rapid glance at the laws and system introduced by the Spaniards into Mexico, and then considers the effect upon the population by bad administration, as bearing upon modifications of national character. In his narrative of events after hostilities had broken out, Mayer, though following principally the American official reports, does full justice to the heroism of the Mexican armies on the field of battle. But by far the most important of Brantz Mayer's productions is: *Mexico, Aztec, Spanish, and Republican*. 8vo, 2 vol., pp. 433 and 399. Hartford, 1853. For the preparation of this work he consulted a large number of excellent authorities, and subjoins a list of the principal ones—more than 80 in number—to his preface. The first volume contains the history of Mexico from the conquest down to the termination of the war with the U. S., including a sketch of the Aztec empire and civilization. In this history, the first complete account of the viceregal

period published in English was presented to the public. The second volume is devoted to a consideration of Mexico during the time at which the author wrote. Its geological and geographical structure; its commerce and industries; its laws and constitutions; and its political and national condition—are severally discussed. Then follows a description of the individual states and territories, and their different antiquities, productions, and characteristics. The work concludes with similar notices of New Mexico and California as parts of the U. S. Mayer, during his residence in Mexico, obtained copies of a number of important documents filed in the general archive in the capital. I have been fortunate enough to obtain possession of 30 of them, ranging in date from 1689 to 1812. They comprise royal orders, viceroy's reports, and accounts of expeditions to and events in Texas, California, and New Mexico. I have had them bound into one large folio volume, and catalogued it under the title of *Mayer's MSS. Mexicanos*.

Consideracion sobre la Situacion Política y Social de la Republica Mexicana. Mexico, 1848. 8vo, pp. 56. This anonymous pamphlet is signed 'Varios Mexicanos.' It gives a review of the general condition of the country in 1847, considered in a military, clerical, official, and social point of view, in order to explain the ruinous result of the war with the U. S. The language used is free, the Mexicans being described as a nation without nationality, full of corruption and vanity, and lacking any signs of seriousness or energy.

Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, Apelacion al Buen Criterio de los Nacionales y Estrangeros. 8vo, pp. 71 and 184. Mexico, 1849. On the 27th of August, 1847, the deputy Ramon Gamboa laid before congress a series of charges against Santa Anna relative to his conduct of the war, accusing him of treachery. After the fall of the capital, Gamboa amplified his accusations, and on Nov. 15th presented them to the chamber. Santa Anna in 1848, having obtained a passport and safe-conduct from the American general, left Mexico in April, and proceeded to Kingston, Jamaica, whence in Feb. 1849 he addressed the above defence of his conduct to the president of the grand jury in Mexico. In it he reviews his career from the commencement of his campaign in Texas down to his departure from Mexico, and endeavors to refute Gamboa's charges. He naturally repudiates the accusations of bad generalship and treachery, and enters into explanations of what he considered the causes of the disasters which attended the Mexican arms. He supports his argument by a number of official documents, which occupy the last 184 pages of the *Apelacion*.

Bustamante, Invasion de Mexico por los Anglo Americanos. MS. This manuscript of 172 folios was one of the last efforts of the author at production, and is a revision and continuation of *El Nuevo Bernal Diaz*, of which I have already taken notice. Many of the pages are in Bustamante's own handwriting, but the greater portion of the work is written by an amanuensis. It carries on the narrative of the invasion from the time of Scott's departure from Puebla to the capture of the city of Mexico, which Bustamante thus stigmatizes: 'Ocupacion indecente y cobarde de Mexico, por el ejército Anglo Americano mandado por el General Scott por causa de la infame traycion y cobardia de Antonio Lopez de Sta Anna.' f. 148. Many other matters, political, internal, and military, occupy the attention of Bustamante in this production, besides the operations in the valley of Mexico. His usual want of order in arrangement is observable.

For additional authorities on this and three preceding chapters, consult *Méz.*, *Apuntes Hist. Guerra*, 91, 115-27, 151-343, 362-403; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, v. passim, vi. 46-7, 82, 379-85, 402-3, 530; *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Méx.*, MS., iv. 200, 236-7, 250, v. 1-245, vi.-vii. passim, viii. 1-43, 79; *Id.*, *Méz. en 1848*, MS., 3-44; *Id.*, *Nuevo Bernal Diaz*, ii. 54-235; *Id.*, *Invasion de los Amer.*, MS., 12-13, 37-9, 51-6, 61-73, 87-152; *Id.*, *Campaña sin Gloria*, 3-4, 6-37; *Ramsey's Other Side*, passim; *Roa Balcena, Recuerdos*, passim; *Méz.*, *Col. Leyes Fund.*, 287-300; *Id.*, *Legisl. Méj.*, 1848, 48, 28-108, 142-3, 195-7, 305-12; 1849, 318-19; 1850, 3-8, 42, 60-2, 113, 121-3, 180-1, 183-96, 206, 212-14; 1851, 116-18; 1852, 122-3; 1853, 619-21; 1856, 111-14;

Id., *Col. Lopez y Der.*, 1847-8, *passim*; 1850, 9-12, 34, 85; *Id.*, *Col. Lopez y Der.*, 1848, i. 7-19, 70-3, 104-6, 128-9, 153-6, 257-63, 282-3, 604-706; *Id.*, *Col. Lopez y Der.*, 1850-1, i. 3-6, 28-9, 42-3, 77-8, 83-90, 114-16, 127-32, 143-4; 1853, iv. 26-7, 33-4, 51-2, 66, 345-6, v. 87, 217-18; *Banco, Estad. B.p. Mex.*, iii. 1st pt. 253; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 206, 330-40, 352, 357-60, 369, 372, 404, 422, 436, 544; *Id.*, *Hist. Ja. opa.*, iii.-iv. *passim*; *Id.*, *Mex. Hist.*, i. 24-6, 49-51, 205-6, ii. 236-65, 430-4; *Costa, Tratado de Paz*, 1-45; *Arrington, Recop.*, Enero-Abr. 1849, 21-40, 50-70; Mayo 1842-Abr. 1850, 8-12, 26-7, 70, 105-6, 151-2, 155-90, 228, 232-3, 266-7; *Ripley's War with Mex.*, i.-ii. *passim*; *Santa Anna, Contest. Oficio*, 1-12; *Id.*, *Comunic. Ofic.*, 1-11; *Id.*, *Manf.*, 1-12; *Id.*, *Despedido*, 1-23; *Id.*, *Apel. al buen Criterio*, *passim*; *Id.*, *A sus Compas.*, 6, 18; *Id.*, *Detall.*, 1-48; *Arromiz, Hist. y Créd.*, 24-306; *Id.*, *Liog. Mex.*, 261-4; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 876-8; *Buagel, Tercera Brigada*, 1-9; *Derecho Intern. Mex.*, 1st pt. 193-258, 2d pt. 157-9; *Lagosa, Atilio y Dof.*, 3-268; *Arranzola, Méj.*, ii. 279-93, ap. 3-6; *C. S. Good Doc.*, Cong. 30, Sen. 1, Sen. 52; Sen. Rept., *passim*; H. Ex. 1, 40, 56, 59, 63; *Id.*, Cong. 30, Sen. 2, H. Ex. 2; *Id.*, Cong. 31, Sen. 1, Sen. 11; H. Ex. 24; *Acta and Resol.*, p. 124; *Id.*, Cong. 32, Sen. 1, Sen. 51; Sen. Rept., 28; H. Jour., 93; *Id.*, Cong. 34, Sen. 1, Sen. 96, 103; Sen. Rept., 32; *Id.*, Cong. 35, Sen. 1, H. Jour., 555; *Id.*, Cong. 41, Sen. 2, Sen. Misc. 74; *Id.*, *Mesa and Doc.*, 1847-8, ii. 949-52, 1303-10, app. 1-236, index, 234-6; *Méx., Mem. Hist.*, 1870, 283, 297-9, 1044-7; *Id.*, *Mem. Relac.*, 1848, 35-8; 1849, 1-47; *Id.*, *Mem. Just.*, 1852, 6-7; *Id.*, *Mem. Guerra y Mar.*, 1849, 8-12; *Id.*, *Album Fotog.*, ii. 13; *Id.*, *Bienes Iglesia Guadal.*, 1847, 1-38; *Id.*, *Breve Impugn.*, 1-20; *Id.*, *Contest.*, 1-36; *Id.*, *Código Fund.*, 1-92; *Id.*, *Contrato Armam.*, 1-37; *Id.*, *Dictám.*, 1-37; *Id.*, *Al Pueblo Mex.*, 1-36; *Id.*, *Decr. de 16 de Dic.*, 1-7; *Id.*, *Decr. Minist. Guerra*, 1-13; *Id.*, *Expos. por los que firmaron*, 1-27; *Id.*, *Manif. Sup. Trib. Guerra*, 34-8; *Id.*, *Reglam. Corso*, 1-23; *Id.*, *Tratado de Paz*, 1-55; *Id.*, *Tratado Gund. Hidalgo*, 1-28; *Id.*, *Proyecto Ley*, 1-121, 3 abts; *México en 1840 y 1847*, 1-40; *Estado Mayor Gral. Ejér.*, 1-8; *Est. Un. del Norte, Las Noticias*, 1-12; *Estrada, Defensa*, 1-32; *Pacheco, Expos. del ex-Ministro Relac.*, 1-29; *Dunbar's Romance Age*, 40; *Miscel. Instr. y Am.*, i. 180-98, ii. 260-82; *Colima, Impugn.*, 12; *Rodenbough's 2nd Dragoons*, 135-7; *Heller, Reisen in Mex.*, 285-7; *America, Pict. Hist. of*, pt ii. 68-100, pt iii. 5-8, 43-50; *Webster's Speeches*; *Otero, Comunic. sobre Negoc. Diplom.*, 1-12; *Diario Exact. Mex.*, MS., 1-68; *Bolet. de Notic.*, Apr. 8, 11, 1847; *Azpiroz, Código Extranj.*, 150-83; *Observac. Parecer Fiscal*, 1-21; *Abrams, Mex. and Mex. Zustände*, 72-81; *Carleton's Battle of Buena Vista*, app. 215-32; *Perez, Dicc. Geog.*, i. 106-10, 493-7, ii. 12-28, 442-58, 684-701; *Rouhaud, Région Nouv.*, 28; *Onwald, Californien*, 133; *Hernandez, Estad. Méj.*, 234-5; *Furber's Volunteer*, 329-32, 455-6, 487-91, 517-640; *Henley's Speech Mex. War*, 1-8; *Wise's Los Gringos*, 253-61, 277-8; *Mex. War, Compl. Hist. of*, 68-103, 120-8; *Mex.*, *Treaty bet. U. S. etc.*, in *Mex. Pamphlets*, iv. 1-384; *Murray's Pict. Hist. U. S.*, 478-90; *Mex.*, *Official List Officers, etc.*; *Mex. Scrope*, ii. 265 et seq.; *Mex.*, *U. S. Army in Mex.*, MS., 1-4; *Id.*, *Hist. Raising Flag; Mexican War, by an English Soldier*, 137-214, 234-88; *Mexican War and its Heroes*, *passim*; *Gregory's Hist. Mex.*, 48, 78-80; *Hansard's Parl. Rec.*, lxxxix. 606, xciii. 381; *Lane's Autobiog.*, MS., *passim*; *Thorpe's Army of Rio Grd.*, 184-7; *Dicc. Univ. Hist. Geog.*, i. 49, v. 157-9, vi. 314-15, viii. 559-70, ix. 35-44, 131-9, 854-9, x. 106-13, 450, 790-7, 961-1030, ap. i. 210-13, 248-60, 427-9; *Cutts' Cong. Cal. and New Mex.*, 10-11, 29-67, 165-91; *Baqueiro, Ensayo Yuc.*, ii. *passim*, iii. 456-70, ap. 93-101; *Brocklehurst's Mex.*, 77-8; *Tributo á la Verdad*, 1-143; *El Razmador*, May-June, Oct.-Dec. 1847, Jan.-Mch 1848, *passim*; *Amer. Alm.*, 1849, 193-7; *Cuba, Battles of*, 49-53, 68-103; *Ober, Mex.*, 41-2, 467; *Taylor's Broad Pennant*, 287-330, 372-97; *Livermore's War Mex.*, 82-102, 122-56, 168-87, 204-27; *Sherman's Mem.*, i. 83; *Marquez de Leon, Mem. Póst.*, MS., 8-13, 41-5, 48-9, 245; *Taylor's Biog.*; *Taylor and h's Staff*, 81-90, 113-23, 167-94, 206-74; *Taylor and his Gen.*, 298-318; *Dem. Review*, xxiv. 152-4, xxvi. 244-51, 340-7, 417-25, 540-7, xxx. 193-202, 244-50; *Donovan's Advent.*, 1-127; *Zerecero, Rev. Mex.*, 75; *Miscel. ó sea Colec.*,

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CHAPTER XXI.

REORGANIZATION UNDER HERRERA.

1849.

OBSTACLES TO REFORM—WEAKNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT—PARTY AGITATION—OPPOSED BY POPULAR SENTIMENT—ARRANGEMENT WITH FOREIGN CREDITORS—CONSOLIDATION OF THE INTERIOR DEBT—EFFORT TO REDUCE EXPENSES—SMUGGLING AND OTHER INROADS ON THE REVENUE—INVOLVED FINANCES—A SUCCESSION OF MINISTERIAL CHANGES—MILITARY CORRUPTION—THE SERVICE IN DISREPUTE—ITS RECONSTRUCTION—NEW ARMAMENT—REDUCTION OF FORCE—THE NAVY—MILITIA SYSTEM—EFFORTS AT COLONIZATION—MILITARY COLONIES ON THE FRONTIER, AND THEIR VALUE.

Nothing could be more trying than the position of Herrera's government. It was expected to resurrect the country, reorganize departments, aid institutions, and restore prosperity generally; and all this without means, and in face of violent opposition from parties intent only on their own advancement, and ready to plunge the nation into greater troubles by fomenting outbreaks in different quarters. Paredes was still in hiding, and none knew but that he might at any moment reappear, and lead his partisans to fresh achievements.¹ Although the suspense could not profit the

¹ *El Universal*, the ablest journal of the time at Mexico, advocated strongly the conservative, and less openly the monarchical, systems, and *El Tiempo* upheld the latter without subterfuge; while *El Monitor Republicano*, although friendly to the prevailing republicanism, freely criticised the weakness of the government, a feature which proved the chief target for *La Palanca* and other minor sheets. A number of pamphlets appeared to the same end, Baz, for instance, coming out to refute articles of the *Palanca*, in *Defensa*, 1-12; *Miscel.*, xii. pt 3. Mier discussed republicanism in *Profecia Política*, 1-28; *Pap. Var.*, xli. pt 11; and consolidation principles find support in *Méx., Segund. Part. Consolid. Rep.*, i. 1 et seq. Comments on party strife in *Repúb. Méx. Reseña*, 1-80, with partisan views.

monarchists, who now centred their hopes in him, others availed themselves of the unsettled disposition, notably the Santanists, who with their elastic principles stood prepared to promise anything, and even fulfil it, if their main object could be attained. Petitions were sent in to the chambers for permission to recall their leader, but, only too eager to keep so dangerous an agitator out of the country, the representatives hastened to declare that he must not set foot on Mexican soil without their permission.²

This measure was precipitated by the pronunciamiento, February 10, 1849, of Leonardo Marquez, actually the head of a battalion engaged against the revolted Indians of Sierra Gorda, later one of the foremost conservative generals. He believed that the discontented troops would welcome their stanch champion, Santa Anna; and being personally devoted to him, the intriguing Marquez thought it best to secure for himself the credit of initiating the call.³ But he had miscalculated. Even some of his own battalion withdrew,⁴ and others deserted on finding that Querétaro, the proposed key for operations, refused to open its gates. The valiant General Bustamante happened to have his headquarters here, and took such steps that the retreating rebels soon submitted, although not until their leader had managed to secure terms for himself.⁵ Had the movement not been checked at the onset, the Santanists would probably

² Act of Feb. 14th. He must signify to the government his desire to return, and the congress would thereupon consider the request. *Heraldo*, Mar. 6, 1849. In *Apunt. Hist.*, 1849, 1-12; *Pap. Var.*, xli. pt 1, the agitation stoops to personalities.

³ He declared that the resignation of Santa Anna should be considered void, and his term of office unexpired, owing to the absence of the congress at the time. Herrera should surrender the presidency to a person chosen by a council till Santa Anna could return and convoke a new congress. The army was to be fixed at 50,000 men. Marquez arrested General Guzman, his immediate chief.

⁴ Among them Captain Tomás Mejía, later his companion in arms, yet formidable rival.

⁵ From Col Vasquez, who besieged him at La Griega. He was arrested at Popotla, but released on presenting a pass signed by Bustamante. After this he went into hiding. *Siglo XIX.*, for Feb. 1849.

have risen in force in different quarters; for the capital was in a ferment, and spasmodic though ineffectual pronunciamientos took place during the summer and autumn in the provinces around. Even the troops, on which Marquez counted in vain, rose for a moment with Santanist cries against the unpopular governor of San Luis Potosí,⁶ and farther north in Tamaulipas a band did succeed in holding its ground for some time;⁷ while in the Mizteca the Indians sought to renew their former prolonged fray, with its attendant raids and turmoil,⁸ although General Álvarez this time prevented it.

The feebleness of these outbreaks was due rather to inherent weakness than to efforts of the governments to check them, as may be instanced by the impunity with which Governor Cosío of Zacatecas manœuvred the dissolution of the local legislature and bid defiance to the supreme authorities when they sought to interfere.⁹ The desolation of the late war was still too fresh among the people for them to encourage the petty military pronunciamientos; and more, the war of races in Yucatan, and in the Sierra Gorda, which bordered on the valley of Mexico itself, acted as a fear-inspiring sedative on the white and mixed races, especially as it was well understood that revo-

⁶ Los Reyes. General Uraga quarrelled with him, and withdrew his men from the city, leaving it exposed to the revolted Indians of the ranges.

⁷ Under leadership of Flores. About the same time that he raised the standard of revolt, in June, a conspiracy was discovered at Orizaba. Three months later a man named Villalva made a call for Santa Anna at Cocola, troops of Izcdar displayed mutinous sentiments, and the natives of Tlascala rose against tax collectors. Details of these movements are given in *Universal*, *Siglo XIX.*, etc., for June to Oct. 1849, *passim*.

⁸ They appear to have been encouraged by a military outbreak at Temascaltepec and Sultepec under Zamudio and E. Leon, and Felipe Santiago figured as the chief leader among the score of villages which had rallied. *Heraldo*, Jan. 17, 19; *Universal*, June 26, 27, July 1, 1849. Allusions in *Méx., Mem. Polít.*, 1850, 1-62, ap. 1-13; *Revisor*, Jan. 12, 1850, etc.

⁹ Partly by seeking to substitute the vice-governor. García. In this case, however, the governor had the people chiefly on his side, for the legislature was taking a course not wholly in accord with the constitution. *Zacatecano*, no. 118, etc.; *Universal*, Oct. 6, 8, 11, 23, 1849. There were troubles also in and round the federal district that called the attention of the government. *Id.*, Sept. 10th, 25th, attended by an increase of the garrison. *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1849, 179.

lutionary factions, notably the Santanists, would not hesitate to stir aboriginal prejudices to suit their aim.¹⁰ Nevertheless, while holding aloof from actual revolution, the people and provincial authorities neglected to display that patriotic spirit, and offer that passive if not active coöperation needed by a government charged with so important a task as the reorganization of the administrative departments.

Attention was called foremost to a decree dated June 14, 1848, requiring the reconstruction of the treasury department, the reduction of the civil service force and army list, overcrowded in course of time by a host of supernumerary and useless officials, and the presentation of a plan to the chambers for the consolidation of the debt, to which special funds had not yet been assigned.¹¹ The latter effort proved most difficult, although a favorable readjustment of the foreign debt had led to equally flattering expectations for the interior credits.

This readjustment was prompted by a protest from the English creditors who claimed that, as the cession of territory to the United States affected the landed security tendered them, they were entitled to a share of the indemnity obtained for that cession.¹² The demand was too fair to be ignored; but the minister

¹⁰ At Tulyahualco, close to the capital, Santanists ventured to excite race feeling, simply because an alcalde was objectionable. The attempt was promptly suppressed. *Heraldo*, Jan. 26, 1849.

¹¹ The decree declared further, in its 25 articles, that the government could not dispose without authorization of the indemnity due from the United States. The consolidation plan, to be presented within three months, embraced pensions, overdue salaries, mileage. All extra federal officials, known as *agregados*, auxiliaries and supernumeraries, were to be dismissed at once, and no money expended beyond the sums designated in the estimates, gratuities, extra allowances, and so forth being forbidden, as well as pay during absence. Arrangements must be made with creditors against the tobacco revenue for paying them from this branch alone. The excise, consumption, and municipal taxes in the federal district and territories should be replaced by direct contributions. All extra officers in the army and navy were to be given leave, without pay, unless they had served from 10 to 30 years, in which case the compensation would range from $\frac{1}{2}$ to whole pay pensions, and *montepío* allowances being stopped, save for disabled men. *Mex., Legisl. Mej.*, 1848, 162-8.

¹² By decree of Feb. 19, 1850, the government was authorized, in conjunction with a congressional committee, to arrange with the creditors. *Mex., Legisl. Mej.*, 1850, 42-3.

of finance availed himself of the gloomy prospects to extort from the bondholders a large abatement on the usuriously swollen capital, together with a reduction of the interest from five to three per cent, in consideration of a draft on the United States treasury for two and a half million pesos. The total of the regular foreign debt, contracted at London, was thereupon fixed at £10,241,650, with an assignment on the custom-houses for the payment of the interest.¹³

Encouraged by this successful transaction, Minister Payno proceeded with somewhat blind confidence to consolidate the interior debt into one fund, with uniform bonds, and an interest of three per cent. This was decreed by law of November 30, 1850, under which, in conjunction with an insufficient representation of creditors, a rather arbitrary discount was imposed upon the different classes of debt, the remainder being allowed an interest of three per cent from the fund assigned of twenty per cent on the custom-house revenue, with an annual redemption of \$300,000.¹⁴

¹³ Embracing 25 per cent of the import duties, 75 per cent of the export duties from Pacific ports, and 5 per cent of those from the gulf. For the first six years the surplus from the assignments was to be applied to a sinking fund, and subsequently \$250,000 a year should be remitted to redeem the bonds. *Méz., Piezas Justific. Deuda Est.*, passim; *Méz., Debt Rept.*, id.; *Prieto, Informe Deuda Estran.*, 1-15. The ministerial reports in *Méz., Mem. Hac.*, 1850 and 1851, *Payno, Méz., Espos. Hac.*, 1-128, *Murphy, Deuda Ester.*, contain full particulars of the transaction, which was effected on Oct. 14, 1850, and in the finance chapter of the next volume the history of the foreign debt will be reviewed. Manuel Payno deserves the credit which he claims for an arrangement which reduced this debt practically from 76 to 51 million pesos.

¹⁴ Any surplus from the assignment was to be applied to increasing the interest at the half per cent every five years till it reached 5 per cent. All bonds must be exchanged for the new uniform issues, within six months for Mexico and twelve for foreign parts. Creditors who refused to accept this compromise would be disregarded for ten years, and so with non-classified credits. The discounts were applied as follows: Debts antedating the independence would lose 50 per cent of the capital and 80 of the interest; the twenty per cent bonds would lose the interest in arrear, and a million and a half of capital, receiving in compensation \$500,000 from the U. S. indemnity of 1851 and 1852; the copper fund remained intact, and also the money loaned at not above legal interest, which was to be paid, half from the U. S. indemnity, half with bonds from the new fund; debts due to employés would be recognized for 80 per cent, if in the hands of the original claimant or his heirs, at 15 per cent if in the hands of speculators; debts due on administered property would receive 30 per cent from the indemnity and 70 in new bonds; the obligations of this class bearing interest were reduced to 6 per cent, of which only half would be paid with the new bonds; of the debt

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A special council was created to manage the consolidation and direct the custom-houses, appointing also agents therein, at expense of creditors, to watch the collection of duty on their behalf.¹⁵ The issue of bonds for the new fund was fixed at forty million pesos, leaving an extorted gain for the treasury of nearly thirty millions.¹⁶ But several circumstances combined to interfere with the plan which aimed foremost at restoring the national credit, while relieving a burdened treasury. There was not a sufficient surplus from the indemnity to meet the demands assigned upon it by the funding law,¹⁷ and the prospect of guarantee for paying even the reduced interest appeared so slim that it assisted materially in raising a wide outcry against this partial repudiation of the debt. The proper step should have been to plan the reorganization of the finance department, notably by economic curtailments and establishing the necessary taxes for responding to the new funding law. Instead of this, a leap was made in the dark, with the result of exposing most glaringly the insolvent condition of the

created during the forced occupation of the United States war, 40 per cent would be paid from the indemnity and 60 in new bonds; of the floating loans with obligations, 35 per cent would be settled with the indemnity, and the remainder entered into the new fund at par, the accrued interest was cancelled, the convention of two and one per cent would be liquidated by paying half of its interest with the indemnity of 1851 and 1852; of the convention of five per cent 40 per cent would be settled with indemnity money, and 60 with new bonds; the debt owing to wounded soldiers and benevolent institutions would enter at par into the new fund. *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1850, 233-60, with forms for new bonds, special instructions, etc. Another law of March 4, 1850, had classified the debts to be included in the funds under 17 headings. See *Id.*, 47-8.

¹⁵ The council was to consist of six members and a president, holding office for six years, with a salary of \$4,000 and \$6,000 respectively. They had also to take steps against contraband. Regulations for this body were issued on Dec. 9th. For committee reports, preliminary to the new fund law, see *Méx., Dictámen Comis. Crédito Púb. en que se propone proyecto*, 1849, 1-18; *Id.*, *Arreglo de Deuda*, 74 and lxvii. pp; *Id.*, *Dictámen de la Mayoría*, 1-41; *Pap. Var.*, clxxxi. pt 4, ccvi., pts 1-3.

¹⁶ According to the account of the exuberant Payno already referred to.

¹⁷ This required \$3,995,000, besides more than \$400,000 a year, while the surplus from the U. S. indemnity amounted to little over \$4,000,000, *Esteva's Espos.* of March 28, 1851, on which, for that matter, new assignments were being made. The amount of the debt has been underestimated through lack of proper data.

government.¹⁸ Under such circumstances and with the fear of future repudiation, such loud remonstrances were made by certain creditors, notably by the clergy and by foreigners under ministerial protection, that the plan had to be modified and infringed in a number of cases,¹⁹ thus defeating its main object.

As a means to enforce the reorganization of the treasury, and the reduction in expenses, a law of November 1849 limited the administrative expenses to \$500,000 a month, whereof two thirds were for the war department.²⁰ This involved a reduction on salaries of one fourth for officials in actual service, and one third for others, which in itself produced a pressure that caused the limit to be ignored and also an increased draft on the convenient United States indemnity money²¹ to cover the usual deficit, besides a continued anticipation of custom-house revenue, contrary to all intentions. One reason for the deficits lay in the tariff reductions and other charges imposed during the recent occupation, and which necessitated a subsequent corresponding abatement on the restored tariff

¹⁸ Minister Esteva, who succeeded Payno for a brief period as finance minister, condemns the law as a blow against the national credit. 'La ley declaró la bancarota, si no total, á lo ménos parcialmente.' *Espos.*, 9, Mar. 28, 1851. Payno naturally rose to defend the object of the plan. The consolidation into one fund would reveal the extent of the indebtedness and diminish much of the financial confusion, destroy the jealousy existing between different classes of creditors, procure gain for the treasury, throw into circulation a large amount of now hidden and useless money, and join personal with national interests. *Mem.* of June 30, 1852, 14-16. He deplores infringements on the plan.

¹⁹ Instance law of May 19, 1852, *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1852, 112-17, which also imposes a contingent on the states to aid the fund. Hardly any of the foreign debts were properly left with the fund. The claims, for example, of Fort & Co. and Drusina, for about \$1,200,000, were covered by an arrangement of Jan. 21, 1851, offering \$300,000 from the U. S. indemnity, \$600,000 from half of the tax on circulated and exported money, and the balance in the new bond. Rules for these foreign conventions in *Convenciones Diplom.*, 1852, 1-31.

²⁰ *Arrilaga, Recop.*, 1849, 163-6. The apportionment stood \$333,333 for army and navy, \$61,273 for treasury, \$18,993 for justice, \$53,810 for the relations department, \$33,482 for the congress, and \$2,250 for the executive.

²¹ Which had been partly authorized by the above and other decrees. Concerning the payment of the indemnity, see *U. S. Govt Doc.*, Cong. 31, Ses. 2, Sen. 31, iii; *Id.*, Cong. 31, Ses. 1, Acts and Res., 79; *Universal*, Feb. 16, 20, 27, May 2, 1850, etc.; *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1850, 113-14, 198; *Id.*, *Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd.*, 1850-1, i. 74-5.

of October 1845 of about forty per cent,²² owing to the mass of low-duty goods flooding the markets. The measure was also intended to counteract the ruinous contraband trade, facilitated more than ever by the Guadalupe treaty.²³ A further reduction not being deemed advisable, the government was instructed to increase the revenue cruisers and coast guards;²⁴ but lack of funds and official dishonesty rendered the order of little effect. Traders grew rich publicly by the traffic. Local authorities or conspirators would raise a dispute or pronounce, with a view to remove the federal officials, when the opportunity arose for obtaining large plunder; or they joined in favoring irregular importations at the ports, lest the treasury should lose all through smuggling.²⁵

The total estimated revenue for the year 1849-50 was \$8,000,000, of which \$3,500,000 came from import and export duties, and \$1,000,000 from state contingents; while the expenditure was placed at \$16,500,000, whereof \$5,800,000 toward the debt and \$7,600,000 for the war department, leaving a deficit of \$8,500,000. For the following year the income and expenditure were placed at \$9,000,000 and \$20,300,000 respectively, showing a deficit of \$11,300,000.²⁶ These debit balances had to be met, the easiest

²² This was decreed on May 3, 1848, the new duty being 60 per cent of the 1845 tariff, with some exceptions gradually introduced. *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1848, 128-9. The loss to the treasury in consequence was placed at nearly \$2,000,000 in Peña y Cuevas' budget of Jan. 1849.

²³ Minister Elorriaga, indeed, urged greater reductions in the tariff as a check. *Mem.* of Feb. 12, 1850, 8-9.

²⁴ Placing two steamers and thirteen small vessels on the gulf and on the Pacific. The carrying-out of this measure was impeded by lack of funds as usual, save in a small degree. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1849, 134-5.

²⁵ Supercargoes would detain vessels off the ports till they could obtain a reduction of duty, and this failing, the cargoes were landed on unfrequented parts of the coast, or on islands and introduced gradually. Honest officials were therefore often prejudicial to the interests of the government, as Minister Esteva confesses in his *Memoria* of Apr. 4, 1851, 100-2, addressed to the congress.

²⁶ For the preceding four years the income and expenditure stood at \$10,700,000 and \$25,200,000, \$10,200,000 and \$24,300,000, \$10,400,000 and \$21,600,000, \$5,500,000 and \$13,800,000, the last being for 1848-9. *Méx., Presupuesto*, 1849, 1-9; *Méx., Breve Manif.*, 3-15; *Méx., Mem. Hac.*, 1850, 127 pp.; *Id.*, 1851, 1-18; *Pap. Var.*, xxxi. pt 56, xcii. pt 6; *Economista*, April, etc., 1849; *Heraldo*, Jan. 8, 1849.

way being to defer payment to creditors and withhold salaries, as we have seen; the next temporary relief was found in the ruinous method of mortgaging prospective revenue, and the most dreaded yet final recourse, in levying taxes and contributions at the risk of inviting fresh pronunciamientos. A few were imposed, such as a double quota from real estate and income within the federal district, and more pressing demands for state contingents.²⁷ But what availed these—even with the addition of the accidental war indemnity—to provide for the demands of the reorganization, and offset the shrinkage in duty receipts and other sources? The perplexed ministers would make a superficial examination of the assets, clutch at more or less impracticable suggestions for banks and mints, hint at further curtailment of expenses, which they would never enforce, cast furtive glances at the tempting church estates, and then unfold a budget or project, roseate with plausible recommendations to brighten the actual dark picture.²⁸ A more critical and prudent congress tore some projects into fragments as visionary, rejected others as doubtful or unpopular, and frittered away valuable time in discussing the remainder. A plan worthy of consideration was to induce the clergy by concessions to guarantee the new consolidated fund, and thereby connect them as well as the creditors more closely with the interests of the country;²⁹ but they very naturally feared that this

²⁷ The former by decree of Oct. 6, 1848, the latter of April 10, 1851, demanding \$790,000, whereof \$100,000 each from Mexico and Guanajuato, \$80,000 from Jalisco, \$70,000 each from Puebla and Zacatecas; several states paid \$10,000 and \$6,000, and Colima ended the list with \$3,000. *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1851, 111-12. A decree of April 1849 admitted articles of food free into the north-east provinces, a concession which aided fraud.

²⁸ Piña y Cuevas urged strongly the establishment of a national bank, 'which would facilitate the disposal of two thirds of the revenue.' *Espos. of Feb. 14, 1849*, 3-4. It may be mentioned here that a bank of savings was opened in the Monte de Piedad pawn establishment. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1849, 78-80. Concerning the extension of mints, see full report in *Méx., Mem. Hac.*, 1849, 1-80, and suggestions in *Méx. Mem.*, 47-52, in *Doc. Méx.*, pt 4; *Soc. Mex. Geog. Bolet.*, i. 177, 219. Instances of greater strictness with officials appear in *Méx., Manif.*, 1849, 1-23; *Pap. Var.*, xli. pt 5.

²⁹ As advocated by Esteva, *Plan of Apr. 4, 1851*, who proposed that new imposts for the interest of the fund should be intrusted to clerical control.

would only open the door for wider encroachments, and refused even to listen to it.

Finding their suggestions unappreciated, and without means to carry out the task intrusted to them, the finance ministers entered office and resigned in rapid succession,³⁰ and it became difficult to induce any prominent and able man to accept a position so troublesome and thankless. In the ministries of relations and justice there were only four changes during the two years and a half of Herrera's administration, Lacunza, well known as lawyer and writer, holding the former portfolio for nearly two years,³¹ while General Arista, of whom the president stood in awe, retained the war department during the whole period, and used its resources with great success and for his own advancement, as will be seen.

In the proposed reorganization, the military department received an attention corresponding to its economic and political importance. At the close of the late war a general outcry rose against the army for its inefficiency, so utterly out of proportion to its enormous cost, its pompous assumption, and its readiness to create local disturbances and revolutions. What a contrast to the body of well-trained soldiers and vet-

³⁰ From June 1848 till January 1851 there were 16 changes, 6 of them provisional, and several made within a few days of the preceding. Among the ablest ministers figure Mariano Riva Palacio; Piña y Cuevas, the bank projector; Arrangoiz, a prominent conservative and later minister under Maximilian, and who, after his resignation in July 1849, accepted the embassy to France; Gutierrez, who had been long trained in the treasury; Manuel Payno, under whom the debts were refunded. He and Piña held the office for over 6 months. For dates and comments, see *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1848, 360, 379, 482; 1849, 54, 92, 177, 324-6; 1850, 158; *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1848, 159, 361, 380, 481-2; 1850, 130-1, 143, 169; *Id., Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd.*, 1850-1, i. 90; *Domenech, Hist. du Méx.*, ii. 230-3. 'Se dificulta extraordinariamente encontrar una persona honrada que quiere hacerse cargo del ministerio de hacienda.' *Monitor Rep.*, Nov. 14, 1849. Arrangoiz admits that he did nothing important, and that under direction of Alaman and Peña y Peña. *Méj.*, ii. 298; *Universal*, July 22, Aug. 2, 1849, Mar. 3, May 15, June 29, July 4-5, 1850; *Heraldo*, Jan. 1849, etc. For certain unsustained charges against ministry. *Castillo, Sentenc. Absol.*, 1-18; *Pap. Var.*, xii. pt 12.

³¹ From May 1849 till Jan. 1851, preceded by Luis G. Cuevas and M. Otero, with Monasterio for provisional occupant. The other secretariate was managed successively by J. M. Jimenez and Marcelino Castañeda.

erans which entered Mexico in 1821 to affirm the independence, headed by officers who had been educated in military colleges, and developed under a system of slow and merited promotion, and fitted to hold its own against almost any opponents! Since then it had sunk into an instrument or accessory of factions, under the leadership of men who owed their advancement chiefly to intrigue; men wholly untrained and unfitted, who by heading or adhering to pronunciamientos had swung themselves from the position of sergeants to captains, colonels, and generals, and maintained the position by virtue of their influence over a certain number of followers, bribed or intimidated, and who now assisted to intimidate a weak government risen by the same process, and therefore dependent on the caprice of factions. Under such circumstances, merit was ignored, proving sometimes even an obstacle to success; and insubordination being thus fostered by extraordinary rewards, it naturally spread among the rank and file, to the general demoralization of the army. Embezzlement by officers, and a chronic poverty of the treasury, contributed greatly to this state of affairs, by driving a neglected and starving army to desperate acts. The service fell into such disrepute that recruits could not be obtained save by cruel impressment, chiefly of Indian peasantry, who with a natural distaste for the business had to be driven into battle and guarded in camp.

At the conclusion of the late campaign the government found that desertion had reduced the troops to small proportions, with an excess of officers, although a large number of them had, from a lack of faith in their courage or skill, sought safe retirement. The moment was favorable for reconstructing the army, since to abolish it, as some proposed, was out of the question, as the northern frontier was ever threatened by raiding Indians, to say nothing of the turbulent disposition of the people generally.

But apart from this circumstance, the necessity of

a standing army which separates the soldiers from the citizens in a republic, for the maintenance of the internal peace, almost throws such a commonwealth out of the category of republic. A true republic implies the existence of a people capable of governing and defending themselves. A permanent army implies the inability of self-government, and the necessity of a standing menace to make the people behave.

In the United States the position of the soldier is below that of the average citizen; in Mexico it is far above. The poor people are exceedingly poor, ill fed and clothed, and worked like beasts of burden; hence the soldier will remain such as long as he can get his pay. And the ignorant and timid people must pay the cost of his support, while the high official alone commands his services. Having been kept so long under the yoke of a foreign despotism, its equivalent is continued now in the form of military rule, moral courage and independence in certain quarters are paralyzed, and there is presented this singular state of things, namely, a people with a representative government, nominally sustained by universal suffrage, held in helpless subjection by a one thousandth part of their number armed and organized.

By a law of November 4, 1848, the army was limited to 10,000 men, namely, 6,000 infantry, 1,800 cavalry, 1,800 artillery, and 400 sappers, all to be voluntarily enrolled, partly from old troops, and consequently with a higher rate of pay to secure them.³² The

³² Recruits were to be between 18 and 40 years of age, and without near relatives depending on them for support. Ten pesos were offered on enlisting, and the pay was fixed at \$15 a month for infantry, \$16 for cavalry, and \$17 for artillerists and sappers, with an increase for certain classes in accordance with the regulations issued Dec. 1, 1847, sergeants receiving \$26, \$29, and \$30, respectively, infantry captains \$67, lieutenant-colonels \$133, colonels \$200, generals \$333 and \$417. The quota demanded in each state varied from 2,231 from Mexico, Tlascala, and the federal districts, to 104 from Tabasco, the northern states being called upon for a special proportionate enrolment for militia and military colonists, amounting to a little over 1½ per mille of the population. *Méx., Ley Nov. 4, 1848, sobre Ejército*, 1-16; *Méx., Legist. Mej.*, 1848, 476-80; *Arrillaga, Recop. Ley., Dec., Circ.*, 1-112. Preceding projects in *Herrera, Proyecto Ejército*, 1-72; *Arista, Id.*, 1-24, ap. 1-15; *Id., Refut.*, 1-44; *Méx., Dictámen Ejército*, 1-116; *Pap. Var.*, lvi. pts 1-4, cciv.

suppression of forced levies was applauded as in true consonance with republican institutions; yet so slow was the response of recruits that conscription had finally to be reintroduced in 1852,³³ for up to that date less than half of the required 10,000 of regular troops had been enrolled.³⁴ It required further reforms and time to restore the prestige of an institution injured by decades of abuse; for a number of obstacles stood still in the way, such as the stay of promotion from the ranks, which prevented ambitious men, the most desirable for soldiers, from enlisting. The reason for this rule lay partly in the desire to obtain more scientifically trained men for the command, partly in the wish to give preference in this direction to the large number of officers retired from the army under the new pruning operations,³⁵ and to the aristocratic youth educated at the military college.³⁶ So loud were the protests against this exclusion of commoners that even the war minister joined in opposing it, but in vain.³⁷ Equally futile was the appeal from a host of neglected invalids, aged, disabled, or retired men and officers, who, under the sad condition of the finances, had to

pt 1, ccxxiv. pt 8. See also detailed regulation of April 22, 1851, *Méz., Col. Ley., Dec. y Ord.*, 1850, 288-321, with subdivisions, pay, etc.

³³ Regulation in decree of Feb. 28th. *Méz., Legisl. Mej.*, 1852, 47-50. Preceding rules are found in *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1849, 90-1, 130-1, 148-9.

³⁴ The ministerial report of 1850 shows only 3,545 infantry and cavalry, *Méz., Mem. Guer.*, 1850, doc. 10, while that of 1852, *Id.*, 1852, doc. 12, has 4,400, or 5,320 short of the required 9,720, including officers. The total permanent army in 1850, including active militia, military colonists, and national guard paid by the federation, was 8,513, with a pay of \$2,703,934, the total cost of the department for the year being \$5,753,654. *Id.*, 1851, docs 1-14.

³⁵ With two thirds pay. They numbered 839 at the close of 1849, and received \$302,103 during the year. During the following year 81 more were retired, but 141 either died, withdrew, or were called into active service. *Méz., Mem. Guer.*, 1850, 34, and doc. 22; 1851, 34.

³⁶ By decree of April 22, 1851, the college was assigned 16 guardians and instructors for 90 and odd alumni, at a cost of \$54,748 a year, whereof the alumni were apportioned at the rate of \$216 a year each. Four were to be annually sent to Europe. *Méz., Col. Ley., Dec. y Ord.*, 1850, 209-10, 302-3; *Colegio Mil.*, in *Pap. Var.*, cciii. pt 14. Yet the condition of finances caused the neglect of the college, and but for private aid it might have been closed.

³⁷ A decree of 1853 confirms the restriction issued in 1847 and 1849. *Méz., Mem. Guer.*, 1850, 22, etc. Instances of arguments of protests in *Ordoñez, Opús.*, 1-82; *Pap. Var.*, ccxxiv. pt 9. Richthofen, *Rep. Méx.*, 424, 442, etc., approves the limitation, as may be supposed, from his German views of discipline.

be disregarded in favor of the more imperative demands from the active army. Yet even the latter had frequently to suffer from the same cause, which thus tended to discourage enlistment.³⁸ Artillerists and medical men were especially difficult to obtain.

A most important feature connected with the reorganization of the military department was the introduction of improved armament from France and Belgium, of which the report for 1851 announced the receipt of over 20,000 muskets alone.³⁹ Foreign workmen and patent machinery were also brought for local gun factories, with a view to replace the artillery destroyed or carried off during the invasion. The fortresses and military stations, on the other hand, received little attention, mainly owing to the lack of funds, and partly because the late war had tended to diminish their importance, and so they remained for the most part half ruined and dismantled. Among the ideas adopted from abroad was the gymnastic evolution practised in the French army.⁴⁰ The navy was in a more deplorable condition even than the fortifications; for in 1849 the republic possessed only one small vessel, a transformed trader; but a portion of the intended

³⁸ An officer's complaint in *Argüelles, Anuncio*, 1857; *Pap. Var.*, ccvii. pt 12. Rules for monte pio and pensions. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1849, 100, 114, 127-8, 143-4, 227-8; *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1849, 29-9, 186-7, 235-6, 369-70; 1850, 157-8; 1851, 53-64; 1852, 15-16, 108-9; *Universal*, Aug. 26, 1852, 3. It was proposed to abolish comandancias generales, but protests against the project found hearing. *Ordoñez, Estincion Com. Gen.*, 1-11.

³⁹ *Méx., Mem. Guer.*, 1852, 73-6, and doc. 6. Concerning the ordering of arms, see *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1849, 145; *Id., Recop. Ley., Dec. y Circ.*, 123-4; *Economista*, May 2, 1849, etc.

⁴⁰ And text-books were issued to spread it. Officers were required to study topography. *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1850, 37-9; 1851, 11-13. Concerning the new regulations for the medical corps, see *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1850, 102-5, 137-42; *Id., Col. Ley., Dec. y Ord.*, 69-71, 85-9; *Correo Nac.*, Oct. 23, 1848; *Universal*, Apr. 22, 1850. Military tribunals are considered in *Manif. Sup. Trib.*, 1-38; *Méx., Doc. Jueces Mil.*, 1-43; *Pap. Var.*, lxxxviii. pt 4, clxxxvi. pt 4; *Suarez y Navarro, Discurso sobre Trib. Mil.*, 1-60; *Miscel.*, xii. pt 1. Their code of procedure is given in *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1852, 201-2. Further general rules and orders in *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1848, 361-2; 1850, 58-60, 114-18; 1851, 26-7, 50-3, 61-2, 74-83, 170-2, 235-69, 303-4; 1853, 335-46; *Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Ord.*, 1850-1, 41-2, 79-82, 219-25, 236, 338-60. On the moral condition and influence of the army, see *Rep. Méx., Lijera Reseña*, 35 et seq. Mora has strong hostile views. *Rev. Méx.*, i. 407-38.

coast-guard fleet was on the stocks, and in 1851 the navy had with this indirect addition swollen to seven vessels, five of them manned by 133 sailors, besides an imposing staff of officers, and with 19 guns.⁴¹

To compensate for the reduced strength of the regular army, greater attention was given to the militia, now divided into local and mobile, the former embracing all able Mexicans between the ages of 18 and 55, the latter composed of a proportion corresponding to six per mille of the population, and liable to serve beyond the state where enrolled, although not for a period exceeding six months. When leaving the place of residence for a day or more, the militia received the same pay as the regular troops, from state funds unless employed on federal service, in which case the state deducted their allowance from money due the supreme government. They were therefore entirely at the command of the states, and in sympathy with them, forming a powerful element for supporting demands against the federal authorities. The duty demanded even from the constantly employed mobiles, known also as the federal reserve army, was comparatively easy; especially as they were commanded by officers of their own election, and those who chose to enlist naturally preferred this service to the regular. Many states neglected to issue proper regulations for the militia, and but few chose to enforce them; so that great laxity prevailed, and this was increased by the loose character of the substitutes provided by those who could purchase exemption.⁴² A special allowance had to be made for equipping thirty-four companies of mobiles in the northern

⁴¹ The total annual cost being \$89,000. The fleet embraced a steamer, a brigantine, and five schooners, two in the Pacific, and another steamer was building at New York. *Méx., Mem. Guer.*, 1850, 35; 1851, 37-8; 1852, 86-7.

⁴² Law of July 15, 1848, *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1848, 240 et seq.; *Guardia Nacional, Ley Orgán.*, 1-8. A report of Feb. 24, 1849, places the mobile force at 24,973. Apportionment in *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1849, 32-5. Other regulations, etc., in *Id.*, 161-3, 175-7, 183-4, 237-8; *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1848, 529-30; 1850, 82-3, 110-20, 300-1; *Guardia Nac.*, ii. 44.

provinces, as a permanent supplement to the deficient regulars, for guarding the border and repelling Indian raids.⁴³

The northern frontier had become more than ever the object of anxious care, less because of the closer approximation of a feared neighbor than because of the growing inroads of wild Indians. The treaty of Guadalupe provided that the United States should assist in checking this evil, since the source of invasion lay within their territory; but the border was too extensive to be guarded in any adequate manner, and their efforts to suppress the turbulent savages only tended to drive them southward into the less protected Mexican provinces, where the superior arms furnished by unscrupulous United States traders gave them great advantages. Vast uninhabited tracts here favored them, and colonization had long suggested itself as a remedy; but who would settle in a country so subject to political disorders and civil war, so maleadministered and oppressed by arbitrary taxes and restrictions, where the enactments by one congress were on the morrow annulled by another, where lawlessness and insecurity went hand in hand? The inducements were slight, particularly when equally rich lands in the adjoining northern republic were offered free, with every advantage and protection. The efforts so far made in this direction had brought insignificant fruit; partly because of their spasmodic, illiberal, and inconsistent nature, and of the not unreasonable fears grown out of the Texan experiment.⁴⁴

⁴³ This embraced the 7 northern states, of which Coahuila obtained 300 men, Durango 400, and the rest 200 each, at a total cost of \$374,118 a year. *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1849, 218-22. Yet the necessary measures were hampered by a lack of funds. *Méx., Mem. Guer.*, 1850, 14. The total militia employed by the federation, by list of Dec. 1851, numbered 6,983 men and 393 officers. *Id.*, 1852, doc. 14.

⁴⁴ Concerning some recent efforts for French and other Latin immigration, see *Mem. de Coloniz. é Indust.*, 1851, 3 et seq. A Spaniard named Mier y Teran obtained great praise for offering large tracts to this end. *Monitor Rep.*, Feb. 28, 1850. He was shrewd enough to see that settlement would increase the value of his other land or his trade. Colony projects may be studied in *Méx., Proyecto Coloniz.*, 1-12; *Coloniz., Nuevo Proyecto.*, 1-19;

This lack of success suggested the planting of military colonies by the government, which were to serve also as bulwarks for other settlements.⁴⁵ Recruits were received for a service of six years, after which they obtained a tract of land, together with certain privileges, as exemption from taxes and aid to till the soil and erect a home. The chronic lack of funds interfered as usual to prevent enthusiasm for the plan; and although a thousand recruits were sent to the front in 1849, with the full staff of inspectors, paymasters, and so forth, they formed rather flying or roaming columns than fixed settlers.⁴⁶ In the fol-

Coloniz., Doc. que pub. la Direccion., 1848, 1-46; Pap. Var., cxiv. pt 5. Decree against illegal settlements. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., v. 572-3.* The clergy naturally raised the objection of intolerance, which was maintained. *Coloniz., Inconvenientes, 1-24; Pap. Var., xi. pt 5, cxiv. pt 4; Correo Nac., Aug. 18, 29, 1848.*

⁴⁵ By decree of July 19, 1848, such colonies were ordered to be formed, at a cost not exceeding that of the presidio companies, created by law of March 29, 1826, and with all privileges that may be granted to colonists in general. To this end the northern frontier was divided into three sections, the Oriente, embracing Tamaulipas and Coahuila; the Chihuahua, for the state of this name; and the Occidente, including Sonora and Lower California. For gifts to friendly Indians \$10,000 a year were assigned. Each section was placed under a colonel, as inspector, who must visit every colony at least once in two months. A lieutenant took charge of two to three colonies, as sub-inspector and jefe político subalterno, and a captain commanded at each settlement. The enlistment was voluntary, with a bounty of \$10 for six years' service. At the end of this term the soldier might retire and settle on the land granted him, the grant being doubled for twelve years' service; no pension could be obtained. The land so given varied from half a fanega de sembradura to three fanegas. On planting a colony on tracts purchased from private owners or otherwise obtained, the recruits were to receive six months' pay in advance, and the necessary tools, beasts, and material for houses. Married settlers were exempted from every tax, even parochial. A justice of the peace in each colony had cognizance in first instance. *Mex., Legist. Mej., 1848, 261-9; Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., v. 422-6, 747-50.* Military colonies were proposed as early as 1828.

⁴⁶ *Mex., Mem. Guer., 1850, 14-18, docs 3.5.* Of the recruits the Oriente, Chihuahua, and Occidente sections had 434, 296, and 340, respectively. The original plan called for 2,426 troops, whereof 1,751 cavalry, with 3,502 horses and 49 cannon, the pay list being estimated at \$717,572, of which the officers took \$211,000. Of the 18 colonies there were to be 3 in Tamaulipas, 4 in Coahuila, 5 in Chihuahua, 5 in Sonora, and 1 in Lower California. A number of suggestions appeared for promoting their formation and efficiency. *Colonias Milit., 1848, 1-6; Id., Proyecto, 1-4, and docs; Plan para Defensa, 9, etc.; Pap. Var., lxxxix. pts 9-11; and a law was issued April 24, 1849, appointing a council of two members of congress, from the states suffering under Indian raids, to frame a plan for defence. Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., v. 551-2; Escudero, Not. Son., 80-1; Universal, Aug. 12, Sept. 25, Oct. 6, 1849. Rules for the colonies, in Mex., Legist. Mj., 1849, 154-6, 184-5; 1850, 136; 1851, 342; 1853, 347-53. Comments in Sartorius, Import. Mex., 26, 32, etc.*

lowing years, however, more funds were provided, and according to the report for 1851 some order had been introduced, so that half of the colonies could be regarded as founded and in a fair way of development, with settlers gathering around them, while the remainder stood provisionally organized; yet the total number of recruits was still less than half of the stipulated figure,⁴⁷ and large stretches of frontier, some of

⁴⁷ The 18 colonies counted 1,093 men and 140 officers, including chaplains, thus lacking 1,333 men and 51 officers. The Oriente frontier, which extended for 170 leagues, was less exposed along the lower or eastern half, owing to the growing river traffic and settlement on both banks of the Rio Grande del Norte. The most easterly colony was therefore Monterey, located at Paso de Piedra, nearly opposite Laredo of Texas, on May 15, 1850. Above this followed Pan, provisionally placed at Lampazos; Rio Grande, located on Feb. 26, 1850, at Mision Nueva, 21 leagues above; Guerrero, placed provisionally on July 19, 1850, at Piedras Negras, 14 leagues above, and opposite Fort Duncan of Texas; Monclova Viejo, located on August 1, 1850, at Moral, 8 leagues above; San Vicente, located at Agua Verde, 10 leagues above, after a provisional stay at Santa Rosa. The seventh colony, Camargo, not being required lower down the river, as originally proposed, a place was sought for it above the preceding, and as the great ford for Indian raiders lay at Paso de los Chizos, not far above the mouth of Rio Puerco, it was intended to move to this region also the Guerrero colony. At San Carlos, founded in July 1850 at the ancient presidio, began the Chihuahua line of colonies, to cover a frontier of 160 leagues, behind which extended an area of 17,000 square leagues, with a scanty population of 150,000. Above this, near the mouth of Rio de Conchos, lay the old Presidio del Norte, and this point was also retained for the colony of the same name, founded in May 1850; while southward, along the Conchos and Florido, three military outposts were proposed, at Las Babizas, La Cruz, and Punta de la Agua (sic), to guard against Indians. Pilares was established at the same time near Vado de Piedra, 14 leagues above, and 47 leagues intervened between it and the next colony, El Paso, 14 leagues east of the town of Paso del Norte, which forms the gateway to New Mexico. It was founded on Dec. 15, 1849, close to the civil colony of Guadalupe, composed of emigrants from the north side of the river. The fifth colony of Janos was placed provisionally at the presidio of the same name, 70 leagues from Pilares. On both sides, therefore, of El Paso were long stretches of border requiring more protection, one station being proposed for Pilares, a point between Vado de Piedra and Paso del Norte, and others for Sierra de la Florida, Ojo de las Vacas, and the mining camp of Santa Rita del Cobre, west of Paso del Norte. The Occidente frontier was still more extensive, and guarded so far by presidio companies, which stood on the point of abandoning their posts, when in Jan. 1851 the inspector arrived with reinforcements of men and means, and established the six colonies provisionally at the old presidios of Babilpe, Fronteras, Santa Cruz, Tucson, Altar, and Santo Tomás mission, the latter in Lower California, along an irregular line that rarely approaches the border. Few of these locations were promising, and it was proposed to move Santa Cruz 12 leagues eastward to San Pedro hacienda, whose owner offered good land, Tucson to Tabasco, Altar to Tres Álamos, 30 leagues from San Pedro, and the one in Lower California to Santa Catalina. For details see reports incorporated in *Méx., Mem. Guer.*, 1850, 14 et seq.; *Id.*, 1851, 15-39; *Id.*, 1852, 35-63, with documents and maps. A portion of this reproduced in *Dicc. Univ.*, ii. 450-4. Rules and provisions. *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1850, 199-205, etc.; *Méx., Col. Ley.*

the most exposed, remained unprotected. But it was expected that the military colonies would soon attract civil settlers, and as these grew stronger the former might push onward to form fresh outposts and nuclei for settlement. This expectation received an unlooked for and most welcome response in the application for land by several hundred Seminole and other peaceful agricultural Indians from the United States, who were received with open arms and rendered good service against savage invaders.⁴⁸ A similar system of colonies was applied to maintain in subjection the rebellious Indians of Sierra Gorda, centring in Querétaro, and to set them a good example in agricultural development. Success attended both aims; and in 1851 there were three flourishing settlements, embracing 250 soldiers and over 2,200 other settlers, with schools and rapidly unfolding home comforts.⁴⁹

y Dec., 1850, i. 138-42. For further authorities and particulars, I refer to *Hist. North Mex. States*, ii., this series.

⁴⁸ The applicants consisted of 309 Seminoles, Quicapos, and Mascogoes, including families. The Quicapos alone deserted. *Derecho Intern. Mex.*, iii. 496-9.

⁴⁹ The three colonies were Santa Rosa Uraga, established in June 1851 near Iacala, and numbering at the end of the year 438 souls; Arista, founded in April 1851, near Jalpan, and numbering 450 souls; San Ciro de Albercas, 20 leagues from Arista and 14 from Rio Verde, founded a little earlier and containing 1,603 persons. They were known as the Mexico, Querétaro, and San Luis Potosí colonies, respectively; a fourth was needed in the Guanajuato part of the mountains to complete the line. *Mex., Mem. Guer.*, 1850, 18-19, docs 6-7; *Id.*, 1851, 25-6, doc. 5; *Id.*, 1852, 58-63, docs 3-4. They were established in accordance with a decree of Oct. 26, 1849. *Mex., Legisl. Mej.*, 1849, 275-89. Further regulations in *Id.*, 1851, 269-76; 1853, 355-68; *Arriaga, Recop.*, 1849-50, 152-9; *Mil., Reglam.*, 1-15. The decree of July 25, 1851, for placing four colonies on the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, was hampered by a lack of funds and by local outbreaks. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, vi. 101-5; *Mex., Reglam. Colon. Mil.*, 1-31; *Pap. Var.*, cxiv. pt 8; *Universal*, Oct. 14, 1849.

CHAPTER XXII.

WAR OF RACES.

1849-1851.

RACE FEELING—CONDITION OF THE INDIAN POPULATION—HOSTILITIES IN THE SIERRA GORDA—A PROJECTED NORTHERN REPUBLIC—BORDER RAIDS—SCALP-HUNTING—THE WAR IN YUCATAN—ATTITUDE OF BRITISH SETTLERS IN BELIZE—THE BACALAR EXPEDITION—SELLING PRISONERS INTO FOREIGN SLAVERY—DISSENSIONS AMONG THE REBELS—INEFFICIENT CAMPAIGN PLANS OF MICHELTORENA AND VEGA—REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN THE SOUTHERN STATES—AGITATION FOR RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE—PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION—OBSTACLES TO REFORM—CHARACTER AND SERVICES OF HERRERA.

RACE feeling forms a potent element in Mexican politics. The overthrow of Spanish supremacy removed the strongest of the irritating causes, and with a prudent, equable national policy the rest might have followed; but they were kept alive and given a new direction by that chronic evil, party strife, which with reprehensible recklessness hesitated at nothing to gain the object in view. After the achievement of independence, there remained practically only two races in the country, the aborigines, including by sympathy and other links a proportion of the lower castes, and the higher mestizos, the ruling, stirring race, embracing mixtures of all degrees, as well as those claiming to be pure whites, vanity on one side and policy on the other being motives for the union. Religion had been a soothing bond that kept them all together, assuaging among the oppressed the bitterness caused by oppression; but of late it had been loosened by the more cultivated classes, in a manner that could not fail

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to affect the rest. Another bond lay in the mestizos themselves, as the outcome of them and others; and although this connected very feebly with a number of unmixed tribes in different directions, which in their isolation dreamed of ancient glories and inherited



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rights, and brooded over the wrongs inflicted by aggressive factions and administrations, yet it was one that must grow stronger and broader by the process of natural absorption. It may seem strange, however, that this slow growth was not interrupted in a marked

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manner by the Indians, with their aggravated causes for discontent; with their number, exceeding that of all the other races; and with their many opportunities for outbreaks, midst civil wars and faction bids. Fortunately, the patient, long-suffering disposition of the aborigines, and above all their division into distinct tribes and nations, with different interests and sympathies, proved a barrier to any general and disastrous uprising.

Local movements have taken place, however, and although generally merged during the republican era in party strife, several were distinctly Indian revolutions, such as those in the Mizteca country. The late war of invasion gave opportunity and impulse to others, as we have seen. The futile though threatening pronunciamiento of Marquez for Santa Anna in February 1849, with a portion of the government troops engaged in subduing the rebellious Indians of Sierra Gorda, is claimed to have occurred at the turning-point in this campaign. The mountaineers certainly took advantage of the diversion to capture Rio Verde and several villages. The leader, Quiros, moreover, chose to ignore a convention lately arranged,¹ as not sufficiently favorable to his ambitious views. Thus pressed, the governor appealed for aid to the adjoining states, and with the 2,000 additional men obtained, took such effective steps that the revolution was suppressed by October, Quiros being captured and executed.²

Several hundred of his most active followers were exiled to different frontier colonies, there to vent their

¹ Although the government meekly conferred upon him the command at Xichú, with the rank of major, and a guard of 100 men paid by the former. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 368; *Méx., Mem. Min. Guer.*, 1850, 7.

² And his second, Ramirez, falling mortally wounded. Their followers were included under the general amnesty of April 12th, yet 478 prisoners were sent away to remain under supervision as colonists in different northern frontier states. See *Méx., Legisl. Mcj.*, 1849, 82, 292-3; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, April 1849, 131-2; 1849-50, 161-2. For aid granted, *Méx., Col. Lry. y Dec.*, 1848, 458. Other details in *Monitor Rep.*, Dec. 22, 1848, etc.; *Sonorense*, Dec. 1, 1848, etc.; *Heraldo*, Dec. 11, 1848, etc.; *Correo Nac.*, Jan. 3, 1849, etc.; *Cent. Am. Papers*, v. 302; *Méx., Mem.*, v. doc. 4.

turbulence in repelling the more savage invaders from beyond the border, and to help in counteracting the intrigues of certain cliques which still labored to form an independent republic of the northern states.³ This project had no hopes of success, partly owing to the need of assistance from the southern provinces against their great affliction, Indian raids. Operations of local troops and flying corps availed little against the fleet and wily Apaches and their confrères, equipped as they were with superior arms, provided by avaricious traders, and colonies and missions could make but slow impression.⁴ Under such circumstances it seemed pardonable for the provincial authorities in their desperate strait to listen to the proposal of a company of adventurers from the United States, which offered to kill hostile Indians at two hundred dollars each.⁵ Journals of the southern states not so afflicted naturally became the medium for a loud cry against the 'blood contract,' alleging, among other reasons, that it left the door open for numerous abuses, such as robbery, spoliation, and attacks on friendly Indian villages, which might stir up civil war. It was argued in answer that no other effective means existed,


³ The commandant at Matamoros reported in June 1849 that a conspiracy had been discovered, emanating from refugees at Brownsville, and proposing to start the movement. Their manifesto, which bears a strong resemblance in its opening to that issued by the U. S. in 1776, declared the seven northern states independent of Mexico, on the ground of corrupt administration and political changes, oppressive exactions by usurping rulers and their disorderly armies, forcible encroachments on the church and faith and personal property and rights, and disregard for the interests and sufferings of the northern states. The nine articles may be consulted among other places in *Universal*, July 10, 1849; *Cent. Am. Papers*, v. 43, etc.

⁴ For plans and manœuvres to check the invasion, see *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mez.*, v. 487-8; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1849, 125-6; *Id.*, *Recop. Leg.*, *Dec. y Circ.*, 125-31; *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 31, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 1, pt. ii. 18-67; *Monitor Rep.*, Aug. 8, 1849, etc.; and for comprehensive account, *Hist. North Mex. States*, ii., this series; *Castañeda, Plan Defensa*, 1-27; *Pinart Coll.*

⁵ With \$50 more for warrior prisoners, and \$150 for boys and girls under 14, \$50 less if dead, and right to all spoils taken from the Indians, the leader of the party being responsible for all effects taken from or damage done to peaceful inhabitants. *República*, July 4, 1849; *El Toro*, June 5, 1849. The legislature of Chihuahua approved the proposal, although hesitating at the bid for killing women. Durango adopted substantially the same measure, while preferring to give original owners of recovered stock the privilege to redeem it at \$3 for horses and \$3 for mules. *Dur.*, *Registro Ofic.*, June 25, 1849, et seq.

and that the retaliation, publicly announced, was no worse than the methods of the foe, which lay constantly on the watch for stealthy descents on exposed settlements, leaving smoking ruins and bereaved families to mark their visits. Not long after, San Luis Potosí arranged a coalition between the suffering states for joint action against the savages, supported by a common fund and a certain proportion of troops.⁶

The most distinct war of races was that waging at this time in Yucatan. The reoccupation of Valladolid



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and that of Tihosuco by white men were the culminating achievements in the campaign of 1848, which secured to them the supremacy and the possession of the gulf coast of the peninsula. The Indians had been driven back into the forests and deserts, and could claim absolute sway only in the region south, or rather south-east, of the great central cordillera, where their three great leaders, Florentino Chan, Cecilio Chí, and Ja-

⁶ *Méx.. Informe Comis. Pesquis.*, 1874, 81, etc.; *Méx., Border Com.*, 337-40; *Pap. Var.*, cxcix. pt 5.

cinto Pat, divided the power, in the east, centre, and south respectively. The white men proposed to follow up the advantage by harassing the foe, carrying the war into their midst, and affirming the progress made by pushing the cantonments farther and farther, obtaining prisoners, and compressing the revolution within ever-narrowing limits. This plan met with a certain degree of success in the Valladolid region;⁷ but below, round Tihosuco, greater resistance was encountered, and the Indians turned the tables by laying siege to this town, and Saban, one of the new cantonments, maintaining it obstinately for months, despite the efforts for relief,⁸ and encouraging their comrades in the north to firmer resistance, so much so that they ventured to attack Valladolid itself. West of the central campaign ground extended the mountainous district of Chenes, within a dozen leagues of Campeche, where the rebels still held forth,⁹ almost in the midst of the cultured settlers. Stirred by comrades driven from the eastern fields, they became so daring as to provoke Campeche to special expeditions against them; but although the troops generally overcame all resistance, the foe proceeded only to reoccupy their ground, and maintain a harassing guerrilla conflict from the fastnesses.

For the southern campaign, centring round Bacalar, a double aim was proposed. This region bordered on Belize, occupied by the British under treaties of 1783 and 1786 for purposes of trade alone, yet gradually came to be regarded as a colonial possession.¹⁰

⁷ Where Col Mendez, by the end of January 1849, gained four villages, and established two cantons at Chemax and Tikuch. In the following months the garrisons were extended to Yalcobá, and an expedition from Tizimin made a successful march toward Chancénote, bringing back more than 300 prisoners. *Boletín Ofic.* for these months, *passim*.

⁸ Saban lay south of Ichmul, and the other cantonment, Chikinonot, north. The siege of Tihosuco began in Jan. 1849. *Globo*, March 1, 1849.

⁹ Round Hopelchen, Bolonchenticul, etc.

¹⁰ The forcible entry into the district of the Yucatan governor, O'Neill, in 1798, and his defeat, led the colonists to regard their occupation as affirmed by conquest; but by convention of 1802 the right was not sustained. The treaty of commerce between Mexico and England in 1823 confirmed the privileges held under the treaties with Spain; and although the clause was vague,

Not content with encroaching on territory and resources, the traders here did not scruple to provide the rebels with arms, ammunition, and other effects. Indeed, all their war supplies came from this source, and were paid for by spoils from the northern settlements, and partly by dye-woods and other products. Yucatan had protested against this infringement of treaty, and obtained satisfactory assurances; but the capture by the Indians, in the spring of 1848, of Bacalar, the great entrepôt for trade in this direction, tended to a disregard of promises, and traffic in war stores and other effects increased, with the assistance of imposing flotillas and caravans, which conveyed the merchandise to secret depôts throughout the peninsula. Mexico joined in protesting before the British minister, who merely referred the matter to England, where again it passed through the usual dilatory channels, affording the colonial authorities an additional excuse for countenancing not only contraband trade, but actual coöperation with the rebels.¹¹

It was proposed by the Yucatec government to re-occupy Bacalar and cut off this pernicious traffic, which tended to sustain the revolution, creating at the same time a diversion by so promising a movement in the rear. Colonel Cetina accordingly left Sisal in April 1849 with 800 men by steamer, and obtained possession of the town, which he fortified, and began to take steps for suppressing illicit commerce. Pat proved equal to the emergency, however. Incited by the blow at their main source of revenue, 4,000 of his followers obeyed the summons to rise against the invaders. Bacalar was closely invested, and although Cetina held out well, his operations were so circumscribed as to extend to little beyond defence. Malarial fever and desertion crippled him, and a relief ex-

the vain effort made ten years later by the court of St James to obtain a transfer of Spanish territorial claims shows that the occupation was not accepted as unequivocal. *Méx., Mem. Min. Rel.*, 1879; *Peuiche, Hist. Rel. Belice*, 5 et seq.

¹¹ *Méx., Mem. Min. Rel.*, 1850, 8-9.

pedition of 800 men from Sabán had to return with the loss of over half its force.¹²

The campaign which opened so auspiciously with the turn of the year had been practically a failure. The white men had not been able to hold more than a portion of the ground occupied, and the drain of a long war was beginning to be felt. There were over 16,000 men in the field,¹³ including 2,000 friendly Indians, besides local defenders and garrisons; and toward their support and equipment the republic had in 1848 contributed only \$150,000. Yucatan itself had a revenue of less than half a million, and could devote only a proportion to war purposes. It was evident, therefore, that no funds could be spared for pay. Indeed, the troops were nearly all volunteers, receiving from any surplus on hand an occasional gratuity.¹⁴ Provisions were obtained chiefly on credit, and later from camps and farms of rebels, most of the expeditions henceforth being to forage. The revenue was mortgaged, and declined under the neglect of agriculture and other industries, and the smallness of the personal contribution tax, formerly so productive. Under this pressure the popular Governor Barbachano conceived the idea of utilizing the numerous prisoners taken during the war. He had obtained the passage of a decree expelling from the country for ten years all Indians who were captured or failed to submit, on the ground that the government could not

¹²In May-June 1849. It was overwhelmed by the Indians, and had to find its way back in detachments. The besiegers exhibited the most reckless bravery in pushing their works and making their assaults, usually by night. At one time there were over 200 of the garrison on the sick-list, and food failing, desertion increased. In order to check the growing discontent, Cetina one day called on the men in favor of retreat to step forward. Half a dozen did so, only to be shot, according to *Baqueiro, Ensayo*, ii. cap. vi. Even a lieutenant was shot for being in secret understanding with the rebels. See also *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 159; *Universal*, June 9, 16, etc., 1849.

¹³'Trece mil cuatrocientos hombres componen las fuerzas que ha levantado el Estado.' *Méx., Mem. Min. Guer.*, 1850, 11.

¹⁴From the subsequent monthly allowance granted by Mexico, privates received \$1 each and the rest in proportion, to \$30 for the col; but this was not often given.

support them.¹⁵ Soon after came an offer from Cuba of twenty-five pesos for any prisoner surrendered for service on plantations and elsewhere. The government accepted the bid, while seeking to protect the victims to a certain extent under the formality of contracts for their term of service, pay, and treatment.¹⁶ The first batch consigned to this servitude numbered more than three hundred. At Habana the Mexican consul inquired into the case, however, and the federal government, in April 1849, issued a decree against such consignments. The Yucatecs advanced humanitarian reasons in defence, alleging that servitude even more severe must be preferable to starvation or to death, to which marauding rebels were amenable. The contract fee was but a fair compensation for a small portion of the ill inflicted by the prisoners. This argument prevailed, and the traffic was limited only by the number of captives obtainable. In order to affirm her control in the province, the republic insisted on a proportion of the federal revenue, offering instead a monthly allowance of \$16,000;¹⁷ but the effort of the agent to collect it roused such serious opposition¹⁸ that it had to be modified, with loss of the subsidy, however.

At the time of the greatest dejection among the white men in the autumn of 1849, they were relieved by a change of tactics on the part of their opponents, who raised the siege of Tihosuco and Sabán, abated their vigilance in the south, and fell back mainly on

¹⁵ Decree of Nov. 6, 1848. *Aznar. Coll.*, iii. 240. For details concerning the state revenue and resources, see *Yuc., Mem. Gob.*, 1849, with appended docs.

¹⁶ The term was for 10 years, with a compensation to the men of \$2 a month, 2 cotton dresses a year, and certain weekly allowance of maize and meat. The women and children received much less.

¹⁷ 'Un situado de diez y seis mil pesos.' *Méx., Mem. Min. Rel.*, 1850, 12. Yucatec authorities reduce it to \$15,000.

¹⁸ In June 1850 the jefe político at Tiximin pronounced for separation, but the attempt was promptly suppressed. *Méx., Mem. Min. Guer.*, 1850, 9. A contract for provisions was vainly objected to by the agent as infringing the tariff. The subsidy, granted in August 1849, was stopped within less than six months. In March 1850 the town of Carmen was almost totally destroyed by fire, with a loss estimated at \$3,000,000.

the defensive. The cause lay in dissensions due to the assassination of the leader Chí,¹⁹ and the unwise act of Pat in imposing a contribution for obtaining war material. Of what avail a rebellion directed chiefly against taxation, if this had to come after all? The Indians did not choose to consider that they had been driven from the raiding grounds that supplied the spoils for purchasing arms, and they readily listened to the appeal of his rivals against him. He fled, but was overtaken by them and killed,²⁰ leaving to Chan, the eastern leader, the control, which was shared to some extent, however, with his lieutenants Pec and Poot.

Before his death, Pat had despondently sought British mediation for terminating the war, and his successors advocated the project with a view to obtain the shelter of a protectorate.²¹ Pat's appeal succeeded, and the superintendent of Belize²² met the rebel representatives in November 1849, to arrange a basis for negotiations. They insisted on being accorded independence, with a concession of the territory lying east of a line drawn from Bacalar northward to the gulf.²³ The government very naturally refused to entertain the terms, and availed itself of the disposition for peace to send clergymen to the different districts with persuasive inducements. A number of chiefs did yield; but the majority held out,²⁴ on the ground

¹⁹ By a lover of his wife, his own secretary, who played the role of an ascetic to further his designs.

²⁰ *Patria*, Sept.-Oct. 1849, *passim*.

²¹ Venancio Pec even proposed a journey to England for the purpose, but the means collected for the trip were lost during a raid.

²² Charles St John Fancourt, who in 1854 published at London a *History of Yucatan*, covering a portion of the colonial period.

²³ The cause of war lay in the violation of promises by the Yucatec government, offering exemption from taxes in return for their aid against Mexican invaders, yet imposing the most onerous and unequal contributions. They could never again rely on the promises of the Yucatecs; and rather than submit to their taxes or control, they would emigrate. Their proposal to be governed by the superintendent of Belize, Fancourt could not entertain. He prevailed on them to reduce their territorial claim and allow whites to reside among them. *Cent. Amer. Papers*, v. 80; *Nic., Cor. Ist.*, Jan. 16, 1850.

²⁴ In a rambling proposal of Jan. 24, 1850, signed by Chan, Pec, Novelo, and Secretary Gil, at Cruzchen, it is required that the Spanish troops, as

that the desired stay of raiding expeditions was not granted. The white men would not lose so promising an opportunity to gain advantage over the vacillating and divided natives, and to obtain much needed supplies for their troops.²⁵

General Micheltorena, of California fame, who arrived in February 1850, to take charge of the campaign on behalf of the republic, approved of the close pressure applied by expeditions, henceforth accompanied by priestly peace commissioners—palm and sword combined; but he strove to produce more harmonious and effective action by concentrating the forces into two divisions only.²⁶ The advantage was not maintained, however, for the success of certain parties, the relief of Bacalar, and the advancement of a few cantonments were counterbalanced by a renewal of the war spirit among the irritated natives, who surprised Tekax and other places, resumed siege operations at Bacalar and towns to the north, and undertook more determined raids beyond the lines.²⁷ Unity and co-operation were promoted by founding a more central capital or headquarters near Ascension Bay, named Chan Santa Cruz, the latter in allusion to three crosses, to which interested leaders ascribed a sacred origin.²⁸ Micheltorena became so discouraged at the changing prospects and the neglect of Mexico that he resigned.²⁹

they are called, stay their expeditions in order to give the Indians time to consult. Reproduced in *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, viii. 339-64.

²⁵ Mendez made a raid toward Chan's headquarters at Cruzchen, and brought back 150 loads of maize, 20 prisoners, and 140 submitted natives. *Patrie*, Feb. 25, 1850, et seq.; also *Fénix*, etc.

²⁶ Under Col Eulogio Rosado, commanding in the south-east, and Gen. Cadenas, commanding in the north-west.

²⁷ *Méj.*, *Mem. Min. Guer.*, 1851, 11-12. The most brilliant operation during the year was O'Horan's march in June-July 1850 across the peninsula to Bacalar and back, bringing 218 prisoners and tokens from 117 killed. *Baqueiro, Ensayo*, ii. cap. vi.; *Fénix*, nos 128-9. Bacalar had been relieved in April, when nearly lost.

²⁸ It lay eight leagues east from the bay. The foundation was fostered by J. M. Barrera, a rising man, who hero discovered the indispensable spring, so prized in this arid country, and obtained the assistance of a priest who was a ventriloquist. *Baqueiro*, loc. cit. It became the object of repeated attacks and fell several times, but grew, nevertheless, to become the chief town.

²⁹ He promised to subdue the rebels within four months if a million of pesos were placed at his disposal. This was out of the question, a loan of \$70,000 alone being offered by the peninsular people.

He was replaced in May 1851 by General Vega, who recognized that the actual method of hemming in the natives by pushing cantonments had passed its limits, owing to the lack of sufficient resources in the country still unsubdued, and the necessity for letting a large proportion of the starving troops return to attend to their long-neglected farming and other pursuits. He accordingly reorganized the men on the new Mexican system, into *guardia móvil* and *sedentaria*, and reduced the occupation along the front to the leading cantonments, where the *móvil* militia would be relieved at intervals by the *sedentaria*, which remained at home ready for any call.³⁰ Vega established his headquarters at Peto, whence he directed occasional expeditions to distract the enemy and gather supplies and prisoners. The natives retaliated in different ways, partly by falling upon the reduced garrisons; and so the contest dropped into a prolonged desultory warfare, wherein several quieted districts joined, notably the eastern, encouraged by the decreased efficiency and activity of their opponents.³¹ At the same time party spirit began to add to the disorder in the gulf settlements, the main factions being that of Barbachano, the popular governor, who so stoutly upheld the rights of the peninsula against Mexico; and of Mendez, who sought to strengthen himself by appealing to the military chiefs and other federal adherents, and suc-

³⁰ The *móvil* was divided into three divisions, under Cadenas, Rosado, and Molas, with a reserve under Llergo. *Siglo XIX.*, no. 156 et seq. Kampocolché was the most advance cantonment.

³¹ The priests who attended the expeditions only lost influence. Zamacois indulges in a panegyric on their persuasion and zeal. *Hist. Mej.*, xiii. 335-79. The district of Chichanjá, west of Belize, yielded to mediation from the corregidor at Peten, but were soon roused again by Barrera. In 1852 three formidable expeditions left for the east under Col Ruz, for the centre and Chenes districts under O'Horan and others, and for the south under Vega himself, who alone achieved anything important. He took Chan Santa Cruz, Feb. 24th, relieved Bacalar, and returned to Peto by the end of April. In June Bacalar was again relieved, and Chan Santa Cruz taken once more, involving the fall of Pcc. For details, see *Universal*, Feb.-Oct. 1850; and following: *Siglo XIX.*; *Id.*, *Progreso*, June 13, 1850, etc.; *Cent. Amer. Papers*, ii. 39 et seq.; v. 302; *Guat. Gac.*, Aug. 23, 1849, etc.; *Baqueiro, Ensayo*, ii. cap. vi., etc.; *Ancona, Hist. Yuc.*, iv. 290 et seq.; *Barbachano, Mem. Yuc.*, 148 et seq.; *Rivera, Hist. Yuc.*, iv. 140 etc.

ceeded in 1851 in obtaining for his party a nearly equal representation in the congress; but in the following year his rivals again obtained a decisive majority.³²

The disorders in Yucatan and Sierra Gorda affected tumultuous spirits elsewhere, which were encouraged by the weakness of the government, as displayed in coping with these troubles. Chiapas had been greatly disturbed by a faction hostile to the local government, and which sustained itself for a long time, despite several defeats, with aid from Guatemala and from the adjoining state of Tabasco. The overthrow here in 1850 of an aspiring partisan of Sentmanat named Beltran³³ only caused the rise of others, notably Moreti.³⁴ He stood in league with Melendez, who for a year held the Tehuantepec Isthmus in alarm, advocating partly its separation from Oajaca.³⁵ The repression of both entailed trouble and expense to all the adjoining states, even to the borders of Guerrero and Puebla, where a native leader, Juan Clara, had given new energy to the lingering mountaineer revolt, which began several years back at Chilapa, and gave occasion for numerous local pronunciamientos by San-

³² Notably in the almost unanimous reelection of Barbachano for governor. In 1850 the electoral college appeared so unfavorable to the Mendez faction that they formed a separate college and sent 12 deputies of their own to Mexico. The chambers chose to ignore both elections. In 1851 the Barbachano electors numbered 5, the Mendez 3, while 2 were independent, and 2 friends of Vega, with leanings to Mendez.

³³ This aspirant was Beltran, seconded by a Spaniard named Olave. Beltran held in 1848 the ascendancy for a time, capturing Governor Maldonado of Chiapas, but in 1850 he was taken and shot. *Maldonado, Informe*, 1-14; *Universal*, Nov. 25, Dec. 12, 1849, Jan. 29, June 26, 1850; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 52, 135; *Heraldo*, Dec. 20, 1848; *Correo Nac.*, Dec. 14, 19, 1848.

³⁴ He rose in the southern part of Vera Cruz in April 1851, and although his force was dispersed within a month, he broke forth anew.

³⁵ Melendez first rose at Juchitan with less defined plans, although directed mainly against the governor of Tehuantepec department, Echavarría. The separation cry was intended to bring him greater support, but failed, and in Jan. 1851 he submitted on favorable terms. The government hesitating to confirm them, he fled, and kept the district in fear of another outbreak. A petty revolt at Tehuantepec itself in Dec. 1851, Moreti's operations, and a facile rising at Comitán in June against Chiapas' governor, were all sympathetic movements. Details are given in *Méx. Mem. Min. Guer.*, 1851, 5-6, 9-12; 1852, 9-16, 32; *Universal*, 1849-51, passim; *Siglo XIX.*, id.

tanists, discontented soldiers, and others. Clara's submission in May 1851 restored tranquillity for a time.³⁶

This was greatly promoted by steps taken in connection with the Tehuantepec canal project. In 1850 a convention with the United States was projected, stipulating that the government should open the isthmus of Tehuantepec to interoceanic traffic, and protect those who might arrange with Mexico to construct there a canal or railroad.³⁷ A clause permitting the United States to send troops to guard the construction roused a cry of alarm, even from persons friendly to the executive; and led to the rejection of the convention, and to the annulment of a concession for such work made to Garay in 1842, and subsequently extended, and transferred successively to English and United States companies. This action, based on the assumed illegality of the governments conferring the grant, and its extension, a common feature of Mexican political instability, afforded a certain ground for complaint; and seeing a prospect for a handsome indemnity, the American grantees chose to make so loud a demonstration through the press and before the authorities at Washington that Mexico took alarm.³⁸ Showy preparations were even made

³⁶ *Mex., Mem. Min. Guer.*, 1851, 5, 10; 1852, 8. Among sympathetic local movements were a Santanist rising at Cocula, and a militia meeting at Cuautla, in October 1850, based on land claims. The murder of Gen. Rea, at Ayutla, in the same month, ascribed partly to his Spanish origin, aroused great excitement. *Monitor Rep.*, Jan. 4, 1851, etc.; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv, 210.

³⁷ There are 13 articles. By the 3d and 4th the U. S. have the right to send troops for protecting the constructors, if required by Mexico, or in case of interrupted relations. Art. 8 stipulates that the toll and contributions on Americans are not to exceed those levied on Mexicans. Mexican products pay rates one fifth less. *Mex., Legisl. Mej.*, 1850, 152-7. This was signed in June 1850 by the minister Pedraza and Letcher, and approved by the governments at Mexico and Washington, but rejected by an act of the Mexican congress in April 1852.

³⁸ For a history of the grant and its vicissitudes, see *Tehuan., Account of*, London, 1846, 1-128, with maps; *Id., Observ. Communic. between Atlantic and Pacific*, N. Y., 1848, 1-50, with several plans and maps; *Ramirez, Mem. Diferenc.*, 109-230; *Mex., Rept. Tehuan. Com.*, 1-12. Statements prepared by the grantees in *Burwell, Mem.*, 1-36, with maps; *Tehuan., Controversy, Review*, 1-63. Mexican replies, *Garay, Privilegio, Mem. Instruct.*, 1-39, translated in *Garay, Privilege, Mem.*, 1-44; also *Id., Statement, Mex.*, 1852,

by the company to send men to Tehuantepec, and in view of the recent movements of filibusters from the United States to Cuba, it was thought prudent to take precautions against a possible landing. The headquarters of the comandancia general of Vera Cruz were moved to Acayucan in the autumn of 1851; the national guard of the adjoining states was enlisted and ordered to be in readiness; arms were distributed and four vessels stationed off the Goazacoalco.³⁹ While all this proved to be needless for the purpose intended, it served to prevent any formidable revolutionary movement. A measure expected to have a soothing effect on the somewhat turbulent Mescala region was the formation of the present state of Guerrero, so named in honor of the great patriot leader.⁴⁰

The chambers held two extra sessions during 1849 to forward⁴¹ the reorganization efforts of the government, but the discussion of projects for reforming the constitution produced little result. The question of religious tolerance came up as usual to rouse a heated argument in the journals,⁴² the conservatives main-

and a number of minor memorials and statements in *Barnard's Tehuan.*, app. 277-81, etc.; *Tehuán. Canal*, 1846-53, a collection, and other sources to be quoted in a later special chapter on the subject, from *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 32, Ses. 1, Sen. 92, 1-177, x., etc.

³⁹ The government was permitted to dispose of 3,000 militia, and a considerable force of regulars moved to the scene. Captain Miron was made chief of the sotavento region, under Comandante General Marin. *Méx., Mem. Min. Guer.*, 1852, 19-22.

⁴⁰ After whom was also named his native town of Tixtla. It was formed of the districts of Acapulco, Chilapa, and Tasco, taken from Mexico; Tlapa, taken from Puebla; and Coyuca, taken from Michoacan. Decree signed at Mexico, May 15, 1849. *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1849, 99-100. The addition of Coyuca was promoted by the pronunciamiento of Piuzon shortly before, advocating this step. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 151. The formation was mainly due to the efforts of Bravo and Alvarez. See their appeals to other states for confirmation. *Universal*, June 33, 1849; *Economista*, May 30, 1849. *Soc. Mex. Geog. Bolet.*, ix. 268; *Pinart Coll.*, no. 1022. Rio de las Balsas formed the Michoacan boundary. Conditions accompanying the decree of confirmation in *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1849-53, 31-2, 143-8; *Dublan and Lzazo, Leg. Méx.*, v. 559-60, 623-4, 647-8. A proposal to unite Coahuila and Nuevo Leon led to a local dispute with the governor of the former state, and to what was called unwarranted interference by the president. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 371.

⁴¹ Concerning their sessions, prorogations, etc., see *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1849, 68-9, 118, 129-30, 326-7; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, Apr. 1849, 117; 1849-50, 65, 66, 73, 95-6, 195, 267; *Universal, Globo*, and other journals.

⁴² The *Iris* and *Eco del Comercio* warmly advocated tolerance, while the

taining that the admission of other creeds into a country so thoroughly catholic would prove a dangerous germ of discord. Sympathy evoked by recent political movements against the vatican tended to lend an overwhelming support to this view. Public prayers were ordered in behalf of the persecuted pontiff, the chambers voted him a gift of \$25,000 from the scanty funds of the treasury, and the president wrote to offer him an asylum in Mexico.⁴³

During the latter half of 1850, the nation was absorbed mainly by the struggle for the presidency, to take place in the following January. Among the candidates were General Arista, the minister of war and the leading spirit of the administration; Gomez Pedraza, who had figured as liberal president in 1831; Luis de la Rosa, boon companion of the federal champion Farías, and who had gained great popularity as governor of Zacatecas; Nicolás Bravo, the patriot, with strong conservative principles; General Almonte, well known as former holder of the war portfolio, and who in course of time had become thoroughly imbued with conservative ideas; and Santa Anna, whose cause was by no means weak.⁴⁴ Arista, who had gained the reputation of promoting most of the strong and national measures under the actual administra-

Universal headed another number, and the clergy threw a flood of petitions against it, notably by women. There was one from Orizaba containing the signatures of 1,200 females.

⁴³ By letter dated Feb. 12, 1849, *Méx., Mem. Min. Just.*, 1850, 40-1; text reproduced in Zamacois, *Hist. Méj.*, xiii. 233-8. Decree of March 16, 1849, ordering a gift and three days' prayer. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1849, 113. The pope replied by holding out a vain hope for a Mexican cardinal and by conferring decorations on Herrera and those who had joined him in offering aid. Arista took a decided stand against tolerance. *Derecho Intern. Méx.*, i. 626-57, shows the friendly relations with Rome. *Cent. Amer. Papers*, iii. 163; *Guad., Consuelo del Cabildo*, 1-89, on encyclical letter regarding immaculate conception. Concerning constitutional reforms, projects from the north, *San Luis Potosí, Constit., proyecto, Reforma*, 1843, 1-29; 1850, 1-46.

⁴⁴ Arista was supported notably by the *Monitor Republicano*; Pedraza by the influential *Siglo XIX.*; Rosa by the *Demócrata*; Bravo by the well-known *Universal*; Almonte by *Linterna de Diógenes*. Santa Anna counted on *La Palanca* and *Huracan*, the latter favoring also Iturbide, while the *Tribuno* and *Oposicion* advocated Farías and Bernardo Couto respectively.

tion, was evidently the favorite among the people; and as his decided control of the government gave him an advantage, the opposition turned their efforts chiefly against him. The conservatives had special cause for dislike in his arbitrary interference with the municipal elections in the capital, resulting in the removal of the conservative monarchical ayuntamiento of 1849, the introduction of a law whereby the long-standing control of the local authorities in the elections was taken from them, and the consequent installation for 1851 of a strongly liberal body.⁴⁵ They did not hesitate to bring forward the most absurd charges to create prejudice, even to accuse him of instigating the murder of a prominent citizen.⁴⁶ All

⁴⁵ By decree of Nov. 6, 1850. *Méx., Legist. Mej.*, 1850, 214-15. The ayuntamiento elected for July 1849 included such men as Alaman, the aged minister, now favoring a stable monarchy, Vasquez de Leon, and Arrangoiz, later strong pillars of Maximilian. The proceedings of Arista at the close of 1849, to stay their control of the ensuing election, created some disorder and mobbing, and led to the resignation of the body, after a protest against the meddling of the government. The minister of justice also retired, and was replaced by Senator Castañeda on Dec. 7th. The preceding ayuntamientos of 1847 and 1848 successively declined the invitation to assume the management, and petitions poured in against it, as well as abuse from journals. Instance, *Universal*, Aug. 30, 1849, and subsequent dates; *Globo*, Dec. 2, 1849, etc.; *La Muerte*, *Tío Nonilla*, and others. The editor of the latter sheet, a Spaniard, was banished as obnoxious to peace. The rest were protected by the existing liberty of press. The electors chosen by the government commissioners failed to reach the necessary numbers, and Anaya, the governor of the district, resigning, Col Azcárate succeeded him, to assume also control of municipal affairs. Finally congress decreed the installation of the body ruling in 1848, which held possession from Sept. till Jan. 1, 1851, when the newly elected liberal regidores entered. Decrees concerning the successive elections and changes are in *Méx., Legist. Mej.*, 1849, 113-15, 131-3; *Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, 1850, 5, 206-8, 213-14, 243-4. For charges against ministry for meddling, see *Arango y Escandon, Acusacion*, 1-12; *Méx. Pamphlets*, iii. pt. vi. Review of district affairs in *Méx., Mem. Min. Rel.*, 1851, 36-43, ap. no. 7. Observations by Governor of State Arizcorreta in *Respuesta*, 3; *Dispos. Varias*, v. 67; *Pap. Var.*, cciii. pt. v. 4. Riva Palacio succeeded Arizcorreta in 1849 as governor of the state of Mexico. *Alaman, Apunt. Biog.*, 40-1.

⁴⁶ Cañedo, deputy from Jalisco, although the thieves who, assisted by a servant, had done the deed were quickly caught and convicted, yet the execution was delayed for a time. See charges in *Universal*, Mar. 31, 1850, and *Huracan*, based on a supposed fear by Arista of documents in Cañedo's possession. On July 27, 1850, the *Universal* headed a number of journals in a formal protest against Arista's candidature, as the outcome of intrigue, not of party nomination, urged merely by organs of the minister, who paid them from the public treasury. He had failed to aid in defending Mexico against the late invaders, and broken faith with all parties, surrounded himself with adventurers, and disturbed public peace to gain his own ends. His election would only produce revolution. See also *Garay, Defensa*, 1-64; *Miscel.*, xii. pt. 4.

this availed little, however, for he secured the election.⁴⁷

So ended the rule of Herrera. He was eminently a man of peace, with aims suited for the period of reaction following the excitement and calamities of 1846-7, during which the people at large, sadder and for a time wiser, became intent mainly on rest and recuperation. The result was a gratifying revival of prosperity. Abundant harvests were reported from every quarter; the yield of the mines increased rapidly, and also the export lists, giving impulse to manufactures and traffic. A step was taken toward railway⁴⁸ and telegraph construction, the first wires under such auspices making connection between Mexico and Puebla in 1851.⁴⁹ Buildings rose, home comforts spread, and art, science, and literature began to flourish in a degree hitherto unparalleled, under the leadership of poets, dramatists, and thinkers like Carpio, Pesado, Galvan, the Lacunzas, Prieto, and Payno. This evidence of growing prosperity received an appropriate display in the first industrial exhibition held in the country, in imitation of European efforts. It was opened November 1, 1849, under the auspices of the municipal authorities at Mexico; and although limited for this occasion to horticultural products, including flowers, fruit, and vegetables, sweetmeats, and certain classes of plastic art, it proved highly successful, and beneficial in its effect. Unfortunately civil war and other troubles

⁴⁷ Out of 19 legislative votes Arista obtained 13, Almonte 3, Rosa 2, and Pedraza 1. The announcement took place in the lower house on Jan. 8. The votes of Jalisco, Querétaro, and Coahuila were challenged; those of the latter state were alone rejected. See *Universal*, Jan. 10, 1851, and other journals, as above. Arrangoiz, *Méj.*, ii. 316, writes as if Almonte had a good prospect of gaining the seat by congressional election.

⁴⁸ By decree of May 8, 1849, the government was authorized to contract for a railway from Vera Cruz to the Pacific by way of Mexico. *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1849-50, 39-42.

⁴⁹ At the close of October the first message was sent. The credit of this work is due to a Spaniard, Juan de la Granja, who obtained the privilege to construct lines. Several laws were issued to protect them. *Derecho Intern. Mex.*, iii. 969-70; *Méx., Mem. Fomento*, 1866, 92-3, doc. 47, etc.

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interfered with the proposed annual renewal of the enterprise.⁵⁰

The preceding observations apply especially to the central provinces, comprising the greater part of the population, yet the north and south are not altogether an exception, although here the war of races on the one side, and the devastating ravages of wild Indians on the other, spread a great blight. There were also the common afflictions attending the inroad of cholera in 1850,⁵¹ and the agitation of parties blind to everything but their own ambitious purposes. Their dissension and strife extended to the congress itself, obstructing, neutralizing, defeating every effort to aid the government in its all-important task of reorganization and reform. Against such indifference and opposition, even the best of men could not have succeeded, much less the somewhat incongruous and experimental body under Herrera, varied during a period of two years and a half by sixteen different changes in the finance ministry, and eight in those of relations and justice. Herrera was a man of proverbial honor and rectitude, well meaning, and full of beneficent projects; but he lacked energy and firmness to carry them out, and not having sufficient discernment to select and retain the most fitting advisers, he yielded too readily to more positive minds like Arista's, which were intent rather on their own aims, or unable to cope with the task undertaken. Nevertheless, when we con-

⁵⁰ The project adds another to the many laudable efforts of the able Lucas Alaman, at this time president of the abused conservative monarchical ayuntamiento of the capital. So eagerly was it received by the people that 379 objects were sent in the first day. Alaman accordingly formed a Junta de Fomento de las Exposiciones, and prepared to open the second fair in May 1850, when the cholera came to stop the preparations. His death and later wars proved additional checks. For reports of the exhibition, see *Monitor Rep.*, Oct. 31, 1849, et seq.; *Tío Nonilla*, Nov. 5, etc., with awards; also Cortina's review, in *Discurso Cient.*, pt. xiii. 1-12; and Arrangoiz', *Méj.*, ii, ap. 7-16, as one of the committee.

⁵¹ The deaths from which were estimated by Oct. at 14,000. Precautionary decrees had been issued as early as Jan. 1849. *Méx., Legist. Méj.*, 1849, 6. Round Fresnillo a failure of crops gave rise to outbreaks among the afflicted, *Variedades Jurisp.*, i. 286-305, and Mexico suffered in March 1850 from a heavy fire. *Rivera, Mex. Pint.*, ii. 271-2.

sider the exceptionally trying circumstances under which he was called to power, attempting to bring order out of chaos with insufficient means and against harassing opposition, his administration ranks among the most acceptable, judging by the reforms introduced and the prosperity unfolded, even though several of the leading tasks of reorganization remained unaccomplished. If no positive admiration followed him to his retreat at Tacubaya, neither did ill-will. He lived in a seclusion, forced upon him to some extent by maladies, to which he succumbed in February 1854, leaving an enviable record as one of the most upright and unselfish of rulers.⁶²

⁶² His extreme poverty confirmed his proverbial integrity, 'dejando solamente á sus hijos un nombre immaculado y á sus conciudadanos el ejemplo de verdaderas virtudes.' *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 377. The *Diario Oficial*, Feb. 12, 1854, alone sought to please Santa Anna by sneering at his military ability. He was buried unostentatiously at San Fernando.

CHAPTER XXIII.

ARISTA'S ADMINISTRATION.

1851-1852.

A REFORMED TURNCOAT—FALSE ECONOMY—A NATIONAL FINANCE COUNCIL—CLAMORING CREDITORS—CABINET CHANGES—RAMIREZ AS PRIME MINISTER—INACTION OF THE CHAMBERS—CARBAJAL INVADES THE NORTH-EASTERN PROVINCES—THE ÁVALOS TARIFF—INDIAN RAIDS—SEVERITY TOWARD JOURNALISTS AND PARTY LEADERS—BLANCARTE STARTS THE REVOLUTION—PLAN OF GUADALAJARA—URAGA MANEUVERING—ATTITUDE OF CONGRESS—GROWTH OF THE HOSTILE PARTY—VERA CRUZ TURNS THE SCALE—RESIGNATION OF ARISTA—HIS CHARACTER AND DEATH.

MARIANO ARISTA, the new president, was a man from whose experience and ability, as the most successful minister of the preceding administration, the country expected some decisive benefits. It mattered not that his political and moral principles were of a somewhat shady hue, or that his generalship during the war of 1846-7 was far from meriting so prompt a token of national approval. Although trained in royal armies to the pursuit of insurgent, he possessed discernment enough, even at the age of nineteen, to join the victorious side, by marching into Mexico in 1821 with the *trigarante* army. Rapid promotion whetted the appetite of the youth, and convinced him that constancy was at best a burdensome virtue. He passed in quick succession from one party to another, always ready to serve the victor, and displaying particular devotion during the centralist rule of Bustamante in persecuting federalists. Nor did he hesitate to join his quondam patron and subsequent enemy,

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Santa Anna, whom he soon abandoned in favor of Herrera. As minister of war, he lost no opportunity to promote his own aims for the succession, notably by a persistent pursuit of his former conservative allies.¹

He took possession of the presidential chair on January 15, 1851, and at once managed to attract the ridicule of the opposition by petty regulations for the public offices, and for visitors and persons having business at the palace.² While introducing no material change in the policy of Herrera, which was practically his own, he transferred the portfolios for relations and justice to Yañez and Aguirre, two well-known lawyers, and placed General Robles Pezuela in charge of the war department, retaining only the finance minister Payno.

The finance problem remained as ever the most difficult and troublesome, partly from the constant changes in laws and administration, which gave no time for a thorough reorganization, partly from the lack of men at the proper moment fitted to plan and carry out the reform, and most of all from the want of harmonious and intelligent coöperation between the executive and the legislative body and general and state

¹ Born at San Luis Potosí in July 1802, he became a cadet in his eleventh year, joined the royal armies toward the close of the revolutionary war, and had just gained a lieutenancy when in 1821 he passed over to the victorious republicans, among whom he speedily became lieutenant-col. This rank was confirmed in 1824 after he had assisted in overthrowing Iturbide. He turned against Guerrero under the rising star of Bustamante, attained in 1831 the rank of brigadier, and ten years later that of chief of the northern army and general of division, the reward for his successful suppression of federalists from Tampico northward. He was arraigned for his miserable failures in the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma in 1846, which measure was partly the result of jealousy of Ampudia, but escaped conviction, probably through his influence as minister of war, for the trial had been prolonged for years. As Herrera's guiding spirit, he deserves credit, however, for his energy in maintaining the peace and promoting the reorganization of the army. Concerning his election and other points, see *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, vi. 6; *Mex., Legis. Mej.*, 1851, 10; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 378-80, who rather screens his mistakes, through political sympathy; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xiii. 442, etc., as a conservative, is less lenient. *Bib. Mex., Amen.*, i. 17; *Sosa, Biog. Mex.*, 75-9.

² To promote the despatch of business, but assumed by many to be directed against conspiracy. *Mex., Legis. Mej.*, 1851, 18-24. Even Arista's supporter, *Monitor Rep.*, same dates, condemned the order.

governments. Aware that the chambers stood resolved on economy, Arista determined to retrench in the most rigid manner in order to diminish the enormous difference exhibited in the budget between income and expenditure, estimated at \$8,275,000 and \$26,000,000, respectively.³ True, the latter figures were somewhat exaggerated to impress the congress and people with the necessity for assisting a government, which after a revision of the estimate proposed to reduce it as low as \$10,683,000. To this end salaries of active employés were cut to an alarming extent, and those of passive servants still more.⁴ But the pruning was uneven; and while looking for the most petty saving in certain directions with even harsh strictness, large sums were heedlessly squandered in others. Finding that the president would not entertain what Payno regarded as better methods, and that the legislative power refused to assist in covering the smaller and more pressing deficit still left, he resigned, and so did several of the following finance ministers, in rapid succession, as in cases before mentioned,⁵ until it became difficult to find any

³ Half of the revenue came from custom-house receipts, and of the expenditure, \$10,867,293 were toward the public debt, and \$7,294,529 toward the military department, as calculated by Piña y Cuevas in July 1851.

⁴ 'A las dos terceras partes el sueldo de los empleados en servicio activo, á tres cuartas el de las clases pasivas.' *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 383. Arista required monthly statements from every department whereon to exercise his efforts at reduction.

⁵ Payno was succeeded, Feb. 15th, by Ignacio Esteva of Vera Cruz, well known as a writer, and he in the following month by Aguirre, who adopted several of Payno's plans for revising the tariff and closing certain ports as costly and unreliable. He also proposed that the government be authorized to remove officials and close certain offices, for greater economy, to place a new tax on textile goods, to assume control of the three per cent mining tax, to transfer the Vera Cruz railway to a corporation, and to raise a loan of \$5,500,000 for converting the interior debt, hypothecating, if necessary, church estates. Esteva had similar designs on this tempting property, but Arista was too much of a churchman, or too politic, to permit any such inroad. The journals, indeed, attacked the government for obsequiously assisting the church in collecting condemned books. The result was the tender of the portfolio to Lerdo de Tejada, the later famous right hand of Juárez. A mere survey of the disorder to be unravelled and the opposition to be encountered sufficed to make him step out again. None else offering to succeed, Yañez himself took charge in April, leaving the relations to Monasterio till a head for the cabinet was found in Mariano Macedo, a lawyer of repute. An appeal was made to the states for an exhibit of their finances, and these proving too poor, under

one willing to accept the position. Finally Piña y Cuevas proposed a series of light taxes to meet the requirement; but the states raised so many objections that the chambers held back; whereupon he summoned in August a council of governors to examine the condition of affairs and suggest better remedies. Far from sympathizing with the administration, they condemned it for lack of system and management, and presented a new estimate for expenditure that wholly removed the deficiency.⁶

Although their censure was not undeserved, they had not failed to duly consider the situation; the government required extra power from a hostile congress to act upon the new estimate, with its demand for further special retrenchment. The ministry accordingly resigned,⁷ and a new cabinet was formed under the leadership of the advocate Fernando Ra-

the more or less dark coloring purposely imparted, to afford any hope for departmental aid, the chambers were again appealed to for an assignment on the money set aside toward the debt and an annulment of the tobacco contracts, but it was not thought well to abuse further the good faith of creditors and contractors. Yañez accordingly resigned, and Piña y Cuevas assumed his place in June. He submitted that the deficit, almost wholly connected with the interior debt, must be removed by settling interest thereon in accordance with the law of Nov. 30, 1850, by suspending all payments toward it, or by reducing the appropriations. The second plan would leave a deficit of only \$360,129; the last one \$3,237,544; yet he preferred this, and suggested a series of new taxes. See references to projects to follow ministerial changes so far, *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1851, 173, 220, etc.; *Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Ord.*, 1850-1, 265, 329, etc.; also, with comments on financial management, *Siglo XIX.*, Jan. to July 1851; *Universal*, id.; *Regulador*, id.; and other journals. As an instance of Arista's capricious management of funds may be mentioned that he took about \$100,000 from the impoverished treasury for embellishing the palace with balconies, etc.

⁶Based on a decree of Nov. 1849, which limited the expenditure to a trifle over half a million a month. They further offered to increase the state contingent from \$724,865 to one fifth of their revenue, equivalent to \$1,000,000, which of course availed nothing. Report in *Gob. Estados, Doc.*, 1851, 1-72, with projects and arguments. Other special treatises on the question in *Méx., Hac. Expos.*, 1851, 1-34; *Prieto, Manif. sobre Recursos*, 1-17; *Gomez del Palacio, Rápida Ojeada*, 1-14; *Méx., Proyecto*, 7, 16, etc.; *Pap. Var.*, cccviii. pt 4. The council consisted of three governors and seven delegates; other governors excused themselves or required legislative permission. The session began Aug. 17th and ended the 29th, prolonged beyond need by the neglect of the ministry to prepare efficient data. It had been hoped to obtain sanction for an extraordinary contingent, a two per mille estate tax, a reorganization of the tobacco revenue, increased duty, and certain industrial contributions, and to effect a settlement of the interior debt.

⁷ Macedo narrowly escaped formal arraignment for certain acts.

mirez,⁸ assisted by Urbano Fonseca, for justice, Márcos Esparza, for finance, and General Robles, who was retained for the war department. This quartette managed to hold its position into the following year by prudently bending before the winds, content with some slight concessions from a congress which frittered away its time in idle discussions and upon petty questions,⁹ and displayed such dissension and lack of method and patriotic zeal that the ministers felt obliged to point out the need for its reorganization;¹⁰ while more than one journal urged its suppression, or at least that of the senate, and gave wing to rumors that Arista might do so.¹¹

But the idea was impracticable. With jealous discontent of states, and wide-spread dissatisfaction among the pinched soldiers, the country would not have suffered from the suppression of a body composed mainly of degenerate members, elected by intrigue and intent on pay and bribes,¹² and of those who aimed solely at thwarting a government hated by their party. A number, however, were actuated by the laudable desire to compel a retrenchment so seldom observed, although they might have used a little more judgment in their opposition, and reminded of their duties not only recalcitrant members, but the states, many of which were growing loose in their observance of the federal bond and its obligations, neglecting to

⁸ Ramirez took possession Sept. 11th, making as usual a host of promises, among others to be guided by public opinion. *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1851, 310, etc.

⁹ The *Monitor Rep.*, Dec. 15, 1851, in reviewing its acts during the year, inflicts a scathing rebuke, in which other journals join.

¹⁰ *Méx., Mem. Min. Just.*, 1852, 3, etc.

¹¹ The editor of *Las Cosquillas* had to seek a hiding-place to escape arrest. The *Regenerador* of Morelia and *Eco del Comercio* of Vera Cruz were nearly as bold. The chambers also created trouble by meddling in local affairs of states, and ordering payments where the government sought to economize. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 382; *Id.*, *Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 218 et seq. Concerning prorogations, etc., see *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1851, 119, 209, 222-3; *Méx., Col. Ley.*, Dec. y *Ord.*, 1850-1, 260-1, 322-3, 323-9. List of congress members in *Méx., Col. Man. y Guia*, 1852, 1-51.

¹² As the open accusation ran. While several departments were suffering from a lack of funds, congress took care in the following year to decree an assignment of eight per cent on duties for the payment of its members and of treasury officials. *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1852, 150.

pay the contingent and to promote harmonious and necessary measures.¹³

A notable transaction by Ramirez was his arrangement with the interior and foreign creditors of the republic, who had become clamorous and even threatening under the failure of a pressed administration to meet their demands.¹⁴ A revolution in the north-east provinces had besides obliged it to infringe the tariff laws in an alarming manner. By decree of May 19, 1852, an effort was made to carry out the provisions of November 1850 for the consolidation and settlement of the interior debt; but the assignment proved insufficient to cover more than two thirds of the interest.¹⁵ Before this the foreign ministers and representatives had formally protested against the inroads on custom-house revenues by tariff infringements in the north-east, and the glaring neglect to suppress smuggling,¹⁶ which naturally affected the assignments for paying their claims.

The energetic steps taken in consequence served to appease them somewhat, and a number of pending and deferred claims were arranged by special conventions at the close of 1851,¹⁷ a settlement that was not to be of long duration.

¹³ Some insisted on retaining the excise tax abolished during the late war, while others had adopted direct contributions, to the increase of confusion. Arista divided the country into 15 treasury districts, and created a military comisaría.

¹⁴ The interior creditors had formed an association which claimed the right to be consulted in all custom-house appointments. It was known as the junta de crédito público, having the right to appoint an agent to watch proceedings at custom-houses.

¹⁵ The three per cent on net receipts of custom-house, the state contingent, and some smaller appropriations toward this debt amounted to only \$560,000, while the interest was \$827,176. A law of June 1, 1852, created a funding department for the debt. Both decrees with regulations are given in *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1852, 112-16, 137-46. For projects and comments, consult *Méx., Hac. Expos.*, 1851, 1-32; *Deuda Int., Ley de 1852*, 1-15; *Id., Doc. relat.*, 1851, 1-92, and app.; *Méx., Comis. de Hac. Dictámenes*, 1851, 1-28.

¹⁶ See record of conference held on Jan. 28, 1852, between Ramirez and representatives from France, Spain, Eng., the U. S., and Guatemala. *Derecho Intern. Méx.*, i. 619 et seq. Not long after came war vessels to support them. *Falconet, Manif.*, is a protest in behalf of Mexican bondholders. *Méx., Debt Rept.*, i. 3, 20, etc. Comments in *Español*, Oct. 9, 1852, etc.

¹⁷ Spanish claims, partly dating from the time of the independence war, amounted to \$7,500,533. Some of them, already recognized by convention of

The enforced retrenchments of the government gave rise to a number of internal difficulties tending to weaken its hold on the public, although the blame mainly belonged to the states, legislative bodies, and people generally, which expected too much. One result was an alarming increase in highway robbery and other crimes, owing to the reduced patrol service and the indifference or connivance of underpaid officials;¹⁸ another, the increase of pronunciamientos fostered by factions, and joined in or permitted by a neglected army. One broke out at Guanajuato immediately after the election of Arista; and although the government inflicted a severe lesson in suppressing it, another futile effort was made in July 1851.¹⁹ Similar demonstrations were reported from San Luis Potosí, Vera Cruz, Puebla, Tlascala, and other central parts into the ever-restless Jalisco, and southward, as a rule on

July 1847, were somewhat modified, and the rest were to be examined without further loss of time, five per cent interest being allowed on those without assigned funds and three per cent on others; treasury notes for certain portions were to be accepted at the custom-house in liquidation. Decree in *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, vi. 163, 277, with comments in *Mex. et l'Espagne, Mem.*, 251-64. Ramirez was accused of yielding too much to Spain. *Ramirez, Acus.*, i. 1-8; *Id.*, *Apuntes Convenciones*, 1-20; *Id.*, *Observ.*, 1-11; *Pap. Var.*, clxxxv. pts 14, 16; but he was exonerated. *Mendoza, Cuestion Mej.*, 3 et seq. Certain English claims through Montgomery, Nicod, & Co., Martinez del Rio, etc., amounting to more than \$4,700,000, were now to receive three per cent interest and five per cent toward a sinking fund, merging later in the proposed consolidation fund. See also *Mex., Debt Rept.*, i., with report of Apr. 23, 1852. Percy W. Doyle was the English diplomatic agent in the beginning of 1852. *Español*, Feb. 18, 1852; *Universal*, Oct. 3, 1850, July 15, 1852. A. de Iturbide figured at London for Mexico. *Arch. Mex.*, *Actas*, ii. 314. Of the French claim by Serment, Fort, et Cie, somewhat over \$1,000,000, received assigned funds in July 1851, but damages for non-fulfilment Ramirez would not recognize. A small claim by Hargous of the U. S. was settled. See *Mex., Mem. Min. Hac.*, 1852; *Mex., Mem. Min. Rel.*, id.; *Luchet, Observ.*, 1-60; *Pap. Var.*, clxxxv. pt. x. By decree of Oct. 9, 1851, a consumption tax of eight per cent was levied on foreign effects, to be divided with the states, which stopped their special smaller levies of the same class. *Mex., Legis. Mej.*, 1851, 323-5.

¹⁸ See *Monitor Rep.*, Feb. 6-21, 1851, etc.

¹⁹ The former outbreak, on January 8th, was started by the brothers Liceaga, guilty of a similar movement in June 1850. *Universal*, June 12, 1850. They arrested Gov. Arrellano and gained possession of the city and fortress; but Uruga marched quickly to the spot, and regained possession by assault on the 13th, executing several ringleaders. *Mex., Mem. Min. Guer.*, 1852, 5-6. Pardon issued, *Mex., Legis. Mej.*, 1851, 223-4; *Guan., Mem.*, 1852, 5, etc.; *Sonorense*, Feb. 21, 1851. The movement in July was headed by Ortiz, a son of the famous Pachon, in favor of Santa Anna; but informers caused it to be suppressed.

local issues, which only too frequently were the cloak for more serious designs to be revealed in case the attempt should succeed.²⁰

The most serious movement was promoted on the north-east frontier by contrabandists. The extremely high duties imposed by this debt-ridden and badly administered country were in themselves an encouragement to illegal traffic. The officials were induced to close their eyes to it, and the inhabitants found enough profit therein to encourage it, disliking, as they besides did, a distant government which burdened them with disorderly and useless troops, while doing little toward their protection and welfare. Moreover, the merchants and manufacturers suffered so much from the undermining of their business that they secretly joined issue with the contraband party, in order to obtain some change for the better. The leader was the irrepressible Carbajal, who still labored to form an independent republic in this region, assisted by sympathizers in Texas and adjoining states, and meanwhile sought to benefit himself and his friends by smuggling. The moment appearing ripe for either project, he enlisted from his headquarters at Brownsville some 500 adventurers,²¹ and crossed the border river on September 18th. He was joined by two hundred Mexicans, who had already been stirred by a confederate²² to pronounce for a re-

²⁰ In San Luis Potosí, Olivares and Velarde rose in Jan. 1851 against the prefect of Tancanhuitz. In Vera Cruz certain Córdovans rebelled in Sept. against the local chief, and took to the hills, declaring for a division of the state, and in Dec. the militia at Acayucan had a conflict with the suspicious citizens, while Rebolledo pronounced at Jalapa against an excise tax. In Puebla, Lopez demanded the reestablishment of the bases of 1843, and at Tenancingo the presbyter Alcocer also declared for more general reforms. Details in *Méx., Mem. Min. Guer.*, 1852, 9, 30-3, 77-9, no. 20; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 252-61; *Universal*, May, passim, June 18, July 23, Aug. 5, 1850; Jan.-Dec. 1852, passim; *Siglo XIX.*, Jan.-Dec. 1852, passim, etc.; *Español*, Jan. 3, 10, 1852. The southern movements which kept Chiapas and adjoining states in trouble have been spoken of.

²¹ Who were offered \$25 a month, besides booty and glory. Avalos, commanding at Matamoras, had before this summoned troops on a false alarm, but relapsed into inactivity.

²² J. M. Canales, who pronounced on the 3d near Guerrero, *Méx., Mem. Min. Guer.*, 1852, 22, demanding the withdrawal of federal troops, the reform

duction of duties, and other reforms. At the head of the liberation army, as it was called, he readily took possession of Camargo, and advanced on Matamoros, whose inhabitants were known to favor his plans. Avalos was not strong enough to resist both the citizens and the invaders; but aware of the motive influencing the former, he offered to purchase their active or passive coöperation by conceding the main point, a reduction in duties and removal of prohibitions.²³ The result was a flood of merchandise from the neighboring republic, to the injury of the revenue and of the manufacturing interests, and midst the outcry and protests of sufferers, notably creditors with assignments on the custom-houses; but the government could not remedy the evil, nor did it consider the step inappropriate under the circumstances. Haste was made to send reënforcements from the lower seaports and adjoining provinces, and to issue a decree of confiscation against any goods that might be introduced by the invaders.²⁴

Great was the disappointment and rage of Carbajal on finding his plans forestalled and his weapons turned against himself. He nevertheless laid siege to Matamoros, carried several strongholds, and inflicted no little damage on the buildings; but the garrison managed to regain the positions, and even compel him to retreat on October 30th, after ten days' fighting. The report that reënforcements were approaching hastened their movements.²⁵ Carbajal reorganized at

of the constitution, equal senatorial representation for the states, free introduction of provisions on the Rio del Norte frontier for five years, the removal of prohibition, reduction of duties, and greater leniency toward smugglers.

²³ 'Les négociants, profitant de cette circonstance, introduisirent à Matamoros une quantité de cotonnades américaines, estimée à plusieurs millions de piastres,' says Domenech, *Hist. du Mex.*, ii. 235, who was there at the time. He intimates that Avalos pocketed large sums for the concession. *Id.*, *Journal*, 385. Arrangoiz, *Méj.*, ii. 317-18, distorts the case somewhat, in order to charge Arista with complicity in the smuggling. Others accused him of sharing the profits of Avalos.

²⁴ *Méz.*, *Col. Ley.*, *Dec. y Ord.*, 1850-1, 406-7. Carbajal issued a counter-decree against goods introduced by the government party.

²⁵ Domenech ridicules the method of fighting. Fully 600 cannon-shots and 30,000 musket-bullets were exchanged with hardly any injury, save to build-

Reinosa to face the now allied opponents, but was so severely chastised during an attack on Cerralvo, at the close of November, that he took refuge across the border. In the following February he made a fresh inroad, with about five hundred men. The government was on the watch, however, and forced him back at once with considerable loss.²⁶ The old tariff was now restored, to the relief of creditors and foreign traders, and pretexts for sympathetic pronunciamientos, notably at Tampico and in Vera Cruz, were removed.

The government lodged a reasonable protest against the criminal forbearance which permitted adventurers to enroll and equip in Texas for raids into Mexican territory. Orders were accordingly issued in the United States for checking such movements, but the local authorities had reasons for giving little heed to them.²⁷ Mexico, therefore, remained exposed to this infliction, as well as to the inroads of wild Indians, for which her northern neighbor was likewise blamed, although less at fault. By the treaty of Guadalupe, the government of the United States had bound itself in a measure to check this evil, only to find the task beyond its power, owing to the habits of the savages and the vast expanse and wild nature of the region which sheltered them. It could not protect its own settlements against such swift and flitting marauders.

ings, for the combatants on both sides remained carefully under cover. Ávalos was wounded in the leg by a spent ball, 'et courut se cacher.' *Hist. du Mex.*, ii. 235; *Id.*, *Miss. Adven.*, 330-5. Carbajal had 300 U. S. riflemen and 600 Mexicans. *Constitucional*, Nov. 1851, passim; *Pinart Coll.* Congress conferred the title of 'leal' on the heroic city, and granted medals to its defenders. *Méx.*, *Legisl. Mej.*, 1852, 134-6; *Sonorense*, Aug. 6, 1852. A steamer arrived during the conflict with troops from Tampico, but thought it prudent to turn. The commander was arraigned. *Méx.*, *Mem. Min. Guer.*, 1852, 25-6.

²⁶ The Mexicans claimed to have killed 48 men and captured 143 rifles and the solitary field-piece, while acknowledging 6 killed and 9 wounded. The battle took place Feb. 21st near the Rio San Juan. Carbajal retreated during the night. The old tariff was restored three months later. Comments in *Méx.*, *Discurso*, 4-11; *Sistema Prohib.*, *Represent. á favor*, 1-16; *Pap. Var.*, cxcix. pt 5; cccxiv. pt 10½. See also *Universal*, *Siglo XIX.*, and *Español*, during the months in question. *Rivera*, *Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 248-53, etc.

²⁷ Carbajal was arrested at Brownsville during the spring of 1852, but was released on a comparatively insignificant bail. Zamacois, *Hist. Mej.*, xiii. 488, 530-1, joins in bitterly condemning such farcical interference.

Colonization on both sides of the line could alone provide the remedy, and this was slow of action, yet operating with marked effect along the lower course of the Rio Grande del Norte; while westward the ravages increased, till they reached the climax in Sonora and Arizona. The history of this region, as related in other parts of my work, is filled with savage deeds and pathetic incidents, that cluster round smoking ruins and redden the land with blood, where bleaching bones and rude Samaritan crosses add to the horror of desolation.²⁸

Every ill afflicting the republic was, of course, ascribed by a growing opposition to the government, till even hitherto neutral states and parties joined in the prevailing cry, and caused friendly spirits to waver. As petty outbreaks increased, and rumors spread of impending revolution, the executive became more suspicious, and ordered a number of arbitrary arrests, including persons whose popularity and prominence created much feeling in their behalf. Severe injunctions were directed to starving officials, who clamored for their pay; and finally a decree was issued, imposing heavy fines and imprisonment upon editors who criticised the acts of the supreme authority.²⁹ These injudicious acts, which served merely to exhibit the fear and weakness that dictated them, produced a general remonstrance; and the supreme court, headed by Ceballos, objecting to the press decree as anti-constitutional, it had to be revoked.³⁰

²⁸ See *Hist. North Mex. States*, ii., and *Hist. Ariz. and New Mex.*, this series. The raiders penetrated even into Nuevo Leon, San Luis Potosi, and Zacatecas, as I have shown, and almost every number of the *Universal*, *Siglo XIX.*, *Monitor Rep.*, etc., for these years, especially during the summer months, contains allusions to ravages, generally copied from the *Diario Oficial* of the respective states.

²⁹ The press had been imbibed, partly by the grant of subsidy to the *Monitor Rep.*, which was claimed to be really in payment for official notices, as the government did not care to establish a special organ. The press restriction was issued on Sept. 21st, with penalties of from \$200 to \$500, and 4 to 6 months' imprisonment. The following day the leading journals came out with blank columns, which spoke stronger than the fiercest article could have done. The editor of *Eco del Comercio* was exiled.

³⁰ On Oct 13th. *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1852, 302, 341.

Every such rebuke and defeat brought on ridicule, and lessened the influence of the government, causing an exaggerated sense of liberty to prevail in all directions, manifested by the states in a disregard for the federal bond, and the enactment of measures beyond their province.

In the middle of 1852 several hitherto despised movements began to assume alarming proportions. Rebolledo, who at the close of the preceding year had risen at Jalapa against the local authorities and their tax levies, and for some time struggled with little success, was now creating some attention³¹ by his firm stand and more extended range of pretensions for reform. At Mazatlan a no less powerful uprising took place on similar grounds, with the advocacy of state division,³² and in Michoacan religious feeling added its potent influence to the trouble there brewing. The lately installed governor, Melchor Ocampo, was a man of liberal views,³³ whose precepts became no less obnoxious to the clergy than his measures. They used every effort in behalf of the opposition, pointing among other things to the immense increase in cost of the local administration as compared with centralist times. The result was not exactly as expected, for a number of armed factions rose, which endangered the interests of the state rather than the stability of the government. Nevertheless the religious element of the strife spread far beyond the borders, to add strength to germinating movements elsewhere, among them in Jalisco, which once more was to cradle the revolution.

Governor Portillo had made himself unpopular at Guadalajara by introducing an obnoxious police sys-

³¹ Considering many of the demands reasonable, Arista ordered the government of Vera Cruz to give them attention, and advised leniency, but met with insolent disregard. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 395-6; *Id.*, *Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 286 et seq. Correspondence hereon, in *Vera Cruz, Sucesos*, 1852, 1-36; *Pap. Var.*, cxcix. pt 7.

³² As will be related in *Hist. North Mex. States*, ii., this series.

³³ Without professed religious faith, at whose inauguration pronounced anti-clerical mottoes were displayed by his party.

tem, and seeking to control affairs too closely in behalf of the authorities at Mexico. He had, moreover, incurred the anger of a hatmaker named José María Blancarte by arresting him for assault on the police, and expelling him and a fellow-officer from the militia, wherein the former held by popular suffrage the rank of colonel. To injure the people was bad enough, but to offend the hatmaker colonel was unpardonable. Blancarte saw his opportunity in the prevailing discontent, and found no difficulty in obtaining adherents among the soldiers as well as the citizens. On July 26th he took possession of the gubernatorial palace, and at the head of a self-constituted council proclaimed as governor Gregorio Dávila, who was empowered to summon a legislature to revise the state constitution and introduce reforms,³⁴ Blancarte retaining the chief military command. Portillo retired with a few faithful troops to Lagos, where he sought in vain to impose a check on the movement. The federal government responded to his appeal for aid by the futile despatch of commissioners, a peaceful course which only gave time for the revolution to take root, favored by other local movements.

The ever-wrathful Santanists, who had so long been wasting their efforts in different directions, did not fail to exert themselves on so promising an occasion, partly by holding before the soldiery the well-known liberality and care of their chief for the army, and before the clergy and conservatives the need for a strong hand at the helm in order to stay the evident loosening of the union, with its attendant ravages, spoliation, and mob rule. Blancarte was really flattered into giving a wider scope to his pronunciamiento. On September 13th he hastened, at the head of the militia, to proclaim the deposal of Arista for having infringed the laws, and the recall of Santa Anna

³⁴ These changes had to be carried out within six months. Blancarte's proclamation painted Portillo's administration in the blackest hues. In breaking into the building the mob killed the government secretary and the major in command.

to coöperate in reorganizing the government in accordance with the federal constitution, and in choosing a temporary president to act until the states decided upon an executive with extraordinary power to restore order.³⁵ Dávila, who appears to have been an excellent man, objected to this plan, and the Santanists seized the opportunity to thrust into his place one of their own party, General Yañez.³⁶ This step gained, it was less difficult to persuade the prominent civilians, clergy, and regular army men to assert their will in an issue of such growing importance, and not let it collapse under the leadership of so insignificant a person as Blancarte, unknown beyond Guadalajara, or under restrictions objectionable to different parties and sections of country. A week later, accordingly, a modified plan was agreed upon, calling on José L. Uruga, one of the leading generals in the army, to place himself at the head of the movement, and within thirty days summon, in place of the actual unworthy congress, an extraordinary body of two deputies from each state, whose task should be to elect a president for the unexpired quadrennial term, to revise the constitution on a federal basis, reform the financial and electoral systems, reorganize the neglected army, and systematize the frontier defence against Indians. Herein were direct concessions to discontented troops and suspicious federalists, and strong inducements to the other leading parties—a plan and indorsement that could not fail to win respect. Blancarte, indeed, found it prudent to give his approval.³⁷ Well aware

³⁵ The plan, containing 11 articles, was formally issued on Sept. 15th, by Blancarte, as provisional governor, owing to the resignation of Dávila. Text in *Jal., Doc. Rev.*, 6-7, which appears to be Blancarte's production. Correspondence between the two, and decrees of the former, are annexed.

³⁶ Suarez y Navarro, who acted as secretary to Blancarte, claims to have been the chief agent of the Santanist party, actuated by a belief in Santa Anna's ability to save the union. In 1856 he issued a little volume, *El General Santa-Anna Burlándose de la Nación*, 16°, 1-291, giving documents in the case and seeking to prove that he was deceived by this schemer. Suarez y Navarro gained promotion by his agency and signs as a general. See pp. 21-91, therein, concerning the manœuvres in question.

³⁷ The 14 articles of the plan were first discussed and adopted by a purely civilian meeting, and subsequently by the militia. Text and signatures in *Méx., Hist. Mex.*, Vol. V. 39

of the mixed feeling with which the ecclesiastical signatures would be regarded, the opposition was assured that they joined merely to prevent bloodshed, and Santa Anna was prudently kept apart from political nomination; yet both features added immense weight to the document.

The call upon Uraga proved a surprise to many. He held command of the division lately ordered to crush this very uprising. Hearing of the favor with which the revolutionists regarded him, the government naturally became suspicious, and resolved to transfer the command, pretending that his services were required as comandante general of Guanajuato, where he could be watched by a loyal governor. Uraga understood the motives, and declined to serve the government any longer, yet he coquetted for some time before yielding to the invitation from Jalisco. The chief reason for the delay was his vain effort to start a pronunciamiento of his own in Guanajuato, which should give him greater importance and power.³³

Shortly before the issue of the general plan of Guadalajara, the cabinet had become so discouraged at the outlook as to resign, and a new ministry entered, composed of Mariano Yañez, J. M. Aguirre,

Col. Ley. Fund., 300-7; also in *Suarez y Navarro, Santa-Anna Burlándose*, 83-9; *Español*, Oct. 30, 1852, and other journals. By art. 3 the appointment of a provisional president was not consigned to any one. The national guard was to be relieved in several respects. The congress had to sit not over a year, and issue a general political amnesty. Till the finance system could be organized, half the state revenue must be yielded for general purposes, except from the northern border provinces. Capitation taxes and exemption purchase from the militia should cease at once. States might reorganize at any time under this plan. The decree of April 20, 1847, was revived. As soon as the provisional government of art. 3 was established, Santa Anna should be invited to return whenever he desired.

³³So declare both Suarez y Navarro, *Santa-Anna Burlándose*, 60-76, 92-112, and Ledo, governor of Guanajuato; the latter, in his *Exposicion*, 1-84, with appendix, of the following year, seeks to show his commendable foresight in resisting this and cognate movements which aimed to set aside the federal system and impose a dictator on the country. He shows on pp. 37, 58, that Uraga failed because his troops could not be relied on to support him against the loyal legislature. The government called him to Mexico, but he pretended sickness, and soon departed for Guadalajara by way of Michoacan. His letter, accepting the Jalisco plan, is dated Oct. 25th. *Méx., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 306-7.

Guillermo Prieto, a distinguished writer, and P. M. Anaya.³⁹ An extra session of congress was now called to consider a fresh appeal for aid, in the shape of a loan of three millions, additional taxes, and special power for the executive. A small advance was secured to sustain an army which might otherwise pass over to the enemy; but beyond this the chambers were afraid to go, especially as the government might succumb at any moment, now that only half of the governors signified a doubtful adherence.⁴⁰ Indeed, a decree hinting at confiscation,⁴¹ and certain arbitrary proceedings against suspected and obstinate citizens, had increased the bitterness against the executive. Finally the lower house was moved by the representations of Prieto, on behalf of the imperilled credit of the republic, with interest on debt overdue, and the possible loss of twenty-five millions by the failure to meet engagements; on behalf of a defenceless frontier ravaged by Indians and invaded by adventurers; on behalf of an army demoralized by misery and neglect; and for the sake of preventing perhaps a dissolution of the republic, with fratricidal war.⁴² Just then, however, the revolution took a turn which brought the senate to resistance against a government evidently doomed, and congress closed without effecting anything.⁴³

³⁹ For relations, justice, treasury, and war, respectively. Robles had retired from the war department already in June. Yañez tried in May to manage the treasury, without success, and took the present office Oct. 23d, his colleagues having entered Sept. 3d, 14th, and 22d, respectively. See also provisional occupants, in *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1852, 152-3, 241-2, 293-301, 351-5, 375-81; *Arch. Méx., Actas*, i. 105, etc.; *Calend., Man. y Guia*, 1852, 52-621, *passim*. Charges and comments in *Ramírez, Dimisión*, 1-12; *Universal*, Sept.-Oct. 1852, and other journals. Aguirre was arraigned for his press-restriction decree, and resigned Oct. 26th, Ponciano Arriaga succeeding. Riva Palacio and Ledo had been summoned, but declined. *Ledo, Espos.*, 6-9.

⁴⁰ Only eight of them published the late press decree, six in the south and north, and two in the central provinces, among these Ocampo of Michoacan, against whom the people were in revolt. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 400.

⁴¹ Of Dec. 21st. *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1852, 386. In August the government had been allowed to dispose of 4,000 militia in states adjoining rebellious districts. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, vi. 237.

⁴² This appeal was made on Dec. 16th.

⁴³ Concerning the progress of the futile discussion on relief projects, see *Universal*, *Siglo XIX.*, *Monitor Rep.*, for Sept.-Dec. 1852, all freely criticizing

Three fourths of the country now stood arrayed against the capital and its rulers. Mazatlan had sided with Jalisco; Durango adopted its plan; Aguascalientes did not, on being promised an independent state organization. Chihuahua and Puebla were fermenting. Michoacan was torn by different factions, the leading one under the clerical champion Bahamonde, whose pronunciamiento on September 9th had given impulse to the general plan of Guadalajara.⁴⁴ In Tamaulipas the struggle for the governorship,⁴⁵ together with a certain adhesion to the plan of Jalisco, had encouraged the persevering Carbajal to repeat his invasion, this time converted by his adventurous following into a marauding tour.⁴⁶ Sonora was also the scene of an invasion headed by Count Raousset de Boulbon, with more laudable aim, yet no less a source of apprehension;⁴⁷ and the disputed territory of Soconusco had been entered by Guatemalans, while Chiapas, Tamaulipas, and Tehuantepec were more or less disturbed. The crowning blow was, however, to come from Vera Cruz. Tampico had pronounced early in December for the plan of Jalisco, and lowered at once the tariff. Fearing the effect of this reduction on its trade, Vera Cruz considered itself obliged on the 27th to follow the example, and was sustained by the garrison of Ulúa.⁴⁸

the chambers, and the former two also the government. *Arch. Mex., Actas*, i. 3-4, 80-91, etc.; *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1852, 75, 319-25, 363-4.

⁴⁴ The well-known leader Guzman upheld Arista in the inaccessible south of the state, while Zitácuaro rose for tolerance and seized church property. Bahamonde's proclamation and plan of Maravatío, etc., in *Universal*, Oct. 13-27, and *Español*, Sept. 22, 1852.

⁴⁵ Cárdenas, R. Prieto, and Garza, holding the title under different claims.

⁴⁶ For Ávalos had retired into Matamoros and defended it well. In April 1853 the U. S. authorities were induced to secure the arrest of Carbajal, who was now restrained by heavier bonds.

⁴⁷ For this as well as the later interesting phases of Raousset's expedition, see *Hist. North Mex. States*, ii., this series.

⁴⁸ Names of participating leaders in *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 324-7; *Vera Cruz, Sucesos*, 1-36. Tuxpan lost no time in joining. Gen. Woll was sent for from Habana. J. Arrillaga was proclaimed governor. The government issued a futile decree closing the gulf ports. Other government measures in *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1852, 323 et seq. For details of movements, see the journals already quoted, also *Siglo XIX.*, *Monitor Rep.*, *Sonorense*, etc., for Sept.-Dec. 1852; *Méx., Discurso*, 4-7; *Pap. Var.*, excix. pts 6, 9; *Cent. Amer. Pap.*, ii.

In addition to this, the government suffered direct military disasters. Its troops had laid siege to Guadalajara December 15th, but met with so severe a repulse that active operations were suspended within a fortnight.⁴⁹ The motives of the general in command were evidently similar to those influencing the congress—to watch the turn of the current—for the soldiers could not be relied upon, and the revolutionists were preparing to advance upon the capital.⁵⁰ The turn soon came. Arista saw that resistance was useless. After one more vain appeal to the chambers,⁵¹ which opened the regular session with the new year, he resigned January 5, 1853, surrendering the government, in accordance with the constitution, to Chief Justice Juan Bautista Ceballos.⁵² He lived for a while on his estate, till exiled in May, when he proceeded to Spain, dying at Lisbon in August 1855.⁵³

4, etc.; Revere, *Keel and Saddle*, 232-5, gives some account of the Michoacan campaign, in which he shared. *Siendo Liberales*, 1851, 1-32, discusses the religious question in Michoacan on behalf of the clergy. *Bib. Mex., Amen.*, i. 17. Comments of Ex-minister Robles, in *Pap. Var.*, cxcix. pt viii. 3-5; *Gerard, Excurs.*, 162-7, 184-8. The Tampico revolution and measures against it are noticed in *Arch. Mex., Actas*, i. 367-72. Text of this pronunciamiento and capture of Gov. Cárdenas in *Universal*, Nov. 28, Dec. 26, 1852. Gonzalez, *Hist. Aguasc.*, 183-98, gives details concerning movements in this little state. Echeverría and subsequently Solano held sway here and in Zacatecas. San Luis Potosí also felt the stir. The chief leader in Puebla at the time was named Victoria. The legislature authorized the levy of 6,000 men to maintain order. *Español*, Sept. 25, Nov. 3, 1852. Mexico was disturbed at several points. Report in *Madrid, Manif.*, 1-23; *Pap. Var.*, ccii. pt 8. Rebollo had already declared for Santa Anna. *Suarez y Navarro, Santa-Anna Burlándose*, 125-6. For conditions in Oajaca, *Oaj., Mem.*, 1851, 1-19; 1852, 1-34.

⁴⁹ Gen. Miñón, who had succeeded Vasquez in the command, being wounded. The representations of the revolutionists had doubtless some effect. See correspondence in *Suarez y Navarro, Santa-Anna Burlándose*, 100 et seq.

⁵⁰ They had already compelled the removed governor to retreat into Guajuato, whither they followed to coerce the still loyal or neutral authorities of this state. They took possession of its capital, but were soon driven forth; yet the country districts were gradually joining them, the agitator Liceaga having risen successfully in their behalf. *Guan., Mem.*, 42-7. Lerdo explains his efforts to prevent disorder. *Espos.*, 59-63; *Pap. Var.*, cxcix. pt 9.

⁵¹ Deputy Franquiz urged the unconditional concession of a million 'sin pensar, sin leer, sin discurrir,' only to excite derision.

⁵² *Méz., Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd.*, 1853, 4-5. Minister Yañez had left already on Dec. 10th, urging Arista to follow his example. *Español*, Jan. 5, 8, 1853. His protest, etc., in *Universal*, May 31, 1853.

⁵³ Of an ulcer, for which he was about to seek relief at Paris. He died after embarking on board the steamer *Tagus*, August 7th. He was also

Arista entered office under unfavorable circumstances, when demoralization had already taken root, fostered by an exaggerated idea of liberty, and a lack of energetic measures and good management. He had to bear the accumulated ills of the preceding administration, and suffer from the reaction following his manœuvred election, manifested also in congressional hostility. Whatever his defects as a soldier and statesman, he had evidently resolved, after gaining the supreme object of ambition, the presidency, to be loyal to his trust; but the change of heart came late, for the consequent leniency and self-restraint were classed as weakness, and served to encourage his many enemies, who could be controlled only by force and intrigue. The change also indicates a character not equal to the responsible position of ruler over a people so difficult to manage. He shone best as minister under Herrera, in reforming the army and sustaining the union. A later federal government recognized his laudable adhesion to the constitution, and respect for national representation, by crowning his memory with the much-coveted title of *benemérito*.⁵⁴

troubled by the hallucination that Santa Anna's agents were seeking to assassinate him, 'habia perdido el juicio.' *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. ap. 21. The body was deposited in the legation tomb at Lisbon, the heart being taken by F. Ramirez to Mexico, whither Comonfort also ordered in 1856 that his remains should follow. He was a tall, imposing personage, with an English stamp. Official correspondence regarding his remains in *Méx.*, *Corresp. Diplom.*, ii. 643-722.

⁵⁴ By decree of Sept. 25, 1856, which also admitted his remains into the Metropolitan church. Comonfort believed his government would have proved a blessing with due coöperation from the states and congress. *Méx.*, *Legisl. Méj.*, 1853, 402-5. His resignation has been hastily commended as voluntary, 'para no servir ni aun de pretexto á una revolucion;' but press restriction, arrest of prominent men on mere suspicion, and the despatch of an army against Jalisco show no purely unselfish attitude. The army proved unreliable. Rivera also defends him: 'La Nacion toda.....olvida las muchas debilidades del hombre para admirar las grandes virtudes del ilustre ciudadano.' *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 406; and Zamacois blames the congress for his failures. Both Santa Anna and Suarez y Navarro raved against him as a criminal worthy of the gibbet, but dared only to exile him. See letters in *Domenech, Hist. du Méx.*, ii. 250. The conservative share in his overthrow is considered in *Méx.*, *Partido Conserv.*, 6-7.

CHAPTER XXIV.

HIS MOST SERENE HIGHNESS, THE DICTATOR.

1853.

CEBALLOS IS CONFIRMED AS PRESIDENT—INEFFICIENT MEASURES—SUPPRESSION OF THE CONGRESS—PLAN OF ARROYOZARCO—RESIGNATION OF CEBALLOS—LOMBARDINI SUCCEEDS—NEPOTISM AND CORRUPTION—ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN—VICTORY OF SANTANISTS AND CONSERVATIVES—RETURN OF SANTA ANNA—HIS MINISTRY AND POLICY—A CENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATION—RECONSTRUCTION OF THE ARMY AND ITS OBJECT—FAVORITISM, ESPIONAGE, AND PERSECUTION—A FEW REDEEMING EFFORTS—DEATH OF ALAMAN, THE GREAT CONSERVATIVE LEADER—POMP AND ARROGANCE OF THE DICTATOR—ORDERS AND TITLES—VISIONS OF EMPIRE.

THE political situation was by no means improved by the resignation of Arista; for the troops gave signs of uneasiness, and no one knew what course they might take. Fortunately the commanding officers succeeded in controlling them. The chambers were summoned to signify their choice of a new ruler, and thought it prudent to introduce the least change possible, by sustaining as president ad interim Judge Ceballos, whose opposition to the late decree restricting the press had added to the laurels formerly gained by him as governor of Michoacan.¹ He took the oath the same day, January 6, 1853, and proceeded to form a

¹ His adopted state, for he belonged originally to Durango, where he was born in 1811. His creditable service in congress won for him in May 1852 the presidency of the supreme court, and consequently the nearest claim to the chief magistracy. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 407, with portrait and autograph. The representatives of 16 states gave him their vote, including Vera Cruz and the federal district. Riva Palacio obtained half the vote of Mexico, and that of Tamaulipas. Oajaca gave her favorite Almonte half the vote, and so did Puebla to Gov. Múgica, while Guerrero declared for its chieftain Alvarez. *Méx., Legist., Mej.*, 1853, 3, 5.

new cabinet. This was not an easy task in times so critical, for he objected to any decided change of policy, and sought rather a conciliatory middle course, in which few of the prominent men had any confidence. Finally, the war portfolio was accepted by General Blanco, a well-known conservative and Santanist; and those of relations and justice by J. A. de la Fuente and Lodron de Guevara, one a moderate liberal, the other bent on extraordinary powers for the executive, but both influenced by the former. J. M. Urdiqui took charge of the finance department.²

After giving so strong a majority to the new president, the chambers could not wholly ignore his demand for aid. Nevertheless, it was not without pressure that they conceded to the executive extraordinary powers for a period of three months.³ The resignation of Arista was avowedly to promote a peaceful solution; and with this intent Ceballos had also been installed. He accordingly released the political prisoners, issued an amnesty for similar delinquents, and invited the governors to assist in obviating hostilities and arriving at an arrangement, to which end he countenanced for the time the tariff changes at the gulf ports.⁴ But these and other measures were stamped with a vagueness and irresolution that repelled confidence and gave strength to the revolution, which was rapidly spreading southward in Oajaca, and from Querétaro northward as far as Chihuahua. Indeed, the movement had assumed a force which temporizing or partial concessions could not bend.

² Blanco had supported the leasing of mints and the restriction of the press. Fuente was an educated but inexperienced Coahuilan and Guevara was old and devoid of energy. Riva Palacio and Yañez declined to join, and Ceballos could not agree with T. Lares and Lopez Pimentel, who insisted upon a complete reaction.

³ On condition of not changing the form of government or existing treaties, nor deciding in ecclesiastic affairs, private property, and privileges of state or federal supreme powers. See acts of congress, Jan. 9th-11th, etc., in *Arch. Mex.*, *Actas*, i. 488-97, 520-2; *Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd.*, 1853, 5-6.

⁴ Among the measures proposed were: equalization of tariff reforms, recognition of the newly risen authorities in certain states, restitution of officials unjustly removed by Arista, and above all an accord with the revolutionary element. *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1853, 7-11.

The chambers seemed to be imbued with the prevailing doubt, and relaxed their support, a large proportion of the members neglecting even to attend the sessions, and allowing the opposition free play in its hostility to the administration.

The only safety lay apparently in yielding to the swelling torrent by adopting the plan of Guadalajara, but in such a manner as to place the executive at its head if possible. On January 19th, accordingly, a bill was presented in the lower house for calling a national convention to frame a federal constitution, choose a president, and promote harmony.⁵ Great was the outcry among the deputies against this invitation to commit political suicide. Ceballos and his cabinet were denounced as traitors, threatened with a revocation of their extraordinary power, and even by arraignment.⁶ His reply was to dissolve the body,⁷ an act consummated with no little disorder. "Sovereign people! behold how a revolutionary government treats your representatives!" cried one of the ousted members; but the appeal evoked merely groans and derision. The senate received similar treatment. The two bodies thereupon met at a private house to proceed with the impeachment of Ceballos, and to elect a new president. Nineteen votes fell upon the able governor of Puebla, Múgica y Osorio, and he declining, Marcelino Castañeda, vice-president of the supreme court, accepted; but on passing to Puebla to be installed he failed to receive the necessary indorsement, and had to retreat.⁸ In order to stop such irregular and disturbing procedure, deputies

⁵ It was to meet at Mexico, on June 15th, for a year, and investigate the management of the actual government.

⁶ The bill was placed before the grand jury with instructions, and Arroyo, the temporary successor of Fuente, was summoned to answer on the 20th for infringing the constitution. Ceballos ignored the call upon him. The supreme court had already been appealed to concerning the revocation.

⁷ By generals Marin and Noriega, both devoted Arista men.

⁸ The Puebla legislature demanded of him the additional authorization of the senate, and this having meanwhile been dispersed, none could be obtained. See correspondence between Castañeda and Múgica. *Universal*, Jan. 23, 1853. Múgica was a merchant of moderate tendencies.

and senators were dispersed and strictly forbidden to hold meetings.⁹

Their last act was a bitter protest against the ungrateful Ceballos. Deceived by his stanch opposition to Arista's very slight attempt at arbitrariness, they had raised him to the presidency, and shown their confidence by intrusting him with the special power refused to the submissive Arista. And this was the return. The situation no doubt seemed to demand prompt measures, and Ceballos evidently took a prudent course in yielding to the popular plan, regardless of the representatives for whom he had been chosen to act; but the coup d'état served only to precipitate the inevitable revolution into a new channel. The ministers recognized their rashness and resigned, Blanco alone retaining office with a view to use his influence for private and party interests.¹⁰ The president was but a child at the mercy of the stronger party leaders surrounding him. Lombardini, a warm admirer of Santa Anna, declared openly for the plan of Guadalajara, while acknowledging the existing administration; and Uruga was invited by Blanco to a conference. In the belief that this manœuvre strengthened his position, Ceballos sought to avail himself thereof to obtain a loan; to which end a new tariff was projected, with due regard for the changes demanded by the gulf ports;¹¹ but cautious capitalists were not to be so readily persuaded, at least by such a government. Its fall was retarded only by differences which

⁹ Decree of Jan. 21st. *Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Ord.*, 1853, 7-8, 23-4; *Id., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 307. Their protest, in *Universal*, Jan. 21, 1853, *Siglo XIX.*, and other journals. Their proceedings are recorded in *Arch. Méx., Actas*, ii. 3, and *passim*. Ceballos explained in a proclamation that his only motives were to stay civil war, by calling a new national representation to suggest the means for harmonious readjustment. The garrison announced its approval of his course.

¹⁰ Fuente had taken the alarm already on the 18th, Guevara and Urquidí following his example on the 20th and 21st. Correspondence with Uruga in *Suarez y Navarro, Santa-Anna Burlándose*, 148 et seq.

¹¹ Export duty was reduced to four per cent, circulation to two per cent, and in most other respects the reformed tariff of 1849 was to be followed. Army reforms were also proposed, and a temperate prudence was shown in letting officials retain their position, even when not in accord with the new plans.

still kept apart the leaders of the great movement,¹² for most provinces had by this time tacitly or expressly adhered to it, different sections seeking merely to define its course, some for the maintenance of federalism, some for the revival of the bases of 1843, others for Santa Anna, and still others preferring to leave the decision to the convention. Even monarchists ventured amidst the confusion to raise their voice.

This state of affairs could not long remain unchanged. General Robles, late minister of war, who had been sent to take charge of the government troops lately operating against Guadalajara, retired into Guanajuato, and there came to an understanding with the powerful governor Ledo, a moderate liberal with conservative ties. Both thereupon agreed with Uruga upon a new plan, formally adopted at Arroyozarco, near Querétaro, on February 4th, whereby the latter was empowered to appoint a junta de notables, which had to elect a president with dictatorial power to act till a congress, called within a year, should issue a new constitution.¹³ This evident disregard for the federal bond and privileges, together with the determination to permit an aristocratic faction to impose a dictator upon the country, was sure to rouse no little feeling. So far, however, it was only a project for the consideration of the powers at Mexico, which after

¹² Oajaca had changed her governor, and had approved the dissolution of congress. Bravo and Alvarez held aloof. Vera Cruz had declared for Santa Anna, under Uruga's leadership, and part of Puebla united with her, while other sections declared for the new movement, Tlascala proclaiming itself a state. The division in San Luis Potosí had been amicably settled by dissolving the legislature, and installing Adame as governor in place of the assassinated Reyes, the plan of Jalisco being thereupon indorsed, as well as in Querétaro and Morelia. At Ixtlahuacan, General Carmona had declared for centralism. See *Universal*, Jan. 1853, *passim*; *Español*, id.; *Siglo XIX.*, id.

¹³ He was to be assisted only by a council of state of his own appointment. In the junta the army, clergy, and industrial classes were to be represented, each by one person, and the states and territories each by two persons of standing. This plan was signed by Uruga and Robles, and had to be submitted to Ceballos. Suarez y Navarro ascribes its main features to J. Palomar, as the medium between Uruga, Alaman, and others. *Santa-Anna Bur-lándose*, 130-6, 140-4, etc.; but he admits that the real motives are unknown. *Universal*, Feb. 8, 1853; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 300-3.

all held the key to the situation. Ceballos could gain nothing by the new plan, unless the selection of the junta was left to himself; and Uruga refusing to yield this all-important point, he virtuously declared against so glaring a distortion of the Jalisco programme. But the decision lay not with him. Blanco had surrendered his now useless portfolio, and sided with Lombardini, who in controlling the garrison held the position of arbiter. His leanings could not well be misinterpreted; yet it was absolutely necessary for success to court the sovereign states; and the Arroyozarco project was accordingly so modified as to leave to the legislatures, and where these lacked to the governors, the choice of the dictator, a significant clause being added, permitting votes to be cast for a citizen absent from the country—that is, Santa Anna.¹⁴

Ceballos now recognized his own insignificance; and objecting to be made a cat's-paw for Santa Anna, he resigned, withdrawing the same day, February 7th, to his former position on the bench. And so ended the month's rule of the chief justice, which may be regarded as the closing link of the experimental chain begun by Herrera. Although less unselfish than the repentant Arista, it may be claimed that Ceballos endeavored to save for the liberals all that he could. His failure was due to causes beyond his control, yet promoted by a lack of discriminating foresight. Nevertheless, he marked his administration by two important measures, obtaining the weighty coöperation of the United States minister toward a new Tehuantepec interoceanic contract, which not only assisted to invalidate the claim of Garay's successors, but brought some money

¹⁴ As soon as order and organization had been introduced by the new executive—the glaring term of dictator being excluded—orders should be issued, and within a year, for the election of the constitutional convention, in accordance with art. 4 of the Jalisco plan. The dictatorial executive should be assisted in its task by a council of state of its own choosing. Ceballos should, on March 17th, open the votes for this executive, and retain office till it could be installed; if he declined, the generals of the divisions might elect a successor. Text in *Méx., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 307-11.

to the treasury.¹⁵ The other act was an official recognition of civil marriages with foreigners, against which the church struggled as a dangerous infringement on its rights.¹⁶

In accordance with a clause of the new plan, the generals who had assisted in framing it were to elect a successor in case Ceballos resigned. The choice lay presumably between Uruga, already spoken of for the presidency, and Lombardini; but none of those concerned favoring the former, Lombardini obtained the vote.¹⁷ As the depository, and nothing more, of the executive power, he formed no cabinet, but attended to the different departments with the aid of existing subordinate officials.¹⁸ This was deplorable in several

¹⁵ An immediate payment of \$300,000 was to be followed by a similar amount in monthly instalments of \$50,000. Although essentially British, the company was headed by Col Sloo of the U. S. The other claimants were not sparing of abuse, to judge by such publications as *The Grant to Col Sloo*, 1, etc.; *Hargous' Memorial*, 1-7, dated April 1853; *Tehuacan Canal, Col.*, pts 8-9. See also *Tehuacan, Dictamen Comp. Guan.*, 1-20.

¹⁶ A Frenchman had attracted persecution for marrying before his consul. Ceballos gave him a small indemnity, and offered to arrange a convention for recognizing such marriages. Rivera is not friendly to Ceballos for aiding to overthrow federal institutions. 'El corto tiempo que gobernó fué una lección útil para los gobernantes que conspiran.' *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 418.

¹⁷ Of Uruga and Robles. *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1853, 60-1. See *Universal* of Feb. 8-9, 1853, and other journals on the change. The choice was due to the mutual jealousies of Uruga and Robles; for the latter was also supposed to have aspirations. Lombardini availed himself of this feeling, while pretending to disclaim personal aims, and prudently casting his vote beyond the circle of the three electors upon Larea, a prominent conservative. Robles' disgust appears to gleam in his defence, issued a few days later, *El Comandante á sus Conciud.*, 1-50, with the usual substantiating documents. Ledo had cause for a similar strain in the disregard shown for him by Uruga and Robles, at whose disappointment he rejoiced. *Espos.*, 66, etc.; *Pap. Var.*, cxcix, pts 8-9. Lombardini's commissioners also came out in a *Manifiesto que dirigen los Comis. por la Guarnicion*, 1-24. Manuel Maria Lombardini was a native of the capital, where he was born in 1802. He joined the independents in 1821 as cadet, after which he retired into private life till the yorkino struggle brought him into this party. He rose slowly, till Santa Anna and his relative, Valencia, took him in charge and made him in 1840 a brigadier, and as such he behaved well during the war of 1846-7. His sympathies for Santa Anna and the plan of Jalisco provoked persecution from Arista. Rivera regards him more as a parade officer, with sufficient patriotism to check ambition. *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 421.

¹⁸ Names in *Romero, Mem.*, 1049-50. Suarez y Navarro, *Santa-Anna Burlandose*, 193-6, relates that Baranda and Gen. Basadre obtained from the first an influence which Uruga strove hard to dispel. He succeeded, in fact, in obtaining permission to form a cabinet, including Alaman. This choice was so strenuously opposed that a new list was formed, embracing Baranda,

ways, for he possessed no ability whatsoever as a statesman, and lacked also the common prudence and integrity for exercising the functions of his office.¹⁹ Moreover, not content with absolutely needful enactments, he arrogated all the powers and privileges possible, as if to make the most of his brief tenure, and decided important questions with such precipitation as to cause no little additional trouble to the following government, besides loss to the nation, notably in the finance department. As it was, different states and parts adhered to different tariffs, with endless confusion and immense leakage in the revenue. The lease of mints to a foreign house was prolonged for a series of years at a ruinous rate;²⁰ certain funds held in trust for the aborigines of the capital were squandered in dissipation;²¹ and comrades in arms and friends of the president were promoted and favored at the public expense in the most glaring manner, nearly a thousand military commissions alone being issued to a host of officers, retired or dismissed as superfluous or worthless by the late economic administrations. As may be imagined, the army was swelled in due proportion, mostly by ruthless impressment among the unfortunate Indians, on the plea of maintaining order and repelling invaders, but in reality to sustain the victors in their position and aims.²²

These operations passed comparatively unchallenged, partly from a disregard for Lombardini, who

Elguero, Bonilla, and Uruga, for relations, justice, finance, and war, respectively. Additional influence was now brought to bear, and the project fell, Uruga being mollified with the mission to Spain and a heavy allowance for expenses. The proposed ministers are given in *Español*, Mar. 9, 1853, etc.

¹⁹ Uno de los hombres públicos de ménos capacidad, etc., observes Arrangoiz broadly, *Méj.*, ii. 328; and others concur, although modifying their judgment by calling him an honorable man.

²⁰ The loss, says Rivera, *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 427, being nearly five millions, while the government obtained only \$200,000.

²¹ *Cadena, Expos.*, 1-28; *Pap. Var.*, cxvii. pt 13; *Galvez, Ante la Prim. Sala*, 1-58.

²² Near the capital were to be massed 12,000 men under Carrera. Corona was made comandante general of Mexico, and Ampudia received a prominent position. A large preference payment to M. Mosso, Lombardini's intimate, was widely criticised.

was looked upon as a mere *locum tenens*, and obeyed only when convenient, but chiefly from the all-absorbing party struggle throughout the country in connection with the presidential vote and its attendant hopes. All the states, with rare exception, were in the throes of revolution, resulting in gubernatorial and other changes in the leading sections, such as Mexico, Puebla, Oajaca, Michoacan, and even Guanajuato; while those around sympathized more or less, either by adopting the plan of Mexico or that of Jalisco. Conservatives and Santanists availed themselves of the excitement caused by the impending change to push their advantage, especially in weighty districts, well aware that the rest in their bewilderment, or from a natural inclination to stand on the winning side, would be apt to follow their example.²³ The cry for the maintenance of federalism was lost in the turmoil. Santa Anna's patriotism and services during the war of 1846-7, although unsuccessful, and his subsequent voluntary return into exile, caused many to look upon him with favor as a reformed man, and his late stand for federalism inclined toward him a large proportion of this wide-spread though momentarily subordinate element. In the soldiers again he had always a strong support, owing to his care for their pay and comfort; and as the army was now rapidly swelling under control of Lombardini's appointees, its influence on the struggle may readily be understood. His partisans

²³ Remote states could especially be counted upon to follow the central ones, and movements in accordance did take place in most of them. Thus Zacatecas, Coahuila, and Nuevo Leon acknowledged the plan of Mexico, the latter agitating at the same time for free-trade. Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and neighbors joined the victors in due time, Sonora and Lower California remaining comparatively quiet, as did Guerrero under the direction of Alvarez, who declared that he would yield to the majority. The gubernatorial changes in Mexico, Michoacan, Oajaca, Puebla, and Guanajuato were in favor of the new order, to which Querétaro and San Luis Potosí also adhered. Petty provinces like Colima and Tlascala bent for the sake of autonomy, and even Yucatan and Tabasco declared for the plan of Jalisco; while Vera Cruz, followed by Tampico, pronounced for Santa Anna, but with a federal system. Suarez y Navarro seeks to take great credit for his share as government commissioner in influencing the turn in Mexico, Puebla, and other districts. *Santa-Anna Burlandose*, 197 et seq. In *Siglo XIX.*, Mar. 11-14, 1853, and other journals, may be found documents on negotiations with states.

used these means to the fullest extent. They pointed out the absolute need for a man of his recognized ability and energy to bring order out of the prevailing strife, which might otherwise degenerate into anarchy and dissolution, and to put a check on the savage raids in the north, and on the threatening invasions along both frontiers.

Under such circumstances, it was not surprising that the state votes, opened on the 17th of March as arranged, should declare for the wily hero of Vera Cruz by an overwhelming majority.²⁴ And now for a rush to be foremost in bringing him the gratifying news.²⁵ No less was the haste on his part; for before the official notification could reach him, he sent assurances that he was prepared to coöperate with leading men, and sacrifice himself for the good of the country, even so far as to retire again if this should seem advisable. At the same time he began to send his instructions to Lombardini, who obediently accepted the role of mouth-piece. He left in March the village of Turbaco, not far from Cartagena, where he had for some time been figuring as beneficent patron, and reached Vera Cruz on April 1st.²⁶ It was a day appropriately significant of deluded hopes, cherished by the people no less than by the crowd of adherents and office-seekers, who jostled one another at the landing-place, eager to render homage to the dictator, and receive the boon of his passing glance. Among them were not only conservatives of all grades, but men of prominence

²⁴ Of 18 against 3 for Uraga, and 1 each for Ceballos and Trias, the favorite governor of Chihuahua. Zacatecas, Colima, and Aguascalientes voted for Uraga, Nuevo Leon for Ceballos, and Puebla held aloof. *Dublin and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, vi. 329-30. See analysis, in *Universal*, Mar. 18, etc., 1853, *Español*, and other journals. *Oliva de la Paz* of Aguascalientes was foremost in hailing the victor as savior, etc.

²⁵ Governor Serrano of Vera Cruz had undertaken to anticipate the result by sending congratulations nearly a month in advance, and his recall had been carried by Gen. Escobar and others long before. *Domenech, Hist. de Mex.*, ii. 248.

²⁶ In the English packet boat *Avon*, with his family. Two sons had preceded him.

from other parties, who stood prepared to barter principle and prestige for a patronizing smile.²⁷

His advance toward the capital was a triumphal march, past streaming banners and pealing bells, under imposing arches and floral wreaths, over abject deputations, and midst the boom of cannon and the cheers of a novelty-seeking multitude. And Santa Anna responded in turn with winning nods, and a most generous dispensation of promises, to which he lent support by a well-studied proclamation,²⁸ and a modest refusal of the title of captain-general, which Lombardini obsequiously revived for his special benefit.²⁹ No less pleasing was the impression produced by an amnesty for all political offences, which served to lull the fears of those on whom vengeance might fall. The illusion of the federalists was early disturbed, however, by an unsatisfactory reply to petitions in favor of their system; and among the conservatives only too many regretted the surrender of so much power to such a man. But they needed him, and he could not do without them.

Lúcas Alaman, as their leader, had taken the precaution to outline the policy desired by them, requiring above all protection against liberal encroachment upon the church as the only reliable bond between the people, with their antagonistic castes and races; also security for proprietors of landed estates—generally of enormous extent—against the progressive ideas now becoming prevalent. The masses were

²⁷ Among representative men were a body of five, headed by Gen. García, to announce the election to the presidency; Alaman representing the ecclesiastic cabildo; Haro and Bonilla the municipality of the capital; Uruga and others to offer the welcome of their respective states; and a deputation to instruct Santa Anna regarding the condition of affairs, selected with calculated prudence mainly from moderate liberals. Suarez y Navarro, *Santa Anna Burlándose*, 228 et seq., seeks to parade his influence in this connection.

²⁸ Text in *Universal*, Apr. 6, 1853. Prepared by B. Vivó, not as Miranda declares in his *Manifi*, by Haro, for his as well as others submitted were declined.

²⁹ By decree of April 11th, *Méx.*, *Legisl. Mej.*, 1853, 183-4, with a pay of \$12,000, and an elaborate uniform. A decree of March 12th permitted him to wear any of his cherished foreign decorations. *Id.*, 100. Specimen of congratulatory addresses in *Morelia, Repres.*, 1853, 1-21.

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unfit to exercise the privilege of electors, and federation was an anarchical system for such a country, which needed a strong central control. Hence a new territorial division was desirable to assist in obliterating the semi-independent state organizations, and a strong army to maintain order, repress highway robbery, and check savage raids, a still larger reserve being formed from inexpensive militia troops. In addition to these more or less veiled suggestions, Alaman undertook to warn Santa Anna against schemers and speculators, flatterers and traitors, who might lead him with hasty measures into difficulties, perhaps to a speedy fall.³⁰

These insinuations against his wisdom and prudence, conveyed in a tone of superior knowledge and independent frankness, could hardly please the dictator, now once more surrounded by deferential courtiers and flatterers. They were presumptuous.³¹ But they came from the leader of a strong and indispensable party, whose aristocratic ideas conformed to his own ambitious views. He must, therefore, dissimulate a while till they could be safely snubbed. He even appointed Alaman prime minister, the other three portfolios being given to Teodosio Lares, Haro y Tamariz, and J. M. Tornel, for justice, finance, and war, respectively. Within a month two new departments were created for interior affairs: one termed gubernacion, and relieving especially Lares from the interior administration not closely connected with judicial and ecclesiastical matters; the other, known as fomento or improvements, embraced public works, trade, coloni-

³⁰ The celebrated letter of Alaman may be consulted in *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 334-40, reproduced from the draught given by Rafael, editor of the *Universal*. It appeared earlier in less authentic form, as in *Gac. Guat.*, Nov. 16, 1855; *Cent. Amer. Pap.*, i., etc. Santa Anna was also urged not to perform the usual retreats to his remote country-seat, to the inconvenience of officials and the peril of administrative affairs. Other party suggestions are given in *Santa-Anna, Espos. al Prest.*, 1-20; *Manif. á la Nacion*, 1-8; *Dictador confundiendo los Partidos*, 1-24; *Pap. Var.*, cc. pt 5; *Gutierrez, Carta.*, pt 2.

³¹ Suarez y Navarro relates that he was privately consulted about the letter, and condemned it as revealing lack of ability, etc. *Santa-Anna Burlándose*, 238-50 et seq.

zation, and cognate branches. They were intrusted to Diez de Bonilla and Velazquez de Leon, respectively.³² The composition was of the most pronounced

³² The latter appointed on April 26th, the other on May 13th. *Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd.*, 1853, 23, 66, 70-2, etc. Elguero declined the fomento portfolio. The later federal president Lerdo de Tejada joined the department as under-secretary, or official mayor, and Suarez y Navarro retained a similar post under Tornel. See also *Universal*, Apr. 21, 1853, *Español, Siglo XIX.*, etc., of the same time. Suarez y Navarro again parades his assumed importance during the formation of this cabinet. Esteva and Ramon Pacheco were first proposed for the departments of treasury and justice, and Bocanegra and Baranda for gubernacion and fomento; but Alaman's selection had greater weight, except in Tornel's case. Suarez y Navarro thereupon casts reflections on Alaman for stooping to accept office from the man he had abused in his *Historia de Méjico*, and relates that Lares expressed himself honored to accept even the lowest office to 'servir á una persona como V. E.' *Bur.*, 257, 264, 287-8. He himself is proud to serve in an humbler sphere. Yet not long after he tires of the insignificant role to which he is relegated, and turns upon his ci-devant patron at the first safe opportunity, first in the *Siglo XIX.*, from which he reprints articles under the title of *El General Santa-Anna Burlándose*, *Méx.*, 1856, 1-291. The little volume forms a good specimen of the political pamphlets and treatises which abound in Mexico. They spring generally from disappointed men, who seek in print to repeat the parried thrust and parade in borrowed plumage; men as ready to intone hosannas to the victor as to turn upon him the moment he totters. The text presents, midst its ill-natured purposes, several admirable characteristics of the national literature, such as choice and varied language, and a forensic stamp that not only imparts dignity of tone but impresses the purport. With most of these pamphleteers, however, sentences are evolved with less regard for order and sense than high-sounding declamation. Lack of depth is disguised by empty invocations to liberty and rambling floridity, well calculated to rouse shallow sympathies; while innumerable italics, indices, asterisks, and exclamations direct attention to the points aimed at, and which might otherwise escape notice. Pungent epithets of varied and reiterated form supply the place of satire. Well aware of the little credence accorded to such publications, and perhaps to his own statements, Suarez y Navarro frankly declares that as he does not expect to be believed, on his mere assurance, he will base it wholly on documents appended. He thereupon proceeds to magnify his insignificance and color his attitude, till he becomes aglow with admiration of his own cleverness of verbal manipulation. Opposing facts are either swept away with imperious dashes of shallow sophistry, or made to disappear by the very impetuosity of his glibness. Indeed, before reaching the middle of his several arguments, premises, clew, and conclusions alike are lost to sight, left to stray or to be lost in the jungle of glaring contradictions. But Suarez y Navarro is a soldier: he looks not behind. He keeps bravely onward, evidently deluding himself with the belief that the main point has been gained by mystifying the reader, and impressing him with the idea that midst the haze looms some portentous blot which must entomb the opponents—the tyrant Santa Anna and his crew—and relieve by contrast, at least, the brightness of his own sacrificed zeal and ability.

More dignified is the defence of his fellow-actor, Muñoz Ledo, *Esposicion*, *Méx.*, 1853, 1-84, and ap. 1-34. Chagrined at being circumvented by more astute jugglers, who snatched the bone of contention, he assumes the attitude of injured innocence and patriotic martyrdom. Unfortunately for himself he does not check his flow at the proper moment, but allows the reader to recover from his bewilderment, and discover in the superfluous ramble this poverty of disguise and weakness of plea.

Santanist conservative type. Tornel, who alone stood credited with federal sympathies, was above all devoted to his patron; and the leader Alaman bore so strong a reputation for Spanish leanings, monarchical tendencies, and aristocratic bias against the masses and their independence champions, as to be almost offensive to the people at large.³³ Here, then, was already an infringement of the national will, which in the revolutionary plans demanded due respect for public opinion, and representation at least for the leading parties.

Lombardini made a formal surrender of authority April 20th, and died soon after.³⁴ Two days later the new government issued its basis or programme for administration till a constitution could be framed. It defined to some extent the duties of the ministers,³⁵ and of the projected council of states, whose twenty-one members were to form into committees corresponding to the ministerial departments.³⁶ States and territories were to return to the limits and condition prevailing before the late revolution; and in order to facilitate the reorganization now entered upon, their legislative authorities must retire, leaving to the governors their functions until the projected constitution could be issued.³⁷

The unsettled state of affairs following the revolution, and the all-absorbing expectancy of coming events, offered every opportunity for thus quietly and

³³ Rivera speaks of his prohibition principles, and terms Laredo a federal seceder. *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 432; *Id.*, *Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 341-2, 395-6.

³⁴ While holding the position of comandante general of the federal district. He succumbed to a pulmonary disease, Dec. 22, 1853. Few noticed either his retirement or death, all attention being devoted by foes and flatterers to Santa Anna. The inaugural ceremonies of April 20th are given in *Méx., Legist. Mej.*, 1853, 188-92; *Arch. Méx.*, *Actas*, ii. 320-4; *Universal*, Apr. 20, 1853, and subsequent dates, and other journals, with addresses, etc. He took the oath to conform to the plans of Jalisco and of Mexico.

³⁵ Here fixed at five. A procurador general was to be appointed for protecting the interests of the treasury.

³⁶ Internal regulations for the council, issued on June 17th, embrace the methods of consultation in joint session, etc. *Dublan* and *Lozano*, *Leg. Méx.*, vi. 530-3.

³⁷ Aguascalientes alone was exempt from returning to former conditions. For text of basis, see *Méx., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 311-15; *Méx., Col. Ley.*, Dec. y *Ord.*, 1853, 5-8.

at one stroke centralizing the administration. The financial system quickly conformed, yet the blow was mitigated by withholding a while the decree changing the states into actual departments, with some additions to their number.³⁸ Even municipal bodies were abolished, save in leading towns,³⁹ and subjected more than ever to rules from governors and to other restrictions, and finally to appointment by the central authorities, which thus took from the people every semblance of political government, and intruded themselves also in other directions, inquiring, for instance, with suspicious zeal, into the conduct of school children, and requiring lawyers to qualify at the capital.⁴⁰

Everything was subordinated to the direction of the dictator, who indicated his will, and executed it through officials, from councillors, generals, and governors to prefects, sub-prefects, and clerks, selected mainly with regard to their loyalty to their patron, and partly from policy. Although ability and fitness were secondary considerations, they cannot be said to have been lacking; for adherents, as well as the men to be courted, belonged as a rule to the cultivated and ruling classes. The council of state included individuals who had nearly all achieved distinction in ecclesiastic, legislative, and gubernatorial branches.⁴¹

³⁸ Decree dated Sept. 21st. *Id.*, 87-8. In course of the year Aguascalientes was rewarded by separation into a distinct department; Sierra Gorda was made a territory; likewise Isla del Carmen in Yucatan, the better to control the turbulent peninsula and Tehuantepec, in view of the importance acquired by the proposed interoceanic route and the turmoils in this region. For limits, capitals, etc., see *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, vi. 427, 709-10, 796, 811, vii. 61-2; *Soc. Mex. Geog. Bolet.*, iii. 445; *Nacional*, July 15, Dec. 23, 1853, etc. There was also a change in the federal district, and a vain appeal from Huasteca. Comments in *Azcárate, Reseña*, 1-15.

³⁹ The seats of governors and prefects. Description of uniforms to be used by them in council and at ceremonies, with rules for sea-ports, in *Mex., Col. Ley., Dec. y Ord.*, 1853, 76, 232-3, 340.

⁴⁰ General Diaz, *Biog.*, MS., 68-9, suffered in common with other provincials from this restriction.

⁴¹ Among them the president, Bishop Munguía of Michoacan, who had given no small impulse to the revolution, and achieved a literary reputation by his voluminous theologic writings, whereof the *Obras Literarias* alone exist in three series on my shelves. Also the influential Governor Múgica of Puebla, the ex-ministers Esteva and Cuevas, and Agustín de Iturbide. List in *Arch. Mex., Actas*, ii. 314-16; *Mex., Legisl. Mej.*, 1853, 34-9, 88-9. Supple-

Governors and prefects were mostly military men, among whom Santa Anna knew better how to choose devoted followers fitted to carry out his imperious demands by virtue of their training and their control over troops.⁴² The distribution of foreign missions served less to reward the recipients than to remove to a safe distance certain persons of influence, such as Uraga, who was sent to Berlin, and Almonte to Washington.⁴³

The readiest means for according favor and rallying adherents round the government was to offer appointments in the army, which, to this end, must now be reorganized and increased to 91,500 men. This force was to consist of 26,500 permanent troops and the remainder of active militia, into which latter had to be merged all state militia, for better control by the central government.⁴⁴ The dissolution of the popular militia system created much ill-feeling, manifested at Vera Cruz in open though futile revolt. Another cause for discontent lay in the commendable substitution of conscription for the cruel impressment, which had created serious injury to agriculture, interior traf-

mentary and honorary members were added, embracing the archbishop and other dignitaries. They were entitled 'excellencies,' and given a staff of office.

⁴²Generals Blancarte, Yañez, Escobar, Blanco, Corona de la Vega, Heredia, Betancourt, Ormachea, Ampudia, and Mora were rewarded respectively with the governments of Lower California, Sinaloa, Tabasco, Oajaca, Vera Cruz, Yucatan, Durango, Tlascala, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Zacatecas. Rebollo died before he could accept the place subsequently given to lancarte. The latter is said to have been first offered Guanajuato, but declined out of modesty. Blanco had special orders to watch Guerrero, wherein Alvarez was soon induced to resign, whereupon Gen. Moreno stepped forward to hold control for the dictator.

⁴³Uraga felt bitterly this exile, and the comparatively insignificant post accorded him in lieu of the Spanish mission. He had the presumption to regard himself as the most indispensable man in Mexico at the time. See letters reproduced in *Domenech, Hist. du Mex.*, ii. 247-51. Both he and Almonte were possible candidates for the presidency. Pacheco, at first proposed for the cabinet, was sent to France. General Robles took a strong attitude, and was allowed to go into voluntary exile. For comments on these and other missions, see *Eco de España*, July 30, Sept. 24, Oct. 1, 1853, etc.; also *Español*, Feb. 19th, Apr. 23d, 27th, etc.; *Universal*, and other newspapers; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 226-8, 381, 396, 403-5, 434; *Losada, Question*, 17. Rules for diplomatic service in *Méx.*, *Legisl. Mej.*, 1853, 71-80.

⁴⁴The proportions of permanent troops were 15,816 infantry, 3,948 cavalry, 5,325 artillery, 1,264 engineers, besides medical corps, etc. Of the militia, 51,068 were infantry, 12,286 cavalry, and 692 artillery.

fic, and other branches, by driving the Indians into hiding. The superior mixed and white races had learned to regard them as the proper material for the rank and file, and made such opposition to filling the quota assigned to each department that local and general authorities had to close their eyes to the law and accept the contingent without questions, regardless of the tearful appeals from bereaved wives and orphaned children. As it was, the required number could not be obtained,⁴⁵ despite the allurements offered in privileges, and in several instances glittering uniforms and larger pay, whereof the new grenadier guard presented a striking example. The reconstruction was based on the latest systems, and instructors were introduced from Europe,⁴⁶ whence came also improved arms and cannon for the long-neglected fortresses, as well as ships, with which it was proposed to swell the navy to twelve vessels.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ A conscription decree of March 15, 1854, places the total army at only 16,000 permanent troops and 30,000 active militia.

⁴⁶ Santa Anna even proposed to engage three regiments of Swiss soldiers, partly for checking mutinies, as shown by letters in *Méx., Hist. Rev.*, 1853, 55, ap. iii.-v., although he has denied it. The lack of money appears to have assisted in defeating the project. Rivera, *Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 501, 523, notes the arrival of Prussian teachers.

⁴⁷ Six for each coast. Regulations for navy, admiralty court, etc., in *Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Ord.*, 1854, vi. 31-4, 41-6. In 1854 there were two barks and two schooners in the Pacific, in bad order, with about 170 men. *Soc. Méx. Geog. Bolet.*, vii. 331-2. Military colonies were fostered, by decrees at least, *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1853, 86-7; *Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Ord.*, 1853, iv. 210-11, and a decided impulse was given to the military college for providing devoted and efficient officers. *Id.*, iv. 220-5, vi. 1-27; *Méx., Regl. Col. Mil.*, 1854, 1-30. A military conference society was to develop the actual officers. *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1853, 463-7. The army had the preference in receiving pay. The conscription of 91,499 was based on a population of 7,661,520, for six years' service. Of the state militia, married men and family supporters were exempt from entering the new militia. *Méx., Decreto Reemplazar Ejército*, 1854, 1-26; *Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Ord.*, 1853, iv. 378, v. 10-11, 163-4, 232-76; 1854, vi. 148-71, vii. 142-3. Indians were declared exempt by paying poll tax, etc. Regulations for grenadiers, body-guard, lancers, and medical corps, in *Id.*, 1853, iv. 17-19, 29-33, 376-7, v. 519-20; 1854, vii. 15-22. Further regulations, general and special, in *Id.*, 1853-4, iii.-vii., passim. *Arch. Méx., Actas*, ii. 30-392, passim; *Id., Col. Ley. y Dec.*, i. 400-1; ii. 179; *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1853-4, passim; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, vi. and beginning of vii. The pay-rates, in *Zambrano, Tarifa Sueldos Mil.*, 1-239, allow \$15½ to infantry soldiers, \$1 less to active militia, \$15½ to cavalrymen, \$16½ to artillerymen, and \$21 to grenadiers and lancers. *Méx., Anales Min. Fomento*, i. 705-6. Richthofen, *Rep. Méx.*, 433-6, 460-4, comments on the preceding condition of army; Tempisky, *Milla*, 85-90, on dress and appearance;

In order to render the new army as reliable as possible for the aims of the dictator, commissions were not only freely distributed among his known adherents, but several measures were invented to get rid of suspected individuals. A decree was issued to rake up the conduct of officers during the war of 1846-7, and dismiss those who had neglected to fight or shown cowardice, while rewarding the brave and patriotic. The task was confided to a special council, which had also to remove inefficient officers;⁴⁸ and it would ever have been commended for its regenerative spirit, had not the real motive soon become apparent in the unjust and arbitrary manner of staining honorable names, and ignoring incapacity and unworthiness when centred in favorites. Not content with all these steps for securing control, certain petty demonstrations were used as a pretence for issuing an outrageously strict law against conspirators,⁴⁹ and establishing an extensive force of secret police, which penetrated even into the family circle. The flimsiest accusation and the barest suspicion sufficed to drag worthy citizens from their homes into prisons and exile.⁵⁰ Others were subjected to the most annoying surveillance. Internal passports served to control movements in every direction, and a press law forbade under severe penalties the slightest unfavorable comment on political affairs, every journal having to furnish heavy bonds for good conduct. The introduction of arms was carefully restricted, and even their possession by private citizens. Thus both incentive to and means for outbreaks were to be diminished; but indignation found

Fossey, *Mex.*, 494-5, on cruel impressments; and Santa Anna, *A sus Compas.*, 9, etc., claims credit for his reformatory efforts. *Pap. Var.*, xxvi. pt 2, lvi. pt 5, xciii. pt 3. Regulations issued after Sept. 1847 were annulled.

⁴⁸ Rules for this Junta de Calificación. *Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd.*, 1853, iv. 19-26.

⁴⁹ Of August, involving confiscation and trial by court-martial. Its numerous articles permitted the most arbitrary measures. *Id.*, 372-5. Decrees against guerrillas and invaders. *Id.*, 19, 49, 304; Dublin and Lozano, *Leg. Méx.*, vi. 382-3.

⁵⁰ Over 500 persons were exiled to interior and foreign parts, besides 'los echados a presidio,' etc. *Méx., Hist. Rev.* 1853-55, 11.

vent, nevertheless, especially among the friends of persecuted liberals like Degollado, Ocampo, Juarez, and Arista, the latter foremost in feeling the wrath of the new potentate. Juarez had acquired no small fame as model governor of Oajaca.⁵¹

For a long time, however, the people at large were quieted by hopes of the coming reconstruction for which the dictator had been summoned, and by many undeniably good reforms introduced, although some of them proved in time to be mere showy enactments, or disguises for iniquitous schemes, as I have shown. The reorganization of the army, the restoration of fortresses, the introduction of superior armament and methods, had all their commendable features; and the army served also to increase security and order by checking brigandage, which of late years infested the roads in every direction.⁵² Education was fostered, if not among the masses, at least in higher circles; and if the clergy were courted with intolerant decrees against protestant agents and bibles, and even against publications in general, it was sought to purify the observance of feast-days; and a pleasing, although perhaps injudicious, concession was made to instruction and to the people by readmitting the Jesuits.⁵³ But the most enduring benefit conferred by Santa Anna was the creation of the fomento ministry, which gave the greatest impulse so far to internal improvements, in opening roads and bridges, constructing telegraphs, taking steps for building railways and public works, in fostering agriculture and mining,

⁵¹ After lingering for some time in the dungeons of Ulúa, he was sent off, without means, to suffer privations in the United States. *Juarez, Biog.*, 16-17; *Bas Vida Juarez*, 77 et seq.

⁵² Robbers were subjected to military laws. *Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd.*, 1853, iii. 78-80, v. 25-6. It was also sought to improve the administration of justice. *Id.*, iii. 86-7, iv. 202-4, 213, 403, v. 8, 116. Comments on security and judicial reforms, *Universal*, June 5-6, 1853; *Gac. Salv.*, Nov. 11, 25, 1853; *Cent. Am. Pap.*, iv. Earlier projects, in *Distrito Fed., Proyecto*, 1-60; *Nombram. de Min. Sup. Corte*, 1-20.

⁵³ The vatican was courted, and two new sees were projected. The mission of the apostolic delegate Clementi is explained in *Garza, Opúsculo sobre Silla Apost.*, 1-33.

promoting colonization, and reanimating trade.⁵⁴ In this lay some atonement for the heavy increase of taxation demanded by a costly military government, with its many reorganization plans.

By decree of May 14th the revenue was centralized, the government assuming control of all property and general contributions hitherto belonging to the states and territories.⁵⁵ This brought the estimated income to fully \$17,000,000,⁵⁶ less \$3,500,000 set aside for special purposes. The expenses were proportionately large, and those who had so long been talking about the economy of a centralized administration became less confident. The estimated expenditure was placed at \$11,500,000, without counting a heavy additional sum required for reorganizing the military department, and a sum of \$17,000,000 for covering the interest of the interior and foreign debts, partly overdue, and for meeting certain advantageous conventions.⁵⁷ The deficit could be covered only by a loan, and as this was not obtainable on reasonable terms, save by offering unexceptionable security, Haro proposed the hypothecation of church property. The clergy understood the government policy too well to admit this or any other encroachment, however glowing the promises for compensation. They raised such opposition that the minister resigned.⁵⁸ And now affairs were allowed to drift into

⁵⁴ A society for material improvements gave its aid. *Universal*, May 5, 12, 27, 1853; *Pap. Var.*, xciii. pt iii. 3-4; *Rosa*, *Ensayo*, 35-52. Manero has some valuable reflections on colonies. *Doc. Interes.*, 28-36, etc., based partly on reports in *Méx.*, *Mem. Colon. Indust.*, 1852, 1-71; *Coloniz.*, *Dictamen*, 1852, 1-12; *Almonte*, *Proyecto Colon.*, 1-31.

⁵⁵ For changes in administration, etc., see decree in *Méx.*, *Col. Ley.*, *Dec. y Órd.*, 1853, iv. 69-71.

⁵⁶ The original estimate was \$19,000,000, whereof \$8,000,000 from custom-houses, \$2,500,000 from excise, \$1,000,000 from consumption taxes, \$500,000 from contributions on pay and luxuries, \$1,500,000 from tobacco, and \$3,500,000 from a special tax on real estate devoted to a special purpose. *Haro*, *Informe*, of July 12, 1853.

⁵⁷ The regular three per cent interest on the foreign loan of \$51,200,000 and the interior of \$43,000,000—a portion at five per cent, with expenses and funding—was \$3,423,000. The war department required \$8,500,000 on the first low estimate, and the other ministries \$2,900,000. Of this the actual pensions and montepío required \$1,500,000. The president's salary was \$30,000.

⁵⁸ He was succeeded Aug. 6th by Sierra y Rosso, who held office till Jan.

disorder and oppression. Haro had begun well by economizing in several ways, stopping extra allowances, annulling many of Lombardini's orders, and promoting honesty and zeal with medals and advancement as well as by inspection; but this fell into neglect, and taxes and contributions increased fast and furiously to meet the increasing demands, until trade and industries, just about to revive, were again thrust back into a languishing condition. Even windows were taxed in a manner to threaten a change in architecture. Debts remained unpaid, the frontier was neglected, ruinous contracts and privileges were conceded, and disorder reigned supreme within the treasury, owing partly to inefficient methods, and partly to the pressure for means. The demands of creditors were staved off: those of the Spanish by means of a most unfavorable convention, which, being objected to by later governments, brought war clouds upon the country, as will be seen;⁵⁹ and so with the French claims.

The credit as well as the blame, for the opening measures at least, of the dictatorship are due to Lúcas Alaman, one of the most prominent minds of Mexico, distinguished as the prime minister of its first republican administration, and subsequently as the leader of the conservative party. He contributed in a marked degree, in different public capacities, to shape the destinies of the nation: now as benefactor in checking the unbridled projects of visionaries and schemers, and in promoting material advancement; anon, unfortunately, in urging partisans to fierce strife, and in arraying selfish opposition to the dearest interests of the people.

Of an aristocratic family, reared amidst the exclu-

26, 1854; Parres followed for four months; Olazagarre from June 16, 1854, till Jan. 16, 1855; then Parres again for three months, and finally Canseco. Concerning different bank and reform projects, see *Méx., Cuestion del Dia*, 1-81; *Prieto, Instruc. Negoc.*, 1-47; *Méx., Ley. para Arreglo Admin.*, 1-24. Also different laws in *Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Ord.*, 1853-4, *passim*. Haro now joined the foes of Santa Anna.

⁵⁹ In a later chapter, explaining causes for allied intervention.

siveness of the colonial régime, he had imbibed ideas wholly antagonistic to the great majority, by which and for which the independence had been achieved. And travel only tended to confirm the ancestral predilection for the old-world glories of Spain. He refused to court the populace, holding with haughty assumption of superiority to the path marked out by his prejudices. This tone pervaded also his transactions in general, wherein he acted with an unimpeachable integrity that scorned to take advantage of his official opportunities, and found support in a simple, unostentatious life, and an unobtrusive piety. Yet beneath this lofty rectitude lurked a cold reserve that repelled friendship, and a diplomatic calculation that did not scruple at any means for the accomplishment of a seemingly good partisan object. His mind and prominent traits stand reflected in his writings, with their depth of thought, their clear and unaffected style, and with their lurking satire and marked party bias.⁶⁰ Through him flowed both good and evil for Mexico; yet in all he undoubtedly aimed with true conviction for the best, and to him this centred in an autocratic government, which, with the aid of the educated and wealthy classes, including the clergy, should hold the masses in tutelage. His faults were rather of his race and class than of himself, and his countrymen can afford to forget them in admiring him as the foremost patron in his time of their arts and industries, as a distinguished historian, and as one of their greatest statesmen.⁶¹

His death, which occurred on June 2, 1853, while he was still unfolding his plans for reconstructing the government, proved a serious blow to his party; for

⁶⁰ An account of his literary work and life has been given at the close of vol. iv., *Hist. Mex.*, 821-4, this series.

⁶¹ He figured even for a brief term in 1829 as associate ruler with Velez and Quintanar, and continued with the incoming president, Bustamante, as premier. His adherents praise him further as the creator of national industries, 'el ornamento de su país.' *Alaman, Apuntes*, 56. Rivera again abuses him as 'desprovisto de sentimientos patrios,' *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 146; while Arróniz, *Biog. Mej.*, assumes a moderate impartiality. *Perez, Dicc.*, i. 200-5.

his moral energy and determination presented the only formidable check to the ambitious designs of the dictator, and reminded him of his obligations to those who had installed him. The restraint was further loosened by the demise shortly after of J. M. Tornel y Mendibil, the war minister, a man of erudition and experience; and although a devoted Santanist, he was swayed to some extent by federalist ideas.⁶² And now Santa Anna gave freer reins to his actions, with the coöperation of more pliant ministerial creatures, headed by Diez y Bonilla.⁶³ He moved to Tacubaya immediately after Alaman's death, and lived there in regal state, with imposing pageantry and guards of honor in glittering uniforms. The palace, with its dazzling interior of tapestried and mirrored walls, costly furniture and statuary, and alcoves decked in choice flowers, became the frequent scene of balls and soirées; and here congregated the beauty, wealth, and influence of the country, forming a veritable court of sycophants and hangers-on, bending to his every whim.

It pleased him, this homage, and he deigned to recognize it by exerting his sovereign powers to adorn his courtiers with a fringe of nobility. He restored the Guadalupe order of Iturbide's ephemeral empire, an act explained to boorish republicans as required to perpetuate the glories of the independence, to reward

⁶² He had figured with credit as a governor, senator, and minister, and achieved distinction as an orator and writer, in a large number of *Discursos* and minor issues. He died Sept. 11, 1853, and received far greater honors than his patron accorded to the less popular Alaman. *Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd.*, 1853, v. 17-19; *Tornel, Nac. Méj.*, 424 et seq.; *Id.*, *Carta*, 3-7; *Id.*, *Manif.*, pts 1-3; *Pap. Var.*, cl. pt 22, cexix. pt 4. Zavala objects to his lack of character. *Rev. Méx.*, ii. 36-7.

⁶³ As Alaman's successor, Aguilar y Marocho taking his place in the gubernacion department, and retaining it by a course of servile submission, as did Lares and Leon the portfolios of justice and fomento. The treasury office changed hands several times, as I have shown, owing to internal difficulties, and likewise the war ministry, intrusted to L. J. Alcorta, who in Jan. 1854 was succeeded by Blanco, Arista's scheming war minister. Suarez y Navarro displayed such violence at being passed over for this position that he was exiled as a dangerous ingrate, and became an implacable foe. Consult appointments and comments, in *Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd.*, 1853, iv. 201, 208-9, v. 95, etc.; *Arch. Méx.*, *Actas*, i. 438, etc.; *Eco de España*, June-Oct., *passim*; and *Universal*, etc.

merit, and add prestige to the government.⁶⁴ He even condescended in the distribution to recognize the services of the mouldering Iturbide, Guerrero, and O'Donjú, while crushing Hidalgo, Morelos, and the rest with contemptuous disregard. Unfortunately, at the first public display of the order, as the members paraded in all their glittering insignia before the gaping masses, these, unable to grasp the solemn import of things esoteric, profaned the occasion by dubbing them *huehuenches*, a nickname passed round with boisterous hilarity, that found a persistent echo throughout the country. Even among the higher classes were men who manifested equal lack of appreciation. Chief Justice Ceballos, who after resigning the presidency had returned to the supreme bench, was honored by an offer of the third-class order. Either the degree was below his expectations, or he was sincere in declaring that his republican convictions opposed its acceptance; for he declined, as did his associate, Castañeda. Such unheard of independence in the midst of fawning adulation stung Santa Anna; and contrary to his stipulations and oaths, he ordered them both to be dismissed in the face of general though suppressed disapproval.⁶⁵

These and other puerilities were indulged in, regardless of the low condition of the treasury, and much time was wasted in discussing questions of social precedence and color of liveries, while depression

⁶⁴ The three classes of grand crosses, comandadores and caballeros, were preserved, the former two limited to 24 and 100 members, respectively. He declared himself, as president, the grand master, and allowed Bravo to figure as vice-president. For regulations and list of first members, whereof 10 and 22 in the first classes, see *Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Ord.*, 1853, 222-30, ap. 13-26; *Guadalupe, Decreto para Orden*, 1-11; *Pap. Var.*, cccxvii. pt 13; *Eco España*, Nov. 16 till Dec. 24, 1853, passim. Decorations for services in civil war were commendably forbidden. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, vi. 312-13, 582-3, 593, 752-72; *Zarco, Hist. Cong.*, i. 211-424, passim.

⁶⁵ On the ground that they were not in accord with the supreme policy, nor with the conduct of one who had not long ago attacked national representation, in dissolving the congress. See correspondence in *Méx., Rev. 1853-5*, ap. v.-x. Castañeda had more cautiously pleaded lack of means to sustain the honor. For new appointments to the bench, see *Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Ord.*, 1853, v. 251-2.

and misery stalked abroad. Cholera was adding its horrors in the central provinces; locusts ravaged the eastern; both frontiers stood menaced by bands of invaders; and in the north neglected presidios and colonies were left to struggle with insufficient means against savage raiders; while the newly raised armies wallowed in ease in the interior cities, there massed to sustain autocratic measures and hush murmurings. And well they did their work; for the several efforts made to shake off the yoke were promptly suppressed, notably in Guanajuato, Yucatan, and Vera Cruz.⁶⁶ The severe decrees against conspirators were applied with greater zeal than ever, and one prominent man after another who might prove dangerous to the government was sent into exile or cast into a dungeon, the only redeeming feature being a comparatively small number of executions.⁶⁷

The main object of the late revolution was to restore order, and convoke in due time a congress to frame a constitution. This implied a probable change of executive, and with curtailment of power, by no means palatable to Santa Anna; and as he had never yet allowed anything to interfere with his will so long as he possessed the means to enforce it, he was not likely to do so now in the face of such trifling objections as public rights and wishes, or such shadowy obstacles as promises and oaths. Nevertheless, he

⁶⁶ The trouble here occurred in May 1853, on the part of the militia at Vera Cruz, when the order came for reorganization. The two days' fight cost a number of lives. Several futile agitations took place for the fulfilment of the Jalisco plan, at Ixhuacan, Ayutla, and Morelia, and a more serious movement at Guanajuato, whereby the governor was for a moment removed, and a call made for Uruga as president. One leader was captured and shot. In Yucatan three leaders were executed for upholding federation, although retaining Santa Anna for president. Tamaulipas was, as ever, unquiet, although calmed somewhat by a severe decree against invaders. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, vi. 594. For details of troubles in different directions, I refer to *Universal*, May 27, 1853, and subsequent dates; *Español*, id.; *Siglo XIX.*, id.; *Sonorense*, id.; *Eco España*, July 23, etc.; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 343-433, passim; *Losada, Cuestion*, 15-19; *Gac. Guat.*, May 13, 20, Nov. 11, 1853; *Cent. Am. Pap.*, iv.; *Gonzalez, Hist. Aguasc.*, 196-209.

⁶⁷ Although Villa-Amor, *Biog. Santa Anna*, 27-31, talks of sicarios, paid assassins, and 'cuantos fueron conducidos al cadalso para volver luego al calabozo,' etc. *Méx., Rev. 1853-5*, 11, 18, etc.

manifested a strange scruple, considering that he had been all along violating personal guarantees, judicial sanctity, amnesties, and constitutional bases. Instead of taking the easy method of unceremoniously ignoring objections, he had recourse to the circuitous form of letting his emissaries stir up a pronunciamiento in that hot-bed, Guadalajara, on November 17th, condemning the limited term assigned by former plans for reconstructing the government and restoring order. In truth, the Guadalupe order alone, with its newly created aristocracy, so indispensable to an aspiring country, demanded deep consideration of new liveries and fresh rules of precedence, lest a mere knight should peradventure throw the social structure out of gear, and disturb equanimities by taking the pas before a commander. Hence it was declared that the term should be prolonged at the pleasure of the present illustrious chief.

Moreover, it had been the custom to address the president as 'excelentísimo'; but while this was doubtless good enough for Santa Anna's predecessors, it seemed outrageous presumption to place such a man on the same level, and he a self-created grand master. 'Most serene highness' was, therefore, suggested as more fitting. Certain loyal wise-heads of Puebla thought this insufficient, and wished to add 'mariscal general,' 'grand admiral,' 'grand elector,' and other grand things, to which others chimed in, 'for life.' In its despair at being thus forestalled, the army wildly proclaimed him 'savior of Mexico,' although to many this savored rather of the remote and airy celestial than of the tangible and imposing mundane. The capital atoned for its lack of promptness by indorsing all and everything, and the rabble, that a few days before heaped ridicule upon the grand master, now filled the streets with their 'vivas,' with special intonation of the prestige-wreathed title of captain-general.

The climax was capped, however, by a few scattered

villages which proclaimed him emperor. The empire idea was not confined to one class, as we have already seen; and it found a certain support among those who, since the late war of invasion, began to think of a Hispano-American confederacy. Some, despairing even of autonomy midst the continued strife of factions, demanded in addition a protectorate, preferably under Spain.⁶⁸ Alaman had lately stood at the head of those who advocated monarchy as the only promising means for imparting stability to the government, and confidence on the part of foreign powers; but they deemed the prestige of a European prince essential to the project, and had been sounding the western powers regarding a member of the Spanish royal family. Alaman's successor continued negotiations till the fall of the ministry at Madrid caused them to be suspended, for the time at least,⁶⁹ greatly to the delight of Santa Anna, who naturally objected to an interloper, and looked only too longingly at a sceptre for himself. But the rocket flight of Iturbide's empire had struck a warning chill among native aspirants, and the quack and cackle of the aforesaid villages found no reverberating echo to redeem their feebleness, yet they served by the contrast to make other proclamations seem less excessive and ridiculous. This was a great gain in itself, and Santa Anna could bide his time.

In the agitation for things of such importance as the government of the country, it was not expected that common people should do aught else than swell the refrain; for had not governors and officials been appointed by superior wisdom to speak and act for them? Unlike the irresolute and bewildered masses, often guided by ridiculous notions of liberty and equal-

⁶⁸ Advocated notably by the *Heraldo* of Madrid, and condemned by the *Siglo XIX.*, while the *Clamor Público* boldly declared for a union with the United States.

⁶⁹ They had been kept so secret that only a few intimates knew anything about them. Bonilla sought to deny his share in the matter, but Arrangoiz declares, *Méj.*, ii. 342, that he possesses his letter of Aug. 1, 1853, in evidence. See also Ferrer, *Cuestion de Méx.*, 261-6, and the charges against Lacunza, in *Pap. Var.*, cvi. pt vii. 10-17, for conniving.

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ity, these well-drilled pupils of the master could interpret the slightest wink of superior policy, and knew their duty even in so far as to impress upon the duller brains of subordinates and civilians of prominence the prudence of following example, and that promptly. The result was an overwhelming indorsement of the new plan of Guadalajara, couched in the most earnest and even supplicating terms. Santa Anna felt moved by such devotion, such popular tribute to his greatness; but duty and principle should alone be his guides. Then came expostulations and entreaties. The country would assuredly fall into anarchy and ruin unless he retained the firm control. This was irrefutable. He would sacrifice himself for its good. Accordingly, on December 16, 1853, he issued a decree prolonging the dictatorship indefinitely, and bestowing upon himself the title 'most serene highness.'⁷⁰ This was generously supplemented by an amnesty to political exiles within the country, although not till the most dangerous had been sent out, and till arrangements had been made to keep others under close espionage. Still further shone Santa Anna's self-abnegation in declining for a second time the office of captain-general as well as the other titles, and he

⁷⁰ Its three articles, significantly addressed to and issued by the minister of war, alluded to the manifested desire of the 'authorities, corporations, and notables of all the departments' in support of the Guadalajara plan, and the expressed views of the council of state. Not a reference to the people, and yet by art. 1 'it is declared the will of the nation that the actual president retain the power with which he is invested for all the time he considers necessary to consolidate public order, and assure territorial integrity and the reform of administrative branches.' By art. 2 he is permitted to designate his successor in case of death or disability, in a sealed document intrusted to the ministry. Art. 3 attaches the title 'alteza serenísima' to the presidency. The minister adds that henceforth communications to the president must be headed 'serenísimo señor.' *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1853, 591-3. Confirmatory notices in *Pinart Coll.*, no. 1114; *Eco España*, Nov. 26, Dec. 7, 20, etc., 1853, and other journals. As an offset, governors were entitled 'excelencia,' ayuntamientos 'ilustres,' and prefects 'señoría.' Domenech, who understands from certain private letters that the empire movement was more general, is disgusted with Santa Anna for his groundless fear of Iturbide's fate; 'il n'eut point le courage d'imiter Souloque.' *Hist. du Mex.*, ii. 253. Even Álvarez, now preparing to revolt, thought it politic to send congratulations. Iturbide received the title 'libertador,' and his surviving descendants large grants of lands on account of the compensation once voted them, besides a pension of \$12,000. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, vi. 326, 760.

magnanimously refused to swell the burdens of the people by accepting the increased pay of \$60,000, for there were not lacking subservient finance ministers always at hand to give preference to his modest wants.⁷¹

⁷¹ The authorities consulted for the preceding chapters are:

Dublan and Lozano, *Leg. Mex.*, v. 422-6, 533-5, 551-73, 623-4, 640-8, 683, 722-4, 747-50, vi. passim, vii. 14-15, 61-79, 204, 291-2, 312-13; Rivera, *Hist. Jalapa*, iv. passim; *Id.*, *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. passim; *Id.*, *Méx. Pint.*, i. 26, ii. 271-2, 400; *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 31, Ses. 1, Acts and Res., p. 79; *Id.*, Cong. 31, Ses. 2, Sen. 31; *Id.*, Cong. 32, Ses. 1, Sen. Jour. 196 et seq., Sen. 97; *Thompson's Recoll. Mex.*, 168, 177; *Zerecero, Rev. Mex.*, 95; *Derech. Intern. Mex.*, 1st pt, 619-57, 2d pt, 325-8, 3d pt, 67-72, 496-9, 969-70; *Almonte, Proy. Leyes sobre Col.*, 1-31; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xii. 303, xiii. 377-8, 426-835; *Suárez y Navarro, Sta. Anna Burlandose*, passim; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, Enero-Abr. 1849, 1-132, ap. 1-3; Mayo 1849-Abr. 1850, passim; *Id.*, *Recop. Ley.*, *Dec. y Circ.*, 1-93, 113-17; *Méx. Col. Leyes Fund.*, 300-15; *Id.*, *Legisl. Méj.*, 1848, 356, 360-2, 379, 458, 476-96, 508-60; 1849-54, passim; 1856, En.-Jun., 475, Jul.-Dic., 304-5; *Id.*, *Col. Leyes y Dec.*, 1848, 159, 264-71, 351, 361, 380, 458, 481-2, 529-30, 765-71; 1850, passim; *Id.*, *Col. Leyes, Dec. y Órd.*, 1850-4, i.-vii. passim; *Id.*, *Mem. Relac.*, 1850, 8-12; 1851, 1-43, and annexes 1-15; *Id.*, *Espos. Hacda*, 1850, 1-8; *Id.*, *Mem. Hacda*, 1850, 1-127; *Id.*, *Mem. Hacda*, 1851, 1-18, and annexes; *Id.*, *Mem. Hacda*, 1870, 374-6, 387, 400-1, 1048-51; *Id.*, *Mem. Guerra*, 1850, 1-35, and annexes 1-26; 1851, 1-37, and annexes 1-16; 1852, 1-118, and annexes, pp. 1-57; *Id.*, *Mem. Justicia*, 1850, 1-59, and annexes 1-20; *Id.*, *Mem. Fomento*, 1866, 92-7, and annexes 47-55; *Id.*, *Espos. é Inic. Minist. Hacda*, 1851, 1-32; *Id.*, *Mem. Polít. y Estad.*, 1850, 1-62, and annexes 1-13; *Id.*, *Mem. Col. Indust.*, 1852, 1-71; *Id.*, *Rev. contra Sta. Anna*, 1-35, ap. iii.-cv.; *Id.*, *Plan p^a la Defensa*, 9-10; *Id.*, *Corresp. Diplom.*, ii. 643-722; *Id.*, *Piezas Justif.*, 1-26, 35-50, 61-99; *Id.*, *Colonias Mil.*, II. 6; *Id.*, *Regl. Colon. Mil.*, 1851, 1-31; *Id.*, *Regl. Colon. Mil.*, 1854, 1-30; *Id.*, *Ejército, Ley sobre Arreglo*, 1-16; *Id.*, *Deuda Int.*, *Ley de 1852*, 1-15; *Id.*, *Discurso Presid. Repúb.*, 15 de Oct. de 1852, 1-11; *Id.*, *Discurso Presid. Est. Un. Mex.*, 1 de En. de 1852, 1-30; *Id.*, *Presupuesto Min. Rel. Int.*, II. 9; *Id.*, *Dictám. Com. Puntos Constit.*, 1849; *Id.*, *Dictám. Proy. Coloniz.*, 1849, 1-12; *Id.*, *Com. de Hacda*, *Dictám.*, 1851, 1-26; *Id.*, *Dictám. Com. Crédito Públ.*, 1849, 1-18; *Id.*, *Dictám. Com. Crédito Públ. Deuda Int.*, 1849, 1-74; *Variedades Jurisp.*, i. 286-305; *Wilson's Mex.*, 68-78; *Zambrano, Tarifa Sueldos*, 1-239; *Oaj.*, *Espos.*, 1850, 1-5; *Inconven. Coloniz. Indiscret.*, 1-24; *Oaj.*, *Espos. que hace el Gob.*, 1851, 1-19, and annexes 1-17; *Id.*, *Espos. que hace el Gob.*, 1852, 1-34, with Docs; *Gonzalez, Hist. Aguascal.*, 183-209; *Mayer's Mex. Azt.*, ii. 32, 125-9; *Herrera, Proyecto Est.*, 1-72, II. 3, sh. 1; *Méx.*, *Dictám. Junta*, 1849, 1-116; *Ober, Mexico*, 469; *Gomez del Palacio, Rápida Ojeada*, 1-14; *Manero, Doc. Interes.*, 28-40; *Dicc. Univ. Hist. Geog.*, ii. 430-5; *Luchet, Observ. al Dict.*, 1-60; *Maldonado, Informe elev. al Vice-Gob.*, 1-14; *Mier (S. T. de), Profecía Polít.*, 1-28; *Mesa, Breve Manif.*, 3-13; *Fossey, Mex.*, 185, 494-5; *Buenrostro, Hist. Prim. Cong. Constit.*, 127-8; *Correo Nac.*, Aug. 18, 29, Oct. 23, 28, Nov. 7, Dec. 14, 19, 20, 26, 1848, Jan. 3, 1849; *Corr. de Esp.*, Nov. 1, 1854; *Manif. Supr. Trib.* 1-38; *Am. Quart. Reg.*, ii. 276-7, iii. 19-20, 330-1, iv. 87-90, v. 104-8; *Galvez, Ante la Prim. Sala*, 1-58; *Maclure's Opiniones*, 247; *Ordoñez, Opúsc. sobre Ascensos*, 1-12; *Id.*, *Extincion Comand. Gen.*, 1-11; *Sartorius, Import. Mex.*, 28, 32; *Repúb. Mex.*, *Ligera Reseña*, 1-25, 35; *Morelia, Represent. que el Vecind.*, 1-21; *Gutiérrez, Leyes de Ref.*, 431-42; *El Heraldo*, Oct. 20, Dec. 11, 20, etc., 1848, Jan. 8, 15, 17, Mch 3, 6, etc., 1849; *Niles' Register*, lxxv. 104-5, 110-11, 173, 177; *Masson, Olla Podrida*, 175-217; *Peña y Peña, Observ. hechas*, 1-64; *Arizcorreta, Respuesta*,

1-30; *Id.*, *Manif. al Públ.*, 4; *Prieto, Instrucc.*, 1-47; *Rosa, Ensayo*, 35-9, 45-52; *Azcúrate, Reseña hecha*, 1-15; *Zarembo's Merchant*, 15; *Suarez y Navarro, Discurso sobre Trib. Mil.*, 1-60; *El Sonorense*, Dec. 1, 1848, Nov. 23, 1849, Feb. 21, Dec. 5, 19, 1851, Jan. 9, Aug. 6, 1852, Jan. 14, Mch. 4, 18, May 20, 27, 1853; *Guadalupe, Ord. Mex., Decreto*, 1-11; *Richthofen, Rep. Mex.*, 33-89, 433-6, 445, 454-64; *Sac. Union*, July 25, Aug. 8, 1855; *Sac. Record*, Dec. 15, 1870; *Celis, Defensa*, 1-39; *El Universal*, 1849-53, passim; *Méz., Expos. que la Com. Perm.*, 1850, 1-8; *Id., Constit. Polit.*, 48; *Id., Convenc. Diplom.*, 1-31; *Id., Seg. Part. Consolid. Rep.*, i. 1-2; *Id., Doc. Refer. Cuest. Agit.*, 1-43; *Id., Expos. Hacda*, 1849, 1-112; *Id., Garant. Indiv., Dictám.*, 1849, 1-35; *Id., Legac. Méz.*, En.-Dic. 1849, 1-370; *Id., Guarnic. de Méz., Manif. al Públ.*, 1-24; *Id., Cuestion del Dia; Id., Ley p^a Arreglo Contencioso*, 1-24; *Id., Nombram. Minist. Sup. Corte*, 1-20; *Id., Dec. p^a reemplazar Bajas*, 1-26; *Id., Part. Conserv.*, 6-7; *Id., Ley de 4 de Nov. de 1848*, 1-16; *Id., Mem. Present.*, 47-52; *Id., Manif.*, 1849, 1-23; *El Siglo XIX.*, 1849-53, passim; *El Regulador (Puebla)*, May 1849 to Apl. 1852, passim; *March, Hist. Marina*, i. 130; *Noriega, Estad. Depart. Méz.*, 705-6; *Madrid, Manif.*, 1-23; *Veracruz, Sucesos Act. Revol.*, 1-36; *Tabaco, Dictám. sobre Nulidad Cont.*, 1-20; *Ledo, Expos. sobre Cond.*, 1-84, ap. 1-34; *Castillo, Sentenc. Absol.*, 1-18; *Otero, Discurso; Bonilla, Decreto p^a Organiz. Órd. Guad.*, 1-11; *Cadena, Expos. que hacen*, 1-28; *S. Fr. D. Herald.*, 1850-3, passim; *Méz., Rept Tehuant. Comm.; Tlaxcala, Estatuto*, 1-20; *Barnard's Isth. Tehuant.*, app. 277-81; *Siendo Liberales*, 1-32; *Polynesian*, vii. 103; *Prieto, Informe sobre Deuda Estr.*, 1-15; *Tesoreria y Com. Gen. Presup. de*, 1-174; *Temp'sky's Milla*, 85-90; *Abbot's Méz. and U. S.*, 279-81; *Album Méz.*, i. 16, 47; *Ramírez, Dim. del Minist.*, 1-12; *Id., Observ. hechas*, 1-11; *Id., Mem. de las Difer.*, 109-230; *Id., Acusacion*, 1-8; *Id., Apuntes Hist. Convenc. Dipl.*, 1-20; *Méz., Mem. Direcc. Coloniz.*, 8-9, 21-4; *Id., Plan Def. Estados Inval. Bárbaros*, 1-27; *Id., Dictám. Junta Def. contra Bár.*, 1-20; *Viglietti, Reseña*, 10-17; *Méz., Proy. Recursos*, 7, 16; *Papeles Varios*, xi. pt 5, xxvii. pt 9, xxxi. pt 50, xli. pts 5, 11, 12, lvi. pts 3-5, lxxxviii. pt 4, lxxxix. pts 1, 8, 9, 11, xciii. pt 3, cvi. pt 7, cxiv. pts 4, 5, 8, clxxxi. pts 4, 4½, clxxxv. pts 10, 14, 16, clxxxvii. pt 4, cxcii. pt 6, cxcvi. pt 13, cxci. pts 5-7, 9, ccii. pt 8, cciii. pt 5, cciv. pt 3, ccvi. pts 1, 3½, ccviii. pt 4, ccxviii. pt 7, ccxxiv. pts 8½, 9, 10, 10½, ccxxvii. pts 12, 13; *Hunt's Merch. Mag.*, xx. 673, xxix. 475; *Revisor*, Jan. 12, 1850; *Pinart Coll.*, passim; *Diario Avisos*, Mch. 28, 1860; *Wappæus, Méz. und C. Amer.*, 127, 183; *Williams, El Istmo de Tehuant.*, passim; *Manif. á la Nac., Alg. Mexic.*, 1853, 1-18; *S. L. Potost, Constit., Proy. Ref.*, 1848, 1-29; *Id., Constit., Proy. Ref.*, 1850, 1-23; *Id., Constit. Polit. Ref.*, 1850, 1-46; *El Nacional*, Dec. 23, 1852, June 17, July 15, 1853; *Sistema Prohib., Repres.*, 1-16; *Zarco, Hist. Cong.*, i. 211-40, 296-310, 329-36, 359, 421-4; *Falconnet, Manif.*, 3, 20; *Ferrer, Cuest. de Méz.*, 261-6; *El Español*, 1852-3, passim; *Bazancourt, Mexique*, 217-46; *Brocklehurst's Méz.*, 50; *Alta California*, 1851-3, passim; *Alm. Calend. Galvan*, 1854, 65-72; 1855, 67-76; *Alm. Calend. Man. y Guia*, 1852, passim; 1854, 54; *Dictador en Méz.*, 1-24; *Diario Debates 3 Cong.*, i. 55; *El Economista*, Abr.-Mayo 1849, passim; *Baz, Def.*, 1-12; *Distrito Fed., Proy. Ley Justif.*, 1-60; *Archivo Méz.*, i.-ii. passim; *Méz. et l'Esp., Mem.*, 251-64; *Hayes' Constit. Law*, i. 32; *Id., Mexico*, 4-5; *Estado May. Gral. Ejér.*, 27-31; *Colonias Mil. Proy. Establ.*, 1-4, docs 1-4; *Id., Reglam. Establ. Sa. Gorda*, 1-15; *Disposic. Varias*, v. fol. 67; *Caballero, Hist. Alm.*, 23-6; *Méz. Bondholders, Rept*, Apl 23, 1852; *Guardia Nac., Ley Org.*, 1-15; *Tehuán., Dictám. sobre Aprobac.*, 1-20; *Id., Reglam. Col. Mil.*, 1-32; *Rivera, Méz. Pint.*, ii. 274; *Coloniz., Dictám. Com.*, 1852, 1-12; *Id., Doc. Direcc. Col. é Ind.*, 1-46; *Id., Nuevo Proy.*, 1-19; *Taylor's Spec. Pres.*, 24, 599, 602, 606-8; *El Globo*, Mch. 1, 1849; *El Monitor Repub.*, Dec. 22, 1848, Feb. 6, 12, 1852; *El Guardia Nac.*, Feb. 25, 1850; *Charnay, Cités et Ruines*, 196-7; *Frisch, Staaten von Méz.*, 15, 25-7, 32-43; *Serapio (Fray), Escenas*, 34-41; *Guan., Mem.*, 1853, 5-8, 36-7, 42-7; *Eco de España*, Jul.-Dic. 1853, passim; *El Español*, Mch 30, 1853; *Domenech, L'Empire Mex.*, 23-42; *Id., Hist. du Méz.*, ii. 230-8, 249, 253-4; *Id., Miss. Adv.*, 330-5; *Id., Journal*, 382-405; *Wortley's Travels*, 207, 227-8; *Moreno y Jove, Oracion Fúa*, 5;

Revere's Keel and Saddle, 232-5; *Perry's Travels*, 14-69; *Losada, Cuestion Mex.*, 15, 17; *Cent. Am. Papers*, i.-v. passim; *Villa-Amor, Biog. Gen. Sta Anna*, 26-35; *Soc. Mex. Geog. Bolet.*, i. 94, 177, 219, 333-4, iii. 445, v. 201, 207, vii. 331-2, ix. 159, 268; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 956; *Id., Apuntes Biog.*, 40-1; *Barbachano, Mem. Camp.*, 140-9; *Santa Anna, á sus Compañ.*, 4-8, 11-14; *Id., Manif.*, 6; *Id., Biog. del Gen.*, 21-2; *Id., Espos. dirigida*, 1-20; *Payno, Rentas Gen.*, 97-100; *Id., Convenc. Mex.*, 26; *Id., Memoria*, 3, 45; *Id., Proy. Arreglo Gastos Hac. Públ.*, 1-78; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. passim; *Robles Pezuela, El Comand^{te} en Jefe*, 1-50.

CHAPTER XXV.

OVERTHROW OF DICTATORIAL RULE.

1854-1855.

SANTA ANNA'S DESPOTISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES—PLAN OF AYUTLA—JUAN ÁLVAREZ AND IGNACIO COMONFORT—SANTA ANNA'S CAMPAIGN IN GUERRERO—DISTURBED CONDITION OF MEXICO—SALE OF NATIONAL TERRITORY—A FARCICAL PLEBISCIT—SANTA ANNA CONFIRMED IN POWER—HIS ATTEMPT AT A CHANGE OF POLICY—CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION—END OF SANTA ANNA'S PUBLIC CAREER—COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN MEXICO—PRESIDENT CARREERA—HIS CONCILIATORY EFFORTS—REACTIONARY INTRIGUES—LIBERAL TRIUMPH—ÁLVAREZ CHOSEN PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT.

THE political situation at the opening of 1854 was insufferable. War had become chronic. Half a century of internal dissension, with occasional foreign invasions, was not enough, it seems; for now it is renewed, or rather continued, the little misunderstanding with the United States not being allowed long to interfere with time-honored customs and current throat-cuttings. Puffed with vanity and blinded by flattery,¹ Santa Anna had come to regard himself a god; he fancied he could regulate thought with bayonets. He had inklings of an intended movement against him in Guerrero, to guard against which he sent Colonel Rafael Espinosa as military commandant to Acapulco. This department, for the liberal ideas

¹ Prominent men who contributed to the preparation of a historical work, published in Mexico in 1848, in which Santa Anna's generalship and some of his political acts were reflected upon, received harsh treatment from him. All the copies the government could lay hands on were destroyed, the minister Aguilar pronouncing the work disgraceful, which it was not, and its authors 'malos mexicanos'; several of whom have since held the highest positions.

of its authorities, its past record, position, rough mountainous ground, and unhealthy climate, was one that he feared. Its most influential citizen, General Juan Álvarez, had been at first among Santa Anna's powerful supporters, but soon became disgusted with the dictatorial régime. To meet a possible emergency, and to keep the authorities in check, the government, with the pretext that an expedition was fitting out in California, under Count Raousset de Boulbon, to invade Mexico, and might land at Acapulco, though General Álvarez had written that no reinforcements were



CAMPAIGN AGAINST ÁLVAREZ.

needed, despatched a considerable number of troops to Guerrero, directing at the same time the naval commandant at Acapulco to have an armed vessel in readiness to blockade the port. No plan had as yet been formed by the discontented sureños, and, indeed, no thought given as to where the means were to come from. A revolution was impending, however. On the 20th of February news reached the capital that Álvarez had raised the standard of revolt in the south. The government then decreed severe measures against the rebels and all aiding them.²

²Feb. 13th it was ordered that merchants, whether national or foreign,

Colonel Florencio Villareal, the commandant of Costa Chica, strongly suspected of disaffection, had been summoned to Mexico in October, but a convenient illness had kept him away. At last, orders were transmitted to bring him, dead or alive, to Ocatepec. But the suspected chiefs had been wary, and kept themselves out of Santa Anna's clutches. General Tomás Moreno left Chilpancingo February 24th for the coast, and Espinosa with his forces stopped his march at Buenavista on hearing that the enemy was on the Peregrino height for the purpose of checking his advance. An unequal struggle was thus begun between the sureños and the government. The latter made extensive preparations to crush the rebellion. In the mean time, on the 1st of March, Villareal, with the force of 300 or 400 pintos under his command, proclaimed in the town of Ayutla, district of Ometepe and department of Guerrero, a political plan,³ which

sending abroad for goods to be imported at any place controlled by the rebel chiefs, were to be dealt with as conspirators. Acapulco was declared closed to foreign and coast trade, on the 2d of March. Álvarez, and all officers who joined him, were deprived of their rank. *Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Ord.*, 1854, Jan.-May, 102-3, 123, 128; *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1854, Jan.-May, 146-53; *Méx., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 315-18; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 478, 480.

³The famous Plan de Ayutla, which, after a preamble setting forth the nation's grievances against Santa Anna's despotism, has the following nine articles that were the basis for a provisional government. 1. Santa Anna and other functionaries who, like him, had forfeited the people's confidence, and all public officers opposing this plan, were to cease at once from exercising any authority. 2. After a majority of the nation had accepted the plan, the commander-in-chief of the liberal forces was to convoke one representative from each state and territory, to meet at some convenient place, and acting together were to choose a president ad interim of the republic, and continue afterward as a state council during the provisional régime. 3. The president ad interim was clothed with ample powers to protect the integrity and independence of the national territory, and to aid every branch of the public administration. 4. In states seconding this plan, the chief commander of the forces, associated with seven persons of his own choosing, to assemble, and within one month enact and promulgate a statute to serve as the provisional code of their state or territory; the foundation of each such statute being that the nation is, and forever shall be, one, indivisible, and independent. 5. Fifteen days after entering upon the discharge of his duties, the president ad interim was to convoke a constituent congress, on the basis of the law enacted for a similar purpose in 1841, to constitute the nation as a representative popular republic, and to revise the acts of the provisional executive. 6. The army to be preserved and cared for; foreign and domestic trade fostered; and at the earliest possible date a new tariff and regulations to be framed and enforced. Until such time, the tariff issued in Ceballos' administration to be revived. 7. Conscription and passport laws to be abolished. 8. Persons

was ratified on the 11th, with a few amendments at Acapulco, by the officers and troops stationed there, and by Colonel Ignacio Comonfort, who was at once recognized as commandant of the fortress and of the military district.⁴

The position of commander-in-chief of the 'ejército restaurador de la libertad' was given to Álvarez, and that of second in command to Moreno. The former had correspondence with the discontented at the national capital, and with the exiles Juárez and others, residing in New Orleans.

This revolution, being favored by public opinion, was sure of victory, though it had to meet at first, with only a few ill-provided men, the numerous hosts at the dictator's command,⁵ backed by the influential classes, including the clergy, who supported him with their might to secure the restoration of their own power.

The action at Ayutla had a magical effect. It was hailed by the masses with marks of approbation. The government pretended to despise, as insignificant, this movement, started in that distant and thinly settled region of the country; but it soon found itself impotent to withstand it.⁶

opposing this plan, or in any manner aiding the government or its supporters, to be looked upon and dealt with as foes to national independence. 9. Generals Nicolás Bravo, Juan Álvarez, and Tomás Moreno were invited to place themselves at the head of the liberating forces, to carry into effect the administrative reforms set forth in the plan, with power to make such modifications as they might deem conducive to the national welfare. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, i. 3-18, ii. 94-101; *Méx., Legis. Mej.*, 1856, Jan.-June, 442; *Bandera de Ayutla*, June 21, 1856; *Méx., Rev. contra Santa Anna*, 36-166, *passim*.

⁴ A tenth article declared that if a majority of the nation wished to modify the plan, the signers pledged themselves to respect and carry out the national will. The proceeding from this time forth went under the name of Plan de Ayutla reformado en Acapulco. *Méx., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 318-22; *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, 11, 101-9. It has been asserted that the displeasure of Álvarez and Comonfort with Santa Anna arose from the annulling of the acquisition by the former of a large tract of land which they had bargained to transfer to an American, by which operation they were to clear many thousands of dollars. *Marquez de Leon, Mem. Póst.*, MS., 89-90.

⁵ Forty thousand men and all the resources of the government; the millions to be received from the sale of Mexican territory; and the forced absence of a large number of liberals in exile, or confined in prisons.

⁶ Álvarez was called the southern panther, and 'un mal mexicano puesto de acuerdo con los enemigos extranjeros.' *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 496.

Álvarez was said to be intrenched in the hacienda of Providencia. Troops went from Oajaca to occupy Jamiltepec, and others from Mexico to strengthen the force marching on Acapulco under the orders of General Perez Palacios. The dictator's attention was by this time divided, the revolt having in March broken out in several parts of Michoacan,⁷ by the invasions of Sonora by Raousset, and of Lower California by William Walker,⁸ as well as by the incursions of savage Indians.⁹

Santa Anna concluded to assume in person command of the troops in the field, and started from Mexico on the 16th of March, accompanied by the secretary of war, Santiago Blanco, and preceded by the cazadores de los supremos poderes, leaving in charge of the minister of relations a sealed document, in which was designated his successor should he die during the campaign. The other ministers remained at the capital, transacting the ordinary affairs of government, and daily reported by special courier to the dictator. The minister of war in a circular apprised the country that his most serene highness would be

⁷ A number of chiefs made themselves a national reputation by constantly harassing the government's troops. Among them were Faustino Villalva and his son Jesus, Epitacio Huerta, Manuel Pueblita, and others. The Villalvas with 1,300 soldiers were defeated on the Limon hill by Col Zuloaga, who for this victory was made a general. Santa Anna's officers showed no mercy to prisoners. Michoacan suffered terribly by the civil war, and by the havoc of cholera. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*. iv. 486-526, passim; *El Estándarte Nac.*, 1857, July 18; *Correo de España*, 1854, Nov. 29.

⁸ See *Hist. Cal.*, and *Hist. North Mexican States*, this series.

⁹ The Lipans and other native nations made frequent raids for plunder, the frontier states being kept in constant fear. The inhabitants were ordered to arm and fight, and rewards were offered to such as rendered good service. Fortifications were also to be erected on the frontiers, but nothing of the kind was done. These troubles, as well as Indian insurrections in other parts of the republic, continued till the latter part of 1856. The war of races in Yucatan went on without any sign of coming to an end. *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1854, Jan.-Dec., 110-12; 1856, July-Dec., 132-4; *Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd.*, vi. 135-6, vii. 84-5, 151; *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, ii. 358-61; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, vii. 62-3, 295; *Méx., Informe Com. Pesquisidora*, 1874, 122-6; *Zamacois, Hist. Mej.*, xiv. 308-12. Among the outrageous acts of Santa Anna's rule was that of permitting natives of Yucatan, who had been made prisoners or kidnapped, to be taken to Cuba as coolies; though he later modified his order and had prisoners transferred to other parts of the country. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 457, 462. 'La venta de los indigenas de Yucatan.' *Villa-Amor, Biog. Gen. Santa Anna*, 34.

absent one month, the object of his journey being to learn by a personal inspection the true state of affairs in Guerrero. Santa Anna was everywhere the object of foreordered ovations, and in some parts the abject rabble pulled his carriage. But so great was becoming the desertion among his troops that a specially severe order was issued by Minister Blanco at the hacienda San Gabriel against deserters.¹⁰ The liberals abandoned Los Cajones on his approach. He captured Fort Coquillo, the garrison having escaped. This victory was made much of by his flatterers.¹¹ Alvarez abandoned his position at Peregrino, his plan being to dally with the enemy and let the deadly climate defeat them.

The revolution was certainly spreading, and though the government applied its resources to the best advantage, destroying considerable bodies of rebels, and shooting a number of prominent leaders, among them Gordiano Guzman at Cutzamala, the conflagration spread from Zacatula to Tusanla, and from Tacámbaro to Tecpan. In Rio Verde, a captain broke out in open rebellion in April.

Santa Anna ordered the confiscation of property belonging to revolutionists, the burning of hostile towns, and the execution of their chiefs and others taken in arms. These orders were generally carried out, Santa Anna's severity being great toward those showing lukewarmness. One day the dictator's rear guard was cut off from the rest of the forces, and he found himself without communication even by means of foot-messengers. This gave rise to all sorts of rumors. His highness had been not only defeated, but also seriously wounded; while the *Diario Oficial* announced triumph after triumph of the dictator's forces, and disgraceful defeats of the revolutionary troops, foretelling that the defence at Acapulco, which it

¹⁰ At Chilpancingo, where Santa Anna visited old Gen. Bravo, was begun the publication of an official journal, whose first number said that the troops in Guerrero had pledged their support to the dictator.

¹¹ Celebrated in Mexico with salvos, ringing of bells, and general rejoicing.

called the last bulwark of wickedness, would be a feeble one.¹² Finally, after overcoming many obstacles, the dictator and his army appeared before Acapulco on the 20th of April, with about 7,000 men, and called upon the commandant, Comonfort, to surrender the fortress, to which a flat refusal was returned, even though the request was accompanied, it is said, with pecuniary considerations. After a fruitless effort to take the fort, Santa Anna beat a retreat. This was a difficult operation, the liberals having reënforced the Peregrino hill, on the line of his march. His rear was constantly harassed by Moreno, into whose hands fell the sick and wounded. The battle of Peregrino was a notable one, and though Santa Anna escaped utter destruction, his loss of men and supplies was quite large. The remnants of his force had to make their way through burnt fields, annoyed from all sides, till completely battered and exhausted they reached Chilpancingo early in May. After placing detachments in various towns, Santa Anna returned to Mexico. When the news reached the capital that he had been neither slain nor taken prisoner, his partisans were greatly rejoiced, and gave him an ovation on his arrival.¹³ Their rejoicing was greatly increased by the ratification in Washington of the Gadsden treaty.

A treaty for the cession of territory to the United States, known in Mexico as the sale of the Mesilla valley, and including the territory of Arizona, and for the grant to the American government of certain transit privileges, was concluded on the 30th of December, 1853, the negotiators being, on the part of

¹² The real facts were that the dictator's troops, lacking resources in that country, were decimated by disease; many of his chief officers were wounded, his messengers and spies intercepted, and some of them had paid for their temerity by being made to hang from the limbs of trees. The insurgents seldom offered any resistance, but after firing at the enemy fled to the woods. Álvarez had occupied Las Cruces in Santa Anna's rear.

¹³ 'Haciéndosele un recibimiento ordenado por sus ministros cual se le haría á un gran conquistador.' *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 345. Santa Anna's statue was placed on an arch; a hurricane on the 26th, in disregard of his greatness, threw down the arch and dashed the statue to pieces.

Mexico, Manuel Diez de Bonilla, José Salazar Ilarregui, and Mariano Monterde; and on the part of the United States, James Gadsden, the American minister, accredited near the Mexican government.¹⁴ The Mexican government ratified the treaty on the 31st of May, 1854; the American on the 29th of June of the same year. It was published by the former power on the 20th of July, 1854.

The funds proceeding from the sale of territory were

¹⁴ Art. 1. Mexico conceded as the U. S. boundary the same dividing line between the two Californias as was already established by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the other boundaries to be as follows: Beginning in the gulf of Mexico, 3 leagues from land, opposite the mouth of the Rio Grande, as provided in the 5th art. of that treaty; thence, as defined in that article, up the middle of that river to the point where the parallel of 31° 47' north crosses the same; thence due west 100 miles; thence south to the parallel of 31° 20'; thence along the said parallel to the 111th meridian; thence in a straight line to a point on the Colorado River, 20 Eng. miles below the junction of the Gila and Colorado rivers; thence up the middle of the Colorado until it intersects the existing line between the U. S. and Mexico. Commissioners were appointed to run the new boundary line. Clauses in the 5th art. of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo conflicting with the above were to be no longer in force. Art. 2 released the U. S. from all liability on account of the obligation contained in the 11th of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. That art. and the 33d of the treaty of Apr. 5, 1831, were abrogated. Art. 3. In consideration of the above, the U. S. agreed to pay Mexico, in New York, ten million dollars, namely, seven on the exchange of ratifications, and the remainder when the boundary line had been established. Art. 4 abrogated the 6th and 7th of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Vessels and Am. citizens were to have free and uninterrupted passage through the gulf of Cal., to and from their possessions north of the boundary line; the passage to be by navigating the gulf and the Colorado River, and not by land without Mexico's express consent. Art. 5. All provisions of the 8th, 9th, 16th, and 17th articles of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo were to have application to the territory now ceded. Art. 6. Grants of land by the Mexican government within the territory now ceded, after Sept. 25, 1853, were to have no value unless located and duly recorded in the city of Mexico. Art. 7 reaffirmed the 21st and 22d articles of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Art. 8. The Mexican government having authorized, on Feb. 5, 1853, the construction of a plank road and railroad across the isthmus of Tehuantepec, the U. S. and their citizens were to enjoy all the privileges of transit for themselves and their merchandise, as the most favored nation; also the privilege of passing the mails in closed bags. Prompt arrangements to be made to enable the U. S. to pass through the isthmus troops and munitions which the latter might have occasion to send from one part of their territory to another; the Am. government agreeing to protect the work of the railroad as far as it might feel it to be sanctioned and warranted by the public or international law. Art. 9 stipulated that the ratification of this treaty be exchanged at the earliest possible day, within six months of the date of its being signed. *Derecho Intern. Mex.*, 1st pt, 258-67. *U. S. Govt Doc., H. Ex. Doc.* 109, vol. xiii., 33d Cong., 1st Sess.; *Cong. Globe*, 1853-4, 2234, 2258; *U. S. House Jour.*, 1082, 33d Cong., 1st Sess.; *U. S. Senate Jour.*, 920-1, 33d Cong., 1st Sess.; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xv. 951-61; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 402-3, 438-9; *Id., Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 435, 441, 460-1.

of great help to the government in its present emergency, and no time was lost to lay hands on the money by special negotiation involving loss. There was now no limit to the despotism of the government and its tools in the departments. An order of banishment was never revoked.¹⁵ The poor were the victims of conscription and general ill treatment; property was not safe from confiscation; justice was only for the despot's favorites.

The spread of the revolution after Santa Anna's escape from Guerrero was now rapid.¹⁶ Engaged in it were not only Álvarez, Comonfort, and Moreno, but Santos Degollado and Vidaurri. An official recognition that revolution existed in many parts, and was likely to break out in others, was at last made on the 5th of June, and departments, districts, cities, and towns seceding from their allegiance would be ipso facto placed under martial law without further declaration.¹⁷

Santa Anna changed his residence to Tacubaya on the 26th of September. He could now see that the situation was no longer tenable, and desired the conservatives to somewhat modify their policy, which would involve a change of cabinet. The governors of departments were asked for a marked change. The dictator, however, in a circular of October 17th, denied having contemplated a change of ministers,¹⁸ of whose honesty, loyalty, and activity he was well satisfied.

¹⁵ The cause for its being issued, or the accusers often, could not be learned: 'la respuesta sacramental era que lo mandaba Su Alteza.' *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 461-2.

¹⁶ It was no longer confined to Guerrero and Michoacan. San Luis Potosí was threatened, and the Sierra Gorda teemed with rebels, all pursuing the plan of offering no resistance, but harassing the enemy and cutting off his supplies.

¹⁷ No person was allowed transit through such places, unless provided with a passport; without it, any person was amenable to detention; and if suspicion rested on him or her, the application of the law against conspirators would follow. *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1854, June-Dec., 5-6; *Méx., Col. Ley.*, Dec. y *Órd.*, 1854, May-Dec., vii. 12-13.

¹⁸ The ministers he then had, and who continued to the end of his rule, were: M. Díez de Bonilla, of relations; M. M. Canseco, of the treasury; Teodosio Lares, of justice; Santiago Blanco, of war, till July 30th; Joaquín Velazquez de León, of fomento. *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1051.

Another circular of the 20th, said to have been issued by the advice of the government council, embodied the plan of ascertaining on the 1st of December, for the fourth time, the national will, so as to positively know if the president was to continue in power or surrender it.¹⁹ In order to give a coloring of reality to this farce, it was announced that the result in each town would be published. It was, of course, clear to every one's mind that the majority of voters, from fear, would not take advantage of this apparent privilege, and that only the government's supporters, or persons dreading molestation, would express a desire for Santa Anna's continuance in power.²⁰ Books were opened at each voting-place, and each voter had to express his wish in writing over his signature. The books on which the negative votes were to be inscribed remained almost blank. The result showed upwards of 400,000 ayes, and very few nays, which the government hailed with joy, and the rabble licked the hand that put the collar on their necks.²¹ The dictator in a manifesto thanked the people, expressing indifference for power, assuring the nation that the sale of territory was made to avert a war with the United States, and reproached the liberals for the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.

Meanwhile the revolution was making giant strides, which Santa Anna hoped to check with offers of par-

¹⁹ Laying stress on the plea that he held an unlimited power by popular suffrage, he alludes to the revolutionary spirit lately manifested in Guerrero, Michoacan, Tamaulipas, and elsewhere, and directs that, on the 1st of Dec., 1854, the governor and other local authorities take the popular vote on the following points, namely: 1st, Whether the president is to continue in office with his ample powers; 2d, If not, to whom must he surrender the executive authority. The vote was to be sent to the president of the council in sealed packages, and kept by him unopened till Feb. 1, 1855, when the full council was to count the votes and publish the result. The decree also authorized citizens and the press to freely express their opinions on the subject. *Méz., Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd.*, 1854, May-Dec., vii. 187-9, 194-5, 201-4.

²⁰ Minister Aguilar beforehand directed the governors to see that the result should be 'el debido.' *Baz, Vida de Juarez*, 86; *Rivera, Gob. de Méz.*, ii. 464.

²¹ The vote was published Feb. 2, 1855. *Méz., Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd.*, 1855, Jan.-Aug., viii. 58; *Méz., Legist. Mej.*, 1855, 62-3; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méz.*, vii. 325-30, 399.

don, on paper—pure humbug and trickery²²—executions, imprisonments, and expulsions continuing as usual.²³ The country was now desolated by war and the cholera; robberies on the high-roads were common; the frontiers were raided by savage Indians. The government was hard pressed for money, the millions received from the United States having disappeared in a few months. Comonfort now returned from abroad to Acapulco with a large supply of war material, which not only saved the revolution from a possible collapse, but enabled its chiefs to push operations to a successful issue.²⁴

Santa Anna's stringent measures had no effect. He then issued an address to the people renewing his promises made at Vera Cruz of being a ruler and not a party man; and went so far as to decree a general pardon;²⁵ but apparent leniency was now looked on as an evidence of fear. He went south as far as Iguala; but as Michoacan had been made by Comonfort the centre of military operations, he changed his headquarters to Morelia, where he was received with the honors of triumph.²⁶ He took Zamora, the insurgents continuing their tactics of not confronting the government forces. He returned to Morelia, and after a while to Mexico, without having obtained any advantage. The revolution was fast gaining ground. Santa Anna now stationed troops between Mexico and Vera Cruz. When his general, Güitlan, was routed in San Luis Potosí, and other expeditions met with disaster, the dictator saw the necessity of a complete change of policy if he would not again leave the country. He summoned the council, and proposed the framing of a

²² Decree of Feb. 12, 1855. However, it excepted five classes, among them the head men of the rebellion, and those who had thanked an Am. senator for a speech that Santa Anna pronounced 'injurioso al honor y decoro del gobierno nacional.' *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1855, 247-8.

²³ Basadre, Traconis, and Manuel Baranda were expelled from the country.

²⁴ They were checked for a time by Santos Degollado's defeat at Guadalajara.

²⁵ Apr. 2, 1855; its words were, 'se conceda este á todo el que lo solicita.' *Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd.*, 1855, viii. 189.

²⁶ It is said that the cry, 'Viva Antonio Primero!' was repeatedly heard.

constitution, and even tendered his resignation, which was not accepted.²⁷ At last he became convinced that with an empty treasury nothing could be accomplished, and resolved to quit Mexico, still pretending that he could sustain himself,²⁸ and with a show of calmness inaugurated the work of railroad construction. But as the revolution made great progress in the east, fear seized him that his exit might be cut off; and pretending that his presence was greatly needed in Vera Cruz, he deceived his own supporters.²⁹ Early on the 9th of August he started for Vera Cruz, leaving authority with the ministers to transact ordinary business.³⁰ That same morning was published his decree of the previous day to enforce one issued by him March 16, 1854, and kept under seal, appointing his successor. The successor thus appointed was a triumvirate, consisting of the president of the supreme court and generals Mariano Salas and Martin Carrera,³¹ who, once installed, were to summon a congress to form a constitution.

General Diaz de la Vega remained in command of the capital. Upon Santa Anna's departure becoming generally known, there was much manifest uneasiness. The silence of the official press confirmed the dangers of the situation; and though Santa Anna's most intimate friends denied that he intended leaving the country, their assertion was not believed after the appointment of his successor was made public. The

²⁷ The plan of a constituent congress to make a fundamental code received no favor. Preference seemed to be for an organic statute, which was adopted, together with Bernardo Couto's motion to make no compromise with the revolutionists.

²⁸ Shortly before this, he received from the king of Prussia the decoration of a Knight of the Red Eagle. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 540; *Correo de Esp.*, 1855, June 20.

²⁹ Minister Lares, on the 2d of Aug., when Santa Anna's family was departing for Vera Cruz, denied in a circular that his highness intended to abandon the republic.

³⁰ *Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd.*, 1855, Jan.-Aug., viii. 332.

³¹ It was also provided that, in the event of the death of either of those generals, the vacancy should be filled by generals Rómulo Diaz de la Vega and Ignacio Mora y Villamil, in the order they were named. *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1855, 401-2; *Méx., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 322; *Dublan and Lozano*, vii. 553.

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situation was indeed critical; and as late as August 12th nothing could be done to pacify the people, the despot being still in the republic. On that date he reached Perote and published a manifesto, extolling himself, and accusing others of things which might have been averted if he had been a faithful public servant.³² He wrote to the commander in Mexico to install the triumvirate at once, but was answered the next day that the capital had already adopted the plan of Ayutla. This plan had circulated, and been received with marks of approval by the people and troops. Generals Carrera and Diaz de la Vega had to second it in order to avert greater evils. On the 13th of August the garrison and ayuntamiento proclaimed the plan,³³ and the populace, led by men who afterward figured in congress, committed many outrages.³⁴

Santa Anna, on receiving the news of the change in Mexico, embarked the 16th and 17th, with his family, on the war steamer *Iturbide*, bound to Habana, whence he went to Cartagena in the United States of Columbia. He never again figured prominently in public life.³⁵ His death was on the 21st of June,

³² Arrangoiz, *Méj.*, ii. 346, speaking of crimes committed during and after that revolution, charges them all to Santa Anna: 'él y solo él es responsable.'

³³ Seven articles were adopted. It was a kind of compromise the conservatives attempted to offer the liberals, but which was not accepted.

³⁴ The houses of several conservatives were sacked, especially that of the minister Diez de Bonilla.

³⁵ He resided in his exile at various places, most of the time at the island of Saint Thomas. His party died out, and in a little while also the memory of a man who, but for his inordinate pride and ambition, might have done his country great service in the brilliant positions he occupied, and won for himself the first place in the hearts of his countrymen. After some years he wished to return to public life, and made his appearance at Vera Cruz toward the end of February 1864, that port being then under the control of the imperial regency, presided over by General Almonte. He was required to execute a deed recognizing the foreign intervention and the empire, and to solemnly bind himself to publish no manifesto except it showed that he had come back only as a private citizen. He signed the obligation on board the steamship *Concepcion*, and landed with his family; but the next day sent to Mexico and allowed to be published in Orizaba a document in which, though recognizing the empire, he endeavored to cause trouble; for which the French made him go on board the *Colbert* and leave the country. He returned to Saint Thomas, and on the near approach of the empire's collapse visited the U. S., and suggested to Mr Seward, secretary of state, the organization of an army for completing the overthrow of the throne; he also tendered his services to President Juarez, which were, as a matter of course, not accepted; for as a

1876, in the city of Mexico, and few prominent persons accompanied his remains to the grave. A pension asked for his widow was refused by congress. An attempt was made in the following year to have the national congress pass an act declaring that Santa Anna died in possession of all the honors and decorations conferred on him by the nation. I cannot find, however, that any final action was taken.

The first of the articles adopted by the public meeting that proclaimed the plan of Ayutla, and General Rómulo Díaz de la Vega as the commander-in-chief of the forces at the capital, authorized him to choose a board, or junta, of two representatives for each department, and the federal district, which he did, appointing a body of 52 members, on whom devolved the duty of electing, under the second and third articles, at a single sitting and by absolute majority, a president ad interim of the republic, and of serving afterward as his council of state during his short provisional rule. It was thus unexpectedly to assume the most prominent place in the revolution. The junta assembled in the hall of deputies, and pro-

soldier he had been faithless to his superiors, and as a ruler had never been of firm principles, but a political weather-cock and an unmitigated tyrant, with self-aggrandizement as his chief aim. His estates were seized by the liberal party in 1855, Gov. La Llave of Vera Cruz being the first to issue a decree to that effect. Afterward President Zuloaga ordered them restored, and this was carried out by his successor Miramon. Santa Anna's military rank was also restored to him. In Chihuahua he was on the 6th of July, 1866, proclaimed a traitor of the worst type for his acceptance of the empire, and his property was confiscated. He made an attempt in 1867 to enter Mexico, coming to Vera Cruz on the steamer *Virginus*, when the city was besieged by the republican forces. Being arrested by a U. S. man-of-war, and held as a prisoner till the republicans captured the place, he was permitted to go on the *Virginus* wherever he pleased, out of the republic. For violating his pledge on the coast of Yucatan he was arrested and taken to Vera Cruz, where he was tried, and sentenced to eight years' exile. In Habana he still tried to influence Mexican politics; but this was the last of the old man's efforts, he being by this time convinced that he had become a political nonentity. A general amnesty decreed by the Mexican government allowed him to return to his country in 1874. He petitioned not only for the restoration of his property, but also of his rank as a general with pay. His reiterated petitions were denied, till the last one, which was left unnoticed. But for this persistency to recover rank with its emoluments, which had been hinted to him would not be conceded, his earlier services might have spared him some degree of prestige. He lost all, and was left to an embittered life, utterly ignored.

ceeded at once to choose its officers, namely, Mariano Riva Palacio, president; Miguel Buenrostro and Ignacio Peña y Barragan, secretaries. Thus constituted, the members voted for the president ad interim, electing Martin Carrera by 26 votes, against 16 for Diaz de la Vega, four for Riva Palacio, and two for Comonfort.³⁶

The president elect was a well-meaning man, but being under control of the military element, could obtain no general recognition, nor even leave a footmark of his short rule. He did, it is true, adopt measures in accord with the spirit of the revolution,³⁷ but his authority did not politically extend outside of the gates of Mexico.

Martin Carrera, besides holding a high rank in the Mexican army with an honorable record,³⁸ had filled several civil offices; he served as a member of the national legislative junta of 1842, which framed the bases for the political reorganization of the country; also as a senator in the general congress, being reelected

³⁶ 'Recayó la eleccion en la persona del Exmo Sr general de division D. Martin Carrera.' *Archivo Mex.*, *Col. Ley.*, i. 18-25; *Méx.*, *Legisl. Mej.*, 1855, 493; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, vii. 553-4; *Méx.*, *Col. Ley. Fund.*, 322; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 470-5; *Baz, Vida de Juarez*, 87-8.

³⁷ Abolished the appellation of 'alteza serenísima'; suppressed the order of Guadalupe and the policy of secrecy; liberated all political prisoners; and ordered hostilities on the part of the government troops to cease, unless for defence; mustered auxiliary forces out of service; and forbade comandantes generales to intervene in treasury matters. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, vii. 554, 572-3; *Méx.*, *Legisl. Mej.*, 1855, 403, 479; *Archivo Mex.*, *Col. Ley.*, i. 31-8.

³⁸ Born at Puebla in 1806. His father being a colonel of artillery of the royal army, the son entered the service when only nine years old, and at twelve was already an officer. In 1821 he joined the ejército trigarante, and later was sent to the defence of Vera Cruz. In 1833 he was made a col of artillery. During his long military service he took part in many actions of war. In July 1840 he defended the government, for which the next year he was promoted to general of brigade. In the U. S. war he served honorably in the valley of Mexico. In 1853, for his services to General Santa Anna, he was made a general of division and a councillor of state, and later accompanied the dictator in the Michoacan campaign. After he ceased to be president, he retired to private life till the tripartite intervention, when he tendered his services to the government, which did not employ him. The empire retired him from the service. He died, much respected and esteemed, on the 22d of April, 1871. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 471-2, 475; *Perez, Dicc. Geog.*, iii. 272-4.

the following year; a councillor of state in 1846, he soon after held the highly responsible position of adviser of the war department.

Carrera was well aware of the difficulties he would have to encounter, and tried to resign the powers thus placed in his hands, but was prevailed on to accept them as a duty he owed his country to save her from the anarchists. Each wing of the conservative party was working for its own aims.

Carrera issued a proclamation offering to organize the national guard, reform the army,³⁹ regulate the treasury, and respect personal rights, which offers could not satisfy the leaders of the revolution. The several departments of government were in charge of the *oficiales mayores*, or chief clerks, men who had been dumb in the presence of despotism, and now, in order not to lose their pay, had consented to wear the cap of liberty.

Another complication in Carrera's way was the pronunciamiento at San Luis Potosí of Güitian's brigade under the direction of Antonio Haro y Tamariz, on the 13th of August, just previous to the news reaching that place of Santa Anna's desertion of his post. That movement had in view the deposal of the dictator, and the summoning of a congress to represent the national sovereignty, solemnly pledging protection and respect of property, the clergy, the army, and of all classes of society. Copies of this plan were forwarded to the chiefs of the revolution of Ayutla, inviting them to aid the effort to restore peace and consolidate a government. Haro y Tamariz, as the head of the plan, abolished the conscription and capitation tax, establishing also freedom of the press.⁴⁰ His movement was distinct from that

³⁹ 'El ejército necesita reformas, por lo que claman hasta sus propios individuos... el ejército tendrá como hermana á la guardia nacional.' *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, i. 25-30.

⁴⁰ Another pronunciamiento occurred about this time; that of Santiago Vidaurri at Monterey; but it was limited to establishing his dictatorship over Nuevo Leon, his state. *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 346.

of the capital, not the usurpation of a few military officers, but the act of a prominent citizen who, for his open hostility to the late dictatorship, had been proscribed, and as he proclaimed it before the events of the capital became known to him, he could not be looked upon as an intruder at the eleventh hour. This fact made of him an element to be feared equally by the two chief contending parties; particularly as aimed at gaining the good-will of both the people and the ruling class. Thus we see that since Santa Anna's disappearance from the political field, the leaders of Ayutla and Acapulco had to contend against two dangerous elements, inasmuch as they both manifested a purpose to forward the aspirations and interests of the masses, proclaiming liberty, and yet endeavoring to uphold the principles and abuses that the southern revolution had been fighting to extirpate. They attempted a compromise, and even to support the clergy and the army, against whom the revolutionary element bore a deadly hatred.

Meanwhile Comonfort was marching on Guadalajara. Many departments accepted the plan of Ayutla; but the efforts of the liberals for a general recognition of it met opposition on the part of the troops. The latter provisionally accepted at Vera Cruz⁴¹ Carrera's government, coupled with the condition of its being recognized by all the other departments.

Carrera endeavored to avert anarchy by means of strict impartiality toward all the elements of the body politic, but neither the respect felt for him personally, nor his meritorious services, could make the masses of the people forget the illegitimate source of his authority.

The wording of the fourth article of the plan of Ayutla having enabled its enemies to divert the revolution from its real aims and to make themselves

⁴¹ The chief of that department, Ignacio La Llave, had proclaimed there the plan of Ayutla and Acapulco, without additions or amendments.

masters of the situation, the people resolved to estop them, and thus prevent a reaction. The liberal press demanded the exclusion of all conservatives from participation in public affairs. It must be acknowledged, however, that Carrera's government came to be looked upon favorably in several important departments.⁴² But for a liberal movement that took place in San Luis Potosí, and several pronunciamientos elsewhere, Álvarez and Comonfort would have had before them a long and more difficult task to plant their victorious banner in the city of Mexico.⁴³ Carrera, finding himself ignored by the leaders of the original revolution, set aside all points of etiquette, and without acting through the medium of a minister, invited all of them to hold a convention at the historic town of Dolores Hidalgo on the 16th of September, promising to send commissioners to meet them. His invitation was disregarded.⁴⁴

Comonfort heard, on the 20th of August at Acatlan, on his march to Guadalajara, of the events at the capital, San Luis Potosí, and other places. He ordered the revolution to proceed on its course, and refused to recognize Carrera. On his arrival at Guadalajara, the 22d, he met with an enthusiastic reception.⁴⁵ On the 28th he issued a circular in which public attention was called to the fact that the general-in-

⁴² Puebla, Vera Cruz, Querétaro, and Guanajuato. Some of its orders were obeyed in Yucatan. The former Santanista garrisons also tendered him their support.

⁴³ Nuevo Leon resumed her autonomy, intending to maintain that status till a congress should be summoned in accordance with the convocation of Dec. 10, 1841. Zacatecas on the 16th of Sept. seconded the plan of Ayutla; Gen. Parra opened fire on the people, but after a fight lasting the whole night the revolutionists were victorious, and the troops laid down their arms. Doblado in Guanajuato asked for concessions in favor of the conservatives. The events at the capital were accepted in many places; but the heads of the real revolution waited for orders from Álvarez, or other leaders of their party.

⁴⁴ It was accepted only by La Llave, though proceeding, as he said, from one devoid of authority.

⁴⁵ The revolutionary chiefs insisted on Carrera's resignation. Haro y Tamaziz wanted his plan accepted, and that the chiefs of the revolution should hold a meeting excluding therefrom Carrera's commissioners. La Garza started from San Luis to hold a conference with Vidaurri. Doblado sent a commissioner to prevent the conference; and at the same time Álvarez marched upon the capital with southern troops.

chief, alluded to in the plan of Ayutla, could be none other than Álvarez.

The abundant reactionary elements, namely, the large number of military officers and employés thrown out of positions, were on the other hand actively at work forming plans, several of which had appeared. The most dangerous was that of San Luis Potosí, a model of a former one on behalf of religion y fueros. The conservatives, with the aid of the discontented military element, were already organizing their forces to be ready for the coming reaction, which in their opinion was not far off. They were at the same time trying to exonerate themselves from the charge of having been the supporters of the dictatorship.

Carrera threw up the presidency at 11 o'clock on the night of September 11th, leaving the command of the district of Mexico, pursuant to the Ayutla plan, in the hands of Vega,⁴⁶ who at once chose a council of government of seven members. The garrison made a declaration to the effect that their recognition of Carrera as president had been an act of expediency; they reiterated their acceptance of the plan of Ayutla, and promised to place themselves under the government emanating therefrom.

Álvarez with his army by slow marches reached Chilpancingo only on the 8th of September, while Comonfort was actively engaged in assembling at Lagos the chiefs of the different plans proclaimed, with the object of inducing them to coöperate with him. On hearing that Carrera had retired, and the capital had accepted the plan of Ayutla without restrictions, Álvarez was formally recognized in Lagos as the chief of the revolution, Haro y Tamariz and

⁴⁶ Carrera did no act to any one's injury, or that could blot his honorable name. He maintained order in the capital, and forwarded the ends of the revolution. His correspondence with its chief leaders proved to him there could be no combination between the past and the future. In his manifesto of the 12th he hopes his countrymen will acknowledge that he fulfilled his promise of not causing a single tear to be shed. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, i. 50-7, 63-72; *Baz, Vida de Juarez*, 88-90; *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1051-2.

Doblado desisting from their pretensions.⁴⁷ The plan of Ayutla, reformed at Acapulco, became the law for all, and Álvarez the representative man of the ideas embodied in the revolution. He then continued his march to Iguala, intending to tarry at Cuernavaca.

The reaccionarios now began to throw obstacles in Álvarez' way, hoping to reap advantage for themselves from the abnormal position in which the country was placed. They objected to his appointment of the representatives, demanding that the states should make it. Álvarez paid no heed to their subtle arguments, and issued at Iguala, September 24, 1855, his decree appointing one representative for each state and territory, and summoned them to assemble at Cuernavaca on the 4th of October to elect a president ad interim, and comply with the other requirements of the second article of the plan of Ayutla.⁴⁸ The representatives assembled at Cuernavaca on the 4th of October, in convention, with Gomez Farías as their president, and Benito Juárez, F. de P. Cendejas, and Diego Álvarez as secretaries. On the same day they declared Juan Álvarez to be the president ad interim of the republic.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ The parties signed an act to that effect at Lagos, in Jalisco, Sept. 16, 1855; Comonfort being also recognized as Álvarez' representative and second in command. *Archivo Mex.*, *Col. Ley.*, i. 57-9.

⁴⁸ Among the most prominent of the 25 representatives thus appointed were: Félix Zuloaga, Guillermo Prieto, Melchor Ocampo, Benito Juárez, Ponciano Arriaga, J. M. Lafragua, Valentin Gomez Farías, and Juan José Baz. *Id.*, 75-8; *La Voz de Son.*, 1855, Nov. 9, 16.

⁴⁹ The election was officially published in Mexico on the 19th of October. *Mex.*, *Col. Ley. Fund.*, 322; *Mex.*, *Legisl. Mej.*, 1855, 450-2, 459; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 582-4.

CHAPTER XXVI.

LIBERAL INSTITUTIONS RESTORED.

1855-1856.

PRESIDENT ÁLVAREZ' ADMINISTRATION—REFORMS INITIATED—LEY JUAREZ—DIFFERENCES IN THE LIBERAL PARTY—ÁLVAREZ RETIRES—IGNACIO COMONFORT, THE SUBSTITUTE PRESIDENT—HIS CONCILIATORY POLICY—DIFFICULTIES WITH THE CLERGY AND MILITARY—SEDITIONARY MOVEMENTS—PUEBLA CAMPAIGN—DECREES AGAINST THE CLERGY—CONGRESSIONAL WORK—RAOUSSET'S AND WALKER'S INVASIONS—RESIGNATION OF ÁLVAREZ—DISSENSIONS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESS—ESTATUTO ORGÁNICO—ADOPTION OF LIBERAL PRINCIPLES.

JUAN ÁLVAREZ, who now took the oath before the representatives and assumed the reins of government, was born on the 27th of January, 1780, in the old town of Santa María de la Concepcion de Atoyac, later ciudad Álvarez, his father being a native of Galicia, in Spain, and his mother of Acapulco. He was educated in Mexico, and was one of the first men to take up arms in the cause of independence.¹ After the establishment of the federal republic, he affiliated with the moderate republican party, and afterward took an active part in the affairs of that eventful political period, particularly in the campaigns in southern Mexico. Santa Anna in 1841 promoted

¹ He joined Morelos at Coyuca Nov. 17, 1810, as a private in the ranks. His promotions were so rapid that within a year he was made a colonel. Severely wounded in both legs at Acapulco, he was saved by a soldier, also wounded, who carried him away on his back. Álvarez took part in many actions of war, and having been signally defeated at Pié de la Cuesta, sought refuge in the woods, pursued like a wild beast by the royalists, who nicknamed him El Gallego. His fortune of upwards of \$35,000 was confiscated. He joined the trigarante army in 1821 and captured Acapulco. He aided Bravo and Guerrero to overthrow Iturbide's empire. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 477-8.

him to general of division. During the war with the United States, Santa Anna accused him of shirking his duty; but afterward, as comandante general of Puebla, he tried to harass the foreign invader. To the efforts of Álvarez was greatly due the erection of Guerrero into a state, whose first governor he became, and when the legislature assembled it declared him a 'benemérito del estado en grado heroico.' He opposed the plan of Jalisco that brought Santa Anna back to Mexico in 1853, and finally, associated with others, overthrew the dictatorship, as we have seen.

The president at as early a day as possible formed his cabinet, with the following ministers, namely, Ignacio Comonfort, of war; Melchor Ocampo, of relations; Guillermo Prieto, of the treasury; Benito Juárez, of justice and ecclesiastical affairs; Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, of fomento²—all of whom had shown themselves to be uncompromising enemies of tyranny.

The first measure of the administration was the framing of the estatuto orgánico, it being impossible to provide a constitution at an early day. Álvarez' mission was a difficult one; indeed, beyond his ability. He had to strengthen the bond of national union, which of late had become much loosened; to bring uniformity into the government of the states; to limit the powers of the governors; to bring light out of chaos in the treasury; and to regulate the administration of justice.

The president decreed that in the event of a vacancy in the executive office, it should be filled by the council of state. He also suppressed the order of Guadalupe, and on the 15th of October granted an amnesty to deserters from the army, of whom there were many, owing to the improper course pursued by the dictator Santa Anna.³ The ministers actively

² *Méz., Legisl. Mej.*, 1855, 455-6; *Méz. Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1052.

³ He had solemnly promised that the ranks should be filled by conscription, and not by levy, and yet most of the men in the army had been taken by the press-gang. He exempted the Indians from the draft, exacting from them a

devoted themselves to their tasks; but very soon differences cropped out, resulting from Comonfort's acts in Mexico, whither he had been despatched with extraordinary powers, which created embarrassments, as several of his measures clashed with others adopted in Cuernavaca.

The men of the revolution, as stated before, were bitterly hostile to the regular army, and the idea of dissolving it began to gain ground. Ocampo and Juarez were for doing so, but Comonfort decidedly opposed the scheme; he continued its existence, resolving that the military class should be reformed, but not destroyed.⁴ Comonfort also prevailed on Vidaurri to accept the arrangements made at Lagos. That chief had been demanding the punishment of the army. This army question greatly fanned the flame of division in the liberal party; it had already broken out with the election of Álvarez, which had been a victory of the radical wing over the moderate liberals and a large portion of the clergy who preferred Comonfort, and like the whole upper class of society at the capital and throughout the republic, looked on the southern chief as wholly unfit to be president.

A call had been issued on the 16th of October for a congress to assemble at Dolores Hidalgo on the 14th of February, 1856, to organize the nation under a republican, democratic, and representative form; a few modifications had been added to the oft-mentioned decree of 1841.⁵ The functions of the congress were limited by the 69th article of the decree to framing the constitution and organic laws, and to revising the acts

capitation tax in lieu of military service, and yet they were forced into the ranks. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, i. 77-80. On the 29th of Oct. the government dismissed many officers from the service. *Mex., Legisl. Mej.*, 1855, 521-3.

⁴ Promotions granted by former administrations from Jan. 20, 1853, to Aug. 9, 1855, were declared null on the 27th of Nov. *Dublan and Lozano, Ley. Mex.*, vii. 611-12.

⁵ The states and territories were to choose representatives on the basis of one for every 50,000 inhabitants, and also for a fraction exceeding 25,000. The clergy, both regular and secular, were excluded from voting or being voted for, which greatly vexed them. *Mex., Legisl. Mej.*, 1855, 488-502.

of the late and present governments. Those duties were to be performed and completed within one year from the date of assembling.

Comonfort's opposition to violent measures and Ocampo's preference for a radical policy brought on a ministerial crisis; but as the latter was the only one of the ministers who insisted on leaving the cabinet,⁶ his portfolio was given to Miguel María Arriola who filled it till the 7th of December. Much concern was caused by the dissension in the ministry, the summoning of the congress to meet at Dolores, and the alarming report of the president's death, which had been imminent from the running-away of the mules of his carriage when he was occupying it. The clergy began to assail the reformers from the pulpit, and some correspondence passed thereupon between the civil and episcopal authorities. The condition of the republic was anything but safe; the danger came chiefly from the laxity originating in the plan of Ayutla; local authorities, the creation of local pronunciamientos, had assumed unlimited powers, recognizing no common centre; each governor was legislating on all matters, even such as were of the exclusive province of the supreme government; and the states had disposed of the revenues collected within their respective limits. Measures to put a stop to such abuses were necessary, and were accordingly provided.⁷

An emeute in San Juan de Ulúa, promptly quelled, and a letter of Anastasio Zerecero, assuring the people, in the name of Álvarez, that the president had never belonged to the puro party, caused much alarm among the liberals. Álvarez became convinced at

⁶ He felt that his position was precarious, being grounded only on the president's will, of which he could not be certain in the event of antagonism, especially after there had been a groundless contradiction on the part of Comonfort, whose superior claims to influence had to be acknowledged. *Ocampo, Mis quince días de ministro*, 18-28.

⁷ An order of the 19th of Nov. required of the comandantes generales that they should not interfere in affairs of the treasury, and much less dispose of the funds in custom-houses, which were appropriated by diplomatic conventions to the payment of the foreign debt.

last that the seat of government should be in Mexico, and he entered therein on the 14th of November with an army of pintos. The filthiness and repeated acts of brutality of the pintos, who had quartered themselves in the central parts of the city, caused general disgust and alarm. This, together with reactionary intrigues, and the evident unfitness of Álvarez for the position he filled, led to the impression that ere long there would be a popular movement to place Comonfort in the executive chair.

General Uraga, who had presidential aspirations, was detected in a conspiracy at Guanajuato, and arrested; papers compromising him and other prominent persons were found in his possession. Symptoms of sedition supposedly connected with this affair being discovered in Puebla and Querétaro, the comandantes generales of states were enjoined to the utmost vigilance, in a circular of November 21st,⁸ which led to the arrest of Colonel Osollo and others.

The government thus far had not accomplished much; but friendly relations were now restored with foreign powers, and the ministers of war and treasury busied themselves, the former in organizing the national guards and correcting abuses in the regular army, and the latter in arranging the affairs of the treasury. The first step taken in the direction of reform was by Minister Juárez in the law of November 23, 1855, on administration of justice and the organization of courts, which has since borne the name of ley Juárez. As by the articles 42 and 44 special courts were suppressed, the military and ecclesiastical being excluded from all cognizance of civil causes, the archbishop saw in it a direct attack against the rights of the church; and protesting against these articles and the regulation for the execution

⁸ It spoke of the government's resolve to carry out its regenerating mission at all hazards, surmounting all obstacles, even at the cost of heavy sacrifices. To accomplish this, subordinate authorities must 'prestijiarlo y defenderlo con repetidos actos de prudencia y energía.' *El Pensamiento Nac.*, 1855, Nov. 22; *Méx., Legis. Mej.*, 1855, 347-9.

of the law, he desired that the question on ecclesiastical fuero should be submitted to the pope,⁹ which was not assented to by the government. From that moment the motto of the reactionary opposition was 'religion y fueros,' the clergy senselessly promoting revolution with the aid of the discontented military, whose mutinous acts were equally inexcusable. The liberals, on their side, made hostile demonstrations against the conservatives, whose apparent chiefs Santa Anna and Blanco were dropped from the rolls of the army as deserters. Degollado, Moreno, and others who rendered important services in the last revolution, were now commissioned as generals.

The ministerial crisis still continuing, because Comonfort insisted on throwing up the portfolio of war and retaining only the office of general-in-chief, the president saw at once that his administration could make no progress without a fixed policy. Wherefore he directed the secretaries to lay before him the course each had concluded to adopt for developing in his department the plan of Ayutla, with the view of discussing the various plans, and of drawing from them the line of policy to be pursued by the government. He also directed the council to make the draught of the estatuto orgánico. Meantime the enemies of the administration found a powerful auxiliary in the division of the liberal party. It caused no little surprise to see the conservative party begin to favor Comonfort, as if they had entirely forgotten his agency in their overthrow.

Alvarez realized that he must leave a position so unsuited to his taste,¹⁰ and then chose for his successor

⁹ It has been asserted that Juarez, to have the law signed and published, took advantage of Comonfort's absence from the city. Juarez in a letter of 20th of August, 1866, to Matias Romero, denied the assertion. *Baz, Vida de Juarez*, 95; *Juarez, Vida del Ciudad.*, 46-7.

¹⁰ He has been wrongly accused of inordinate ambition. Such was not his nature. On leaving the executive authority, he said that he was now as poor as when he assumed it, and had no need of public office to support himself and family. He knew how to use a plough, and had often lived by it. *Baz, Vida de Juarez*, 96-7; *El Pensamiento Nac.*, Dec. 18, 1855.

the man that public opinion seemed to point out, Comonfort; but the latter already had enemies, who advised Álvarez not to give up the presidency. In this dilemma the president called a meeting of the most prominent members of the liberal party, to fix upon the best course he should pursue to rid the country of current evils.¹¹ After hearing their observations he resolved to carry out the purpose of turning over the executive authority, at least for the winter months, to Comonfort, who was to act as his substitute. But the opponents of the conciliatory policy that Comonfort would be sure to follow made Álvarez hesitate, and on the next day he accepted the resignation of the ministry, and summoned Luis de la Rosa to organize another. This vacillation appeared like a defeat for Comonfort, but it is not recorded that the vacant portfolios were filled by other ministers during the few days that Álvarez still remained at the head of affairs.

The government was now in a most trying situation, without money and without a policy. Contention divided the liberal party, and selfish interests retarded the reform just as it had won two victories—the suppression of privileges in civil causes and the exclusion of the clergy from public affairs. The attacks on the clergy, the adoption of certain financial measures, and the cutting-down of offices and salaries, tended to form a compact mass of enemies actively plotting the overthrow of Álvarez' administration. The discontent was made manifest in the revolutionary movement, headed by Doblado in Guanajuato, refusing further recognition of Álvarez' government, and proclaiming Comonfort president, which was immediately seconded at Tepic. These acts put an end to Álvarez' vacillation. On the 8th of December, 1855, he issued

¹¹ It took place on the 4th of Dec. Three points were submitted to it by Álvarez, namely, 1st, Would his resignation be expedient? 2d, In the event of his continuing in power, should he change his ministers? and 3d, What qualifications should he look for in his ministers? He was advised to retain the presidency, and appoint a cabinet with Comonfort and Juarez in it.

a decree abrogating the law that conferred on the government council power to appoint a substitute president, and appointing Comonfort as such during his own temporary absence.¹² The legitimacy of the appointment, though disputed by the government council, whose president was Valentin Gomez Farías, was really within the limit of Álvarez' authority. This culmination of the crisis was well received, and quieted the public mind. The manner of transferring the presidency was not, indeed, in accord with democratic theory, but under the circumstances none other was possible. Some attempts at disturbing the peace were made by the lower classes, instigated by Comonfort's opponents, but they were energetically quelled by the governor of the district. Owing to these disturbances, there were at the same time two presidents and none at all, till the 10th; for Álvarez hesitated about giving up the executive authority, and Comonfort resolved to have no further interference with public affairs, retiring to his house. Álvarez made him a visit, and after a long conference publicly surrendered him the office, on the 11th of December, at four o'clock in the afternoon. On the 18th of December Álvarez left the capital, escorted by the Guerrero troops.¹³ In the mountains he fought for Comonfort's administration. In the war of foreign intervention he showed much patriotic ardor, and his efforts were appreciated by President Juarez, who gave orders to

¹² 'Por mi separacion temporal del gobierno.' The office to be filled, in the event of the substitute president's temporary inability, by the president of the supreme court with two associates, named by the substitute president himself. The council of government refused to administer the oath to Comonfort, claiming that they, and not Álvarez, under the plan of Ayutla, had the authority to appoint the substitute. Comonfort was sworn in, however, on the 11th. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, i. 130-4; *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1855, 627-9; *Zarco, Hist. Cong.*, i. 56-61; *La Bandera de Ayutla*, 1856, Jan. 12; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, vii. 629, 630; *Méx., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 322.

¹³ The reactionary Arrangoiz, who had no love for the old veteran, or for liberals in general, accuses him of having in the few days of his rule issued several iniquitous decrees, sanctioned by the ministers Ocampo, Arrioja, Prieto, Juarez, and Comonfort. Álvarez, 'se volvió acompañado de sus hordas salvajes al Sud; era imposible para él vivir entre gentes civilizadas.' *Méj.*, ii. 346-7.

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the forces in the east to act by his advice when, on account of distance, they could receive no prompt decisions from the general government. The veteran was commanding the fifth division of the army when, on the 21st of August, 1867, he departed this life.¹⁴

Ignacio Comonfort, in assuming the executive office, took on his shoulders a heavy load of responsibility at an unpropitious time. The victorious liberal party had become divided, and the unscrupulous schemes of the reaccionarios had to be combated. To effect this, prudence and energy were required. However, the important service he had done to the cause of liberty, his acknowledged patriotism, personal qualities, and practical ability in affairs, inspired hopes of peace and good government.

His life, previous to his taking so prominent action in the late events for the overthrow of tyranny, had been comparatively uneventful. He was born in Puebla the 12th of March, 1812, his parents being Lieutenant-colonel Mariano Comonfort, and María Guadalupe de los Rios. At the age of 14 he was placed in the Carolino College, a Jesuit institute, to receive instruction in the higher branches. At manhood he was tall, well proportioned, and robust. In his manners he was self-possessed and of grave deportment; his face was swarthy from exposure to the weather. Marks of small-pox gave his features at first sight a severe look, which, however, disappeared on more familiar scrutiny. He had a habit of leaning his head toward the right shoulder. He was amiable and conciliatory;

¹⁴ Álvarez was much beloved by his countrymen. He did what he could to diminish the horrors of war. Tamaulipas made him one of her citizens; Mexico did the same, and struck a medal in his honor. Congress twice declared him a benemérito de la patria; he held several important positions, among them that of honorary vice-president of the Institut d'Afrique, in France, and corresponding member of several scientific societies. In his domestic relations he was a loving husband and father, taking a deep interest in the education of his children, and instilling in them sentiments of honesty and love of liberty. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, ix. 310; x. 268; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 484; *El Derecho*, iii. 418. He was not a learned man, 'pero si de buen sentido y de valor.' *Díaz, Datos Biog.*, MS., 65.

he could conceal his feelings and control his passions; he was ready to forgive personal injuries. He was brave and cool in danger, firm of purpose, and slow in resolve; but resolutions once taken, he was energetic in carrying them out. Generous and open handed, he never could accumulate a large property; he was honest, moreover, in all his transactions, private and public.¹⁵ Religious, and much devoted to the faith of his forefathers, he did not encourage intolerance. He was affectionate toward his family, plain and unassuming, and of very simple habits.¹⁶

Comonfort before he was twenty years of age had taken part in the political disturbances as a soldier; during his early military life he was present in several battles and sieges, displaying much ability, as well as gallantry and coolness.¹⁷ He was a deputy in the congresses of 1842 and 1846; also, of the one that assembled in Querétaro, in 1846, was chosen a senator, and later was inspector of the custom-house and collector at Acapulco, which place he left to take his seat again as a deputy in congress. At the end of the session he was reappointed collector, and held the office till Santa Anna dismissed him on false charges.

¹⁵ 'Apenas dejó á sus hijas un mezquino patrimonio, fruto de sus economías, y resto de insignificantes propiedades que tenia ántes de figurar en política.' Payno, *Cuentas, Gastos, etc.* It has been asserted, however, that he and his minister Payno had transactions together at the expense of the national treasury. Such accusations should not be believed without their being fully corroborated by evidence.

¹⁶ In the midst of popular ovations, the people always saw him in his plain black coat, except once, the 27th of September, 1837, anniversary of the entry into Mexico of the trigarante army under Iturbide, he presented himself in the civic procession in full uniform to do the fullest honor to the occasion, and save himself from criticism; 'porque es preciso...hacer honor al egército, y á la memoria del Sr Iturbide; no sea [he added with a smile] que si voy vestido de paisano, me tengan por demagogo.' Portilla, *Méj. en 1836-7*, 339-40. Comonfort was a well-informed and high-minded man, but lacked confidence in his own judgment, which often led him to rely too implicitly on the counsel of others. This diffidence was the cause of his political ruin. Diaz, *Datos Biog.*, MS., 63.

¹⁷ He was always found on the side of liberty, fighting against tyranny, with the battle-cry of 'religion y fueros.' After a long period of private life, he was made prefect and commandant of Tlapa, where he introduced many improvements, though constantly troubled by raiding Indians from the south. In the American war he served some time as aide-de-camp to the Mexican commander-in-chief. Rivera, *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 483-6; *Id.*, *Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 823-5, 828-9; Wappäus, *Mex.*, 128-9.

It is unnecessary here to speak at length of his services in the field and council, after the adoption of the plan of Ayutla; suffice it to say that the triumph of that measure was in a great measure due to him

The temporizing disposition of the new president did not blind him to the necessity of upholding the measures of Álvarez, and of acting in accord with the spirit of the revolution. Two days after assuming the reins of government he appointed his cabinet, whose members gave assurance that a true spirit of liberty, order, and integrity would influence every act of the administration; that an enlightened democratic reform and the advancement of the country's general interests would result from their labors. The ministers were: Luis de la Rosa, of foreign relations; Ezequiel Montes, of justice and ecclesiastical affairs; Manuel Siliceo, of fomento; José María Lafragua, of interior relations; Manuel Payno, of the treasury; and José M. Yañez, of war and marine.¹⁸

The chief points of the policy outlined by the ministers were: no dismemberment of the national territory;¹⁹ avoidance of civil war by prudent and conciliatory measures, appealing to physical force only in the last extreme; a constituent congress²⁰ to be convoked at once to frame the constitution, and in the

¹⁸ Rosa is well known to the reader; a man of literary and scientific attainments, progressive ideas, and ability as a political economist and diplomat. Montes was an able jurist, and though new in the political field, had liberal convictions, and public education was already indebted to him for good service. Siliceo was a new man in politics. Lafragua had been active in a press law with liberal tendencies indicating his political proclivities. Payno had previously done good work in financial matters. Yañez was a good officer and a magnanimous man. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, 135-6; *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1855, 629-32; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 487-8, 600; *Méx. Revol. contra Santa Anna*, 132.

¹⁹ Comonfort and Payno have been accused of an intention to sell Lower California to the United States in 1856, which plan, it is alleged, was defeated by Minister La Rosa.

²⁰ Owing to difficulties which prevented the meeting of congress at Dolores Hidalgo, the president, on the 26th of Dec., revoked art. 68 of the decree and summoned the congress to assemble in Mexico. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, i. 201; *Zarco, Hist. Cong.*, i. 19-29; *Dublan and Lozano, Ley. Méx.*, vii. 631-2, 639-40.

mean time issue, at an early day, an organic statute to have provisionally the force of law.

The ministry promised some special laws; namely, one on personal rights, others on the press,²¹ police, and national guard; and still another, recognizing the independence of the municipalities, but without allowing them any action in political affairs.²² The ecclesiastical question being one that demanded much circumspection in its treatment, the government reserved the expression of an opinion upon it till after it had received the cabinet's careful study and consideration.²³ It must be confessed that if President Comonfort could firmly establish all these measures, the promises of the last revolution would be realized. The defeat of a filibustering expedition in Lower California was an auspicious event, but the country was still destined to see dark horizons betokening changes in her political life. The day succeeding that on which Comonfort assumed the executive office occurred in Puebla the first revolt, one of the many that were to distract the government's attention from carrying out its intended measures of reform. It was reported in that city that the bishop was to be exiled. Soon after the hour of prayers on the 12th the bell of the cathedral tolled alarm, and some men of the poorest class tried to capture the barracks by surprise, joining the dragoons that came from Amozoc, belonging to General Güitian's brigade; but being repulsed, they intrenched themselves around the episcopal palace, and on the morning of the 13th dispersed, Güitian's men return-

²¹ A provisional law granting ample freedom to the press was published on the 28th of Dec. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, i. 203-22.

²² Other matters embraced in the programme were: abolition of taxes, judicial costs, and monopolies; building penitentiaries and improvement of jails; a new tariff law reconciling free-trade, where possible, with protection to home industry; an honest budget; acquisition of national property by foreigners; reformation of the mining laws; and facilitating public industrial exhibitions. *Id.*, 141-2, 223-6.

²³ As a mark of reverence for the church, the archbishop and his clergy were invited to join the government and people in prayers to God to grant wisdom to the authorities in their measures to insure the welfare of the nation. *Mex., Legial. Mej.*, 1855, 633; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, vii. 631.

ing to Amozoc, and marching on toward Zacapoaxtla, whose inhabitants and those of two neighboring towns rebelled, on the pretext that the ley Juárez deprived the clergy of their rights. General Güitian had been sent there to quell the rebellion, but in combination with the parish priest, and seconded by Colonel Olloqui, he revolted. Bishop Labastida advised them all to make their peace with the government,²⁴ which advice they did not heed. The first forces sent against them were under General La Llave, Colonel Ortega, and Lieutenant-colonel Calderon; they also mutinied and joined the others, after which Colonel Osollo took command of the infantry and entered Teziutlan, while the cavalry under Güitian overran the plains of Apam.²⁵

The two hostile elements—clergy and army—were at work striving to avenge their supposed grievances. Priests took part in seditious plots, the pulpit being freely used to mislead the sincerely religious, specially the women, with the false assertion that the government was assailing religion. Hence the uprising on behalf of religion and fueros, intended to restore the so-called conservative party with its privileges and abuses.²⁶ The military resented the insults heaped on them in the last war by the liberal leaders, specially Vidaurri, and manifested a disposition to defend themselves by revolution, which was unjustifiable as

²⁴ The clerical press, such as *La Sociedad*, *El Universal*, and *La Cruz*, continued, however, vilifying the supporters of the existing order of things. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 483-9; *La Cruz*, ii. 208-13, 235, no. 8, suppl. 25.

²⁵ Other revolts of the long series soon followed. In Oajaca three priests and a Spaniard instigated an uprising, to demand the restoration of the fueros, and called to the government J. M. García, who accepted the position; much fighting and bloodshed resulted from it. Revolutionary movements followed in Zacatecas, Querétaro, and Jalisco. Uraga proclaimed in the sierra the bases orgánicas, but met with no response. A brigade was sent after him, and the rebels submitted. A movement in Oajaca against Gov. Juárez was promptly put down. In Puebla there was much excitement. Col Miramon's defection gave a great impulse to the reaction. Comonfort, still having faith in the army, despatched against the insurgents General Severo del Castillo, who had never committed a defection, and had just pledged his word of fealty to the government. But he proved faithless. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 489-90.

²⁶ Highwaymen labelled their hats with the word 'religion.'

they had been forgiven the past, and Comonfort was a firm friend to them.

The reactionists were divided. Some advocated the federal system, others the famous seven laws, or centralist constitution, which had ere this gone out of mind. Fears were felt by many that there would be no congress, and that the nation must continue for an unlimited period in an abnormal condition. The government, however, hoped with God's favor and the aid of the people soon to reëstablish a constitutional régime.

Some prominent men were plotting in the capital; among them Haro y Tamariz, Francisco Pacheco, and Agustín Zires, and Comonfort decreed their expatriation. Other officers were scattered in distant places. An anonymous document found in Haro's house contained a plan to raise Agustín Iturbide to the throne of the 'Imperio de Anáhuac,' and if he refused acceptance, then Haro himself was to be emperor. The Roman catholic was the religion alone to be tolerated.²⁷

Haro made his escape, and joining the rebels at Zacapoaxtla, was chosen their chief.²⁸ He demanded the reëstablishment of the bases orgánicas of 1843. Meantime a congress should be convoked, and the government vested in a president, named by the chief of the movement, with ample powers.²⁹

The revolutionary forces attacked Puebla on the 16th of January; the governor, having with him but a small garrison, had to parley, and was allowed to de-


²⁷ Comonfort had asked Haro to stop plotting, but he made light of the matter, and pursued his course, which brought on stringent measures. Minister Lafragua's circular of Jan. 8, 1856, in *Archivo Mex.*, *Col. Ley.*, i. 418-20.

²⁸ Seditious movements were now breaking out in many places, promoted by priests and soldiers. In Morelia there was a cry of 'mueran los impíos! Viva Uruga!' *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 619-24; *Id.*, *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 491-2; *Santa Anna, Revol. contra*, 276-7; *La Bandera de Ayulla*, Jan. 12, 1856; *El Pensamiento Nac.*, March 5 to Apr. 25, 1856; *Méx., Legist. Mej.*, 1856, Jan.-June, 357-8.

²⁹ The scheme went by the name of 'plan regenerador,' and was circulated over their signatures by Haro, Güitán, and Castillo. *Haro a sus Compt.*, 1-20. Castillo's plea for defection was that it had been wrong 'to send the army against the army,' and that his forces had no supplies. *Archivo Mex.*, *Col. Ley.*, i. 468-76; *Méx., Legist. Mej.*, 1856, Jan.-June, 71.

part on the 21st with the honors of war and three pieces of artillery.³⁰ The reactionists were now flushed with victory, having an army of over 4,000 men, well disciplined and well officered, and held the second city in the republic, where they had powerful friends and abundant supplies.

The government's forces—5,000 strong, commanded by generals Villareal, Traconis, Zuloaga, Gayosso, and Moreno—marched out of Mexico on the 29th toward



PUEBLA.

Puebla; 1,000 more were expected from Guanajuato. Comonfort resolved to conduct in person the operations against Puebla.³¹ On the 24th of February he

³⁰ The loss of Puebla was officially announced by Minister Lafragua, January 24th, together with the measures adopted for its recovery. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, i. 486-90.

³¹ The rebels had failed to take advantage of a mutiny in San Juan de Ulúa in the night of Feb. 12th, which might have favored their cause. The mutiny was put down by a counter one of the 21st. The leaders were tried and sentenced, but finally pardoned. *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1857, 10; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 627-9.

had 11,500 men provided with good artillery, and placed in echelon; and 4,000 of national guard had been stationed in Mexico. He then started for the front on the 29th, erected intrenchments at San Martin, as a basis for future operations, and finally established his headquarters in Rio Prieto. The reactionists had retreated within the walls of Puebla. The clergy at first paid the expenses, and when their means were exhausted the merchants were called upon for loans.

The garrison made a sally in force on the 8th of March, and gave battle at half-past seven o'clock in the morning, at Ocotlan. After two hours' fighting, with a doubtful result, Haro asked for a truce, and while holding an interview with Comonfort his troops retreated unnoticed to Puebla. On the 9th the siege was established and energetically pressed till the 22d, when the enemy surrendered. Owing to Comonfort's refusal to treat with Haro directly, the latter gave up the command to Castillo and Guitian, managing to escape or conceal himself, and they to Oronoz, who completed the capitulation,³² under which the reactionary rank and file might remain in the government's service or be disbanded, at their option. The officers were to be confined where Comonfort might choose, he afterward to dispose of their future fate.³³ The casualties of the victors had been 400 killed and 500 wounded; the expenses of the government about one million dollars. The insurgents not included in the capitulation were to be tried and punished. Strin-

³² The besieged were then short of provisions, their water supply being cut off. They had been compelled to abandon the heights, and were reduced to narrow quarters. *Villareal, Parte Ofic.*; *Puebla, Parte Gen.*; *Barrero, Diario Ofic. Operac.*; *Archivo Mex.*, Col. Ley., i. 815-17; *Mex., Mem. Hacienda*, 1857, 9-13; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, viii. 142-8; *Santa Anna, Revol. contra*, 287-303.

³³ The generals and field-officers were sentenced to serve as privates three years; the other officers two; those who had done good service in the war of independence, or in a foreign war, only one year. The generals and field-officers were afterward given the option of exile for four years. All were finally pardoned. *Archivo Mex.*, Col. Ley., i. 815-28, ii. 39-42, 65-8; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, viii. 155-6.

gent orders were issued for Haro's arrest. A decree of March 31st provided that the governors of Puebla and Vera Cruz should seize the property of the church, and without neglecting public worship, apply the remainder of its revenue to the payment of damages caused by the rebellion to private citizens, and to pensioning widows, orphans, and those crippled by the war. The clergy, of course, made a strong protest against this law.

Though the chief points of policy and war had preferably occupied the government's attention, other matters of general usefulness were not neglected for the advancement of education, trade, and other industries.³⁴ Among the most important decrees was one of January 9, 1856, to hold Santa Anna, his ministers, governors, and other subordinates, responsible for their illegal acts, both to the nation and to individuals.³⁵

So much expedition had been used to bring about the assembling of the constituent congress that the first preparatory meeting took place on the 14th of February.³⁶ The labors of the chamber were of no particular interest till the 21st, when by 72 votes against seven the decree of Alvarez that called Comonfort to occupy the executive chair was ratified.³⁷ This confirmation by so large a majority was equivalent to a special vote of confidence; it not only secured Comonfort's position, as it became grounded on

³⁴ Several ports were opened to commerce, and other facilities afforded to commerce, as well as to manufactures, and mining, as well as for developing education. Foreigners were given the privilege of owning real estate under certain conditions; permission issued for founding the town of El Progreso in Yucatan, and for navigating the Mescala River; the public debt was duly attended to.

³⁵ Their estates were accordingly sequestrated, and placed at the disposal of the supreme court to meet damages. No judicial costs were to be charged. Some months later Santa Anna was sentenced to pay heavy sums. *Zarco, Hist. Cong. Constituy.*, i. 121-6; *Méz., Diario Ofic.*, March 31, 1870; *La Bandera de Ayulla*, Feb. 9, 1856.

³⁶ Ponciano Arriaga was chosen its chairman, and the secretaries were Isidoro Olvera and Francisco Zarco.

³⁷ *Zarco, Id.*, 61; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, viii., 129-30; *Méz., Legisl. Mej.*, 1856, Jan.-June, 336-7; *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, i. 782-3.

the support of the people's representatives, but also made him the head of the liberal progressive party, whose esteem he won by his resolve to crush the reaction, which presented so formidable a front in Puebla. The desideratum now was to avoid any cause for disagreement between the executive and legislative powers. It will be remembered that the elections having been effected amid the raging outcries of the reactionists, who would not or could not vote, nearly all the deputies belonged to the most advanced party; hence it was not a little surprising that Deputy Marcelino Castañeda's motion for the reestablishment of the constitution of 1824 should have been lost by one vote—40 nays to 39 yeas. A committee was appointed for the revision of the acts of the government, which caused much loss of time, and gave rise to disagreeable discussions.³⁸ The conservative press began to show signs of hostile intent, asserting that its party was not represented in congress, and that this body had not met the expectations of the people, for it was nothing but a mob of demagogues, whose tendencies were dangerous.³⁹ Its plan evidently was to bring on discord between Comonfort and the chamber, which for a time did not succeed. Petitions came from every direction to enact progressive measures. Several states, apprehending the possibility of a victory in the field of battle by the reactionists, bethought themselves of forming a coalition.⁴⁰

³⁸The first motion was made Feb. 27th. The regulation of the revising commission was finally adopted March 15th. *Zarco, Hist. Cong. Constituy.*, i. 63, 85-98.

³⁹The congress was accused of an intention to 'enardecer los ánimos, complicar la situación, y poner obstáculos al gobierno.' *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 495.

⁴⁰It was promoted by Santos Degollado and Vidaurri, governors respectively of Jalisco and Nuevo Leon, and entered into by Jalisco, Zacatecas, Nuevo Leon, San Luis Potosí, Chihuahua, Durango, Sonora, and Sinaloa. Degollado laid it before congress by letter of the 4th of March. Its objects were to maintain the union of all the states and a democratic form of government; to settle disputes between states by arbitration; to defend the public liberties; and in the event of the nation finding herself without a head, then the general-in-chief of the coalition army was to act as president, with a council

On Comonfort's return to the capital, April 3d, the peace it was supposed he had secured was celebrated with feasts lasting several days. He was greeted with much enthusiasm and marks of affection by the authorities and the people, the ayuntamiento presenting him a valuable bâton. In his address to the people he expatiated on his policy, which had been one of clemency.⁴¹ Congress gave him a vote of thanks, but refused to confer on him the rank of general.

Comonfort's energetic course discouraged the marauders of Mexico, Guerrero, Michoacan, and elsewhere. All submitted, and peace reigned in the republic for a while. It was only for a short time, however. The clergy and army kept up the agitation. A majority of the officers that capitulated at Puebla, and whose sentences had been commuted, endeavored to raise another revolt, railing against the government, whose clemency to them was attributed to fear.⁴² The conservative journals of Puebla called demagogues and protestants all persons who demanded that the bishop should check his clergy's seditious utterances from the pulpit. The governors of Puebla and Vera Cruz, on their part, used harsh and even tyrannical measures toward the friends of the church.⁴³

Congress approved the ley Juarez as one of the conquests of the revolution.⁴⁴ It was also engaged some time with the commissions issued by Santa Anna between the 19th of January, 1853, and the 13th of

of commissioners from the allied governors, ruling strictly by the plan of Ayutla, and carrying out the laws already sanctioned by the nation. The project was abandoned on the defeat of the reactionists. *Zarco, Hist. Cong. Constituy.*, i. 79-84; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 631; *La Bandera de Ayutla*, 1856, March 28; *El Pensamiento Nac.*, 1856, Feb. 27, Apr. 8.

⁴¹ He had sent no one to the scaffold, and only where justice and the nation's safety demanded it had he used severity. *Zarco, Hist. Cong. Constituy.*, i. 111-13, 137; *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, ii. 3-6.

⁴² They wore a ring with a cross and the motto 'Marzo 21.'

⁴³ For concealing church property, or speaking ill of the law for its seizure. These measures were not in accord with the plan of Ayutla, nor with the estatuto orgánico that the cabinet was engaged in framing.

⁴⁴ Ninety deputies were present at the long discussion, but only 83 on the day it was put to the vote, 82 of whom were in favor. *Zarco, Hist. Cong. Constituy.*, i. 166-82.

August, 1855, the committee on military affairs having reported adversely to their confirmation, excepting only promotions by seniority, or for some other good reason.⁴⁵ The commissions were annulled, excepting those conferred for the defeat of the French invaders under Raousset de Boulbon at Guaymas.

The French count, Raousset de Boulbon, had been some time in 1853 engaged in fitting out at San Francisco, California, an expedition to invade Sonora. Upon the news reaching Mexico, requisite orders were issued to the governors of Sonora, Sinaloa, and Chihuahua, and to the commandant of Lower California, to meet the invasion. President Santa Anna himself at once prepared a division of troops for the same purpose. Raousset landed and had some successful encounters with Mexican troops, but through the intervention of the French minister, desisted from his purpose for the time being and visited Mexico, and Santa Anna received him as a friend. Not having succeeded, after considerable delay, in obtaining from Santa Anna a command in the Mexican army, he returned to California with the view of carrying out his projects.

The Mexican government had encouraged the colonization of a tract of country in Sonora by some Frenchmen from California, the colonists binding themselves to take up arms in defence of the Mexican nation. They came to Guaymas and were well received; everything was going on smoothly until the 1st of July, 1854, when Raousset landed with about 400 Frenchmen and Germans, with whom he attempted to capture Guaymas, together with the comandante general, Yañez, and the garrison. But his plan failed; he was defeated and taken prisoner with all his men. Raousset was sentenced to death, and shot on the

⁴⁵ Montes, the minister of justice, spoke in favor of confirmation, on the ground that the dictatorial government had been a legitimate one; but his proposition was rejected. The whole discussion is given in *Zarco, Hist. Cong. Constituy.*, i. 211-40, 290-310, 328-33, 421-4.

12th of August following. The other prisoners were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment in Perote.⁴⁶

A few months previous to Raousset's invasion of Sonora, William Walker, who some years later became the famous adventurer of Nicaragua, landed, on the 28th of November, 1853, with a piratical expedition from San Francisco, at San Lúcas, in Lower California, with the intent, as was said, of annexing that country to the United States. The invaders marched to La Paz, which they plundered, committing also other lawless acts; after which they reëmbarked for La Ensenada, 100 miles from San Diego, at which place, as well as at Todos Santos, they encamped, repeating in that region their acts of plunder. On the news reaching Santo Tomás, armed forces were despatched after them. Walker and his men did not wait to be attacked, but abandoned the country and returned to California.⁴⁷

All remonstrances and conciliatory efforts on the part of the government availed naught to keep the bishop of Puebla from attempting to rouse the hostility of the masses against it; whereupon the president resolved on the 12th of May to send him into exile.⁴⁸ The bishop tried to give satisfactory explanations, and in a letter to Comonfort denied the expressions attributed to him, offering to prove his assertion with witnesses, and respectfully asking for a rescission of the order; but his petition was not granted, and he was taken to Habana in a national ship expressly fitted out for his comfortable transportation.⁴⁹ This

⁴⁶ An account of Raousset's invasions of Sonora is given in *Hist. North Mexican States*, vol. ii., this series.

⁴⁷ Particulars of this episode appear in *Hist. North Mexican States*, vol. ii., this series.

⁴⁸ He was accused of reproaching the people for allowing the seizure of church property. In circulars he advised resistance to the authorities. His sermons caused great alarm to the friends of the government, and rejoicing to its enemies. He truly believed he was doing his duty. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 500; *Portilla, Méj. en 1856-7*, 32-4; Arrangoiz, *Méj.*, ii. 349, calls that banishment 'otra de las infinitas tropelías.'

⁴⁹ Bishop Labatida, on June 10th at Habana, declared that he never by

was not the only measure adopted against members of the clergy. Congress revoked Santa Anna's decree of September 19, 1853, permitting the restoration of the society of Jesus.⁵⁰ This may be called an infringement of the principles of unlimited liberty so much boasted of.

Comonfort went to reside at Tacubaya, where he had a garrison under General Parrodi. General Juan Soto succeeded Yañez in the war department, and the latter was given the command of the troops in Sonora, Sinaloa, and Lower California. The treasury portfolio resigned by Payno was first given to Muñoz Ledo, and finally, on the 20th of May, to Miguel Lerdo de Tejada.

Just at this time another difficulty came to annoy Comonfort and the liberal party, threatening dissension, which was the resignation of the presidency, and of his rank as general of division, by Álvarez at La Providencia. Congress got over the matter by accepting the report of the committee to which the resignation had been referred, that it was not of its cognizance.

The government had besides to cope with that greatest of difficulties, scarcity of resources; for it had removed all the taxes established by the dictator Santa Anna. The only sources of revenue left were the excise, which Vidaurri objected to, and the duties from customs, quite small at this time, owing to the want of confidence among the merchants caused by the presence at Vera Cruz of a Spanish squadron which brought the Spanish minister Miguel de los Santos Álvarez. It looked like a hostile demonstration, and as long as it continued, Mexico could lend herself to no negotiations with him. The situation was made more stringent by the harsh tone of the Madrid semi-

word or deed manifested, or authorized in his clergy, hostility to the constituted authorities; he had only upheld the interests of the church, as in duty bound by the oath taken at his consecration. *Bordanova, Conducta del Ob. de Puebla*, 60-8.

⁵⁰ Passed June 6th. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, ii. 168-9; *Zarco, Hist. Cong. Constituy.*, i. 378-410.

official press. There were also pending questions with Great Britain and the United States which distracted the president's attention.

Serious disagreements having broken out between the constituent congress and Comonfort, fears were for a time entertained that the latter would disperse that body and assume the dictatorial powers conferred on him by the plan de Ayutla, ignoring the fact that the same plan gave congress authority to revise the acts of the government. To arrive at an understanding of this state of affairs, I must revert to the adoption by the president, with the sanction of his ministers, of the estatuto orgánico, which was published after the draught of a constitution had been framed, on the 15th of May.⁵¹ That statute had a tendency to the centralization of the government, by extending the action of the executive over everything, not excepting even the municipalities, in exchange for the renunciation he voluntarily made of the full powers the revolution had vested in him. It did, however, confine his authority within legal bounds, and for this reason might be termed a constitution, embracing as it did many of the clauses to be discussed by the constituent congress. Some governors and deputies showed their disapproval in formal protests, doubtless because the former were deprived of the unlimited powers they had been exercising; the fact that the law terminated the existing anarchy went for nothing in the estimation of these protestants. This was likewise the cause of dissension between the executive and congress, imbittered by the former claiming a direct participation in the proceedings of the latter, with the avowed purpose of tempering the action of the deputies, who, carried away by the excitement under which they had been elected, deemed it their duty to set up a government diametrically opposed in

⁵¹ Under the ninth section of this instrument, the governors of states and jefes políticos of territories were to be appointed by the president; it set forth their powers and duties, making of them real dictators. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, ii. 110-49.

principle to that of the tyrant so effectively overthrown.⁵²

The draught of the new constitution had its first reading on the 16th of June, and the consideration of its clauses was begun at once. It embodied many principles borrowed from the organic code of the northern United States.⁵³ The declaration of the rights of man rested on the opinions of the most approved publicists, and on principles recognized in the codes of the most enlightened nations. Equality before the law was accepted as a fundamental right, and therefore all special privileges and prerogatives were rejected.

With the adoption of such principles, the idea of monarchical institutions for the country was out of the question, and the *fueros* hitherto claimed by the military and the ecclesiastics were effectually abolished.

⁵²The point was warmly discussed in the chamber several days, but no final action seems to have been taken. *Zarco, Hist. Cong. Constituy.*, i. 419-20, 425, 517-20, 543-5, 571-8, 617-35; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 665-8, 672-5, 687; *Id., Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 501-4.

⁵³The authors and others who subscribed to it, while recognizing the merits of the old one of 1824 for the time it was enacted, qualified it as incomplete and non-progressive, not such a one as the exigencies of the present and future generations required.

CHAPTER XXVII.

CONSTITUTION AND REFORMS.

1856-1857.

COMONFORT SUSPECTED—ARCHBISHOP LA GARZA'S COURSE—LEY LERDO
—COMONFORT AND CONGRESS RECONCILED—CONSTITUTION OF 1857—
REBELLIOUS CLERGY—SECOND PUEBLA CAMPAIGN—MORE SEDITIOUS ACTS
—NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE POPE FAIL—MORE SUSPICIONS AGAINST CO-
MONFORT—POLITICAL CONFUSION—LAWS AFFECTING THE CLERGY—
CONSERVATIVE MANŒUVRES—LIBERAL DEMANDS—COMONFORT'S VACIL-
LATION.

THE delay in promulgating the constitution, and the bickerings in the liberal party, filled the minds of its best men with fear that the reactionists might regain the ascendancy, renew past horrors, and even dismember the country. The chief points at issue in the party were: the organization of Coahuila and Nuevo Leon as one state;¹ the reinstallation of the government council decreed by the president; and Alvarez' resignation of the presidency. The conservatives and the clergy were bent on making of every political question a religious one, and the radicals were disclosing socialistic views. The allied foes of the ruling party had, for a while, pretended to side with the president, highly commending his conciliatory spirit and his energetic measures to preserve public order; they had actually advocated his striking a blow at the congress. Their purpose, as was

¹ Governor Vidaurri having attempted to annex the greater part of Coahuila's towns to Nuevo Leon, the president, on the 15th of April, 1856, declared his act null. This decree was confirmed by the constituent congress on the 25th of Sept. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, ii. 371-2.

subsequently made clear, was a sinister one, and nearly succeeded. It was to alienate from him the good-will of the radical progressionist wing of his supporters, who now began to attribute his moderation to the representations of the ecclesiastics, and a large part of the women in opposition to the establishment of freedom of religious worship. But so soon as the liberals became united by the very policy the president pursued, the reactionary press changed its tone and began a tirade against him.² Even the venerable archbishop was not spared, for he was accused of advising that the ecclesiastical issues should be arranged with the pope. Their invectives were so scandalous that the government ceased to forbear, and suppressed *La Sociedad*, *La Patria*, and other journals; the rabid partisans of the clergy then resorted to anonymous papers upholding their principles of retrogression, which they caused to appear on street corners.

Lázaro de la Garza y Ballesteros, archbishop of Mexico, was born in Nuevo Leon, on the 17th of December, 1785. In 1810 he was admitted to the bar, and in 1815, his vocation being for the priesthood, he was ordained,³ after which he held several important ecclesiastical positions, and on the 31st of October, 1837, became bishop of Sonora and Sinaloa, which see had been vacant fourteen years. His course in the diocese won him general respect and love. He had visited it before 1848 as far as Üres, 200 leagues from his capital, overcoming great difficulties and suffering from illness. His promotion to the metropolitan church of Mexico was on the 30th of September, 1850.

Garza greatly exerted himself to reform his clergy, and was munificent;⁴ but he lived without display and

² 'Le llamaron... contemporizador con la maldad.' *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 502.

³ In 1810 the university conferred on him the degree of licentiate and doctor of canon law, and in 1830 that of licentiate of civil law.

⁴ His gifts for charitable and other useful public purposes are said to have exceeded \$200,000.

on the plainest food. The archbishop's position became difficult, having to guard the interests of the church, and at the same time avoid being converted to any political party. He defended these interests, and even his foes gave him credit for honesty of purpose, acknowledging that he could not do otherwise. He could not conscientiously allow the church to lose its property from any worldly purpose; but he often said that if the people assented he would cheerfully let it go.

What Garza lacked at times was flexibility for arranging difficulties by gentle means. He was not amiable by nature, nor imbued with the spirit of the age. It was painful that one so remarkable for his virtue, and who had done so much for public instruction, should have his last days so embittered. He was in 1861 banished from Mexico, and took up his residence in Cuba, where he remained till called to Rome by Pius IX. He only reached Barcelona, where he died March 11, 1862. His funeral on the 13th was sumptuous; it was headed by the captain-general, and attended by all the authorities and a large concourse of people.⁵

The radicals, on the other hand, accused Comonfort and his ministers of being at best but lukewarm supporters of democratic reform. The president frequently conferred with the deputies, endeavoring to bring about a reconciliation, all without success, till at last he began to lose patience, and declared that he would make no further effort. But though sorely tempted, he committed no abrupt act. No actual rupture took place between the two powers, because the ministers were in accord with the majority in congress to carry out the purposes of the revolution.

A number of questions of a secondary nature, the solution of which had been put off, had now accumu-

⁵ Santa Anna had given him the grand cross of Guadalupe, and in 1853 the grand chancellorship of that order. *Sosa, Episcop. Mex.*, 224-8; *Soc. Mex. Geog. Bol. tin*, 2^a ép., ii. 428-9.

lated, forming elements for an explosion. Harmony between the president and congress appeared impossible; but as the former had taken no irretrievable action, the much-desired accord was happily brought about in a great measure by the 'ley de desamortizacion civil y eclesiástica,' enacted by the executive on the 25th of June, 1856, and which having been framed by Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, the secretary of the treasury,⁶ came to be known as the ley Lerdo.⁷

This law, after a warm discussion, during which the radicals opposed it as insufficient and favorable to the clergy, was confirmed on the 28th by a large majority,⁸ and became a bond of union between the executive and the representatives of the people. The president and his ministers received popular ovations. Beneficial results were expected from the law; and many believed that the enlightened portion of the clergy would look upon it as a beneficent measure, and be grateful to the government for having adopted it. This hope, however, was groundless. The partisans of the old blunder transmitted from colonial times, by which three fourths of the landed property in the

⁶ 'Persona de mucho talento, y en materias de hacienda el hombre mas capaz que ha tenido Méjico; pero anticatólico.' *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 348.

⁷ It was accompanied with a circular of the minister, explaining in greater detail than appeared in the preamble of the law the reasons prompting its promulgation. The lack of free conveyance of a large portion of the landed property was declared to be one of the greatest obstacles to the prosperity of the country. The law authorized tenants to become owners of the estates they held in lease from civil or ecclesiastical corporations; the same authorization was given to those holding mortmain property in emphyteusis, capitalizing at six per centum a year the rent they were paying to arrive at the value of the property, which was secured at six per centum in favor of the corporation formerly owning it, and made redeemable at the purchaser's convenience. From the effects of this law were exempted the buildings immediately applied to the service of a corporation. The law contained other clauses which it is unnecessary to detail here; let it suffice that under it the estates thus conveyed were not to revert to the corporations at any future time, and the latter were furthermore inhibited from owning or administering upon landed property. The government was to receive a five per centum excise on each conveyance of property, payable part in specie and part in bonds of the internal debt. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, ii. 187-93, 254-63; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, viii. 197-201; *Méx., Col. Leyes*, 1831, i. introd. xviii.; *Diario de Avisos*, Jan. 29, 1858; *Buenrostro, Hist. Seg. Cong. Const.*, i. 3; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 665.

⁸ Ayes 78, against 15 nays. The debates may be seen in *Zarco, Hist. Cong. Constituy.*, i. 597-615; *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, ii. 204.

country had been vested in mortmain, disgusted at the praise thus bestowed on the ley Lerdo, assailed it with all their might. The archbishop asked the president to repeal it, setting forth the difficulties of his position, his conscience struggling between his ecclesiastical duty to protect intact the property of the clergy and his sworn obedience to the civil laws, provided the latter did not encroach on the rights of the church; otherwise, rather than to abide by them, he would willingly bear all the suffering that those laws could inflict on him.⁹ Archbishop La Garza acted with moderation, contrasting with the haughtiness and evil disposition of a large portion of the clergy, who openly rebelled against the measure, and resorted to all means to mislead public opinion, alarm the timid, torture conscience by starting doubts, and breaking the public peace. The bishop of Linares, Belaunzaran, and other high ecclesiastics resolved to disobey the orders; likewise, the bishop of Guadalajara and the governor of the diocese of Puebla forbade obedience to the law.¹⁰ On the other hand, the discontented reformers demanded a radical change in the basis of the transfers, and helped to keep up the agitation, which was fast assuming a serious aspect.

Meanwhile the discussion of the articles of the con-

⁹The prelate foretold that only a few private persons would derive any benefit from the law in question. He reminded the government that the clergy had never failed, in times of tribulation, to contribute toward the relief of public necessities, expatiating also on the greater consideration shown at all times to tenants by the church than by private owners. This was on the 1st of July. On the 7th and 21st he repeated his efforts; his remarks were courteously considered by the minister, Ezequiel Montes, but caused no change in the policy of the government. *Garza y Ballesteros, Lázaro de la Contestaciones*, 3-54.

¹⁰The total value of property transferred, under the decree, to the end of Dec. 1856, was \$23,019,281. *Méx., Mem. Hac.*, 1857, annex 149, 531-2. An address of Dec. 15th, attributed to the pope, alleged that Bishop Munguía had been exiled because of a representation made by him against the law of June 25th. The fact was, that he was on the point of being expelled for a seditious pastoral he intended publishing; but whether he made satisfactory explanations or did not issue the pastoral, the banishment was not carried out. Munguía's presence in Guanajuato served as a pretext to disturb the public peace, for which he was summoned to Mexico, but there was no disrespect shown to his person or office. Misrepresentations were purposely sent to the holy see of the prelates being abused, intended to create a bad impression against the government. *Apuntam. sobre derecho púb. ecles.*, 11.

stitution had been going on amid the violent hostility of the conservative press, as well as of opposition in the committee, two of whose members had given a dissenting vote. Two others signed the report, with the reservation of voting against one or more of its articles; and still another declined signing it. A number of the most prominent members advocated the revival of the constitution of 1824, as better suited to the Mexican mind. The project was also opposed on the part of the government by the distinguished statesman Luis de la Rosa; but was finally accepted as a whole by 93 ayes against five nays, and the consideration of each article slowly went on. The archbishop remonstrated to congress against article 15, which treated of religious freedom, asking that the Roman catholic worship should be the only one permitted. The debate on this point began on the 29th of July. There were present 106 deputies, and a crowd of people filled the galleries.¹¹ It lasted till the 5th of August, when it was decided not to put the article to the vote, by 65 nays to 46 ayes. Not having been rejected, it was referred back to the committee for a report in some other form. The question was thus left to the future. But one great point had been gained: light had been thrown upon it by discussion, and the principle was bound to triumph.¹²

The labors of the congress on the constitution were terminated on the 5th of February, 1857, and the fundamental code as adopted was signed, and its support sworn to by each member; after which President Comonfort was escorted to the house, and he also took the oath before God "to recognize, observe, and cause to be observed, the political constitution of the

¹¹ The discussion did honor to the chamber. Good faith, frankness, and courage prevailed. The reactionists tried to get up a mob to insult the deputies; they endeavored to enlist the arts of women in their behalf; but all intrigues availed nothing. *Zarco, Hist. Cong. Constituy.*, i. 771-876, ii. 5-96.

¹² It was again before the house on the 25th of Jan., 1857, the committee asking leave to definitely retire it, which after a stirring debate was granted the next day by 75 to 22. *Id.*, i. 813-17.

Mexican republic which the congress has issued on this day."¹³ After this, both congress and the president

¹³ Among those who took part in the solemn act was the patriarch of reform in Mexico, the aged Valentin Gomez Farias, deputy for Jalisco, and president of the congress. As for Comonfort, did he intend to faithfully carry out his pledge, so solemnly given? or was it an act of weakness on his part to promise what his conscience disapproved? Events soon proved that he was insincere, or weak on that occasion. The new code was drawn up in the name of God and under the authority of the Mexican people, 'sobre la indestructible base de su legitima independencia proclamada el 16 de Setiembre de 1810, y consumada el 27 de Setiembre de 1821.' The following is a synopsis of this famous instrument, which strikes at the roots of the evils that had been so fatal to Mexico's peace and advancement. First and all along are recognized freedom and the rights of man. Slaves entering Mexico become ipso facto free; teaching is made free; no law is to recognize any contract involving the loss or irrevocable sacrifice of man's freedom, whether by reason of labor, education, or religious vow, nor authorize agreements by which he may bind himself to proscription or exile; freedom of speech, of the press, and of petition in writing peaceably and respectfully; the freedom of the press to have no other limit than respect to private life, morality, and the public peace; the right of assembling without arms to discuss private or public affairs of a licit nature is not to be curtailed; the exercise of the privilege for public affairs belongs only to Mexican citizens; travelling and change of domicile without passports is secured; titles of nobility, and hereditary prerogatives and honors, are not recognized. Further, it is prescribed that no one shall be tried by special or retroacting laws, or special courts; that no person or corporation shall enjoy either privileges or emoluments, unless they are in compensation of a public service and fixed by law; family and domicile are made inviolable, unless to make arrest under a warrant from a proper court expressive of the charge; imprisonment for debt is forbidden, judicial costs are abolished, the administration of justice is made free; private property cannot in time of peace be taken without the owner's consent, unless it be for an object of public utility by paying for it, nor in time of war without making good its value. No corporation, civil or ecclesiastical, is allowed to acquire real estate, except the buildings used. Monopolies are abolished, save the coining of money, the postal service, and temporary patent rights. The duties of Mexicans and foreigners are defined. The second title is in two sections. The first prescribes the representative, democratic, and republican as the form of government; the nation being composed of free and sovereign states for their internal affairs, but whose special constitutions must conform with the principles of the nation's fundamental law; the second section names the states and territories, setting forth their boundaries, etc. The third title treats of the national powers, which are divided into legislative, executive, and judicial, prescribing the prerogatives and duties of each. Title 4 prescribes the responsibility of public functionaries, and how it is to be made effective. Title 5 sets forth the obligations of the states, and what they are prohibited to do. Title 6 says that what is not expressly granted to federal functionaries is understood to be reserved to the states; and prescribes the general obligations of federal officials, mode of disposing of the public treasury, etc. Title 7 permits the constitution to be amended or added to by two thirds of the members present, and the subsequent sanction of a majority of state legislatures. Title 8 declares the inviolability of the constitution. A transitory article ordered that the code should be published, and its support solemnly sworn to throughout the republic, and that it should go into operation from and after the 16th of September, 1857. It was signed by 95 deputies, and it will be noticed that no state religion is established, and that in fact the question of religion is ignored. *Zarco, Cong. Constituy.*, ii. 993-1016; *Méx., Cód. Reforma*, 62-9; *Méx., Col. Ley. Fund.*, 353-79; *Méx., Col. Leyes*,

made addresses to the nation, and the new constitution was duly promulgated by the latter on the 12th of February, to take effect on the following 16th of September. On that date the executive issued the electoral law in 67 articles, that had been decreed by the congress on the 3d.¹⁴

1861, i. pt. ii. 201; *Jovar, Hist. Parl.*, iv. 924-36; *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, iii. 11-23, 26-66; *Gallardo, Guia Cong. Constituy.*, 5-65; *Diario de Avisos*, Apr. 18, 1857; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 733, 736-45, 756-61, 763-8; *Id., Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 504; *Martínez, Sinóp. Hist. Revol. Méx.*, i. 175-6.

Zarco, Francisco, *Historia del Congreso Esraordinario Constituyente de 1856 y 1857*. Mex., 1857, 4°, 2 vol., 876 and 1031 pp., respectively. The author of this work was a deputy from the state of Durango, and took quite a prominent part in the labors of the distinguished convention that issued the liberal reform constitution of Mexico in 1857. His work is a daily record, exact and impartial to all appearances, of the sessions. He tells us that he could not at the time take the liberty of passing judgment upon the acts of the congress, or upon the course of its most notable members, without awakening party discussions, which might easily degenerate into personal animosities. He therefore contented himself with giving the facts, and the speakers' own words, and left to the judgment of their fellow-citizens the convention's work and the action of all and each of its members. In the performance of his task he pursued a chronological order, abstaining as a rule from comments, though he did not fail to show the impression left in his mind by some of the debates. In order to make his work more complete, the author has added the text of the principal parliamentary documents of that period, and of several governmental acts that prompted debate in the chamber. He claims as an evidence of his faithfulness that none of his extracts have been found fault with by the speakers, and that the few corrections he was called on to make were upon unimportant points. At the end of the first volume Zarco promised to furnish in the next a table of contents; but he afterward changed his mind, deeming it unnecessary, the marginal notes on each page indicating the subjects that engaged congressional attention from day to day. Zarco has contributed to the press considerable other matter on the political affairs of his country. He was editor of one of the leading newspapers of Mexico, *El Siglo XIX.*, and later a minister of state; he was a man of a high order of talent, and rendered great service to the liberal cause. At his death, congress on the 24th of Dec., 1860, decreed honors to his memory; he was declared a *benemérito de la patria*; \$30,000 were voted to his widow and children; and it was also decreed that the latter should be educated at the national institutes. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, x. 776-7.

Gallardo, Basilio Pérez. *La Constitución de 1857. Guía para consultar la Historia del Congreso Constituyente de 1856-7*. Mex., 1878, 12mo, 65 pp. This work serves to fill the hiatus left by the absence of an index in Zarco's history. The compiler was a member of the constituent congress, a representative from Zacatecas. He lays before the reader the fundamental law, and the respective days on which its several articles were discussed, giving in italics the additions, amendments, and suppressions they were subjected to, and also the votes cast for and against each clause. The date set at the head of each article will suffice to enable one to find without difficulty its discussion in Zarco's work, or any other treating in detail of the labors of the aforesaid congress.

¹⁴Transitory articles of the law commanded the governors of states, after consulting their councils, to issue, within fifteen days after its receipt, proclamations for the citizens to elect representatives to their respective legislatures, and also governors. The powers of the states were to meet not

Let us now retrace our steps to glance at the general political situation. The clergy of Puebla were resolved to obstruct at all hazards the execution of the Lerdo law; whereupon the government adopted stringent measures. Excommunications were fulminated, but they produced little effect. The transfers of estates went on, though slowly, owing to the conscientious scruples of some and the fear of political persecution on the part of others. Several riots broke out in spite of official vigilance, and numbers of ecclesiastics and military officers had to go into exile.¹⁵ The restless Vidaurri had revolted on the northern frontier, seizing Saltillo and Matehuala; under his name many disturbances occurred. He was favored by San Luis Potosí, now a reactionist centre, which kept up correspondence with other large towns, the capital included, and was offering money to win over the government troops. The whole country was in turmoil. No sign of revolution appeared in the city of Mexico, however, till September; on the night of the 14th a lady gave the president particulars of a seditious movement that was to break out on the national anniversary during the civic procession. Further evidence being obtained, on the night of the 15th the Franciscans were arrested, and their convent being occupied by an armed force, a number of conspirators, some of whom were friars, fell into the hands of the government.¹⁶ In view of this, the ex-

later than three months after the summons, and the legislatures have the character of constituent, to form or reform their state constitutions, as well as of constitutional bodies to legislate during their session. The governors for once were authorized to employ coercive or other expedient measures to cause the citizens to exercise the right of suffrage granted them by the constitution. *Zarco, Hist. Cong. Constituy.*, ii. 1017-31; *Archivo Mex.*, *Col. Ley.*, iii. 161-85; *Buenrostro, Hist. Prim. Cong. Const.*, 1-22; *Diario Debates*, 9 Cong., i. 30-2; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, viii. 384-99, 409-18, 426-7, 480-1.

¹⁵ Nineteen prominent clergymen were banished. *La Cruz*, ii. 621, iii. 126. The clergy of the diocese were also, by decree of August 16th, assessed one million dollars damages. *Mex.*, *Legisl. Mej.*, 1856, July-Dec., 81-4; *Archivo Mex.*, *Col. Ley.*, ii. 300-3.

¹⁶ 'Sorprendiéndose in fraganti delito y en los claustros y celdas del mismo convento, muchos conspiradores, y entre ellos varios religiosos.' *Archivo Mex.*, *Col. Ley.*, ii. 357-8.

ecutive, on the 17th, decreed the suppression of the convent and the sequestration of all its property, excepting the main church and chapels, sacred vessels, ornaments, relics, and images, which were surrendered to the archbishop. These energetic measures to curb the clergy lost force by the pardoning of the officers who had capitulated at Puebla, and were actually plotting more than ever, and in despatching Ezequiel Montes, early in October, to beg the pope to accede to an impossible arrangement. The archbishop was requested to check that portion of the clergy who by word and example urged rebellion against the national administration; and he made an effort to that end, which had no effect. In thousands of documents, religion, fueros, and the extermination of the liberals were proclaimed, and the masses were called on to take up arms in the name of God against the authorities. Comonfort, thinking to mollify the opposition of Puebla, accepted Governor Traconis' proffered resignation, and sent there José María García Conde, a man possessed of moderation and prudence blended with firmness, to inaugurate a less rigid rule;¹⁷ but it was all useless, and the government was thus placed in the necessity of putting down by force of arms the revolutionary movements breaking out at several places simultaneously, at a time when nearly all its available troops were operating on the frontier against Vidaurri.

Querétaro, with a small garrison, after a slight resistance, in which the comandante general, Magaña, perished, fell on the 13th of October into the hands of Tomás Mejía, an officer who had been pardoned for his share in Uruga's rebellion. The rebels, together with religion and fueros, promised the Indians to protect the tenure of landed property.¹⁸ San Juan del

¹⁷ 'Un gobierno suave y paternal.' *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 700.

¹⁸ Querétaro was retaken by Manuel Doblado, governor of Guanajuato. Mejía had left the place and gone toward the sierra on the 21st of Oct., having first levied a forced loan of \$18,000, and made Colonel Cortazar coman-

Rio, Tulancingo, and Tlaxco were also assailed. The centre of all these revolts was Mexico. Puebla, the cradle of the reaction, again became a bloody field. On the 16th of October the reactionists attempted to bribe a body of troops, but failed and lost their money. They were, however, more successful on the 20th, when there was a revolt under the lead of Colonel Joaquin Orihuela and Lieutenant-colonel Miguel Miramon, but really directed by the clergyman Francisco J. Miranda, rector of the chief parish.¹⁹ A portion of the garrison had been prevailed on to mutiny, demanding the repeal of the Juarez and Lerdo laws; seized the artillery and ammunition; for a while kept under arrest the governor, comandante general, and other officers; and finally compelled the loyal force under Cayetano Montero to retreat in the direction of Mexico. The prisoners obtained their freedom through the energetic defence made with 80 men by Lieutenant-colonel Diaz Quijano, thereby securing a favorable capitulation.²⁰

These overt acts against the reform, to which the majority of the nation was laboring to give life, served to strengthen the liberal union; this became evident when congress, on being asked by the president to suspend for a time its revisory authority over gov-

dante general. *Id.*, 704; *La Nacion*, Oct. 20, 22, 24, 1856; *Méx., Legisl. Mej.*, 1856, July-Dec., 202-4; *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, ii. 432, 437, iii. 116.

¹⁹ Remarkable for his astuteness and skill, he was the ruling mind of all reactionary work, and the most dangerous man Comonfort had to contend with. Exiled during the first days of Álvarez' government, he came back disguised early in 1856, and most of the time lived in the capital, but constantly shifting his place of residence in the city, so that the police never could find him. He frequently visited Puebla, Guanajuato, and San Luis Potosí, always marking his visit by some act distasteful to the government. It was through his efforts that guerrilla parties infested the rural districts, assailing defenceless towns. He afterward was a prominent factor in bringing about the imperial régime. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 703.

²⁰ Orihuela gave his name to this pronunciamiento; its objects were to depose the existing government, adopting the bases of 1843, and reserving the first place in the administration to be created for the commander-in-chief of the forces engaged in the support of religion and fueros. Orihuela hurled a proclamation against the heretics, issued officers' commissions, received with honor some guerrillas, chose a council of government, and ordered the arrest of some prominent citizens. *Portilla, Méj. en 1856-7*, 109-40; *La Nacion*, Oct. 21-30, Nov. 2, 5, 1856.

ernmental acts, went still further, giving him a vote of confidence, heartily joined in by the progressionist opposition. A commission was named to arrange the difficulties between the supreme government and that of Nuevo Leon.

Aside from the rebels of Puebla, Iguala, and those who afterward appeared in San Luis Potosí, none of the others had any fixed plan, unless it was that conveyed by their war-cry of 'religion y fueros,' which drew into their ranks the ignorant, who were misled by the oft-repeated charge that religion was persecuted by the government.

The president, under the difficulties besetting him on all sides, with but few available troops at hand, and with an empty treasury, managed, aided indubitably by an extraordinary good fortune, to overcome them all. He summoned to his support the military, the representatives of the people, and other prominent men. He armed the national guard, gathered troops, and procured pecuniary means from the merchants. At first he contemplated taking command in person of the forces organized to march against Puebla; but in view of the facts that there were many other places demanding his attention, and that Mexico was the centre of the conspiracies, he resolved to remain in the capital, and despatched the army of operations with abundance of artillery under General Tomás Moreno. It was reënforced by troops from Tlascala, until the total force to operate against Puebla was over 4,000 men under Traconis, Zuloaga, Trias, and Lamberg. Gonzalez Mendoza assumed command of the portion assembled at San Martin.

The plan of operations against Puebla was to capture the rebels rather than to destroy them; but with their small number of only about 200 men they made an unexpected defence, sustained by the belief that seditious movements, of preparations for which they had been apprised, would break out in other cities, Osollo heading one at the capital. Such move-

ments did occur in Maravatío and Tacámbaro, Celaya, Huauchinango, Capula, and elsewhere. Even in the neighborhood of Córdoba were seen some rebel leaders. Meantime the revolted garrison of Puebla stoutly defended every inch of ground. Fresh troops arrived daily from the capital; the water was cut off; fighting was kept up along the whole extent of the fortifications; and the besieged were forced at last,



OPERATIONS AGAINST PUEBLA.

on the 29th of November, to ask for a capitulation, which was signed some days after. Having on the 2d of December lost the intrenchments of San Luis and other points, the chiefs Orihuela and Miramon effected their escape, leaving in command Colonel Fernandez, who concluded next day the capitulation, under the pledge that the lives of the besieged would

be spared, and they were to surrender their arms—a condition that they failed to fulfil.²¹ A force under Pueblita was despatched to intercept Osollo and Gutierrez, who had attempted to relieve Puebla by occupying Tlascala. Public opinion, and not a few members of the congress, disapproved of the capitulation, and so did the president, on the ground that the leaders who had caused so much bloodshed being left with life, it was reasonable to expect there would soon be another attempt at revolution. Peremptory orders were given for the prisoners to give up their arms, or they would be dealt with as conspirators. Orihuela was taken at Atlangatepec and shot in Huamantla. Other rebel forces were dispersed by Moreno's energetic action. But others continued their depredations in several parts. In fact, there was hardly a state in which the rebels had not marauding bands. Comonfort succeeded, however, with the aid of public opinion, in subduing the spirit of rebellion for the moment at least.²²

He banished several persons, one of whom was General Pacheco, for plotting another sedition in the capital, and enacted on December 6th a law for the punishment of crimes against the nation, public order, and peace.²³

²¹ *La Nacion*, Nov. 3-29, Dec. 4-17, 1856; *El Estandarte Nac.*, 1856, Nov. 16-30, Dec. 3-28; 1857, Jan. 4-26; *Bandera de Ayulla*, Nov. 29, Dec. 20, 29, 1856; Jan. 3, 1857; *Diario de Avisos*, Nov. 10-29, Dec. 3-30, 1856; Jan. 17, 1857; Zarco, *Hist. Cong. Constituy.*, ii. 633-40; *Méx., Legial. Mej.*, 1856, July-Dec., 283-5; *Puebla, Parte Gen.*, iv. 1. During the deadly strife, the bishops said nothing to the priests who were fighting in Puebla against the government. Before that they had raised their voices for the fueros and against the ley Lerdo. When their party succumbed, upon being urged by the government, they began making protestations of respect for law and order. *Ricera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 509.

²² *Méx., Legial. Mej.*, 1856, July-Dec., 189-94. An arrangement initiated by Vidaurri was concluded November 18th, at the Cuesta de los Muertos, between him and Vicente Rosas Landa, commander of the government forces, under which Vidaurri, his troops, and the state of Nuevo Leon submitted to the federal authority, and the states on the northern frontier saw peace restored within their boundaries. Vidaurri surrendered the office of governor to the senior member of the state council. Rosas' course was approved, as appears in the correspondence between Comonfort and the minister with him. *Diario de Avisos*, Dec. 17, 1856; *Archivo Méx., Col. Ley.*, iii. 117.

²³ It gave force to the 3d article of the royal pragmática of April 17, 1774, which placed all subjects on an equal footing in trials for violations of the

The reactionists being now defeated, it was generally believed that with one more effort commercial activity and public confidence would be revived; but it was not to be so. Another seditious act occurred at San Luis Potosí; over 1,000 men of Rosas Landa's brigades, returning from Nuevo Leon under the lead of Manuel María Calvo, revolted on the 10th of December, taking up the cry of religion and fueros, which compelled the rest of the force under General Echeagaray to leave the city. Rosas Landa was held as a prisoner for a time. This event confirmed the uselessness of conciliatory measures in dealing with the foes of reform. For some time past it had been rumored that there was in the city of Mexico a directing board,²⁴ the names of whose members had not been divulged. Subsequent events proved its existence and activity. The troops at San Luis Potosí being destitute of resources, the directorio sent Calvo there with money, and he succeeded in winning over a portion of the troops to his projects, in which he was aided by José M. Alfaro, one of the officers who capitulated at Puebla in March, and by Juan Othon, a resident of San Luis.²⁵ This affair coincided with hostile movements in Michoacan, Tlascala, and other places; in the southern part of the district of Orizaba, a party under Abascal committed outrages, using the name of Álvarez.²⁶ Some of Tomás Mejía's forces from the sierra committed

public peace; and to an old law of February 22, 1832, under which all who rebelled against the government must forfeit their honors and offices, and be held responsible, jointly and severally, with their property for all sums which, by themselves or their leaders or orders, were forcibly taken from the federal or state governments, private persons, or corporations. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, ii. 537-57.

²⁴ 'Directorio Conservador Central.' *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 721-35, *passim*; *Id.*, *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 510.

²⁵ A departmental junta was appointed, with Juan Othon as governor, and some thousands of dollars raised, some accounts having it that they were a voluntary gift, and others a forced loan. *Diario de Avisos*, Dec. 27, 1856; *El Eco Nacional*, Jan. 3, 1857; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, viii. 345-6.

²⁶ They fell upon the haciendas San Vicente and Chiconcuac, and murdered several Spaniards. The brigands were captured, tried, and executed in 1858. *Escalera y Llana, Mex. Hist. Descrip.*, 141-5; *Casacola, Acusacion Fiscal*, pp. i.-vi. 1-87; *El Eco Nac.*, Aug. 23, 26, Sept. 1, 3, 6, 23, 26, 28, 1858.

acts of hostility in San Juan de los Llanos; the Indians of Chapala revolted by instigation from Guadalajara,²⁷ and Osollo, pursued by Lamberg, went to San Luis Potosí to assume command by order of the directorio conservador residing in Mexico. The government despatched 4,000 men under Parrodi, that had been organized by the governors of Guanajuato and Zacatecas, to bring the insurgents to terms. The latter soon found themselves destitute of resources. Discontent, and dissensions of which they had not been exempt from the start, now became general. Several interior towns had been terrorized by them, but on learning that the states were raising troops in aid of the government, Vidaurri having provided 1,600 men, besides others furnished by Zacatecas and Aguascalientes,²⁸ they hastened their own ruin. One of their chiefs seized \$240,000 deposited in the British consul's house, and in doing so broke open the door, over which was the British coat of arms.²⁹ The rebel leaders finally concluded that San Luis could not be successfully defended, which led to its abandonment, most of their forces going toward San Pedro Toliman, and after evacuating Cadereita, taking up a position on the impregnable Magdalena, a hill at the entrance of the sierra, where Parrodi laid siege to them. Hunger and thirst forced them to leave the stronghold, and retreat on the night of February 6, 1857, by way of Ajuchitlan and the hacienda Esperanza; but their departure was detected, and they were routed in Tunas Blancas, this defeat being soon followed by the loss of their artillery, ammunition, and a considerable number of prisoners, one of whom was ex-Colonel Osollo with a wounded arm.³⁰ The

²⁷ *El Estandarte Nac.*, Jan. 3, 1857; *Eco Nac.*, Jan. 25, Feb. 8, 1857. *Diario de Avisos*, Jan. 20, Feb. 7, 1857; *La Nacion*, Feb. 7, 8, 1857.

²⁸ *El Estandarte Nac.*, Dec. 31, 1856, Jan. 2, 1857.

²⁹ A portion of this money was subsequently recovered. *Manif. del Gob.*, in *Archivo Mex.*, Col. Ley., iii. 118.

³⁰ Full official accounts in *Archivo Mex.*, Col. Ley., ii. 636-7, iii. 190-240. The city was taken by Vidaurri and Gen. Zuazua on the 11th of February, with many prisoners, Gen. José M. Alfaro, and Gov. Othon being of the

reactionists were thus struck another heavy blow, and hopes of peace revived again. The above happy event coincided with the adoption of the new constitution, a settlement of difficulties with Great Britain, and the sending of Lafragua to Spain to arrange, if possible, questions pending with that government.

According to a report laid before the nation by the president and his cabinet,³¹ on the 4th of March, there were no considerable hostile bodies in the field.³² But Comonfort's government was not to have peace. It was a peculiar feature of it to have new difficulties arise as soon as former ones that beset it had been overcome. Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, minister of the treasury and of relations, had resigned his offices in January,³³ which gave rise to strange rumors. There were popular demonstrations, and a change in the policy of the government was foretold, grounded on the supposition that inasmuch as Lerdo had been the author of certain reforms, his separation from the government would be the forerunner of retrocession. Indeed, there was a general apprehension that Comonfort intended a coup d'état. The *Estandarte Nacional*, official journal, and the officious organs denied it; but the conservative press called it a good idea, and abused the congress with such bitterness that the government suspended the journal *Las Novedades*.

Comonfort issued a pardon to all partisans of the reaction soliciting it, with the exception of such as were taken with arms in their hands. The last attempt at San Luis ought to have taught him the folly

number. *El Estandarte Nac.*, Jan. 6 to March 23, 1857; *El Eco Nac.*, Feb. 15, 1857; *Diario de Avisos*, March 7, 1857; *Buenrostro, Hist. Prim. Cong. Constit.*, 106.

³¹ Ezequiel Montes, minister of foreign relations; Ignacio de la Llave, of government; José M. Iglesias, of justice, ecclesiastical affairs, and public instruction; Manuel Siliceo, of fomento, colonization, industry, and trade; Juan Soto, of war and the navy; Juan Antonio de la Fuente, of the treasury and public credit. *Comonfort Manif. del. Gob.*, 207-8.

³² Tampico, where disturbances had occurred since Oct., on the war schooner *Oajaca*, and on shore, submitted to Moreno on the 19th of Feb. *El Grijalva*, March 11, 1857.

³³ *La Cruz*, iv. 91; *Diario de Avisos*, Jan. 8, 15, 18, 1857.

of exercising clemency toward men who merely wanted a chance to compass his destruction. And yet he actually pardoned many of the government's worst enemies;³⁴ one of them was Osollo, at the request of Parrodi.

Comonfort had to overcome by his own authority all difficulties of a governmental nature that might present themselves till the new constitution went into operation, and a constitutional régime was installed. Some had wanted the new code to be enforced at once; others wished the dictatorship continued till after the elections; and there were not wanting those who suggested the organization of a provisional government. Congress, however, resolved that the plan of Ayutla, and the government it created with Comonfort at its head, should prevail until a president and congress were constitutionally chosen. The enemies of the executive, on assertions and comments of the press in the United States, accused him of having solicited an alliance with that nation, which virtually would be a protectorate over Mexico. The liberal press with indignation rejected the reports, which, though purely sensational, served to give weight to the slanderous charges of the reaction. It is true that a treaty was concluded with the American minister for pecuniary assistance, to be repaid, which treaty was not ratified by the senate of the United States, and therefore was void.

The scarcity of resources, an old affliction, was one of the most serious troubles the government contended with; for it had to pay the sums agreed upon in the English convention, and with a much diminished revenue to meet the obligations contracted both by the former administration and by the revolution of Ayutla. Added to all that were the complaints heard on all

³⁴ At the petition of a number of citizens, he ordered on the 19th of Feb. the criminal proceedings against the imprisoned Franciscans to be discontinued, and permitted them to reestablish their convent in a part of their old building. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, viii. 419-20.

sides of the depredations caused by marauding bands,³⁵ and the impending invasion of Mexican territory by filibustering forces organized in California.

The constituent congress closed its session on the 17th of February,³⁶ without enacting organic laws for the development of the constitution, and the people for a time feared there might be trouble when they saw day after day pass without the new fundamental law being published. However, as it did not imply restriction upon religious opinions, society placed itself on the side of the government; and thus was the formidable opposition on the ground of religion and fueros disarmed. The reverses suffered by the reaction had proceeded from moral rather than material force; for the people well understood that the plan of Ayutla conveyed positive benefits, equality before the law, and social reform. The partisans of reaction had now nothing to hope for, except from dissensions that might break out in the liberal party at the promulgation of the constitution. The outlook was favorable to future peace and order, and therefore the government felt enabled to carry out the programme outlined by President Comonfort in his last address to the national deputies. He took advantage of this lull to promulgate several important laws, some of which affected the clergy, such as that establishing the registro del estado civil, and that for the establishment and use of cemeteries.³⁷ These two laws,

³⁵ Specially in Jalisco, where the Indians plundered several haciendas in the direction of Chapala, and murdered the chief authority of Zacualco. For this reason Parrodi had to resume command in Jalisco. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 750.

³⁶ Comonfort, in bidding it farewell, said that the task imposed on him, namely, 'la preparacion del campo en que la semilla constitucional ha de fructificar,' was an arduous one; but he trusted the people would aid him to prepare the field. He promised to do all in his power to maintain friendly relations with foreign nations; to enforce a proper administration of justice; to establish a good financial system; to look after the nation's security and independence; and to promote everything conducive to her prosperity. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, iii. 67-72; *La Nacion*, Feb. 18, 1857.

³⁷ Lafragua is said to have been the framer of both laws. The former required all inhabitants of the republic, except the members of foreign legations and minors, to be inscribed in the register. Without it they could perform no civil act, and infractors of the law were also subject to a fine of from one

and that of the 17th of March designating the public functionaries who were required to take the oath to support the national constitution, greatly irritated the clergy and their partisans. Their objection to the constitution and the law was not so much for what they said as for what they did not say. The fundamental code had failed to establish the catholic religion as that of the state; in fact, religion had been left out of the instrument; the law of the 17th of March made no mention of the ecclesiastics, and they refused to recognize the constitution.⁸⁸

The very existence of the organic law had been endangered by the hostile attitude of Blancarte, who refused obedience to the government at Zapopan in Jalisco, and was joined by many; but soon after, Parodi brought him to terms, and he submitted. This was Comonfort's third triumph.

The conservatives called, like the rest of their fellow-citizens, to take part in the elections kept themselves away from the polls, several of them saying that they would not mix with the rabble, nor engage in electioneering trickery, but preferred to act without the pale of the law. The progressionists resolved to choose no man without knowing what were his political views; but this not being a custom in Mexico, they had to fall back on the candidate's political record. The liberal press maintained that the philosophical revolution recently carried through was a precursor of peace and good-will, that party hatred and persecution should disappear, and only

to fifteen dollars. The acts declared to be of the civil status were birth, marriage, adoption or arrogation, priesthood, and the profession of a religious vow, whether provisional or perpetual, and death. The record of every act of life, and with it legitimacy of marriage and birth and succession to property, was formerly in charge of the church; the registration of deaths and burials and the control of cemeteries, which by the old laws belonged to the church, were now placed in the hands of the civil authority in each district and town. It is thus seen that the clergy were shorn of an immense power. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, ii. 692-739.

⁸⁸ The law declared that officials refusing to subscribe to the oath would forfeit their positions under the government. *Id.*, iii. 268-71.

the most patriotic, virtuous, and intelligent citizens should be chosen.

The public recognition of the new constitution was the touchstone for scandal; and as the days appointed for taking the oath happened to be in lent, many preachers assailed it from the pulpit, and its enemies in general made of the oath an occasion for secret meetings, at which the government was called a tyrant that wanted to domineer over consciences, when the constitution said not a word about them; the liberals were branded as atheists because that instrument established no state religion.³⁹

Many public officials from conscientious scruples refused to take the oath, and were accordingly dismissed. The archbishop, in a circular to his parish priests, declared the oath illicit, which filled with consternation numberless families whose heads and supporters had been in the necessity of submitting to the law, or losing their only means of livelihood.⁴⁰ The priests demanded of those who had taken the oath to make a public retraction. This only lessened the influence of the clergy, and made many turn lukewarm in religious matters, seeing much that was worldly in the conduct of their bishops.

Among the most remarkable documents that emanated from the church was a pastoral of the bishop of Guadalajara, pointing out the articles which were deemed objectionable in the constitution, namely, the 3d, 5th, 6th, 7th, 13th, 27th, and 123d, in all of which the power of the church was more or less curtailed, but they contained nothing against christianity, or Roman catholic dogmas. The pope had also condemned the action of the Mexican government as oppressive to the church, and refused to treat

³⁹ The clergy felt that their being purposely excluded from the obligation of taking the oath had been a hard blow at their influence.

⁴⁰ In some parts the clergy had solemnized the promulgation of the constitution with a *te deum*; in others, where they closed the churches, the people opened them, making violent demonstrations against the priests, who on their part, spoke of their consciences being oppressed, and God's temples being outraged.

with Montes, the envoy sent with overtures.⁴¹ The conservative journals paraded in their columns a number of retractions, boasting of their triumph. Comonfort, in order to avoid disputes with the clergy during the lenten season, went to reside temporarily at Tacubaya, where he had a garrison of 2,000 men under Zuloaga; but this did not avert the conflict that occurred in the holy-week between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities of the capital. The latter refused admittance on holy Thursday, April 9th, to the governor and other officials into the cathedral, on the ground of their being excommunicated for having sworn to support the constitution.⁴² These difficulties did not, however, prevent the execution of the president's decree; the constitution was gradually recognized throughout the republic, even by some ecclesiastics. Zealous catholics much desired to have their religion declared the religion of the state, to the exclusion of all other creeds. Petitions then came from all parts, asking the president to have the powers conferred by article 123 of the constitution⁴³ used as the basis for the furtherance of their wishes.

The elections fully occupied the leaders of the liberal party, each seeking prominent position for himself. A central electoral committee or club had been installed in Mexico, whose members demanded of Co-

⁴¹ He was received by Cardinal Antonelli, but not in his official capacity, the pope refusing him recognition till the property of the church should be restored, and the hostile laws enacted were repealed. *La Cruz*, v. 447-8, 671-2.

⁴² There was a riot in consequence, and finally the government had to protect the lives of the canons. Some of the leaders were punished. The archbishop was imprisoned in his palace for a few days, several canons were arrested in the ayuntamiento's hall; others hid themselves. A number of rioters were put in jail. It will be well to observe that in no other part of the republic was a similar insult offered the government. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, iii. 484-95; *El Estandarte Nac.*, Apr. 11, 13, 1857; *La Cruz*, iv. 581-95; *La Nación*, Apr. 11, 14, 1857; *Diario de Avisos*, Apr. 11, 13, 15, 1857; *El Eco Nac.*, Apr. 12, 14, 15, 1857; *El Progreso*, May 16, 1857.

⁴³ The federal authorities exclusively had such power of intervention as might be designated by the laws in matters of religious cult and external discipline. This had been misinterpreted as undue interference in matters of conscience; but it really signified such laws as might be enacted for the protection of the political institutions and peace of the country.

monfort a declaration of principles before giving him their support for the chief magistracy; but as he declined to give such a statement, alleging that he had no aspiration for that office, they took up Miguel Lerdo de Tejada for president of the republic, and Benito Juarez for president of the supreme court, both of whom also refused to issue the manifesto required. The committee then split. Lerdo's organ in the press, and his most strenuous supporter, the *Clamor Progresista*, lowered his prestige by declaring, to catch wavering votes, that a man may change his political opinions as circumstances demand.⁴⁴ The consequence was, that the whole liberal press threw the weight of its influence in favor of Comonfort.

The institutions of the country were yet in jeopardy, not merely from the boiling of the political caldron, as seen in the attacks of a hostile press and pulpit, but also from the armed bands, and the repeated attempts at revolt in different quarters. Mejía and his followers refused to submit, unless on terms inadmissible by the government. There was an outbreak in Aguascalientes, and Puebla showed signs of insurrection. A plot was discovered in Tacubaya, in which several officers of the garrison were concerned, said to be for murdering the president; similar discoveries were made in Mexico and other places. A serious Indian revolt occurred in Guerrero.⁴⁵

One of the great obstacles to a proper administration of affairs was the want of a compact and firm ministry, and the situation was rendered more precarious by

⁴⁴ 'Mientras mas apto es un hombre para los negocios públicos, mayores han sido los cambios á que ha sujetado su opinion, segun las sabias inspiraciones de la experiencia y de las circunstancias.' Quoted in *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 519. In June, Lerdo and Melchor Ocampo, who had also been a presidential candidate, withdrew their names. *Id.*, *Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 782.

⁴⁵ Chilapa, garrisoned by about 200 men, was besieged May 4th by 3,000 Indians, under Juan Antonio and Padre Juarez. The troops, after exhausting their ammunition, attempted a sally, and were cut to pieces, more than half perishing, and only a few escaping. The inhabitants, who were hostile to the constitution, in the pursuit aided the assailants in committing many crimes. General Juan Álvarez went there to dislodge them. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 775.

several arbitrary acts of the government.⁴⁶ A sudden ministerial crisis brought to the head of the cabinet Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, as minister of relations, and to the portfolios of justice and government, respectively, Antonio García and Marcelino Castañeda. The political character of the new ministry was moderate, leaning to conservatism, whereas the preceding one inclined to radical liberalism.⁴⁷ The crisis was attributed to some project in connection with tobacco, but the trouble really lay in Comonfort's vacillating course, in his lack of fixed principles, which led him to recede from his past progressive course;⁴⁸ for which reason Castañeda remained but a short time in the cabinet, being succeeded by Jesus Teran, an able, upright, and progressive statesman.

At this juncture the press began to discuss whether it would not be best to continue the dictatorial régime, and postpone the operation of the constitution. This suggestion was made in the midst of the elections, and weakened the progresistas. Comonfort vacillated between that party and the moderado, which was his own; the latter was not in condition to assume a leading role, owing to lack of organization and able leaders, and Comonfort still clung to the idea of forming the liberal union party with men professing merely republican principles. His course was suicidal, for reform principles had been the very life of his administration. He seemed to despair of being able to bear the reforms to a haven of safety, and this aroused suspicion and distrust of his intention. However, he tried to

⁴⁶ Twenty men accused of plotting in Mexico were, without trial, put to work in chains on the public streets by Gov. Baz. This proceeding, if not ordered, was at least tolerated by Comonfort, and brought him much animadversion. A fine was inflicted on an editor for utterances offensive to the liberal side. A heavy tax, payable only once, was also levied, by decree of May 26th. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, iii. 624-32; *Portilla, Méjico en 1856-7*, 245-8.

⁴⁷ The change took place June 5th, Siliceo being the only member left of Comonfort's original cabinet. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, 660; *El Eco Nac.*, June 6, July 7, 1857. Lerdo was a lawyer and president of a college; a new man in government affairs, though presumed to be possessed of sufficient ability for the post.

⁴⁸ *N. Am. Review*, ciii. 108-9; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 780-1; *Id., Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 520.

prepare the advent of the constitution so far as the political division of the country was concerned.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ He raised Tlascala and Colima to the rank of states, pursuant to the new constitution. The same law in its 47th article declared that Coahuila and Nuevo Leon should be one state; and in its 48th that the states of Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, Oajaca, San Luis Potosi, Tabasco, Vera Cruz, Yucatan, and Zacatecas should recover the extent of territory they had previous to Dec. 31, 1852; and thereby the separate territorial status of Isla del Carmen, Tehuantepec, and Sierra Gorda became suppressed. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, iii. 632-5; *Diario de Avisos*, June 23, 1857; *El Tiempo*, Aug. 1, 1852. An unsuccessful effort was made in 1856 for the erection of a new state, to be named Iturbide, with the five districts of Tuxpam, Tampico de Vera Cruz, Tancanhuitz, Huejutla, and the south of Tamaulipas. *Soto, M. F., El Nuevo Estado*, 3-117; *El Estandarte Nac.*, Dec. 29, 1856; *La Nacion*, Oct. 18, 1856.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

DOWNFALL OF LIBERAL INSTITUTIONS.

1857-1858.

CONSERVATIVE INTRIGUES—TALK OF A COUP D'ÉTAT—SPANISH COMPLICATIONS—COMONFORT'S VACILLATING COURSE—HOSTILITY OF THE CLERGY CONTINUES—CONGRESS INSTALLED—COMONFORT AVOWS LIBERALISM—HIS ELECTION AS CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT—PROMISES MADE AND VIOLATED—PLAN OF TACUBAYA—COMONFORT BECOMES ITS CHIEF—ACTION OF CONGRESS—ARREST OF JUAREZ AND OTHERS—REACTIONISTS VICTORIOUS—COMONFORT'S OVERTHROW—CIVIL WAR IN FULL BLAST—ZULOAGA, REACTIONARY PRESIDENT—JUAREZ, CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT—HIS NARROW ESCAPE FROM CAPTURE—HE ESTABLISHES HIS GOVERNMENT IN VERA CRUZ.

THE conservative party, awake to seize every opportunity afforded it by the disturbed condition of the country, boldly came to the front, now that the men of well-known political views had been superseded by others, who were new in government affairs, or who favored a policy of inaction or compromise. The president was urged by the conservatives to solve pending issues by a coup d'état. While pretending to recognize the sovereignty of the people, they claimed that a majority of the nation was displeased with the new constitution, and wanted him to ignore it, and continue the dictatorship. The bickerings of the liberal press widened the gap in the liberal ranks. The president asked the official journals not to say anything on behalf of his candidacy, but that did not prevent the triumph of the moderate party.¹

¹ Accomplished by soldiers with their officers at their head capturing the polls. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 521.

Le Trait d'Union, a French journal of Mexico, advocated the dictatorship, and its remarks were copied into the official journal without disapprobation. And yet it is hardly credible that the president could have fostered such a scheme, knowing that he could rely only on the limited number of men that live by politics to support it. He was a man who calculated well his chances before taking any important step. The majority of the liberals, therefore, treated the coup d'état scheme as newspaper clap-trap. Comonfort over his own signature disclaimed such an intention. Then the progresistas made him their standard-bearer. The political outlook was gloomy, however. Seditious broke out in quick succession everywhere on the promulgation of the new constitution.² It must be said, nevertheless, that the enemies of the government were not permitted to have their own way altogether. The seditious bands, and some parties of highwaymen, were pursued and defeated; many conspirators were severely dealt with. Governor Juarez in Oajaca expelled all priests who refused christian sepulture to the supporters of the constitution and the reform laws. In Aguascalientes the governor, Lopez de Nava, deprived of political rights every man who failed to take the required oath. In Puebla, Governor Alariste ordered public prayers to God to vouchsafe wisdom and success to the constitutional authorities.³

Just at this time the country's troubles were complicated by the unfriendly state of the relations with Spain, whose government had refused to receive La-

² The Spaniard Cobos invited good catholics to defend their tenets by force of arms. Most unfriendly relations existed between the bishops and governors, as evidenced in their correspondence. Mejía, hard pressed by Rosas Landa, submitted; but his capitulation was really a victory, for Landa, deeming it the best course to pursue, recognized military rank in the rebels. The president having disapproved the arrangement, Mejía went back to his lair. *Rosas Landa, Manif.*, 1-64; *El Estandarte Nac.*, June 17, 1857; *Buenrostro, Hist. Prim. Cong. Const.*, 103-4.

³ Details of occurrences may be found in the following authorities: *Riviera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 521-3; *Méx., Mem. Guerra*, 1857, 36-8; *Buenrostro, Hist. Prim. Cong. Const.*, 105, 109; *El Estandarte Nac.*, May 14 to July 5, 1857, *passim*; *El Eco Nac.*, May 1 to July 9, 1857, *passim*; *Diario de Avisos*, May 9 to July 13, 1857; *La Nacion*, May 12-30, 1857, *passim*.

fragua, the accredited Mexican plenipotentiary, and exhibited a disposition to intervene with other European powers in the affairs of Mexico. Hence the idea that a war was imminent, and the general alacrity to be enrolled in the national guard.⁴ The conservatives did not fail to make political capital out of this state of affairs, tendering their services, in the event of war, as citizens and soldiers.

The treasury was exhausted, and pecuniary means being required to keep troops in the field, the president resolved to take them where he could find them. This declaration appeared in the semi-official organ *El Estandarte Nacional*, causing a great sensation, as it was construed to mean the seizure of mortmain property, or the adoption of some other extraordinary scheme. The military, and a part of the press, assumed then a threatening attitude, which angered Comonfort, and drew from him severe measures.⁵ In August he transferred his residence to Tacubaya, and rumors began at once to circulate of his intention to proclaim the bases orgánicas, or something of the kind, with himself at the head of affairs. The names of men well known for their dislike of the late reforms were mentioned as already chosen for the highest places in the forthcoming régime. The conservative press kept up the agitation of a coup d'état, and a portion of the liberal journals counselled illegal and revolutionary acts, and that the first constitutional congress should assume the role of reformer and amend the code of 1857. Meanwhile, the dictatorial powers of the executive should continue, and the state governments be restricted in theirs. The reaccionarios, encouraged at the aspect of affairs, left their hiding-places and appeared at armed meetings. Many liberals then adduced this as the strongest evidence that a dictatorship was indispensable, inasmuch as

⁴ *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, iii. 693-6.

⁵ The military were bluntly reminded of an army circular of 1851, prohibiting their strictures on the government, and several newspapers were suppressed. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, iii. 698-702; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 523.

Comonfort could not possibly save the government and overcome its many foes, with a constitution trammelling his every action, when he should be all-powerful to crush opposition. Riots continued in various parts, and were daily becoming more difficult to quell. In several cases there had been much bloodshed.⁶

A bad feature in the political struggle was the open declaration of the government organs that the new constitution could not go into operation till reglamentary laws were issued. This increased the ill-feeling between the civil and religious authorities.

With the expectation of a forthcoming coup d'état, the conservatives became more audacious; the churches were closed in some towns, and the state governors played the despot in many instances. The prelates, firm in their purpose to resist the government, refused the sacraments to those who would not take back their oath to support the constitution,⁷ while the government, equally firm, demanded the oath from every functionary or official, from the highest to the lowest, without mental reservation, under the penalty of dismissal and forfeiture of political rights. From the time that the question of a coup d'état was brought out upon the arena, some advocated that it should prevent the meeting of congress by contriving to declare null two thirds of the credentials of members elect,

⁶ Among the worst cases was that of Colima, Aug. 26th, when the comandante general was killed, and his remains, as *El País* of Guadalajara recorded it, treated most brutally by the parish priest. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 805. In Puebla, Tlascala, Tamaulipas, San Luis Potosí, Zacatecas, and even at the capital itself, there were several disturbances. In Yucatan the reactionary element gained strength in Campeche. Not even Chiapas escaped the general conflagration. The tiger of Alica, Lozada of Tepic, routed all government forces sent after him and committed horrible cruelties. Hydra-headed revolution showed itself everywhere, and though in most encounters the government forces won victories, yet they were not decisive enough to insure permanent peace. *El Estandarte Nac.*, July 17 to Sept. 22, 1857; *El Eco Nac.*, Aug. 8 to Oct. 31, 1857; *Diario de Avisos*, July 8 to Oct. 29, 1857; *El Tiempo*, Aug. 3 to Nov. 2, 1857; *La Cruz*, v. 622; *El Progreso*, July 18, 1857; *Buenrostro, Hist. Prim. Cong. Const.*, 97, 101-2, 109-10; *Suarez, Informe*, 26-8.

⁷ Bishop Vereá and the canons of Nuevo Leon were arrested, and the former was banished from his diocese. *El Estandarte Nac.*, Sept. 26, 1857; *Diario de Avisos*, Sept. 25, 1857.

on the ground that they were not in accordance with the convocation decree. It is a very remarkable circumstance that the government had looked with indifference upon the elections of members to the congress, and the result was that a majority of them proved to be men opposed to Comonfort's policy; hence, on arriving at the capital and being consulted on the coup d'état, they indignantly rejected the idea. The cabinet on the 15th of September resigned in a body, and the president being unable to replace them at once with men of his own choice, had to leave matters for a time in charge of the oficiales mayores, or chief clerks, there being no under-secretaries.⁸ Congress not having been installed before the 16th of September, and Comonfort's dictatorship being at an end on that date,⁹ the country was left in an alarming condition, rendered still more so by the absence of a responsible ministry at a time when insurrection prevailed everywhere. The excitement in the capital was so great that the business houses were closed, and troops patrolled the streets.¹⁰

At last congress was installed on the 8th of October,¹¹ when the customary ceremonials took place. In his speech at the installation Comonfort, in speaking of what he had done to secure the triumph of the laws and liberal institutions over antiquated errors and bastard interests, and of his determination to crush the revolution, hinted at the necessity of the government being clothed with ample powers.¹² At subsequent conferences held at the palace the need of

⁸ *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, iii. 955-6.

⁹ The constitution should have gone into operation that day; but Comonfort issued decrees on that date under his powers from the plan de Ayutla. From the day congress opened, he acted under this fundamental law. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, iii. 954-5; *Buenrostro, Hist. Seg. Cong. Const.*, i. 56.

¹⁰ Some deputies were maturing a plan to overthrow Comonfort, and put Juarez in his place. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 525.

¹¹ *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, viii. 637.

¹² 'No duda vencerla, como hasta ahora, si conserva su accion tan espedita y enérgica, segun la importancia de los casos lo requiera.' *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, iii. 958-60, 970-1.

such powers, in matters of war and treasury, was discussed, and Comonfort was advised to appoint ministers before formally bringing the subject before congress. He did not heed the advice. José M. Cortés y Esparza, as acting minister of gobernacion, applied for unlimited authority, and encountered the greatest opposition, many of the deputies not deeming that the situation actually required it. Comonfort then resolved to assume it, and indeed he needed full powers, for the reaction, though constantly receiving heavy blows, was not crushed. It kept consciences troubled, recruited proselytes, and without scruples as to means, maintained alive the fire of sedition. Congress refused to allow the president to move outside the law, and yet granted the governors extraordinary powers. Comonfort still acted prudently, appointing a cabinet,¹³ who had some conferences with committees of the congress, and the difficulties were done away with, though charges had been already preferred against the president. The report on ample powers was much discussed, however, and greatly opposed as unnecessary; but certain acts of the reactionists made their necessity clear enough. Congress, however, refused to grant all that was asked for, and on the 3d of November suspended only certain clauses of the constitution till the 30th of April, 1858.¹⁴

¹³ Minister of relations and chief of the cabinet, Juan A. de la Fuente; of justice, ecclesiastical affairs, and public instruction, Manuel Ruiz; of the treasury and public credit, Manuel Payno; of war, José García Conde; of fomento, Bernardo Flores; and of gobernacion, Benito Juárez. The last named took possession on the 3d of Nov.; the others had done so on the 20th of Oct. *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1053-4.

¹⁴ The constitutional articles suspended were nine: namely, freedom of speech, of the press, of assembling, and of bearing arms; respect of domicile; the term of detentions; guarantees in criminal proceedings; application of penalties by civil authority, and use of property, etc. The government was also empowered to borrow six million dollars on as easy terms as possible. *Archivo Méx., Col. Ley.*, iii. 1008-13; *Buenrostro, Hist. Prim. Cong. Const.*, 160, 163-70, 175-87; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, viii. 644-9. Minister Juárez in a circular stated that it was not the government's intention to suspend these guarantees in all the states at once; and that it would use the extraordinary powers only when indispensable. In fact, we are assured that at the public discussion in congress it had been said that they were allowed 'por solo la confianza que inspiraba la presencia de Juárez en el gabinete.' *Juárez, Biog. del Ciud.*, 20.

While the government was engaged in fighting the rebels, congress counted the votes for president, respectively, of the republic and of the supreme court. Comonfort had an absolute majority of 8,000. Juarez and Lacunza being the two candidates with the highest number of votes for the other position, though neither of them had a constitutional majority, it devolved on congress to choose between them, and Juarez was elected.

Peace was not restored, and the army had to be kept on a war footing.¹⁵ As late as the 11th of November a conspiracy was detected in Puebla, said to have been concocted in the *sagrario* of the cathedral. The legislature had a sitting at eleven o'clock at night, and the next day a number of reactionists were shot. The report having circulated that Miramon was in the town, Governor Alatrisme's alarm was still further increased. The governor published a manifesto stating that documents had been seized establishing the fact that the conspirators intended to assassinate the rulers. The reactionists of course declared the executions to have been political murders.¹⁶

In the midst of the turmoil Comonfort assumed the position of constitutional president for four years, from and after December 1, 1857.¹⁷ In his inaugural address he assured the representatives of the people that he accepted the responsible position only because the nation was laboring under great difficulties.¹⁸ He

¹⁵ Eight thousand infantry and 800 cavalry, costing two and a half million dollars. There were, besides, drawing pay 17 generals of division, 58 of brigade, and many field-officers. This involved an expenditure of \$350,000. From Oct. 4, 1855, to Aug. 21, 1857, had been commissioned five generals of division, 38 of brigade, 110 colonels, 116 lieutenant-colonels and majors, making together 1,741 commissions, exclusive of auxiliary forces. To meet this expense, and to aid unhappy Yucatan and the frontier states, forced loans at ruinous rates had to be resorted to.

¹⁶ Rivera, *Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 817-18; *Diario de Avisos*, Nov. 12, 14, 20, 1857.

¹⁷ Buenrostro, *Hist. Prim. Cong. Const.*, 211; *Archivo Mex.*, Col. Ley., iii. 998-1002, 1022.

¹⁸ 'He creído que aun debia hacer nuevos sacrificios en su obsequio, y apurar todos los medios posibles para su salvacion.' *Archivo Mex.*, Col. Ley., iii. 998-9.

asked them to amend the constitution, evidence of his good intentions being the loyalty with which he had fulfilled the pledges made at Ayutla. He bound himself by oath to faithfully discharge the duties of president in accordance with the constitution, and to advance the welfare of the union. Thereupon he received the congratulations of the diplomatic corps and of the authorities. Soon after he asked congress to allow Juárez, La Fuente, and Cortés Esparza, members of the supreme court, to continue at the head of their respective departments in the cabinet.¹⁹

Certain conferences held by Comonfort with commissioners from several states had a threatening aspect, and fears were entertained that the clergy would get the upper hand, which were all the more excited by a religious feast in the oratory of the president's palace at Tacubaya on the 13th of December. Congress became alarmed and held secret meetings.²⁰ The chief officers of the brigade under Zuloaga had been for some time urging Comonfort to strike a blow. The state governors had been confidentially asked by persons from the capital to effect a political change on the ruins of the present system; that is to say, the federal congress and the state legislatures were to be suppressed, and Comonfort's dictatorship restored. Anastasio Parrodi, governor of Jalisco, declaring that the president wanted no change, urged the other governors to uphold the constitutional system. Minister Payno²¹ and General Zuloaga were accused of plotting against the constitution, which

¹⁹ The British minister protested against the election of justices of the supreme court, saying that they should all be of the legal profession; the government intimated in reply that he had better mind his own business. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 526.

²⁰ On the 14th the ordinary session was by special decree prorogued for thirty working days. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, iii. 1029.

²¹ Baz, *Vida de Juárez*, 118, says that Payno afterward confessed it. But I find that Payno makes a general denial in these words: 'ni antes, ni entonces, ni ahora,' 1860, 'he tenido relaciones políticas con ninguna persona del partido opuesto al gobierno, de que yo formaba parte.' He did confess to the postscript in a letter to Gen. Huerta, denying that he entered into any conspiracy against the established political orders. *Mem., Revol. Dic.*, 75; *Payno, Defensa que hace*, 4.

caused much displeasure in congress, and at first there was thought of arresting all parties concerned; but finally the president was requested to have Zuloaga indicted. As Comonfort's name was mixed with everything rumored relating to a change of system, the minister of government, Benito Juarez, declared in the president's name that all such reports were groundless. And really it was unreasonable even to suppose that Comonfort, falsifying his past record, should take part in any scheme to upset the order of things he had worked so hard to establish; that a man of his ability, and having at his side men like Juarez, Ruiz, and others, who were a guarantee to the constitutional party, should exhibit such turpitude, was inconceivable. Moreover, congress had given him proofs of benevolence, and it was not credible that he would respond to them with ingratitude. But incontrovertible facts came to establish once more that there is nothing impossible in politics. The principle advanced some time before by the *Clamor Progresista* was now given a practical illustration.

The conspirators having perfected their plans with some governors, particularly with him of Vera Cruz, a political movement was effected in the early morning of December 17th, at Tacubaya, to set aside the national constitution, which was declared to be not in accord with the customs and usages of the Mexican people; the supreme control of the government with ample powers was vested in Ignacio Comonfort, who was to convoke, within three months, an extraordinary congress for framing another constitution to conform with the national will, guaranteeing the true interests of the people; which constitution, before being promulgated as the supreme law, was to be submitted to the voters for their approval; and in the event of its non-acceptance, was to be returned to the congress for amendment. The president was to rule, with a consultive council, composed of one representative from each state. All authorities re-

fusing to second the plan de Tacubaya, as the new arrangement was styled, were to be superseded by others disposed to support it.²² Juárez, on hearing the news, forthwith advised Comonfort not to accept the role thus tendered him. He had on the 15th assured congress that the government was on the alert.²³ Deputy Baz, on the 16th, had made known to the national legislature that it was to be dismissed the next morning, as he had seen the plan at Zuloaga's quarters the previous evening.²⁴ On the 17th congress made a solemn protest against the act of that date at Tacubaya,²⁵ and decreed Comonfort's authority as president at an end, and all his acts, in his new role of revolutionary leader, as null and void.²⁶

The day following the pronunciamiento Zuloaga's brigade occupied the capital, where the governor, Agustín Alcérreca, and the small garrison accepted the situation without a murmur. The presidents of the supreme court, Juárez, and of the congress, Isidoro Olvera, and several deputies, were arrested, and congress dissolved. The ayuntamiento of Mexico was also deposed. Even now, under circumstances so plainly showing his complicity in the outrages just committed, Comonfort appeared to hesitate, and it was not till the 19th that he officially announced his acceptance of the plan of Tacubaya, believing that the city of Vera Cruz would sustain him, and after setting free the political prisoners, excepting Juárez, he published a manifesto setting forth the causes that had prompted his course. After mature reflection, he became convinced that, under the circumstances, only

²² Arrangoiz, *Méj.*, ii. 353-4; *El Eco Nac.*, Dec. 19, 1857; *Diario de Arizon*, Dec. 18, 1857; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 528.

²³ 'Velaba por el orden y la constitucion.'

²⁴ It seems that no heed was paid that day to Baz' announcement. *Baz, Vida de Juárez*, 118-19.

²⁵ It said that the 'segundo caudillo de Ayutla,' who had had so much trust put into his hands, and only a few days before had sworn to be the faithful guardian of the country's institutions, had suddenly turned into a 'lucioso vulgar.' *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, iii. 1030-4.

²⁶ That decree was officially published, May 13, 1861. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, ix. 217-18.

judicious reforms and a conciliatory policy would meet with acceptance from the people. His reasons are given in a note below.²⁷ Any other course, he feared, would give the retrograde element the control of affairs in the new situation; anarchy showed her head everywhere; despotism, with its accessories, revenge and persecution, would be sure to follow, and render it impossible for liberty ever to reign in the country. His excuses could not, however, wash away the blot he threw upon his name and fame by the violation of his solemn oath. His conduct at first aroused public hatred, which later turned into contempt for his character.

Comonfort labored under the erroneous idea that he could bring about the amalgamation of parties bitterly hating each other, and constitute a government strong enough to overrule all parties, and be at the same time independent of them all. It is not even impossible that he believed the reaccionarios would eventually get the upper hand, and consign him to the fate that General Guerrero's eminent services—compared with which his own were as nothing—did not save that patriot from. Be it as it may, he soon saw his error, and the entanglements he had got himself into. Seventy deputies assembled in Querétaro and reiterated their protest. Anarchy, now that there was no recognized supreme law, reigned in Mexico, and a three years' terrible struggle began. The plan of Tacubaya was accepted in several towns, and rejected with indignation in others.²⁸ Comonfort, hard

²⁷ Till the 17th he could not, he said, break his pledge to follow the constitution in every act; but after Zuloaga and his brigade set aside the code, which he was powerless to prevent, his position changed. In upsetting the code they effected a revolution, which seemed to have been prompted by the force of circumstances; and in tendering him the chief place they showed that their movement was not hostile to liberty, for they well knew him to be no compromiser with retrogression. He accepted the office under the solemn promise and condition, *sine qua non*, that 'ningun partido dominaría en la situación nueva, y que el gobierno no había de abandonar el camino de una prudente reforma, ni el pensamiento conciliador que le había guiado hasta entonces.' *Baz, Vida de Juárez*, 128; *Portilla, Méj. en 1856-7*, 288-300.

²⁸ The states of Mexico, Tlascala, Vera Cruz, Tamaulipas, and parts of

pressed on one side by constitutionalist forces, on the other by conservatives, and at the same time by the coalition of states in the interior,²⁹ without having a party of his own, was really in a quandary. It has been both asserted and denied that he was at one time on the point of joining the reaccionarios, and becoming a tool of the clergy. Judging by his conduct, the conclusion must be that he never abandoned the plan laid out in his manifesto. As soon as the so-called council of state was installed, the 25th of December, he discovered that the color of the situation was not quite so fully defined as the reaccionarios wanted it.³⁰ Comonfort expected a great deal from what he called the assiduity and efficacy of the council; but as it was an illegal body, utterly devoid of prestige, and none of the parties would accede to his pretensions, it could accomplish nothing. His phrases had no significance. The states protested against his acts, and continued their preparations for a solution of the difficulties by the resort to arms.

Comonfort realized how dangerous his position was when Vera Cruz, on which he had confidently relied, but which had never been in favor of the reaction, forsook him. This was on the 30th of December;³¹ he then tried to save himself by sending emissaries

Querétaro and San Luis Potosí were the only ones to second it. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 833, 835; *Diario de Avisos*, Dec. 30, 1857, Jan. 1, 2, 7, 1858; *El Eco Nac.*, Dec. 23, 29, 1857; *Voz de Son.*, Feb. 10, 1858; *La Razon*, Jan. 6, 1858; *La Paz*, Jan. 5, 1858.

²⁹ Jalisco, Guanajuato, Querétaro, Aguascalientes, Zacatecas, Michoacan, and Colima. They organized numerous forces to uphold the constitution, and General Anastasio Parrodi, their commander-in-chief, issued a proclamation setting forth the general plan. *Portilla, Méj. en 1856-7*, 305-6; *La Razon*, Jan. 1, 1858.

³⁰ In his speech at the opening of that council, he reiterated, though in another form, the statements of his last manifesto, laying stress on the oft-repeated though absurd and impracticable theory of making of a whole people one family in aspirations. There were, besides, some progresistas in the council who exposed the absurdity of his plan to amalgamate the parties. *Baz, Vida de Juarez*, 126-7; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 528; *La Paz*, Jan. 1, 1858; *Diario de Avisos*, Dec. 25, 1857; *La Razon*, Dec. 25, 1857; *El Eco Nac.*, Dec. 22, 1857.

³¹ 'Estamos perdidos,' said he, when he saw an official report that Vera Cruz had returned to her allegiance. It was indeed a coup de grace. *Payno, Mem. Revol. Dic.*, 99; *Diario de Avisos*, Jan. 6, 1858.

to make known to the troops in the interior his repentance, and willingness to surrender the executive office to the president of the supreme court. No man ever found himself in exactly such a plight. He thought at one time of going into the interior to fight in person against the reaction; but was deterred by the fact, which he was well aware of, that he could not by force of arms combat ideas. He did not succeed in forming a ministry, because no combination was then possible. The question of releasing Juarez being broached, Comonfort assented, but still he was kept confined in a room of the palace, it being known that the coalition of states had resolved his recognition as president of the republic the moment he should present himself at any place within the territory under their control.

The hatred of the liberal party to Comonfort, great as it was for what he had done, was much increased when it became known that the archbishop and the bishop of Michoacan, approving the plan of Tacubaya, removed the bar of excommunication from all who should turn to its support. Comonfort could find no way to extricate himself, and the council acknowledged their inability to better the situation. Some advised him to make a frank retraction, and to attempt a complete change of policy. He still hoped for relief from General Zuloaga's friendship, which seems to have been sincere, but it availed nothing. García Conde, minister of war, was the only member of his last cabinet that continued despatching government affairs; his proposals were rejected from the interior. In one of them he had asked for a meeting of governors to bring about a general reconciliation. The alarm was very great. The constitutionalists lost no time. At a meeting of officers presided over by Comonfort they expressed regret at his not adopting any of the extremes; but then, as at all times, he firmly clung to his neutrality, refusing to take any course for or against

any party.³² Finally, on the morning of Monday, January 11, 1858, when Comonfort was on the point of departing for the interior, the troops quartered in Santo Domingo and La Ciudadela revolted, going over to the reaccionarios, who had ere this set aside the plan of Tacubaya. Comonfort's spirit was now aroused. Declining the proffers of protection to his person made by the diplomatic corps, he concentrated nearly 5,000 men that he still had in the lower part of the palace and other accessible points, showing much coolness, and resolved to hold the San Francisco, the headquarters of the constitutionalists, with whom he had come to an understanding. He thought then it would be a lesser evil to go back to the point of departure, and surrender the executive authority to the person designated by the constitution, as appears in the manifesto he published in July 1858, in New York.³³ He accordingly released Juarez,³⁴ who forthwith repaired to Guanajuato, and on the 19th of January established there his government, which was

³² Being assured of every facility if he would give his preference to the conservative party, he refused; he would not become, he said, the destroyer of his former friends; could not banish Juarez or Olvera, nor fight against Doblado and Parrodi. He would modify all; 'yo no perseguiré ya, porque el brazo me duele de castigar; pero yo no puedo convertirme en reaccionario.' He was told to throw himself into the arms of the puros, as the out-and-out liberals were called, and they would forget and forgive; to nationalize the property of the clergy, to confine the nuns to fewer houses, do away with the friars, banish a few dozen men from the country, and perhaps shoot a number of others; to follow a straight progressive policy, call an assembly to make another constitution, and stop all temporizing with the clergy, high and low. No: he would not send away the archbishop, who might die on the journey, and the death would be laid at his door. How leave the towns without their curas? How expect the soldiers to fight with alacrity, knowing that dying they would not be absolved, and at death would not be buried in holy ground? He wanted time to think, and to introduce reforms slowly, without doing violence to the consciences of the peaceful and timid. Such was the dilly-dallying at a time when there was not a moment to spare. 'Revolucion que no marcha, muere.' *Payno, Mem. Revol. Dic.*, 95-7.

³³ 'Menos malo era volver al punto de partida;' the plan of Tacubaya have been destroyed by its own authors, and the reactionary tendencies of the pronunciamiento being clear. *Comonfort, Política*, in *Portilla, Méj. en 1856-7*, 391; *Comonfort's Policy*, 19; *Méx., Rev. Filosóf. Hist. Polít.*, in *Doc. Hist. Méx.*, 1832-7, nos 10, 55.

³⁴ Juarez is said to have been under the personal custody of Manuel Payno, to protect him from possible assassination. *Payno, Mem. Revol. Dic.*, 95, 104-5.

at once recognized by a majority of the states, and became a centre of union for the liberals.

But to return to affairs in the city of Mexico. The position of La Santísima was intrusted by Comonfort to General Trias. The reactionists, on their part, were not idle. They were constantly receiving accessions from Comonfort's army, so that on the night of the 20th his 5,000 men had diminished to scarcely 500, with which insignificant number it would be folly to attempt defence. Comonfort kept up his courage; but by the advice of his friends Rangel and Pardo, he resolved to leave the capital. In his sad predicament he uttered not a word against the men who had brought him into it. The reactionary general, Parra, allowed him to depart, which he did about eight in the morning of January 21, 1858, with his aids and some troops, most of whom deserted him a little way out.³⁵ He embarked on the steamer *Tennessee* on the 7th of February, leaving a manifesto expressing the vain hope that the well-intentioned of all parties, disregarding past animosities, might succeed in restoring peace to the country.

Comonfort expiated his errors. He went into banishment as a last recourse. It was really the best thing he could do, even at the time when the best services of every liberal were greatly needed. But though in exile, he did not remain quiet. He always manifested the desire to serve his country, and made attempts to return and defend liberal principles. At last a foreign war afforded Comonfort the opportunity for an honorable vindication.

The reactionary leaders, who for the moment could hardly realize their victory, immediately after Comonfort abandoned the capital, took possession of the national palace and archives, amidst the ringing of bells and the plaudits of their partisans. Zuloaga,

³⁵ Col Valero cried out 'Viva la religion!' and with the 5th cavalry and Oajaca lancers returned to the city. *Portilla, Méj. en 1856-7*, 332-3.

whom Comonfort had arrested, and soon after released because no complicity in the revolt of January 11th appeared against him, now found himself placed by circumstances at the head of affairs; and pursuant to the reformed plan of Tacubaya, summoned a body of representatives, among whom were some bishops and other ecclesiastics, to meet on the 22d and choose the president of the republic. They met accordingly, made José Ignacio Pavón their chairman, and after some unnecessary discussion for form's sake, inasmuch as two or three military chiefs and the clergy had the whole control, Félix Zuloaga was chosen president by twenty-six votes, against one cast for Echeagaray and another for Santa Anna. The oath of office prescribed by the committee, containing the obligation to support religion and national independence, and to promote union among the Mexicans, and the general welfare, was administered to Zuloaga a little after midnight on the 23d.

Zuloaga was born in Álamos, Chihuahua, in 1814, and in 1834 became a lieutenant of national guards. In 1836 he was transferred to the engineer corps, in which branch he served several years in various parts of the country. In 1843 he was a brevet lieutenant-colonel. During the American war he prepared defences in Monterey, Saltillo, between Vera Cruz and Mexico, and lastly, in the southern part of the capital.³⁶ The next two years he served in the southern campaign as a brevet general of brigade, and in 1855 was promoted. That year he was taken prisoner, and Comonfort not only saved him from being shot, but had him at his side until the triumph of the revolution of Ayutla. Later he intrusted to him the military operations in the sierra de Querétaro, and afterward employed him in the two campaigns of Puebla, and appointed him a councillor of state. Finally, we

³⁶ In July 1847 he returned to private life in his native state, where he held, for a time, municipal offices till 1853, when he rejoined the military service, being made a colonel and president of the military court for trying robbers and highwaymen, which office he filled several months.

have seen that, as a mark of confidence, he gave him command of the brigade stationed in Tacubaya.³⁷

At the time of taking possession of the presidential chair, Zuloaga spoke in general terms of his intention to secure the just rights of citizens, but did not lay down any policy.³⁸ He at once appointed his cabinet, made up of men whose antecedents and political opinions clearly indicated that the civil war would be pushed energetically till the influence of the army and clergy should predominate.³⁹

The foreign legations rather hastily recognized his government as one de facto. It would have been difficult for them to say on what they grounded its probable stability.

Among the first acts of Zuloaga's cabinet was the organization of a government council with one representative from each state and territory, regulating its functions and duties. The next steps were to restore the fueros, and generally to annul the reform laws passed during Comonfort's administration.⁴⁰ Their retrogressive acts did their cause more harm than the liberal forces ever could; inasmuch as the reform

³⁷ Rivera says that though Zuloaga's revolt led to Comonfort's downfall, it is but justice to state that he did not mean to be ungrateful to the late president. *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 533. Lefèvre speaks contemptuously of his character and abilities: 'Antiguo baratero en una casa de juego, que solo su nulidad le habia designado al clero para que este hiciese de él su hombre de paja.' *Doc. Ofic. Maximiliano*, i. 26.

³⁸ However, the development of a policy in consonance with the reformed plan de Tacubaya was soon after initiated. *La Cruz*, vi. 558; *Méx.*, *El Gob. Sup.*, 1-9; *Córtes*, *Diario Cong.*, i. ap. 5, note 4, 20; *Diario de Avisos*, Jan. 23, 25, 1858.

³⁹ The appointments were on the 24th, namely: Luis G. Cuevas, minister of relations; Manuel Larrainzar, of justice, public instruction, and ecclesiastical affairs, who resigned the office April 22d, being succeeded ad interim by Hilario Elguero from April 24th, and later by Francisco Javier Miranda from July 10th; Hilario Elguero, of government; Juan Hierro Maldonado, of fomento; and José de la Parra, of war. Hierro was for a time charged with the portfolio of the treasury, which, on the 25th of April, went into the hands of Manuel Piña y Cuevas. *Méx.*, *Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1058.

⁴⁰ The Lerdo law and that on parochial emoluments were repealed on the 28th of Jan. *Méx.*, *Col. Ley.*, Mex., 1861, ii. 1-18; *Diario de Avisos*, Jan. 28, 1858; *El Eco Nacional*, Jan. 29, 1858. On the other hand, President Juárez, by his decree of Jan. 19, 1858, reiterated August 30 and January 4, 1859, declared all acts of the revolutionists from Dec. 17, 1857, null and void. *Archivo Méx.*, *Col. Ley.*, iv. 3, 7, 13-17; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, viii. 654; *Buenrostro, Hist. Seg. Cong. Const.*, i. 60.

laws had already developed interests that could not be destroyed, particularly such as emanated from the ley Lerdo. However, so great a change was operated in one month, with the power and pecuniary assistance of the clergy, that the government found itself enabled to meet the liberal forces, among whose leaders was lacking the bond of union so necessary to insure success. The conservative chiefs, on the contrary, were now acting in accord.


The possession of the port of Vera Cruz being of the highest import, Zuloaga tried to win over to his side Gutierrez Zamora, governor of that state, who never returned answers to his official letters, but in a private letter⁴¹ apprised him of his resolve to sustain Juarez' constitutional authority. The reactionists still hoped to gain possession of the port, believing that their opponents, by using the moneys appropriated under conventions from the customs revenue to the payment of the foreign debt, would provoke a foreign war. Zuloaga placed much reliance on the recognition of his government by the diplomatic corps, as well as on the support of the pope's legate, Monsignore Clementi.⁴²

All eyes were turned to the campaign in the interior, which was to decide the destiny of the country. Everything else, even the dispute with Spain, fraught though it was with danger in view of the concentration of a large Spanish fleet in the waters of Cuba, went for the present unnoticed. Zuloaga endeavored to win popularity by an order suppressing levies for the army, and to ingratiate himself with the

⁴¹ Dated Feb. 13th. *Diario de Avisos*, Feb. 23, 1858.

⁴² The legate had been officially advised of the repeal of the reform laws. Zuloaga had on the 31st of Jan. addressed the pope a letter expressive of his government's allegiance to the holy see, which was forwarded through Clementi, there being no Mexican legation then in Rome. The answer, dated March 18th, came in the same manner; the pope manifesting the highest satisfaction at the suppression of those laws which had kept the church of Mexico, he said, in great affliction, and rejoicing at the promised harmony between the state and the church in the future. *Diario de Avisos*, February 27, 1858; *La Cruz*, vii. 94-6, 415-16; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, v. 37; *Wappäus, Mex.*, 124-5.

clergy and the pious, frequently attended church, visited the shrine of the *virgen de Guadalupe*, took the communion in public, and even went so far as to appoint himself a chaplain. He also pardoned deserters from the army, and liberated some prisoners, but at the same time filled the jails with liberals accused of plotting. The eastern states, on the other hand, formed a league, and Vidaurri was organizing forces to oppose the reaction. Manuel Doblado headed



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another coalition in the interior for the same purpose. It was he who declared that retractions in articulo mortis counted for nothing. This last-named league presented a resolute aspect, Parrodi decreeing on the 15th of January that anti-constitutionalists should be dealt with as conspirators. Zuloaga and his supporters paid no heed to that threat other than to organize forces with the money supplied by the clergy.⁴³ Be-

⁴³ The libro de actas of the cathedral chapter of Mexico, with the signatures of El Obispo de Tenagra, arcediano, and Ignacio Martinez y Rojas, secretary,

lieving themselves under God's special protection, and relying on the dissensions said to exist among the liberals, the reactionary chiefs felt certain of success. The liberal army of the interior, upwards of 10,000 men, had its headquarters in Celaya. The troops had been in constant hard service and needed rest. San Luis Potosí, Tampico, and other principal towns were surrounded by liberal forces, and had it not been for the defection of many, the reaction might have been easily crushed. The battle of Salamanca in Guanajuato, fought on the 9th and 10th of March, was the most memorable one, and resulted disastrously for the constitutionalists,⁴⁴ opening the gates of the interior to their foes, and was soon followed by Dolado's capitulation at Silao. The successes rewarding the reactionists in less than two months were extraordinary, and if they had been able to get Vera Cruz, their rule might have been a long one. They were now further strengthened by a revolt in Mazatlan, with the approval of General Yañez, and of the troops in Guanajuato and other towns. But the constitutionalists were determined not to yield;⁴⁵ they

giving them authenticity, Jan. 27 and 28, 1858, shows that even before the end of the reactionary revolution its chiefs had asked for money of the archbishop; that afterward he was asked to contribute one and a half million dollars. It was first intended to let the government have the least valuable portion of the silver plate in the churches and convents; and finally, as its necessities were very pressing, it was concluded that the chapter should forthwith advance \$150,000, and afterward arrange about the million and a half. The archbishop had in general terms promised that the church would aid the government to the best of its ability, but 'ni habrán de hipotecarse sus bienes, ni tampoco emitirse pagarés, ni aceptarse libranzas.' Other ecclesiastical documents exhibit the enormous sums furnished by the clergy for carrying on the war.

⁴⁴ They retreated from Celaya in the face of the enemy, commanded by Osollo, who attacked them on the 9th. Many of the liberal battalions threw down their arms and deserted, which became known to Osollo that night. Sure of victory, he vigorously followed up his advantage the next morning; but Parodi made Calderon's cavalry charge upon his ranks, causing much havoc. However, Osollo had excellent artillery, which was efficiently used. Calderon was slain, and most of the liberal battalions became dispersed. A few of them stood their ground, repulsed the enemy, and saved some pieces of artillery. The ammunition was despatched to Irapuato, and the chiefs with 3,000 men moved on to Guadalajara. *Diario de Aris*, March 9, 1858; *El Eco Nac.*, March 11, 1858; *Buenrostro*, *Hist. Seg. Cong. Const.*, i. 61; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 536; *Id.*, *Hist. Jalapa*, v. 38-9, 43-5.

⁴⁵ President Juárez' government, in a circular to the governors detailing

kept up an active guerrilla warfare, striking the enemy or crippling his resources, as opportunity favored them. It was easy to see that after its victory at Salamanca the reactionary government would leave no stone unturned to secure possession of the port of Vera Cruz. With this object in view, intrigues were carried on with some residents of the place, all of which were frustrated by the vigilance of the authorities. Echeagaray marched with troops into the state, where he had friends, through whom money was used to breed discord between the regular forces and the national guard; but, thanks to Governor Gutierrez Zamora's good management, harmony was restored.

Zuloaga decreed the dismissal from the army of the generals and other officers serving with the liberals, and believed his triumph secured, when a portion of the garrison in Guadalajara mutinied, with Lieutenant-colonel Landa at its head, and seized Juarez, whom the circumstances of the war had obliged to remove there from Guanajuato, together with his ministers and other officials.⁴⁶ The mutineers confined their prisoners in one room, threatening them with death, particularly Juarez, as the only obstacle to the triumph of the reactionists. They were extricated, however, from their perilous position, or with Juarez' death there would have been an entire change in the country's political affairs, for some years, at least.

This was a thrilling episode. Nuñez, the commander of the garrison, hastened to the mutineers' barracks, where he was fired upon and then placed in confinement. However, a portion of the cavalry and national guard started to rescue the prisoners, and as they were about entering the palace, the mutineers

the last occurrences, made known his firm resolve to face all difficulties, and to incur all sacrifices in order to save the laws and citizens' rights.

⁴⁶ After the defeat at Salamanca, the garrison of Guadalajara becameshaky. Landa, with a portion of his regiment, the 5th infantry, which was on guard at the government palace, revolted in favor of the reaction. *Juarez, Biog. del Cind.*, 23; *Diario de Avisos*, March 22, 26, 1858; *El Eco Nac.*, March 21, 24, 1858.

thought themselves lost. Peraza, who commanded the guard over the prisoners, ordered his men to point their muskets at the prisoners. Guillermo Prieto dissuaded the soldiers from firing, and they left the room. Landa and one Morett tried to obtain from Juarez an order for the faithful troops not to fire against the mutineers, but he impassively replied that, being a prisoner, he could give no orders. Landa finally agreed to an arrangement that Juarez and the others should be set free and allowed to leave Guadalajara, exempt from recapture within the radius of ten leagues from it. The party had a narrow escape from falling into the enemy's hands again on their journey to Colima, when Juarez not only showed the utmost coolness, but great abnegation.⁴⁷

Juarez arrived at Sayula on the 23d of March, and found there General Rocha with his force. Before reaching Colima, news came that Parrodi had on that day surrendered in Guadalajara without resistance,⁴⁸ and thus failed the coalition of the states in the interior.

Santos Degollado, who had hitherto had only the portfolio of government, was now also intrusted with that of war, and with the chief command—incompetent as he had shown himself for high commands—of the constitutionalist army yet to be organized. He was also clothed with ample powers in financial affairs connected with that army.⁴⁹

Juarez now resolved to establish his government in Vera Cruz, where he could make his action better felt. Accordingly, on the 14th of April, he embarked at Manzanillo with the other members of his cabinet, namely, Melchor Ocampo, of relations; Man-

⁴⁷ Full details of the affair at the inn of Santa Anna, Acatlan, appear in *Juarez, Biog. del Ciudad.*, 24-6, 47-8; *Juarez, Cartas*, in *Circulares Leg. Mex.*, 452-3.

⁴⁸ Parrodi capitulated to Osollo and Miramon. Tepic accepted the reformed plan of Tacubaya March 27th. *El Eco Nac.*, March 28, Apr. 10, 1858; *Diario de Avisos*, March 29-31, Apr. 5, 9, 10, 1858.

⁴⁹ Decrees of Apr. 5th at Colima. *Dublin and Louano, Leg. Mex.*, viii. 654-5.

uel Ruiz, of justice; Guillermo Prieto, of the treasury; and Leon Guzman, of fomento,⁵⁰ on the American steamship *John L. Stephens*, and in seven days reached Panamá, whence, via Colon, Habana, and New Orleans, he went to Vera Cruz, landing on the 4th of May, 1858, and forthwith installed his government.⁵¹

⁵⁰ *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1054-7.

⁵¹ Officially announced to governor and others by Minister Ocampo on the 8th of May. *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, viii. 653-6; *Diario de Avisos*, Dec. 21, 1858.

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CHAPTER XXIX.

STRIFE FOR SUPREMACY.

1858-1859.

PRESIDENT JUAREZ—HIS GOVERNMENT AT VERA CRUZ—WAR OPERATIONS—ZULOAGA'S DIFFICULTIES—HIS CHANGE OF POLICY—ECHEAGARAY'S PRONUNCIAMIENTO AND PLAN—ROBLES PEZUELA'S REFORMED PLAN—ZULOAGA SET ASIDE—MIRAMON COMES TO THE FRONT—ZULOAGA REINSTATED—ROBLES PEZUELA RETIRES—ZULOAGA NAMES A SUBSTITUTE—MIRAMON AS PRESIDENT—HIS CAMPAIGN IN VERA CRUZ A FAILURE—BATTLE OF TACUBAYA—CONSTITUTIONALISTS' DEFEAT—A DAY OF HORRORS, AND ITS EVIL CONSEQUENCES.

At the end of the last chapter we left the government of Juarez, based on the constitution of 1857, installed at Vera Cruz.

Before proceeding further, I will give here some information on the previous life of this extraordinary man, risen from the lower stratum of society to become one of his country's brilliant lights, statesman, patriot, and representative of a progressive age.

The city of Oajaca, capital of the state bearing the same name, is situated in a small valley near the mountain of San Felipe, a portion of the extensive and complicated ridge formed by the junction in the state of the two branches of the Sierra Madre. Twenty-two miles to the north-east of the city is the town of Santo Tomás de Ixtlan, within whose district lies, in the most intricate part of the mountain, the humble though picturesque hamlet of 150 or 200 inhabitants named San Pablo Guelatao, consisting of a few huts of adobe and the rest of straw, but surrounded by fertile soil that yields a variety of fine

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fruit, and embellished with a lake to which, for its limpid waters, the people have given the romantic name of Lago Encantado. Here in this spot was born the champion of Mexican liberty and independence, Benito Juarez, on the 21st of March, 1806.¹ He lost his mother at his birth, and remained in charge of his grandmother first, and of an uncle next. The poverty of his relatives and the isolated position of his home prevented the boy from receiving even the first elements of instruction, and thus at the age of twelve years he could neither read nor write, and was ignorant of the Spanish language.

The people dwelling to the north-east of the sierra bore a name for honesty and industrious habits, which made them much sought after by the wealthy families of the city for servants, whose compensation was indeed insignificant; but then the boys and girls desiring it had an opportunity to attend school. Juarez followed the example of his companions, and in 1818 entered the service of a worthy and charitable citizen named Antonio Salanueva,² who became so much attached to the bright and studious Indian boy that he resolved to educate him for the priesthood, and in due time entered him at the ecclesiastical seminary. The young student's application was truly remarkable, and his conduct exemplary in every respect. He made rapid progress, and had already finished the first year's course of theology, when he threw off the robe, never having taken kindly to the ecclesiastical calling, and went to study law in the instituto de

¹ The certificate of his christening at the parish church of Ixtlan on the following day states that he was born in wedlock, both his parents, Marcelino Juarez and Brigida García, being pure Indians; their worldly goods consisted of a hut, a little piece of land, and a few domestic animals. They were therefore in not very comfortable circumstances, and could offer their son only a life of toil. *Baz, Vida de Juarez*, 22-3.

² 'Tercero del Carmen que tenia escuela pública en Oajaca.' *Castellanos, Refutacion*, in *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, iii. ap. 98. Others say he was a bookbinder, and it is barely possible that he occasionally had a book to bind or repair. I am speaking of 1818. *Baz, Vida de Juarez*, 24; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 591. Zerecero, *Mem.*, 533, calls him a bookbinder, and a 'tercero descubierto de la tercera orden de San Francisco,' one who, without having taken the vows of chastity and clausure, yet wears a habit similar to that of the other friars.

ciencias y artes, founded by a state law of 1826. From that time it may be said that he began to pave the way to eminence as a jurist and statesman of the most advanced ideas.³ Before his admission to the bar, he took an active part in the warm political campaign of 1828, affiliated, as a matter of course, with the yorkinos. Juarez never profited pecuniarily by the legal profession, his mind being too much engrossed with politics.⁴ In 1846 he began to figure in the national councils, as a deputy in the federal

³ The creation of the instituto was looked upon by the clergy as a threat against their order from the liberal party; and though the college was in charge of an enlightened, liberal-minded Dominican priest, war was declared against it. Hence a deadly hatred ensued between the seminario, which represented the old system and continued giving the education of the colonial period, and the instituto, which sympathized with progress and was to impart modern scientific instruction. Juarez experienced the moral pressure of his protector and of the ideas he had been thus far educated in, both requiring that he should stay in the seminario, while his instincts, deep thought, as well as his intimate friends, called him away to the instituto. Miguel Méndez, a pure Indian of bright intellect, who died young, was one of the friends who prompted him to resist his protector's influence. *Zerecero, Mem.*, 536. In 1829 he was appointed to the chair of experimental physics. In 1832 he was made a bachelor of laws, and on the 13th of Jan., 1834, admitted to the bar with the privilege of practice in all the courts of the republic. *Baz, Vida de Juarez*, 30-1; *Juarez, Vida del Ciudadano*, 12.

Juarez' personal appearance was as follows: of less than medium height; dark copper color; his features were those of a pure Indian, with black piercing eyes and a frank countenance. He had a large scar across his face, which, however, did not disfigure it; hands and feet quite small. Open and communicative in matters not demanding reserve, he was extremely reticent in state affairs; a man who reflected and deliberated long before acting. It was his wont to deeply study the letter and spirit of the law, and after forming his opinion on the right interpretation, nothing could swerve him. His temperament was lymphatic bilious, with all the energy and force of the bilious, and all the calm and coolness of his race, even amid the greatest danger. His health was usually good; indeed, only once in his long political career was he confined to his bed till his last illness. He slept but little, and was an early riser. On the 1st of August, 1843, he married Margarita Maza, by whom he had twelve children, most of them girls. His home was remarkable for domestic peace, his wife being a model woman. His private like his public life was pure; never was he accused of corrupt practices. His leisure moments were devoted to study, specially of history; and though well informed on general subjects, his natural modesty precluded all display of his attainments. *Juarez, Biog. del Ciudadano*, 40; *Salm-Salm's Diary*, ii. 30-1. Portraits of Juarez may be seen in *Zerecero, Mem.*, 529; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, v. 398; *Id., Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 344; *Payno, Cuentas, Gastos*, etc., 601. See also my *Life of Porfirio Díaz*, chap. vi.

⁴ His first public office was that of alderman of Oajaca in 1831; next he was elected to the state legislature, and held the deputyship two years, when, being accused of complicity in an attempted revolution in 1836, he was confined in prison several months. In 1842-5 he was juez civil y de hacienda; and then made secretary of the state government; a few months later, attorney-general.

congress, when he sustained the government in raising funds on the ecclesiastical property for the war against the United States. In 1847 he was chosen constitutional governor of Oajaca, reëlected in 1849, and discharged the office till 1852, when he retired to private life, the constitution not permitting a second reëlection. These five years of service gave him renown throughout the republic. After his surrender of the executive authority, he became president of his beloved instituto, and opened a law office, being then as poor, plain, and honest as before he held his first public trust. But he was allowed only a few months' rest. His presence in the country was dangerous to any tyrannical ruler.⁵

After the triumph of the revolution of Ayutla, we have seen Juarez a member of the president's cabinet, and later appointed governor of Oajaca in 1856. His administration at this time was marked by much ability and energy. Among the many benefits it conferred on the state was the restoration of the instituto de ciencias which Santa Anna had suppressed. In 1857 he was chosen constitutional governor of the state by 112,000 direct votes.

The blow which the constitutionalists received by Parrodi's surrender tended to decrease their number, as well as that of the towns which had hitherto rec-

⁵ The conservatives having triumphed in Oajaca in January 1853, Santa Anna arrived in Mexico in April; a few months later he had Juarez banished from his home to Jalapa. Soon after he ordered him to Huamantla, and on arriving in Puebla, the next day, Santa Anna's son José arrested him, and without allowing him time even to get his clothes, conveyed him in a closed carriage seventy leagues to the pier at Vera Cruz. After a confinement of a few days in San Juan de Ulúa, he was put on board the British mail steamer without even paying for his passage, or allowing him time to procure money to live on during an indefinite period of exile. Some friends, however, went to his aid, and paid his passage to Habana and thence to New Orleans. At the last-named place he lived on the little his wife and friends could send him, and we are assured that at times he had to eke out a livelihood by twisting cigars. He remained in New Orleans till July 1855, when he went to Acapulco, via Panamá, and joined General Alvarez, then commanding the forces in revolt against the dictator Santa Anna, and was made a councillor of state. *Zerecero, Mem.*, 536-42; *Baz, Vida de Juarez*, 78-91; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 592; *Id., Hist. Jalapa*, iv. 426, 505; *Juarez, Vida del Ciud.*, 13.

ognized only Juarez. However, the liberal party was large, having in its ranks a majority of the most enlightened as well as of the lower classes. What they lacked was a sufficient number of able commanders to give them the superiority on the battle-fields. And yet the situation was almost desperate. Parrodi and Doblado had become much disheartened, and Juarez could count only on Degollado for the moment as a man of acknowledged firmness.

The reactionary government was also experiencing serious trouble from the uncompromising spirit of the clergy.⁶ Among its several measures was one that did not please the people, namely, changing the organization of the states into mere departments, thus restoring the central régime with a complete territorial and administrative modification. Its unpopularity was further increased by the conduct of its agents in arresting and persecuting persons, in extending espionage, enlarging the number of informers, and violating the privacy of domicile under the pretext that the inmates were conspiring. Besides the difficulty of capturing Vera Cruz, the conservative party, in whose ranks were included Zuloaga's personal supporters, had another of a very serious import; it had become divided into three branches, namely, Santanistas, Zuloaguistas, and fusionists: the first named wanted exclusively conservative principles leaning toward the aristocratic, and being aware of Zuloaga's administrative incompetency, looked upon him as a mere tool to carry out its ends; the second branch, equally exclusive in principles, was for sustaining Zuloaga; and the third desired the fusion of parties, and leaned toward moderation. The liberal party used its best endeavors to widen the breach, and to

⁶ Bishop Munguía deemed it a necessary prerequisite, before administering the sacraments to those who had sworn support to the constitution of 1857, or accepted the reform laws, that they should make a public retraction; and furthermore, foreign assignees of former ecclesiastical estates had suffered in their interests at the hands of Zuloaga's government, and filed complaints with the representatives of their respective nations. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 537.

increase the general hatred toward the reactionary administration, which, notwithstanding all these drawbacks, continued favored by fortune in its military operations.⁷ The triumphs obtained in battle made it believe that the so-called reformed plan of Tacubaya would soon rule over the whole country unopposed, in view of the fact that within four months the conservative standard had been planted in most of the populous cities of the republic amidst the enthusiastic acclamations of its partisans.

Vera Cruz had now no communication with the interior. The reactionists claimed that Juarez had come to reside there because he could not obtain recognition elsewhere. Zuloaga passed several decrees of a military character, and others to create resources; and with the view of crippling those of his enemy, ordered the closure of the ports of Vera Cruz, Matamoros, Acapulco, and Manzanillo, and the temporary opening of that of Tuxpam, which had recognized his authority.

The national existence of Mexico was now in danger; the bonds of government in the interior and the diplomatic relations with foreign powers being broken, the situation was only growing worse, and there was no apparent cure. Juarez had no idea of giving up the struggle. In Yucatan the reactionists possessed only Mérida; Tabasco was beset by the liberals; Chiapas was entirely under the control of the latter; and so were Oajaca, Guerrero, nearly the whole of Michoacan, Sonora, Aguascalientes, Zacatecas, Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, and Chihuahua, Tehuantepec, Colima, and even Tlascala; and among the states where Zuloaga's authority was recognized, such as Vera Cruz, Tamaulipas, San Luis Potosí, Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Mexico, there were some

⁷ Miramon routed the forces of Nuevo Leon at Las Carretas on the 20th of April. Echeagaray with his army had taken Orizaba, and reenforced by General Negrete, who rebelled at Corral Falso the 21st, was threatening Vera Cruz. *El Eco Nac.*, May 31, July 5, Aug. 20, 1858; *Diario de Avisos*, March 24, April 21-30, June 21, 1858.

most important points occupied by the constitutionalists.⁸

After the first shock caused by the reactionary victories had passed away, the constitutionalists felt more encouraged, and their numbers increased. Juárez' administration at first suffered much from lack of resources, but soon became convinced that it could sustain itself for an indefinite time in the port of Vera Cruz in spite of everything its opponents might do. The reactionists had one armed vessel at their disposal, the *Guerrero*, but with her could not establish a blockade, much less as the liberal government had the *Demócrata* and some gun-boats.

The time came at last when Zuloaga's government could get no more money from the clergy; so it resorted to an extraordinary tax levy, against which the British and American ministers protested. The decrees repealing the ley Lerdo, the orders on loans, and the double payment of duties demanded from foreign trade, which only by special permits from Zuloaga could affect imports, brought on further complications.⁹

Circumstances made it evident that the assembling of a congress, pursuant to the plan of Tacubaya, to constitute the nation "in the manner most adequate to its needs," was an impossibility, and Zuloaga's cabinet had to frame an estatuto orgánico to serve provisionally as a fundamental law, which could neither satisfy any one nor guarantee order or regularity in

⁸ The reactionists' tenure would not be secure till they conquered Sonora and Chihuahua, defeated Vidaurri, and captured Perote; expelled Garza from Ciudad Victoria, Castro from Zacatecas, Aranda from Zacatecas, Degollado from Colima and the surroundings, Álvarez from the south; and generally other chiefs who held important positions, not to speak of the innumerable guerrilla bands of Villalba, Leon, Córdoba, Carbajal, and a thousand others in the sierras. To face so many foes the Zuloaguistas had not the requisite number of soldiers—in the city of Mexico alone they had to permanently keep at least 2,000 men—nor the money to support the forces already in the service. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, v. 81-2.

⁹ The contest had by this time assumed the utmost blood-thirstiness. Some conspirators taken in Guadalajara were decimated. Herrera y Cairo, a former governor of Jalisco and a confirmed progressionist, was taken out of his hacienda by the reactionist chief Piélagos and killed.

the acts of the reactionary government, as under the peculiar condition of affairs it had to pursue its course without the pale of law; as regarded the liberals, it was of no use, the constitution of 1857 being their sole recognized code.

The government councils that the Zuloaguista governors organized availed naught; they were both a drag and a heavy burden on the revenue, already scanty, and derived only from extra taxation or loans from the clergy. The means furnished by the clergy, much against their will, being insufficient, the government seized private property to cover the taxes, often employing the armed force in that odious occupation. In this manner the relations with the American legation came to be interrupted. Miramon also committed violent acts against Englishmen in San Luis Potosí.

The failure to subdue the constitutionalists was finally attributed to lack of efficiency of the ministers; whereupon Zuloaga early in July organized another cabinet, with the following members, namely: Joaquin Castillo y Lanzas, of relations; M. Fernandez de Jáuregui, of government; Father F. Javier Miranda, of justice; General J. M. García, of war; Pedro Jorin, of the treasury; and José M. Zaldívar, of fomento.¹⁰ The retrogressive tendencies of this new ministry may be judged from the fact that Father Miranda's was its leading mind. It promised a more stringent policy, and certainly carried out such a one. Its most objectionable measures were a law against conspirators, and another muzzling the press.¹¹ This change of policy on Zuloaga's part would have soon brought his rule to an end; but this result was retarded by Miramon's capture of Guanajuato on the 24th of July.¹²

¹⁰ *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1058.

¹¹ The former, dated July 14, 1858, subjected conspirators to the action of courts-martial; no trial was to occupy over eight days. Death, imprisonment, or exile were the penalties provided. The other law caused the discontinuance of many journals.

¹² The place had been taken by the constitutionalists under Zuazua. *Diario de Aviso*, July 29, 1858.

Nevertheless, the reactionary government controlled only the places where it had heavy garrisons.

A number of liberals deluded themselves with the hope that the war could be ended by compromise, and suggested it to Degollado—as if compromise were possible between parties separated by such a bloody chasm! Indeed, their opponents did not fail to breed discord in their ranks, and some of the liberal leaders aided them to accomplish that end. Several prominent leaders pretended to feel contempt for the inactivity of Juarez' government precisely at a time when it was most active. Vidaurri by his exactions and arbitrary acts greatly alarmed Juarez, who wrote Degollado to reassume the chief command in the north which he had virtually abandoned.¹³

On the other hand, Zuloaga's special permits for trade greatly favored the liberal government. When this was detected, the reactionary commander Echeagaray declared the communication with the port of Vera Cruz closed on the 30th of August. The plottings of the reactionists in the liberal camp were met with liberal plots in the city of Mexico. One of these conspiracies was, unhappily for the parties concerned in it, detected on the 15th of September.¹⁴ The spirit of freedom, manifested in so many ways, prompted the government at Vera Cruz to refuse aid from private persons in the United States so long as its opponent did not seek the protection of a foreign flag; for an intervention on the part of England, France, and Spain in Mexican affairs was already contemplated as among the possibilities. Juarez had gained the good-will of the United States, whose minister, Forsyth, demanded his passports from Zuloaga.

¹³ Vidaurri without authority deposed several liberal governors, replacing them with his own friends. Some of the governors had assumed powers that were of the exclusive province of the general government; for instance, the governor of Chihuahua and his legislature granted to a company the exclusive right to build an interoceanic railroad. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 543.

¹⁴ These parties were executed. *El Eco Nac.*, Nov. 20, 21, 1858; *Diario de Avisos*, Sept. 16, Nov. 19, 1858.

The war continued to rage. The constitutionalists showed themselves at various points, the largest force being that of Antonio Carbajal. Some of these parties became notorious for their lawless acts, and Zuloaga resolved to recognize in guerrillamen no political character, and to punish them as common criminals, besides holding them pecuniarily responsible for damages caused.¹⁵ There was much fighting going on. A severe action took place August 12th near Acámbaro, between Leonardo Marquez and the constitutionalists under Pueblita and others, nearly 4,000 strong, that lasted several hours, the night putting an end to it. Marquez then marched to Querétaro. Miramon and Mejía occupied San Luis Potosí on September 12th. Vidaurri was signally defeated by them and Marquez, near Ahualulco in San Luis Potosí on the 29th of that month, after an intermittent fighting of five days. His frontiersmen left on the field 400 killed, 170 wounded, upward of 3,000 prisoners, 33 pieces of artillery, 120 wagons of ammunition, arms, etc. According to Miramon's official report, his casualties were 7 officers killed, 20 wounded, including Mejía, 136 rank and file killed, 181 wounded, and 43 missing.¹⁶ This victory was celebrated in Mexico in many ways, Zuloaga decreeing a cross to every man of his army who was in the battle, and a sword of honor to Miramon. The joy of the reactionists was somewhat dampened by the reverse sustained in the defile of Las Cuevitas, Jalisco, on the 21st of September, by the forces of General Casanova, who had himself a narrow escape from capture. However, their victory at Ahualulco was so important that it prevented the downfall during two years more of the reaction, which now encountered resistance only in Vera Cruz, against which place it brought to bear all its resources. And yet, at that time when

¹⁵ Several parties were thus treated. *Diario de Avisos*, Sept. 27, Oct. 13, 1858; *El Eco Nac.*, Sept. 13 to Oct. 31, 1858.

¹⁶ Rivera, *Hist. Jalapa*, v. 128-9; *Diario de Avisos*, Oct. 15, 25, Dec. 10, 1858; *El Eco Nac.*, Oct. 15, 24, Nov. 17, 27, 1858.

the reactionists were in their fullest strength—October 1858—the capital was assailed on the 14th by 3,000 constitutionalists from Morelia, of whose coming Zuloaga had no inkling till they arrived at the gates of Mexico. The assailants were commanded by General Blanco, who occupied the hill of Chapultepec, and attacked the Tlalpam gate, but had to retreat before the reactionary forces of Perez Gomez and Piña; the liberals being likewise dislodged from San Pedro y San Pablo and La Merced, where they had intrenched themselves with their leader, General José J. Álvarez.¹⁷

The capital was the centre of agitation of all the liberals that had been expelled from the departments, and who now began to feel renewed encouragement with the recapture of Guadalajara by Santos Degollado on the 27th of October, after a siege of thirty days and a formal assault. One third of the city was left in ruins. Several executions followed for unjustifiable acts.¹⁸

The defeat of Vicario in the south of Mexico, and the occupation of Pachuca by Carbajal, also occurred. In the last months of the year, the only hopes of the reactionary party were centred in Miramon's energy, recognized and admired even by his enemies, and in the supplies imported by Colonel Robles Pezuela through La Antigua, with which he at once tendered his services to General Echeagaray for the capture of Perote.¹⁹

¹⁷ The liberals came, expecting there would be a revolutionary movement in the capital. In their disappointment they retreated on the 17th in the direction of Los Remedios, carrying away many of the silver bars they had taken out of Morelia and leaving the others with a sympathizer. With them went Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, whose residence was in Tacubaya. *Diario de Avisos*, Oct. 18-29, Nov. 2, 3, 1858; *El Eco Nac.*, Oct. 18-31, Nov. 1-4, 1858; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, v. 130-2; *Id.*, *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 545.

¹⁸ Felipe Rodriguez, Piélagos, the murderer of ex-Gov. Herrera, and Morayo, chief of police, suffered. Piélagos was hanged on the balcony of the episcopal palace. *H. M. Prop. Eccles.*, 31-4, 38, 46-9.

¹⁹ The liberal forces of any consideration at the present time were those of Degollado in Jalisco; Gutierrez Zamora and Alatríste in Vera Cruz and Puebla; Garza in Tamaulipas; Arteaga in Querétaro and Guanajuato; Álvarez in Guerrero; Huerta and Blanco in Michoacan; Álvarez, Delgado, and Miranda in Monte Alto, near the capital; and those in Oajaca. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, v. 137.

Zacatecas was taken by Marquez, but it availed him nothing; he had to quit the city, and it was forthwith reoccupied by the constitutionalists. He marched to Guadalajara with 4,000 men, and Degollado evacuated it, his forces going in various directions, a portion of them making an unsuccessful defence of several days on the Tololotlan bridge, some eighteen miles from Guadalajara.²⁰ The reactionists were also successful in capturing Perote on the 16th of November.²¹

In the early part of November, Zuloaga's minister Fernandez de Jáuregui offered to resign his portfolio, but the resignation was not accepted. When the constitutionalists took Guadalajara and committed the terrible acts of retaliation described, the utmost alarm seized the government circle in Mexico, and the oft-repeated cry of religion, country, and society being threatened with destruction was again heard. The British and French ministers, Otway and Gabriac, held frequent conferences with Zuloaga, and Spain showed herself a most decided friend of the reaction. Judging by the satisfaction the reactionists were manifesting, it was pretty certain that they would coöperate with the foreign squadrons in the blockade of Mexican ports.²² There were in Vera Cruz at the time armed vessels not only of two European powers named,²³ but one of the United States, which had come to demand payment of the claims of their citizens. The latter found in Juárez' government the best disposition to settle the claims.

²⁰ According to Marquez' official report, Degollado was defeated the 14th of Dec., and the city was occupied the next day. *El Eco Nac.*, Dec. 19, 22, 28, 1858.

²¹ After three months' siege by 3,000 men. The town was destroyed. With the fortress were taken 37 pieces of artillery. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, v. 138-41.

²² The *Diario Oficial* said that the European war vessels at Vera Cruz and Tampico had no hostile intention against the republic; but 'against the vandals that had committed outrages on natives and foreigners... It was well known by both natives and foreigners that the so-called constitutionalist revolution was not a political but a social one.'

²³ There were then lying off Vera Cruz five Spanish and five French war ships.

Juarez appealed to the governors of states to raise money wherewith to meet the French dividend already due and guaranteed by the custom-house at Vera Cruz, and also to enable him to defend the seat of his government.

The failure of Zuloaga to provide for a constitution brought on the destruction of his government. Echeagaray made a pronunciamiento at Ayotla on the 20th of December, 1858; his plan being to summon a congress to frame a fundamental law suited to the needs of the country.²⁴ Meantime he was to administer the government. Zuloaga at once adopted measures to put down the revolt, assuming personal command of the forces in the city, and forbidding all relations with the rebels. He issued a manifesto against Echeagaray, who was dismissed from the army, and had Manuel Doblado arrested.

The new plan was seconded in Cuernavaca, but met with little favor from either liberals or reactionists, though it claimed to fill the aspirations of the country, which, as Echeagaray said, detested political exaggerations, and only desired a rational freedom.

Zuloaga's measures availed him nothing, for, on the morning of the 23d, Gual's infantry battalion in the capital revolted in support of another plan formed by Robles Pezuela, which somewhat modified that of Ayotla, and was intended to overthrow the existing government. Robles and Echeagaray were to designate the persons who were to organize a provisional government in the manner provided in their plan.²⁵ Robles was recognized in the capital as the chief of the movement. Zuloaga offered to resign if the objections were to himself personally, but would not give his assent to the overthrow of the principles of his administration.

²⁴ The congress to be formed of three deputies from each department. The constitution to be submitted to the people for approval, and amended if necessary. *Diario de Avisos*, Dec. 23-8, 1858; *Lefèvre, Le Mexique*, 66; *Wappäus, Mexico*, 130; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, v. 148-9; *Id., Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 547.

²⁵ They were to appoint, in accord with the chief civil authority of each department, a junta of notables, who should choose three representatives.

But as the troops on whom he relied forsook him, he had to resign the presidency, which he did at eleven o'clock on the night of the 23d, after which he went with his family to seek asylum at the British legation, though he had been assured by the revolutionists of personal safety and liberty.²⁶ All military commissions that had been issued by him were recognized as valid.

The authors of the last political revolution believed that neither of the two chief contending parties could triumph over its opponent, and secure peace, and that by getting Zuloaga out of the way an understanding might be arrived at with Juarez and his supporters. Robles Pezuela occupied the palace in the morning of the 24th, and but for the greater activity in the movements of officials, the change effected was hardly noticeable.

Manuel Robles Pezuela was a native of Guajuato.²⁷ In 1852 he was minister of war, and the next year, being dissatisfied with the political situation, he resigned his office and military rank, and went abroad, travelling through the United States, England, and the continent of Europe as far as Turkey, and visiting the principal fortresses and scientific and military establishments. In September 1858 he returned to Mexico and aided Echeagaray to capture Perote, having had restored to him his rank as a general.

Juarez had no faith in the men who were at the head of the recent movement in Mexico. His opinion was expressed in clear and distinct terms, in his

²⁶ The arrangement for his resignation was made at the house of Lic. José M. Godoy, by two generals and one member of the legal profession, representing each of the parties. *El Eco Nac.*, Dec. 26, 1858.

²⁷ In 1842 he was a captain of engineers; in 1846 a lieutenant-col; in which year he commanded the engineers at Vera Cruz during the blockade by U. S. forces, and also in the following year during the siege and bombardment. For his good services he was given a medal of honor, and the congress of Vera Cruz made him a citizen of the state. He continued rendering services throughout the war with the U. S.

advice to the constitutionalists to keep themselves aloof from it, and to the soldiers fighting for the constitutional cause not to forsake their standard, but to continue the good fight till victory should crown their efforts.²⁸

Robles appealed to the clergy for means to support the troops, and despatched commissioners to Governor Gutierrez Zamora at Vera Cruz, and other prominent supporters of Juarez, inviting them to second his plan. Meanwhile the reactionary forces were kept on the defensive.

The departments of Mexico and Guanajuato accepted the modified plan, and it was reported that Vera Cruz was well disposed thereto, inasmuch as it recognized for its basis popular sovereignty. The constitutional government looked, however, on these devices as by-play, and commanded that operations on the field should be vigorously prosecuted.

One thing was noticed in the arrangements of the leading men at Mexico: that no mention was made of a commissioner to represent the northern army in the junta to be organized, as if to indicate that Miramon was ignored. This greatly displeased the out-and-out reactionists, and the result was that Robles' action did not change the aspect of the main question.

The organization of the junta at the capital was delayed by Echeagaray, who was not pleased with the doings there, and even felt disposed to march with his troops upon Mexico; but he was arrested, and on being released sent as his delegate Carlos Peza, who on his way was captured by the guerrilla chief Carbajal. Robles' plan for various reasons became impracticable, though he had finally agreed to Echeagaray and Miramon being represented in the junta,

²⁸ In his proclamation of Dec. 29th, Juarez says: 'Mexicanos: Meditad bien estos sucesos, y decid si la república tendrá paz, libertad y garantías con tales hombres, que reaccionarios, no respetan sus propias hechuras; y gobernantes, ni tienen el prestigio, ni la fuerza para hacerse obedecer.' *Baz, Vida de Juarez*, 146.

which assembled on the 30th of December,²⁹ and after framing rules for the executive, and the mode of calling the nation to constitute herself, proceeded to choose a provisional president of the republic. Robles had a majority of votes, but it was decided to have another ballot, as it might be dangerous to ignore Miramon's claims to the presidency. The young general was finally chosen by 50 votes against 46 for Robles Pezuela, and proclaimed to be the provisional president, Robles being authorized to act as his substitute till Miramon should come and assume his duties. A circular of January 4, 1859, by Juarez' minister Ruiz, calls the proceedings a scandal.³⁰

Miramón, flushed with his last victory over Degollado, repudiated all that had been done in Mexico, announcing his intention to uphold the reformed plan of Tacubaya. Robles then retired to private life for a few days. Much confusion prevailed now in the reactionary councils. Zuloaga resigned the presidency, then annulled the resignation, and finally decreed that it was his prerogative to name a substitute, designating on the 31st of January, 1859, Miguel Miramon for that position. He was the first to hail Miramon as president, and surrendered the executive authority into his hands, though probably reserving the right to resume it.³¹

From time to time afterward Zuloaga manifested desires of reoccupying the presidential seat. Miramon took him into the interior, so as to have him under better control. Miramon used him to legalize his own arbitrary acts. This did not last long, as another junta shortly after made Miramon president in his own right. Zuloaga made his escape, remain-

²⁹ There had been summoned 150 men, but only 90 or 100 came together, with Mariano Riva Palacio as president, and Lic. Gonzalez de la Vega and Gen. Francisco Segovia as secretaries. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 551-2; *Id.*, *Hist. Jalapa*, v. 157-61; *Diario de Avisos*, Jan. 1-4, 26, 1859.

³⁰ 'A junta of persons having no mission from the people, and yet calling itself popular, has made an ephemeral appointment.' *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, iv. 13-17; *Baz, Vida de Juarez*, 146-8.

³¹ *Diario de Avisos*, Jan. 20, Feb. 2, Aug. 15, 1859.

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ing concealed till early in 1861, when he reappeared, claiming that he was president. He carried on a campaign during that year and a part of the next, when he went abroad, returning to Mexico in 1864, but not to figure again in political life.

Miguel Miramon, on assuming the duties of the executive office with the usual formalities, took an oath to discharge them faithfully, and to the best of his ability, upholding the Roman catholic religion. At first he made no appointments of ministers, leaving the several portfolios in charge of the respective *oficiales mayores*, but on the 15th of February he formed his cabinet, placing at its head Santa Anna's favorite minister and counsellor, Manuel Diez de Bonilla.³²

Miramon was born in the city of Mexico, on the 29th of September, 1832, descended from a French family of Pau that had been ennobled about the middle of the seventeenth century, as is said to have been established by the records in France, extracts from which were procured at his special request by the French minister, Monsieur de Gabriac. He was of middling height and lean, handsome of face, elegant in figure and manner, with an open brow and searching look, dark hair, mustache, and imperial. A man of fine intellect, he was ambitious, brave, and daring. He had many true friends, and toward those to whom he gave this name he was loyal.³³ In

³² Diez de Bonilla, minister of relations; Teófilo Marin, of government; Manuel Larrainzar, of justice, public instruction, and ecclesiastical affairs; Gabriel Sagaceta, of the treasury; Severo del Castillo, of war and marine, who held it only till the 29th of April, being succeeded by Antonio Corona; and Octaviano Muñoz Ledo, of fomento. *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1059; *Diario de Avisos*, Feb. 15, 1859.

³³ *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, v. 175. *Arias, Reseña Hist.*, gives his portrait, 385. There is one thing against his private character, however, which seems to have been prepared by Monsieur Elvin, and found in Maximilian's privy office in Mexico. It was a document giving particulars about the persons of high prominence who had rendered aid to or accepted the French intervention. Of Miramon, it says that he became a gambler early in life, and that when he was a captain of chasseurs in Toluca, he one day gambled away the funds of his company, and then forced the winner to return them to him:

February 1846 he entered as a pupil the military school, sustained the government in 1847, and that same year took part in the battles fought against the United States army at Molino del Rey, and Chapultepec. A brief synopsis of his early military record is given at foot.³⁴ Of his action in the revolutionary campaigns against Comonfort's government, and of his career since then, I have sufficiently spoken in the proper places. For his services at the capital, on the 20th of January, 1858, in taking by force the hospicio and ex-acordada on behalf of the reformed plan of Tacubaya, he had been made a general of brigade. On the 22d of December, 1858, he was promoted to general of division. His most recent services to the cause were rendered that same month, by defeating Degollado in the hacienda of Atequiza. Retaking Guadalajara, he pursued the enemy, waded the Tuxpan River at Los Novillos, recovered Colima the 25th, signally routed the constitutionalists at San Joaquin the 26th, and next marched on to the Barrancas de Beltran, where he captured 32 pieces of artillery, together with all the enemy's ammunition and trains. Leaving a garrison in Colima, he returned to Guadalajara.³⁵

Miramón proved himself not merely a brave man, but one possessed of great efficiency as a commander, with no small aid from fortune thus far. Some years later, while his courage and daring were fully acknowledged, he was set down to be "no scientific general, and rather an indifferent strategist."³⁶


* para sacarse de embarazo, cayó, el sable en mano, sobre la persona con quien habia jugado, y le hizo devolver así su dinero.' *L'effevre, Doc. Maximiliano*, i, 399.

³⁴ In the military school he went through the regular grades of promotion, from corporal to lieutenant of artillery. In 1852 he served in Jalisco, and in 1853 was in some actions under generals Salas and Rosas Landa in the department of Mexico. After that he saw much active service, and rose rapidly, so that we see him on the 6th of July, 1855, a brevet lieutenant-colonel, and on the 30th of the same month a fully commissioned one.

³⁵ It was there that he heard of his election by the junta of notables to the presidency. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 558.

³⁶ *Salm-Salm's Diary*, i. 34.

The young president was at once the object of much attention on the part both of his personal friends and admirers, as well as of the supporters of the cause he represented. At a grand banquet in his honor, which took place in the Minería building, the chief clergy were present, with the ministers of France and Ecuador, the latter being the representative of the Jesuit president Doctor García Moreno; the subject of intervention by foreign powers in Mexico was touched



MIRAMON'S VERA CRUZ CAMPAIGN.

upon by Conde de la Cortina, and a toast was drunk to it.³⁷ It has been said against Miramon that in 1858 he applied to France for armed intervention, but he denied the charge.³⁸

Among the new president's first measures was a heavy tax, which caused much consternation, of one per centum on all property exceeding \$1,000 in value.

³⁷ 'Se brindó por la intervención de las potencias extranjeras en México.' *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 356.

³⁸ From New York, Nov. 5, 1862. He also requested Almonte to publish his denial in Mexico.

Miramon's chief aim now was to capture Vera Cruz, to accomplish which he borrowed from the clergy \$300,000 on private security. Leaving all state affairs to be attended to by the ministers, he started for Vera Cruz on the 16th of February accompanied by Minister of war Castillo. In Puebla the populace gave him a royal reception.³⁹ He had been preceded by the battalions which were to carry out the difficult undertaking. On the 21st he went to Orizaba, where the ayuntamiento gave him a cordial greeting. On the 3d of March preparations had been completed, and the forces began their march. A portion of them under Oronoz and Negrete was sent to flank the Chiquihuite positions, and the Tamariz brigade to force the Jamapa ravine. The rest of the forces marched on by the national road, carrying with them a large supply of projectiles. The hopes of the liberal party were now centred in Vera Cruz, where every preparation was made to meet the impending storm. All the constitutional troops that occupied the defiles of the sierra were concentrated in the port, and families were by order of the comandante general, Iglesias, sent out of harm's way.

Ampudia, commanding the eastern liberal army, addressed Miramon's troops, urging them to abandon their standard. Money was offered to such reactionist officers as were considered purchasable, but only a small number accepted the bribe.

Meantime the reactionists had received heavy blows elsewhere. One of them was the capture by their opponents of Zacapoaxtla, which left free the communications between Vera Cruz and the north. Leon, Lagos, Aguascalientes, and Guanajuato fell into the hands of the constitutionalists. San Luis Potosí, Guadalajara, and other principal towns were closely pressed. Morelia, in Michoacan, where the

³⁹ Cholula st. was carpeted to the episcopal palace, where he was lodged. The populace pulled his carriage. Entertainments followed one another in quick succession. He issued a flattering proclamation to the people. *Diario de Avisos*, Feb. 24, 1859.

defeated liberals from Jalisco had found refuge, was the general headquarters of Degollado, several governors, and other prominent chiefs. Artillery and war material of all kinds were made there for the liberal army, and thence were despatched troops in all directions. An army under Degollado himself went to operate in Querétaro and the valley of Mexico. The reactionists were so weakened that they could not assail Morelia.

Miramón's army to attack Vera Cruz consisted of 5,000 well-provided men, with 28 pieces of artillery. The town was divided into four quarters, and the positions were covered by about 1,350 infantry and 440 artillerymen; the rest of the garrison were some 1,200 men.

Cobos and Tamariz attacked the liberals in the barranca of Jamapa and were repulsed. Miramón, on hearing it, ordered the reserve division at the hacienda Potrero to retreat, and marched with the main body from Córdoba to the barranca. Oronoz received counter-orders to retreat from Omealca and take his position in the Potrero. The liberals, after destroying the bridge of Paso del Macho, retreated to Huatusco and next to Jalapa, leaving the route to Vera Cruz free. Their opponents took the Chiquihuite without resistance on the 12th of March, three pieces falling into Miramón's hands.⁴⁰ On his near approach, Governor Gutierrez Zamora declared martial law in the city, and on the 18th announced to the citizens that the enemy was already upon them;⁴¹ and so it was, Miramón's headquarters being at Medellín, which, like Alvarado, had embraced his cause.

While these operations were going on, the constitutionalists, under Degollado, abandoning Leon, Guanajuato, and Querétaro, advanced from San Juan del Rio to Arroyo Zarco, paying no heed to the reaction-

⁴⁰ Miramón's march through Vera Cruz left its mark of destruction. All small towns and bridges were burned.

⁴¹ 'Los traidores están al frente de nuestros muros.' *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, v. 191.

ary chiefs Callejo and Mejía, and marched toward the capital. Marquez, however, on hearing of the liberal movements, started from Guadalajara with 1,000 men and nine pieces of artillery, and dislodged the liberals from Guanajuato.

The practical effect of Degollado's strategy was to prevent Miramon from bringing all his resources to bear upon Vera Cruz.

The reactionary army had advanced slowly, expecting some seditious movement in the port, for which reason the small town of Vergara was occupied only the 22d of March.⁴² Finally, at a council of war Miramon's officers declared that the capture of Vera Cruz by assault was impracticable, with a large number of their forces suffering from the effects of the malarious climate. On the 29th he abandoned the siege, without firing a gun or attempting any attack, and with his whole army marched back toward Mexico.⁴³

Miramon on his march found himself intercepted by Ampudia's army, which on the 2d of April attacked the reactionists at San Juan Coscomatepec, and drove them away, taking some prisoners, among whom were a Spanish major named Juan Gonzalez, and Father Francisco Ortega, the famous parish priest of Zacapoaxtla, both of whom were shot by La Llave's order. A portion of Miramon's forces under Negrete, however, routed the constitutionalists in La Lagunilla, and rounding Las Cumbres, came upon Ampudia and Alatríste, who retreated, losing three pieces of artillery and their ammunition.⁴⁴ Miramon then con-

⁴² That same day several prominent reactionists arrived on a British steamer, believing the place already taken by their friends. Among them were generals Diaz de la Vega, Blanco, and Woll, and two sons of Santa Anna. They landed at Mocambo and repaired to Miramon's headquarters.

⁴³ Miramon's mouth-piece, Lieut-col Manuel Ramirez de Arellano, said it was owing to the havoc of disease, and to scantiness of resources; food had become so scarce that, 'without exaggeration, a general's pay would not suffice to support a subaltern.' He scorned the idea that Miramon had any fear of the city's walls, guns, etc. *Apuntes de la Camp. de Oriente*, 38-43; *Diario de Avisos*, Feb. 15 to March 31, 1859; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, v. 194-5.

⁴⁴ Arellano says that the constitutionalists under Ampudia, Traconis, La Llave, and Alatríste fled from Coscomatepec on learning that 1,500 men were going after them. 'Estas fuerzas eran precisamente las que venian á cortar

tinued his retreat, and on the morning of the 9th arrived at Ixtapa, whence he went on to the capital.⁴⁵

General Corona, who commanded at the capital, in order to keep up the courage and enthusiasm of the garrison, which consisted of about 1,550 infantry, the alumni of the military school inclusive, 950 cavalry, and upward of 600 artillerymen, reported the receipt of official despatches that Vera Cruz had surrendered.⁴⁶ Degollado's army of over 6,000 men was divided into three sections, one of which went in the direction of Atzacapotzalco, another toward the hacienda of Enmedio, and the third to Ahuehuetes and Tlalnepantla. The reactionary forces under Callejo and Mejía, who had followed the constitutionalists, were not prevented by Degollado from joining others of their army, and from taking possession on the 22d of March of Tacubaya and Chapultepec, and entering Mexico the next day. Other reactionary parties, both large and small, were also permitted to go to the relief of the beleaguered capital. The incompetency of the liberal commander for the responsible position he held was thus further confirmed. His undisciplined troops were easily routed on the 7th of April, and Marquez entered the city without obstruction. So much ignorance and lack of military prowess on the part of the besiegers inspired the reactionary army with hopes of easy victory, and they were not disappointed. A battle was fought on the 11th of April, in which the constitutionalists were signally defeated, Degollado's loss in men and war material being large, and his force almost entirely dispersed.

The liberal army had been intrenched in Tacubaya, Chapultepec, and Molino del Rey. Marquez sallied

la retirada de todo el ejército antes de que entrara á Córdoba.' *Apuntes de la Camp. de Oriente*, 48-9.

⁴⁵ Previous to his departure he ordered the execution of Capt. Oscar Robert. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, v. 200-1.

⁴⁶ It was published in the *Diario Oficial*, preceded by copious details, ingeniously got up, interspersed, as usual, with insulting epithets to the constitutionalists, and the cry of Viva la religion! was not omitted. The whole imposture was reproduced in the *Diario de Avisos*, March 22, 1859.

on the 10th, with 5,000 men and 22 pieces of artillery, in the direction of San Cosme, Popotla, and the hacienda of Morales. He placed a double battery on the heights of Tacubaya, to cut off the enemy's retreat by way of Toluca, and opened a brisk fire on the Molino de Valdés, which lasted till after dark. This mill and the archbishop's house were the most advanced as well as the strongest points of the liberals. At nightfall there was noticed a brisk musketry firing, answered from a position nearer Tacubaya, and even at 9 o'clock some discharges of artillery were heard. At 6 o'clock the next morning the heights of Mexico were crowded with spectators. No movement could then be seen in Marquez' camp; but at a few minutes before seven twelve of his pieces opened a tremendous fire on the archbishop's house and the aforementioned mill, and a column of infantry, under cover of it, approached the mill, being hotly received by volleys of musketry; but soon the constitutionalists abandoned the position, and the firing ceased there. A few moments later the battery on the height continued playing upon Tacubaya, though not very actively, a portion of the reactionary army advancing a considerable distance, and taking up a position in the vertex of an angle in the direction of the archbishop's house and the slope of the Chapultepec forest. The column placed a battery there, which kept up a heavy fire from half-past seven till ten. Another fight occurred at the casa mata, where the liberals—infantry, cavalry, and artillery—were attacked by two battalions of infantry and some cavalry. At ten the general depôt of ammunition in the archbishop's palace exploded. Some grenades had also been hurled upon Chapultepec from Belén. Before 11 o'clock Marquez was in possession of all the points Degollado had held in Tacubaya.⁴⁷ A portion of the latter's army retreated to Chapultepec,

⁴⁷ The constitutionalist government attributed to that explosion, which, it said, occurred after the liberals had three times repulsed the enemy's charges, Degollado's retreat, 'in perfect order and with the greater part of his trains and pieces of artillery.' *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, iv. 21-2.

whence, as well as from Molino del Rey, they were soon dislodged, and finally, being closely pursued, became dispersed. Other liberal bodies had beforehand retreated toward the south, and still others went by way of Atzacapotzalco to the villa del Carbon. Marquez captured 31 pieces of artillery.⁴⁸

At the time the reactionary forces under Marquez were gaining so signal a victory over their opponents, Miramon arrived at the capital in a stage-coach, having in his company the general officers Cobos, Diaz de la Vega, Blanco, and Castillo. At half-past ten the salvos of artillery, the ringing of bells, and the enthusiastic plaudits of his admirers and sycophants announced his unexpected return. He at once repaired to the heights and witnessed the dispersion of his enemies.⁴⁹ Degollado and many of his generals and field-officers had in time placed themselves out of harm's way; but others were not so fortunate.

For the second time had the constitutionalist hosts come to the very intrenchments of the capital, to be again hurled back discomfited. On this as on the former occasion, their losses were heavy, much heavier now than before, for Degollado had brought with him all his forces and a large amount of war material that he had been long in gathering. But his friends and partisans in the city failed to fulfil their promises, and on the part of himself and his leading officers there was a marked lack of ability and of unity in action; for neither attacking nor retreating at the proper time, their troops were torn to pieces in their own intrenchments, leaving in the enemy's hands all their trains, artillery, and ammunition, a large number of the slain, about 200 prisoners, one of whom was General Lazcano, and, it was said, even Degollado's

⁴⁸ *Diario de Avisos*, Apr. 4, 13, 1859; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, v. 192-202; *Domenech, Hist. du Mex.*, ii. 317. Col Ignacio Zaragoza, in a letter of April 14th to Vidaurri, describing the battle and its lamentable result, says that the army of the north lost only a few men, and its morale was good. *Boletín Oficial de Monterey*, in *La Estrella de Occid.*, July 1, 1859.

⁴⁹ His mouth-piece, Arellano, coarsely says, 'presenció la dispersion de aquellas chusmas.' *Apuntes Camp. de Oriente*, 63.

uniform and general's sash.⁵⁰ The joy of the reactionists was unbounded, and was manifested in salutes, illuminations, etc.; the victory serving Miramon to cover up his error and fiasco of Vera Cruz. Amid that rejoicing, and the chanting of a te deum by the clergy, Miramon issued a written order to Marquez to shoot all his prisoners of the rank of officers. Marquez, being a man of very limited education, regardless of the duties of humanity, had gone into the war prompted by fanaticism and personal ambition. Shooting prisoners was perfectly in order in his estimation, and consequently he fulfilled Miramon's order to the letter, and even went beyond; for either himself, or those to whom he intrusted its execution, committed on that day and night crimes that filled the world with horror. Several students of the medical college had come out to attend the wounded of either band, and while fulfilling this mission were dragged in the darkness of night from the bedsides of their patients to the place where the prisoners were being shot, and immolated with the others. Both Miramon and Marquez disclaimed responsibility for the outrage, shifting it one upon the other.⁵¹

⁵⁰ As acknowledged in his circular published in *El Pigmeo*, and reproduced in *La Estrella de Occid.*, June 24, 1859.

⁵¹ The number of students thus massacred was eleven, all of them members of good families. The following names have been recorded: Juan Doval, José M. Sanchez, Gabriel Rivera, Ildefonso Portugal, Juan Diaz Covarrubias, and Alberto Abad. Another young man, Manuel Mateos, recently admitted to the bar, was also shot. I find also among the executed Agustin Jáuregui, Eugenio Quisen, S. Fischer, Manuel Neira, and captains Ignacio Sierra and José Lopez. Rivera, *Hist. Jalapa*, v. 203-4; *Id.*, *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 559. Minister Ocampo on the 23d of April addressed a circular, which says: 'Se cobaron bárbaramente con los heridos, con los pocos dispersos que aprehendieron, y aun con los cirujanos.' Upwards of 100 persons were sacrificed, 'among them several of very tender age.' *Archivo Mex.*, *Col. Ley.*, iv. 23; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, viii. 667-9; *North Am. Review*, ciii. 113; *Lefèvre, Doc. Maximiliano*, i. 26-7; *Lefèvre, Le Mexique*, 81-8, 93; *Marquez, Refutación*, 24-7. Marquez, in a manifesto published in New York in 1860, says that he gave orders not to harm the prisoners, and at his first interview with Miramon told him so. After their separation at the city, he, Marquez, went back to Tacubaya, where soon after Lieut-col Flores, an aid of the president, handed him, in the presence of many, an order that read as follows, translated into English: 'General-in-chief of the national army. Most excellent sir: This very afternoon, and under your excellency's strictest responsibility, you will cause to be shot all the prisoners of the rank of oficiales y jefes, reporting to me the number of those whom this lot has befallen. God and law. Mexico, April

The prisoners and students were not the only ones sacrificed on that 11th of April. Some children were speared to death. Several peaceable citizens were brought from neighboring towns and murdered. The bodies of the victims were thrown together into one or more ditches. And on that day the clergy were blessing the authors of these atrocities.

The nation became horrified, and the leaders of the government at the capital were from that day looked upon as a band of merciless assassins. Degollado then established the system of retaliation, and every reactionary commander or officer taken prisoner was shot. The reactionists pursued the same course, and henceforth the war was carried on with greater animosity than ever before.

The public reception of the victorious army in the capital on the 12th was enthusiastic on the part of its supporters, whose houses were embellished with bright curtains. In the steeples of the cathedral were demonstrations of joy. Every device was used to express the satisfaction of the reactionists. Marquez and Mejía traversed the streets in an open carriage, amid the cheers of the populace.⁶²

11, 1859. Miramon—a rubric. To his excellency the general of division in chief of the army of operations, Don Leonardo Marquez, Tacubaya. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, v. 719-20. Marquez explains how this secret order fell into the hands of Juarez' government, making it known that he had acted under orders. Miramon's order certainly says nothing of shooting physicians or students. Jáuregui, Miramon's counsel at his trial in Querétaro, acknowledges that he owed his life to Miramon on that dreadful day, when he was, together with six others, on the point of being shot by Marquez' orders. He adds that Miramon heard of the shooting of the students after the execution, and became very indignant, but could not punish Marquez for the brutal act, because to him was due that day's victory. In a letter to Jáuregui, Miramon says: 'I wish to refer to Tacubaya. You will, perhaps, see an order of mine to shoot; but this referred to the officers, my prisoners, and never to physicians, and much less to civilians. At this moment, when I am preparing to appear before God, I make you this declaration.' *Maximiliano, Causa*, 227; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 360. On the 2d of March, 1861, among the first acts of Juarez, after his triumph, was to order the arrest and trial of Miramon and his ministers, and all others who had participation in that massacre.

⁶² Marquez wore a band with this inscription: 'Á la virtud y al valor, la gratitud de las hijas de México,' which had been presented to him that morning by a committee of ladies. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, v. 204. The corps of engineers gave him a sword of honor, of fine steel with a gold hilt, and a silver scabbard inlaid with gold. *Diario de Avisos*, April 16, 1859.

CHAPTER XXX.

TRIUMPH OF THE CONSTITUTIONALISTS.

1859-1861.

UNITED STATES' RECOGNITION OF JUAREZ—MIRAMON'S ACTION—CONFISCATION OF CHURCH PROPERTY—INTERIOR CAMPAIGN OF 1859—TREATIES—MIRAMON'S SECOND EXPEDITION TO VERA CRUZ—UNITED STATES' ARMED INTERVENTION—INTERIOR CAMPAIGN OF 1860—MIRAMON'S RETURN TO MEXICO AND RESIGNATION—PRESIDENT PAVON—MIRAMON'S TITLE TO THE PRESIDENCY—APPROACH OF CONSTITUTIONALISTS—MIRAMON'S DEFEAT AND ESCAPE—JUAREZ' TRIUMPHANT ENTRY INTO MEXICO.

THE victory of Tacubaya, though important for the reactionists, did not dishearten their opponents. The latter were further encouraged by the recognition of Juarez' government on the part of the United States, which accredited Robert M. McLane near it as minister, the appointment having been confirmed by the senate on the 6th of April, 1859. Soon after his arrival Juarez sent José M. Mata to Washington as Mexico's representative, with the same diplomatic rank.¹ This interchange of relations created a deep impression, not so much in Mexico as in Europe. Miramon's minister of relations solemnly protested against it, declaring null all attendant arrangements.²

¹ On 29th April. *Diario de Avisos*, May 27, July 1, 1859.

² Díez de Bonilla impartially details the relations between the two countries since Zuloaga's occupancy of the executive chair at the capital, whose government the U. S. minister, Forsyth, had at first recognized. He then alleges that Forsyth proposed the cession to the U. S., for a pecuniary consideration, of a large portion of Mexican territory, as well as an irrevocable privilege of passage through the isthmus of Tehuantepec. Forsyth's proposals being rejected, he broke off relations, and his government supported him in it. He concludes that the recognition of Juarez' government by the U. S. is intended to give it legitimacy and authority that it may aid them to despoil Mexico of her territory. McLane, in a note to Minister Ocampo of the 28th of April,

Bonilla went further: he cancelled the *exequatur* of Consul Black in Mexico, and of all other United States consuls and vice-consuls in the republic. This was, however, made nugatory by Ocampo's circular of April 23d, to governors, confirming anew the *exequaturs* of all those consular officers.³

Mexico had now reached a state of chronic anarchy, and there seemed to be no remedy for it. The so-called conservative party favored an absolute rule with all its sequences; and though holding to a republican form, it was in fact a military dictatorship. It contemplated the establishment of a monarchy. The clergy, which was the most influential wing of that party,⁴ and whose chief was Padre Miranda, one of Miramon's ministers, were working for a foreign prince to reign in Mexico, and to that end opened relations with Gutierrez Estrada, of whom more hereafter.⁵ The policy of the party was to restore the *fueros* that the *ley Juárez* had suppressed; to keep the press under restraint; to have prohibitory tariffs; and to prevent the incoming of foreigners, which might endanger the church. The constitutional government was opposed to all this; and moreover resolved to deprive the clergy of the means to prolong the war.

The reactionists were much exercised to find relief for their great malady—impecuniosity. The minister of the treasury, Sagaceta, was blamed, and then superseded by a young man, Carlos G. de la Peza, under

denies Bonilla's charges, adding that his government looked on Juárez as the legal and de facto authority recognized by four fifths of the states and a large portion of the citizens; which was particularly the case in the seaports on both seas, and in the five or six Mexican states contiguous to the U. S. as well as in those of the south through which U. S. citizens have the right by treaty to trade. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, iv. 25-35; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, viii. 669; *Ferrer, Cuent. de Méx. Ven. Amer. Gen.*, 429, 438-42.

³ Ocampo dubs Bonilla's statements hypocritical; the loss of territory under the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, being caused by the stupid course of the conservatives, and the sale of Mesilla being the act of the 'imprudente Sr Bonilla.'

⁴ *Díaz, Datos Biog.*, MS., 440-3.

⁵ The correspondence between the two men on this plan was intercepted by the liberals, according to Degollado's circular of May 20th to the governor. *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, iv. 38.

whose management the confusion in the finances was greater than ever. That change caused the resignations of Diez de Bonilla, Larrainzar, and Marin. They were succeeded July 7th by Octaviano Muñoz Ledo, minister of fomento, who assumed ad interim the portfolio of relations; Isidro Diaz became minister of justice; and Antonio Corona, who had succeeded Castillo in the war department, took temporary charge of that of government.⁶

Miramon issued a manifesto on the need of reforms, claiming that his motto was to go forward, for not to advance was retrogression. He spoke of wise measures and not bloody victories as the means of extricating the country; expressed himself liberally in regard to the press, and used other fine platitudes; but failed to present any well-defined plan of administration.⁷

An effort was made at this time to arrive at an understanding between the belligerents on some matters of general interest, such as guaranteeing the safety of the mails; but all such projects were abandoned on the publication by Juarez, July 12, 1859, of a law to confiscate and nationalize the property of the clergy, and of his decree of the next day regulating the mode of carrying it into effect.⁸

⁶ *Diario de Avisos*, July 12, 1859; *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1059.

⁷ This document was issued at Chapultepec on the 12th of July, and published in Mexico on the same day and the 13th. *Diario de Avisos*, July 13, 19, 20, 1859.

⁸ It was passed with the unanimous approval of the ministers, all of whom countersigned it. In the preamble the clergy are accused of being the promoters of the war; of their open rebellion against the legitimate authority representing the national sovereignty; and also of their wasting away the funds intrusted to their care for pious purposes in supporting the fratricidal strife, and all for the sole purpose of rendering themselves independent of the civil authority. The law confiscates all ecclesiastical property, excepting churches and their contents. All convents of friars, and religious brotherhoods or congregations, are suppressed, and no new ones are to be established. Existing nunneries are allowed to continue, but all under the exclusive jurisdiction of the respective diocesan. Nuns quitting their convents to return to secular life are to be reimbursed at once the money they took with them as dower to the convents. Those who took no dower are to be paid \$500, and to cover such claims and the requirements of public worship, four million dollars are appropriated from the general fund. *Archivo Méx., Col. Ley.*, iv. 82-114; *Méx., Cód. Reforma*, 145-60; *Diaz, Datos Biog.*, MS., 432.

This was soon followed by other enactments directly affecting the church, namely, on civil marriage, prescribing the formalities, and declaring null all marriages contracted without having first complied with them; on capellanías, declaring them included in the property to be nationalized under the law of July 12th; on the personal civil status, intended to fully establish independence between church and state; on cemeteries, taking the control of them from the church and giving it to the civil authorities; and finally, a despatch was sent to Manuel Castillo Portugal, attaché having in his charge the archives of the Mexican legation in Rome, apprising him that the president had ordered that legation suppressed, as useless after the independence of state and church had been declared; and directing him to leave Rome and bring with him the archives, to be preserved in the department of relations.⁹

The law of nationalization of the ecclesiastical estates greatly contributed toward the ending of the civil war. The government at Vera Cruz, having staked upon that measure the existence of the liberal party, lost no time in developing its effects by the sale of such property. Against contracts of that nature an energetic protest was made by Miramon's minister, Muñoz Ledo, who addressed himself to the foreign ministers. Similar protests were also filed by reactionary corporations and authorities.¹⁰ Owing to

⁹ Passed respectively July 23, 28, 31, and August 3, 1859. *Méx., Cód. Reforma*, 161-88; *Archivo Méx., Col. Ley.*, iv. 116-32, 136-60; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, viii. 705. Minister Ocampo in his circular of August 6th, on the manner of carrying out the laws on civil status and cemeteries, lays much stress on the need of the state governments providing decent cemeteries; he lays serious charges at the door of a portion of the parish priests for refusing Christian burial to the indigent who could not pay the church dues, as well as to the excommunicated, which was done with the remains of the distinguished citizens Pedraza and Farías. On the first point he says: 'La sórdida é insensible avaricia del clero, la repugnante y bárbara frialdad con que algunos de sus miembros tratan á la pobre viuda ó al desvalido huérfano... el increíble pero cierto cinismo con que dicen cómetelo, á quien necesitaria ayuda y consuelo.' *Archivo Méx., Col. Ley.*, iv. 163-72.

¹⁰ The execution of the law encountered an energetic resistance on the part of the clergy, the archbishop and his suffragans preaching and writing against

the difficulties in the way, there was not activity enough in conveyances of ecclesiastical property to meet the expectations of the liberals at Vera Cruz. It was evident that speculators preferred to postpone to a more suitable time operations in that line. As to the reactionary government, it increased the poverty of its treasury by the suppression of a number of established taxes without providing means to replace the sums thus lost. It also decreed, on the 16th of July, many financial measures that were entirely inapplicable under the existing circumstances.¹¹ The idea contemplated at Mexico of levying thirty million dollars was an absurd one; the departments could not bear such a tax, as the property holders and merchants were ruined, and the other classes in the utmost indigence. The ayuntamientos petitioned for the suspension of the so-called ley de hacienda, which helped to bring on the reaction a further loss of prestige.

The reactionary press made the most of the laws enacted at Vera Cruz, asserting that religious unity was on the point of destruction, and that the people were about to be forcibly deprived of their catholic worship;¹² insisting, to give still greater warmth to the question, that the asking by the liberals of aid from the United States was treason. But what kept the reactionists in considerable alarm was the lack of activity they began to notice in Miramon, who appeared to have devoted himself entirely to conjugal felicity.¹³

it. Padre Miranda published a pamphlet. Even a number of liberals disapproved of the enactment.

¹¹ Suppressed the board of public credit; issued new bonds to the amount of eighty millions, to exchange them for a certain class of claims with a premium of from five to eleven per centum on the face of the bond; established a class of bonds without interest; and laid an impost of thirty millions on the departments and territories, laborers and others of the poor class, and the internal trade being left unencumbered; the interior custom-houses were to be used only as warehouses; and foreign merchandise was to pay duties at the place of consumption. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 564-5; *Diario de Avisos*, July 20, 1859.

¹² On their publication at Zacatecas by Gonzalez Ortega there was a riot, in which many were killed and wounded.

¹³ Notwithstanding which, a conspiracy having been discovered in Sept., *HIST. MEX.*, VOL. V. 49

Military operations had by no means been neglected, as on their result depended the triumph of one or the other contestant. Miramon despatched Marquez and Mejía, on the 19th of April, with a strong army to operate in Michoacan. They occupied Morelia, which had been abandoned by the liberals on the 29th, and were received with open arms, particularly by the ecclesiastics.¹⁴

Most of the liberal forces had marched toward Guanajuato to reënforce Hinojosa, Ortega, and Zaragoza. Marquez tarried but a few days in Morelia, marching with his whole force to Guadalajara, and then Pueblita and other liberals reoccupied Morelia May 3d.¹⁵ Huerta and Doblado, who had escaped from Mexico, had conferences on the 9th of May.¹⁶ Huerta still got more resources from the place, though the state had contributed already one and a half million dollars.

Marquez went on undisturbed to Guadalajara, and entered it on May 15th, being received under a triumphal arch, and crowned with a golden wreath. Other high honors were also paid him.¹⁷ Marquez made a trip to Tepic, which had been captured by the reactionists June 29th, shot some citizens, and returned to Guadalajara with twenty loads of silver, taken while being clandestinely exported.

Most of the central towns were the prey of malefactors, among whom must be included many chiefs of guerrillas, who had adopted the appellation of one or the other contending party. Carbajal, on

the parties implicated were executed. But it seems that in August he had pardoned a number of political prisoners. *El Eco Hisp.-Am.*, Oct. 31, 1859; *Diario de Avisos*, Aug. 17, 1859.

¹⁴ The cathedral was reopened, and a *te deum* chanted. Religion was again ascendent.

¹⁵ Some reactionists' houses were stoned. Morelia was left without horses or money, Marquez having drained it of \$60,000 within a few days.

¹⁶ The few remaining church bells with which the reaction had been hailed were now brought to the ground, and religion was again at a discount.

¹⁷ The *ayuntamiento* presented him a magnificent *bâton*, on the gold head of which was an inscription in memory of his victory at Tacubaya. A *te deum* formed also a part of the programme.

the liberal side, had a party made up mostly of robbers and assassins, whose outrages were innumerable. Tlascala was a great sufferer. Carbajal's tyranny is said to have been insufferable, but no one dared oppose him.

Miramon, recovering his wonted activity, started in November for the interior. Many women of Morelia had asked him to free them from the constitutionalists.¹⁸ To oppose the liberal forces which, under Degollado, were marching on Querétaro, Miramon concentrated those of Velez and Mejía, and hurried on to that city, accompanied only by his aides-de-camp, and adopted the requisite measures to inflict another of his damaging blows on the enemy. Marching by the Celaya road he appeared before the liberal force in the afternoon of the 12th of November, and after rejecting at a conference Degollado's proposals to leave him the command in chief of the army, if he would swear to support the constitution of 1857, coupled with the agreement that a congress should be convoked to reform that code, he signally routed him in the morning of the 13th, at La Estancia de las Vacas, capturing thirty pieces of artillery, 500 stand of arms, ammunition, wagons, and 420 prisoners, among whom were generals Santiago Tapia and José J. Alvarez, both wounded.¹⁹

Degollado had in May given up the command for a time to bring supplies from abroad, which he landed in June or early in July at Tampico, and took at once to San Luis Potosí. Huerta had also received

¹⁸ It was in August. *Diario de Avisos*, Aug. 25, 1859.

¹⁹ Miramon told Degollado, on leaving him, that the liberals would be defeated before the expiration of twenty-four hours. The cannonading began at 7 o'clock. At 9 the liberals attacked the enemy's left flank, sustained by Mejía's brigade. The reactionists were likewise assailed on the right and in the centre, and being defeated at the latter point, were in danger of losing the battle, when Miramon made a simultaneous effort, commanding the centre in person, which turned the tide. Although the liberals fought desperately, it was all over at eleven o'clock. Doblado and Arteaga, with about 1,000 men, fled to Morelia, where new forces were raised. Degollado, arrived alone at Guanjuato, in the night of the 14th, and the next day started for San Luis Potosí, whither some of the scattered liberal troops found their way.

large quantities of arms, with which he reopened the campaign in Guanajuato.

The appearance of the liberal forces at La Estancia de las Vacas had been the first step of a well-arranged plan whose chief objective point was Mexico, but the want of simultaneous action resulted in the defeat at La Estancia, and the plan had to be abandoned. Fortune was frowning on the liberals, who met with disaster at Tulancingo, Maravatío, and Toluca. They had lost in the different encounters, since July, 10,000 men, 62 pieces of artillery, 7,300 muskets, 3,000 sabres, 3,000 accoutrements, and a large quantity of other effects.²⁰

The defeat at La Estancia was not considered in Vera Cruz a crushing blow, because of a wrong impression that Marquez had revolted against Miramon for suspending him from command and ordering him into arrest for his seizure of a money conducta. So much credence was given to the report that Juarez allowed semi-official commissioners to hold conferences with Robles Pezuela, which afterward assumed an official character, grounded on the belief that the latter would accept the constitution and reform laws. He denied it on the 11th of November, and finally declined negotiating without express instructions from Miramon. Marquez had taken in Guadalajara \$600,000 from a conducta of \$1,964,000, pleading extreme need of funds for the troops, which were becoming demoralized, and Jalisco might be lost. Shortly before he had levied a forced loan of \$100,000. In a manifesto he tried to justify his acts. Miramon disapproved the affair of the conducta,²¹ from fear of consequences, repaired to Guadalajara, suspended Marquez, and ordered him to report in Mexico, where he was placed under arrest.²²

²⁰ *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, v. 280-2; *Id.*, *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 566; *Archivo Mex.*, *Col. Ley.*, iv. 38-9; *Diario de Avisos*, Nov. 15, 18, 19, 24, 26, 1859; *La Estrella de Occid.*, Aug. 12, Nov. 23, Dec. 2, 9, 1859.

²¹ It was finally shipped at San Blas on the British man-of-war *Amethyst*.

²² Marquez had been angry because many of his troops had been taken from

The reactionary president was enthusiastically greeted at Guadalajara by his partisans, and started with about 3,000 men and a few artillerymen for Colima, where the liberals under Ogazon, Rocha, and others, to the number of about 5,000, were concentrated in the barrancas of Atenquique and Beltran. He flanked the position on the 18th of December at a place called El Perico with two battalions, went to Tuxpan River defended by Rojas' forces, whom he defeated, and on the 22d entered Colima. The next day Miramon attacked his opponents on the opposite height of the barranca of Tonila, and on the 24th drove them hence, capturing prisoners and artillery.²³ After that Miramon hastened on to Mexico, where he arrived on the 7th of January, 1860, and began preparations for a campaign in Vera Cruz. The reactionists now believed themselves invincible. At the end of 1859 they held sway as far as Aguascalientes, Zacatecas, and San Luis Potosí; at the last-named place Vega's brigade of Woll's division had arrived on the 25th of November. Woll himself had reoccupied Zacatecas the 21st.

President Juarez began to fear that he would be left without the means to cure the maladies of his country. This apprehension brought him at last to give a willing ear to the proposals of the American minister, McLane, and to accept United States volunteers in the liberal ranks. President Buchanan and his cabinet, setting aside the neutrality laws, permitted the exportation of war material, giving further evidence of their protection to the liberal party in the treaty that bore the name of McLane-Ocampo, signed the 14th

him. He wanted each general to do his part. 'De lo contrario,' he said in one of his despatches which was intercepted, 'se perderá el gobierno, y nos llevará á todos en su caída.' *Marquez, Manif.*, 1-42; *Diario de Avisos*, Dec. 12, 1859; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, v. 264-5. It seems, however, that Miramon's visit to Guadalajara on that occasion had been mainly caused by the attempt of Marquez to proclaim Santa Anna president. See Miramon's letter to Maximilian at Querétaro, in *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xviii. 1022-3.

²³ *La Opinion de Sinaloa*, Jan. 29. 1860.

of December, 1859—a treaty that underwent several amendments.²⁴ Its most objectionable clause, in the estimation of a large number of Mexicans, was that giving the United States the right of protecting their citizens and interests by force of arms, in certain events, within Mexican territory. This condition placed Mexico at the mercy of her sometimes overbearing sister. There was another clause, it is asserted, in which the Mexican government expressed its willingness to accept in a certain form the protectorate of the United States, should circumstances in the future render it necessary for Mexico to assume such an obligation.²⁵ Miramon's government protested

²⁴ It granted the U. S. or their citizens the right of transit ad perpetuum by three great highways across the Mexican republic, namely: 1. By railway or other means of communication across the isthmus of Tehuantepec from ocean to ocean; 2. By railway from some point on the Rio Grande across the states of Tamaulipas, Coahuila, and Nuevo Leon, Durango, and Sinaloa, to the port of Mazatlan on the Pacific; 3. By railway from the territory of Arizona across the state of Sonora to Guaymas in the gulf of California. It granted also, in connection with that right of transit, the following privileges: To establish warehouses at the termini of all those roads; to navigate the waters communicating with them; to transport effects and merchandises from Arizona or California, or more distant points, to other parts of the U. S. free of duty, through all and each of said routes, whatsoever might be their class or place of production or manufacture. Such goods might be warehoused, paying only cartage and storage, and no duties unless imported into Mexico for consumption. A large number of U. S. manufactures or productions might be imported into Mexico at the termini of the several transit routes on the basis of perfect reciprocity; the congress of the U. S. to determine whether the goods were to be admitted free of duty, or pay a fixed rate. Art. 8 gave the U. S. the right of conveying troops and military supplies across the republic of Mexico by the Sonora and Tehuantepec routes, as if they were Mexican troops, etc. Art. 9 authorized the U. S. to protect, by force of arms if necessary, all these transit routes, if Mexico failed to do so. Art. 10 guaranteed freedom of religion and of worship to citizens of the U. S. in Mexico, whether in temples or private houses. Art. 11 declared that no forced loan should ever be levied on U. S. citizens. To compensate Mexico for the import duties she thus deprived herself of, the U. S. agreed to pay her four million dollars, of which sum two millions were to be retained to cover claims of U. S. citizens against Mexico. There was also a convention to enforce treaty stipulations, and to maintain order and security in the territory of the republics of Mexico and the U. S., stipulating that, in consideration of the disordered state of the frontier, the forces of the two republics might act in concert and cooperation to enforce the stipulations of their treaties, if the lives or property of the citizens of one of them were imperilled, and their government unable to protect them. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 599-600; *Id.*, *Hist. Jalapa*, v. 239-40, 269-75; *Diario de Avisos*, Jan. 9, 1860; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xv. 337-42, *Domenech, Hist. du Méx.*, ii. 312-14.

²⁵ The treaty was deemed by the European press of serious import for Mexico if it ever went into operation. The *London Times* expressed the belief that the country would virtually become in a short time an appendage

against the treaty, and sent the protest to European governments as well as to the department for foreign affairs at Washington. Even in Vera Cruz the treaty caused some displeasure, several officers of the national guard resigning, and the artisans and soldiers manifesting their displeasure. Doblado preferred a compromise with the reaction to foreign intervention; and the minister, Juan Antonio de la Fuente, refused to approve it. The reactionists made a great outcry over it, alleging that national territory had been sold; that independence and religious unity had ceased to exist; commerce and industry were forever ruined; national honor and dignity trampled upon; and protestantism given the freedom of the country. The liberals, in general, on the other hand, saw in the treaty nothing but an amplification and extension of the treaties of 1831 and 1853. Be this as it may, though confirmation was warmly urged by Buchanan and others with powerful arguments, the senate did not deem it wise to burden the country with such obligations, and rejected the treaty.

Almonte, Miramon's minister in Paris, made a treaty in eight articles, on the 26th of November, 1859, with the Spanish ambassador Mon, binding Mexico to prosecute and punish the authors of outrages against Spanish subjects in the haciendas San Vicente and Chiconcuac; and though it was acknowledged that Mexicans were not amenable for those acts, Mexico agreed to indemnify those subjects; Spain, on her part, consenting that such indemnities should not be held as precedents for other cases of the same nature that might occur. The 6th article gave full force and vigor to the treaty of November 12, 1853,²⁶ without even an incidental mention of the

of the U. S. The U. S. papers manifested great surprise at the magnitude of the concessions made by Mexico for so small a sum as four million dollars, when twelve years before the U. S. had offered fifteen millions for the transit across Tehuantepec, and later paid ten millions for the Gadsden purchase.

²⁶ A convention for the adjustment of Spanish claims made by Santa Anna's administration. *Méx., Derecho Intern.*, 1st pt, 409-14; *Córtes, Diario Senado*, i. no. 8, 65, no. 9, 76, ii. no. 95, 1124.

revision of non-Spanish claims. Juárez and his cabinet, on the 30th of January, 1860, protested against the validity of such a treaty, and it never became a law.²⁷ On the other hand, Miramon, in a circular to the foreign diplomatic corps, endeavored to refute Buchanan's statements in his last message to congress, protesting against the pretensions of his government.²⁸

Some changes occurred soon after the conclusion of the McLane-Öcampo treaty in Juárez' cabinet.²⁹

Meanwhile both belligerents had been swelling their ranks and carrying on an active campaign. The constitutionalist forces were quite numerous early in 1860, and Miramon made preparations for a second campaign against the city of Vera Cruz. On the 8th of February, 1860, he started from the capital, accompanied by his minister of war, Diaz, to place himself at the head of Robles' division, timing his movements by a prearranged combination by which a small squadron under Mexican colors, and commanded by General Marin, was to sail from Habana to coöperate in the attack on Vera Cruz. The squadron was expected off that port about the end of February. Juárez on the 23d made a proclamation declaring it a piratical expedition,³⁰ and the United States naval forces had orders from their government to prevent the intended coöperation.

Each contending faction used its best endeavors to injure its adversary. The reactionists raised parties

²⁷ On two grounds: 1st. Its injustice; 2d. Its execution by persons having no authority to bind the republic. *Méx., Derecho Intern.*, 2d pt, 247-53; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, viii. 734-6; *Archivo Méx., Col. Ley.*, iv. 243-50; *Lefèvre, Doc. Ofic. Maximiliano*, i. 27-8.

²⁸ *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 362-70; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 570.

²⁹ Miguel Lerdo de Tejada became minister of the treasury, Dec. 22, 1859; Ignacio de la Llave, of government, Dec. 14th; José de Emparán, of fomento, Jan. 21, 1860; José Gil de Partearroyo, of war, Jan. 10, 1860; and Santos Degollado, of relations, Jan. 23, 1860. *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1055-7. Öcampo's resignation was owing to his dislike of Lerdo on account of his political record; in fact, they hated one another with a cordial hatred. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, v. 283.

³⁰ Marin and his officers acting under commissions that had been cancelled for their desertion to a foreign country. *Archivo Méx., Col. Ley.*, iv. 355-6.

on the coast to prevent supplies reaching Vera Cruz; and the liberals procured the desertion of the enemy's soldiers, before whose minds was constantly kept the fear of death by black vomit.

Miramón marched slowly, having with him about 3,000 men with a large supply of artillery and ammunition. He was incessantly harassed by guerrillas. At Paso de Ovejas he granted amnesty to all who would retire to live peaceably, and promised death to every man taken in arms three days after the date of the proclamation. Negrete marched from Orizaba, by the Tejería road, and joined Miramón, who now had about 5,000 men, and established headquarters at Medellín on the 2d of March, awaiting Marín's arrival to begin his attack. Success was by no means certain, for the reason that the steamer *Indianola*—under the United States flag—which had been chartered by Juárez to watch Marín's squadron, came into port and anchored with other vessels of the same nationality under the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa, thus indicating their intention to take part in the defence.

At this time negotiations were opened between Medellín and Vera Cruz that came to no result, the proposals of both presidents being rejected. These negotiations were initiated by Captain Aldham of the British war ship *Valorous*, who obtained a pass from Juárez to visit Miramón and hand him a note from the British foreign office, in which was manifested a desire that an armistice of six months or a year should be agreed to by the belligerents, to allow time for a general assembly empowered to give the country a government of respectability and order, together with civil and religious freedom. The British government threatened, if its proposition were unheeded, to demand reparation of damages to its subjects inflicted by either belligerent. Miramón assented to the armistice, under the joint mediation of England,

France, Spain, and the United States.³¹ Juarez rejected the proposition, and issued a declaration against compromise in any form.

There were lying in Vera Cruz, besides the steamers *Indianola* and *Wave*, under charter to the liberal authorities, the United States frigate *Savannah*, and corvettes *Saratoga* and *Preble*. Marin's squadron, composed of the steamers *General Miramon* and *Marqués de la Habana*, was descried in the offing at half-past two o'clock in the afternoon of March 6th. The ships steamed along the coast from La Antigua and anchored in Anton Lizardo at four. On passing San Juan de Ulúa, they had been signalled to show their colors, which they did not do till opposite the Spanish vessels. By the time they reached the anchorage, they were boarded by several of Miramon's officers. The *Indianola* and *Wave* had been ready to tow the *Saratoga*. Captain Jarvis, commander of the frigate and senior officer present, sent a lieutenant and 80 men to the *Indianola*, and another officer with an equal number of men to the *Wave*, each officer at once assuming command of the steamer he was on. La Llave went on board one of the steamers. The attack on Marin's ships was successful; at midnight the two vessels were a prize of the United States naval force. The *General Miramon* made some resistance, and then, in trying to escape, got aground. The *Marqués de la Habana* attempted no defence. The *Saratoga* fired 90 shots.³² The prizes were afterward sent to New Orleans to be adjudicated on by the admiralty court.

Captain Jarvis' proceedings were protested against by the commander of the Spanish war brig *Habanero*, on the 13th of March, claiming the *Marqués de la Habana* as Spanish property. The commander also

³¹ Much correspondence passed from March 12th to Apr. 21st between Miramon's government and the legations of England and France as well as Captain Aldham. *Diario de Avisos*, Apr. 20, 1860. The proposed assembly was to be composed of men that had filled public trusts from 1822 to 1853.

³² The casualties on both sides were 40; one of the wounded was La Llave.

claimed the captured ship *Concepcion*, but no heed was paid to the demand. The commander of the French naval force protested against the *Saratoga's* interference in the affairs of Mexico, which he called an unlawful precedent. Marin was put in jail in New Orleans, and subsequently released on bail. On the 27th of March, calling himself a jefe de escuadra, or rear-admiral of the Mexican navy, he entered a similar protest.³³

The action of Captain Jarvis had been in obedience to the orders of his government to recognize no blockade of Mexican ports by the reactionists. He was also instructed to land from his ships such an armed force as might be deemed sufficient to afford protection to United States citizens.

The right of the United States government to interfere between the belligerents to hinder their free action, or of their war ships to attack and capture Marin's squadron, is not at all clear. Notwithstanding the approval of Jarvis' course by the president, the United States district court at New Orleans declared the capture of Marin's ships illegal, and decreed immediate restoration. Nothing was said of damages, Marin having waived them. That was right enough, but meanwhile Miramon had been deprived of the services of the ships as well as of the war material they had brought for him.³⁴

The besiegers prosecuted their operations without interruption from sallies of the besieged, though

³³ The Spanish legation at Washington also protested, and demanded the restitution of the *Marqués de la Habana*, and satisfaction to his flag. Full particulars on this affair may be obtained in *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 572-3, 600; *Córtes, Diario Cong.*, i. ap. 5, no. 4, 30, ii. no. 28, 402-4; *U. S. Govt. Doc.*, Cong. 36, Ses. 1, Sen. 9; *Diario de Avisos*, March 17, 19, 24, Apr. 10-30, May 3, 4; *Lefèvre, Le Mexique*, 132-59; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xv. 373-89, 963-73.

³⁴ Their cargoes consisted of 1,000 fourteen-inch bombs, 2 brass mortars, 4,000 stand of arms for infantry, and upwards of 60,000 rations. The expenses of the expedition were no less than \$300,000, the *Marqués de la Habana* costing \$130,000, and the *General Miramon* \$70,000. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, v. 301-6; *Diario de Avisos*, July 10, 14, 23, 1860.

small guerrilla parties gave them much annoyance in waylaying their supplies. The plan of a fusion was fostered by the few remnants still left of the moderate party and by property holders, most of the latter for their own private ends. Miramon listened to them, and sent a communication to General Ramon Iglesias, commander of the forces in Vera Cruz, offering to pursue the most rational course to bring about a peaceful arrangement. Negotiations followed, but no understanding was arrived at, because of Juarez' refusal to do anything that was not in accord with the constitution of 1857, under which he was acting as president. Moreover, he would not give his consent to foreign intervention in the adjustment of the country's affairs.³⁵ Miramon, on his part, accepted no amendment.

The besiegers threw bombs into the city, and continued the exercise from the 15th to the 20th of March, doing but little damage.³⁶ Miramon's casualties from warfare and disease had been large. At last he saw that he was foiled, and concluded to retreat. The retreat commenced in the morning of the 21st, Miramon's object being to reoccupy his lines of Orizaba and Jalapa, where the guerrillas allowed him no peace and many of his men deserted and joined the liberal ranks.

Miramon reached Mexico on the 7th of April, and both there and on the route avoided unusual honors,

³⁵ It had been agreed that there should be a truce under the guarantee of the U. S., England, France, Spain, and Prussia, who were also to say what was to be done with the treaties entered into with foreign powers by both contending parties. The whole nation was to decide the points at issue. Here was the stumbling-block. Juarez demanded that the constitution of 1857 should be recognized as the supreme law, and that every act done should be pursuant to its requirements. Miramon could see in this only delay in military operations, without any advantage for his party, or the least probability of the civil war coming to an end. The French govt had instructed its minister to attempt a pacification through a national convention, leaving out the religious question, as the English proposition had been unpalatable to the conservatives. Juarez would not trust European mediators, whose partiality for the reaction had been marked.

³⁶ It was calculated that 5,000 balls and 500 bombs were thrown, and that the besieged hurled about 6,000 grenades.

which, under the circumstances, appeared to him as mockery. The constitutionalists had been taught by reverses how to inflict injuries. The campaign in the interior had been somewhat brisk, and advantageous for them. Early in April Ortega entered Aguascalientes, the reactionist Ramirez retreating, threatened by Uraga, who joined Zaragoza near San Luis Potosí. Ortega next went to Zacatecas; Ramirez had gone to Fresnillo. Uraga was on his way to concentrate at Zacatecas when the reactionist Rómulo Diaz de la Vega attacked him at Loma Alta, north of San Luis, on the 24th of April, and was defeated, falling prisoner, together with General Calvo and others;⁸⁷ in consequence of which San Luis Potosí was evacuated by the reactionists. After this several chief interior cities were either taken or besieged by the liberals. Oajaca had been besieged ninety-eight days, when, on the approach of a reactionist brigade, the siege was raised.⁸⁸

Degollado was sent back into the interior, and he appointed Uraga quartermaster-general of the army. Large bodies of liberals were concentrated to attack places occupied by their foes, whose resources were becoming low. Guadalajara was closely pressed by Ogazon, and its commander, Woll, despaired of making a successful defence. Miramon repaired to the interior early in May 1860, with the double object of relieving that place and attacking Uraga. Taking with him from Querétaro the troops of Mejía and Castillo, he advanced to Irapuato and Salamanca. Uraga, who had his headquarters in San Felipe, sent some troops to Guanajuato and left the rest in Silao. Miramon marched against the last place, and Uraga retreated to Leon, stationed his main army and trains in Lagos, and tried to draw the enemy to the Cerro Gordo. His movements were such that Miramon

⁸⁷ It is understood that Vega lost 1,000 men, 18 pieces of artillery, and 30 wagons.

⁸⁸ Cobos, with 3,000 men, had withstood double that number; he made an able defence, aided by Trejo, the man who made the gallant fight at Perote.

could not detect his purpose. The latter, being unable to divide his force, had to change his plan repeatedly. Thus went Miramon, advancing to Guadalajara, which was threatened by Uraga, whose aim was to widen Miramon's distance from Ramirez' brigade, leaving the latter isolated and surrounded by superior hostile forces. But Uraga committed the blunder of assaulting Guadalajara with Miramon in his rear. The attack was made on the 25th of May with 7,000 men. The garrison of that place was 3,000 strong. He was repulsed, seriously wounded in the thigh, and taken prisoner. At one o'clock in the afternoon Miramon arrived to aid in completing the victory. The assailants, who were under Ogazon, Valle, Zaragoza, and others, left 300 wounded in the streets of the city, and hastily retreated to the ravines, carrying away twenty pieces of artillery. This mishap to the liberal cause postponed its triumph for several months.³⁹

In Jalisco took place other occurrences worthy of mention. March 14th San Blas was attacked by several small vessels in the service of the liberals, and the schooner *Ipala* was captured. In April the foreign residents of Tepic asked protection from British war ships at San Blas against the threats of the liberal chief Colonel Rojas, who had attempted to levy a forced loan of \$60,000. The *Amethyst* landed a force and held the place. The *Pylades* prevented the entry into the port of armed vessels that the governor of Sinaloa had fitted out to transport troops and artillery.⁴⁰

On the 9th of May a reactionary force of 2,500 or 3,000 men under Calatayud was defeated at Ixcuintla, after thirteen hours' fighting.⁴¹

³⁹ This was one of the most interesting episodes of the three years' war. Uraga's forced retirement was not much deplored by the liberals, his heart not being in their cause. He had never cared much for the constitution of 1857, for Juarez' government, or Degollado's authority. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 577-8; *Gonzalez Ortega, Apunt. Biog.*, 44-6; *Diario de Avisos*, May 29, 30, June 5-23, July 18, 1860; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 364.

⁴⁰ Whatever the British officers intended, they certainly aided the reactionists.

⁴¹ He lost 300 killed, 500 wounded, 4 cannon, all his ammunition, and

It is recorded to the discredit of the liberal cause that one of its forces on the 29th of April visited Bermejillo's haciendas, San Vicente, Dolores, and Chiconcuac, sacked them, and shot four Spanish subjects, which tended to complicate the difficulties with Spain.⁴²

Ramirez reoccupied Zacatecas early in June, and on the 15th was routed by Ortega at the hacienda of Peñuelas.⁴³ The action lasted two and a half hours. Whole battalions were captured, artillery, trains, small arms, and ambulances fell into the victor's hands.⁴⁴

Miramón marched to southern Jalisco with 6,000 men and 32 cannon, having with him Mejía and Castillo, and found the constitutionalists to the number of 8,000 under Zaragoza intrenched on the height of Zapotlán. After a few days' hesitation, he concluded that it would not be safe to attack the enemy in his stronghold, and retreated to Guadalajara. The defeat at Peñuelas had some influence in checking his impetuosity. Leaving Castillo there, he retreated to Lagos, which had been occupied and then evacuated by Ortega, where he reorganized and augmented his army; but he could no longer communicate with the capital, owing to the activity of the guerrilla parties.⁴⁵ He afterward repaired to Leon, where Zuloaga, whom he had been virtually holding as a prisoner, effected his escape. This flight much alarmed Miramón and his supporters. The council of state was called upon for a decision. The disappearance of the president, that emanated from the plan of Tacubaya and gave a legal status to Miramón, was a serious matter. He might recall his decree of January 31, 1859, and want

other supplies. *Cuadro Sinóp.*, 4, 5, in *Vega, Doc.*, MS., 4; *Vega, Lig. Reseña*, 14-15, in *Vega, Doc.*, iii. no. 765.

⁴² *El Mensajero Esp.*, May 5, 1860.

⁴³ It is said the latter attacked against Degollado's express orders.

⁴⁴ Ortega had the enemy's dead officers buried in Aguascalientes with military honors. The others he released on parole; but shortly after their return to Mexico they were serving under Miramón, who had shown little interest for them. *Gonzalez Ortega, Apunt. Biog.*, 35-9.

⁴⁵ The reactionists under Alfaro experienced a reverse in Los Cerritos at the hands of I. M. Carbajal and F. Antillon.

to reassume his position or make some one else his substitute. The council of state slurred over the plan of Tacubaya that created it, declaring that under any circumstances Miramon should continue as president.⁴⁶ His partisans alleged that on assuming the presidential office he had limited his tenure of it till the republic should be pacified; which not having been as yet accomplished, he was to continue holding the supreme power.

The liberal party now felt certain that the reactionist government could not hold out much longer. After its defeats at Pinos, Ixcuintla, Loma Alta, and Peñuelas, and the retreats from Vera Cruz and Sayula, the triumph of the constitutional cause could not be a doubtful matter. Many hopeful advantages for the country in the enjoyment of free institutions, law, and order were expected from the present political situation, despite the hostile attitude toward Juárez' government of England, France, and Spain, and a large portion of the American press. Prussia also, and the two most retrogressive governments in America at that period, Guatemala and Ecuador, continued recognizing Miramon's government until its collapse.

Miramon's star was now in the descendent. The constitutionalists, under Gonzalez Ortega, Zaragoza, Antillon, Doblado, Berriozábal, and other chiefs, marched against him on the Silao hills and completely routed him, on the 10th of August. The victorious army under the chief command of Ortega was entitled 'Divisiones Unidas de Zacatecas y Michoacan.' He remained on the field till he saw there was no retrieval,⁴⁷ and then started for Querétaro, where he

⁴⁶ The grounds of their decision were: that the nation's welfare demanded it; that it was a necessity and the public will; that the absence of the one did not imply the cessation of the other. *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 579; *Diario de Avisos*, June 16, Aug. 16, 1860.

⁴⁷ It was imprudent to face an army three or four times larger than his own. He lost all his artillery, and only his personal courage saved him from capture. *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 366. According to the *Opinion de Sinaloa* of Sept. 11, and *La Estrella de Occidente* of Sept. 23, 1860, besides the artillery and trains, he lost upwards of 2,000 prisoners, among them many officers of all ranks, one of whom was Tomás Mejía. All the prisoners were released,

arrived on the 11th, reaching Mexico that same night at 10 o'clock. He forthwith summoned his ministers to discuss the situation, and it was resolved that he should give up the presidency for a few days, during which interregnum the president of the supreme court, Ignacio Pavon, would act.⁴⁸

Miramon insisted on a new choice of president, as Zuloaga could not hold the office for an indefinite period. The junta of departmental representatives created by Zuloaga's law having been installed with Teodosio Lares as president, and Manuel Larrainzar and Mariano Icaza as secretaries, they chose on the 14th of August Miramon, by a majority only, it having been so arranged to give the farce a little semblance of impartiality. After that there was much show of enthusiasm, and the usual formalities of taking possession of the presidential office were gone through.⁴⁹

Pavon, during his tenure of only two days, did nothing except to publish the act of Miramon's election. He returned to his post in the supreme court, and held it till the political problem was solved. After that he retired to private life.

Miramon soon after his installation as president ad interim, on the 18th of August, appointed his cabinet.⁵⁰

and a safe-conduct given them. Generals Cruz, Hernandez, and Pacheco were among the reactionary officers that perished in the battle. *Gonzalez Ortega, Apunt. Biog.*, 41-3; *Diario de Avisos*, Aug. 13-20, Sept. 7, 12, 25, Oct. 4, 1860.

⁴⁸ He had been a public servant since 1822 or 1823, beginning his career in the judiciary and continuing it in the financial department. Between 1841 and 1851 he held high positions in the judiciary, and in the latter year he was retired on full pay, having served thirty years. At the beginning of the three years' war he was presiding over the national supreme court, and had been retained in that post.

⁴⁹ The vote of the junta was published by edict; there was the regular *te deum*, the archbishop receiving Miramon at the door of the cathedral. At the felicitations, Miramon said it was not becoming noble souls to be cast down by misfortune: 'Ánimo, señores, ya triunfará la causa santa que defendemos; ya se pondrá Méjico en camino de ocupar un lugar distinguido entre las naciones cultas'; and so she is certainly doing, but not by the road Miramon and his political coöperators were misleading her.

⁵⁰ Juan N. Almonte, then abroad, minister of relations and president of the cabinet; Teodosio Lares, Teófilo Marin, Isidro Diaz, Antonio Corona, and Gabriel Sagaceta, holding the other portfolios. Lares was also placed in.

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Meanwhile the forces victorious at Silao advanced upon Querétaro, constantly swelling their ranks and increasing their resources, having an abundance of artillery; but against public expectation, they retreated to the interior on discovering that there was no movement at the capital on behalf of the constitution. The reactionary government, nothing daunted by the terrible disaster at Silao, actively reorganized its forces, resorting to forced levies, and procuring resources to meet its urgent needs. The troops stationed in the east were concentrated at the capital, and other measures adopted for a campaign, which Miramon determined should be in the valley of Mexico. He now resolved to release Marquez from his arrest.⁶¹ The capital by the end of August saw all communication with the rest of the country cut off. The guerrilla parties had also dug a trench on the road between Mexico and Puebla. Amidst all the turmoil Joaquin Francisco Pacheco, Spanish ambassador accredited to the government of the republic, who had arrived at Vera Cruz on the frigate *Berenguela* on the 23d of May, chose to present his credentials to Miramon, first obtaining, through devices not altogether honorable, permission from Juarez to travel into the interior.⁶²

The ceremonial of official reception would be called magnificent by some and ridiculous by others. The

charge pro tem. of the department of relations. *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 1060.

⁶¹ Oajaca was taken by the liberals, which released a large number of men of their political creed who had been confined there. The same thing had occurred at Guadalajara.

⁶² On his arrival he disclaimed any intention to meddle with the dissensions of the country. In a private letter to Juarez he expressed sympathy for Mexico in her distressed condition, manifesting his wish to go to the capital to fulfil 'mi mision, que no tiene por objeto el dañarle ni hostilizarle.' He then asked for a pass through the region under Juarez' control, and for an escort for himself and his suite of fourteen persons, which requests were courteously acceded to the next day. After visiting McLane and De Gabriac, who was on his way to Europe after laying by in five years the snug sum of \$150,000, he went on to Jalapa, where the authorities extended every mark of consideration. He arrived in Mexico on or about the 1st of June, and was received with high honor. *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 362-4; *Ricera, Hist. Jalapa*, v. 326; *Córtes, Diario Congreso*, i. ap. 5, no. 4, 17-20, 50-1; *Lefèvre, Mex. et l'Interv.*, 159-62; *El Mensajero Esp.*, June 8, 1860.

ambassador and his suite went in solemn procession around the plaza, the carriage conveying Pacheco and Mangino, the introducer of foreign ministers, being drawn by six fine horses. In his speech Pacheco spoke of Mexico's independence, hoping that she and Spain would look upon one another as sisters.⁵³

Miramón had now every reason to believe that the constitutional army would soon make another attempt to capture the capital.⁵⁴ Ortega had concentrated at Querétaro 7,000 men, among whom were the prisoners taken at the last three important actions lost by the reactionists, and 28 pieces of artillery. The constitutional contingent from Tamaulipas was called away, which had much influence to postpone the plan of attacking Mexico, where the reactionist brigades of Chacón, Gutierrez, Robles, and Negrete were already in position.⁵⁵ Miramón organized his army in three divisions, under the respective commands of Robles, Márquez, and Mejía, with Oronoz, Negrete, Velez, Cobos, Cruz, and Chacón in charge of the brigades.⁵⁶ Ortega went to Guanajuato after resources, which were so scarce that it became an absolute necessity to seize at Laguna Seca, near San Luis Potosí, the conducta bound to Tampico, amounting to \$1,100,000, which had already paid eight per centum for duties on leaving Guanajuato, Zacatecas, and San Luis.⁵⁷

⁵³ Glowing descriptions of the whole affair may be found in *Diario de Avisos*, Aug. 24, 1860; *Córtes, Diario Congreso*, i. ap. 5, no. 4, 21-2.

⁵⁴ González Ortega, whose forces had advanced as near as Cuautitlán, addressed a circular to the foreign representatives on the 24th of August, apprising them that he had orders to take the city by force of arms, and that his government would not be responsible for injuries and damages suffered by foreign residents. *Córtes, Diario Congreso*, i. ap. 5, no. 4, 22-3.

⁵⁵ Other reasons given were, that the season rendered military operations in the valley impracticable. There was, besides, a respectable reactionary force in Guadalajara which it was expedient to destroy before marching on Mexico. *González Ortega, Apunt. Biog.*, 43.

⁵⁶ The liberals experienced another disaster at Toluca. Having heard that Miramón was coming upon them in force, they abandoned the place; but as the enemy made no movement, they returned to meet with a surprise, losing as prisoners many of their chief officers.

⁵⁷ It was done on the 9th of Sept., 1860, by order of Degollado and Doblado. It was an unfortunate step, as it created much alarm among the merchants; besides, the funds belonged mostly to foreigners. The foreign merchants hitherto had favored the liberal cause; but the affair at Laguna Seca made

The seizure of the conducta by Degollado's order was disapproved of by the government at Vera Cruz, which well knew what complications and embarrassments it would entail on Mexico; for a convention had been already signed by Spain, France, and England, in which Prussia was also to have a share, for interfering in the affairs of Mexico, even without the consent of the United States.⁵⁸ It was stipulated that the mediators should propose a general armistice for a year's time, during which the Mexican people should be called upon to fix the principles, or basis, for their government, the mediating powers sanctioning what the congress should determine. Those governments represented to that of the United States the motives prompting their course, which they based on the weak-

enemies of them, the most excited being the Spaniards, French, and Germans, who did not get back their money. *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 370; *Payano, Mex. y Cuest. Financ.*, 103-16; *Méx., Mem. Hacienda*, 1870, 530-1; *Risera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 582-3. The money was distributed at Lagos, notwithstanding the protests of the foreign consuls. However, Degollado returned them \$400,000, promising that the balance would be paid after the triumph of the liberal cause. Juarez on the 24th of October decreed the repayment of that sum out of the proceeds of convents, for the sale of which his decree afforded greater facilities than the original law of July 13, 1859. That decree was also published in Mexico by his order, Jan. 10, 1861. Another decree of Dec. 17, 1860, applied to the payment of claims for damages caused by the existing war not only the sums provided for on the 24th of Oct., but also further amounts out of the funds proceeding from sales of national property, and out of the proceeds from customs at Tampico. *Méx., Cód. Reforma*, 202-3, 211-13.

⁵⁸ A letter dated July 31, 1860, from No. 9 Rue Roqueplan, Paris, and attributed to Juan N. Almonte, was published by the newspaper *La Revolución* on the 7th of October; it says: 'This point [that of mediation] being arranged in Madrid, I forthwith returned to this city, where I prevailed on the French government to invite Prussia, so that France, Spain, England, and Prussia are agreed to offer the mediation. Mon. de Saligny has been already despatched, and in the early days of the coming month he will leave here for Mexico, via the United States, to arrive in Vera Cruz early in Sept. On his arrival in Mexico he will find there Señor Pacheco, Herr Wagner, and perhaps Sir Charles Wyke... Saligny has orders to act without waiting for Sir Charles Wyke; so that the representations of Spain, France, and Prussia being in accord, ... the mediation may be officially tendered. The mediation being accepted, a general armistice will be agreed upon, and then will be determined the mode of assembling an extraordinary congress to reconstruct the nation. ... In the event of Juarez and company refusing to accept the mediation, which I do not think they would refuse now, it seems to me that the powers aforesaid, specially Spain and France, will adopt other more efficacious means to force the red party to listen to reason. The U. S. have been invited to co-operate on behalf of the mediation; but they have refused to lend their support, though opposing no obstacle, which is quite an advantage, 'pues así va la Europa amanzándolos, y mas tarde vendrá la intervencion.'

ness manifested by the two contending parties, and on the circumstance that neither Spain nor the United States had assented to exercise a sole intervention. They pretended that it was a humanitarian mission they were about to perform.⁵⁹ Nothing came out of the mediation, because Juarez adhered to his answer given in the spring of the year to proposals of the British foreign office.⁶⁰ But the political troubles that disturbed the United States in the latter end of 1860, and preceded her gigantic sectional war, augmented the agitation of the European courts on Mexican affairs. Toward the end of November arrived Dubois de Saligny, the new French minister, whose instructions were to recognize Miramon's government.⁶¹

⁵⁹ In the latter part of 1860 there were five Spanish war ships opposite Vera Cruz, that had gone to back the demand for the return of the Spanish bark *Concepcion*, condemned as a good prize by the admiralty court at Vera Cruz, as also a demand for the suspension of the decree to stop payment of the money stipulated to be paid under the international conventions, which decree had been issued because the government had not the means to meet the obligations. These Spanish vessels might have used force, and thus the reactionary party would have again proudly lifted its head; but there were also seven or eight U. S. men-of-war moving along the coast, that might have taken a part in the performances.

⁶⁰ Matthews, the British representative, left Mexico after he lost all hope of bringing about an arrangement between the belligerents. Juarez pleaded that the constitutional government could accede to nothing whatever not grounded on the constitution of 1857, from which he derived his authority, and whereby he exercised the executive functions. *Córtes, Diario Congreso*, i. ap. 5, no. 4, 24-40. Degollado essayed a plan of his own, supposed to have been influenced by the British minister, Matthews, which he formed at Lagos and entitled Plan de Pacificacion, to bring about a compromise with those who were dissatisfied with the constitution of 1857. He proposed that a congress should within three months decree a constitution, on the basis of the reform laws; that the diplomatic corps together with delegates of the two rival parties should name a president, who was to be neither Miramon nor Juarez. The plan was sent to Gonzalez Ortega, then besieging Guadalajara, who, like all other chief officers before whom he laid it, rejected it with indignation. It was almost inconceivable that a man who had been such a steadfast champion of the legal government should have, at the very time when its triumph was almost certain, turned round to modify its principles and set up another standard. Juarez deplored as well as became indignant at such a stultification, and at once, Oct. 17th, removed Degollado from the command which he held only nominally, for Ortega had been for some time the virtual commander-in-chief of the forces in the north. *Archivo Mex., Col. Lry.*, iv. 377-80; *Juarez, Biog. del Ciudad.*, 31-2; *Baz, Vida de Juarez*, 185-7; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, viii. 754-5, 762; *Córtes, Diario Congreso*, i. ap. 5, no. 4, 33-7; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 380.

⁶¹ It was rumored that he was a man of liberal opinions, and it was held to be certain that he would act in accord with the U. S., having had confer-

Juarez had on the 6th of that month decreed the election of representatives to a general congress, and of president of the republic. At this time he felt so sure of his triumph that he made preparations to transfer himself and his government to the valley of Mexico, and made arrangement for resuming the payment of the foreign debt in January 1861. But we must now retrace our steps, and make ourselves acquainted with the military situation on which Juarez grounded his hopes of immediate success.

Gonzalez Ortega had in October concentrated 17,000 men around Guadalajara, whilst the garrison was of less than 7,000. Marquez made rapid marches to relieve the place, reaching Guanajuato with his force considerably increased. Huerta, Ogazon, and Rojas were detached to hold him in check; they at first suffered some reverses, but finally defeated him. The garrison, under Severo del Castillo, expected no relief; and being destitute, Castillo entered into a parley with the enemy, and was allowed to leave the place with his troops on the 20th of October.⁶² His force marched by way of Santa Ana to Tepic, without ammunition, and with unloaded arms, whilst the constitutionalists marched upon Toluca, and on the 10th of November at Calderon utterly routed the army of Marquez, who was not aware of Castillo's arrange-

ences with the government at Washington, and obtained its consent to join the tripartite convention to establish a provisional government in Mexico, to which object McLane had been directed to coöperate.

⁶² That day the besiegers had taken Santo Domingo and El Cármen. Castillo made an arrangement with Zaragoza, which was approved by Gonzalez Ortega, by which both belligerent forces were to retire in opposite directions, the besieged toward the west, the besiegers toward the east, till they were twelve leagues beyond the city; meantime Castillo's artillery would be left in the town. Commissioners from both parties were then to arrange the terms for the incorporation of the reactionary forces into the constitutional army to march together upon the capital, and if they could come to no agreement, the armies were to go back to their positions, and hostilities should be resumed. This truce gave the constitutional army an immense advantage, as will be seen in the text. *Gonzalez Ortega, Apunt. Biog.*, 44-6; *Rivera, Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 583-4. A portion of the reactionary forces joined Doblado and Antillon; others, violating the armistice, went with Castillo to Tepic, and many disbanded themselves. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, v. 360.

ment till a few hours before being attacked.⁶³ Marquez and Velez took to Querétaro and Mexico the news of their disaster.

Miramon then frankly set forth the situation in a manifesto, and summoned a junta of prominent citizens residing in the capital to determine what ought to be done. The junta, among whom were the archbishop, bishop of Monterey, other ecclesiastics, and several generals, met on the 3d of November, but no result was arrived at on that day; two days later it was resolved to defend the city to the last.⁶⁴ Miramon's government had been unable to establish any financial system, its only resources being obtained from the clergy, or by forced loans, which together with those levied by the liberal party ruined many fortunes and put others in great jeopardy. Having now no means to support his troops, he permitted the chief of police, Lagarde, on the 16th of November, to enter the house of Mr Barton, in the calle de Capuchinas, with an order from Marquez, under the pretext of arms being hidden there. The next day an armed force under Colonel Jáuregui invaded the house with a number of workmen, who forced open the doors on which were the seals of the British legation, and carried away nearly \$700,000, in disregard of all protests, and of the fact that the money belonged to British bondholders.⁶⁵ With these funds Miramon organized new troops to fight the numerous hosts that were approaching the valley, including Ampudia's force from Vera Cruz.

A large number of reactionists had now forsaken their sinking cause and joined the liberal party. The

⁶³It was said that Marquez had 7,000, and his adversary fell upon him with at least 10,000; and that the former lost all his ammunition, baggage, and trains, and 2,000 or 3,000 prisoners.

⁶⁴*Diario de Avisos*, Nov. 6, 1860. From the time of the second failure to capture Vera Cruz, the reactionists met with a series of reverses, whereby they lost all the departments excepting Mexico and Puebla.

⁶⁵Marquez had asked Whitehead, their agent, for a loan from these funds, and had been refused, the agent pleading that he had no authority to accede to the request. *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xv. 1039-42.

liberal forces, having defeated their adversaries at every encounter, marched on toward the capital with the eclat that prosperity always imparts, swelling their ranks with officers and men of the other party.

The city of Mexico, being threatened on all sides by the constitutionalists, was placed under martial law on the 13th of November. At the end of the month Carbajal's forces were in Zumpango de la Laguna and Villa de Guadalupe, Berriozábal's in Toluca, and Ampudia's in Tlalpam. The army from Guadalajara was advancing under the commander-in-chief, Gonzalez Ortega.⁶⁶ Miramon made arrangements to move his forces with great rapidity, forced a portion of Ampudia's to retire from Cuautitlan, and sallying out on the first of December, struck the constitutionalists a blow at San Bartolo. With the continual movement of his troops he managed to get supplies into the city. But with all his extraordinary energy he could not check the discouragement of his party nor the repeated defection of his troops. Nothing daunted, however, he resolved to strike another blow, selecting as his objective point Toluca, the headquarters of the liberals, where a great many of their prominent men were assembled. He had not been misinformed about Berriozábal's lack of precaution. Leaving Mexico at dawn of the 8th of December, on the next day he gained a victory over the liberal forces, which were almost totally captured, together with Degollado, Berriozábal, and Benito Gomez Farías, as well as fourteen pieces of artillery, trains, a large supply of small arms, etc. The prisoners were kindly treated.⁶⁷ Miramon's success facilitated the

⁶⁶ He moved slowly, strengthening his ranks, and replacing the military supplies expended in Jalisco. He wanted to besiege Mexico with 25,000 men, and expected to reach the valley on December 15th.

⁶⁷ The Spanish minister stated to his government that Miramon had resolved so to act before he started to assail Toluca. He also said that among Degollado's captured papers was a plan of attack against Mexico, in the handwriting of Matthews, the British chargé. *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 371-2; *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, v. 4; *Córtes, Diario Cong.*, ap. 5, no. 4, 90; *Diario de Avisos*, Dec. 17, 1860.

arrival of provisions in Mexico, and his friends became very enthusiastic, not being willing as yet to believe that their chief's star was on the wane. But partial successes could not prevent the steady approach of Gonzalez Ortega's army of about 9,000 or 10,000 men, with 44 pieces of artillery, which left Querétaro on the 10th of December, and was to be further reënforced from Morelia and elsewhere. Miramon, with the double object of saving the capital from the effects of a siege and assault, and of defeating the enemy before the concentration of all his forces, started from Mexico on the 20th of December, at the head of his best troops, 8,000 strong, with thirty pieces of artillery, the brigades being respectively commanded by Marquez, Velez, Negrete, Ayesteran, Cobos, and others. On the morning of the 22d he was between Arroyozarco and San Francisco Soyaniquilpan, establishing his lines, and trying unsuccessfully to cut off the liberal left wing. The fight began at eight o'clock in the morning on the heights of San Miguel Calpulalpan, and had terminated at ten, and with it the reaction and the three years' war.

Ortega's army was 16,000 strong, Miramon's about one half that number.⁶⁸ The latter made so vigorous an attack that it dislodged the Juaristas from many positions. The combatants gained or lost ground only foot by foot.⁶⁹ Ortega steadily reënforced weak positions. Mariano Miramon, the general's brother, charged with the cavalry, but a number of his men went over to the enemy; the rest fled, running against their own infantry, and general confusion followed. Miramon's centre was then broken; the rest followed, artillery, trains, ammunition, wounded—all was abandoned. Miramon was utterly routed.⁷⁰ He went

⁶⁸ Arrangoiz, *Méj.*, ii. 372, would have it believed that Miramon's men were most of them demoralized, which cannot be true, judging from their prowess in the battle.

⁶⁹ Domenech says: 'Miramon se multiplie; lui, ses généraux Marquez, Negrete, Cobos et autres font des prodiges de valeur.' *Hist. du Mexique*, ii. 348.

⁷⁰ González Ortega, *Apunt. Biog.*, 47-50; *Boletín de Notíc.*, Dec. 25, 1860,

back to Mexico at 2 o'clock in the morning of the 23d, and summoned his ministers for eight o'clock to consult on the situation, after which he retired to snatch a little rest till the appointed hour. The representatives of France and Spain attended the council of ministers, and as a result of their deliberations repaired, accompanied with generals Berriozábal and Ayesteran, to Gonzalez Ortega's headquarters, to treat on terms of capitulation. Miramon had an intention of retiring to Puebla. The whole day passed in discussions, and in adopting precautions to prevent desertions, alarming symptoms of defection being noticed in the several barracks. At last it was resolved that the only course left was to capitulate. But Gonzalez Ortega would listen to nothing but unconditional surrender;⁷¹ and when the commissioners returned, on the 24th, the cry then was, each one for himself; the ministers went into hiding, and Miramon surrendered the city to Degollado and Berriozábal, who had been chosen by the ayuntamiento for the preservation of public order till General Ortega's arrival; after doing which, the remaining troops, and many prominent reactionists, among them Miramon and Zuloaga, assembled in the Ciudadela, and after dividing among themselves \$140,000, started together by the Toluca road, Miramon disappearing after a while. In his attempt to reach the coast, he narrowly escaped capture at Jico, in the vicinity of Jalapa; his companions, Isidro Diaz and Ordoñez, were taken. Miramon remained in concealment at Jalapa, and finally was conveyed by a French man-of-war's boat on board a vessel of that nation, called *Le Mercure*, that took him to Europe.⁷²

Jan. 7, 1861; *Córtes, Diario Congreso*, i. ap. 5, no. 4, 90; *Córtes, Diario Senado*, i. no. 12, 128; *Archivo Mex., Col. Ley.*, v. 11-16; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xv. 520-2.

⁷¹ However, he cheerfully acceded to foreigners arming themselves for their own protection till the government could afford it to them. *Córtes, Diario Congreso*, i. ap. 5, no. 4, 90-1; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 374-6.

⁷² This assistance rendered by the French navy to Miramon called for and gave rise to a warm correspondence on the part of the Mexican government

Miramon's flight put an end to the deadly strife and unheard of vicissitudes of the last three years. The victorious liberal army, of about 25,000 men, entered the capital on new-year's day amid the joy and enthusiasm of the people, who had draped their houses in white, and poured upon the men a rain of flowers and laurel wreaths. The greeting was one worthy of the army that had fought so bravely to restore the reign of justice and law, as well as the magna charta of the country's liberties, reform and future progress.⁷³

After the severe punishment of some malefactors by Quartermaster-general Zaragoza, Juarez arrived at the national capital on the 11th of January, 1861. He had hastened his journey because Gonzalez Ortega was exercising supreme powers in decreeing measures which were of the exclusive province of the executive. The president was enthusiastically greeted by his partisans, as well as by the high military and civil officers, as far out as Guadalupe, and on entering the city in an open carriage, amid the popular acclamation, his presence was further announced by the salvos of artillery. He at once published a manifesto.⁷⁴

and the British naval commander Aldham, with the commanding officer of the French naval forces, Le Roy. Later, on the 22d of March, 1861, complaint was raised in the British house of commons that Miramon, who had stolen money from the British legation, had been favored to escape on a French ship. Juarez ordered that Miramon, Marquez, and all others who were implicated in these affairs should be arrested, prosecuted, and punished, with confiscation of their properties included; of which the British representative was officially apprised. *Boletín de Notic.*, Jan. 27, 28, Feb. 9, 10, 22, 1861; *Archivo Mex.*, *Col. Ley.*, v. 194-5; *Dublan and Lozano. Leg. Mex.*, ix. 16; *Hansard's Parl. Deb.*, clxii. 250; *El Amigo del Pueblo*, Feb. 26, 1861; *Le Trait d'Union*, Feb. 8, 16, 22, Apr. 24, May 1, 1861. All that, however, did not prevent that Miramon should be received and honored at the Spanish court by the queen on the 2d of Dec. of that year.

⁷³ A tragic and bloody episode sealed the end of the reactionary rule. Among the unfortunate victims was Vicente Segura, who had been a forcible writer in favor of the reaction as chief editor of the *Diario de Avisos*, so often quoted in connection with the last three years' events.

⁷⁴ Dated Jan. 10th. After congratulating the nation on the success of the constitutional régime over so many difficulties, he solemnly pledges himself to surrender the executive authority to the elect of the people, as he had considered it a deposit intrusted to his responsibility. *Archivo Mex.*, *Col. Ley.*, v. 23-6; *Dublin and Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, ix. 9; *Córtés, Diario Congreso*, i. ap. 5, no. 4, 93.

The war of independence achieves for Mexico autonomy; but much remains to be done before she can fit herself for this new sphere—before she can be relieved of the fetters and encumbrances worn by her during three centuries of despotic tutelage. Relief comes only in another struggle between the new and old order of things; against superstition and class supremacy, protracted through nearly half a century, and forming a probationary transition period to the era of development under Porfirio Diaz.

The period of independence opens auspiciously, with the country recovered from the ravages of war; but prudence is cast to the winds in framing plans for the future, and in carrying them out. The formation of a republic is the natural outcome of a rising by the people for the people, as indicated in the speedy fall of Iturbide's empire; and equally natural is the eagerness to imitate the constitution of a sympathizing neighbor, the successful prototype of the new evolution. The conditions of the two nations, however, are widely different in race characteristics, climatic and other environments, and in interests and leanings; and while Mexico's adopted institutions are modified somewhat by French ideas, the new culture standard for Anáhuac, yet they are hardly suited to a people just out of leading-strings—a people so far unschooled in the self-control required for the enjoyment of true liberty. Moreover, it seems hazardous to separate a hitherto united country into semi-independent states, especially when there exist large bodies of ignorant aborigines, who, constituting a class of minors, require the care of one supreme guardian. On the other hand, the federal system is encouraged by the diversity of races, based to some extent on ancient tribal differences and distribution, and fostered by the isolated or sectional warfare of the independence struggle; and it soon becomes apparent that in the division of states lies a source of strength for the people in the conflict now beginning with the

conservative element; while the gradual spread of education and liberal ideas serves to lessen and control the dangerous elements among the masses, and to bring the needful training and self-restraint. The federal system is therefore well enough for Mexico, and time and experience are alone needful to fit her for its design and scope.

The primary obstacle and mistake lie in exaggerated ideas of liberty, interpreted as license, with might as right. The people copy the letter, not the spirit, of the United States constitution; and disregarding as they do the relative duties of states and general government, the letter only hampers the administration. They grasp too readily at any plausible project without weighing its value and ulterior effect; and, unguided by leading principles, they neglect to carry out its commendable features with any degree of reasonable consistency. The people of the United States are men of order, who wait patiently till judge or ballot shall decide a question. The wide-spread interest among all classes, in houses, land, savings banks, is an element that binds them to such order. In Mexico climatic influence and indolence of character tend to diminish the importance of home, with its all-modifying influence, and hinder the acquirement of property among the masses. Having, therefore, less to risk, they hesitate less in yielding to the appeal of turbulent and designing leaders, who feel no compunction in plunging the country into tumult and civil war for the attainment of private ends. Impetuous by nature and impatient under restraint, they are readily fired by flaming and plausible outcries to turn against the salutary and corrective limitation of reform, allowing no time for testing its value or letting it take root.

Warned of the looming danger, and observing the heterogeneous and discordant elements among the people, the conservative party, composed mainly of the wealthy and privileged classes, begins early to take

steps for securing predominance, by striving for a government centralized at the capital in one strong hand and encircled by aristocratic bulwarks, as instanced already in the empire of Iturbide. This resolve stands redeemed to some extent by the conviction that the masses are as yet unfitted for an equal share in the administration. The people, however, who have achieved the independence, and founded upon it bright hopes of equality and self-rule, are not disposed to surrender the fruits of their efforts to a class which has contributed little or nothing toward the great object. The result is a bitter strife between the two great parties, known in course of time under the different names of reactionists and progressionists, conservatives and liberals, aristocrats and democrats, and so forth, with numerous subdivisions, which, under various disguises and pretensions, manage to win over or unite for a time upon a common issue a more or less strong representation from the opposite side.

In the heat of conflict little hesitation is shown at the means for sustaining excitement or attaining success; and so we behold now a persecution of individuals and classes, as instanced notably in the expulsion of Spaniards, which has an effect not unlike that of the huguenot expatriation in France; anon a deplorable pillage or massacre, involving innocent persons, and staining the honor of the nation; and again, a goading and rousing of race feeling which threatens a deluge of blood. And so the country is racked and torn by a series of inflictions that retard progress and imperil national existence. The prime mover in the struggle is the growing mestizo element, with its lofty ambition and intelligent energy. The oppressed and neglected Indian, ever the prey of the victor, still holds aloof, regarding the issue with mingled indifference and suspicion, for he has so frequently been deceived in his hopes.

A leading factor in the strife is the army; at times a mere instrument, but only too often the arbiter.

Inflated by self-importance since the war of independence, it readily develops into a cormorant feeding on the vitals of the nation. It becomes the pliant instrument of its ambitious spirits—men who, impelled by vanity and greed, seize a favorable moment, and, assisted by distance from the centre or by the preoccupied or enforced situation of the authorities, swing themselves by a series of frequently bloodless revolutions from corporals and lieutenants to generals, meanwhile hiding defalcations and extorting concessions. With growing strength they become party leaders, menace the supreme government itself, and either dictate terms or install more compliant rulers. The result is an administration at once spiritless and inefficient, depending on the caprice of selfish factions, and unable, from lack of stability and means, to carry out the policy of reform with which it has deluded the people and gained consent to a tenure of power. Frequently the new heads aim only at a division of spoils, in view of their precarious position, and promote maleadministration by surrendering places of trust to those who have helped to install them, to favorites, and to opponents who must be conciliated. Corruption extends into every department; officials abuse their power by extortion and oppression, intent only on making the most of their prospectively brief term. Half the national revenue is absorbed ere it reaches the treasury; justice is sold to the highest bidder; and the army, the main reliance of the powers that be, becomes demoralized under officers who depend on its good-will. The people themselves encourage abuses by an indolent good nature that objects to harsh though wholesome restraint.

One striking result of the disorder is foreign intervention and invasion, based on unfulfilled promises and obligations, lured by thirst for trade and spoliation, and favored by anarchy; all of which give cause and opportunity for secession. A powerful neighbor bestirs herself to goad the nation to a war for which it

is wholly unprepared, with undisciplined and poorly armed troops, and with jealous and incapable officers, who drive veterans to despair, needlessly sacrifice the raw recruits bravely offering their blood for home and liberty, and encourage the foe to become more and more exacting. Even in the midst of evil may be found some good, however; for while half the national domain is ceded, the region is really a wilderness, so far as Mexico is concerned, and a source of weakness by demanding a costly defence against white and Indian invaders. Its loss is merely precipitated, to serve more speedily to open the portals for an elevating intercourse.

The church stands side by side with the army in being a prime mover in the turmoil. It is no longer the great bond between the races. Its influence has been sadly lessened, its holiness sadly battered during the war of independence, dimming the sacred character of its servants; while its wealth, to the very altar vessels, lures an ever-swelling host of hungry spoilers. Its very existence is threatened, prompting to steps for defence, in an alliance with the aristocratic party, with similar motives and sympathies. But this action only exposes it to a double buffeting. Its wealth is not only subjected to a heavy drain in support of revolutions fostered by the clergy, but the hostile factions find herein an excuse for carrying out their schemes of spoliation and reform, thus cutting off resources which have served to feed desolating wars, and restricting privileges employed to keep the masses in superstitious subjection and deplorable ignorance. The church assumes at last its true position, as a consolatory, humanizing medium, subordinate to the state and depending on the government; divested of dangerous fueros, and purged of noxious drones in the shape of religious communities. This may be regarded as the greatest triumph of the people, bringing as it does tolerance, civil marriage, and freer

education to crush superstition and lift the mind from bondage.

A phase of the decline in ecclesiastical influence is the absence from the rank of national leaders of priests who shed such lustre on the preceding period. The chiefs are now military men, as may be judged from the character of the period, with a sprinkling of lawyers, who owe their elevation partly to the accident of vice-presidential positions, partly to opportunities in the legislative field. Prominent among presidents are several heroes from the war of independence, beginning with Victoria and Guerrero, both pure, unselfish patriots, unaffected and amiable, but little fitted to direct the experimental steps of a young nation along a new path, in the face of bitter opposition. In contrast to these stand educated men with aristocratic tendencies, like Bustamante and Pedraza, the former long a pillar of centralism, and with a certain administrative ability. Gomez Farias achieves distinction in being the first president to openly assail the detrimental influence of the church; and he survives to triumph two decades later, while his opponent, Lucas Alaman, the great leader of the conservatives, dies in the midst of his plans for establishing a monarchy. In the course of ever-seething revolutions, rulers succeed one another in rapid succession, some holding their positions only for a few days, to leave hardly a trace, while a few manage to complete a full term of office. Among them are too often mere creatures of the moment, the toys of military caprice; now vacillating and procrastinating, anon rash with defective projects, with occasional spurts of stronger and redeeming but unsustained efforts. But there are also able and patriotic men, who effect some good, only to rouse the storm by their plans for reform, and fall under the ruins of their noble though unstable structures. Among them figure prudent and well-meaning men like Herrera, the man of peace, and Comonfort, who proclaims the final federal con-

stitution; worthy judges like Peña y Peña and Ceballos; the financier Echeverría; instruments of the army in Canalizo and Lombardini; brilliant soldiers like Miramon, Bravo, and Anaya; the hot-headed Paredes; the reformed conservative Arista, and the converted democrat Almonte. The most conspicuous personage of the period, however, is Santa Anna, arch-intriguer, political juggler, brazen blusterer. A worshipper of success, to which he sacrifices honor and true patriotism; using men and institutions as means for his own ends; prostituting an ability which, combined with energy, raises him to the category of a genius, while lack of principle and firmness lower him to abject baseness. Ever dissimulating and obedient alone to the political barometer, he stands ready to desert a cause or patron at the first indication of failure; to parade now as a reformer with dazzling promises and scanty fulfilment, anon as a despot with iron heel and regal pomp. In diplomacy, an unsustained Talleyrand; in war, a sorry Napoleon.

He it is whose ambition tends to revive at intervals the centralist idea of the conservatives, that relic of colonial days and of Iturbide, only to strengthen opposition to it by abuses and oppression, and foster appreciation of and fitness for the federal system. One more bloody ordeal is required, one more purifying patriotic struggle, ere the people are permitted to establish full liberty in the dear-bought constitution of 1857, under which a Juarez and a Diaz are unable to loosen the still binding fetter and inaugurate the era of advancement.

First among the most indefatigable of Mexican writers and zealous collectors of historical material is Carlos María Bustamante, who was born in Oajaca, Nov. 4, 1774. His father, José Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante, was a Spaniard by birth, and his mother, Gerónimo Merecilla y Osorio, was the second of four wives with whom Sanchez de Bustamante intermarried. The rigid manner in which religious duties were observed in the family implanted in Carlos María's mind a tone of deep piety, which was never after eradicated. Having received the rudiments of education, at the age of 15 he entered the seminario conciliar at Oajaca to study philosophy. The first year he failed in his examination. This stimulated him to increased exertion, and the following year he passed with marked approbation of the examiners.

He then went to Mexico and took his degree as bachelor of arts, and returning to Oajaca, graduated in theology at the convent of San Agustín in 1800. In July 1801 he was admitted to the bar, and having been appointed relator de la audiencia of Guadalajara, his duties in criminal cases caused him so much pain that he soon resigned his position and returned to Mexico, where in the famous trial of Capt. Toribio del Mazo y Piña, accused of the murder of Lucas de Galvez, capt.-gen. of Yucatan, he made so able a defence as to save the prisoner's life. For some years Bustamante pursued his profession, and gained great celebrity in several other important causes. In 1805 he began to publish the *Diario de México*, having with difficulty obtained the permission of Iturrigaray. The obstacles which he encountered in this undertaking were numerous. When the war of independence broke out in 1810, Bustamante attached himself to the cause of the revolutionists, whom he aided indirectly as far as lay in his power. Availing himself of the liberty of the press, proclaimed in 1812, he published *El Juguetillo*, in which he attacked Calleja, and on the imprisonment of Lizardi, the author of the *Pensador Mexicano*, he escaped a similar fate by flight to Zacatlan, then occupied by Osorno. He thence proceeded to Oajaca, where, having been appointed a brigadier and inspector general of cavalry by Morelos, he organized a regiment. But the battle-field was not Bustamante's province; and when the congress of Chilpancingo was inaugurated, Morelos appointed him deputy to represent Mexico. On the flight and dispersion of congress, Bustamante experienced great hardships, and on several occasions narrowly escaped with his life. Twice he attempted to embark at Nautla and escape to the U. S., but on both occasions was frustrated; and he was finally driven to accept the indulto March 8, 1817, at Plan del Rio. Having removed to Vera Cruz, he determined to carry out his intention of emigrating, but having embarked on board an English brig, August 11th, the captain of the port went on board and took him prisoner, lodging him in the castle of San Juan de Ulúa. Proceedings were instituted against him for attempting to leave the country without the permission of the government, and he was condemned to eight years' imprisonment. He remained in San Juan de Ulúa till February 1819, when the mariscal de campo, Pascual de Liñan, in command at Vera Cruz, released him and assigned that city as the place of his confinement. When the Spanish constitution was proclaimed in 1820, the criminal court included Bustamante in the amnesty proclaimed by the cortes. As soon as independence was achieved, he returned to the capital, where he arrived in Oct. 1821, after an absence of nine years. Bustamante then plunged deeper in politics than ever. When congress met in Feb. 1822, he took his seat as deputy for Oajaca, and was one of the members imprisoned by Iturbide. After the downfall of the empire he was again reelected, and was a member in all succeeding congresses until his death, which occurred Sept. 21, 1848, the disasters of his country in the war with the U. S. having doubtless hastened it. Bustamante married Doña Manuela Villaseñor, who died in Aug. 1846, and shortly afterward he entered into a second marriage with a young person whom he had educated and treated as a daughter.

Cárlos Bustamante was a man of no ordinary talent; but so ill balanced was his mind that he was constantly going astray. His ardent imagination and uncurbed enthusiasm, together with a childlike credulity, made him too much the tool of designing demagogues. As a statesman he was unswerving in his patriotism, but his fixed views only embraced the two broad and general principles of independence and republicanism. In all other respects he was variable and inconstant, and would desert his party for trifling causes. In his enmities, as well as his friendships, he was more consistent. He never forgave Iturbide for his neglect of the old revolutionists. Simple-minded and disinterested, his line of conduct was never guided by selfish motives or by greed of gain. In spite of his many errors, it can never be denied that his intentions were good.

The ruling passion of Bustamante was the publication of his works, for collecting material for which he had a mania. Archives were ransacked; doc-

uments were gathered in from all quarters; and persons were consulted who might throw light on particular events; while every dollar that he could spare outside the requirements of his household was devoted to pushing his works through the press. The most important of these is *Cuadro Histórico de la Revolución de la América Mexicana*. Mexico, 1823, 4 32. This production was commenced on the 15th of Sept., 1810, and was published in six small 4to volumes, the first of which was issued in 1823 and the last in 1832. No regular plan is observed in the *Cuadro Histórico*, which consists of a series of letters without order or regularity with regard to the sequence of events. The author seems merely to have added letter after letter as fast as he could gather material for the narration of incidents, whether they were connected or not. Although a vast amount of valuable documents are reproduced and a great many others referred to, his statements must always be taken with the utmost caution. He is in no sense a reliable author. Accepting without reflection any tale that fell in with his own views, many of the occurrences he relates are exaggerated, warped, or utterly false. But worse than this: Bustamante is not a thoroughly honest writer, and by the suppression of facts in some cases and the perversion of them in others, he lays himself open to the most serious censure. Other less heinous offences are noticeable in the *Cuadro Histórico*. Perorations are frequent, and the rancorous spirit and bitterness which they display do not make the perusal of them pleasing. With regard to style, it is easy, fluent, and clear; sometimes marked by a degree of elegance, but too often Bustamante's language is disfigured by low expressions; while the frequent occurrence of forensic and obsolete words exposes him to the charge of affectation. This work has been severely criticised by his countrymen, but no one has applied more ungenerous terms to it than Zavala, who qualifies it as a farrago of false, absurd, and ridiculous statements, while he charges the author with continual perversion of the truth, and with putting his country to shame by affording evidence of the want of candor and honesty in a writer of its annals. *Hist. Rev. Mex.*, 2. This attack elicited from Bustamante an equally sweeping and unjust condemnation of Zavala's work. In his indignation he gives that author the lie direct, and declares that he had written a history without knowing even the names of the principal persons who figure in it. *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. sup., Prol. vi., and p. 318-21. On the other hand, Mendiivil and Alaman speak in terms of high appreciation of the services rendered by Bustamante. And not without justice. The greatest credit is due to the member for Oajaca—for during his whole congressional career Bustamante was a deputy for that state, with rare exceptions—for the untiring zeal with which he prosecuted his literary labors during a life-time of political turmoil. Had he only possessed the qualities which would have enabled him to use rightly the large accumulation of authentic material which he succeeded in laying his hands on, he would have been the greatest Mexican historian of modern times. As it is, he can hardly be regarded as having advanced much beyond the grade of an industrious compiler.

A second edition of the *Cuadro Histórico* was issued in five 4to volumes, comprising 2,284 pages, during the years 1843 to 1846, inclusive. As a continuation to the above work, Bustamante published, in 1846, *Historia del Emperador D. Agustín de Iturbide*, an 8vo volume of 293 pages of text, with an index. This book displays the feelings with which the writer regarded that unfortunate leader. I have referred to various works of Bustamante in this and previous volumes, and to enumerate all the others would be uninteresting. Mention, however, must be made of *La Galería de Antiguos Principes Mexicanos*; *Mañanas de la Alameda, ó Conversaciones sobre la Historia Antigua de México*, Mexico, 1835 and 1836, 2 vols, which was published with the object of assisting the young women of Mexico in acquiring a knowledge of the history of their country; *El Gabinete Mexicano*, Mexico, 1842, being a history of President Bustamante's government from 1836 to the elevation of Santa Anna to the presidency; *Apuntes para la Historia del Gobierno de Victoria*; *Id. de Santa Anna*; and *La Aparición Guadalupeana de México*. Mexico, 1843. This last work illustrates the author's fanaticism, it being a defence of the

authenticity of the miraculous appearance of the virgin of Guadalupe, in disproof of the doubts cast upon it by Doctor Juan Bautista Muñoz in an essay which he read before the academy of history at Madrid in 1794.

Bustamante did not confine himself to original productions, but published a large number of the works of other authors, whose manuscripts he rescued from oblivion. The most notable of these are: *La Historia de Hernán Cortés*, which Bustamante began to publish in 1826, believing it to be an original unedited history in the Mexican language, written by Juan Bautista de San Anton Muñoz Chimalpan, a native Mexican. He soon discovered, however, that it was only a translation of Gomara's history. The same year he published in a 4to volume *El Descubrimiento de la América por Colón*, which he attributed to the Franciscan friar Vega, and *Texcoco en los Últimos Tiempos de sus Antiguos Reyes*, by Veitia. In 1832 he produced *Descripción de las dos Piedras Antiguas Mexicanas, que se Hallaron en la Plaza de México en 1790, con Ocasión del Nuevo Empeñado*, by Leon y Gama. Still later in 1841 he brought to light *Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en Nueva España*, by Padre Alegre. The historians of Mexico are greatly indebted to Bustamante for his discovery and publication of these and other valuable manuscripts, but it is to be lamented that he could not desist from interpolating in the text observations of his own, without distinguishing them from the original, and from suppressing portions that appeared to him of no value. Yet, where comparison of his publications with the originals has been possible, he has been proved frequently guilty of this literary crime. The littérateur José Fernando Ramírez has exposed his dishonesty in this respect, particularly in Sahagún's large work, which Bustamante published during 1829 and 1830, in three 4to volumes, the first under the title of *Historia de la Conquista de México*, pp. 350, and the two following containing respectively 397 and 339 pages, under that of *Historia General de las Cosas de Nueva España*. Sahagún's manuscript had lain for two centuries in the Franciscan library at Tolosa in Spain. Discovered by Juan Bautista Muñoz, Lord Kingsborough obtained a copy, and published it in London in 1830. Another copy had been obtained by Brigadier Diego García Panes and brought to Mexico. Bustamante availed himself of the latter. But Ramírez compared Bustamante's edition with that of Lord Kingsborough, and the discrepancies were found to be of the gravest importance, with every presumption in favor of the correctness of the London edition. I must not omit to mention the *Historia Civil y Política de México*, of Padre Andrés Cavo, written at Rome in the 18th century, and giving a chronological history of Mexico from the time of the conquest to 1766. This work might forever have remained unpublished had it not fallen into the hands of Bustamante, who brought it out in 1836-8 in four volumes, comprising 1,174 pages, under the title of *Los Tres Siglos de México durante el Gobierno Español hasta la Entrada del Ejército Triunfante*. The history is continued from June 1767 down to the independence in 1821, in a supplement written by the editor. Bustamante's zeal may be imagined when it is considered that to write this supplement he searched, according to his statement, 174 volumes of the secret correspondence of the viceroys. *Tres Siglos*, iii. sup., Prol. ii. In all Bustamante's publications of this class, he inflicts upon the reader a multitude of unnecessary notes of his own, many of them being useless or irrelevant.

Among the periodicals edited by Bustamante I may mention, besides those already alluded to, *La Abispa de Chilpancingo*, 1821-2; and *La Voz de la Patria*, 1831-2, which contains the history of presidents Victoria and Guerrero. He moreover published in other periodicals a multitude of articles on different subjects, besides innumerable separate pamphlets. His writings frequently exposed him to disagreeable consequences, and on more than one occasion were the cause of his being imprisoned.

Cárlos Bustamante was of medium height, with a pleasing expression of countenance. In early life he became bald and his hair turned gray, which gave him the appearance of being older than he really was. He spoke with great facility in public, but his voice was harsh and disagreeable. This fault,

together with his habit of introducing trivial ideas, had an unpleasant effect upon his audience, and not unfrequently while he was addressing the house the benches would become deserted. In 1833, being in danger of political persecution, he published in his defence his autobiography, under the title, *Hay tiempos de hablar y tiempos de callar*; and soon after his death an anonymous writer, 'un amigo de Don Carlos y mas amigo de la verdad,' issued *Noticias Biográficas del Licenciado D. Carlos María de Bustamante, y Juicio Crítico de sus Obras*, Mexico, 1849, pp. 56.

Manuel Larrainzar, in his *Algunas Ideas sobre la Historia*, supplies a brief sketch of Bustamante's life, with a short review of his principal works. Larrainzar treats him with more generosity and justice than many critics have done. He also informs us that the collection of Bustamante's works comprise 19,142 pages, and cost between \$40,000 and \$50,000. *Soc. Mex. Geog. Bolet.*, xi. 514-19. Bustamante kept a diary, in which all notable events were entered. Shortly before his death he deposited this manuscript in the archive of the apostolical college of Guadalupe at Zacatecas. It consisted of a great number of volumes—as many as 80 according to some—but the contents are of no unusual value, as all essential parts of it were used in his printed works. Most of Bustamante's manuscripts after his decease fell into the possession of José María Andrade, a publisher and bibliophilist of Mexico, who laid the foundation of what was intended by Maximilian to be the imperial library of Mexico. After the fall of that prince, the collection of books was transported to Europe and sold. Bustamante's manuscripts formed an interesting portion of this collection, and I fortunately secured most of them, including eight heavy 4to volumes of *Memorandum, ó sea Apuntes para escribir la historia de lo principalmente ocurrido en México, 1844 to 1847*; nine volumes of *Voz de la Patria*; four volumes of the *Gabinete Mexicano*; *Medidas para la Pacificacion de la América Mexicana*; the histories of Victoria's and Santa Anna's administrations, besides others. All these writings are in the author's own handwriting. They are much more complete than the printed works with which they correspond, or for which they supplied the material. But the most interesting is *México en 1848*, a fragment of 44 leaves written on both sides, and representing the last effort of this untiring worker. It contains a series of notes of the principal military and political events in Mexico during the middle of 1848. The first 38 leaves, with the exception of one, are in Bustamante's handwriting, then, as his strength failed, an amanuensis was employed. This fragment was begun March 17th, and ends abruptly on the 24th of June, barely three months before the author's death.

Manuel Rivera, *Historia Antigua y Moderna de Jalapa y de las Revoluciones del Estado de Vera Cruz*. Mexico, 1869-1871, 8vo, 5 vols. A history of Mexico, but confined principally to the state of Vera Cruz and the town of Jalapa. It begins with the occupation of the territory now called Vera Cruz, by the Ulmecas, previous to the arrival of Cortés, and concludes with the year 1868, by far the larger portion of the work being taken up with the period from 1808 down to the latter date. It was originally intended to divide the work into five parts, but this plan was not adhered to, as the 4th completes the work in vol. v. The promise, too, of an appendix of statistical information at the end is not carried out. Each chapter embraces three histories, namely, the national, the state history, and the local history of Jalapa; generally, but not always, in the above order. Numerous plates, chiefly portraits of governors of Vera Cruz, views, and plans of the principal towns, illustrate each volume. The author derived his information from the writings of Sahagun, Motolinia, Herrera, Betancourt, and Torquemada for the conquest; for the history of later times, from the work of Boturini and some others, who profited by the still fresh remains of Indian history; the works of Humboldt, and the *Diccionario de Geografía y Estadística*, by Orozco y Berra. For modern history, the writings of Alaman, Bustamante, and Zavala were consulted. The most interesting data, however, were derived from manuscripts furnished by the archives of some of the towns in the eastern part of the republic, and by pri-

vate individuals. Beginning with 1808 the years are printed on the margin of each page. As a rule, after 1809, each chapter includes the history of a single year, but otherwise there is much confusion, repetition, and want of connection. Public documents are not given, excepting in one or two instances, although the more important ones, as the constitutions of 1824 and 1857, etc., and the numerous plans and acts, are supplied in a condensed form. The author's style is concise and generally clear. In the first part of the work the general history is very much condensed, receiving more attention from the revolution of Morelos to that of Juarez of 1858-60, but gradually becoming condensed again in recording the latter events of the French intervention. The state and local history of Jalapa is given with the same degree of fullness throughout the first four vols, but in the fifth is more brief.

Juan Suarez y Navarro, Informe sobre las Causas y Carácter de los Frecuentes Cambios Políticos Ocurridos en el Estado de Yucatan, etc. Mexico, 1861, 4to, pp. 193. A report of General Suarez on the condition of Yucatan, drawn up by order of the Mexican government. The three subjects especially dealt with are the division of the peninsula into two states; the cause and character of the frequent political changes; and the sale of Indians as slaves to Cuban planters. This report contains much valuable information, more than 100 pages being occupied by official documents. Attention is first called to the comparative independence of Yucatan under the viceroys, the decline of the power of the priesthood, and consequent loss of property. Then follows a political and historical sketch of events during the period from 1829 to 1861, supported by documentary evidence. No details of battles are given, general mention of them only being made. As regards the question of Indians being sold as slaves, the fact appears fully established; as late as 1859 even captured Mexican soldiers were sold. Notice is, moreover, made of the condition of the highways, of the army, of education, agriculture, and the judicial courts. A brief historical sketch of Belize is added, with remarks upon its detrimental effect upon Yucatan by the introduction of contraband goods. Campeche is regarded as affording an asylum to Cuban slave-ships. Suggestions are made for the amelioration of affairs. The same author previously published, in 1850, *Historia de México y del General... Santa Anna*. It is stated on the title-page that events included in the period from 1821 to 1848 are narrated, but as they are only carried down to 1833 the book may be regarded as incomplete. The writer seeks to defend Santa Anna.

Luis Manuel del Rivero, Mejico en 1842, Madrid, 1844, sm. 8vo, pp. 321, is the production of an unprejudiced Spaniard. Though it would appear from the title-page that the work is a description of Mexico in 1842, the author gives a philosophical review of her history from the time of the conquest, portraying the social and political positions of the monarch, the Spanish aristocracy in Mexico, the church, and the native population; the gradual production of a great monarchical power, but at the same the development of a society democratic in its latent principles; the slowly increasing hatred of immigrant Spaniards by the creoles, and the ultimate result, the independence of the colony. The war of independence is cursorily but critically discussed; and then all branches of the community are in turn submitted to the same analysis. The intellectual and political faculties of the people are examined, their conditions detected and placed before the reader in a fair light.

Emil Karl Heinrich Freiherr von Richthofen, Die Aeusseren und Inneren Politischen Zustände der Republik von Mexico, etc. Berlin, 1854, 8vo, pp. 499. An account of the internal and external political condition of Mexico since the independence down to the year of date, by an ex-Prussian envoy and minister resident to the republic. The imprint seems to indicate that its publication was the work of the Prussian government, and apparently intended as a hand-book to modern Mexico. The title, gauged by the contents, is a little misleading, as the author devotes no space to the many events which make up the political history of the republic during the years covered by his volume, except, indeed, a list in chronological order of the administrations since

Iturbide. But his general information is various and pertinent; his book is a compend of useful information about Mexico, its resources, industries, general administration, church, army, etc., being succinctly treated of and intelligently grouped. His impulse as a writer is honest, judging, where he thinks that comments are opportune, the Mexican people with much insight. Except for a paragraph in his preface which points to considerable faith in Santa Anna, he seems to lean toward no party or opinion of the country he describes. As an appendix to his work, he gives copies of the constitution, with two reform acts, and a treaty with England.

Beltrami (J. C.), Le Mexique. Paris, 1830, 8vo, 2 vols, 443, 431 pp. Account of travels through Mexico. Beltrami was a royal counsellor and member of the medico-botanic society of London, and of other scientific associations. Ill health and the abolition of his court caused him to become a traveller; and as such he issued several works relating to his pilgrimage in Europe and America (see ii. 196-8, and other places), wherein he displays a republican and anti-church spirit. He promises other works on different countries in America. The present book is a continuation of *A Pilgrimage in Europe and America*, which does not pass outside of the U. S., and like that written in form of letters addressed from different places to a countess. He opens with the voyage from New Orleans to Tampico, whence he proceeds into the interior through San Luis Potosí and Querétaro to Guadalajara; thence by way of Guanajuato to Mexico City and Vera Cruz, when the work ends. During this trip he gives his observations on cities and country, on institutions, industries, manners and races, and political occurrences, interspersing the narrative with frequent learned allusions, analogies, and historic anecdotes. As a naturalist and savant he devotes attention to fine arts; as an anti-churchman he wages bitter warfare on the ignorant and immoral friars; and as a moralist he discourses on popular characteristics. His classic and other similes, and quotations in Latin, etc., are perhaps too frequent, but much useful information is given. The style is admirably suited for letters, and throughout runs the French piquancy which is always so attractive.

Mathieu de Fossey, Le Mexique. Paris, 1857, 8vo, pp. viii. and 281. The author entered Mexico with the Goatzacoalco colony, and remained in the country as a trader, travelling extensively through the republic in that capacity. He gives an account in this volume of his travels and residence in Mexico during the period from 1831 to 1856, describing in the easy French style the politics and people, the country and its resources; in fact, everything of interest that fell beneath his eye. Of good education and connections, he was able to form the acquaintance of prominent persons, and consequently to gain a higher insight into society and politics. Being a fair observer and vivacious writer, he has imparted zest and interest to his narrative. He rather flatters the Mexicans, and finds foreigners more objectionable than others; nor does he spare his own people. Where views are expressed, they appear impartial and sound. A second edition of his work was published in Paris in 1862. Fossey also published in Mexico in 1844 his *Viage á Méjico*, 12mo, pp. 339, originally written in French and translated into Spanish.

José Ferrer de Couto, Cuestiones de Méjico, Venezuela y América en General. Madrid, 1861, 8vo, pp. 660. This work contains much valuable historical and political matter. The author vindicates the administration of the Spaniards in the new world from the time of the discovery, and urges that the reorganization of Mexico should be effected by European intervention. Indeed, the whole work was written with that object. During the same year Ferrer published *Comentarios sobre la Cuestion de México*, a small work of 48 pages in pamphlet form, designed to be a supplement to the above. It contains the same political views with regard to the relations between Mexico and the U. S. After entering into an explanation of the different races and political parties in Mexico, and giving a brief sketch of events from the time of the independence, the writer proceeds to state his views regarding the

political events which took place in Mexico during the three years previous to the French intervention, condemning the action of the U. S. with respect to Mexico, and disapproving of the sluggish action of his own nation, Spain. A second edition of the large work was issued in 1862.

Bazancourt (*Baron de*), *Le Mexique Contemporain*. Paris, 1862, 12mo, 388 pp., map. A brief history of Mexico under republican rule, chiefly with a view to explain the causes and need for the allied intervention of 1861-2. The latter episode occupies the last 100 pages. The remaining pages, from 71 to 285, relate to the republican rule from 1821 to 1860. The previous pages are occupied with the revolution and conquest. The book is too brief in its outline to be of value for any but the intervention period.

Evaristo Escalera and Manuel Gonzalez Llana, *Méjico Histórico-Descriptivo, Seguido de la Crónica Militar de la Expedición Española*. Madrid, 1862, 8vo, pp. 336. An historical and descriptive account of the Mexican republic from a Spanish point of view. The revolution is briefly sketched; the relations with the U. S. are more fully entered into. Nearly one half of the volume is devoted to description of the country, its people and productions.

Fuller references for the last five chapters are: *Córtés, Diario Senado*, i.-ii. passim; *Id.*, *Diario Congreso*, i. passim, ii. 402-4, 754-5, 773, vi. passim; *Romero, Hist. Intr. Europ.*, 24-66, 84-94, 180-9, 225-30; *Id.*, *Bosquejo Hist.*, 26; *Id.*, *Tabla Sinóp.*, 1-78; *Id.*, *Sit. Méx.*, 3-12; *Suarez y Navarro, Informe*, 26-8, 65-107, 132-76; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, xi. 1, 997-1009, xiii. 873-86, xiv. 308-12, 1062, xv. passim; *Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Méx.*, ii. 185-90, iii. 143-9, vii.-ix. passim, x. 23-4, 268, 776-7; *Zurco, Hist. Congreso*, i.-ii. passim; *Méx., Col. Leyes Fund.*, 315-22, 353-79; *Id.*, *Col. Ley.*, *Dec. y Ord.*, iv. 31, vi. 102-3, 135-6, vii. 3-8, 12-13, 75, 84-5, 115, 134-5, 151, 187-95, viii. 37, 58-60, 288-9, 299-300, 331-2; *Id.*, *Col. Leyes*, 1861, i. 1-18, 201, ii. 19-60; *Id.*, *Legisl. Méj.*, 1854-6, passim; *Id.*, *Mem. Rel.*, 1873, annex no. 2, 71-3; *Id.*, *Mem. Guerra*, 1857, 1-134, and annexes 1-29; *Id.*, *Mem. Hacda*, 1857, 3-13, annex no. 149, pp. 531-2; *Id.*, 1868, annex no. 45, pp. 5-9; *Id.*, 1870, passim; *Id.*, *Mem. Fomento*, 1868, 6; *Archivo Méx., Col. Leyes*, i.-vi. passim; *U. S. Gort Doc.*, Cong. 33, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 109; *Sen. Jour.*, 920-1; *H. Jour.*, 1082; *Id.*, Cong. 35, Ses. 2, *Sen. Jour.*, 617; *Id.*, Cong. 36, Ses. 1, *Sen. Jour.*, 982-3, *Sen. Jour.*, 1-13, vol. ix.; *H. Ex.*, *Mess. and Doc.*, pt. i. 13-18, 36-51, pt. 16-17, 354-86; *Id.*, Cong. 36, Ses. 2, *Sen. Jour.*, 19-21, vol. i.; *Id.*, Cong. 37, Ses. 2, *Sen. Jour.*, 1, 50; *H. Ex.*, 50, 100, 120; *H. Jour.*, 1252; *Id.*, Cong. 38, Ses. 2, *Sen. Jour.*, 11, 33; *Id.*, Cong. 39, Ses. 1, *Sen. Jour.*, 17; *H. Ex.*, 73, 76; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 504, iii. 30, iv.-v. passim, vi. 828-9; *Id.*, *Gob. de Méx.*, ii. 435, 441, 453-642, 686; *Id.*, *Méx. Pint.*, 22, 27-8, 63-4, 226-7, 385-6; *Rosa, Ensayo*, 4-15; *Raigosa, Negocio promov.*, 1-116; *Rivero, Méx. en 1842*, 116-18; *Rosas Landa, Manifest.*, 1-64; *Revelador fidedigno*, 1-16; *Méx., Revol. contra Sta Anna*, passim; *Id.*, *Méx. Legacion Circ.*, i. 406-48, ii. 397; *Id.*, *Código Reforma*, 37-8, 62-9, 187-8, 197-200, 202-3, 211-13, 338-41, 361-2, 398; *La Razon*, Dec. 1857-Jan. 1858, passim; *El Eco de Occidente*, Apl. 13, 20, 27, May 2, 11, 1859; *Lefèvre, Le Mex. et l'Interv.*, passim; *Id.*, *Doc. Ofic. Maximo*, i. 23-9, 40-57, 69-125, 135-77, ii. 314-31; *Méx. Scraps*, ii. 47, 56-7, 63, 455; *Méx. y la Interv.*, 1-122; *Méx., La Interv. Europ.*, 1-8; *Mexique, L'Intervention Française* (Paris, 1868), 1-29, 39-49, 59-120; *Rosas, El Clero y las Revol.*, 1-11; *Méx., Diario Ofic.*, Mch. 31, 1870, 1-3; *Masseras, Essai d'Empire*, 1-30; *Cuadro Sinóp.*, fol. 3-7, in *Vega, Doc.: Dicc. Univ. Hist. Geog.*, x. 751-2; *Baz, Vida de Juarez*, 51-93, 104-8, 120-35, 189-228; *Id.*, *Ley de 12 de Julio de 1859*, 11-31; *Id.*, *Manifest.*, 1-16; *Graham's Mag.*, xlvii. 369-70, 464-5, xlviii. 175, 463; *Lazo Estrada, Oracion Civ.*, 1-16; *Brocklehurst's Méx.*, 63-4; *Dudas de un Estud.*, 1-26; *Martín, Précis*, 109-372; *El Español*, Apl. 6, 20, 23, 1853; *Coronado, Manifest.*, 1-15; *Nat. Dem. Quart. Rev.*, Mch. 1860, 236-46; *Payne's Hist. Europ. Col.*, 316-17; *Barbachano, Mem. Camp.*, 99-120, ap. 139-44; *Escalera y Llana, Méx. Hist. Descript.*, 141-5; *Nayarit, Los Pueblos del Est.*, 12; *Estado Mayor Gral. Ejér.*, 2, 4; *Hall's Life Max.* 1st, 26-8, 64-7; *El Constituc.*, Feb. 29, Apl. 13-14, June 8, 1868; *Adorno, Anál. Males Méx.*, 3-32, 144-52; *Gonzalez, Hist. Aguasc.*, 209-320; *Id.*, *Relac. Marcha Brigada*, 1-16;

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